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Guide to Trust
Services
What's New
This guide examines trust services from the
Reference perspective of open information interchange. It
Business Guides has the following structure:
Standards List
Standards Fora List 1. A System of Trust
RTD Project List 2. Trusted Third Parties
3. The Building Blocks of Trust
News 4. Examples of Trust Services
Electronic Commerce
Information Management
This guide should be read in conjunction with the
Information Society RTD
Standards Conferences Diffuse Guide to Information Security, which
provides further information on the guidelines,
User Support criteria and technical building blocks for the
Index management and use of trusted third party
Search services, as well as guidelines on the
Help Desk management of information security in general.
Background 1. A System of Trust
About IST
About Diffuse
Diffuse FAQ
A System of Trust is an environment whereby
RTD Initiatives entities (Administrations, Businesses,
IPR Statement Consumers) may trade or transact with each
Disclaimer other with the confidence that all entities are who
they claim to be, conduct business in accordance
with their functional obligations, and in which all
exchanges between parties are secure.
It should be noted that 'security' is a subjective
term, but may be defined as an acceptable
balance of threats against safeguards for a
particular circumstance. Central to a system of
trust is an acceptable level of security for a given
task or activity. Further information is provided

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in the Guide to Information Security.


In open information interchange, and particularly
in the context of Electronic Commerce, a trusted
system typically involves the presence of one or
more third parties who act as an intermediary
between the main transacting entities. Such
intermediaries may change the value of the
transaction by altering or adding to it (e.g. a
goods forwarding agent). Alternatively, they may
provide information/support services which do
not fundamentally alter the value of the
transaction itself (e.g. electronic catalogue
hosting). These intermediaries are termed
'Trusted Third Parties' or 'TTPs'; they collectively
provide the 'System of Trust'.
TTPs are widespread and divergent. They are
present in the traditional trading environments,
for example, a bank as a TTP between a buyer
and a seller; or in less apparent environments, for
example, a security alarm company as a TTP
between a household and the police. Within the
context of an electronic open information
interchange environment, the status and
implementation of a system of trust and the use
of TTPs are of considerable interest and
importance. Two features highlight the
importance of the role of TTPs:
! Electronic Commerce has brought new
business models and practices to the trading
environment and user confidence is required
for the new electronic systems. TTPs can
significantly enhance confidence in these
systems
! The global and virtual nature of Electronic
Commerce means that buyers and sellers

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often do not, and need not, have any


physical contact or direct knowledge of each
other. TTPs can be used to provide such a
link.

As well as the confidence in the management of


the infrastructure of a trusted environment, users
would need to be satisfied that there is an
adequate technical environment available so that
the transactions within that environment can
themselves be trusted.
Moreover, in the context of open information
interchange, users would need to know more
about the content so that they can decide whether
or not to retrieve an information object or who is
associated with an object that is provided. If the
information object is a report, who has reviewed
the report and given it a "seal of approval"? Does
the information really originate from the claimed
author? If the information object is a software
program, who has checked it to see that it does
what it claims to do and does not contain any
viruses? What computing resource does it need?
What support is available for it?

Users therefore require information about the


information ("meta-information") so that they
can reach conclusions about trusting what is
provided via open networks such as the Internet.
Underpinning trust services is a Common Trust
Management Environment. The main aspects of
this environment are:
! Provisioning and operation of Trusted Third
Parties and specific services that TTPs offer
! Technical building blocks to provide a
common and interoperable basis for the

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system of trust -- The Building Blocks of


Trust.

2. Trusted Third Parties


2.1 Overview
Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) offer a vehicle by
which an entity can deliver assurances between
its subdivisions, between itself and its customers,
and between itself and its correspondent
institutions. An institution may choose to set up
an internal TTP function or use an external
provider of TTP services. The provision of TTP
function/services includes the provision of
guidance for designing and implementing a TTP,
management and operation of the TTP, and the
interworking of TTPs.
Entities that intend to use TTP services should
consider the following aspects of trusted
services, which are particularly important for
most communities:

! Generic security requirements of TTPs


! Establishment of a security policy
! Provision of security solutions and
mechanisms
! Operational use and management of TTP
service security
! Responsibilities of TTPs
! Services levels which TTP's can provide
! Interworking constraints/rules of TTPs
! The roles, positions and relationships of
TTPs and other related entities (e.g. network
service providers, end users, etc.)

