CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

ARTICLE VIII
SECTION 1 a) Lopez vs. Roxas Judicial power is the authority of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable before the courts of justice. DOCTRINE: IF NO LAW IS APPLICABLE, THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION. b) Santiago vs. Bautista Award of honors to a student by the board of teachers may not be reversed by the Court where the awards are governed by no applicable law. c) Channie Tan vs. Republic Court has no authority to entertain an action for judicial declaration of citizenship where there is no law authorizing such proceeding. d) Felipe vs. Leuterio Court may not reverse the award of the bard of judges in an oratorical contest. e) UST vs. Board of Tax Appeals Implicit in the conferment of power on Congress to create courts and to determine their jurisdiction is the denial of the same to other departments. f) Simon vs. CSC Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as in equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. g) Villarosa vs. HRET The court may determine whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion thus former may review the decision of the latter. h) Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice The power of control over the execution of its decision is within the province of the Judiciarys power since the constitution granted it with the entirety of judicial power. The most important part if litigation whether civil or criminal, is the process of evaluation of decisions were supervening events may change the circumstances of the parties to compel the court to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. Section 19 Article 7 should not be interpreted as denying the courts of this power since even after the finality of the decision, the court may still review their decision. The suspension of the death sentence is within the exercise of judicial power and it does not encroach upon the power of the president to grant reprieve although the effect is the same. The same logic lies when the Congress, in exercising its legislative power enacts a law amending the Death Penalty Law. To contend that the executive has the power to protect life would be a violation of the principle of the co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of the government. a) Santiago vs. Guingona It is well within the powers of the court to determine whether the Senate and its members gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of its function and prerogatives. However, the court may not delve into matters that are purely within the internal affairs of the legislature. SECTION 2 a) Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals Where a statute designates the court having jurisdiction other than courts of general jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction do not have authority. But where there is silence, the general rule app lies. b) Mantrust System Inc. vs. CA The power to prescribe the jurisdiction of the court belongs to the legislature, except for those powers, which the constitution says may not be taken from the Supreme Court (section 5). The president herself in her exercise of her legislative powers issued the law in question. Thus, because of the separation of power doctrine, there can be no justification for judicial interference un the business of administrative agencies except when there is a violation of any of the constitutional rights or it commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. DOCTRINE: THE COURT IS ONLY GIVEN JUDICIAL POWER and NOTHING MORE THUS: c) Manila Electric co. vs. Pasay Transportation inc The courts may not be required to act as board of arbitrators d) Noblejas vs. Tehankee The court may not be charged of administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. e) Director of Prisons vs. .Ang Cho Kio It is not the function of the court to give advisory opinions SECTION 4 a) Fortich vs. Corona A decision of the court 2-2 is a decision in itself that the motion for reconsideration shall not be granted. Cases are decided, Matters are resolved. b) Firestone Ceramics vs. CA Decisions or resolutions of the Supreme Court en banc is the decision of the Supreme Court itself. The supreme court is not an appellate court vis--vis its divisions and exercise no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. The only constraint is that the any doctrine or principle of law rendered by the court en banc or in division can only be reversed or modified by the court sitting en banc. SECTION 5 Requisites for the exercise of judicial review: a) PACU vs. Secretary of Education There must be before the court, actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and such question must be ripe for adjudication meaning, the governmental action has an adverse effect on the person challenging it. b) People vs. Vera The person challenging must have a legal standing that is, he/she should have a direct and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustain or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement. c) People vs. Vera Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised on the pleasing, it shall not be raised in the trial, and if not raised on the trial, it may not be raised on appeal. d) Philconsa vs. Enriquez The court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is really unavoidable or the lis mota. Standing:

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorney of the Philippines vs. COMELEC The person has standing if it can be shown that: 1. he has personally suffered an injury as a result of the alleged governmental action 2. Such injury can be directly traced to the challenged action 3. The injury will likely be redressed by a favorable action. b) Kilosbayan vs. Guigona; Tatad vs. Department of Energy The SC may take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of legal standing; the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people or paramount importance to the public.

a)

prudential type: there is impossibility of a courts undertaking an independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due to coordinate branches of government; or adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question (frequent during the Marcos Era).

SECTION 6 Maceda vs. Vasquez: power to discipline judges of lower courts.. (section 11), the ombudsman may not investigate a judge independently of any administrative action of the SC. SECTION 8 Nitafan vc. Commission of Internal Revenue: salary of judges and justices are subject to income tax; overruled Endecia vs. David and Perfecto vs. Meer. People vs. Gacott: decision en banc is needed only when the penalty to be imposed is dismissal of a judge, disbarment of a lawyer, suspension for more than one year and a fine exceeding Php 10,000.00. Zandueta vs de la Costa: Abolition of office is valid when done in good faith and not for political or personal reasons. Ins such a situation, there is no removal from office because a removal implies that the office exists after the ouster. Vistan vs. Nicolas: A judge may not present himself as a congressional candidate for that would constitute misconduct. In re: Judge Manzano: the judge may not accept the position because of Section 12. Consing vs CA: the absence of a certification will not invalidate a decision. Court Administator vs. Quinanola

TAX PAYERS SUIT

a) Tan vs. Macapagal; Sanidad vs.COMELEC Tax payers legal standing: 1. When it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the constitution, or in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. 2. He will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE
a) de Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank The SC rejected the Orthodox view but instead, the court adopted the view that before an act is declared unconstitutional it is an operative fact, which can be a source of rights and duties. Modalities of constitutional interpretation: a) historical approach approach through analyzing the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the circumstance of its ratification b) structural approach drawing inference from the architecture of the three-cornered power relationships found in the constitutional arrangement. c) Doctrinal approach rely on established precedents d) Ethical approach seeks to interpret the Filipino moral commitments that are embedded in the constitutional document e) Textual approach reading the language of the constitution as the man on the street would understand it. f) Prudential approach weighing and comparing the costs and benefits that might be found in conflicting rules. Political Questions: a) Baker vs. Carr Various types of political questions: textual type: where there is found a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a political department (Santiago vs. Guingona and Arroyo vs. devencia) functional type: lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue or there is impossibility of deciding without initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion (Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tanada vs. Macapagal and Daza vs. Singson)

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Aruejo vs CA: Rules promulagater by the COMELEC will govern only cases filed in the COMELEC. For cases filed in regular court; rule of court shall prevail. Orocio vs. COA; Bustamante vs. COA: decisions must be made by the collegial body Mison vs. COA: a decision that is void cannot be ratified; a chairman us not the commission. Absent a decision of the collegial body, there is no valid decision. Paredes vs COMELEC: Supreme Court may review finding of fact but only on cases when there is evidence of arbitrariness. Reyes vs RTC: decisions en banc may be brought to the COURT but motion for reconsideration shall be decisded by Commission en banc. Cua vs COMELEC: 2-1 decision valid Ambil vs. COMELEC: a ponente who retired cannot promulgate his decision. Dumayas vs COMELEC: Retirement of the judges disqualifies them from promulgating the decision. The justices left may form another majority. Mateo vs. CA: RA 7902 provides that the judgment of quasi-judicial agencies may be appealed to the CA within 15 days from the receipt of notice. This is pursuant to Section 7, which states: Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law. Garces vs CA: the case or matter that can be brought to the SC on certiorari under Section 7 Art IX-C are those that relate to the exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-

judicial powers. In the case of comelec, THIS involves elective regional, provincial and city officials.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Aquino vs. CSC: CSC cannot disapprove an appointment and require the appointment of another person whom he believes is more qualified. Binamira vs. Garrucho: Appointment is the selection by authority vested with power of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Designation connotes merely an imposition by law of additional duties of an incumbent official. The latter is a function of the executive. Binamiras appointment was invalid because he was not appointed by the President. Borres vs. CA: primarily confidential: nature of the office must be such as to require (see delos santos) Briones vs. Osmena: While abolition of office does not imply removal of the incumbent officer, this is true only where the abolition of office is done in good faith and not merely as a cover for a removal otherwise not allowed by the constitution. The right to abolish cannot be used to discharge employees in violation of civil service laws (Gacho vs. Osmena). Canonizado vs. Aguirre: There is no bona fide reorganization thus, declaring the positions expired is unconstitutional. Delos Santos vs. Mallare: PROXIMITY RULE: every appointment implies confidence but much more than ordinary confidence is necessary to a holder of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee but primarily close intimacy which ensure freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of the state. Mayor vs Macaraig: The commissioners had a right to remain in office until the expiration of the terms for which they have been appointed unless removed for cause provided by law. Security of tenure is protected right under the constitution. Abolition is not the same as removal from office. FLORES vs. DRILON: When an elective official accepts an appointment without first resigning his elective position, the appointment is invalid. Naseco vs. NLRC: civil service laws embrace all government owned and controlled corporations with original charterthat is, created by law (EIIB vs CA). Naseco is not covered by CSC for it is merely a subsidiary of the NDC. PNOC vs NLRC: Corporations created by special charters are subject to Civil Service, those unincorporated under the Corporation code are not SAMSON vs CA: The position of assistant secretary to the mayor is not one of those considered as highly confidential under Section 5F of RA 2260. What were enumerated are secretaries but not assistant secretaries. The compensation attached and designation given suggest that the position is purely clerical and the fact the they sometimes handle confidential matter does not alter the nature of their work (Ingles vs. Mutuc) Santiago vs CSC: Power to appoint is a matter of discretion, next in rank rule does not apply. Larin vs Executive Secretary: the presidents power to discipline include the power to remove. But it is limited. The career service officers and employees who enjoy

security of tenure may be removed only for causes provided by law in accordance with procedural due process. ACHACOSO vs. Macaraig: Permanent appointment can only be extended to a person that has all the qualifications. The mere fact that the position he occupied belongs to a career service does not automatically confer on him security of tenure. GARCES vs. CA: Consent of the official concerned is needed for a transfer to be valid.

COMELEC
SECTION 2 Antonio vs. COMELEC: COMELEC can promulgate its own rules of procedure. Tan vs. COMELEC: Commission may merely issue recommendation of disciplinary action for deputized officers. Alunan vs. Mirasol: Election of Sk is beyond the scope of supervision of the COMELEC Kilosbayan Inc. vs COMELEC: COMELEC has power to investigate and prosecute but the complainant must show probable cause. LORETO vs. BRION: second placer cannot take place of the winner Taule vs. Secretary Santos: The power of COMELEC is over popular election. Brillantes vs. Yorac: a designation as acting chairman is temporary because it is revocable at will. It is not allowed for it violates the safeguards of the commissions independence. Salazar vs. COMELEC: What the constitution says must be heard en banc are motion for reconsideration of decisions that is resolution of substantive issues. SECTION 3 Soller vs. COMELEC: comelec division has jurisdiction over cases in the first instance.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Supanagan Jr. vs. Santos: legislative bodies of local governments shall have Sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law. Under the Local Government Code (BP 337), the power to appoint Sectoral is conferred upon the President of the Philippines but the secretary of Local Government may, by authority of the president inform the Sectoral representatives of their appointments. It is the president who appoints and the secretary is merely the transmitter. Tan vs. COMELEC: Areas affected refer to both places that are covered by the new province and those other areas of the Province of Negros Occidental since the remaining areas are also affected. As provided in the dissenting opinion of Justice Abad Santos in the case of Paredes vs. Executing Secretary, when the constitution speaks of the unit or units affected, t means all of the people of the municipality if such is to be divided, or all the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. Padilla vs. COMELEC: The deletion of the phrase unit or in Section 10 Article 10 of the constitution does not affect the ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC. The reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly affected, it means

that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof should have a right to vote in the said plebiscite Abella vs. COMELEC: Component cities are those whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. Such independence carries with it the prohibition directed to registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA: CAR is merely an administrative region created under the Reorganization Plan. Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over CAR and the offices created under EO 220, CAR may be considered at most as a regional coordinating agency if the National Government which is similar to the regional development councils which the president may create under Section 14 Abbas vs. COMELEC: the creation of the autonomous region is made effective upon the approval by a majority votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite. Even is we assume that it is in conflict with the Tripoli agreement, the standard for the validity of said act is provided by the constitution, thus RA 6734 will prevail. Moreover, granting that the Tripoli agreement is part of the law of the land, it will be of the same class as RA 6734, which is a statute. The rule is that the Later law prevails thus RA 6734 will prevail over the older Tripoli agreement. Cordillera Regional Assembly vs. COMELEC: It is expressly provided in the constitution that the autonomous region shall be composed of provinces, cities, municipalities, etc. In other words, the term region used should mean two or more provinces. Leonor vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration: Since Cordillera Autonomous region did not come into existence since only Ifugao ratified RA 6766, as a consequent, the Cordillera Bodong Administration which was created in pursuant to section 13 of EO 226, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region and the CPLA as the regional police force do not legally exist.

