LIABILITY FOR MULTIPLE ELEMENTS PENALTY: penalty for the most serious crime applied in its maximum period

COMPLEX CRIMES -at least two crimes are committed -a complex crime is only one crime; only one penalty is imposed Two kinds: 1. COMPOUND CRIME: a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies 2. COMPLEX CRIME PROPER: offense is necessary means for committing the other 1.COMPOUND a. only one single act is performed by the offender b. produces (1) 2 or more grave felonies (2) one or more grave felonies and one or more less grave felonies (3) two or more less grave felonies GUILLEN: Single act: throwing hand grenade Product: murder and multiple attempted murder TWO OR MORE GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE FELONIES. -Light felonies produced by the same act: (1)treated and punished as separate offenses (several light felonies) or (2) absorbed by the grave felony. Applicable to crimes through negligence. 2.COMPLEX CRIME PROPER a.at least two offenses are committed b. one or some of the offenses: necessary to commit the other c. all of the offenses are punishable under same statute. Necessary means =/= Indispensable means Indispensable: ingredient of the crime (part of act/s of execution) The offender, in executing various acts, must have a single purpose. There is NO complex crime... -when in the definition of a felony one offense is a means to commit the other (murder qualified by means of fire which by itself is arson) -when one offense is committed to conceal the other (not necessary means) -when one of the offenses is penalized by a special law (example: homicide and illegal possession of firearms) -when two or more crimes are committed but a) not by a single act or b) one is not a necessary means for committing the other -of rebellion with murder, arson, robbery or other common crimes SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES PLURALITY OF CRIMES Successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of which no conviction has yet been declared. KINDS: 1.FORMAL OR IDEAL- one criminal liability a) complex crimes under art 48 b) law specifically fixes a single penalty for two or more offenses committed (ex: robbery with homicide) c) continued crime 2.REAL OR MATERIAL- there are different crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender -recidivism (there must be conviction with final judgment) CONTINUED CRIME: a single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution -set foot by a single impulse -NOT a complex crime: offender does not commit only a single act but a series of acts -not being a complex crime, the penalty should not be imposed in its maximum period TRANSITORY CRIME: different from continued in criminal procedure to determine venue - moving crime GRAVE FELONIES 1.To which the law attaches capital punishment (death penalty) 2.Penalties in which any of their periods are afflictive (reclusion perpetua, temporal, perpetual or temporary absolute or special disqualification, prision mayor) LESS GRAVE FELONIES 1.Penalities which in their maximum are correctional (Prision correccional, arresto mayor, suspension, destierro) LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL LAWS -special legal provisions intended prevail over general ones -special law: statute enacted by the Legislature, penal in character, which is not an amendment to the RPC.

y People vs Abella (1979) Inmates on one side of the floor attacked the inmates on the other side. They locked the cell so that no one could enter or get out. 14 people died. After the pleadings and trials, eventually, 37 inmates were sentenced to death. Counsels of the accused say that TC erred in saying that there was conspiracy among them, and SolGen says that instead of the 37 death penalties, there should have only been 14 death sentences. So the issue is, are they guilty of a complex crime or not? SC held that yes, they are guilty because based on the ruling of a precedent case delos Santos: Ruling based on the theory that: when, for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense and various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense, a complex one. And in another precedent case Lawas: the killing was held to be only one complex offense of multiple homicide because it resulted from a single criminal impulse and it was not possible to determine how many victims were killed by each of the accused. ISSUE: Are they guilty of a complex crime? HELD: Yes. RATIO: y After a perusal of the confessions, SC finds that their admission of guilt is corroborated by evidence of the fact that the massacre described actually took place. y Re: argument of the counsels (2nd to the last bullet of the facts) y Conspiracy can logically be inferred from the simultaneous and concerted acts of the 16 raiders who, after putting down the guard and entering the big cell, joined and combined forces with their co-attackers, inmates of the big cell who were waiting for the go signal to begin the attack in pursuance of their criminal objective. y The trial court added that the acts and conduct of the accused from the start of their aggression until the attack was suppressed were characterized "by a swift, united and concerted movement that could easily indicate a community of purpose, closeness of association and concurrence of will y The accused had deliberately planned the attack as shown by the manner in which they executed the massacre y Re: SG argument y Precedent: In the De los Santos case, which involved 2 riots wherein 9 prisoners were killed, the 14 members of the gang who took part in the killing were convicted of multiple murder (a complex crime) and not of 9 separate murders. y Ruling in delos Santos was predicated on the theory that: when, for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense, a complex one y Precedents to delos Santos:

