Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2. Develop and implement training for Chief Officers that will focus on the
procedures and the active management of a MAYDA Y operation.
3. Re-emphasize the importance of using the proper format when transmitting a
MAYDAY as per Communications Manual Chapter 9, Section 9.4.
4. Amend the Communications Manual Chapter 9, section 9.4 to include: The
by combustible material in close proximity to a portable electrical heater in the rear of the
cellar. (See Diagram # 2) There was a delay in the notifIcation to 911. Occupants spent
some time searching the first floor for the source of smoke before realizing that the fIre
was in the cellar.
Initial Operations
Engine Company 290 transmitted a 10-75 for a fIfe in a two-story private
dwelling at 1340 hours. Engine Company 290 back stretched a P4-inch hose line to the
front of the fIfe building. The Engine Company 290 Officer reached the fIfe building
first and an occupant told him that the fIfe was in the cellar. The Engine Company 290
OffIcer opened the interior cellar door, located just inside the front entrance, and heavy
black smoke pushed out. He immediately closed the door and waited for the hose line to
be placed in position and charged.
Ladder Company 103, the fIfst due Ladder Company, arrived at approximately
1341 hours. The Ladder Company 103 Officer, the Ladder Company 103 Forcible Entry
FirefIghter, and Firefighter Sclafani, the Ladder Company 103 Can Firefighter (the Inside
Team) proceeded to the front stoop and donned their facepieces while waiting for Engine
Company 290's hose line to be charged.
The Ladder Company 103 Chauffeur Firefighter began to remove the cellar
window bars on the exposure #1 side. The Ladder Company 103 Roof Firefighter placed
a portable ladder on the exposure #4 side adjacent to the fIfst floor windows. He then
worked on removing the window bars on two rear cellar windows on the exposure #4
side before proceeding to the rear. Neither member completely removed these cellar
Page 13 of 62
window bars. The Ladder 103 Outside Vent Firefighter went to the rear and began
forcing the exterior rear cellar entrance door.
When Ladder Company 107 arrived, the Officer thought that the fire was on the
first floor due to heavy smoke venting out the front door. The Ladder Company 107
Inside Team went to the second floor and conducted a primary search. There was a light
smoke condition on the second floor with no fIre extension. The primary search on the
second floor was negative.
The Ladder Company 107 Chauffeur, Roof and Outside Ventilation Firefighters
began to remove the cellar and fIrst floor window bars on the exposure #1 side.
Initially, Engine Company 332 assisted Engine Company 290 in stretching their
hose line. Engine Company 332 then stretched a 1 %-inch hose line from the apparatus of
Engine Company 290 and charged it in front of the fIre building.
Engine Company 236 arrived as the third due Engine Company and teamed up
with Engine Company 290.
At approximately 1344 hours, the Ladder Company 103 Inside Team encountered
a heavy smoke condition as they opened the door leading to the cellar. Firefighter
Sclafani, the Ladder Company 103 Can Firefighter, began to descend the upper cellar
stair followed by the Ladder Company 103 Officer. Both members were able to walk
down the stairs upright; the heat condition was not severe at this time. The Ladder
Company 103 Forcible Entry Firefighter descended the upper cellar stair behind the
Ladder Company 103 Officer. When Firefighter Sclafani reached the half landing he
called out that there was a door. Firefighter Sclafani was at the wall on the half landing
that was straight ahead from the upper stair. The lower stair leading down to the cellar
from the half landing was behind Firefighter Sclafani and to his left. Firefighter Sclafani
said, "It's to the left", and then continued down the lower stair to the cellar followed by
the Ladder Company 103 Officer.
The Ladder Company 103 Forcible Entry Firefighter and the Engine Company
290 Officer descended the upper cellar stair followed by the hose line to the half landing.
The Ladder Company 103 Forcible Entry Firefighter was unable to descend the lower
stair to the cellar due to the conditions on the half landing.
While the Engine Company 290 Nozzle Firefighter advanced the hose line down
the upper cellar stair to the half landing, the Engine Company 290 Back Up Firefighter
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made a large loop in the hose line at the top of the upper cellar stair to assist in hose line
advancement. The large loop fell onto the Engine Company 290 Officer dislodging his
helmet. He did not have the protection of his helmet for the remainder of this ftre. The
Engine Company 290 Officer became entangled with the items stored on the half landing.
