War of Brothers

Bezalel Academy of Arts & Design Class: Israel Place and Culture Teacher: Yona Weitz Student: Felipe Ivanicska (exchange student) Term: 2010/2

The hypothesis I want to develop in this paper is that Jewish Israelis and Arab Israelis (both citizens and refugees) behave like brothers. The kind that fights a lot, but still brothers. This idea started developing for me as more as I read about it, but specially Meditations on National Identity1, by Bat-Ami Bar On, when she says that in her contact with a Palestinian woman she discovered that they had a lot in common. My objective in the course of this text is to see if this theory sustains itself, based in academic texts, historical evidence and a lot about my contact with protests on Nakba (15 of May) and Naksa (05 of June) days, through the (still untitled) documentary Im editing with images the photographer Cameron Barnes shot in those events and his and Jeremy Hodges testimonials about it. Bat-Ami Bar On talks about Amal Kawar, a Palestinian woman [she] met in the summer of 1988, at that years meeting of the National Womens Studies Association. She says they were introduced to each other by a mutual friend in public [] a rather safe space. And, on Bat-Amis point of view: who could have been enemies, have become friends. Theyre first connected through their feminist activism, what make the borders between them less significant, and also by not having a complete process of independence. She adopts the pragmatic point of view that identity is something fluid and hard to name and define, and that most of the time the definition of that is done because practical matters, and the whole identity thing is something hard or even impossible to be completely aware of. She says that, as most Israelis, she grew up learning the hegemonic discourse of her country, but that also her father used to take her to see the Arab villages and
1

Meditations on National Identity (BAR ON, Bat-Ami, Indiana University Press, 1994)

taught her about the oppression they live under. She starts out to point other aspects in which they are similar: feminists, academics living in USA, and also born in cities relatively close to the Mediterranean Sea. She realizes how they have very subtle things in common, like the relation with the environment, their reactions to colors, smells and sounds, their eating habits and even their gestures. She cites Yoram Binur who, in his book My Enemy, My Self2, talks about how he disguised as a Palestinian laborer, and how she was struck by how little he had to do for it, which indicates some similarities. But then, she doubts if this relation is so easy to make, and points out a general aspect, the difference between the Jews who grew influenced by the Zionist dream (the one who grew stronger by the end of the XIX century) and the Arabs, who grew under Turkish influence and later European one. That opposition is crucial for Bat-Ami, as she highlight the fact that Arab culture has been suffering a constant diminishment, at the same the IsraeliJewish one developed following an acculturation very well planned. To short the story, she ends up saying that she doesnt want to lose her humanity and solidarity for the Palestinian people which she learned from her father. After that prolegomena, lets retrocede to the historical facts that might reinforce my theory. By the time Islam was born, on the VII century, the Jewish people had already been separated from their Arabic brothers, first by the ramification that happened to Noahs sons, and then later by the Diaspora, which forbade them of being more in contact. We cannot predict what would happen if the Jews were still in a large number by the time of the rise of Islam, but we can definitely say that the historical facts points to a situation where there isnt much contact between those two people. During the history of Palestine, most of the periods when Arabs were in military and political control of the land they had a policy of tolerance against Jews, being on the most important the Decree of Omar, established in the VII century, which allowed the freedom of expression of each one religion . Other more obvious facts that make them closer are language (both semitic) and religious similarities: monotheism, book-based, promote tolerance and charity, and even a lot of characters and situations in the Holly Books are similar and, of course, happens in very similar geographical places. Genetically, though, its proved that Ashkenazi

My Enemy, My Self (BINUR, Yoram)

Jews are closer to the Palestinians, and that Jews in general are closer to populations from the north of the Fertile Crescent3. Advancing a few years to the creation of the State of Israel, we can find some factors that contributed to the alienation between those two fraternal people. After defeating the Turk-Ottomans in 1917 and conquering Palestine, which was already a great loss for the Arab world, the British government started to help the Jews to conquer the best and more fertile lands and strategic positions. Since the end of the previous century the Zionist movement was already growing and Jews were migrating to Palestine. After an initial moment where the British cooperated with that, they realized that the Zionist movement was getting to much influence on their politics, so they reduced the migration aid and started to make different and contradictory agreements with Arabs, Jews and even the countries from the Entente, which fragmented the relations between the two people and also with the international community in general, which totally made them look untruthful to the Arabs, and they were already expecting to act by themselves. After the II World War, of course, this had to be reconsidered, because it was even more eminent that the Jews needed a place where they could have sovereignty. Some data here is necessary to help explain the Arab hatred against Jews that time: this second people had 56% of the Palestine lands, almost all of it on the countryside and very fertile areas, but they represented only 33% of the total population. The Jewish people boosted the feeling of acceptance the international community had towards them after the II World War, mixed with the prophecy of the return, and started to act very violently against the Arabs, trying to expel them from this territory. Coming back again to the present, lets analyze the situation of the two protests/manifestations that Ive mentioned before: the Nakba and Naksa days of 2011, based on videos done by Cameron Barnes and Jeremy Hodge in the Silwan neighborhood in Jerusalem and in Ramallah. First, some facts to contextualize. On the beginning of 2011 a webpage in Facebook was created calling for a Third Intifada on the 15 of May 2011, a bomb exploded in Jerusalem city center, hurting
3

