Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983 VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA RUBEN ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE ENCABO respondents. Antonio R. Atienza for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondent NLRC, Quasha, Asperilia, Ancheta &- Valmonte Pena Marcos Law Offices for private respondents. RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

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Before the Court en banc is a motion to reconsider the decision promulgated on July 20, 1982 which set aside the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission and reinstated the decision of the National Seamen Board. To better understand the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, we reiterate the background facts of the case, Taken from the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission:
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It appears that on different dates in December, 1978 and January, 1979, the Seamen entered into separate contracts of employment with the Company, engaging them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a period of twelve (12) months. After verification and approval of their contracts by the NSB, the Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan. On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a cable from the Company advising him of the possibility that the vessel might be directed to call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same time informing him of the procedure to be followed in the computation of the special or additional compensation of crew members while in said ports. ITF is the acronym for the International Transport Workers Federation, a militant international labor organization with affiliates in different ports of the world, which reputedly can tie down a vessel in a port by preventing its loading or unloading, This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment of its wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the crew members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its prescribed rates.) In the same cable of the Company, the expressed its regrets for hot clarifying earlier the procedure in computing the special compensation as it thought that the vessel would 'trade in Caribbean ports only. On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another cable to complainant Bisula, this time informing him of the respective amounts each of the officers and crew members would receive as special compensation when the vessel called at the port of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-controlled port. This was followed by another cable on 23 March 1979, informing him that the officers and crew members had been enrolled as members of the ITF in Sidney, Australia, and that the membership fee for the 28 personnel complement of the vessel had already been paid. In answer to the Company's cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula, in representation of the other officers and crew members, sent on 24 March 1979 a cable informing the Company that the officers and crew members were not agreeable to its 'suggestion'; that they were not contented with their present salaries 'based on the volume of works, type of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a world wide trade': that the 'officers and crew (were) not interested in ITF membership if not actually paid with ITF rate that their 'demand is only 50% increase based on present basic salary and that the proposed wage increase is the 'best and only solution to solve ITF problem' since the Company's salary rates 'especially in tankers (are) very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila ... In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the basic pay of the complainant crew members, although it claimed, that it would "suffer and absorb considerable amount of losses." The proposal was accepted by the Seamen with certain conditions which were accepted by the Company. Conformably with the agreement of the parties which was effected through the cables abovementioned, the Seamen were paid their new salary rates.

Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to cancel the contracts of employment of the Seamen, claiming that its principals had terminated their manning agreement because of the actuations of the Seamen. The request was granted by the NSB Executive Director in a letter dated 10 April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company cabled the Seamen informing them that their contracts would be terminated upon the vessel's arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979 they Arere asked to disembark from the vessel, their contracts were terminated, and they were repatriated to Manila. There is no showing that the Seamen were given the opportunity to at least comment on the Company's request for the cancellation of their contracts, although they had served only three (3) out of the twelve (12) months' duration of their contracts. The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of earned wages with the National Seamen Board. The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of contract and recovery of excess salaries and overtime pay against the private respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB rendered a decision declaring that the seamen breached their employment contracts when they demanded and received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates. The dismissal of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were ordered suspended. The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of the contract by the petitioner was without valid cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition. WON THE ACTUATIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS ARE GROUNDS FOR THE TERMINATION OF THEIR CONTRACTS AND THEIR DISMISSAL IS LEGAL

The private respondents submit the following issues in their motion for reconsideration:

