Course Syllabus

Course Information Course Number/Section Course Title ECON 7381 001 Special Topics in Experimental and Behavioral Economics - Behavioral Public Finance Fall 2011 TR 11:30am 12:45pm SLC 1.202A

Term Days & Times Classroom

Professor Contact Information Professor Xin (Sherry) Li Website elearning Office Phone 972-883-4987 Email Address sherry.xin.li@utdallas.edu (Please note that I cannot receive emails that are sent from elearning.) Office Location GR 2.820 Office Hours TR 3:50-4:50pm or by appointment Prerequisites Graduate microeconomics and econometrics (Econ 5301 Microeconomics Theory I, Econ 6307 Microeconomics Theory II, Econ 6309 Econometrics I, and Econ 6309 Econometrics II strongly recommended). Audit students need to register for audit credit. There will be no assignments or exams given to audit students. Course Description This course aims to bring students to the frontier of research in experimental and behavioral economics with a focus on public economics. We will try to understand individual economic choices using economic models enriched by psychological mechanisms. Student Learning Objectives/Outcomes The principal objective of this course is to introduce to students recent literature on experimental and behavioral economics with a special focus on topics related to public finance. Students will be expected to come to class having read a lot of material. The main learning objective is to help students become producers of research that incorporates behavioral elements into economic models, and develop their own ideas for research projects which may be further turned into a chapter in their Ph.D. dissertations. General References (Recommended) Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin, Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton University Press 2004. Kagel and Roth. Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
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Plott and Smith, Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, North Holland, 2008. Akerlof and Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 2010. Important Dates Sep. 6, 27, Oct. 13, Nov. 1 Nov. 24 - 25 Nov. 29 Dec. 6 Dec. 6 5pm Dec. 12

Problem sets/ referee report assignments will be handed out (due in two weeks) Thanksgiving holidays no class Term paper presentation Last day of classes Term paper due

Grading Your course grade is determined as follows: 10% Class participation 10% In-class presentation 20% Two problem sets 30% Two referee reports 30% Term paper (20%)/presentation (10%) In-Class presentation: Each student will have chance to present in class a few articles selected from the reading list below. Problem Sets: We will assign two problem sets over the course of the semester. They will be made available two weeks before they are due. Referee Reports: You are required to submit two referee reports on papers chosen by me. Term paper: Each student will develop a research proposal/paper. The paper is due at 5pm on Monday Dec. 12, 2011. The paper, no longer than 1500 words, must be relevant to behavioral/experimental economics and must be approved. Topics in the area of public economics are strongly encouraged. It should (i) state the problem, (ii) explain how the problem relates to other, solved, problems and how it is different, (iii) defend why the problem is important enough to warrant attention by economists, (iv) sketch out how a solution might be obtained, (v) state what are likely to be the important theoretical and empirical problems to be overcome, and (vi) discuss what the solution is likely to look like. The keys I will be looking for in the paper are (i) clear articulation of your point, (ii) clear articulation of the limitations/challenges of your approach, and (iii) a firm placement within the existing literature. The latter is not a literature review but a statement of This is where the literature on this topic is and this is why my project represents an advance. Graded parts of the course are assigned points. Your total number of points will determine your final grade as follows:

90% or above ~ A+ 85% or above ~ A 80% or above ~ A75% or above ~ B+ 70% or above ~ B 60% or above ~ BCourse Syllabus Page 2

Below 60% ~ C
Please be aware that your grade is not negotiable under any circumstances and any efforts to the contrary will not be recognized. The Negotiations Center Seminar and the Economics Program Seminar You are strongly encouraged to attend the Negotiations Center seminar series (which meet on Mondays from 11:30am-1:00pm at SOM) and the economic program seminar series (which meet on Fridays at GR3.606).

Tentative Topic Outline I. Introduction

J. Andreoni and J. List. Experimental Approaches to Public Economics, Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005) 13551359. B. D. Bernheim, and A. Rangel. Behavioural Public Economics. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 18 August 2011. S. DellaVigna. Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, Journal of Economic Literature 2009, 47:2, 315372. B. D. Bernheim and A. Rangel. 2007. Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision Makers. in P. Diamond and H. Vartiainen, Economic Institutions and Behavioral Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 7-77. C. Camerer. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, in Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin ed., Advances in Behavioral Economics, 2004. S. Dellavigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, Journal of Economic Literature, June 2009, Vol. 47, pp. 315-372. G. Harrison and J. List. 2004. Field Experiments, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December. S. Levitt and J. List. Field Experiments in Economics: The Past, The Present, and The Future. European Economic Review, (2009), 53(1), pp. 1-18. M. Rabin. Psychology and Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVI (March 1998), pp. 11-46.