These can be categorized and are addressed in

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the following subsections.


! Management and Operation
! Network of TTPs
! Basic Obligations
! Basic Services
! Supplementary Services.

2.2 Management and Operation


A TTP function, whether internally or externally
provided, can only add value when the users of
the services are assured of the quality of the TTP
function. Before contracting with a provider or
starting operation of an internal system, the entity
must satisfy itself that the following issues are
addressed (these issues are often known as
assurances):

! Trust: Is the TTP organized, controlled and


regulated in such a way that its operation
can be relied upon, checked and verified?
! Accreditation: Is the TTP accredited by
recognized national, regional, or
international groups?
! Quality of service: For example, when is the
TTP service available? What is the minimal
level of service offered?
! Audit and accountability: Are the quality of
service criteria being met? How is this
independently proven? To whom is the TTP
accountable if the criteria are not met?
! Compliance: Is the TTP operating in
compliance with accepted industry standards
and all relevant regulation?
! Contract: Is there a legally binding contract
in place covering the provision of service
and addressing all the relevant issues? Are

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there contracts with co-operating TTPs that


also address these concerns?
! Liability: Is there a clear understanding as to
issues of liability? Under what circumstances
is the TTP liable for damages? Does the TTP
have sufficient resources or insurance to
meet its potential liabilities?
! Policy Statement: Does the TTP have a
security policy covering technical,
administrative, procedural and organizational
requirements?
! Confidentiality: How is the confidentiality of
information ensured?

Standards and Specifications


There are no specific standards within
this area. The following generic
architecture specifications are, however,
of relevance:
! ISO/IEC 10181:1996 Information
technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems. (Part
1: Overview; Part 2: Authentication
framework; Part 3: Access control
framework; Part 4: Non-repudiation
framework; Part 5: Confidentiality
framework; Part 6: Integrity framework; Part
7: Security audit and alarms framework)
! ISO/IEC TR 13335:1996 Information
technology - Security techniques - Guidelines
for IT Security (GMITS)
! ISO/IEC 15408 Information technology --
Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for
IT Security
! ISO/IEC TR 15443 A framework for IT
security assurance
! ISO/IEC 15446 Guide on the Production of

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Protection Profiles and Security Techniques


! ETSI EG 201 057 V1.1.2 (1997)
Requirements for TTP services
! BS 7799:1999 British Standard for
Information Security Management
! ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Information
technology -- Code of practice for
information security management
(equivalent to BS 7799-1:1999)
! US DoD 5200.28-STD (December 1985)
Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria
! US NIST Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation
! The Open Group Common Data Security
Architecture (CDSA)

Please refer to the Guide to Electronic


Commerce Regulation regarding developments in
this area.

2.3 Network of TTPs


The electronic TTP concept is relatively new and
a network of co-operating TTPs must be
developed before the full potential of TTPs will
be realized. This network must be developed
whilst ensuring that TTPs can independently
maintain their assurances. The fact that
competition between TTPs suppliers may reduce
costs at the expense of offering reduced levels of
service must be balanced against the fact that
there should be open competition of TTP
suppliers to ensure free market principles. This is
most often addressed, as it is with other service
industries (e.g. banks), via the availability of
supervisory or licensing authorities.

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It is of paramount importance to preserve


confidence to all parties dealing with TTPs. The
two principles for such a network are a
dichotomy:
! Mutual Co-operation and Respect -- through
Co-operation guidelines
! Isolation and Self-security -- through
Separating trusted networks
2.3.1 Co-operation guidelines

In order to support a network of Trusted


Services, individual services have to make
mutual recognition agreements with each other
about, for example, cross certification of each
other's certificates and mutual liability with
respect both to the services offered and the
holding of, or access to, related keys. These
mutual agreements are much easier and more
effective if there are generally agreed codes of
practice and management guidelines for the
operation of trusted services. Accreditation of
trusted services promotes development and
acceptance of the services. Agreements then have
to be made between service providers and users
about their mutual responsibilities and liabilities
concerning the services offered and the
cryptographic keys associated with them.