ACCOUNTABILITY Hipolitas vs. Mergas: Even if the offense is not very serious, the nature of the position amounts the acts as malfeasance. Public Service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. The yardstick of public service is honesty and integrity, both imprinted in the 1973 and the 1987 constitution. ROMULO vs. YNIGUEZ: The Batasan by a majority, as provided for the rules of court can dismiss the complaint for impeachment because there would not be any use of proceeding further if the required 2/3 would not be obtained. Such act of the Batasan as a body is an exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review. IN RE GONZALEZ: A public officer who under the constitution is required to be a member if the Philippines Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Such public officer during his incumbency cannot be charged before the Sandinganbayan or any other court with the offence which carries with it penalty

of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office NUNEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: The creation of the Sandiganbayan was precisely aimed for curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in public service. MAYOR LECAROZ vs. SAN: broad powers were given to the sandiganbayan which includes all other civil and criminal practices involving public officers of the court. Section 4 Article XIII of the Constitution provides for the creation of a special as the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction cases involving such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned and controlled corporations in relation to their office as may be determined by law. ZALDIVAR vs. SAN: The Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) and Ombudsman have different duties. The former shall be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor and shall continue to function as may have been provided for by law except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the Constitution. The latter shall have the duty to investigate on its own, any act or omissions of any public official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. DELOSO vs. DOMINGO: The clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. Furthermore, the Ombudsman act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee during his tenure of office. The murder of 3 persons is no doubt an illegal act and since this was committed by a governor, the crime lies within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsmans investigative authority. CRUZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: The authority of the Ombudsman is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government like the PCGG. BUENSADA vs. FLAVIER: The Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees pending investigation. The court held in Nera vs. Garcia that suspension is just a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be in his authority and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspensions. NATIVIDAD vs. FELIX: Deloso vs Domingo has already been re-examined in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou which both provided that the authority of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from any investigative agency of the Government. CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF MWSS vs. VASQUEZ: The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contract is vested on government agencies. Courts will not interfere unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award. LASTIMOSA vs. VASQUEZ: In the exercise of his powers, the Ombudsman is authorized to call in prosecutors for assistance as provided for in Seciton 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770). When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman meaning, he is subject to

the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve reverse and modify his decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. The preventive suspension is also valid in pursuant to Section 24 of the Ombudsman act which expressly provided that the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman, but not more than six months without pay. ALMONTE vs. VASQUEZ: The privilege of confidentiality is recognized only on matters relating to military, diplomatic and other national security secrets. If the claim of confidentiality does not rest on these matters, the privilege cannot be invoked. GENERAL PROVISIONS METRAN vs. PAREDES: It is also a well settled rule that where a suit is brought against an officer or agency with relation to some matter in which defendant represents the state in action and liability, and the state, while not a party to the record, is the real party against which relief is sought so that a judgment for plaintiff, although nominally against the named defendant as an individual or entity distinct from the state, will operate to control the action of the state or subject it to liability, the suit is in effect one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP vs. TEODORO: Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity is organized. CAA vs. CA: It has already been settled in the Teodoro case that CAA as an agency is not immune from suit. It being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity for is essentially runs a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public, an enterprise not exclusive prerogative of the state REPUBLIC vs. FELICIANO: A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint is clearly a suit against the state which under settled jurisdiction is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued, wither expressly or impliedly MOBIL PHILIPPINES vs. ARRASTRE: A non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity FESTEJO vs. FERNANDO: Rule of immunity may be relaxed where its strict application will result in an injustice. MINISTERIO vs. CFI: Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing form sovereignty the

other capacitates the municipalities to exercise a private, proprietary right. In the second function, the officers and agents act in their corporate or individual capacity. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO vs. JUDGE FIRME: The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting on behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions DA vs. NLRC: a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and this can be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it appears into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relate to the exercise of sovereign functions (US vs. Ruiz). PNR vs. IAC: Consent of state to be sued can be manifested expressly through a general or special law or indicated implicitly as when the state commences litigation for the purposed of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters into a contract. When the state enters into a covenant, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other party. REPUBLIC vs. SANDOVAL: The Mendiola Commission only has recommendatory powers and he presidents statement was merely an expression of solidarity with the rallyists. Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case US. vs. REYES: The doctrine of state immunity and its exceptions are summarized in Shauf vs. CA where it was held that the rule may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of the land. While the doctrine appears to prohibit suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. WYKIE vs. RARANG: Crimes cannot be possible covered by the immunity agreement. Our laws and even the laws of US do no allow the commission of cries in the name of official duty. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. VINZONS: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert justification over one another. The establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. Entering into a contract for maintenance is therefore an act jure imperii and not a waiver of immunity.

NATIONAL PATRIMONY

SANTA ROSA MINING vs. LEIDO: whatever right that was vested over the mining claims before PD 1214 were merely possessory right which can be lost through abandonment or forfeiture or may be revoked for valid legal grounds.

NOTES AND DIGESTS

Article VIII The Judicial Department Section 1 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. issued a temporary restraining order delaying the execution of the sentence. In that decision, the Court said that the power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction because the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and other such lower courts as may be established by law. As to the claim that such power was an intrusion into the executive, the Court said that the presidential power of pardon cannot be interpreted to mean that the courts are powerless to enforce their decisions after their finality. An accused convicted of final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can still be claimed in the appropriate courtts. Thus, the courts still have power over the execution of a sentence. Since what is given to the judiciary is only judicial power, the courts may not do anything that is beyond the scope of judicial power (Meralco v. Pasay Transportation Co. 57 Phil. 600). Also found application in Noblejas v. Teehankee (23 SCRA 405) where as Commissioner on Land Registration he claimed the same privileges and emoluments as a judge of a Court of First Instance. The Supreme Court ruled that it had no administrative power over officials of the Executive Department. When a law says that disputes between government agencies shall be settled administratively and the administrative decision shall have the effect of a final decision of the courts of justice, it means that recourse to courts is premature before the exhaustion of administrative remedies (PHIVIDEC v. Velez, G. R. No. 84295) When a law prohibits courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government, such a prohibition can only refer to administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. Outside this, and on issues involving questions of law, the courts cannot be prevented from exercising power (Malaga v. Penachos, Jr. G. R. No. 86695) Grave abuse of discretion Sinon v. Civil Service Commission: is meant such carpricious and whimsical exercise of judgement as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Garcia v. Board of Investments Synopsis BOI abused authority when nothing was shown to justify the transfer of the petrochem plant to Batangas except blanket discretion given to investors to choose the site or transfer it from their first choice. Advisory opinions The recommendatory powers of the Courts are limited to Article 5 of the RPC. (Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio 92 Phil 906). An advisory opinionis a response to a legal issue posed in the abstract. This is not a judicial act. Declaratory Relief

Since Congress has the power to create, they have the power to dissolve courts. Judicial Power There are two requirements for the application of judicial power: There must be an actual controversy. The controversy should be decideable by the application of law. Hypothetical questions are not for the Courts to decide. Nor can they give advisory opinions because advisory opinions are hypothetical in nature. The best way to decide controversies is through a fair appreciation Political question: when the Constitution has given the resolution of the question to the political departments or to the people in their sovereign capacity to decide. Baker v. Carr Considering Section 1 of Article VIII, whatis a political question? (found in page 506 of the large book) According to CJ Concepcion, it is the duty of the Court to answer questions concerning grave abuse of discretion. Not a new provision. Found in the Civil Code. U.S. v. Nixon Who decides executive privilege? US Supreme Court: we do. Although there may be confidential documents. The Supreme Court may see this behind closed doors. Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction (Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346) It is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights (Lopez v. Roxas 17 SCRA 756) The exercise of judicial power goes beyond the promulgation of final decisions. In the Echegaray case, the Supreme Court

Four requirements for Declaratory Relief: there must be a justiciable controversy the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse the party seeking relief must have an interest in the controversy the issue involved must be ripe for legal determination A declaratory judgment involves real parties with conflicting legal interests. A declaratory judgment is final and binding on the parties. Section 2 The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. The Supreme Court has constitutional powers and Statutory powers (which is up to Congress to allow). The courts cannot injoin discretionary acts of executive bodies. Congress has the power to create new courts and to apportion jurisdiction among various courts. Congress may not impair the independence of the judiciary. Section 5 deals with powers that Congress may never take away. In Mantrust Systems, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the restriction of an injuction against APT in connection with the disposition, sale, and acquisition of assets transferred to it or against any purchaser of the assets sold by the Trust by means of a Presidential Proclamation does not impair the judicial power of courts because the power to prescribe the power of the courts belong to the legislature, and Marcos was THE legislature at that time. Whether or not courts of general jurisdiction have authority over administrative agencies depend on the statutes governing the suibject. Where the statute designates the court having jurisdiction other than courts of general jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction have no authority. Otherwise, the general rule applies (Lupango v. CA, 160 SCRA 848) The proper exercise of judicial power requires prior legislative action definining such enforceable and demandable rights and prescribing remedies for violations of such rights and determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies and disputes arising from legal rights. Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to exercise judicial power in a specific case and is a prerequisite of judicial poower, which is the totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdicition and hears and decides a case (Corwin, the Constitution of the USA). The authority of Congress to create courts of varying jurisdictions is subject only to the limitations that it may not reduce the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that it cannot create a second Supreme Court and confer additonal jurisdiction to the Supreme Court (without its approval).

The power to create courts takes with it the power to abolish courts, but Congress cannot abolish courts to remove unwanted judges. Congress can reorganize the judiciary but not the SC. Section 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. The grant of fiscal autonomy to the judiciary assures its independence. Appropriations may not be reduced beyond that given the year prior and should be regularly and automatically released. The Department of Budget and Management cannot tell the Supreme Court what kind of equipment it may purchase. The provision is not new. Section 3. Fiscal Autonomy Radiowealth v. Agregalado Facts This case is about the purchase and installation of P585 worth of Webster Teletalk machines, model 206MA, and Webster telephone speakers. The Clerk of Court certified the purchase and installation of these machines on the 2nd and 3rd floor of Malacaang Annex, which used to house the Supreme Court, were of urgent character and necessary to public service. C. L. Dacanay, chairman of the Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President disapproved the purchase and installation as contrary to EO 302 and the policy adopted by the cabinet discontinuing open market purchases, as well as being violative of EO 298. The Auditor-General also refused to sign the treasury warrant to be able to pay Radiowealth. Held In the requisition of fixtures, equipment, and supplies, both the executive and judicial departments are on the same footing. The several EOs that the Auditor-General gives as basis for refusing to sign the warrant are not based on express legislation. Bengson v. Drilon Facts The issue is on the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the 1992 GPA relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme Court. Held The attempt to use veto power to set aside a resolution of the Supreme Court to deprive retirees of benefits given them by RA 1797 trenches upon the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary granted by the Constitution. Fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the judiciary, CSC, COA, COMELEC, Office of the Ombudsman, and other constitutional commissions contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.

The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocates and utilizes funds for their operatons is anathema to fiscal autonomy. Notes Fiscal autonomy is the power and authority to levy, assess, and collect fees, fix rates of compensation. This case was brought about by a misunderstanding of the concept of veto power. Section 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Court en banc is not an appellate court. Doctrinal decisions may only be overturned by court sitting en banc. When sitting en banc, the case is decided by a majority of the number of justices who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with a concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon means that the word decided must be applied to cases and the word resolved must be applied to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. The three vote rule does not apply when the required three votes is not obtained in seeking a motion for reconsideration. The failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided (Fortich v. Corona, G. R. No. 131457) Section 5 The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Composed of one Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. A vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days. Composition may not be changed by ordinary legislation. Divisions of up to three, five, and seven members each, three justices required to make a decision, otherwise it must be decided en banc. The divisions are as provided for in the Rules of Court. Today, there are three divisions of five each. The following must be heard en banc Constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law Constitutionality of presidential decreees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, Where a majority in a division is not obtained Reversing or modifying a principle of law previously laid down in banc or in division Administrative cases where the vote is for a dsimissal of a judge of a lower court or the discipline of one Election contests of either the President or the Vice President

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Fortich v. Corona Facts Carlos Fortich was governor of Bukidnon and Renato Corona (now SC Justice) was the Deputy Executive Secretary during the time of this case. The case deals with a piece of land which was conveted from being a nonagricultural land to agricultural land under the Agrarian Reform Program. Some farmers were contesting an earlier decision of the nd court through a motion of reconsideration. The 2 resolution ended with a vote of 2-2. The farmers interpreted this pursuant to the Constitutional provision that says cases or matters by a division shall be decided by a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the canse and voted thereon, and in no case without a concurrence of at least three such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc, provided that no doctrine or principle or law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. Held The framers distinguished between cases and matters. Cases are decided and matters are resolved using reddendo singula singulis. It is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtaned. In the case, there is a 2-2 vote on the motion for reconsideration. This means that the motion is lost and the assailed decision is not reconsidered and therefore deemed affirmed. Marbury v. Madison Held Whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land. The Constitution is the paramount law of the land, an act of legislature, repugnant to the Constitution is void. It is the duty of the Court to decide cases where laws are in conflict with each other. If a law is void because of its repugnance to the Constitution, does it, notwithstanding its validity, bind courts and oblige them to give effect? It is the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Notes In cases where a law passed by the legislature is contrary to the Constitution, the Constitution takes precedence.

because the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly The judicial department has the obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the case at bar for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the Constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as the sole judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Tan v. Macapagal Facts Eugene Tan, Silvestre Ocampo, and Rogelio Fernandez of Roxas City filed for declaratory relief as taxpayers assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido resolution dealing with the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Commission Issues Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to sue. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to say/interfere with the Concom Held The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement The case must be ripe for adjudication, which in this case it is not. The judiciary must leave the ConCom to fulfill its responsibility. As long as the proposed amendments are still unacted, there is no room for the interposition of a judicial oversight. Only after the amendment is ratified can the appropriate case be instilled. PACU v. Sec. of Education Facts PACU requests that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional because A. It deprives owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law B. It deprives parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power to prescribe rules and standards is an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Issue Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction Held When a law has been treated as constitutional, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. The petitioners here have suffered no wrong from the enforcement of the criticized statutes. Judicial power is limited to actual cases and controversies. The Court does not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest.