II. Public goods

D. Davis and C. Holt, 1993. Public Goods, Externalities, and Voting, in Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press. Y. Chen, Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Literature. Forthcoming in The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results edited by Charles Plott and Vernon Smith. G. Marwell and R. Ames, Economists free ride, does anyone else?: experiments on the provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics, IV, 15 (3), 1981, 295310.

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T. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal, Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 24 (2), 1984, 171193. R. M. Isaac, K. F. McCue and C. R. Plott, Public goods provision in an experimental environment, Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1), 1985, 5174. T. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal, Private incentives in social dilemmas: the effects of incomplete information and altruism, Journal of Public Economics, 35 (3), 1988, 309332. J. Andreoni, Why free ride?: strategies and learning in public goods experiments, Journal of Public Economics, 37 (3), 1988, 291304. R. M. Isaac, J. Walker and A. Williams, Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence utilizing large groups, Journal of Public Economics, 54 (1), 1994, 136. J. Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, The Economic Journal, June 1990, 100 (401), 464 477. E. Fehr and S. Gchter. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, American Economic Review 90 (2000), 980-994. E. Fehr, J. Falkinger, S. Gchter and R. Winter-Ebmer. A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence, American Economic Review 90 (2000), 247-264. J. Andreoni, P. Brown, and L. Vestlund. What Makes an Allocation Fair? Games and Economic Behavior, 40, July 2002, 1-24. J. Potters, M. Sefton, and L. Vestlund. After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games, Journal of Public Economics, August 2005, 1399-1419. A. Bracha, M. Menietti, and L. Vestlund. Seeds to Succeed? Sequential Giving to Public Projects, Forthcoming Journal of Public Economics. C. Kumru and L. Vestlund. The Effects of Status on Voluntary Contribution, Forthcoming Journal of Public Economic Theory. J. Andreoni and R. Petrie, Public Goods Experiments without Confidentiality: A Glimpse into FundRaising, Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-8), 2004, 1605-1623. J. Andreoni. Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8 (1), 2006, 1-22. G. Charness, R. Cobo-Reyes, and N. Jimnez. Efficiency, Team Building, and Identity in a Public-Goods Game. UCSB working paper. R. Croson. Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms: An Experiment in Team Production. Research in Experimental Economics, Vol 8, 2000, pp. 85-97. R. Croson and M. Marks, The Effect of Recommended Contributions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, Economic Inquiry, Vol 39, 2001, pp. 238-249. J. Andreoni. 1995. Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v.110, no.1, 1-21. O. Bochet, T. Page, and L. Putterman, 2006. Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 11-26.

