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Torts and Damages 1. Introduction a. Classes of Torts (1156-1162 CC) i. Art. 1156.

An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. ii. Art. 1157. Obligations arise from: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Law; Contracts; Quasi-contracts; Acts or omissions punished by law; and Quasi-delicts.

iii. Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. iv. Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. v. Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book. vi. Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. vii. Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws. b. Distinction Between Damage and Damages i. Damage the loss, prejudice, or injury resulting from the act of a person ii. Damages compensation for such loss, prejudice, or injury 1. Moral 2. Exemplary 3. Nominal 4. Actual/Liquidated 5. Temperate/Moderate

Doctrines: 1. BLTB vs. CA Driver of motor vehicle presumed negligent if he was violating any trafc regulation at the time of the mishap, unless there is proof to the contrary. Employer is solidarily liable because under a contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passengers, to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers is attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. 2. Aboitiz Shipping vs. CA The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the point of destination and has left the vessel owners dock or premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time of a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 3. Dangwa Transport vs. CA It is duty of common carrier or passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyance while they are doing so. The victim, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger and is entitled to the right and protection pertaining to such a contractual relationship. 4. Imson vs. CA Dismissal of one defendant by virtue of a compromise agreement with the plaintiff results in the dismissal of all the defendants, including those in c. Distinctions Culpa Aquiliana/Contractual/Criminal (See Table)

1. Quasi-delict Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

a. Elements (2176 CC) i. Act or omission ii. Results in damage iii. There is fault or negligence iv. No pre-existing contractual relationship Doctrines: 1. Vergara vs. CA To sustain a claim based on a quasi-delict, the following requisites most concur: (1) damage suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose acts he must respond, and (3) connection of the cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 2. Andamo vs. IAC Article 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law, but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary, or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores and would only be entitled to the bigger award of the two. 3. FGU Insurance vs. CA Elements of quasi-delict. Vicarious liability of owners of motor vehicles is not applicable where there is no employer-employee relationship. 4. Equitable Lease vs. Suyom The registered owner of a vehicle is the lawful operator insofar as third persons are concerned and consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator

e. No Double-Recovery Rule (2177 CC) Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. i. A single act can give rise to two kinds of liability: 1. Civil liability for quasi-delict and 2. Liability for crime. Under crime, the defendant has two kinds of liability: a. Criminal liability

b. Civil liability Doctrines: 1. Virata vs. Ochoa Private prosecutor made a reservation to le a separate civil action for damages against the defendant for his criminal liability, but then withdrew it and then reserved the right again. The acquittal of the defendant on the criminal case is not bar to the prosecution of the civil case for damages based on quasi-delict. What is prohibited by law is double recovery for the same negligent act. In this case, one act is based on crime, and the other is based on quasi-delict. 2. Jarantilla vs. CA Offended party did not reserve right to institute separate civil action. Defendant acquitted because of reasonable doubt. Offended party institutes a civil action for damages based on the same subject matter and act complained as in the criminal case. Court decided it was valid because the there were separate two acts. The one instance where a civil action cannot be instituted after the dismissal of the criminal case is when such dismissal was accompanied by a statement of the court declaring that the act complained of never happened. 3. Atlantic Gulf vs. CA Damages awarded for different reasons, even if in the same case, do not constitute double recovery. 4. Cancio, Jr. vs. Isip One of the elements of res judicata is identity of cause of action. An independent civil action is separate and distinct from any criminal

1. Negligence (1173 CC) The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Article 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

a. Concept of Negligence Negligence is the want of care required by the nature of the obligation and the circumstances of the persons, time, and place Doctrines: 1. Picart vs. Smith The test for determining negligence: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom the negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition of this provision, is the constitutive fact of negligence. 2. Citytrust vs. IAC Banking is a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the duciary nature of their relationship. 3. Metrobank vs. CA Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. While the banks negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to the respondents, for which they are entitled to recover reasonable moral damages. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Temperate or moderate damages which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages may be recovered when the court nds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Moral and temperate damages, which are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, are not awarded to penalize the petitioner but to compensate the respondents for injuries suffered as a result of the formers fault and negligence, taking into account the latters credit and social standing. 4. FEBTC vs. Querimit The business of banks is impressed with public interest, the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of the family or of an ordinary business rm. The duciary nature of their relationship with their depositors requires them to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. A banks us under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. 5. Reyes vs. CA, FEBTC The exercise of extraordinary diligence by a bank applies only when the bank is acting in its duciary capacity. 6. Adzuara vs. CA Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. 7. Bayne Adjuster vs. CA Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation so demands. 8. Samson vs. BPI When the petitioner is not guilty of contributory negligence, he is entitled to moral damages.