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A. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID VIOLENCE TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD THAT THE SEAMEN VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACTS IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR CONTRACT. B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S HAVING AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE SEAMEN'S BASIC WAGE WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS. C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING THAT THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT COULD BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN' IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD VIOLATED THE SAME. D, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND PETITIONER VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE EXPIRY DATE THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH TERMINATION. E. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PREPARATION BY PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS AND THE EXECUTION OF THE SIDE CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN BAD FAITH. F. THIS HONORABLE COURT INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. At the outset, we are faced with the question whether or not the Court en banc should give due course to the motion for reconsideration inspite of its having been denied twice by the Court's Second Division. The case was referred to and accepted by the Court en banc because of the movants' contention that the decision in this case by the Second Division deviated from Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor (L-50734-37, February 20, 1981), a First Division case with the same facts and issues. We are constrained to answer the initial question in the affirmative. A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the fact, that there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. (Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The majority of the Court's work is now performed by its two Divisions, but the Court remains one court, single, unitary, complete, and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that, while ' individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one another, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. And that voice being authoritative should be a clear as possible. Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, whether en banc or in Division, may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3), Article X, Constitution.) In the rare instances when one Division disagrees in its views with the other Division, or the necessary votes on an issue cannot be had in a Division, the case is

brought to the Court en banc to reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier decision, and to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has happened in this case. The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the Court's decision, speaking through the First Division, in Wallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor (102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly conflicting resolutions of basically the same issue by its two Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the case to the Court en banc. Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment on the third motion for reconsideration states that the resolution of the motion might be the needed vehicle to make the ruling in the Wallem case clearer and more in time with the underlying principles of the Labor Code. We agree with the petitioner. After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspicacious consideration of the motions for reconsideration and the comments, replies, and other pleadings related thereto, the Court en banc is constrained to grant the motions. To grant the motion is to keep faith with the constitutional mandate to afford protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization and to just and humane conditions of work. We sustain the decision of the respondent National labor Relations Commission. There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill the en that lays the golden egg." In other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and immutable the side contracts which require them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations, pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and should suffer instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the still unemployed would be left hopeless. This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole. In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years ago. Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was ponente of the court's opinion declaring as a conspiracy the threat of workingmen to strike in connection with their efforts to promote unionism,
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It is difficult to believe that a right exists in law which we can scarcely conceive can produce, in any posture of affairs, other than injuriois results. It is simply the right of workmen, by concert of action, and by taking advantage of their position, to control the business of another, I am unwilling to hold that a right which cannot, in any, event, be advantageous to the employee, and which must always be hurtful to the employer, exists in law. In my opinion this indictment sufficiently shows that the force of the confederates was brought to bear upon their employer for the purpose of oppression and mischief and that this amounts to a conspiracy, (State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867. Cited in Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor, p. 13. Emphasis supplied) The same arguments have greeted every major advance in the rights of the workingman. And they have invariably been proved unfounded and false. Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name a few were all initially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of government and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the golden eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously injurious not only to the employer but more so to the employees themselves before these claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as "rights" and before these were proved beneficial to management, labor, and the nation as a whole beyond reasonable doubt. The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought rights already established. No matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them. The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all exception? The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary function is recruitment and who .usually gets a lump sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen and the determination of their compensation is subject to the interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how much in terms of profits the local manning office and the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And costs include salaries of officers and crew members. Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have