Standards and Specifications


! ISO/IEC CD TR 14516: Guidelines for the
use and management of Trusted Third
Parties. (common text for proposed ITU-T
Recommendation X.842)
2.3.2 Separating trusted networks

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With networks being joined together in a web of


trust, it is prudent for organizations to protect
their networks from the external world with
respect to security threats such as hackers and, to
an extent, viruses. This is particularly apparent in
a web that joins enterprise networks with
uncontrolled, open networks such as the Internet.
'Firewalls' are the term given to devices
(hardware and/or software) whose purpose is to
establish such safe connections by standing
between elements of a network system. A
firewall is a collection of components that
controls the traffic flow between networks,
generally based on content, request or origin.
Such a system may permit or deny network
traffic according to an organization's defined
security policy on which traffic should be
permitted and which should be blocked.
Firewalls can solve all security problems, for
example, 'inside' jobs or application level issues.
Basic security issues include: can a malicious
client:
! Get access to sensitive data
! Trick the server to perform illegal operations
! Trick a programme to perform illegal
operations
! Upload and execute an external program.

There are two different approaches to build a


firewall: advanced packet screen/filtering works
at the network level and application level
gateways, usually defined as proxy. The most
efficient firewalls are based on combinations of
both.

Standards and Specifications

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! RFC 1928 (IETF): SOCKS Protocol Version


5. Security of messages passed across
firewalls
! RFC 1929 (IETF): Username/Password
Authentication for SOCKS V5. Security of
messages passed across firewalls
! IEEE 802.10 Interoperable LAN Security
(SILS). Security of local, wide and
metropolitan area networks.

See Firewalls and System Security in


the Information Security Standards
section of the Diffuse Standards and
Specifications List for further
information.

2.4 Basic Obligations


There are a number of legal issues that are of
special concern in connection to TTPs:
! Archival and retrieval: The level of
requirements for record retrieval. The
contract with a TTP should be specific about
issues relating to maintenance of keys used
for encryption, authentication, and digital
signatures, as these may need to be
reproduced many years after the transactions
for which they were used.
! Liability: Liability for the misfeasance,
malfeasance, or non-feasance ('feasance'
being condition or obligation) of the TTP to
include direct and consequential damages
must also be fully understood and agreed
upon. The TTP must have adequate financial
reserves or insurance to meet any liability.
! Privacy: Institutions in many jurisdictions,
particularly those relating to financial or

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ethical professions, are obliged to protect the


privacy rights of individuals, especially
safeguarding personal data. These
obligations are sometimes at odds with the
requirement of law enforcement to access
information. The contract with an external
TTP, or the operating procedures of an
internal TTP must address both these
concerns.

See section 3.5 for a wider discussion on privacy


practices and agreement.

Standards and Specifications


See section 3.5 for specifications in the
privacy area.

2.5 Basic Services


The basic services of a TTP are: generation of
cryptographic material, key escrow, key
distribution, key revocation, certification,
directory, authentication etc. Often these are
enveloped into what is termed a 'Public Key
Infrastructure'. They are discussed in detail in the
Key Infrastructure section of the Guide to
Information Security.

2.6 Supplementary Services


2.6.1 Overview

There are many additional services that can be


offered in a TTP network. These are termed
'Supplementary', 'End' or 'Ancillary' services. As
the Electronic Commerce age develops, it is
highly likely that the list of example services (see
below) will grow significantly. Some of the more
major/apparent activities are described within the

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following subsections:
! Archive: The deposit of information
! Timestamping: Providing evidentiary time
stamps to records or transactions
! Non-repudiation: Ensuring evidence of
transmission or origination
! Entity authentication: Ensuring the
correctness of the entities involved
! Notary: The attestation that something has
been done
! Audit: The recording of some action
! Reliability assessment: An entity advising
others who receive digital signatures about
the reasonableness of reliance on those
digital signatures
! Message corroboration service: A person
who creates a hash result to fix the message
content and then timestamps the message
and/or hash result. Message corroboration
relates only to message content and timing
and does not include a digital signature, so it
provides no evidence of the origin of the
message
! Information brokering: An intermediary in
the relationship between the user of
information and the provider
! Payment and billing: Taking payment from
users of information and other electronically
distributed goods on behalf of providers, for
example a copyright use and billing service
! Financial responsibility service: A person
aiding a certification authority in satisfying
the financial responsibility requirements.
Such a person could be a surety issuing a
bond, a bank issuing a letter of credit or a
liability insurance carrier.