g. Negligence as Proximate Cause i. Proximate Cause that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efcient supervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. It does not imply that which is nearest in point of time or relation, but rather the efcient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere pre-existing condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause. Doctrines: 1. Subido vs. Custodio - If two parties are both negligent, in combination, and they are the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort feasor, they are both solidarily liable. 2. Ridjo Tape vs. CA Notice of a defect need not be direct and express, it is enough that the same had existed for such a length of time that it is reasonable to presume that it had been detected, and the presence of a conspicuous defect which had existed for a considerable length of time will create a presumption of constructive notice thereof. Failure to discover the defect, if any, considering the length of time, may amount to inexcusable negligence. 3. Raynera vs. Heceta Drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another are presumed to be the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. The

4. Ermitao vs. CA Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen cards. 5. BPI Express Card vs. Olalia If a bank irregularly issues an extension card to a person, and it is used by an unauthorized party, the person cannot be legally made answerable. The bank is considered negligent, and it absolves the person of liability. 6. Benguet Electric vs. CA Where there is no municipal law or ordinance violated or there was no foreseeable danger posed, a driver is well within his right to park his vehicle within the area. He is not negligent. 7. St. Marys Carpitanos vs. CA According to Art. 219 of the Family Code, Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. For a person to be held liable under Art 219 of the Family Code, there must be a nding that the act or omission caused by the unimancipated minor considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. 8. Adriano vs. Pangilinan Respondent testied that he was engaged in the real estate business, including the grant of loans secured by real property mortgages. Thus, he is expected to ascertain the status and condition of the properties offered to him as collaterals, as well as to verify the identities of the persons he transacts business with. His failure to verify essential facts was the immediate cause of his predicament. His superior knowledge of the matter should have made him more cautious before releasing the loan and accepting the identity of the mortgagor.

Doctrines: 1. PLDT vs. CA A person claiming damages for negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be afrmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the rst instance of proving the existence of the same if contested otherwise his action must fail. 2. Food Terminal vs. CA Since negligence has been established, a persons liability for damages is inescapable. 3. German Marine vs. NLRC The facts sufciently established that there is no doubt that the failure of petitioners to provide private respondent with the necessary medical care caused the rapid deterioration and inevitable worsening of the latters condition, which eventually resulted in his sustaining a permanent disability. 4. Tan vs. Northwest Airlines If there is nothing in the conduct of a party which showed that he was motivated by malice or bad faith, he is not guilty of willful misconduct. 5. Morris vs. CA In awarding damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious, or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Where in breaching the contract of carriage, the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. Such liability does not include moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be recovered only where (a) the mishap results in the death of a passenger; and (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if it does not result in death. 6. Crisostomo vs. CA By denition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a xed price. The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is determinative of the degree of care required in the performance of the latters obligation under the contract. A party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation cannot take the place of evidence. h. Proof of Negligence

i.

Presumption of Negligence The plaintiff may invoke the following principles in order to impute presumed negligence on the defendant: (1) Res ipsa loquitor, (2) Respondeat superior, (3) Violation of trafc rules, (4) Common carrier, (5) Dangerous weapons and substances. In these cases, there is no need for the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent. There is a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant. It is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that he exercised the degree of care required by the circumstances. If he fails to prove this, he shall be liable for damages. i. Res ipsa loquitor Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant that the accident arose from want of care. 13. Elements a. The thing which caused the injury is under the exclusive control of the defendant b. Ordinarily such event will not happen unless there is negligence