The heat condition increased signiftcantly. The Engine Company 290 Officer received
ftrst and second degree bums to his forehead at this time.
As the Ladder Company 103 Inside Team descended the interior cellar stairs, the
Ladder Company 103 Outside Ventilation Fireftghter forced open the exterior rear cellar
door. At approximately 1345 hours the Ladder Company 103 Outside Ventilation and
Roof Fireftghters teamed up and entered the door to conduct a primary search. They
encountered a heavy smoke condition. They were able to proceed into the cellar
approximately 10 feet before they were forced to withdraw to the rear yard due to the
expanding ftre condition. When they exited to the rear yard, ftre vented out of the rear
cellar window and exterior rear cellar door. Fire also vented out of the cellar windows on
the exposure #2 and exposure #4 sides of the ftre building. No handie-talkie
transmissions were made regarding the change in ftre conditions in the cellar at this time.
After completing a primary search on the second floor, the Ladder 107 Inside
Team proceeded to the rear via the alleyway on the exposure #4 side. The Ladder
Company 107 Forcible Entry Firefighter and the Ladder Company 107 Can Fireftghter
stopped to remove the cellar window bars on the exposure #4 side while the Officer
continued to the rear yard. The Ladder Company 107 Can Fireftghter attempted to
remove the middle cellar window bars and accidentally vented this window. The Ladder
Company 107 Forcible Entry Firefighter vented the rear cellar window. They were both
unable to remove the window bars, and immediately joined their Officer in the rear.
The extremely heavy smoke and swirling winds periodically obscured the rear of
the ftre building. The Ladder Company 107 Officer located the rear entrance to the cellar
and transmitted this information to Battalion 44. He also requested a hose line to this
location.
At approximately 1345 hours, the Engine Company 290 Officer ordered the
Engine 290 Nozzle Fireftghter, who was now on the half landing, to open the hose line
due to the high heat condition. The member operated the hose line for approximately ten
seconds and then shut the hose line down in order to reposition himself on the half
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landing. The Engine Company 290 Officer felt that the heat condition increased
significantly and ordered the hose line opened again. There was no visible fire on the
cellar stairs. The Ladder Company 103 Officer and Firefighter Sclafani were in the cellar
approximately eight to ten feet from the base of the stairs.
While operating in the cellar, the Ladder Company 103 Officer was unable to see
the screen of the thermal imaging camera due to the unusually heavy smoke condition.
The Ladder Company 103 Officer decided to leave the cellar when he heard Engine
Company 290's hose line operating. He told Firefighter Sclafani, "Let's go." Firefighter
Sclafani replied, "Okay." When they reached the base of the cellar stair, the Ladder
Company 103 Officer as well as the other members operating on the stairs then heard the
Engine Company 290 Officer call for everyone to get out.
At approximately 1346 hours, Battalion 44 arrived in front of the fire building and
noticed the window bars covering the cellar and fITst floor windows. Battalion 44
requested an additional Engine Company and Ladder Company due to the presence of
window bars. Battalion 44 observed fITe venting from the exposure #2 side cellar
window.
Battalion 44 ordered Engine Company 332 to reposition their hose line to the rear.
As Engine Company 332 was repositioning their hose line via the alleyway on the
exposure #4 side; they observed fITe venting from the two rear cellar windows on the
exposure #4 side.
At approximately 1346 hours, the Ladder Company 103 Officer and Firefighter
Sclafani were craw ling up the lower stair from the cellar. The Ladder Company 103
Officer stated that Firefighter Sclafani was right behind him, at his feet, as they craw led
up to the half landing. Engine Company 290's hose line was being directed toward the
exposure #2 wall on the half landing. As the Ladder Company 103 Officer reached the
half landing, there was congestion with other members who were exiting. At that time,
the Ladder Company 103 Officer heard Firefighter Sclafani who was behind him state in
a muffled tone, "Let's go, Let's go."