Angara v. Electoral Commission Facts Angara was elected to the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. On December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission by resolution fixed that as the date of the last day of filing prostests against elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. Held The National Assembly has in effect cut off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests

Gonzales v. Marcos

Facts Gonzales raised a constitutional question regarding an impermissible encroachment of President Marcos on the legislative prerogative. The issue is centered on the validity of the creation of EO 30, a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the CCP, entrusted with the task of constructing a national theater and music hall, an arts building and facilities to awaken the peoples consciousness in our cultural heritage and to encourage assistance in its preservation. The respondents contend that the petitioner has no personality to contest the case since the funds to construct the CCP came from donations and gifts and not from taxation. Issue Meanwhile, President Marcos issued PD 15 and 179 creating the CCP, defined its functions, and since the PDs were issued during Martial Law, the constitutionality of EO 30 is rendered moot and academic. LOCUS STANDI Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance

Gonong decision. The decision itself said that the conficscation of licenses was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance which was why Ordinance II was enacted. The MMA pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action concerning its validity. Held The court decided to address the problem because of lack of clarity in the law. The court relaxed procedural rules in exercise of its inherent power because of the importance to the public. Joya v. PCGG Facts 35 Petitioners in the special civil action for prohibition and mandamus and preliminary injunction to stop the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on January 11, 1991 by Christies of New York of the Old th th Masters Painting and 18 and 19 century silverware seized from the Marcoses. Issue Whether or not the Court had the power to review the case Held In this case, the Court Held

Facts VAT is issued on the sale, barter, or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to the 10 percent of the gross selling prices of gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered, or exchanged or from the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the NIRC role. The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract and hypothetical form because of lack of concrete record. Held The Court has no power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In rd the case at bar, the Court is being asked to sit as a 3 legislative chamber to view the law. Solicitor General v. MMA Facts In MTC v. Gonong the Court held that the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission, unless the vehicles were stalled and obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of licences is not allowed. On May 1990, the MMA issued an ordinance authorizing itself to detach the license plates, tow and impound attended, unattended, abandoned motor vehicles that are illegally parked. The Solicitor General notes that the conflict between the Gonong decisions and the MMA ordinance has created confusion among motiorists. He also said that the sanctions arer illegal, violative of law, and should be stopped. The MMA argued that there was no conflict between the Gonong decision and the MMA ordinance because the ordinance was supposed to supplement, not supplant the

1. The paintings and the silverware are not public property. The paintings were donated to the Metropolitan Museum. The silverware was seized from the Marcoses. 2. The writ of mandamus cannot prosper because the petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty in light of an enforceable right. 3. It cannot prosper also as a taxpayer suit because the artwork and the silverware were not purchased with public funds. 4. There is no actual case, because the auction happened already. The case is moot. Macasiano v. NHA Facts Macasiano sought to have Sec. 28 and 44 of RA 7279 (Urban Devt and Housing Act of 1992) declared unconstitutional. His locus standi was based on his being a consultant of the DPWH and his being a taxpayer. The provisions in question provide for rules regarding eviction and demolition. It discourages eviction and demolition and provides for a moratorium of 3 years. Macasiano says that the provisions are unconstitutional because they deprive the government and private property owners of their property without due process. Issue Whether the court can review the case

Held There is no actual controversy. The petitioner did not claim that the provsions actually prevented him from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner. He has no locus standi. Requisities for declaratory relief are: 1. justiciable controversy 2. adverse litigants 3. the party seeking relief must have legal interest Petition dismissed. Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC

Facts Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 51, Art. X of RA 7854. The present elective officials of the Municipality of Makati will continue as officials of the City of Makati and exercise their powers and functions until a new election is held and the new officials have qualified or assumed their office. The petitioners contend that this is against Section 8, Art. X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provides that the term of office of elective local officials as three years (except barangay officials whose terms are defined by law), none having more than three consecutive terms. The petitioners said that the section of RA 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the term previously served by them, particularly favoring Mayor Binay who already has three consecutive terms. Held The Court cannot entertain the case. They are presenting a hypothetical issue that Mayor Binay will run again, Also, petitioners are residents of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise the abstract issue. Oposa v. Factoran Facts The plaintiffs are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. The original defendant was the then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., now replaced by Angel Alcala. The plaintiffs want the DENR to cancell all existing timber license agreements and to cease and decist in receiving all timber licenses and approving new timber licenses. The defendants said the plaintiffs have no cause of action and the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question. Issue Whether the petitioners have a cause of action to prevent misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests Held Petitioners instituted a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is the general interest of all citizens of the Philippines. The petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation and the generations yet unknown. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced ecology.

Representative Joker Arroyo are suing as members of Congress and as taxpayers. Public respondents allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. Held A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may in the exercise of its discretion set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. Jurisprudence likewise shows that the SC entertains cases of paramount importance to public interest even if it appears that petitioners have no locus standi. The instant petition in the case at bar is of paramount public interest and the ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays and the counter productive and retrogressive effects staggering as it is expected to raise billions of pesos. Board of Optometry v. Colet Facts The petitioners seek to set aside and restrain the enforcement of RA 8050, an act regulating the practice of optometry (Revised Optometry Law of 1995) The petitioners argue that RA 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. Issue Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the Constitutional case Held There is the unbending rule in Constitutional Law that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a Constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: 1. There must be an actual case or controversy invoving a conflict of rights suceptible to judicial determination. 2. The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party 3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity 4. The resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the solution of the case. An actual case or controversy means an existing case that is appropriate or ripe for adjudication. There is no actual case involving any or all of the private respondents, hence this case is just for declaratory relief. The perties have no locus standi in this case since they are not licensed optometrists and not even juridical persons.

Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. Tatad v. Garcia Facts This case seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of a Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and PGMC in connection with the online lottery system, also known as the lotto. Kilosbayan, a nonstock demestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, nuns, priests, pastors, and lay leaders are suing in their capacity as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Facts The petition is to prohibit respondents from implementing and enforcing the Revised and Restated Agreement to build and lease and transfer a LRT System for EDSA. The petitioners Francisco Tatad, Serge Osmea III, and Rodolfo Biazon are suing as members of the Senate and as taxpayers. The respondent Jesus Garcia is the incumbent

Secretary of Transportation while private respondent EDSA LRT Corp. is a Hong Kong based company. The Agreement provided for the captialization and construction of the EDSA LRT III. The private respondent shall construct the LRT III and then the DOTC will run it. The DOTC will give monthly rentals to the private respondent to recover its capital, taken from the earnings of the rail line. After 25 years, the DOTC shall have completed the payment and the ownership of the project shall be transferred to the latter. Issue Whether or not the respondents have the standing to file the case Held The prevailing doctrrines in taxpayer suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government and in government owned and controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved. However, following the Kilosbayan ruling, the Supreme Court has no choice but to give locus standi to the petitioners. Separate Opinion (Mendoza) As members of Congress, because they allege no infringement of prerogative as legislators. 1 As taxpayers because petitioners allege neither an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing or spending powers of Congress nor an illegal disbursement of public money. As taxpayers, the suit must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the illegal expenditure of public money raised by taxation. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. In that case, a local government BOT contract for a public market did not involve a disbursement of public funds so there was no locus standi. In order that citizens' actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Today's holding that a citizen, qua citizen, has standing to question a government contract unduly expands the scope of public actions and sweeps away the case and controversy requirement so carefully embodied in Art. VIII, 5 in defining the jurisdiction of this Court. The result is to convert the Court into an office of ombudsman for the ventilation of generalized grievances. Kilosbayan v. Morato Facts As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, the PCSO and PGMC entered into a new agreement that would be consistent with the PCSO charter and conformable with the Courts decision.

On January 25, 1995, the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) whereby the PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental agreement equivalent to 4.3% of ticket sales. The term of the lease is 8 years starting from the start of the commercial operation of the lottery equipment. On February 1995, a suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid because it was substantially the same as the old lease contract. If ever it was different, it should be considered void because it violated the PCSO charter and the decision of this Court. The PCSO maintains that the ELA is a different lease contract and that it did not have the funds to purchase its own lottery equipment. Respondents question the right of the petitioners to bring the suit on the ground that not being parties to the contract of lease, they have no personal and substatntial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. Held The petition was dismissed, 7-6, but was later overturned when some of the judges who voted in favor of the PCSO retired. The petition was then sustained, 8-5 Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization Facts Bagatsing is assailing the validity of the contract entered into by the government selling 48% shares in Petron for violating the rights of members of Congress or impermissibly intruding into the domain of the Legislature. Petitioners also claim that the business of oil refining is a public utility and should not be sold to foreigners, in this case a Dutch company. Issue Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to sue as members of Congress and as taxpayers Held They have no legal standing as members of Congress because they failed to show that the contract impaired them as members of Congress. However, they can still sue as taxpayers because of the ruiling in Kilosbayan v. Guingona that taxpayers may sue if there is a misappropriation of public funds contrary to law. In this case, the SC still ruled in favor of PNOC since they found that PETRON is not involved in the buisiness of oil refining and therefore is not a public utility. TELEBAP, GMA7 v. COMELEC Facts Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines with GMA 7 challenged the validity of RA 6646 which provided for the sale of print, radio, and TV ads to the COMELEC during elections for free. TELEBAP is suing as taxpayers and citizens and GMA is suing as a franchise holder. Issue Whether or not the petitioner have locus standi to file the case

Held The TELEBAP, although a group of lawyers in the media industry does not have standing to sue since they did not show that they had a personal and substantial interest in the case and that they were unjustly afffected by the act. GMA, however, has the capacity to sue since they showed that in granting the ads for free, they stand to lose profits. In this case, however, the SC ruled in favor of the COMELEC since COMELEC Time will inform the public and the right of the people to information is paramount to the autonomy of the broacdcast media and to affirm the validity of RA 6646 bears a social function that is for the common good. Gonzales v. Narvasa Facts Ramon Gonzales in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer assails the constituionality of the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants and advisers by executive order. The PCCR is tasked to review proposed amendments to the 1987 Constitution. Issue sue Whether or not Gonzalez has the locus standi to

Held The petitioners have no legal standing to sue as taxpayers since no public funds were used byt the court adopted a liberal policy on locus standi when a case involves an issue of transcendental significance to society, so the Court decided to declare the Representatives as having legal standing to file the petition.

IBP v. Zamora Facts President Estrada deployed Marines to help the PNP in patrolling malls after the Rizal pay LRT bombings. The IBP challenged the validity of the Executive Order as unconstitutional. The Executire Secretary contends that the respondents have no standing because they have no ''real party" interest in the case. Issue Whether or not the IBP has locus standi in the case.

Held A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government. In this case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining personal injury attributed to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner that can claim any injury in this case. A tax payer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law. Sandoval v. PAGCOR Facts PAGCOR, a GOCC organized and requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice whether or not it is authorized by its charter to operate and manage Jai Ailai frontons in the country. The Secretary of Justice said that PAGCOR was allowed to operate frontons under its charter. Petitioner Del Mar filed a petition to prevent PAGCOR from managing and operating the jai-alai games on the grounds that it violated the PAGCOR charter and the Constitution. PAGCOR entered into an agreement with Belle Corporation where Belle will make available to PAGCOR the required infrastructure facilities without any financial outlay from PAGCOR while PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of jai alai. Sandoval also sought to prevent PAGCOR from managintg the jai alai games by itself or in joint venture for being patently illegal and having no basis in the law. Del Mar and Sandoval are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives. Issue Whether or not Sandoval and Del Mar had real party interest to bring the case for review

Held IBP has no locus standi but the Court brushed aside the rule following Kilosbayan v. Guingona; where it was held that locus standi is merely procedural & the courts may take a liberal approach and brush aside the rule if the case is paramount to public interest. BAYAN v. Executive Secretary Facts BAYAN is a political party in the party-list seat in the House of Representatives. Together with Reps. Aquino, Taada, and Arroyo challenged the validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement as taxpayers and as members of Congress. The respondents contend that the petitioners have no standing but they still heard the case because itis of transcendental importance to the public interest. Issue Whether BAYAN and the other Representatives have standing to contest the validity of the VFA. Held The Court found that the petitioners had no standing to have the case heard because as members of the Lower House, they were not party to the ratification of the treaty. They also failed to show any direct injury if the treaty was to be implemented. However, the Court took cognizance of the case because of its transcendental significance to the people.

Liang v. People Facts Jeffrey Liang is a Chinese national employed as an economist with the Asian Development Bank. He is charged with allegedly uttering defamatory words to Joyce Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of the ADB. On April 13, 1994, the MTC of Mandaluyong acting pursuant to the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed an earlier criminal case against him. The RTC of Pasig, however, set aside the order of the MTC, hence the appeal. Issue The issue is whether or not Jeffrey Liang has a political personality and therefore the court cannot resolve the issue because it is a political question

Held The SC also said that the case did not involve a political question becauese the Court can find legal standards for resolving the issue. This is the inverse of the functional type of political question as defined in Baker v. Carr. The Court ruled that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute, and is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Slander or oral defamation cannot be considered as an official act.

changes must be permanenet and do not include temporary alliances not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disapplication. The Court said that the question was in the legality and not the wisdom of the act of the chamber, therefore it is not a political question.