Doctrines: 1. Africa s. Caltex Denition of res ipsa loquitor 2. F.F. Cruz vs. CA Petitioners were not merely presumed negligent, the fact that they failed to obey a city ordinance combined with their actions showed negligence or want of care. 3. Mao-ao Sugar Central vs. CA Res ipsa loquitor applicable to petitioners. They cannot disclaim liability on the ground of Article 2176 contending it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. The decedent cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence, because it of pure speculation. 4. Batiquin vs. CA Under this doctrine, the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of the defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. 5. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Though expert testimony is usually needed to prove malpractice, where common knowledge and experience teach that the injury would not have occurred if due care had been exercised; the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can be invoked to establish negligence. The elements of res ispa loquitor are (1) the accident will not normally occur unless someone is negligent, (2) the instrumentality which caused the injury was under the control of the person in charge, and (3) the injury was not due to the voluntary act of the person injured. c. Defendant fails to give an explanation for the happening of the event

xvii.Respondeat Superior (1733, 1755-1756, 1759 CC) It means let the employer/principal be responsible. Under this principle, if the negligence of the employee has been proved, there is no need to prove the negligence of the employer. The employer is already presumed negligent in the hiring and/or supervision of the employee. This presumption is, however, rebuttable and not conclusive. The doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable not only to common carriers but to other instances where an employee or agent, not necessarily of a common carrier, is negligent. 1. Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756. 2. Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. 3. Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. 4. Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. Doctrines: 1. City of Manila vs. IAC With respect to property functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto. The superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Maintenance of cemeteries is recognized as a municipal activity of a proprietary character. 2. Viron Transpo. vs. Santos The driver of an overtaking vehicle must see to it that the conditions are such that an attempt to pass is reasonably safe and prudent, and in passing must exercise reasonable car. It is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. 3. Calalas vs. CA It does not matter that a third persons act was the proximate cause of the injury. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only to quasi-delicts. In breach of contracts, it is sufcient to show that there is a contractual relation between the parties and the common carrier failed to transmit the passengers safely. There is no fortuitous event when the dangers could have been foreseen and avoided. 4. Ramos vs. CA In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of services, (2) payment of wages, (3) the power to hire and re; and (4) the power to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the means to be used in reaching such an end.

xviii.Violation of Trafc Rules (2184-85 CC) 1. Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating trafc regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. 2. Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafc regulation. 3. The driver is disputably presumed negligent if: a. He had been found guilty of reckless driving at least twice within the next preceding two months; b. He had been found guilty of violating trafc regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months; and/or c. At the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafc regulation.

Doctrines: 1. Mallari vs. CA A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed of he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. 2. BLTB vs. IAC The negligence and recklessness of a driver is binding on the common carrier employer. The employer is solidarily liable with its driver even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi-delict and that of the employer is from a contract. 3. Manuel vs. CA The fact that the respondent had no driving license could not exempt petitioners liability because they were the parties at fault. 4. Aguilar vs. Commercial Bank The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not for public service, is primarily responsible to third persons, for deaths, injuries, and damages it caused. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be xed on a denite individual, the registered owner. The registered owner, the defendant appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but the defendant-appellant has a right to be indemnied by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellee.

xix.Common Carrier (1734 CC) 1. Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; c. Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; e. Order or act of competent public authority. Doctrines: 1. DSR Lines vs. Federal Fire is not one of those enumerated under Art. 1734 which exempts a carrier from liability for loss of destruction of the cargo. Since re is not comprehended within the exceptions in Art. 1734, then the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. Even if it were to be considered a natural disaster within the purview of Art. 1734, it is required under Art. 1739 that (1) the natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss and that (2) the carrier has exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence of the disaster. 2. Delsan vs. CA The emergency rule provides that one who suddenly nds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt, what subsequently and upon reection, may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in which he nds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Employers should exercise due diligence in the selection and supervising of its employees. 3. Singapore Airlines vs. Fernandez The aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.

xx. Dangerous Weapons and Substances (2188 CC) Defendant is disputably presumed negligent if death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances. The defendant may invoke the defense that possession or use of such dangerous weapons or substances is indispensable in his occupation or business. 1. Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as rearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. 2. R.A. 6969 Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990 a. Hazardous substances are substances which present either: i. Short-term acute hazards, such as acute toxicity by ingestion, inhalation or skin absorption, corrosivity or other skin or eye contact hazards or the risk of re or explosion; or ii. Long-term environmental hazards, including chronic toxicity upon repeated exposure, carcinogenicity (which may in some cases result from acute exposure but with a long latent period), resistance to detoxication process such a biodegradation, the potential to pollute underground or surface waters, or aesthetically objectionable properties such as offensive odors. iii. Hazardous wastes are hereby dened as substances that are without any safe commercial, industrial, agricultural or economic usage and are shipped, transported or brought from the country of origin for dumping or disposal into or in transit through any part of the territory of the Philippines. Hazardous wastes shall also refer to by-products, side-products, process residues, spent reaction media, contaminated plant or equipment or other substances from manufacturing operations, and as consumer discards of manufacture products. iv. Nuclear wastes are hazardous wastes made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incidental to the production or utilization of nuclear fuels but do not include nuclear fuel, or radioisotopes which have reached the nal stage of fabrication so as to be usable for any scientic, medical, agricultural, commercial, or industrial purpose. Doctrine: 1. Smith Bell Shipping vs. Borja Petitioners vessel was carrying chemical cargo. While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous inammable chemicals, its ofcers and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was therefore negligent.