There was no visibility due to the heavy black smoke. The Engine Company 290
Nozzle Firefighter operated the hose line from the half landing to protect the members
who were exiting the cellar. The Engine Company 290 Nozzle Firefighter stated that
after one member passed by him, another member then passed him in a more frantic state
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and a third member collided with him. The force of the collision caused the Engine
Company 290 Nozzle Firefighter to be knocked down onto his back. His helmet and
facepiece were dislodged. The use of the chinstrap prevented his helmet and facepiece
from becoming completely dislodged. He shut down the nozzle, placed it on the stair,
and exited the building via the front entrance.
After reaching the front stoop, the Ladder Company 103 Officer and the Ladder
Company 103 Forcible Entry Firefighter immediately realized that Firefighter Sclafani
did not exit the building with them. The Ladder Company 103 Officer returned to the top
of the cellar stairs and heard a Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) alarm sounding. He
stated that he heard air escaping under pressure from a SCBA. The Ladder Company 103
Officer stated that the airflow had a high-pitched sound. He stated that this sound
differed from the sound of an undonned SCBA facepiece without the manual shut off
button depressed. On hearing the PASS alarm and high-pitched airflow, the Ladder
Company 103 Officer transmitted a MAYDAY via his handie-talkie. The time was
approximately 1348 hours.
Battalion 44 did not hear the Ladder Company 103 Officer transmit a MAYDAY.
Immediately after this MA YDA Y was transmitted, Battalion 44 ordered via handie-talkie
for all "Trucks" to get off the fIrst floor until a hose line was in position. Battalion 44's
strategy was to extinguish this fire via the exterior rear cellar entrance. His tactics were
to have Engine Company 290 maintain their position of protecting the fIrst floor with
their hose line while Engine Company 332 attacked the fIre via the exterior rear cellar
entrance.
The heat venting up the interior cellar stairs had intensified. Visibility on the stairs
was zero. The Engine Company 290 Officer located at the top of the stairs also heard the
sound of pressurized air at the half landing. He stated that it sounded like the airflow
from the SCBA was "quicker" than when the manual shut off of the SCBA is not
depressed.
The Ladder Company 103 Officer called for Engine Company 290's hose line.
The Engine Company 290 Officer pulled the hose line up the stairs. The Engine
Company 290 Officer then gave the nozzle to the Engine Company 290 Back Up
Firefighter who operated the hose line down the stairs from the fIrst floor. The Ladder
Company 103 Officer was on the fIrst floor when his helmet was dislodged after being
Page 17 of 62
struck by the stream. He did not have the protection of his helmet for the remainder of
the fire.
The Ladder Company 103 Officer and the Ladder Company 103 Forcible Entry
Firefighter descended the upper cellar stair to locate and remove Firefighter Sclafani
under the protection of Engine Company 290's hose line. The Ladder Company 103
Officer immediately found Firefighter Sclafani unconscious, in a prone position, with his
upper torso on the half landing and his waist and legs on the lower stair. (See diagram #
1) The Ladder Company 103 Officer immediately transmitted a second MA YDA Y via
the handie-talkie stating that the member was on the stairs. Several members believed
that the member in distress made this transmission. The two MA YDAYS transmitted by
the Ladder Company 103 Officer were approximately one minute apart. The time of the
second MAYDA Y was approximately 1349 hours.
The second MAYDAY was acknowledged and Battalion 44 ordered a second
alarm transmitted. The Battalion 44 Firefighter transmitted a second alarm at 1349 hours
and stated, "We have a MAYDAY for a member on the first floor." Battalion 44 ordered
Engine Company 236 to stretch a second hose line to the front of the fire building.
The Engine Company 290 Officer decided to have his hose line continue to
operate from the first floor down into the half landing area to protect the removal
operation. He believed that Firefighter Sclafani would be removed quickly and did not
want to block the stairs impeding Firefighter Sclafani's removal.
The Ladder Company 103 Officer stated that when he reached Firefighter
Sclafani on the half landing, Firefighter Sclafani's helmet and facepiece were not on.
The Ladder Company 103 Officer stated that Firefighter Sclafani's PASS Alarm was
sounding at this time. The Ladder Company 103 Officer and Ladder Company 103
Forcible Entry Firefighter were unable to remove Firefighter Sclafani. The Ladder
Company 103 Officer and the Ladder Company 103 Forcible Entry Firefighter continued
to operate on the half landing in a high heat and heavy smoke condition for
approximately five to six minutes. Their air supply was nearly depleted. They were
physically exhausted and left the building via the front entrance. The time was
approximately 1354 hours.