People vs. Cabrera: 77 Constabularymen murdered 6 policemen and 2 private citizens and gravely wounded 3 civilians, they were convicted of multiple murder with grave injuries, a complex crime. People vs. Sakam: 19 Moros, forming part of a band of 100, massacred 14 Constabularymen. They were charged and convicted of multiple murder, a complex crime. People vs. Lawas: When on a single occasion around 50 Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards (formerly Constabulary soldiers), the killing was held to be only one complex offense of multiple homicide because it resulted from a single criminal impulse and it was not possible to determine how many victims were killed by each of the accused People vs. Manantan: 80 persons stationed on both sides of the fired at the group of riding in 5 cars. 5 persons were charged with multiple murder, a complex crime the case as to 3 of the accused was dismissed on the ground that their confessions were taken after they had been tortured. The conviction for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, as a complex crime, qualified by treachery (absorbing abuse of superiority and cuadrilla and aggravated by quasi-recidivism and evident premeditation (offset by plea of guilty) and recidivism, as to some accused, as shown in the record, should be affirmed.

Enrile vs Salazar (1990) Topic: Complex crime Art. 48, Art 9 (1) (2) Short version: Enrile was arrested. The warrant charges him, along with 2 others with the crime of murder. They are debating on the applicability of the Hernandez ruling to this case, and also an issue is w/n they are guilty of a complex crime. Court said no, because court cannot make a new crime (rebellion complexed with murder) because that function is exclusively for congress. Long version: y Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by officers led by Dir. Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City. The warrant charges Enrile, along with spouses Panlilio, and Honasan with the crime of "rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder" allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt (from Nov 29 to Dec 10, 1990). Enrile was taken and held overnight without bail at the NBI in Taft. Next morning, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in QC, given custody to another district.

Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights bec (1) he was held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books; (2) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; (3) denied his right to bail; and (4) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause SolGen says that the case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the current case against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. SolGen distinguishes between the complex crime arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another (referred to in the 2nd clause of Art 48 and the subject of the Hernandez ruling) and the compound crime arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, which Hernandez was not concerned with and therefore, should not apply.

As they are being charged only of the crime of simple rebellion which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed.

Obiter: The SC noted that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power. Dissent and concurring: Fernan, C.J. Hernandez should not be interpreted as an all embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion are absorbed (by rebellion). Hernandez has served the purpose for which it was applied by the court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in 34 yrs have far-reaching effects on the all embracing applicability of the doctrine. The court should have differenciated acts which are indispensable, and acts which are merely necessary. A crime which is indispensable to the commission of another must be an element of it, but one which is merely necessary is not. Separate: Melencio-Herrera Agree that Hernandez remains good law, but takes exeption that habeas corpus in not the remedy. Had the Information filed charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. CONTINUING CRIME Parulan vs. Director of Prisons (1968) Facts: -Parulan was serving life imprisonment (commuted to 20 years by the Pres of the Phil) in Muntinglupa. In Oct 1964, he was transferred to Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the same month, but was recaptured in Manila. - He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under RPC157. In 1966, CFI Manila found him guilty and sentenced him accordingly. - He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Director of Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered to release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement. Parulan saw his confinement illegal because the sentence of conviction imposed upon him

ISSUE: Is Enrile, along with co-accused, guilty of a complex crime or not? HELD: No. RATIO: y Court says that there is one reason why Art 48 cannot be applied in this case. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately, the following penalties would be imposable: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However under Art 48, the penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. So if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, the provision would be unfavorable to the movant. y Re: held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books y In the context of Hernandez, Enrile is charged with something in the RPC: simple rebellion y Re: denied right to bail