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G. Charness and C. Yang, 2010. Public Goods Provision with Voting for Exclusion, Exit, and Mergers: An Experiment, UCSB working paper. J. Andreoni. Giving Gifts to Groups: How Altruism Depends on the Number of Recipients, Journal of Public Economics, v. 91, September 2007, 1731-1749. T. Salmon, T.K. Ahn and Mark Isaac. Coming and Going: Experiments on Endogenous Group Sizes for Excludable Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 93, 1-2 (2009): 336-351. M. Issac, J. Walker and A. Williams. (1994) Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Very Large Groups, Journal of Public Economics 54:1-36. J. Solow, and N. Kirkwood. 2002. Group Identity and Gender in Public Goods Experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48 (4): 403412. II. Charitable giving Clotfelter, Charles T. 1985. Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bakija, Jon, William Gale and Joel Slemrod (2003). Charitable Bequests and Taxes on Inheritances and Estates: Aggregate Evidence from across States and Time. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 93(2): 366-370. William Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contribution. Journal of Political Economy, August, 1995. Auten, Gerald, Holger Sieg, Charles T. Clotfelter. 2002. Charitable Giving, Income and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data. American Economic Review, 92(1): 371-82. Peloza, John and Peirs Steel. 2005. The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 24(2): 260-272. J. Andreoni. Toward a Theory of Charitable Fundraising.' Journal of Political Economy, v.106, no.6, December 1998, 1186-1213. R. Croson, A. Reed and J. Shang. Identity Congruence Effects on Donations. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol 45, 2008, pp. 351-361. R. Croson and J. Shang. A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. The Economic Journal, Vol 119, 2009, pp. 1422-1439. R. Croson and J. Shang. Limits of Social Influence on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Evidence from Field Experiments. Forthcoming, Economic Inquiry. C. C. Eckel, and P. J. Grossman. Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: A Natural Field Experiment Comparing Matching and Rebate Subsidies. Experimental Economics 11(3): 234-252. September, 2008. C. C. Eckel, and P. J. Grossman. Rebates Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter? Journal of Public Economics, 87(3-4): 681-701. 2003. C. C. Eckel, P. J. Grossman, and M. Johnston. An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis. Journal of Public Economics 89(8): 1543-1560. August, 2005. J. Andreoni and A. Payne. Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities, Journal of Public Economics, v. 95, June 2011, 334-343.
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J. Andreoni and A. Payne. Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fundraising? American Economic Review, 93(3), June 2003, 792-812. C. Landry, A. Lange, J. List, M. Price, and N. Rupp. Is a Donor in Hand Better than Two in the Bush? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. American Economic Review, (2010), vol. 100(3), pages 95883, June. D. Karlan, and J. List. Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment. American Economic Review, (2007), 97(5), pp. 1774- 1793. C. Landry, A. Lange, J. List, M. Price, and N. Rupp. Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2006), 121(2), pp. 747-782. J. List, and D. Lucking-Reiley. The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign. Journal of Political Economy, (2002), 110(1), pp. 215-233. J. Kessler. 2011. Signals of Support and Public Good Provision. Job market paper. III. Taxation M. Allingham and A. Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 1972. J. Alm, G. McClelland and W. Schulze, Why do people pay taxes? Journal of Public Economics, 48 (1), 1992, 2138. J. Slemrod, M. Blumenthal, and C. Christian, Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, Journal of Public Economics, March, 2001. J. Slemrod, and N. Feldman (2007). Estimating Tax Noncompliance with Evidence from Unaudited Tax Returns, Economic Journal, March 2007, pp. 327-352. J. Andreoni, B. Erard and J. Feinstein. Tax Compliance, Journal of Economic Literature, v. 36, June 1998, pp. 818860. J. Skinner, and J. Slemrod (1985). An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, National Tax Journal 38: 345-353. J. Dubin, M. Graetz, and L. Wilde, Are We a Nation of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence on Tax Compliance, American Economic Review, May 1987, pp. 240-245. J. Slemrod, and S. Yitzhaki (2002). Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration. In Handbook of Public Economics eds. A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein. Elsevier Science. M. Spicer, and L. Becker. 1980. Fiscal inequality and tax evasion: an experimental approach, National Tax Journal 33 (2): 171-75. S. Li, C. C. Eckel, P. J. Grossman, and T. L. Brown. Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (2011) 1190-1201. S. Li, C. C. Eckel, P. J. Grossman, and T. L. Brown. Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government? An Experimental Study. UT-Dallas CBEES Working Paper, 2011. B. Frey, and B. Torgler. 2007. Tax morale and conditional cooperation, Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (1): 136-159.
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IV. Heterogeneity A. Alesina, R. Baqir, and W. Easterly. 1999. Public goods and ethnic divisions, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (4): 1243-1284. A. Alesina, E. Glaeser, and B. Sacerdote. 2001. Why doesnt the U.S. have a European style welfare state? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Fall: 187-278. A. Alesina, and E. La Ferrara. 2005. Ethnic diversity and economic performance, Journal of Economic Literature 43 (3): 762-800. R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. The quality of government, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1): 222-279. E. Luttmer. 2001. Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution, Journal of Political Economy 109 (3): 500-528. C. Fershtman, and Uri Gneezy. 2001. Discrimination in a segmented society: an experimental approach, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (1), 351-377. J. Habyarimana, M. Humphreys, D. Posner, and J. Weinstein. 2007. Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? American Political Science Review 101 (4): 709-725. R. Croson and T. Buckley. Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Voluntary Provision of Linear Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics, Vol 90, 2006, pp. 935-955. S. Li. Social Identities, Ethnic Diversity, and Tax Morale, Public Finance Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, March 2010: 146-177. V. Information, Peer Effects, and Social Pressure C. C. Eckel, P. J. Grossman and A. Milano, Is More Information Always Better? An Experimental Study of Charitable Giving and Hurricane Katrina. Southern Economic Journal 74(2):388-411. October, 2007. J. Choi, D. Laibson, B. Madrian, and A. Metrick, Optimal Defaults, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 93, May 2003, pp. 180-185. J. Choi, D. Laibson, B. Madrian, and A. Metrick, Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults, In David Wise, ed., Analyses in the Economics of Aging. 2005. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 59-78. (Available on Laibsons webpage) S. Dellavigna, J. List and U. Malmendier. Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving, forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics. E. Duflo, and S. Emmanuel, 2002. Participation and Investment Decisions in a Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues Choices, Journal of Public Economics, 85, 121-148. E. Duflo, and S. Emmanuel, 2003. The Role of Information and Social Interactions in Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 815-842. E. Duflo, W. Gale, J. Liebman, P. Orszag, and E. Saez. Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4):1311-1346, November 2006. B. Madrian and D. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(4), 1149-1188.
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J. Scholz, A. Seshadri, and S. Khitatrakun, (2005) Are Americans Saving Optimally for Retirement? Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 4, pp. 607-643. R. Thaler, and S. Benartzi, 2004, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, Journal of Political Economy, 112, S164-S187. L. Vestlund, The Informational Value of Sequential Fundraising. Journal of Public Economics, 87 (2003), 627657. VI. Redistribution and Poverty A. Alesina, and D. Rodrik. 1994. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 465-490. K. Hoff, and P. Pandey. 2006. Discrimination, Social Identity, and Durable Inequalities, American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 96: 206-211. K. Hoff, and J. Stiglitz. 2010. Equilibrium Fictions: A Cognitive Approach to Societal Rigidity, American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 100: 141-146. J. Esarey, T.Salmon, and C. Barrilleaux. Social Insurance and Income Redistribution in a Laboratory Experiment, Forthcoming, Political Research Quarterly. VII. Other topics G. Bolton, and A. Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, American Economic Review, March 2000, 90 (1), 166193. B. Buunk, and T. Mussweiler, New Directions in Social Comparison Research, European Journal of Social Psychology, 467-475 2001, 31 (5). G. Charness, and M. Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2002, 117 (3), 817869. Y. Chen, F. M. Harper, J. Konstan, and S. Li. Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens, American Economic Review, vol. 100, No. 4, September 2010: 1358-1398. R. Croson and J. Shang. The Impact of Social Comparisons on Nonprofit Fundraising. Research in Experimental Economics, Vol 11, 2006, pp. 143-156. D. Cooper and J. Kagel. Other Regarding Preferences: A Survey of Experimental Results," in J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, (forthcoming) Princeton: Princeton University Press. J. Cox, D. Friedman, and S. Gjerstad, A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness, Games and Economic Behavior, April 2007, 59 (1), 1745. A.Falk, and U. Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, February 2006, 54 (2), 293315. E. Fehr, and K. Schmidt, The Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1999, 114 (3), 817868. U. Fischbacher, and S. Gachter. 2010. Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 100(1): 54156.
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B. Frey, and S. Meier, Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior Testing Conditional Cooperation in a Field Experiment, American Economic Review, December 2004, 94, 17171722. H. Tajfel, and J. Turner. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In Stephen Worchel and William Austin, eds., The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Chicago: Nelson- Hall. H. Tajfel, M. Billig, R. Bundy, and C. Flament. 1971. Social Categorization and Inter-Group Behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149177. J. Turner, 1978. Social Categorization and Social Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm. In Henri Tajfel, ed., Differentiation between Social Groups, London: Academic Press. T. Yamagishi, and T. Kiyonari. 2000. The Group as the Container of Generalized Reciprocity. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63 (2): 116132. G. Akerlof, and R. Kranton. 1994. Economics and Identity, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 715 753. G. Akerlof, and R. Kranton. 2002.Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of Education. Journal of Economic Literature, 40 (4): 11671201. G. Akerlof, and R. E. Kranton. 2005. Identity and the Economics of Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspective, 19 (1): 932. J. Bargh, 2006. What Have We Been Priming All These Years? On the Development, Mechanisms, and Ecology of Nonconscious Social Behavior, European Journal of Social Psychology, 36: 147-168. D. Benjamin, J. Choi, and A. J. Strickland. 2010. Social Identity and Preferences, American Economic Review, 100: 1913-1928. G. Charness, L. Rigotti, and A. Rustichini. 2007. Individual behavior and group membership. American Economic Review, 97: 1340-1352. Y. Chen and S. Li. Group Identity and Social Preferences. American Economic Review, Vol. 99, No. 1, March 2009: 431-457. H. Bernhard, E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher. 2006. Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement. American Economic Review, 96 (2): 217221. C. C. Eckel, and P. J. Grossman. 2005. Managing Diversity by Creating Team Identity. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 58 (3): 371392. L. Goette, D. Huffman, and S. Meier. 2006. The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups. American Economic Review, 96 (2): 212216. R. McDermott. Forthcoming. Psychological Approaches to Identity: Definitions, Measurement and Experimentation. In R. Abdelal, Y. Herrera, A. I. Johnson, and Rose McDermott, eds., Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Science Research, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. R. Chen and Y. Chen. The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection, forthcoming American Economic Review. G. Charness and A. Rusitchini. 2011. Gender Differences in Cooperation with Group Membership, Games and Economic Behavior, 72(1), 77-85.