Ladder Company 120 arrived as the Firefighter Assist and Search Team (FAST
Unit) and heard the second MAYDAY transmission. They reported in to Battalion 44 in
Page 18 of62
front of the fire building and were assigned to the MAYDA Y operation. Ladder
Company 120 attempted to enter the ftre building via the front stoop. They were unable
to enter due to numerous members positioned on the exterior front stoop.
On arrival, Rescue Company 2 heard the second MAYDAY transmission. The
Rescue Company 2 Officer arrived in front of the fire building after Ladder Company
120 was assigned to the rescue effort and split his company into two teams to locate the
downed member. One team went to the rear while his team attempted to gain access
through the front door. The Rescue Company 2 Officer and the Ladder Company 120
Officer were both now on the front stoop attempting to gain access. Battalion 44 ordered
arrived on the scene. They reported into Battalion 44 and were ordered to fmd another
point of entry into the cellar to address the MAYDAY. Squad Company 252 proceeded
to the rear.
Battalion 58 reported into Battalion 44 and was ordered to supervise operations in
the rear at approximately 1351 hours.
Division 15 arrived in front of the ftre building and assumed command after a
brief exchange of information with Battalion 44. Division 15 ordered Battalion 44 to
supervise the rescue operation. The time was approximately 1353 hours.
Initial Operations in the Rear
As the operations were being conducted in the front, members converged near the
rear entrance stair. Engine Company 332's charged hose line was standing fast in the
rear yard at the exposure #2 - #3 comer. The Engine Company 332 Officer attempted to
contact both Battalion 44 and Engine Company 290 several times via hand ie-talkie to
request permission to advance the hose line into the cellar. The Engine Company 332
Officer wanted to ensure that his hose line would not be in opposition to Engine
Page 19 of62
Company 290' s hose line. While theEngine Company 332 Officer was trying to contact
Battalion 44, he observed fire venting out of the cellar window on the exposure #2 side,
extending up the exterior of the fire building to the underside of the eaves. Engine
Company 332 extinguished this fITe on the exterior without the stream entering the cellar
window. The Engine Company 332 Officer was then mistakenly informed by a member
in the rear yard that Engine Company 290 was out of the cellar and in front of the fITe
building. The Engine Company 332 Officer then ordered his hose line advanced through
the exterior rear cellar door to extinguish the fITe in the cellar. The time was
approximately 1353 hours.
Initial Operations in the Front
As Engine Company 332 was knocking down the fITe on the exposure #2 side,
Engine Company 290 operated their hose line from the top of the upper cellar stairs just
inside the front entrance. When the Engine Company 290 Back Up Firefighter's vibralert
alarm activated, he handed the nozzle to the Engine Company 290 Door Firefighter
directly behind him. The Engine Company 290 Back Up Firefighter then left the fITe
building via the front door to replace his SCBA cylinder. The Engine Company 290
Door Firefighter operated the hose line at this location for approximately two minutes
and then began to advance the hose line down the upper cellar stair. During this time, the
Ladder Company 103 Officer and the Ladder Company 103 Forcible Entry Firefighter
ascended the upper stair and exited the fire building via the front door.
The Engine Company 290 Door Firefighter was unaware of Firefighter Sclafani's
location as he advanced the nozzle down the upper stair unassisted. On reaching the half
landing, he discovered Firefighter Sclafani. The Engine Company 290 Door Firefighter
shut the nozzle down and laid it on the half landing. Engine Company 290's hose line did
not operate again until after Firefighter Sclafani was removed from the fITe building.
The Engine Company 290 Door Firefighter attempted to pull Firefighter Sclafani
up the stairs, but was unable to do so. The Engine Company 290 Door Firefighter stated
that there was a heavy object (coat rack) on top of Firefighter Sclafani that he was unable
to remove. The Engine Company 290 Door Firefighter re-positioned himself on the half
landing at the lower stair but was still unsuccessful in his attempt to remove him. The
time was now approximately 1356 hours.