j.

Defenses When the defendant is presumed negligent, he may invoke the following defenses: (1) Contributory negligence, (2) Assumption of risk, (3) Last clear chance, (4) Prescription, (5) Fortuitous event, (6) Diligence, (7) Mistake and waiver, (8) Others i. Contributory negligence (2179 CC) When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. 1. Two Cases provided for in 2179 a. The defendant can show that the immediate and proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of the plaintiff himself. In this case, the defendant is not liable at all.

b. The defendant can also show that although the proximate cause of the injury was the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff also contributed to the injury with his own negligence. In case of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant is still Doctrines: 1. Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed equivalent for his own imprudence. 2. Taylor vs. Manila Electric While it may be true that the injuries would not have been incurred were it not for the negligent acts of the defendant, the plaintiffs own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inicted the injury. Therefore there is no contributory negligence. 3. Phoenix vs. IAC There is no doubt that the reckless parking of the truck was the indispensable and efcient cause of the accident, but Dionisios negligence, although later in point of time than the truck drivers negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efcient intervening or independent cause it was merely a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck had parked behind the dump truck. liable, but his liability may be mitigated by the court. 2. A court held that a child below 9 years old is incapable of contributory negligence.

Doctrines: 4. LBC Air Cargo vs. CA Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do is chargeable with the consequences thereof. In this case, the incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed. Therefore, the doctrine is not applicable. 5. Jargo Marketing vs. CA Child below 9 years old incapable of contributory negligence. 6. Ilusorio vs. CA A mistake is not equivalent to negligence if it was an honest mistake, if it was not deliberate, and if the person who committed the mistake took all the necessary precautions. Where the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, no recovery could be had for damages.

xxii.Assumption of Risk (1174 CC) Except in cases expressly specied by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Doctrines: 1. Alada vs. Hisole Art.2183 provides that, The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall ceas only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. In this case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously it was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. 2. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. 3. Co vs. CA Persuant to Articles 1174 and 1262, which states that, An obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred in delay. When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable even for fortuitous events, the loss of the thing does not extinguish the obligation, and he shall be responsible for damages. The same rule applies when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. liability attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event if the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. 4. Erquiga vs. CA A basic premise of the doctrine of let the buyer beware is that there be no false representation by the seller. 1. It involves an action to which one consents, and the injury suffered is due to a risk involved in that action.

xxiii.Last Clear Chance A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person, imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Negligence of the plaintiff

does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. Even though a persons own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. 1. Elements a. Prior negligence on the part of the plaintiff b. Defendant is aware of the plaintiff c. Defendant had the last clear chance/opportunity to avoid the peril by taking the necessary precaution, but failed to do so d. Accident occurs because of the negligence of the defendant

Doctrines: 1. Picart vs. Smith The change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away, and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Plaintiff himself was not free from fault. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the negligence of the other party. 2. Bustamante vs. CA The last clear chance doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligation. 3. McKee vs. IAC Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly nds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat his claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the negligence of said party. 4. PBCom vs. CA The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the on who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. 5. Canlas vs. CA The doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest, the bank has to bear the loss sued upon.

xxiv.Prescription 1. Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years: a. Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, b. upon a quasi-delict. However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public ofcer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention, and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year. 29. Discovery Rule The four year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date when the tortuous act was committed. But according to the discovery rule, if the injury is discovered after the four year period, the reckoning point is the date of discovery and not the date of commission of the act. 30. Consumer Act of the Philippines The consumer may sue not only the manufacturer but also the importer and seller for defective product, design, packaging, and lack of information. The prescriptive periods for bringing the actions are:

a. If the defect is apparent: 4 years from purchase b. If the defect is hidden: 2 years from the purchase or discovery of the hidden defect 31. Prescription vs. Laches Prescription Statute of Limitations Fact of delay Matter of time Fixed time The extinction of a right to le an action after the lapse of a denite period of time. Laches Equity Effect of delay Question of equity of permitting a claim to be enforced Relative The inaction of someone who has a right, and the failure to exercise this right.