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! Registration services: Holding information


about the attributes of a person or legal
entity; this service can also be seen as a
support service to a service such as access
control
! Directory services: Providing information
about persons or legal entities so that they
can be contacted or their certificates can be
located
! Electronic messaging -- e.g. via Value
Added Networks.

In general, for each service, codes of practice and


guidelines as well as technical specifications are
required to enable providers to define the service,
its quality, the agreements to be made by
providers of the service with other providers, and
the agreements to be made by users of the service
with the providers.
2.6.2 Archive services

Record keeping is required for a certification


authority, repository and users of trust services.
The records may be kept off-line for backup
purposes, for occasional reference, for risk
management, or for any other legal purpose. An
archive service differs from a repository in that
the archive needs not be readily accessible on-
line, but should be durable in light of available
technology. Retention needs and duration will
vary depending on the requirements or standards
established by applicable law, records retention
and other management policies. Archived records
besides certificates may be needed in dispute
resolution to support the certification authorities
identification of the subscriber, other
representations in the certificate, or possibly the

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basis for revoking the certificate.

Standards and Specifications


There are no known specific standards
in this field.

For general information on archiving,


see the Guide to Archiving.
2.6.3 Timestamping services

Often it is necessary to timestamp a transaction


since the message may be time critical (e.g. proof
of transmission date) or may be useful if
problems are generated later in the business
cycle. For example, if the certificate of a public
key is cancelled on the grounds that the
corresponding secret key has been compromised,
a previously calculated digital signature by the
said secret key would retain its legal value, if an
independent timestamping service had taken
place before the cancellation of the certificate.
The user simply collects any number of digital
signatures over a period of time (e.g. one day,
one month, ...) and sends it off to a TTP for
timestamping. The TTP adds the timestamp and a
digital signature and returns the message.

Standards and Specifications


A series of Internet X.509
specifications has been developed by
the IETF Public-Key Infrastructure
(X.509) (pkix) working group
2.6.4 Non-repudiation services

The purpose of non-repudiation services is to


collect, maintain, make available and validate
irrefutable evidence. They are based on

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mechanisms providing evidence generated by


non-repudiation certificates using symmetric or
asymmetric cryptographic techniques. A clearly
defined security policy for a particular
application and its legal environment is a pre-
requisite for a non-repudiation service. Non-
repudiation certificates establish accountability
of information about a particular event or action
to its originating entity. Non-repudiation
mechanisms are specified to establish the
following:

! Non-repudiation of origin
! Non-repudiation of delivery
! Non-repudiation of submission
! Non-repudiation of transport.

The mechanisms typically consist of non-


repudiation certificates, non-repudiation tokens,
and protocols. Non-repudiation certificates
require a TTP as an evidence generating
authority when symmetric cryptographic
algorithms are used. When asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms are used, digital
signatures of the data communicated are assured
by public key certificates issued by a certification
authority. Non-repudiation tokens consist of one
or more non-repudiation certificates and,
optionally, additional data. Non-repudiation
tokens may be stored as evidence that may be
used later on by disputing parties or by an
adjudicator to arbitrate disputes. Non-repudiation
protocols specify the exchange of non-
repudiation tokens specific for each non-
repudiation service.

Symmetric techniques rely on the existence of a


mutually trusted TTP. The ISO non-repudiation

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standard describes two mechanisms, one of which


requires that the TTP is on-line for the generation
and verification of evidence. The other
mechanism has distribution of keys before the
event for which evidence is required and so the
TTP can be off-line.
Asymmetric techniques describe non-repudiation
mechanisms using digital signatures. A TTP is
required to support some of the mechanisms
described to perform evidence generation,
evidence transmission, evidence recording and
evidence verification. Non-repudiation of origin
and non-repudiation of delivery can be supported
without the direct involvement of a TTP. They
can also be provided with the use of a TTP, as
must non-repudiation of submission and non-
repudiation of transport. Mechanisms for
supporting services such as obtaining public-key
certificates and revocation information, as well as
time stamping and evidence recording, are
required.