Page 20 of62
When the Ladder Company J03 Officer was exiting the front door, he informed
the Rescue Company 2 Officer that Firefighter Sclafani was right there on the stairs. The
Rescue Company 2 Officer and the Rescue Company 2 Can Firefighter proceeded down
the upper cellar stair to the half landing and operated with the Engine Company 290 Door
Firefighter. The Rescue Company 2 Officer stated that he heard the PASS alarm
sounding at this time. There was an extremely high heat condition and zero visibility.
With great difficulty, the Rescue Company 2 Officer removed the 70-pound metal
coat rack that was on top of Firefighter Sclafani. The Rescue Company 2 Officer stated
that he then verbally called for a Life Saving Rope to assist in the removal of Firefighter
Sclafani. While operating with Rescue Company 2, the Engine Company 290 Door
Firefighter's vibralert alarm activated. The Engine Company 290 Door Firefighter then
exited the fire building via the front entrance at approximately 1358 hours.
The Rescue Company 2 Officer attempted several times to get Firefighter
Sclafani's body into a position for removal. He stated that he made a handie-talkie
transmission requesting assistance. This handie-talkie transmission was never
acknowledged. After a short period of time, he was handed some nylon tubular webbing
by the Rescue Company Can Firefighter and was unsuccessful in his attempt to attach the
webbing to Firefighter Sclafani. The heat condition on the half landing was becoming
untenable.
The Rescue Company 2 Officer was aware that there was a hose line on the half
landing. The Rescue Company 2 Officer ordered the Rescue Company 2 Can Firefighter
to find the nozzle, and get the hose line into operation. The Rescue Company 2 Can
Firefighter located the nozzle but was unable to move it because the hose line was
entangled in the items on the half landing. At approximately 1402 hours, the intense heat
forced these members of Rescue Company 2 to exit the building via the front entrance.
When the Rescue Company 2 Officer reached the front entranceway, he
transmitted the following message via handie-talkie:
"Rescue 2 to 1-5 Urgent. We have to have a line at this front door."
Division 15 replied, " Repeat Rescue."
Rescue 2 Officer replied, "We have to have another hose line at this front door to make it
to Division 15. Ladder Company 120 went to the exposure #4 alleyway and assisted
carrying the Ladder Company 103 Roof Firefighter to the front yard. The Ladder
Company 103 Roof Firefighter was then turned over to EMS. The Ladder Company 103
Roof Firefighter was transported to Brookdale Hospital by EMS where he was treated
and released.
The Ladder Company 103 Outside Ventilation Fireftghter was also searching in
the cellar. His vibralert alarm activated. While attempting to locate the rear cellar door,
the Ladder Company 103 Outside Ventilation Fireftghter saw the cellar window on the
exposure #2 side and exited through this window. The Ladder Company 170 Chauffeur,
who was in the driveway on the exposure #2 side, assisted him out the cellar window.
The time was approximately 1403 hours.
Engine Company 332 operated in the cellar for approximately 10 minutes and
extinguished most of the fire in the cellar before their hose line developed a hole.
Battalion 58 ordered Engine Company 231 to bring their hose line into the cellar to
replace Engine Company 332's hose line. Battalion 58 notifted Division 15 that he was
switching the hose lines in the cellar.
Operations in the Front
Several members of Squad Company 252, Ladder Company 120 and Ladder
Company 107 were operating together on the ftrst floor. They searched the first floor,
and then removed the sheetrock around the cellar stairway enclosure on the first floor in
members were with Fireftghter Sclafani when they found him. The heat condition on the
half landing made it impossible to operate without the protection of a hose line. The
Page 23 of62
Engine Company 225 Officer and Engine Company 225 Nozzle Firefighter ascended the
upper stair to the front door. As the members of Engine Company 236 donned their face
pieces near the front entrance, the Engine Company 225 Officer told them to bring their
hose line down the stairs and to the left.
As the Engine Company 225 Officer exited the fire building, the Squad Company
252 Hook Firefighter descended the upper stair to the half landing and found Firefighter
Sclafani. Squad 252 Hook Firefighter was alone with Firefighter Sclafani at this time.
He realized that a hose line was needed and went back up the stairs to get a hose line.
Engine Company 236 entered the first floor of the fire building via the front entrance and
began to advance the hose line down the upper cellar stair at approximately 1404 hours.