Doctrines: 1. Capuno vs. Elordi The time when the prescriptive period of 4 years shall begin to run for quasi-delicts is from the day the action may be brought. This means the day the quasi-delict occurred, or was committed, in this case, when the accident happened. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action for quasi-delict. An independent civil action could have been eld by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent and the same would not have been stayed by the ling of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. 2. Callanta vs. Carnation An action for damages involving a plaintiff separated from his employment for alleged unjustiable causes is one for injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within 4 years. The period of prescription under Art. 292 of the Labor Code, refers to and is limited to money claims, all other cases of injury for rights of a workingman being governed by the Civil Code. Ones employment, profession, trade, or calling has long been classied as a property right and which cannot be deprived of without due process of law, hence the action instituted to contest the legality of ones dismissal from employment constitutes, in an essence, an action predicated upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. 3. Allied Bankin vs. CA A third party complaint is a procedural device whereby a third-party who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. Since the claim is based on tortuous interference, which is a quasi-delict, the complaint should have been led within four years from the time the cause of action accrued, or four years after the order of liquidation. It is an established rule that it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party, when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. 4. Delos Reyes vs. CA A cause of action, being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such right is violated. The only remedy of an owner who was fraudulently deprived of his land, which was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value, is to le an action for damages against the person who perpetrated the fraud within four years after the discovery of the deception.

xxv.Fortuitous events The requisites of a fortuitous event as a defense are: (1) The event must be unforeseen, or if foreseen, inevitable; (2) There must be no concurrent negligence on the part of the offended party. Doctrines: 1. Bayasen vs. CA No negligence as a matter of law can be charged to the driver if he was not driving at an unreasonable speed in the occurrence of an unforeseen event. 2. NAPOCOR vs. CA It is not enough that the event could not have been foreseen or anticipated, but it must be one impossible to foresee or avoid. As a general rule, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable. In the Act of God doctrine, the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the Acts of God. 3. NAPOCOR vs. CA If upon the happening of a fortuitous event, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Art. 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the Act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an Act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or damage might have been occasioned. 4. PAL vs. CA The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages. Petitioners acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers and in discriminating against the respondent. They cannot claim the defense of fortuitous event. 5. Cipriano vs. CA It is immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event since it was petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss. There is a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the re in this case may be considered a fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss

Doctrines: 6. Yobido vs. CA When a passenger is injured or dies, while traveling, the law presumes that the common carrier is negligent. In culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence, or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. The court need not make an express nding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages sought by the passenger. A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone, the common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. The defense of fortuitous event cannot apply in this case since there were human factors involved in the situation. 7. JAL vs. CA Common carriers are not absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. When a party is unable to fulll his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non performance. But if the fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carriers employees, an action for damages against the carrier is permissible.

xxvi.Diligence (Last paragraph of 2180 CC) The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Doctrines: 1. Walter Smith vs. Cadwallader The presumption of liability has been overcome by the exercise of care and diligence of a good father of a family therefore there can be no liability. 2. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water The person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees. The employer will not be held liable if it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision over its employees, and if he had observed the diligence required by law, and that he had taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger. 3. Fabre vs. CA Negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption that his employers, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision for their employee. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualications, experience, and record of service. The rule on common carriers makes no distinction between one who is a principal business activity is the carrying of a persons or goods both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity, neither does it make a distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular basis, scheduled basis, or one offering occasional, episodic, or unscheduled basis, neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public and one who offers service only to a narrow segment of the population. 4. PBCom vs. CA An antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. 5. Reyes vs. CA, FEBTC The rule that a bank, due to the nature of its relationship with the client, must exercise extraordinary diligence applies only when the bank is acting in its duciary capacity. If the relationship between the bank and the client was merely that of seller and buyer, the bank need only exercise the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family. 6. Crisostomo vs. CA By denition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from pne place to another for a xed price. Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and are classied as private or special carriers and common or public carriers. A common carrier is dened under Art. 1732 of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, rms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land , water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. The nature of the contractual relation between tow parties is determinative of the degree of care required in the performance of the obligation under the contract. Since the contract in this case is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care required is only that of a good father of a family.