RULE MAKING POWER Marcos v. Manglapus Facts The case is about whether or not President Aquino can prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines in the exercise of her powers granted by the Constitution. The President is constrained to uphold and defend the Constitution and she has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare, and advance the national interest. The Presidential powers are not limited merely to exercising the Commander-in-Chief powers in terms of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency but is tasked with attending to the dayto-day problems of maintaining peace and order. Held The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences, or a fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power. The 1987 Constitution precludes the Supreme Court by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient recourse to the political question doctrine. We are compelled to decide what would have been non-justiciable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters. Daza v. Singson Facts The House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the Commission on appointments among the several political parties. The petitioner Raul Daza was chosen to represent the LDP. Later, the LDP was reorganized. 24 members from the LP resigned from the party and joined the LDP, swelling its number and reducing the LP to only 17. The House revised the representation in the Commission of Appointments, withdrawing the petitioners seat. Daza challenged the validity of his removal. He said his seat was permanent and the LDP was not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained stability. Representative Singson who took Dazas seat claimed that the SC has no jurisdiction as this is a political question. Held The House has the authority to change its representation in the COA to reflect any changes that may transpire in political alignments. It is understood that such Bustos v. Lucero Facts Bustos is charged with a criminal offense and he wanted to confront his accusers during the preliminary investigation. The prosecutor objected invoking Ruloe 108, Section II of the Rules of Court which provide the rights of a defendant after arrest. It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 infringes section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution which says that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concering pleading practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. These rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. It is said that the rule in question impairs substantive rights of the accused. Held Rule 108, Section II is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Applied to criminal law, substantive law declares what acts are crimes and procedural law provides and procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which the the guilty party is punished. Preliminary Investigations are eminently and essentially remedial, as it is the first step in a criminal prosecution. While Section 11, Rule 108 denies to a defendant his right to cross-examine during a preliminary investigation, his right to present witnesses remains unaffected and his constitutional rights to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial are unchanged. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. It is inevitable that the Supreme Court, in making rules should step on substantive rights and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate it if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only ina limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. The motion is denied. Fabian v. Desierto Facts Teresita Fabian was engaged by Nelson Agustin, then the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District, in an amorous relationship. During the course of this relationship he showered Fabians company

with public works contracts and interceded it in his office. Later, when their relationship soured Agustin resisted Fabians attempts to leave. Fed up, Fabian filed an administrative case with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Deputy Ombudsman eventually acquitted Agustin of all charges. Fabian claims that according to Section 27 of RA 6770, appeals to decisions of the Ombudsman go directly to the Supreme Court. Agustin says that the bar on administrative case appeal based on the Ombudsmans rules on procedure must be binding. Even though no party raised the issue, the SC ordered the parties to look into the constitutionality of Section 27 of RA 6770. Obiter Issue If Section 27 of RA 6770 is declared unconstitutional, what are Fabians remedies? Held Section 27 of RA 6770 is indeed unconstitutional, but since that Section 27 hints at appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by the Court under its rule-making power. The test for whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, is whether the rule regulates procedure the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter. If it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. A transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rulemaking power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals relates to procedure only. The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition. In Re: Cunanan (Bar Flunkers) Facts This case talks about the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, in order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examination successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75% in all subjects without failing below 50% in any subject. Feeling themselves fully qualified to practice law, some unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages a few percentages lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated for and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which reduced the passing general average in bar exams to 70% effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court and the court submitted written comments and shortly thereafter, the President vetoed the bill, and Congress did not override the veto. The President allowed the bill to become law without his signature. Held Under the Constitution, the SC has the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and

procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of law. The Congress is also given the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules promulgated by this Tribunal concerning admission to the practice of law. The Constitution does not say or mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar, or reinstate directly attorneys-at-lawor a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify, or supplement existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service or legal profession requires it. RA 972 is unconstitutional and therefore void without any force or effect. Javellana v. Department of Interior Facts Atty. Erwin Javellana was an elected city councilman of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989 the City Engineer, Ernesto Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-1090 against Javellana for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and for oppression, misconduct, and grave abuse of authority. Divinagracia alleged that Javellana, while being an incumbent member of the City Council has continuously engaged in the practice of law without authority from the Regional Director. Javellana appeared as counsel in a case against the City Engineer, Divinagracia for Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages. Javellana filed a petition for certiorari praying that the new Local Government Code be declared unconstitutional because it infringes on the right of the SC to prescribe rules on the practice of law. Held The case was dismissed for lack of merit. Javellanas contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code entrenched in the power of the Supreme Court to prescribe rules on the practice of law is off tangent. The LGC simply prescribes rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflict of interest between the discharge of their duties and private practice of their profession. Maniago v. CA Facts The offended party in a criminal case did not file to reserve the right to bring a separate civil action based on the same accident against the driver or the drivers employer Ruben Maniago. Maniago argues that the civil action against him impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employer because the private repsondent did not reserve his right to file an independent action. While the case was pending the Criminal action was dismissed for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of evidence. Issue Whether despite the absence of a reservation, respondent may nevertheless bring a separate action for damages against Maniago as specified in the Civil Code.

Whether the dismissal of the criminal case brings with it the dismissal of the attendant civil action. Held The question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of a civil liability must be tried on a single proceeding has always been regarded as a matter of procedure, and since the rulemaking power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of the Court. The requirement of reservation does not impair, diminish, or defeat substantive rights but only regulates the exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. Maceda v. Vasquez Facts Maceda was the presiding judge of the RTC (Antique) when he was charged by Napoleon Abiera of the PAO for allegedly falsifying his Certificates of Service dated February 6, 1989 by certifying that all civil and criminal cases that have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989 in truth there are cases waiting for a decision. Abiera further alleges that Maceda similarly falsified Certificates of Service for a total of 17 months. The repsondent sought the help of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman ordered that Maceda file his counteraffidavit and other controverting evidence. The Ombudsman also denied the ex-parte motion to refer to the SC filed by petitioner Petitioner contends that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charged rose from a judges performance of his officail duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court and that the Ombudsmans investigation constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. Issue Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the SC, and assuming it can, whether a referral should first be made to the SC. Held The investigation of the Ombudsman encroaches on the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employees arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination on whether a judge or court employee acted within the scope of his administrative duties. People v. Gacott, Jr. Facts Judge Eustaquio Gacott filed a motion for reconsideration when he was rebuffed by the Supreme Court through the annulment of his order dismissing a criminal case, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law.

Gacott relies on the second sentence of Article VIII, Section 11 which says that the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower court or order dismissal by a vote of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. He argues that the adverbial phrase en banc refers to a full court and not a division thereof. In 1993, a Court en banc resolution was adopted which clarified the SC Rules and Regulations, noting that en banc cases are contemplated when the penalty imposed is dismissal or if the suspension is more than one year with a fine exceeding P10,000.00 Issue Whether or not Gacott could be administratively disciplined by a mere division of the SC and not the Court en banc Held To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters regardless of the sanction, improbable, or imposed, would result in congested dockets and undue delay in adjudication of cases in Court. In cognizance of the need of a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension or does not need a fine of P10,000 or both, the administrative matter may be decided in division. This is a way to expedite the decision and resolution of cases of matters pending before the SC.

Garcia v. People Facts The Petitioners are sentenced to reclusion perpetua for murdering Jose Estrella. They filed a petiiton for mandamus compelling the RTC in Iloilo to forward the records of the criminal case to the SC for automatic review. Issue Whether the SC must automatically review a trial courts decision convicting the accused of a capital offense sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Held The Court only admits cases where the actual penalty imposed is death. As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from the decision convicting them of murder, the decision became final and unappealable. Judge Fuentes vs. Ombudsman Facts Pursuant to an act constructing the first flyover in Davao, the DPWH expropriated land under the right of eminent domain. However, as of May 1994, the government still had an outstanding debt to the landowners affected by the construction. the DPWH decided to auction off all scrap and iron junk found in the DPWH depot in Panacan. Davao City. Alex Bacquial won the bidding and attempted to withdraw the auctioned pooperties but was prevented by the City Engineer because he sand there were still serviceable properties there due for rehabilitation. Bacquial filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a break through order to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes.

The City Engineer filed a criminal case against Judge Fuentes for grave abuse of discretion with the office of the Ombudsman. Judge Fuentes filed this present petition to enjoin the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case and to order the same to remand the case to the Supreme Court. Held The Supreme Court, as granted in the Constitution, has the sole power to administratively supervise all courts and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them. Judge Caoibes vs. Ombudsman Facts Judge Alumbres filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Judge Caoibes for physical injuries, malicious mischief, and assault upon a person in authority. Judge Alumbres also filed an administrative case with the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal off the petitioner for grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer. Judge Caoives contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make preliminary determination of the respective culpability of the petitioner and respondent-judge who both being members of the bench are under its exclusive supervision and control. Issue Whether or not the Ombudsman should defer action on the Criminal Case pending resolution of the Administrative case. Held The Ombudsman should dismiss the criminal case. Only the SC can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance wioth all laws and to take the proper administrative action against them. No other branch of government may intrude into this power. Court Administrator v. Quianola Facts The Office of the Court Administrator conducted a physical and judicial inventory of cases pending before the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna. They found a lot of cases pending beyond the reglamentary period in the sala of Judge Quianola Judge Quianola countered that due to a stroke he suffered, he could not do his duties as efficiently as he suffered from a cerebral hematoma. The OCA said that the Judge falsified his Certificates of Service and that if he indeed was of poor health he should have asked for assistance, which in fact, he did not. Held The Judge was remiss in his duties and his faliure to expeditiously decide cases within the constitutionally allotted 90 day period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants administrative sanctions. Fined PhP 40,000.00 Section 6 The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Specific Powers Judicial Powers of the Supreme Court (1-2) - these are the only provisions that speak of jurisdiction. These include original jurisdiction for cases affecting diplomatic

representatives and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, as well as appellate jurisdiction over enumerated cases. Auxiliary Administrative Powers of the Supreme Court (3-6) they include the powers to issue temporary assignments of judges, to order a change of venue, to promulgate rules of procedure and enforcement of constitutional rights, integration of the bar, leagal assistance and admission to the practice of law, to appoint its employees, and to have administrative supervision over all courts. Congress may merely diminish the statutory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but not the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial Review Judicial review necessitates the search for an applicable law. The lower court must decide on the constitutionality of a statute (from Art. 5 of the Civil Code). But it is binding only on the parties involved. It only becomes binding when the Supreme Court says so. Esssential Requisities The power of judicial review is merely an aspect of judicial power. The first requisite for the exercise of judicial review before the court is an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication - the governmental act being challenged must have an adverse effect on the person challenging it (PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806), and the person challenging the act must have locus standi to challenge - he must have a personal or substantaial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 58) Auxiliary Requisities As a general rule the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, it may not be raised at the trial, and so on. There are exceptions, though. (Id. 88) The court will not touch constitutionality unless it is unavoidable or the lis mota (Sotto v. COMELEC, Board of Optometry v. Colet) In Mariano v. COMELEC, the SC shut down the petition as premature because the elections for the mayor of the City of Makati are three years away. The elections would have extended his term of office beyond the constitutional limit of three consecutive terms. The rule that the Court can only decide on a question of law when there is an actual case or controversy is not a hard and fast rule. The exceptions occur when for instance, lack of clarity may be creating a great confusion detrimental to public order, like the MMDA confiscating license plates and drivers licenses for traffic violations. The requirement of locus standi may be waived when the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance to the people (IBP v. Zamora) Taxpayer Suits In cases involving the expenditure of public funds, it must be shown that: It must be established that there is an exercise of Congress by its taxing or spending power.

 The taxpayer has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation there will be a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the statute Political Questions Political questions are those questions which under the Constitution are decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive branch of the government. Guidelines in distinguishing whether an issue is a political question or not (Baker v. Carr): textual question: there is a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a political department : functional type: there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. : Santiago v. Guingona (election of minority floor leader) prudential: where there is the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of govbernment or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made (repeated by Section 1), or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on a question. : whether or not we recognize China. Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality The Supreme Court has rejected the view that an unconstitutional act confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection whatsoever. The Court has adopted the view that before an act is declared unconstitutional, it is an operative fact which can be the source of rights and duties. It was applied in the case of De Agbayani v. PNB, where the period before a moratorium law was declared unconstitutional wa- is not allowed to toll prescriptive period of the right to foreclose a mortgage. Since the power of judicial review flows from judicial power, and since inferior courts are possessed of judicial power, it may be inferred that power of judicial review is not exclusive to the Supreme Court. This conclusion may be inferred from Article VIII, Section 5(2) which confers to the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction (appellate review) overjudgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international agreement, law, presidential decree, or regulation is in question. Standing is a substantive requirement: Justice Mendoza. It is discretionary on a Court to recognize the standing of a taepayer. Same thing with matters of transcendental importance. Lawmakers have standing if it affects the integrity of the legislative act. Gonzales vs. Narvasa disallowed taxpayer suit because there was no new money given out.