The Y Chromosome Pool of Jews as Part of the Genetic Landscape of the Middle East Nebel et. Al., 2001

XXXXXXXXXXX people, Egypt and Syria were amidst a revolution against tyrannical and oppressive regimes, Hamas and Fatah were negotiating to put their differences aside and fight for their common cause, and the expectative was that they would start acting more through protests, media and claims for basic human rights deeper than religious or geographical issues, as it was being done in Egypt and Syria, even not only for humanitarian reasons, but also because direct or military conflicts were being too expensive for them, but in general a decrease in terror attacks and the lack of formal and intelligent diplomacy wasnt expected. For me, the expectation was for a rise of violence, but at the same time more intelligent and modern ways of action, through the media, well-planned protests or even social media and the web. I was really amazed to hear how the protests logic works in most of those situations. What I had received on the news in Brazil showed violent and direct clashes between IDF and the Israeli Arabs, with each side fully charging to the other. I admit that Im not the biggest news-follower, so I cant remind exactly what I was watching, but now that Ive done some basic research, it was probably the conflicts in the beginning of the century, between 2000 and 2005, so they were really more violent. Now, comparing that with what I saw on the videos and heard about it: the protests now are more like demonstrations of strength, with each side keeping a more or less still position, occasionally throwing rocks (if the Arabs) or tear gas and rubber bullets (if the IDF). No one really charged to the other side, neither the IDF tried to neutralize the leaders or the more violent ones. I didnt see any arrestment made. In Silwan it was even weirder. The protests were scheduled, every Friday there would be one, but it turned out that the protest was just another conflict. There was no march, no posters, no action to draw public attention, just a lot of kids and teenagers throwing rocks in whoever was there, and the IDF controlling them, in the same way mentioned before. So, after some time they kept doing it, it just became a game: the IDF would go there every Friday, the kids would throw rocks, and to complete the theater: all the media would go there, wear some shirt that said they were from the press and shouldnt be harmed, maybe a gas mask, and would try to get the most dramatic angles, protect themselves against projectiles from both sides. At one point, my friends were going

there as they would go to any touristic spot in Jerusalem, and that one could be name See The Conflict and Dont Hurt Yourself. In Ramallah, something similar happened. As IDF knew that there would something because of the Naksa, they went there and took over a rooftop and some streets, closing a perimeter. The traditional kids with masks and throwing rocks stood in the middle of this area, but they were not totally surrounded, they couldve gone away if they wanted. The other side of the street was completely calm, as if nothing was happening, cars were passing by, and theres even a scene caught by Cameron Barnes where an old man walks calmly parallel to the axis of the conflict. That went for hours, with the Arabs throwing rocks and the IDF throwing tear gas back to them. No one advanced or retreated. On the other hand, the conflicts in Egypt were really violent, with protests, shouting, speeches from the most influential people, Israeli flags being burned, clashes with the Army, etc. Of course the situation there is more dramatic and urgent, so they just had to be more aggressive. My point in digressing about those protests in Jerusalem and Ramallah is to defend my theory presented here. There are a lot of factors that contribute to this kind of situation of the protests: the few resources Israeli Arabs have, the fact that they dont receive support from Arab countries leaders, that all sum up to a scenario where they cant buy guns, or organize something more efficient. But one of the factors that contribute to that might be what I defend on this paper: the feeling that somehow Jews and Arabs are brothers. On the Israeli side, even though the political situation is turning more to a radical right now, they know that they just cant destroy or suppress totally those protests, not necessarily for humanitarian feelings, but part of it is because they know the international media would criticize them, because theyre always ready to say look how Israel is cruel with the people they already oppressed so much. But for both sides theres unconsciously this feeling that they both historically, religiously, spiritually and culturally deserve this land, so they somehow have to preserve the other side. The comparison works better when you think of fights between brothers in the family: even if theyre fighting really hard and intensely for something, their objective is more to prove their point, not to kill the other one. Of course that happened in 1967, when some Arab countries tried