xxvii.Mistake and Waiver

1. Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. Mistake as to the identity or qualications of one of the parties will vitiate consent only when such identity or qualications have been the principal cause of the contract. A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction. 2. For a waiver to be valid and effective a. It must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy, or good customs b. It must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benet which legally pertains to him Doctrines: 1. Doctrines: Spouses Theis vs. CA Article 1390 of the Civil Code provides that the contracts where the consent is vitiated by mistake are annullable. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. The concept of error includes (1) ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing, and (2) mistake which is a wrong conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence of some fact, circumstance, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. 2. Gatchalian vs. Delim A waiver may not be casually attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person. 3. Phil. Carpet vs. PC Marketing As a rule, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either, (1) reinstatement with backwages, or (2) separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing the same by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. It is the employer who has the burden of proving that the quitclaim was voluntarily entered into by him. If consent to the quitclaim was vitiated by mistake or fraud, it cannot be deemed as being voluntary and freely given. There being no valid quitclaim, the employee is entitled to receive the benets granted to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. 4. Dapar vs. Biascara The usurpation of name under Art. 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows, (1) there is an actual use of anothers name by the defendant, (2) the use is unauthorized, and (3) the use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person. The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined, it is the use thereof coupled with the representation that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wifes status, which gives rise to an action for damages.

xxviii.Others Doctrines: 1. Simon vs. David Privileged communications are divided into two classes: (1) Absolute and (2) conditional or qualied privilege, the second being called quasi privilege. In cases of absolute privileged communications, the occasion is an absolute bar to the action; whereas, in cases of conditionally or qualiedly privileged communications, the law raises only a prima facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former class, the freedom from liability is said to be absolute or without condition, regardless of the existence of express malice, as contrasted with such freedom in the latter class where it is said to be conditioned on the want or absence of express malice. An absolutely privileged communication is one for which, by reason of the occasion on which it is made, no remedy is provided for the damages in a civil action for slander or libel. It is well settled that the law recognizes this class of communications, which is so absolutely privileged that even the existence of express malice does not destroy the privilege although there are some dicta denying the rule, and some eminent judges, in dealing with particular applications of the rule have doubted or questioned the rationale or principle of absolutely privileged communications. As to absolutely privileged communications, a civil action for libel or slander is absolutely barred. Qualied privilege exists in a larger number of cases than does absolute privilege. It relates more particularly to private interests, and comprehends communications made in good faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter, in which the author of the communication has an interest, or in respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or private, either legal, judicial, political, moral, or social, made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. Briey stated, a qualiedly privileged communication is a defamatory communication made on what is called an occasion of privilege without actual malice, and as to such communications there is no civil liability, regardless of whether or not the communication is libelous per se libelous per quod. In the case of communications qualiedly privileged, there must be both an occasion of privilege and the use of that occasion in good faith.