Kilosbayan, IBP, and Lacson cases show cases of transcendental importance. State of rebellion simply means that a rebellion is going on. It's just a declaration of fact. There is no need for the concurrence of Congress to declare Martial law. Section 6 The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year. (3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings. (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. Section 9 The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. People v. Lizada Facts The case is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC-Manila finding Lizada guilty of four counts of rape, meting him the death penalty for each count. Lizada is the live-in partner of Rose Orillosa, mother of Analia, the victim. Lizada denied ever having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the children of Rose as if they were his own children. Lizada contends that Analia was coached by her mother because Rose wanted control of the business they set up. Held The SC did not appreciate the contention of Lizada that he should be acquitted. They found him guilty of two counts of simple rape and acts of lasciviousness. They reduced his sentence to reclusion perpetua.

Re: Problem of Sandiganbayan

delays

in

cases

before

the

Facts There was a complaint regarding some delays in the resolution of cases before the Sandiganbayan. Because of the inherent Consitutional right to a speedy trial, the Board of Governors of the IBP decided that SC Administrative Circular 1094 be made applicable to the Sandiganbayan in regard to the pending cases under its jurisdiction. The IBP Governors also recommend to the SC an inquiry into the causes of delay in the resolution of cases before the Sandiganbayan. After an inquiry made, the Court found that there are are a totla of 415 cases left undecided beyond the reglementary period. There are two views regarding the reglementary period of deciding cases before the Sandiganbayan. One view maintains that the cases should be decided according to Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2) which says that all cases or matter filed to the lower collegiate courts shall be decided within 12 months from the date of submission. The second view, howver, contends that since the Sandiganbayan is a trial court, they are required to decide cases within 3 months from the date of submission. Issues What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases within its jurisdiction? Is the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094, which directs all trial judges to make a physical inventory of the cases in their dockets, applicable to the Sandiganbayan? If it is, should Judge Garchitorena be liable for the delays because of a lack of an efficient filing system to monitor the flow of cases? Held The provision in Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which says that cases or matters filed must be decided by lower collegiate courts within 12 months, does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level, which is the Court of Appeals. The Sandiganbayan is a special court on the same level as the Court of Appeals, possessing all inherent powers of a court of justice with the same functions of a trial court. The Sandiganbayan, being a special court, shall have the power to promulgate its own rules. In fact, it promulgated its own rules regarding the reglementary period of undecided cases under its jurisdiction. In its own rules it says that judgments on pending cases shall be rendered within 3 months. Also, the law creating the Sandiganbayan is also clear with the 3 month reglementary period. The Sandiganbayan, in a sense, acts like a trial court, therefore a 3 month and not a 12 month reglementary period shall apply. The Administrative Circular shall apply to the Sandiganbayan and its chairman is liable. Judge Francis Garchitorena is fined P20,000 for inefficiency and gross neglect of duty. He is also relieved of duty as Chairmain of the Sandiganbayan and as a presiding judge to devote himself exclusively to decision writing in all the pending cases in his sala and those pending without a ponente, which he shall write, are decided and resolved.

ARTICLE 10 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SECTION 9: Legislative bodies of local governments shall have Sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law Supangan Jr. vs. Santos G.R. 84663 24 August 1990 Facts: The petitioners are attacking the authority of the Secretary of Local Government to designate/appoint members/Sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies on the ground that it violates Section 9 of the Art. X of the Constitution. Moreover, the petitioners contend that the power to appoint belongs to the President and cannot be delegated to the Secretary of the Department of local Government. Issues: a) W/N the Secretary of local Government can appoint or designate Sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies. b) W/N the President or the Secretary can make designation/appointment without any enabling law pursuant to Section 9. c) W/N the designations made by the Secretary are null and void. Decision: Section 9 of Art X provides that legislative bodies of local governments shall have Sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law. Under the Local Government Code (BP 337), the power to appoint Sectoral is conferred upon the President of the Philippines but the secretary of Local Government may, by authority of the president inform the Sectoral representatives of their appointments. It is the president who appoints and the secretary is merely the transmitter. With regards the second issue, the court held that the phrase as may be prescribed by law is not prospective in character. Section 9 commands that there shall be appointed legislative bodies of local government whether or not a law exists or has still to be passed. In this case, there is a law (BP 337), which is still operative and not inconsistent with the Constitution. BP 337 requires that before the president may appoint members of the local legislative bodies, there must be a determination made by the Sanggunian itself that said sectors are made of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant representation after consultation with associations and person belonging to the sector concerned. In cases wherein the Sanggunian has not yet determined whether there is a need of representation of a particular sector in their city, then there is no basis for the designations/ appointments. With regards qualifications, the court held that the minimum requirement is that the representatives must at least belong to the sector they are representing. SECTION 10: Tan vs. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (11 July 1986)

Facts: Petitioners are residents of the province of Negros Occidental. On December 1985, they filed a case for prohibition for the purpose of stopping responded COMELEC from conducting plebiscite. The petitioners were assailing the constitutionality of BP 885 which is an Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, on the ground that it is a violation of the constitution. Respondents on the other hand insist on the validity of the law and argues that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new province of Negros del Norte do not fall within the meaning of the scope of the term unit or units affected thus, the plebiscite should only cover the units affected or those places that will be covered by the new of Negros del Norte. Issue: W/N the term areas affected refer only to places covered by the new province where the plebiscite should be limited. Decision: A reading of the constitution would give us an idea that the provisions made it imperative that there be first obtained the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of boundaries such as in the present case. Areas affected refer to both places that are covered by the new province and those other areas of the Province of Negros Occidental since the remaining areas are also affected. As provided in the dissenting opinion of Justice Abad Santos in the case of Paredes vs. Executing Secretary, when the constitution speaks of the unit or units affected, t means all of the people of the municipality if such is to be divided, or all the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. Such ruling is applicable in the case at bar.

Padilla Jr. vs. COMELEC GR. No. 103328, 19 October 1992

Facts: A plebiscite was held throughout the Municipality of Labo for the creation of the Municipality of Tulay Na Lupa (in Camarines Norte) in pursuant to RA NO 7155. After the plebiscite, the board of canvassers declared the rejection ad disapproval o an independent Municipality of Tulay na Lupa. The Governor of Camarines Norte (the petitioner) seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted and prays that a new one be undertaken. He contends that there is a failure because the results that were obtained were invalid and illegal since the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the units affected (the 12 baranggays) comprising the new Municipality of Tulay na Lupa. It is the contention of the petitioner that the ruling on Tan vs COMELEC was already pass with the new constitution which deleted the words unit or thus, the ruling in Paredes vs. Executive Secretary should be reinstate. Issue: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting the plebiscite in the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo instead of only the 12 baranggays affected. Decision: The deletion of the phrase unit or in Section 10 Article 10 of the constitution does not affect the ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC. The reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly

affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof should have a right to vote in the said plebiscite. Those who are affected include not only the 12 baranggays but also those living in the parent Municipality of Labo. The petition was dismissed.

SECTION 12:

Abella vs. COMELEC GR. No. 100710 03 September 1991

Facts: Adelina Larrazabal is a registered voter of Ormoc City and she wishes to run for governor of the province of Leyte. Ormoc City is not yet a highly urbanized component city yet it is considered as an independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached and its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. It is the contention of the petitioner that while a Component Citys charter prohibits its voters from participating in the elections for provincial office, there is nowhere in the charter that prohibits said voters from running for the provincial office. Issue: W/N a voter of Ormoc, who is prohibited from electing provincial officials can likewise run for provincial office. Decision: Component cities like Ormoc city whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. Such independence carries with it the prohibition directed to registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte connotes two prohibitions: one is from running and second is from voting for any provincial elective officials. SECTION 14 and SECTION 18:

Decision 1) EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services in the area covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create an autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act that would create the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The transitory nature of CAR does not necessarily mean that it is and interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras for an autonomous region is composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction, which is not established by EO 220 (Section 18). Moreover, the cordillera executive board, which is composed of the mayor of Baguio and provincial governors, merely serve as an implementing body. nd 2) With regards the 2 issue, again, CAR is not an autonomous nor even an interim autonomous region. It did not create new territorial and political subdivisions or merge existing ones into a larger division. It is not even a political subdivision that has a separate juridical personality. CAR is merely an administrative region created under the Reorganization Plan. Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over CAR and the offices created under EO 220, CAR may be considered at most as a regional coordinating agency if the National Government which is similar to the regional development councils which the president may create under Section 14. The petitions were dismissed. SECTION 18: Abbas vs. COMELEC 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA GR NO. 82217 29 January 1990

Facts: The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of EO 220 which created the Cordillera Administrative Region on the ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras through a plebiscite. EO 220 was brought about by negotiations between the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army) headed by Fr. Balwed and the Aquino government. It created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers provinces from Abra to City of Baguio. It was hoped that Car would accelerate the economic and social growth in the region and prepare it for the establishment of the autonomous region of Cordilleras to be supervised by the field offices of the departments of the National Government. Issue: 1) 2)

Facts: The petitioners are assailing the validity of RA 6734, an act providing for an organic act for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. They are praying that the court would enjoin COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for said purpose. They contend that RA 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao which is contrary to the provision of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. Furthermore, petitioners assail RA 6734 for according to them, this is in conflict with the Tripoli agreement.

Issue: W/N RA 6734 is unconstitutional and W/N it conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement. Decision: RA 6734 in constitutional. Even is we assume that it is in conflict with the Tripoli agreement, the standard for the validity of said act is provided by the constitution, thus RA 6734 will prevail. Moreover, granting that the Tripoli agreement is part of the law of the land, it will be of the same class as RA 6734, which is a statute. The rule is that the

W/N EO 220 is unconstitutional W/N CAR is a territorial and political subdivision

Later law prevails thus RA 6734 will prevail over the older Tripoli agreement. As provided in the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region is made effective upon the approval by a majority votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite. By majority, the constitution means that it should be dependent not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite but on the will of the majority in each constituent units. With regards the issue on the constituent units, the petitioners contention that by including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics as the other, the Congress unlawfully expanded the scope of the region. Such a contention was not given any merit by the court for the congress may determine what areas should comprise the autonomous region. With regards the question on the power of the president to merge existing regions, the court held that the president has the power to do so because what is being merged are administrative regions which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions and the power to merge them is traditionally lodged on the president to facilitate the exercise of general supervision over local governments. The petition was dismissed.

Leonor vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration GR 92649 14 February 1991

Facts: Due to the fact that the Cordillera Autonomous region did not come into existence since only Ifugao ratified RA 6766, as a consequent, the Cordillera Bodong Administration which was created in pursuant to section 13 of EO 226, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region and the CPLA as the regional police force do not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted as an indigenous or special court hence, it only exists under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such courts are not part of the judicial system and do not possess judicial power. The decisions of conciliation panels as advisory and conciliatory bodies has the force and judgment of the courts by it can be enforced only through the local city or municipality. The decisions of tribal courts on compromise or arbitration may be enforced or set aside by regular courts only. ARTICLE XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Cordillera Regional Assembly vs. COMELEC GR NO. 93054 04 December 1990

SECTION 1 HIPOLITA VS. MERGAS A.M. No. P-90-412 11 March 1991

Facts: A plebiscite was held on January 30, 1990 in pursuant to RA 6766 for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region. According to the results, only the province of Ifugao ratified the Organic Act. The petitioners were claiming that the Memorandum of the Secretary of Justice to the president saying that CAR can legally and validly constitute CAR is unconstitutional. Issue: W/N the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorable for the creation of the CAR ca alone, validly and legally constitute such region. Decision: No. It is expressly provided in the constitution that the autonomous region shall be composed of provinces, cities, municipalities, etc. In other words, the term region used should mean two or more provinces. Moreover, RA 6766 never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region other wise, there would be absurd situations like there would always be two sets of officials, the provincial officials and the regional officials. This is too much considering the size of the area. Moreover, a huge amount of 10M would be allocated to the region which is again too much considering that it is composed of Ifugao alone. The ruling in Abbas vs. COMELEC is not applicable in this case because the ruling in said case clearly state that the word majority means majority of the votes by constituent units. There is nothing in the Abbas case which deaks wutg te issue of whether an autonomous region could exist despite the fact that only one province constitute it. The petition was granted.

Decision: A deputy sheriff, as officer of the court , whose duties firm an integrated part of the administration of justice, may be properly punished, even punishment short of dismissal or suspension from office for violation of Rules of Court which impedes the fair and just administration of justice. Even if the offense is not very serious, the nature of the position amounts the acts as malfeasance. He is bound, virtute officii, to bring to the discharge of his duties. Public Service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. The yardstick of public service is honesty and integrity, both imprinted in the 1973 and the 1987 constitution.