The Squad Company 252 Hook Firefighter met the Engine Company 236 Nozzle
Firefighter at the top of the upper stair and guided him past Firefighter Sclafani to the
lower stair. As Engine Company 236 slowly descended the lower stair to the cellar floor
they opened their hose line and extinguished visible fire. They continued to operate the
hose line, advancing approximately ten feet into the cellar. Conditions on the half
landing improved significantly once this hose line was in operation between the fire and
Firefighter Sclafani. The time was now approximately 1406 hours.
As Engine Company 236 advanced their hose line in the front of the cellar, the
Engine Company 236 Officer stated the unusual heat conditions indicated there could be
an opposing hose line. He notified Battalion 44 via handie-talkie. Battalion 44 directed
Battalion 58 to have Engine Company 231' s hose line shut down and have them back out
of the rear of the cellar.
The Rescue Company 2 Officer, and the Rescue Company 2 Can and Hook
Firefighters followed Engine Company 236's hoseline down the upper cellar stair to the
half landing. They joined with the Squad Company 252 Hook Firefighter, who was
already operating at this location. The Rescue Company 2 Officer was handed one end of
a life saving rope and attempted to wrap it around Firefighter Sclafani's torso. Before
this could be accomplished, members operating outside the fire building prematurely
pulled the rope out of the Rescue Company 2 Officer's hand. The Rescue Company 2's
Hook Firefighter, who was operating on the upper stair, maintained a hold on the rope
and was able to pass the end of the rope back down to the half landing. The Rescue
Company 2 Officer and the Squad Company 252 Hook Firefighter then attached the rope
Page 24 of62
to Firefighter Sclafani's SCBA shoulder strap. Numerous members outside the fire
building were then directed to pull on the rope and Firefighter Sclafani moved slightly.
The Rescue Company 2 Officer and the Squad Company 252 Hook Firefighter
were able to partially descend the lower cellar stair to pivot Firefighter Sclafani's legs up
onto the half landing. Members on the outside, utilizing the attached life saving rope,
were then able to pull Firefighter Sclafani from the half landing to the front stoop.
Firefighter Sclafani was face down as he was moved up the stairs. The Rescue Company
2 Can and Rescue Company 2 Hook Firefighters located on the upper cellar stair kept
Firefighter Sclafani's face and head off the steps as he was moved out of the frre
the open position. The low-pressure hose was separated between the quick
connect and the pressure reducer assembly. If the facepiece was removed without
the manual shut off button depressed or if the low-pressure hose was severed, then
the air supply in the cylinder would deplete at a minimum rate of 400 liters per
minute. A full 45-minute cylinder has approximately 1835 liters of air and would
be depleted in approximately four to five minutes. The SCBA, facepiece and
cylinder were sent to Intertek Testing Services for analysis
4. The low-pressure hose on Firefighter Sclafani's SCBA was found separated
between the quick connect coupling and the pressure reducer assembly. The
damaged SCBA was sent to Intertek Testing Services for analysis. The low
pressure hose was evaluated for resistance to splitting during an applied heat load
and flex. A pristine sample of a low-pressure hose was subjected to multiple
energy types and then flexed approximately 135 degrees in an effort to replicate
delay.
20. The adverse weather conditions played a key role in the operations at this fIre.
The fire took place in the aftermath of a bfuz;a-with accumulations between 12
and 18 inches of snow. The temperature on this day only reached a high of 20
degrees with a wind chill factor near zero degrees. The average wind speed was
24 miles per hour with gusting winds of up to 48 mph. Although response was
Incident Commander.
Information transmitted via handi-talkie was at times incomplete.
The exact location and nature of injuries were not transmitted to the
Incident Commander.
The fIrst MAYDAY transmitted was not acknowledged.
The Incident Commander ordered all Ladder Company members off
the fIrst floor. This order was not directed to specific units, was not
Page 31 of62
acknowledged, and no further action was taken to ensure
compliance.
22. Procedures outlined in AVC 314, Incident Command and Safety Investigations,
were not fully implemented by the Incident Commander to secure the scene.