Standards and Specifications


! ISO/IEC 13888: Non-repudiation: (Part 1:
General model; Part 2: Using symmetric
techniques; Part 3: Using asymmetric
techniques)
! ISO/IEC 10181:1996 Information
technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems. (Part
4: Non-repudiation framework)
! IETF RFCs 1421-1424: Privacy
Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail
! The Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol
! SDN 701: Secure Data Network System:
Message Security Protocol (MSP)

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! IDUP GSS-API: The Independent Data Unit


Protection Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface
! CORBA Security Services
! ISO 9735:1998 Electronic data interchange
for administration, commerce and transport
(EDIFACT) -- Part 5: Security rules for
batch EDI (authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation of origin)
2.6.5 Entity authentication

The purpose of entity authentication is to


corroborate that an entity is what it claims to be.
Entity authentication mechanisms are based on
the entity to be authenticated corroborating its
identity by demonstrating its knowledge of a
secret authentication key, which is used to
encipher specific data. The enciphered data can
be deciphered and its contents validated by
anyone sharing the entity's secret authentication
key. The claimant and verifier need to share a
common secret authentication key, the
establishment of which may involve a TTP.
Some of the mechanisms can be used to establish
mutual authentication, where both entities are
authenticated; some can be used to authenticate
one of the entities, unilateral authentication. The
mechanisms specified can also be used in key
distribution.

Entity authentication mechanisms are generally


based upon public key algorithms including the
use of symmetric encipherment algorithms and
cryptographic check functions and a digital
signature for the verification of the identity of an
entity. The algorithm used is any that satisfies the
requirements of the specified authentication

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mechanism.
The validity and authenticity of the public key
are therefore most important. How such a key is
securely obtained is outside the scope of this
process. The public key could be obtained by
using a certificate distributed by a TTP or by
some other means mutually agreed by the entity
and the verifier. Authentication may be both
unilateral and mutual.
Entity authentication mechanisms are often
designed around 'zero knowledge' classes of
mechanisms are:
! Identity based, where a trusted accreditation
authority provides secret accreditation
information which is a function of the
claimant’s identity
! Certificate based, where a claimant has a
public, private key pair and the verifier a
trusted copy of the claimant's public key --
this may be by using a certificate signed by
a TTP).

The management of public key mechanisms is


discussed in detail in the Key Infrastructure
section of the Guide to Information Security.

Standards and Specifications


! ISO/IEC 9798: Entity authentication (Part 1:
General model; Part 2: Using symmetric
encipherment algorithms; Part 3: Using a
public key algorithm; Part 4: Using a
cryptographic check function; Part 5: Using
zero knowledge techniques)
! ISO 9735: EDIFACT - Application level

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syntax rules (Part 5: Security rules for batch


EDI (authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation of origin); Part 6: Secure
authentication and acknowledgement
message (message type - AUTACK))
! ISO/IEC 10181:1996: Information
technology -- Open Systems Interconnection
-- Security frameworks for open systems.
(Part 2: Authentication framework)
! FIPS PUB 196: Entity Authentication Using
Public Key Cryptography

3. The Building Blocks of Trust


3.1 Overview
The building blocks of trust are technical
building blocks which provide a common and
interoperable basis for the system of trust.

As already discussed, central to a system of trust


is an acceptable level of security for a given task
or activity. Therefore, many of the technical
building blocks of trust are security related.
These are examined in the Technical Elements
section of the Guide to Information Security.

Additional building blocks of trust include:

! APIs
! Smart Cards
! Labelling
! Privacy Practices.

3.2 APIs
APIs need to be available for a number of
cryptographic service interfaces in support of
trust services, including:

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! Public key delivery and verification


interface
! Certification Authority agent
! Local registration authority
! Publication of certificates and certificate
revocation lists.