SECTION 2 ROMULO VS. YNIGUEZ 141 SCRA 263 (1986)

Facts: The petitioners, representing more than 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan called for the impeachment of

President Marcos together with a verified complaint for impeachment Said resolution was referred to the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government unfortunately, said committee found the complaint insufficient of substance to warrant its further consideration and dismissed the charges. The petitioners filed the present case praying that section 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules on Impeachment be declared unconstitutional for it amends section 3 of the 1973 Constitution by vesting in a smaller body to supplant and overrule the impeachment complaint endorsed by 1/5 of all the members. Such power was vested only in the Batasang Pambansa, as a collegiate body, which has the power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment. Section 8 of the rules of court was also said to be unconstitutional because by requiring a majority vote of all the members of the BP for approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the rules imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial Issue: W/N the rules of court were unconstitutional in so far as it vest a majority of all the members to overrule an impeachment complaint endorsed by 1/5 of the Batasan. Decision: The rules are constitutional. When the Batasan denied the motion of Ramon Mitra to recall from the archives of resolution and the complaint for impeachment, it in effect confirmed the action of the committee on justice, human rights and good government in dismissing said resolutions and complaint on impeachment. The Batasan by a majority, as provided for the rules of court can dismiss the complaint for impeachment because there would not be any use of proceeding further if the required 2/3 would not be obtained. Such act of the Batasan as a body is an exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review. Moreover, the rules are always within the power of the Batasan to modify, change or replace any time. These rules are merely procedural and not substantive. The petition was dismissed. IN RE GONZALES 160 SCRA 771 (1988)

In Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that the court has jurisdiction over public officers and employees including government owned and controlled corporation, except constitutional officers that can be removed only by impeachment which includes the president, the members of the SC and the members of the constitutional commissions. The party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial and punishment in accordance with law after being impeached. It is important to make clear that the court is not here saying that its members or the other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from liability for possible criminal acts or for misbehavior. Fundamental procedural requirement must first be observed before such liability may be determined or enforced. SECTION 4 NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 111 SCRA 422 (1982)

Decision: The provision on the Sandiganbayan was a constitutional recognition of the continuing need to combat graft and corruption already recognized in earlier anti-graft laws. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was precisely aimed for curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in public service.

MAYOR LECAROZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 128 SCRA 324 (1984)

Decision: A public officer who under the constitution is required to be a member if the Philippines Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Such public officer during his incumbency cannot be charged before the Sandinganbayan or any other court with the offence which carries with it penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. The reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed is that members of the Supreme Court, as members of the Philippine Bar may be removed from office only by impeachment because to grant a complaint for disbarment of a member of the court during the members incumbency would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul to the constitutional mandate that members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in the constitution.

Facts: The petitioner who was the mayor of Sta. Cruz Marinduque was charged with the crime of grave coercion for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taken over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by a certain Par. The petitioner was said to have used police forces in order to control the gasoline station therefore depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade and occupation. The petitioned contends that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case and that his case should have been filed with the ordinary courts where the alleged crime was committed. Issue: W/N the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices of public officers. Decision: broad powers were given to the sandiganbayan which includes all other civil and criminal practices involving public officers of the court. Section 4 Article XIII of the Constitution provides for the creation of a special as the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction cases involving such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned and controlled corporations in relation to their office as may be determined by law. It is clear in the petition that the petitioner has used his position in order to gain advantage of Par. Thus, the

sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over his case. The petition was dismissed.

Article XI of the Constitution which reads: Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. 3) The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 4) Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. 5) (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives 6) Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year 7) Respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its corespondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela) and Comment, praying that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution. Briefly stated, the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character.

SECTION 5-7 ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 160 SCRA 843 (1988)

Facts: Enrique Zaldivar, governor of the province of antique sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of cases filed against him since the new constitution expressly provided that it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Issue: W/N the Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution and continued as such even after the ratification of the new constitution. May he conduct preliminary investigation and file cases against government officials. Decision: Yes. The Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) and Ombudsman have different duties. The former shall be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor and shall continue to function as may have been provided for by law except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the Constitution. The latter shall have the duty to investigate on its own, any act or omissions of any public official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Under the present constitution, Raul Gonzalez is mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and can investigate cases only upon the latters authority. The incumbent Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filling of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Petition was granted.

Francisco et. al. v. House of Representatives (Davide Impeachment) G.R. No. 160261

Keyword: Separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary branch of government. Facts: 1) On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). 2) On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of

Issues: Sub issue: 1) Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. Main issues: 1) Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution; and 2) Whether or not the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Main issues: Issue # 1

Ruling: Sub issue Yes, judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. Petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint. This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied) Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, to wit: x x x the Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x.x.x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

Yes, the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. Issue # 2 No, the resolution thereof is not a political question it has not resulted in a political crisis. The possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on. The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

SECTION 7 BIR VS. OMBUDSMAN GR. 115103 11 April 2002

tenure of office. The murder of 3 persons is no doubt an illegal act and since this was committed by a governor, the crime lies within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsmans investigative authority. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 vests in the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. A murder charged against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Facts: The office of the ombudsman received an information from an informer-for-reward regarding alleged anomalous grant of tax refunds to La Tondena Distilleries and Distillera Limtauco and Co. upon receipt of information Ombusdman issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the Legal Department of the BIR and later on to Commissioner Chato ordering them to appear before the Ombudman and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to limtauco and la tondena. It is the contention of BIR that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since to review the same was lodged with the court of Appeals and not the Ombudsman. Moreover, it was the contention of BIR that before a subpoena duces tecum is issued, there must first be a pending action. Petitioner further opines that the factfinding investigation by the Ombudsman is not the proper case for it is only step preliminary to the filing of recovery actions on the tax refunds granted to Limtauco and La Tondena. Issue: W/N the actions of the Ombudsman is correct. SECTION 11 and 12 DELOSO vs. DOMINGO GE No. 90591 21 November 1990

SECTION 13 CRUZ vs. Sandiganbayan GR. No. 94595 26 February 1991

Issue: W/N the respondent PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Government) has the authority to conduct preliminary investigation and file the information with the Sandiganbayn for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices act. Decision: Yes. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tanod Bayan to conduct preliminary investigation was modified by EO 1, which constituted and created the PCGG. Section 3 of EO No 1 provides that the commission shall have the power to conduct investigations as may be necessary. Under EO 14, it is further provided that the PCGG shall be empowered to file in the Sandiganbayan and prosecute all cases investigated by it under EO no. 1. With the ratification of the constitution, the office of the Ombudsman was created under Article XI, the authority of PCGG was maintained. The authority of the Ombudsman is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government like the PCGG.

Facts: Governor Deloso of Zambales seeks to stop responded Manuel Domingo Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon from conducting a preliminary investigation of the charge of multiple murder against him. He contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case because it only has the power to investigate acts and omissions that are connected to his duties as governor and that the Tanodbayan has no jurisdiction to prosecute the murder case against the petitioner. Issue: W/N the ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate the charge of multiple murder allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial governor. Decision: Yes. The constitution empowers the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any public official without any qualification that said act or omission must have been committed or incurred in relation to his office. The Ombudsman and his deputies are tasked to protect the people through acting promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government as well as investigate on its own any complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employees, office or agency, when such at or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. (Section 12 and 13 of Art XI). The clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. Furthermore, the Ombudsman act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee during his

BUENSADA VS. FLAVIER GR No. 106719 21 September 1993

Facts: The petitioners were preventively suspended by the Ombudsman pending investigations filed against them. It is the contention of the petitioners that the action of the Ombudsman is an abuse of discretion for according to Section 13 (3) of the 1987 consitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office thus, he cannot order the suspension himself. The ombudsman invokes Section 24 of RA No. 6770 which provided that the ombudsman or his deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation. Respondents also argue that the power to suspend is contemplated by section 13 (8) of the constitution which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other functions or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending investigation of the administrative complaint filed against said officials and employees. Decision. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees pending investigation. The court held in Nera vs. Garcia that suspension is just a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided. Moreover, it can be concluded that the Congress, by deleting the words subordinate and in his bureau leaving the phrase to read suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending investigation, intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be in his authority and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspensions.

Moreover, Deloso vs Domingo has already been reexamined in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou which both provided that the authority of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from any investigative agency of the Government. Also, a careful reading of Section 15 of the Ombudsman act would give us an idea an idea that the Ombudsmans investigatory powers are but directory in nature. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

CONCERNED OFFICILS OF MWSS vs. VASQUEZ G.R. No. 109113 25 January 1995

NATIVIDAD vs. FELIX GR No. 111616 04 February 1994

Facts: The petitioner is the Municipal Mayor of Ramos, Tarlac and he was charged for the killing of Severino Aquino, a robbery and NPA suspect, while the latter was in investigation at the police station. The PNP requested the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate the petitioner for the death of the victim. Petitioner wrote to the secretary of justice requesting the preliminary investigation be done in Manila, but this was denied. The petitioner then moved to remand his case for preliminary investigation contending that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the case because it was the Ombudsman and not the provincial prosecutor who has jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. respondent judge denied the petition. Issue: W/N the provincial prosecutor of Tarlac has authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner. Case, Decision: In Deloso vs. Domingo, it was said that the Ombudsman has the power to conduct preliminary investigation on any illegal act or omission of any public official which is broad enough to encompass any crime committed by a public official. However, looking at the latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Section 4 of said law provided that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive jurisdication in all cases involving: a) offenses or felonies bu public officers and employees in relation to their office and b) penalty prescribed be higher than prison correctional or imprisonment for 6 years or fine of Php 6,000.00. In the case at bar, the second requirement was met but the first is wanting.

Facts: The Ombudsman, in its October 1992 order, directed the Board of Trustees of MWSS to (a) set aside the recommendation of the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee that a MWSS contract be given to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes and b) to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder. The petitioners sought to annul these orders contending that: a) the respondent acted without jurisdiction in issuing these said orders b) respondent committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously interpreting the decision of MWSS which is a specialized agency of government. The respondent on the other hand contents that the authority of the Ombudsman is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the alleged irregularities in the bidding that was conducted in the MWSS. The ombudsman can call for investigation of any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Respondent further argues that the Ombudsman has investigatory powers, prosecutory powers, public assistance functions, authority to inquire and obtain information and function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures, thus the act of the Ombusdman is well within its powers. Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to issue said orders. Decision: No. The Ombudsman seen to have pre-empted the exercise of discretion by the Board of Trustees of the MWSS since the recommendation to award the contract appears to be yet pending consideration and action of the MWSS Board. The MWSS is government owned and controlled corporation, which has discretion on matters that can be best discharged by it. It was said in Razon vs. PPA that neither the court nor congress and perhaps the Ombudsman could be expected to have the technical expertise to look into matters of this nature. The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contract is vested on government agencies. Courts will not interfere unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award.

LASTIMOSA VS. VASQUEZ GR. 116801 06 April 06 1995

Facts: Petitioner is the Assistant Provincial prosecutor of Cebu. She and the Provincial Prosecutor refused to file a criminal charge of attmpeted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Thus, the Ombudsman filed an administrative complaint against them for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty refraining from prosecuting. The two were placed under preventive suspension. It was the contention of the petitioner that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case of the mayor thus, they cannot be forced to file the case against Ilustrisimo. Issue: W/N the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the provincial prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Decision: Yes. In the exercise of his powers, the Ombudsman is authorized to call in prosecutors for assistance as provided for in Seciton 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770). When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman meaning, he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve reverse and modify his decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. The preventive suspension is also valid in pursuant to Section 24 of the Ombudsman act which expressly provided that the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman, but not more than six months without pay. Petition was dismissed: Note: Preventive Suspension: Civil Service (90 days) grounds: simple showing that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges. Ombudsman (6 months) ground: same as the grounds under the civil service decree plus an additional requirement that the evidence of guilt is strong and that the respondents continued stay in the office may prejudice the case filed against him. Local Government Code (60 days) preventive suspension can be ordered only after the issues are joined, meaning, all the preliminary requirements and exchanges had been completed, respondent has already filed his counter affidavit and the case is ready for resolution.

produce all documents relating to the Personal Service Funds in the year of 1988. Petitioners refused to comply with the orders saying that the DBM only released funds for the 947 plantilla positions which were filled. Moreover, the petitioners were alleging that the documents being asked by the Ombudsman are confidential in nature thus, they cannot be forced to present them. Issue: W/N the Ombudsman can investigate a case brought about by an undersigned and unverified letter and W/N EIIB can invoke confidentiality against the Ombudsman. Decision: The privilege of confidentiality is recognized only on matters relating to military, diplomatic and other national security secrets. If the claim of confidentiality does not rest on these matters, the privilege cannot be invoked. What is being asked by the Ombudsman do not pertain to diplomatic nor military secrets. The fact that the said documents were already examined by COA gives the Ombudsman more right to examine them because there is no reason why said documents may be allowed to be examined by one agency of government and be considered as confidential by another. If the documents are really confidential, then they can always be examined in strict confidence of the Ombudsman himself. The contention of the petitioners that the Ombudsman can only act in appropriate cases and subject to such limitation as may be provided by law does not mean that the Ombudsman cannot investigate a case brought by unverified source. As a matter of fact, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning official act and omission. The general investigation in the Ombudsmans office is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the state from useless and expensive trials. Petition was dismissed. SECTION 18 CAASI VS. COURT OF APPEALS GR 88831 08 November 1990

ALMONTE vs. VASQUEZ G.R. 95367 23 May 1995

Facts: The Ombudsman received anonymous letters alleging that funds representing saving from unfilled positions in the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau has been illegally disbursed thus, it launched an investigation and issued subpoena duces tecum requiring the petitioners to

Facts: Merito Miguel is the municipal mayor of Bolinao Pangasinan. His rival Mateo Caasi, was contending that Miguel should have been disqualified to run for the position of mayor on the account of his being a green card holder filed the present petition. Moreover, the petitioner contends that section 18 of Article XI which states that Public officers and employees who seek to change their citizenship or acquire the statues of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law, applies to this case. According to Miguel, he merely obtained the green card in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic check-up and to visit his children. Miguel further argues that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao Pangasinan and that he voted during the previous elections. COMELEC ruled that the possession of a green card does not sufficiently establish that Miguel abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