-
-
23. The frre building, 577 Jerome Street, was found to have lightweight, laminated
wood I-beam floor joists throughout the building. The wood I-beams in the cellar
ceiling were protected by 5/8 inch sheetrock. The sheetrock in the cellar ceiling
was compromised in one small area near a pipe recess. Three wood I-beams
adjacent to the pipe recess sustained frre damage. Platform construction
prevented frre extension to the floors above even though there was a heavy frre
condition in the cellar.
24. There was no cms card on record for this building, which was constructed in
1999. The Bureau of Fire Prevention did not receive the required notification as
per Department of Buildings Technical Policy Procedure Notice 8/92 for
buildings with lightweight wood I beam construction. The administrative unit
was not aware of this use of lightweight wood I beam construction.
25. The "Smart Mic" (Model # RMN5023 SP01) was being field tested by the
members of Rescue Company 2 on their handie-talkie model XTS3500. Two
members reported that they were unable to transmit or receive messages after
their "Smart Mic" became wet while operating in the cellar. The "Smart Mics"
being field tested by Rescue Company 2 were removed from service following
this frre.
26. The Ladder Company 103 Officer attempted to use the thermal imaging camera in
the cellar. He was unable to see the screen because of the heavy dense smoke
condition.
Page 32 of 62
27. Members vented cellar windows on the exposure #4 side, and other members
performed YES via the rear exterior cellar entrance door, without the approval of
I
different areas relating to this subject. This guide would provide that all related
information is incorporated into an inclusive publication for reference.
7. Re-evaluate Firefighting Procedures Volume 1, Book 6, Private Dwellings,
Chapter 3, section 2, pertaining to first due Engine and Ladder Company
operations at cellar fires in private dwellings having an exterior cellar entrance.
conditions found, coordinate VES with the Inside Team, and vent the fire
area/room when ordered. This information is contained in Firefighting Procedures
Private Dwellings.
10. Equip each Ladder, Rescue and Squad Company with an additional SCBA to be
taken by the unit assigned or designated as the FAST Unit. This will provide a
dedicated and readily available air supply for the distressed member.
11. Amend AUC 320, FIREFIGHTER ASSIST AND SEARCH TEAM - FAST
UNIT, to specify member assignments. This should include designating a
member to ensure that the distressed member has an adequate air supply.
12. Re-emphasize the importance of the FAST Unit bringing the full complement of
FAST tools and equipment to the Command Post or Operations Post.
Page 36 of62
13. Reinforce to all members the need to maintain building entrances and stairways
unimpeded. Stairway Management must be conducted at all operations for the
safety of members and effective operations. Every level of command has a
responsibility to ensure that the stairs are not overcrowded and can be rapidly
used as either a means of egress or access in case of an emergency. They are not
to be used as staging areas.
To alleviate overcrowding on stairways:
Chief Officers should assign only the units or members necessary to
accomplish a task. They shall ensure that companies maintain operational
discipline.
Company Officers must control members to ensure that they do not
impede access or egress on a stairway or at a building entrance. They
shall ensure that members maintain operational discipline.
Firefighters on a stairway must be conducting active operations. Standing
fast on a stairway is dangerous and unacceptable.
14. Re-emphasize that handie-talkie transmissions must be concise and directed to
specific members or units. Unacknowledged transmissions must be regarded as
not being received, and will need to be retransmitted. If handie-talkie
communications cannot be established, consider using alternate means such as
sending a member with the message.
15. Re-emphasize to all Chief Officers the importance of transmitting preliminary and
progress reports as required by the Communications Manual. When a Battalion
or Division is not staffed with a regularly assigned or trained Firefighter, the
Chief Officer must ensure these vital communications are transmitted.
16. Battalion and Division Commanders must ensure that units in their command are
staffed with an appropriate number of Firefighters trained to work as Battalion
and Division Firefighters.
Page 37 of62
17. Re-emphasize the importance of notifying the dispatcher when the FAST Unit is
put to work. This notification will ensure that the dispatcher immediately assigns
exterior hose line to protect civilians or members trapped behind the window bars
inside the building or members removing the window bars. "
21. All Unit Circular 314, Incident Command and Safety Investigations, to
incorporate appropriate subsections of sections 5, 6, 7, and 9 of All Unit Circular
317, Ciime Scene Operations,.to ensure the frre scene is immediately secured and
properly documented. The proper safeguarding of the fire scene and equipment is