Standards and Specifications


! See also the Diffuse Standards and
Specifications List section on Application
Program Interfaces Standards and Guide to
Application Program Interfaces.
! PKCS #11, defines a programming interface
called Cryptoki, for cryptographic devices
such as smart cards and PCMCIA cards
! IETF PKIX working group API
specifications
! GSS-API Generic Security Services
Application Program Interface: Underlying
security services for Internet data
communications.
! The Open Group Preliminary Specification
P442 Generic Cryptographic Service API
(GCS-API)
! CDSA Common Security Service Manager
(CSSM) API, the CSSM Key Recovery API
and CSSM Embedded Integrity Services
Library API specifications
! IEEE P1003.1e POSIX Part 1: System API -
Protection, Audit and Control Interfaces (C
language)
! The Microsoft Cryptographic API

3.3 Smart Cards


Standards are needed for trusted components
such as smart cards which are required to support

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card related, secure commercial and financial


transactions and payments. This needs to cover
the use of all major currently available card
technologies (e.g. magnetic stripe cards,
integrated circuit cards) and applications (e.g.
debit-credit, electronic purse). In addition,
standard protocols for communication between a
smartcard, executing security functions, and
applications, including certificate management,
are needed. Features which need to be addressed
include:

! Application protocols, interface devices and


appropriate software requirements need to
be defined to ensure implementation of the
following functions and services in relation
to customers, vendors and financial
institutions
! Recognition and authentication of all parties
(e.g. customer, vendor, etc.)
! Ordering (including but not limited to order
form, placement of order by the customer
and acceptance of the order by the vendor)
! Agreement on the means of payment and
related authorization to pay by the customer
! Payment authorization (requested by the
vendor to the financial institution)
! Payment request and impact on settlement
! The definition of a security architecture to
provide appropriate integrity, confidentiality
and anonymity.

Smart cards are particularly well suited to host


security keys. This allows portability and mobile
usage and provides some advantages in terms of
security -- for example, it may be more difficult
to steal a card rather then break into a computer.
For added security smart cards can also deploy

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PIN techniques either through the reading device


or, better, through an embedded key pad actually
on the smart card itself.
Further information on smart card is provided is
provided in the Guide to Electronic Payment.

Standards and Specifications


! CEPS -- Common Electronic Purse
Specifications. A comprehensive set of
specifications for the implementation of a
globally interoperable electronic purse
program, based on existing payment
infrastructures. The CEPS technical
specifications need to be combined with the
scheme implementer's own specifications to
create the final CEP implementation
specifications.
! EEP - European Electronic Purse. A card-
based electronic purse capable of handling
both Euros and national currencies. Open
specifications are published by the European
Committee for Banking Standards (ECBS).
! EMV. Integrated Circuit Card (ICC)
Specifications for Payments. Proprietary
specification developed by Europay,
Mastercard and Visa. It defines the terminal
and integrated circuit card (ICC) procedures
necessary to effect a payment system
transaction in an international interchange
environment.
! PKCS #11, defines a programming interface
called Cryptoki, for cryptographic devices
such as smart cards and PCMCIA cards.

Relevant on-going activities

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! The European Union has launched a major


initiative eEurope Smart Card (eESC) to
work towards an agreed technical
framework and codes of practice for the
establishment of common specifications for
smart cards.
! Industry fora, such as the Java Card Forum,
are developing APIs for smart cards.

3.4 Labelling
The precise content of information which is
exchanged between parties is often unknown in
advance. Thus, even if a recipient is assured of
the source and the delivery through specific TTP
mechanisms, the final content may be unwanted.
Labelling is a means of describing what is in the
content associated with the label without users
having to open the container to examine the
contents. The key to a labelling system is the
kind of data provided in the label and what the
data in the label actually says. Both are crucial
for identifying the content to the user and to
enable the user to decide whether he wishes to go
a step further: to open the container and access
the content. In addition, rating and filtering, as
specific applications of labelling, are processes
which would enhance the provisioning of trust
services.

See Guide to Labelling, Rating and Filtering for


further information.