Doctrines: Apart from the occasion in which or the matter in reference to which it is made, what distinguishes an absolutely privileged communication from one which is only qualiedly privileged is, therefore, that the latter is actionable upon proof of actual malice, whereas its existence does not affect the exemption attached to the former, provided that, in the case of judicial proceedings, the derogatory statements in questions are pertinent, relevant or related to or connected with the subject matter of the communication involved. It is thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions, and motions, belong to the class of communications, that are absolutely privileged. 2. Malit vs. People Parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case. Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of judicial proceedings are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry, the same may be considered privileged communication and the counsel, parties, or witnesses therein are exempt from liability. Absolute privilege In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even if it be alleged and provided that the words were spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice. The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. 2. Proline Sports vs. CA There was no malicious prosecution. The elements of malicious prosecution are (1) absence of probable cause and (2) legal malice on the part of the defendant. A resort to judicial processes is not per se evidence of ill will upon which a claim for damages may be based; malice is an inexcusable intent to injure, oppress, vex, annoy, or humiliate. The exercise of a legal right does not make a party liable for damages. 3. Amonoy vs. Gutierrez Damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons right is a loss without injury damnum absque injuria for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises ones rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages. This, however does not apply if the person exercising the right abuses the right or the invalidly exercises the right. 4. Mariscal vs. CA In litis pendentia what is essential is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. In his effort to have the case resolved in a different venue, petitioner has resorted to nit-picking and in the process has lost track of the real issue besetting the 2 actions. A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or party would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules. 5. Sycip, Jr. vs. CA The elements of B.P. No. 22 are (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufcient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufcient funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case, would be misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. This does not sufce to prove the second element of the offense under B.P. No. 22, which explicitly requires evidence of knowledge of insufcient funds by the accused at the time the check or checks are presented for encashment. 2. Spouses lim vs. Uni-Tan The immediate execution of a judgment favorable to the plaintiff is mandated, and the courts duty to order it is practically ministerial. There is no basis for petitioners claim for damages because respondent was in the lawful exercise of its right at the time of the execution sale. Those who exercise their rights properly do no legal injury. If damages result from their exercise of their legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria a loss without injury, for which the law gives no remedy. 3. Ramos vs. CA The hospitals obligations is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor, the equipment and facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctors orders are carried out strictly. No evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner was due to a failure on the part of respondent to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for treatment.

1. Vicarious Liability (2180 2182 CC) a. Provisions i. Art. 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. 1. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. 2. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. 3. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. 4. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. 5. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the ofcial to whim the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable. 6. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. xxx.Art. 2181 Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. xxxi.Art. 2182 If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardians, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. a. Parents and Guardians i. R.A. 6809 An Act Lowering the Age of Majority From 21 to 18 Years amended Article 234 of the Family Code. Art. 234 now reads as follows. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years. Effects of

emancipation: Terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualied and responsible for all acts of civil life, except: 1. Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of 21. 2. Parents and guardians are still responsible for their children and wards below 21 years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Doctrines: 1. Cuadra vs. Monfort The basis of vicarious liability in also fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter becomes himself liable under Art. 2180. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. In this case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the father could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, if the act was caused by it, therefore, he cannot be held liable. 2. Elcano vs. Hill While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, and under Art. 397 of the Civil Code, emancipation takes place by the marriage of a minor child. It is also clear that pursuant to Art. 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. The minor emancipated by marriage can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother, or guardian. Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. This includes a married minor, living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. The reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Art. 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Art. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. 3. Libi vs. IAC The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists of the instruction and supervision of the child. It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children as contemplated in Art. 2180 is primary and not subsidiary. This is because if it were merely subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages, whereas

Doctrines: if it were primary, diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. The parents are and should be held primarily liable for civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company unless it is proven that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages.

Doctrines: 1. Heirs of Delos Santos vs. CA Art. 587 of the Code of Commerce. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for indemnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of goods which he loaded on the vessel, but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipments and the freight it may have earned during the voyage. Under this provision, a shipowner or agent has the right of abandonment, and his liability is conned to that which he has a right to abandon the vessel with all her equipments and the freight it may have earned during the voyage. However, this article applies only where the fault or negligence is committed solely by the captain. In cases where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed, Art. 587 does not apply. The situation will instead be covered by the provisions of the Civil Code on Common Carriers. 2. St. Francis High vs. CA Under Art. 2180, before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. If the employee was not in actual performance of his assigned task, the employer cannot be held liable. If teachers exercised the diligence of a good father. 3. Go vs. IAC The bank is responsible for the acts of its employees unless there is proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The burden of proof lies upon the bank and it cannot disclaim liability in view of its own failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage, but that it was not negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. 4. PSBA vs. CA Art. 2180, in conjunction with Art. 2176, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It provides that damage should have been caused or inicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. One of these obligations is that the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. To avoid liability, the school must prove that the breach of this contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence. 5. Jose vs. CA While the allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180, the failure to prove the employees negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employers vicarious liability. c. Owners and Managers of Enterprises