Issues: a) W/N section 18 applies to this case b) W/N a green card holder is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US. Decision: In the application for Immigrant Visa and Alien registration, Miguel said that he inteded to stay permanently in the US. Thus, his immigration to the US in 1984 constitute an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines because he entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrants visa. To assume otherwise would mean that he applied for immigration to the US under false pretenses. However, Section 18 does not apply to this case because Miguel acquired the status of an immigrant before he was elected to public office and not during his tenure as mayor. Nonetheless, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to him. Said law states that any person who is permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this code unless he has waived his status. Miguels filing of his candidacy does not constitute a waiver of his status, thus, he remains to be an immigrant. Consequently, he is disqualified from running in public office. The decision of COMELEC and Court of Appeals were set aside.

that the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes: 1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan (under the direct control of the Ombudsman) and 2) those falling under the jurisdiction of regular courts (the control and supervision by the ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases complaints filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer or employee). The power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor in their regular capacity or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act state that the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official however, as held in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, this authority is not exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of offense charged. This means that the Ombudsman has no exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees for such power is concurrent with other investigating agencies such as provincial and state prosecutors. But in its exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, the investigating of such cases. In other words, DOJ is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases involving public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage. The petition was dismissed. SECTION 7 LAUREL VS. DISIERTO G.R. 145368 12 April 2002

SECTION 13 HONASAN VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GR No. 159747

Facts: Gregorio Honasan and several others were charged with violation of Article 134-A of the RPC for the offense of coup detat. The panel of investigating prosecutors of the department of justice sent a subpoena to the petitioner for preliminary investigation. The petitioner questions the jurisdiction of DOJ over the case asserting that the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office thus it must be the Ombudsman not the DOJ that has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. He further contends that he should be charged in the Sandiganbayan and not in the regular courts since he is a public official and that the OMB-DOJ joint circular is unconstitutional. Respondent on the other hand contends that the Department of Justice Panel of investigators has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over the charge in pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover, the Ombudsman has the power to deputize DOJ prosecutors as provided in the constitution. Issue: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction over the case. Decision: The authority of the respondent DOJ is not based on the OMB-DOJ Circular but rather on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code which provides that the DOJ shall have the power to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system. The office of the Ombudsman is conferred with the power to investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official, employee or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Such power does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officials. Accordingly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides

Facts: The National Centennial Commission was constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998 with former vice-president Salvador Laurel as Chairperson. Sometime on August 1998, Senator Coseteng delivered a speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the centennial exposition project. Upon motion of Senator Drilon, the speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officer. In 1999, president Estrada formed an ad hoc independent citizens committee to investigate al the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine Centennial projects including its component activities to be headed by former Senator Rene saguisag. The Saguisag Committee recommended the further investigation by the Ombudsman and indictment in proper cases of NCC chair Salvador laurel. Petitioner in this present case assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because the NCC was not a public office. He contends that he is not a public officer as defined under the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public official and W/N the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.

Decision: The power to investigate and prosecute by the Ombudsman pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such an act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make any distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. Thus, the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over this case would depend on whether or not NCC is a public office and consequently, its chairman, a public official. It was held by the court that NCC performs executive functions and was precisely created to execute the law moreover, it has a role in the countrys economic development, especially the in the central Luzon. Thus, NCC performs sovereign functions which is one of the characteristics of a public office. Having performed sovereign functions, it is therefore a public office and the petitioner, a public officer. The fact that petitioner did not receive any compensation is of little consequence, the office of the petitioner may be characterized then as an honorary office, as opposed to lucrative one or an office of profit, but it is public office nonetheless. The office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case. Petition was dismissed SECTION 4

designation by the BIR as a custodian of the properties does not make him a public officer. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore, its decisions are null and void.

CAMANAG VS. GUERRERO GRN 121017 February 17, 1997

Facts: Sometime in 1993, the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) issued the Table of Results of those who failed the May, 1993 Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure Examinations where petitioner Olivia B. Camanag was listed as having failed with a general average of 50.00%. The following year, an anonymous letter was sent to PRC Chairman Hermogenes P. Pobre 'claiming that certain BIR employees allegedly passed the CPA Licensure Exams under anomalous circumstances and Chairman Pobre immediately referred the situation to the Ombudsman. Ombudsman Investigator set the fact-finding investigation of the matter and issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Chief of the BIR Personnel Division. Petitioner seeks the declaration of nullity of Sections 15 and 17 of the Ombudsman Act (R.A. No. 6770), insofar as it empowers the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations and to directly undertake criminal prosecutions. Issue: W/N the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations is a violation of the constitution. Decision: No. The the Ombudsman. under the 1987 Constitution, particularly under paragraph 8. Section 13, Article XI.9 may be validly empowered with prosecutorial functions by the legislature, and this the latter did when it passed R.A. No. 6670, which gave the Ombudsman, among 9 others, the power to investigate and prosecute individuals on matters and/or complaints referred or filed before it. Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman is a distinct constitutional body whose duties and functions are provided for by the Constitution itself. Considering that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute criminal cases emanates as it does from the Constitution itself, particularly, under paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI, which empowers the Ombudsman to "exercise such other powers or perform such other functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe through legislation, it cannot be argued that such power or the exercise thereof is unconstitutional or violative of the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. The case was dismissed. Article XII: National Economy and Patrimony

AZARCON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. 116033 26 February 1997

Facts: Petitioner Azarcon, in his capacity as administrator of properties deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was accused of malversation of public funds for allowing Jaime Acla, his subcontractor to take possession of the properties owned by the latter which was seized due to his tax liabilities. Petitioner alleges that he was not a public officer hence, he should not have been charged with malversation of public funds. He also contends that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes committed solely by private individuals. Azarcon points out that he cannot be considered as a public because there is no provision in the National Internal revenue Code which authorizes the Bureau of Internal revenue to appoint him as one. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with malversation of public funds as a principal after the said individual had been designated by the BIR as a custodian of the distrained property. Decision: The court held that in accordance with Section 4 of PD No.1606, the Sandiganbayan can only exercise jurisdiction over a private individual when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. Azarcon also cannot be considered a public officer for Article 203 of the RPC defines public officers as: 1) one who is taking part in the performance of public functions in the government and 2) that his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be by direct provision of the law, by popular election or by appointment by competent authority. The petitioners

Section 2 Alienation of natural resources SANTA ROSA MINING CO. VS. LEIDO, JR. 156 SCRA 1 1987

Facts: The petitioner, Santa Rosa Mining Company Inc., is assailing the constitutionality of Presidential decree No 1214

and seeks to enjoin the respondent public officials from enforcing. Petitioner contends that it is a holder of fifty mining claims situate in Camarines Norte acquired under the provisions of Act if the US Congress of 1902 or the Philippine Bill. The contested law provided that all mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine bill should file a mining lease application within 1 year from the approval of the decree, which the petitioners complied with under protest. It was the contention of the respondents that the petition should fail since petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing the petition in court citing the pending appeal filed with the Office of the President. Issue: W/N the petitioners are legitimate owners of the mining claims and W/N the PD 1214 is valid. Decision: The court held that whatever right that was vested over the mining claims before PD 1214 were merely possessory right which can be lost through abandonment or forfeiture or may be revoked for valid legal grounds. Moreover, the petitioner was wrong in citing Gold Greek Mining Corp vs. Rodriguez because the issue in this case was the right to a patent over a mining claim after compliance with all the legal requirements for a patent. Such in not the issue in the present case. Thus, the petitioners cannot claim ownership over the mining claims. PD 1214 is constitutional because it is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the state, as owner over lands of the public domain, of which the petitioners mining claim are still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating themselves in the area. The petition was dismissed.

there is actual possession which was not been proven by the predecessor-in-trust. The decisions of the CA were affirmed.

Utilization of natural resources MINERS ASSOCIATION vs. FACTORAN Jr. G.R. No. 98332 16 January 1995

Facts: The petitioners are assailing the validity of Administrative Order Nos 57 and 82 which were issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in order to implement the legislative acts of the president which regards the exploration, development and utilization of minerals. Administrative Order No. 57 provides that all existing mining leases which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 constitution except small scale mining leases shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one year from the effectivity of the Mining Guidelines. AO No. 82 on the other hand provides that entities listed there (mining companies) must within two years from the effectivity of the DENR AOs submit a letter of intent and mineral Production Sharing Agreement. Petitioners contend that these AOs impair the contracts previously entered into for it pre-terminates existing mining leases. Issue: W/N the said orders are valid. Decision: AO 57 and 82 are valid. Upon the effectivity of the 1987 constitution, the state assumed a more dynamic role in the utilization, exploration and development of the natural resources. The constitution expressly provided that utiliation may be undertaken by means of direct act of the state or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements. The AO did not preterminate existing mining leases in general. For one, it does not apply retroactively before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution but rather, only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 constitution. It is a well settled doctrine that mining leases and agreements granted by the state are subject to alteration through reasonable exercise of power of the state. The orders intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their growth and welfare. The petition was dismissed. SECTION 3 Classification of lands DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. JUDGE AQUINO G.R. 31688 17 DECEMBER 1990

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS 185 SCRA 722 (1990)

Facts: San Miguel Corporation seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision denying its application for registration of a parcel of land since it was not able to show entitlement to the said land which was purchased by the company from a certain Severino Perez. Solicitor General opposed the application contending that SMCs claim of ownership in fee simple cannot be granted. Severino Perez contest ownership of the land on the basis of tax declarations and Spanish title which he could not avail of because the 6month period from February 1976 that was prescribed by PD 892 has already elapsed. Moreover, the land is part of public domain thus SMC, as a private corporation is disqualified from owning it as provide by the constitution. Issue: W/N Severino Perez owns the land and thereby has the right to sell it to SMC Decision: The court held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by the law, which in this case is 30 years, creates a legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requirement, ipso jure, ceases to be public land. The tax declarations were insufficient to prove ownership or right of possession of the land. It only comes as strong evidence if

Facts: Petitioner contends that the limestone rich land of Bucay Abra which, was purchased by Abra Industrial Corporation, is within the Central Cordiallera Forest reserve. The director of lands further points out that the land being denuded does not affect its classification. Moreover, while the land could be classifies as mineral land under the Bureau of mines, the process of exclusion from the Cordillera forest reserve had not yet been undertaken thus, the said land was still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the constitution.

Issue: W/N the lower court was wrong in granting the application fore registration of the parcels of land not withstanding its finding that they were within the forest zone. Decision: Yes. The lower court erred. The district foresters failure to object the exclusion of the area sought to be registered from the forest reserve is not a justification for registration, Moreover, the power to exclude the area from the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resource and not the district Forester or even the Director of Forestry. The rule in Director of Forestry vs Munoz which provide that the forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession. This ruling is premised on the regalian doctrine. Pursuant to the constitution, a kind must first be released from its classification as forest land in accordance with the certification of the Director of Forestry. Classification of lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department. Moreover, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienate or disposable. The fact that the land is denuded does not affect its classification. The decision was reversed and set aside. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS 160 SCRA 228 (1988)

Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims. The land could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of prescription nor could it be used simultaneously by them and the mining companies. The decision of the trial court was reinstated.

Right of corporation to own lands DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 146 SCRA 509 (1986)

Facts: The Director of Lands filed a petition questioning the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which ordered the registration in favor of Acme Plywood and Veneer Co. of the five parcels of land acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel. The petitioner contends that the registration proceeding should be governed by the 1973 constitution which provides that the private corporation may not lease more than 1000 hectares of land. This provision is not found in the 1935 constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the land from the Infiels. Issue: W.N the corporation may acquire the whole parcel of land considering that it is beyond the 1000 limit provided by the new constitution. W/N the Acme validly acquired the land. Decision: The court held that the company may acquire the whole parcel of land (481,390 sq meters) because the validity of the acquisition is determined as of the time the land was acquired. The limit provided in the 1973 constitution is found in the 1935 constitution and since it is the constitution in force at the time of acquisition that which will be followed, the acquisition is valid. The Infiels are not disqualified from acquiring and owning the said land because pursuant to the Public Land Act, national cultural minorities who possessed and occupied the same for more than 30 years are given the right to exercise ownership over said lands. Thus, they can sell it to a corporation like Acme. The rule is that alienable public land held by a possessor personally through his predecessors in interest openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed period of time (30 years) is converted to private property by mere lapse or completion of said period. The acquisition of Acme then was valid. The court ruled in favor of the respondents.