to push Israel to the sea, because were not only talking about siblings fights, but politics, including corrupt, dictatorial and radical Arab leaders. One of the things to remind here is that the state of Israel will definitely, doubtless and by any means, defend its land. For hundreds of years theyve longed to return to have a place where they could have sovereignty to protect themselves from all the persecution they suffered during the Diaspora. If that place could be Israel, even better, because it also fills mythological histories of returning to the Promised Land and Jerusalem. This means that the IDF will be violent if necessary, no matter what. To synthesize my arguments, they all point to a context where the alienation between Arabs and Jews, by many facts from the last century, grew to a point where there is almost no conversation among them. One fact that proves it is that between thousands of Israeli government officials, only 3 or 4 are dedicated to the peace agreements, with a budget that represents 0,05% of the total, 3% of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs one. If you look in the broader history, considering the facts already presented and many others, this situation is quite recent. For the first time in thousands of years there is a systematical hatred, discrimination and an eager to destroy the other side, but also for the first time Jews have their own sovereign country, what contributes a lot to the uniqueness of this state of affairs. In Some Problems of Arab-Jewish Coexistence, Samy Smooha and John E. Hofman4 say that there is one fact that both sides have to realize: that there is a Jewish state and that there is an Arab minority in this state. Its unlikely that Israel will renounce its Jewish character or that the Israeli Arabs will disappear. There are essentially two alternatives for coexistence: assimilation or domination. Assimilation is strongly rejected by both sides. Domination will not be tolerated for long by a minority undergoing continual modernization, involvement in a national movement and participation in a region-wide majority. Nor is Jewish domination compatible with the democratic pluralism to which Israel is commited.
4

Some Problems of Arab-Jewish Coexistence in Israel (SMOOHA, HOFMAN, 1977)

This commitment to democracy and some kind of equality is also a remain of the diaspora: they feel they cant systematically destroy or make another people suffer in mass scale. In one hand, they are one of the few countries in the world that are open to receive refugees, but at the same time themselves have created refugees, who are so but in their own land they owned before. This shows that the Israeli-Arab conflict is not as plain and simple as sometimes the media seems to paint. It also reveals an empathy to another point where Israeli Arabs and Jews are similar (and that only the most radical left admit): being persecuted, discriminated and refugees, which is at some point a paradox, because some of that discrimination comes from Israel itself, but at another point, also comes from the Arab neighbor countries, who in their majority also rejects Palestinians. Add that to the fact that Israelis see Palestinians as allies of the enemy, the Arab world in general, and you have a mixed and very complex feeling. So, what happens when someone is confused, threatened and, most importantly, has military and political control? They try to have a fixed and steady goal, otherwise they would be weakened by that confusion, they try to act as plain and directly as possible, to avoid difficult questions and dilemmas. That is also something which could be related to siblings conflicts, where there are lots of complex relations, points that approaches and some others where they stray, a lot of unsaid and shameful feelings. At the moment this paper is being written, revolutions in the Arab world are going on and on. Maybe, in the same way that for the first time the Jews returned to their Promised Land, the Arabs will also have a unique and original social and cultural situation, that will strengthen their relationships, slowly ending the fragmented culture they had as soon as Mohamed died. The hope is that theyll have better opportunities, basic human rights and less religious radical domination, all the three of those things who were created by corrupt and radical leaders who were interested in keeping the population in poverty and ignorance. After that, maybe Israel will think twice before systematically continuing its discrimination against Palestinians, but the country will also have more modern and democratic diplomats to talk to, and the Arab population will be empowered enough to show that their culture is rich, important and also deserves the Holy Land, and theyll both realize that they are just brothers who were kept away for a long time, dont know each other anymore and were manipulated by a third part.

REFERENCES: Some Problems of Arab-Jewish Coexistence in Israel (SMOOHA, HOFMAN, 1977) Thomas Ice - Myths About Israel and Palestine Uri Avnery Uma Guerra Fratricida Entre Semitas (in Portuguese) [A Fratricide War Between Semites] Eduardo Spohr - O CONFLITO RABE-ISRAELENSE IDEOLOGIA, NACIONALISMO E CIDADANIA NO ORIENTE MDIO (in Portuguese) [The Arab-Israeli conflict: Ideology, Nationalism and Citizenship in Middle East) Puc-Rio, 2002 Aura Gomes - A questo da Palestina e a fundao de Israel (The Palestinian issue and the Israel foundation) USP, 2001

CAMERON BARNES INTERVIEW, 15 of June 2011: 1) Describe the events during Nakba and Naksa days 2) What are your opinions on that? 3) Why youve come to Israel? Why do you go photograph those conflicts? Knowing when to run and when to go further towards the frontline, knowing when its okay to take the shot and when its offensive/possibly get you in trouble and more importantly how to keep my focus in utter chaos. The situation today was slightly unsettling because the Palestinians are only throwing rocks on the face of riot police, guns and ultimate power. Its almost a game. No, actually it is a game. They know they are not really hurting Israel, but psychologically I think it keeps some of them sane. To wake up one day and day, this is my way to relieve stress and to at least fill the void of that they are powerless to go foe to foe with the Hews and, of course, Insh Allah, God willing in the name of Allah. JEREMY HODGES INTERVIEW, 2011:

I dont have his interview recorded, it was an informal conversation.