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S. Gaertner, and J. Dovidio. 2000. Reducing Intergroup Bias: Common Ingroup Identity Model. Psychology Press. S. Li, A. de Oliveira, and C. C. Eckel. 2011. Common Identity and Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Investigation, UT-Dallas CBEES working paper. Akerlof, G., 1997. Social distance and social decisions, Econometrica. 65, 1005-1028. M. Fiedler, E. Haruvy, and S. Li. Social Distance in a Virtual World Experiment, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 72, Issue 2, June 2011, Pages 400-426. G. Charness, E. Haruvy, and D. Sonsino, 2007. Social distance and reciprocity: an internet experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 63, 88-103. C. C. Eckel, and R. K. Wilson. Social Learning in Coordination Games: Does Status Matter? Experimental Economics, 10(3): 317-330. September, 2007.

Student Conduct & Discipline

The University of Texas System and The University of Texas at Dallas have rules and regulations for the orderly and efficient conduct of their business. It is the responsibility of each student and each student organization to be knowledgeable about the rules and regulations which govern student conduct and activities. General information on student conduct and discipline is contained in the UTD publication, A to Z Guide, which is provided to all registered students each academic year. The University of Texas at Dallas administers student discipline within the procedures of recognized and established due process. Procedures are defined and described in the Rules and Regulations, Board of Regents, The University of Texas System, Part 1, Chapter VI, Section 3, and in Title V, Rules on Student Services and Activities of the universitys Handbook of Operating Procedures. Copies of these rules and regulations are available to students in the Office of the Dean of Students, where staff members are available to assist students in interpreting the rules and regulations (SU 1.602, 972/883-6391). A student at the university neither loses the rights nor escapes the responsibilities of citizenship. He or she is expected to obey federal, state, and local laws as well as the Regents Rules, university regulations, and administrative rules. Students are subject to discipline for violating the standards of conduct whether such conduct takes place on or off campus, or whether civil or criminal penalties are also imposed for such conduct.

Academic Integrity
The faculty expects from its students a high level of responsibility and academic honesty. Because the value of an academic degree depends upon the absolute integrity of the work done by the student for that degree, it is imperative that a student demonstrate a high standard of individual honor in his or her scholastic work. Scholastic dishonesty includes, but is not limited to, statements, acts or omissions related to applications for enrollment or the award of a degree, and/or the submission as ones own work or material that is not ones own. As a general rule, scholastic dishonesty involves one of the following acts: cheating, plagiarism, collusion and/or falsifying academic records. Students suspected of academic dishonesty are subject to disciplinary proceedings. Plagiarism, especially from the web, from portions of papers for other classes, and from any other source is unacceptable and will be dealt with under the universitys policy on plagiarism (see general catalog for details). This course will use the resources of turnitin.com, which searches the web for possible plagiarism and is over 90% effective.

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Email Use
The University of Texas at Dallas recognizes the value and efficiency of communication between faculty/staff and students through electronic mail. At the same time, email raises some issues concerning security and the identity of each individual in an email exchange. The university encourages all official student email correspondence be sent only to a students U.T. Dallas email address and that faculty and staff consider email from students official only if it originates from a UTD student account. This allows the university to maintain a high degree of confidence in the identity of all individual corresponding and the security of the transmitted information. UTD furnishes each student with a free email account that is to be used in all communication with university personnel. The Department of Information Resources at U.T. Dallas provides a method for students to have their U.T. Dallas mail forwarded to other accounts.