for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under RPC157, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged. Issue: W/N the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon Parulan for evasion of service of sentence Held & Ratio: Yes. In transitory crimes or continuing offenses, acts material to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. - In some crimes, although the elements thereof for its consummation occurred in one place, yet by the very nature of the offense committed, the violation is deemed to be continuing. - some crimes under 1st class: estafa or malversation, abduction - some crimes under 2nd class: libel, kidnapping and illegal detention (deprivation of liberty is continuing), and evasion of service of sentence (the act of the escapee is a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be) - Crime is not consummated after the convict has escaped from confinement, for as long as he continues to evade the service, he is deemed to continue committing the crime and may be arrested without warrant at any place where he may be found; Sec6 (c) Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court (one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is where he has excaped from confinement) supports this Umil vs. Fidel V. Ramos (1991) 8 petitions for habeas corpus consolidated Facts for case I (Umil vs. Ramos): - In Feb 88, The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) verified that the man (Dural) being treated for a gunshot wound in St. Agnes Hospital was the member of the NPA Sparrow Unit responsible for killing 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman. - Dural was charged with the crime of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority. Defendant Bernardo Itucal, Jr. was included as defendant in the amendment of the information. - On 6 Feb 88, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with SC on behalf of Roberto Umil, Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The writ was issued on 9 Feb, and the hearing started.

- On 26 Feb, however, Umil and Renato were release after they had posted bail before the Pasay RTC where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them. Since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favour of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail, Umil and Renato s petition has been rendered moot and dismissed. Issue: W/N Dural was illegally arrested Held & Ratio: No. Although Dural s arrest was not one of those mentioned in Sec5 of Rule 113 as his arrest came a day after the shooting incident, it was justified because he was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion is a continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance of or in connection with, so his arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. -Under Sec5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, an arrest without a warrant is justified when the person is caught in flagranti delicto (caught redhanded), or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. - His arrest was more an act of capturing him to suppress rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately persecuting him in court for a statutory offense. So the arrest need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - Dural was eventually tried and found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. Whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that he was in court when a complaint was read to him, and to this he pleaded not guilty. The irregularity of his arrest is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error. (I think yung case#1 lang talaga ang kailangan. Sa cases I-V lahat NPA, subversion. Sa cases VI and VII, hindi na continuing crime. Here's case II para makita niyo...) FACTS for case II: - Rogelio Ramos, NPA member who surrendered to the military, informed them about the operations of the CPP and NPA. He identified some of former comrades and pointed a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino as safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of CCP-NPA. The house - When apprehended at the house, Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and had with him letters to Constantino and other members of NPA.

- Roque, in charge of finance of the NUFC, admitted ownership of subversive documents found in her sister s house. She also had ammunition and a grenade but no permit for them. - As there was no contention that petitioners are officers of NUFC, it must be deemed admitted. As officers and/or members, their arrest without warrant was justified for the same reasons earlier stated in Dural, and Roque s arrest was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to posses them. CRUZ, J., Dissenting and Concurring: Subversion as a continuing offense to justify an arrest without warrant of any person at any time as long as authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense is a dangerous doctrine. SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting: Dural was charged with double murder. If he had been guilty of subversion (the offense for which he was supposedly arrested without warrant), then he should have been charged with it. A warrantless (or citizen s) arrest is not possible in case of subversion in the absence of any overt act that would justify the authorities to act. Subversion means knowingly, wilfully, and by overt acts affiliate[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of the CCP The military could not have known that Dural, when he was taken, was a member of the NPA because he was not performing any overt act that he was truly a rebel. Overt act is made up of [e]very act, movement, deed and word indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, when he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act contemplated by law. Warrantless arrest may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, and CESAR O. MANCAO vs. Secretary HERNANDO PEREZ May 1, 2001: In response to an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs stones, and other deadly weapons" attempting to break into Malacanang, GMA issued proclamation No. 38 (Declaring State of Rebellion in the NCR) & General Order No. 1 (Directing the AFP and the PNP to Suppress the Rebellion in the NCR). Subsequently, 4 petitions (1. Lacson et al, 2. Defensor-Santiago, 3. Lumbao, 4. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino) were filed before the Court, assailing said declaration and the warrantless arrests allegedly carried out under it. Petitions 1-3 similarly filed for prohibition and mandamus, contending that they were under imminent danger of being arrested.