Standards and Specifications


! W3C PICS (Platform for Internet Content
Selection)

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Relevant on-going activities


! The European Commission's Safer Internet
Action Plan
! A website giving advice on how best to
communicate safety messages about the
Internet to parents, teachers and children has
been set up as part of this initiative by
Childnet International and Fleishman Hillard

3.5 Privacy Practices


Internet users are concerned about the privacy of
information they supply to Web sites. This
includes personal information as well as
information that Web sites may derive by
tracking their online activities. Many online
privacy concerns arise because it is difficult for
users to obtain information about actual Web site
information practices. Web sites are beginning to
post details of their privacy policies; when they
are posted users do not always find them
trustworthy or understandable. Thus, there is
often a one-way mirror effect: Web sites ask
users to provide personal information, but users
have little knowledge about how their
information will be used. This lack of knowledge
leads to confusion and mistrust.

Technical mechanisms could enable users to


exercise preferences over Web sites' privacy
practices, by enabling users to be informed about
Web site practices, delegate decisions to their
computer agent when they wish, and tailor
relationships with specific sites. Thus, a
framework for technical mechanisms which
ensures that information relating to the user is
released only under an acceptable agreement

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(reached through "negotiations" between the user


agent and the Website concerned) would enhance
trust: by giving the user choices and control over
privacy preferences.

See Guide to Internet Privacy for further


information.

Standards and Specifications


W3C Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P1.0) Specification

4. Examples of Trust Services


The follow are examples of trust services that are
available today. It should be noted that they have
divergent codes of practice and provide different
features and service levels. The user populations
of these services also vary considerably. Some
also levy a fee. Many have a national flavour.

! AOL Certified Merchant Program.


International initiative managed by AOL
Time Warner.
! BBBonline. Privacy and reliability related
initiatives managed by organization of the
same name and have a significant user base
worldwide.
! BetterWeb. Global programme managed by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
! casetrust. Joint project of Consumer
Association, CommerceNet chapter and
Retail Promotion Centre of Singapore.
! Cpa webtrust. US/Canadian initiative
managed by accountants and expanding in
Europe.
! e-comtrust. European initiative supported by
several national and international IT, direct

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marketing and consumer organizations.


! JADMA (Japan DMA). Japanese initiative
managed by direct marketing and retailor
associations.
! Labelsite. French initiative managed by two
business associations.
! MedCIRCLE. A collaboration of trusted
European health subject gateways, medical
associations, as well as accreditation,
certification and rating services, with the
common goal to evaluate, describe, or
annotate health information and supported
under the EU IAP programme. It is a follow-
up to the previous IAP project
MedCERTAIN which has developed the
HIDDEL metadata vocabulary to describe
and evaluate health information on the
Internet.
! Qweb. Italian initiative to certify the quality
of Web sites implemented by CISQ
Federation (a member of the International
Certification Network IQNet) with the
collaboration of Certicommerce (which
represents the Italian certification system
sponsored by the Chambers of Commerce).
! Safemall. Korean initiative.
! Spanish Guarantee Seal. Spanish initiative
managed by an Electronic Commerce
Business Association.
! TRUSTe. One of the longest-established
privacy initiatives originally initiated by
CommerceNet and has a significant user
base worldwide.
! Trusted Shops. German initiative (subsidiary
of Gerling Insurance Group) with a
European outreach.
! TrustUK. UK initiative supported by

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government and managed by an e-commerce


business alliance and consumer body.
! Webtrader. A network of trust schemes for
enterprises selling to consumers over the
Internet, with pilot operations supported by
the European Commission DG Enterprise.
The European Commission has established an
eConfidence Forum to investigate measures for
increasing consumer confidence in services
offered over the Internet. Among the
documentation made available by the Forum is a
survey regarding codes of conduct and trust seals
published by the European Commission Joint
Research Centre in November 2001.

In the standards arena, CEN/ISSS established a


Workshop on Legal Compliance and Trust for e-
Business (WS/e-Trust) in November 2001. The
purpose of this workshop is to develop a set of
pan-European, uniform guidelines defining
minimum requirements to be observed by those
making available web sites offering e-commerce,
easily understandable by the parties and
immediately usable by e-commerce merchants
and web-designers. The ISO Committee on
Consumer Policy (COPOLCO) is developing a
case for developing international standards in the
trust area.
File last updated: The Diffuse Project is funded under the European
December 2002 Commission's Information Society Technologies
programme. Diffuse publications are maintained by
TIEKE (the Finnish IT Development Centre), IC
Focus and The SGML Centre.

http://www.diffuse.org/trust.html 7/6/2003

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