Withdrawal from Class

The administration of this institution has set deadlines for withdrawal of any college-level courses. These dates and times are published in that semester's course catalog. Administration procedures must be followed. It is the student's responsibility to handle withdrawal requirements from any class. In other words, I cannot drop or withdraw any student. You must do the proper paperwork to ensure that you will not receive a final grade of "F" in a course if you choose not to attend the class once you are enrolled.

Student Grievance Procedures

Procedures for student grievances are found in Title V, Rules on Student Services and Activities, of the universitys Handbook of Operating Procedures. In attempting to resolve any student grievance regarding grades, evaluations, or other fulfillments of academic responsibility, it is the obligation of the student first to make a serious effort to resolve the matter with the instructor, supervisor, administrator, or committee with whom the grievance originates (hereafter called the respondent). Individual faculty members retain primary responsibility for assigning grades and evaluations. If the matter cannot be resolved at that level, the grievance must be submitted in writing to the respondent with a copy of the respondents School Dean. If the matter is not resolved by the written response provided by the respondent, the student may submit a written appeal to the School Dean. If the grievance is not resolved by the School Deans decision, the student may make a written appeal to the Dean of Graduate or Undergraduate Education, and the deal will appoint and convene an Academic Appeals Panel. The decision of the Academic Appeals Panel is final. The results of the academic appeals process will be distributed to all involved parties. Copies of these rules and regulations are available to students in the Office of the Dean of Students, where staff members are available to assist students in interpreting the rules and regulations.

Incomplete Grade Policy

As per university policy, incomplete grades will be granted only for work unavoidably missed at the semesters end and only if 70% of the course work has been completed. An incomplete grade must be resolved within eight (8) weeks from the first day of the subsequent long semester. If the required work to complete the course and to remove the incomplete grade is not submitted by the specified deadline, the incomplete grade is changed automatically to a grade of F.

Disability Services
The goal of Disability Services is to provide students with disabilities educational opportunities equal to those of their non-disabled peers. Disability Services is located in room 1.610 in the Student Union. Office hours are Monday and Thursday, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.; Tuesday and Wednesday, 8:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.; and Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

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The contact information for the Office of Disability Services is: The University of Texas at Dallas, SU 22 PO Box 830688 Richardson, Texas 75083-0688 (972) 883-2098 (voice or TTY) Essentially, the law requires that colleges and universities make those reasonable adjustments necessary to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability. For example, it may be necessary to remove classroom prohibitions against tape recorders or animals (in the case of dog guides) for students who are blind. Occasionally an assignment requirement may be substituted (for example, a research paper versus an oral presentation for a student who is hearing impaired). Classes enrolled students with mobility impairments may have to be rescheduled in accessible facilities. The college or university may need to provide special services such as registration, note-taking, or mobility assistance. It is the students responsibility to notify his or her professors of the need for such an accommodation. Disability Services provides students with letters to present to faculty members to verify that the student has a disability and needs accommodations. Individuals requiring special accommodation should contact the professor after class or during office hours.

Religious Holy Days

The University of Texas at Dallas will excuse a student from class or other required activities for the travel to and observance of a religious holy day for a religion whose places of worship are exempt from property tax under Section 11.20, Tax Code, Texas Code Annotated. The student is encouraged to notify the instructor or activity sponsor as soon as possible regarding the absence, preferably in advance of the assignment. The student, so excused, will be allowed to take the exam or complete the assignment within a reasonable time after the absence: a period equal to the length of the absence, up to a maximum of one week. A student who notifies the instructor and completes any missed exam or assignment may not be penalized for the absence. A student who fails to complete the exam or assignment within the prescribed period may receive a failing grade for that exam or assignment. If a student or an instructor disagrees about the nature of the absence [i.e., for the purpose of observing a religious holy day] or if there is similar disagreement about whether the student has been given a reasonable time to complete any missed assignments or examinations, either the student or the instructor may request a ruling from the chief executive officer of the institution, or his or her designee. The chief executive officer or designee must take into account the legislative intent of TEC 51.911(b), and the student and instructor will abide by the decision of the chief executive officer or designee.

Off-Campus Instruction and Course Activities

Off-campus, out-of-state, and foreign instruction and activities are subject to state law and University policies and procedures regarding travel and risk-related activities. Information regarding these rules and regulations may be found at the website address given below. Additional information is available from the office of the school dean. (http://www.utdallas.edu/Business Affairs/Travel_Risk_Activities.htm)

These descriptions and timelines are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor.

Course Syllabus

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