Facts: Jose de la Rosa and his children applied for registration of a parcel of land in the Benguet province. The application was opposed by the Benguet Consolidated Inc, (as to Lots 1-5) Atok Corporation (as to Lots 6-9) and the Republic of the Philippines as to lots 1-9. In support of the applications, the original owners who sold the lots to De la rosa testified that they acquired the lots by virtue of prescription. Benguet and Atok on the other hand contends that Lots 1-5 and 6-9 respectively were sold to them by their successors in interest sometime in 1934 and 1909. The Bureau of Forestry interposed its objection on the ground that Lots 1-9 was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under PD No. 217. According to Benguet and Atok the claims were perfected prior to the 1935 constitution thus the properties were already considered private and thus the successors in interest can transfer the same to the companies. The court of appeals ruled in favor of de la Rosa saying that there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. Under such ruling, the surface was classified as agricultural while the land beneath as mineral. Issue: W/N the companies have exclusive rights to the property in question. W/N the CA was correct in their contention. Decision: The court held that the CA was incorrect by stating that the surface can be agricultural land while the subsurface, mineral because classification must be categorical. The land must either be agricultural or mineral. In the instant case, it can be observed that the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral once the mining claims were perfected. Once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever its use to which it is being devoted such use may be discontinued by the state to enable it to extract the mineral therein. The owners however will be compensated pursuant to the Mining Laws. Benguet and

SECTION 7 HALILI VS. CA G.R.113539 12 March 1998

Facts: The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances between Helen de Guzman and David Rey Guzman (Helens son) and between David and Emiliano Cataniag. Helen is an American citizen who inherited real properties from her deceased husband, Simeon de Guzman, also an American citizen. Sometime on 1989, Helen, executed a quitclaim transferring all her properties,

two of which she inherited from Simeon, to her son. David later on sold the properties in Bulacan to a certain Emilio Cataniag. It is the contention of the petitioners that the conveyance from Helen to David, both American citizens was illegal because it was a violation of Section 7 article 12 of the constitution, thus the same should be declared null and void. (note: the petitioners are claiming that they have right of redemption over the land sold by David that is why they are contending the validity of he conveyance. Art 1621 of the civil code provides that owners of adjoining land shall have right of redemption when a piece of rural land is alienated. In order for the petitioners to be able to exercise right of redemption, the contested land must be rural land. The trial court and CA declared the land as urban, thus the petitioners cannot invoke right of redemption. These issues however are not important in our discussion) Issue: W/N the conveyance is illegal thus should be declared null and void. Decision: The court held that the sale of the subject land to Emiliano Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, renders moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen to David. It is true that Helens deed of quitclaim (which transferred the property to David) collided with the constitution specifically Section 7 of Art XII. The court cited the case of Krivenko vs. Register of deeds, which discussed the issue as to who are qualified to own public and private lands in the Philippines. It was held in that case that alienation of agricultural lands is limited to Filipino citizens. Section 5 (now section 7) of Article XII closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into alien hands because it would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if after all, they may be freely alienated upon becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. The capacity to acquire public lands is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of public domain. Private land may be transferred only to individuals qualified to acquire lands of the public domain (Filipino individuals and corporations with at least 60% of the capital owned by Filipino citizens). Consequently, the only way aliens can acquire private lands or a land of the public domain is through legal succession. Although the transfer from Helen to David is illegal, transferring the land to a citizen of the Philippines cured the flaw of the original transaction. In such cases, title of the transferee will be rendered valid. Through this action, the object of the constitution which is to keep our land in Filipino hands will be served. The petition was denied. FRENZEL VS. CATITO G.R. No. 143958 11 July 2003

but the latter assured the former that she will be getting a divorce soon. During this time, Frenzel continued buying properties under Ederlinas name thinking that said properties would be conjugal anyway when they get married. Unfortunately, Ederlinas divorce was opposed by her husband twice. By 1985, Frenzel and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating until they separated that same year. Frenzel demanded the return of all the amounts and properties Ederlina acquired from him. Shortly thereafter, Frenzel filed a complaint in the RTC contending that during the period of their common-law relationship, he acquired solely through his own efforts the personal properties. Issue: W/N the properties should be returned to Frenzel. Decision: The court ruled that Ederlina is the purchaser of the contested properties and even if Frenzel was the buyer, he has no cause of action against the former because he was an alien, thus, disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. Moreover, applying pari delicto, the petitioner was precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent since he himself is still married to his former Filipina wife. Section 14 (now Section 7) of Article XIV (now XII) of the 1973 constitution provides that lands of public domain which include private lands may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of public domain. Aliens, whether individual or corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands. Even if the petitioner is the real vendee, the transactions are a violation of the Constitution, hence null and void and produce no legal effect. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction, which involves his own moral turpitude, may not maintain an action for his losses. This rule is expressed in the maxims EX DOLO ORITUR ACTION and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDIS. The sale is illegal per se and to allow the petitioner to recover the properties would be subversive of public policy. The petition was dismissed.

SECTION 10 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS G.R. No. 122156 03 February 1997

Facts: Frenzel, an Australian citizen of German descent, filed a complaint against the responded Ederlina Catito, a filipina. Frenzel was married to another Filipina but since 1981, they were already legally separated. Sometime in 1983, Frenzel met Ederlina in Australia. The latter was also married to a German national but she concealed this fact from Frenzel. The two had an amorous relationship and the Frenzel persuaded Ederlina to go back to the Philippines where they can engage in a business. Upon going back to the Philippines, Frenzel bought a property under the name of Ederlina. He also helped the girl set up a parlor business. Sometime in 1984, Frenzel discovered Ederlinas marriage

Facts: Petitioner invokes the Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 constitution in its bid to acquire 51% of the share of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) formerly owned by the GSIS. The said policy provides that the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony (Section 10 of Article XII). The issue arose when GSIS decided to sell its MHC shares through public bidding. In a close bidding, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm placed a bid higher than the petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, the petitioner matched the bid price at PHp 44.00 per share, which was tendered by the Malaysian company. Manila Prince then petitioned to the court to enjoin the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm contending that Manila hotel is part of national patrimony, thus, Filipinos should be given preference during

the bid. Respondents on the other maintain that Section 10 is not applicable based on the following grounds: 1. Section 10 of Art XII of the constitution is not a selfexecuting provision and requires an implementing legislation 2. granting that the provision is self-executing, manila hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of public domain and natural resources 3. granting manila hotel is part of the national patrimony, the provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only the shares, not the hotel building or the land where it stands. 4. GSIS rules provide that qualified bidders can only match the highest bid if the former cannot be awarded the block of shares Issue: W/N the Manila Prince Hotel should be given preference in acquiring the 51% share of MHC. Decision: The court held that the argument of the respondent that Section 10 is not self-executing is flawed. Section 10 is a mandatory and positive command, which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing rules for its enforcement. When the constitution mandates that in granting of rights and privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. Patrimony pertains to heritage and refers not only to natural resources of the Philippines. Manila hotel is a living testimonial of Philippine heritage for more than 8 decades, it has bore witness to the triumphs and failures of the Filipinos. Consequently, respondents claim cannot be sustained. The Filipino First policy must mean that the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos but this provision does not mandate the pampering and preferential treatment of incompetent Filipino citizens or corporations. Nonetheless, while the Filipino first policy bestows preference on qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Since the petitioner already matched the bid price tendered by the Malaysian firm, there is no reason why it should not be declared the winning bidder. The respondent was ordered to accept the matching bid of the petitioner.

Facts: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then secretary of DTI, representing the government of RP signed the final act embodying results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing the said act, the Philippines agreed to submit to the WTO agreement. The petitioners assail the WTO agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and to give preference to qualified Filipinos to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. They also pray for the nullification of said agreement because 1) the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products (the national treatment and parity provisions in the WTO Agreement) and 2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and impairs the constitutional powers of both congress and the supreme court. Issues: 1. W/N the provision of the Agreement Establishing the WTO contravene the provisions of the Constitution particularly Section 10 and 12 Article XII of the 1987 constitution. (There are 7 issues in this case, only rd the 3 issue is useful in our discussion) 2. W/N the senate may ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Decision: Section 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections of the said article specifically Sections 1 and 13. Section 13 provides that the state shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Through this section, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world. The constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipinos (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS) but it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the cases of equality and reciprocity. In other words, the constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy for it does not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. What the constitution frowns upon are unfair competition and trade practices. The constitutional policy of a self reliant and independent national economy does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. Moreover, the constitution encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. Given a free trade environment espoused by the WTO, Filipino entrepreneurs will be able to demonstrate capacity to grow. Looking at the constitution, it can be surmised that there are enough balancing provisions in the fundamental law that would allow the senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO agreement (Section 1 and 13). The ratification then was constitutional. Petitions were dismissed.

Dissenting Opinion: Puno, J. Section 10 is pro-Filipino but it is not anti alien for it does not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concession covering national patrimony. In the absence of qualified Filipinos, the state is not prohibited from granting these rights to aliens if the act will promote the welfare of the nation. The right of preference of the petitioner only arises if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad during the bid. The petitioner has no right to match the bid after the bidding closed because doing so would be unfair

TANADA VS. ANGARA G.R. No. 118295 02 May 1997

ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY VS. PUBLIC UTILITY BOARD G.R. No. 19857 02 March 1923

Facts: The petitioner is a corporation organized under the Philippine law. Sometime in 1921, the secretary of Public

utility investigated the operation of the ice plants in Iloilo and he reported that the petitioner should be considered a public utility. Thereafter, the Public Utility Board issued a decision holding the petitioner a public utility and as such, subject to the control and jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commissioner. Petitioner rejected said decision. Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public utility. Decision: A Public utility is a utility corporation, which renders service to the general pubic. Its essential feature is that its service is not confined to privileged individuals but is open to an indefinite public. The public or private character of a utility does not depend on the number of persons who avail of its services but on whether or not it is open to serve all members of the public who may require it. Evidence shows that the petitioner is operating a small ice plant and that there was no attempt made to supply the needs of all who may apply to expand the plant. Moreover, sales have been made to selected customers only. The fact that the petitioner has no competitor in the field does not make it a public utility. Iloilo ice is not a public utility and should not submit to the jurisdiction of the board ARTICLE 17 PLANAS vs. COMELEC 49 SCRA 105 (1973)

the 1935 constitution, which according to petitioners was merely suspended by the establishment of Martial Law, could be once more operative. Issue: W/N the ratification of the 1973 constitution is unconstitutional (based on the 1935 constitution) Decision: The court dismissed the case basing its decision in the ruling in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary. In said case, the new constitution was held to be in force and effect by six justices while four dissented from the majority view. Since the case was dismissed, the validity of the ratification of the constitution was upheld, one of the basic postulates being the presumption of validity. Moreover, the opinion of then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, while in dissent, acknowledged that even without a valid ratification, a new constitution could come into effect by the acquiesce of the people, to whom sovereignty resides. Besides the referendum in 1973, there were other instances when the people went to polls to show their acquiesce in the constitution, namely, during the 1976 amendments, and two elections held under the present constitution. There is no question that the 1973 constitution is in force and effect thus the present case was dismissed. SUMMARY OF THE JUSTICES OPINION ON THE JAVELLANA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CASE (WHICH RESOLVED THE RATIFICATION ISSUE) Originally, there where a total of seven Justices who opined that the requirements of the 1935 constitution for a valid ratification namely: a) Ratification of amendments must be held in an election conducted under the election law b) Supervised by the COMLEC c) Where only franchised voters take part have not been followed. A. Chief Justice Conception the amendatory process provided in the 1973 constitution was not followed because it was precisely provided that only qualified coed under Article V of the 1935 constitution are allowed to participate in the plebiscite B. Makalintal and Castro the citizens assemblies were not limited to qualified, let alone registered voters but included all citizens from the age of 15 No official ballets were used in the voting for it was done only by acclamation or show of hands There was no secrecy as one of the essential features of election process No set of rules were observed COMELEC did no part in the elections thus, the 1935 constitutional requirements were not followed. C. Zaldivar (same as above) D. Fernando (same as above) E. Teehankee two if the essential requisites for ratification through election namely the participation of enfranchised

Facts: Petitioner prays for the annulment of PD 73 in so far as it calls for a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed constitution and Presidential Decree No. 86 which organized the Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public questions on the ground that these decrees are either void or no in effect. It is the contention of the petitioner that PD 73 has no effect because the power to call a plebiscite is lodged exclusively in congress while calling for Citizens Assemblies is illegal since it contravenes with Article XV of the 1935 constitution on the following grounds: a) it is contemplated in the constitution that in the elections wherein the draft constitution is submitted for ratification, only qualified citizens are permitted to vote whereas in Citizens Assemblies, even 15 year olds can vote. b) Elections, plebiscites contemplated in the constitution have provisions for secrecy, citizens assemblies have none. Issues: W/N PD 73 and 86 and consequently, the ratification of the constitution is valid. Decision: Before the court decided on this case, PD 1102 was issued by President Marcos announcing that the Filipino people has ratified the constitution proposed by the 1971 constitutional convention.

MITRA JR. VS. COMELEC 104 SCRA 59 (April 4, 1981)

Facts: The petitioners assail the ratification of the 1973 constitution contending that it is not in force an effect believing that in the event the said constitution is rejected,

person only and administration of the COMELEC are missing thus, there is an irregularity in the ratification. F. Barredo - The referendum falls short of the requirements provided by the 1935 constitution but the result of the referendum (votes of the people) is sufficient basis for declaring that the New Constitution has been ratified. Those who originally dissented (Esguerra, Makaisar and Antonio) believed that people alone should determine whether the constitution was ratified or not. Since the

majority of the people ratified the constitution, it is should be considered in force. Moreover, since there is no provision on revision in the 1935 constitution, the 1971 constitutional convention was called by the direct authority of the people and not by the authority of the constitution. However, 3 justices voted to dismiss the case (Makalintal, Castro, Barredo) including the dissenters. They all believed that whether or not the requirements in the 1935 constitution were complied with is irrelevant in the face of the acceptance of the constitution by the people.