d. Employers Doctrines: 1. Franco vs. IAC Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and the employers primary liability under the CC, which is quasi-delictual or tortuous in character. The rst type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the RPC, which provide that employers have subsidiary liability in default of their employees who commit felonies in the discharge of their duties. The second kind is governed by Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code on the vicarious liability of employers for the damage caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. In this second kind, the employers liability ceases upon proof that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Under Art. 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer is subsidiary to the liability of the employee. Before the employers subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action where the employees criminal negligence are proved. Without such criminal action being instituted, the employees liability cannot be predicated under Aticle 103. If the accused employee dies, then the criminal action against him is extinguished, therefore, there is no basis for the employers subsidiary liability, without the employees primary liability. The liability being sued upon becomes based on culpa aquilian, and the defense of diligence of a good father of a family may be raised by the employer. 2. China Airlines vs. CA The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 may not apply if the relationship is one of agency, an exception to this rule is where the agent is being sued for damages arising from a tort committed by his employee. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of such employer, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The burden is on the employer to adduce sufcient proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. The remedy of the employer is to demand reimbursement from the employee for the amount it will have to pay. 3. Go vs. IAC The bank, through its employees, may be held liable for gross negligence in handing business transactions involved. The bank is primarily liable with the employee if it not only failed to show that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage, but also that it was not negligent in the selection and supervision of the employee.

Doctrines: 4. Castilex vs. Vasquez An employee is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks, whether or not the employer is engaged in any business or industry. To make the employer liable, the plaintiff must (1) establish an employer-employee relationship, and (2) show that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. Once the plaintiff has shown these, the presumption of negligence of the employer arises, and the employer may interposed the defense of the due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. If the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned task, then the employer need not show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee. 5. Jose vs. CA For the presumption of the employers negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees to arise, the negligence of the employee must rst be established. The failure to prove the employees negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employers vicarious liability. 6. Victory Liner vs. Malecdan Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees acting within the scope of their assigned task, only if they can show that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. They have the burden of proving that they exercised such diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be show by concrete proof, including documentary evidence. 7. Delsan vs. CA It is not enough that the employees chosen to be competent and qualied, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees. The employer must present evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of the functions of its employees, and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith. 8. Cerezo vs. Tuazon The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103 of the RPC, or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the CC. an aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action. Under Art. 2180, the employee is not an indispensable party to an action for damages based on quasi-delict, because the liability of the employer is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. When the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary because complete relief is available from either party. 9. Yambao vs. Zuiga When an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. For an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satised with the applicants mere possession of a professional drivers license, he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualications, his experience and record of service. 10. Spouses Hernandez vs. Dolor The liability of tortfeasors is solidary. Under Art. 2180, an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee. This may be inferred from the wordings of Art. 2180, which states that the obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

e. State i. General Rule: The State cannot be sued without consent ii. Exceptions: 1. When the state is performing a proprietary function 2. When the state enters into a contract with a private person 3. Under Art. 2180 when it acts through a special agent

Doctrine: 1. Meritt vs. Government The states agent, if a public ofcial, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task, but such task must be foreign to said ofcials usual governmental functions. If the states agent is not a public ofcial, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the state assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agents tort. When the government commissions a private individual for a special government task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. When the state is performing governmental functions, it is immune from tort liability. When the state performs a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and when it collects revenues therefrom, the state is performing a proprietary function. It is in this instance where there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. If the agency of the government is exercising proprietary functions, it may be liable for damages caused by accidents resulting from the tortuous acts of its employees. It assumes responsibility as an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages, if it fails to prove that it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

f.

Teachers/Heads of Establishments

Doctrines: 1. Palisoc vs. Brillantes There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school. The phrase used in Art. 2180 so long as they (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the students for as long as they are at attendance in the school and include recess time. The responsibility of teachers and school ofcers under Art. 2180 is not limited to pupils who are minors. It is with signicance that teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers, and the state. The law provides that the authority and supervision over the children and wards of parents and guardians ends when they (children and wards) reach the age of majority. 2. Amadora vs. CA Art. 2180 should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the rst part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. The student is deemed in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and inuence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. During all these occasions, it is the teacher in charge who must answer for his students torts. He is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervisions over the pupils in the specic classes or sections to which they are assigned. It should be noted that the liability imposed by this article Is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but when it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. It should also be noted that the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the students age. If a party was only exercising a general authority over the student body, and not the direct control and inuence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections, he cannot be held liable under Art. 2180. As long as the teacher can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from liability. 3. Salvosa vs. IAC Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis (as to the student) and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.