May 6, 2001: GMA lifted the state of rebellion in the NCR, rendering said instant petitions moot and academic. Secretary of Justice denies having issued orders for specific "warrantless arrests" in connection with the rebellion. Petitioners have many remedies they can avail of to protect themselves from warrantless arrest, making the resort to the instant petition unnecessary. There are other reasons for dismissal of the petitions at bar: GR No.147780 (Lacson, Aquino, Mancao) Premature, as it asks the Court to stop enjoin proceedings against the petitioners-proceedings which have not even been filed yet. Even if informations were to be filed later, the Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution under the Rules of Court. Petitioner's prayer to declare hold departure orders against them void ab initio-must be made in the proper proceedings. Writ of habeas corpus is not called for, as its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint. GR No. 147781 (Defensor-Santiago) In filing for mandamus, the legal right of the petitioner to the act which is compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus cannot be issued unless the right to relief is clear. GR No. 147799 (Lumbao) Petitioner claims that the declaration of a state of rebellion is an encroachment on the separation of powers, specifically judicial power to interpret what took place on May 1, 2001. Court said in Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Hon. Zamora, the necessity of calling out the armed forces is not always quantifiable and that the President may rely on means not available to the judiciary to make the decision to do so.

GR No. 147810 (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino) Not a real party-in-interest, as it is a juridical person and cannot be placed under arrest, and the petition did not allege the impending arrests of its members. Even if petition construed as declaratory relief, it cannot be upheld because original actions to the SC do not include declaratory relief unless it involves ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls. WHEREFORE all 4 petitions were dismissed, and the respondents enjoined from arresting the petitioners in the 1st 3 petitions without warrant, in connection with the events of May 1, 2001.

DISSENT: Kapunan Right against unreasonable searches and seizure is an indispensable freedom. Petitioners seek restraining orders and/or injunction against their impending warrantless arrests. Facts relating to the impending arrest of opposition leaders and police officers: Apr 25, 2001: Estrada was arrested in connection with the criminal case for plunder, and was arrested after a skirmish between his supporter and several police officers. After that day and the succeeding days, pro-Estrada supporters gathered at EDSA. The petitioners were among many of the political figures who spoke before the crowd. Apr 28, 2001: Estrada brought to Veteran's Medical Center, from where he would be transported to Fort Sto. Domingo. May 1, 2001: EDSA crowd decided to march to Malacanang. As they were being dispersed, a melee erupted, hurting several police officers and rallyists. AFTER the crowd was dispersed, GMA issued Proclamation 38 and General Order 1, exercising her powers as Commander in Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. After the proclamation, several leaders of the opposition were ordered arrested (without warrant). Issue: WERE THE ARRESTS/IMPENDING ARRESTS ILLEGAL? Proc. 38 & GO1 were based on Article VII, Sec 18, which granted GMA the power to call out armed forces in the case of 1) lawless violence, 2) rebellion, 3) invasion. In case of rebellion/invasion, a) writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, b) the Philippines or part thereof may be placed under martial law. The term "state of rebellion" has NO LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, as the president is NOT required to declare it. If the intent of the declaration of a state of rebellion is to conduct warrantless arrests, it is effectively martial law (but even matrial law can authorize the President to do so). WHEN ARE WARRANTLESS ARRESTS LEGAL? Rules of Court: Rule 113, Sec. 5. "A police officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it, and xxx In cases filing under par. a) and b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with sec. 7 of Rule 119." A warrantless arrest is only justified when a police officer is confronted with circumstances that are a basis for a finding of probable cause of the commission of an offense and that the person arrested is probably guilty of that offense. The petitioners were arrested without warrant for acts of rebellion; their arrest was based supposedly on Sec 5 of rule 113, and the following: UMIL VS. RAMOS (1990) "The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offences committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assault against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes." Reliance on Umil is misplaced (there was also dissent against it because it reaffirmed a case in the Marcos regime of martial law, and cannot apply now). The arrests upheld because the petitioners were members of CPP, NPA, etc. The petitioners in this case are not members of an outlawed organization for overthrowing the government. There must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking place in the presence of the arresting officer (see Art 134 of the RPC).

US vs. SAMONTE defines "in [the arresting officer's] presence" as "when such a officer or person sees the offense, even though at a distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, or the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made." This requirement was not met in the arrests on May 1, 2001. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: Gutierrez "To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is, to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion."

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: Feliciano

The doctrine of "continuing crimes" cannot be involved for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest, especially when the crime does not consist of acts with a definite beginning and end.

DISSENTING: Sandoval-Gutierrez Warrantless arrest not justified under Rule 113, sec. 5, because the petitioners cannot be considered "to have committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" at the time they were arrested.