never demanded the same high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to government protection when they ask for fair and decent treatment by their employer.-, and when they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of improvement according to internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their employees one in keeping with minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the employees really receive, The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums required by fair labor standards legislation but even go way above the minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The same is true of international employment. There is no reason why this Court and the Ministry of Labor and. Employment or its agencies and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign. If any minor advantages given to Filipino seamen may somehow cut into the profits of local manning agencies and foreign shipowners, that is not sufficient reason why the NSB or the ILRC should not stand by the former instead of listening to unsubstantiated fears that they would be killing the hen which lays the golden eggs. Prescinding from the above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen Board nor the National Labor Relations Commission should, as a matter of official policy, legitimize and enforce cubious arrangements where shipowners and seamen enter into fictitious contracts similar to the addendum agreements or side contracts in this case whose purpose is to deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and agencies should present a more honorable and proper posture in official acts to the whole world, notwithstanding our desire to have as many job openings both here and abroad for our workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter involving no less than our dignity as a people and the welfare of our workingmen must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the form of policy legislation, not from administrative rule making or adjudication Another issue raised by the movants is whether or not the seamen violated their contracts of employment. The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody' the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.) They are not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their employer for higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to established principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from decisions of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal. The respondent Commission ruled:
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In the light of all the foregoing facts, we find that the cable of the seamen proposing an increase in their wage rates was not and could not have been intended as a threat to comp el the Company to accede to their proposals. But even assuming, if only for the sake of argument, that the demand or proposal for a wage increase was accompanied by a threat that they would report to ITF if the Company did not accede to the contract revision - although there really was no such threat as pointed out earlier the Seamen should not be held at fault for asking such a demand. In the same case cited above, the Supreme Court held:
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Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, the refusal to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it entered into without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents. (Emphasis supplied). The above citation is from Wallem. The facts show that when the respondents boarded the M/T Jannu there was no intention to send their ship to Australia. On January 10, 1979, the petitioner sent a cable to respondent shipmaster Bisula informing him of the procedure to be followed in the computation of special compensation of crewmembers while in ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets for not having earlier clarified the procedure as it thought that the vessel would trade in Carribean ports only. On March 22, 1979, the petitioner sent another cable informing Bisula of the special compensation when the ship would call at Kwinana Australia.

The following day, shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers and crews were not interested in ITF membership if not paid ITF rates and that their only demand was a 50 percent increase based on their then salaries. Bisula also pointed out that Vir-jen rates were "very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila." In reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25 percent increase. Only after Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum amount given monthly to Vir-jen was the decision to terminate the respondents' employment formulated. The facts show that Virjen Initiated the discussions which led to the demand for increased . The seamen made a proposal and the petitioner organized with a counter-proposal. The ship had not vet gone to Australia or any ITF controlled port. There was absolutely no mention of any strike. much less a threat to strike. The seamen had done in act which under Philippine law or any other civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted valid modes of labor activity. We reiterate our ruling in Wallem.
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Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat, But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their form of expression is contrary to law and public policy. ... Our dismissing the petition is premised on the assumption that the Ministry of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the workinginan's interests and, of course, the nation as a whole. The points raised by the Solicitor-General in his comments refer to the issue of allowing what the petitioner importunes under the argument of "killing the hen which lays the golden eggs." This is one of policy which should perhaps be directed to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country's other policy makers for more specific legislation on the matter, subject to the constitutional provisions protecting labor, promoting social justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement of the freedom of speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition. We agree with the movants that there is no showing of any cause, which under the Labor Code or any current applicable law, would warrant the termination of the respondents' services before the expiration of their contracts. The Constitution guarantees State assurance of the rights of workers to security of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II, Constitution). Presumptions and provisions of law, the evidence on record, and fundamental State policy all dictate that the motions for reconsideration should be granted. WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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Fernando, C.J., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.

, Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 141221-36 March 7, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused, KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused-appellants PUNO, J.: This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438, 6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531 finding accusedappellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1) count of syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.1 In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight (8) informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.
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The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainants; a certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment;2 the receipts for the payment made by private complainants; and two documents signed by the Reichl spouses where they admitted that they promised to secure Austrian tourist visas for private complainants and that they would return all the expenses incurred by them if they are not able to leave by March 24, 1993,3 and where Karl Reichl pledged to refund to private complainants the total sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the amounts they paid for the processing of their papers.4 Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify for the prosecution. She stated that Francisco Hernandez introduced her to the spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl at the residence of a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. At the time, she also saw the other applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl told Narcisa that they could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy. They, however, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and travel documents. She paid the fee in three installments. She paid the first installment of P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the second installment of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on December 27, 1992. She gave the money to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichl spouses at Matira's residence. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the first and second installment5 but not for the third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992 but was not able to do so. Karl Reichl explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy in Austria, but she could not yet leave for Austria because the hotels were fully booked at that time because of the Christmas season. Narcisa's departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993, but it still did not push through. Narcisa stated that they went to Manila several times supposedly to obtain a visa from the Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl assured her that she would be able to leave once she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of Narcisa and that of the other applicants several times but these proved to be empty promises. In March 1993, the applicants met with the three accused at the residence of private complainant Charito Balmes and asked them to refund the payment if they could not send them abroad. The meeting resulted in an agreement which was reduced into writing and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to ensure private complainants' departure by April, otherwise, they would return their payment.6 Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony: In July 1992, her sister, Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco Hernandez at their residence in Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in Italy. When she accepted the offer, Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers. In August 1992, Leonora, together with her sister and Francisco Hernandez, went to Ramada Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda Reichl. At said meeting, Leonora handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl. Yolanda assured her that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses told Leonora to wait for about three weeks before she could leave. After three weeks, Francisco Hernandez invited Leonora and the other applicants to the house of Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to discuss some matters. Francisco Hernandez informed the applicants that their departure would be postponed to December 17, 1992. December 17 came and the applicants were still unable to leave as it was allegedly a holiday. Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of $1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses promised the applicants that they would leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time in January 1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the residence of Leonora and collected the sum of P50,000.00 purportedly for the plane fare. Francisco issued a receipt for the payment. When the applicants were not able to leave on the designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the spouses again made another promise. Tired of the recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the applicants decided to withdraw their application. However, Karl Reichl constantly assured them that they would land a job in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The promised employment, however, never materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document stating that he would refund the payment made by the applicants plus interest and other expenses. The

document was executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants, Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora St., Batangas City.7 Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that she paid a total amount of P100,000.00 to the three accused.8 Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she testified before the court. She said that Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for the job of domestic helper in Italy and required her to pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare her passport and other papers to be used to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992, she gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City and Francisco Hernandez introduced her to his business partners, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl. Francisco Hernandez turned over the payment to the spouses so that they could secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses promised her an overseas job. They said she and the other applicants would leave on December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992, Charito paid the amount of P70,300.00 to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichls. Francisco Hernandez again handed the money to the spouses. On February 16, 1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who delivered the same to the spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not issue a receipt for the payment made by Charito because he told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the other applicants, Charito was not able to leave the country despite the numerous promises made by the accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart, until finally the Reichls told the applicants that Karl Reichl had so many business transactions in the Philippines that they would not be able to send them abroad and that they would refund their payment instead. Hence, they executed an agreement which was signed by Karl Reichl and stating that they would return the amounts paid by the applicants. The accused, however, did not comply with their obligation.9 Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie Bautista, also took the witness stand. She stated that in May 1992, Melanie applied for an overseas job through Francisco Hernandez. Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to be used for the processing of her papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie made the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who was then accompanied by Karl and Yolanda Reichl.10 Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco Hernandez gave the money to Yolanda Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one on August 6, 1992 in the amount of P25,000.00,11 and another on January 3, 1993 in the amount of P51,000.00.12 Three receipts were issued for the payments.13 Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that his wife applied for the job of domestic helper abroad. In June 1992, Francisco Hernandez introduced them to Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending workers to Italy. Rustico and his wife prepared all the relevant documents, i.e., passport, police clearance and marriage contract, and paid a total placement fee of P130,000.00.14 They paid P50,000.00 on June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and P55,000.00 on January 3, 1993. The payments were made at the house of Hilarion Matira and were received by Francisco Hernandez who, in turn, remitted them to the Reichl spouses. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the payment. The Reichls promised to take care of Estela's papers and to secure a job for her abroad. The Reichls vowed to return the payment if they fail on their promise. As with the other applicants, Estela was also not able to leave the country.15 The defense interposed denial and alibi. Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the Philippines on July 29, 1992. Prior to this date, he was in various places in Europe. He came to the country on July 29, 1992 to explore business opportunities in connection with the import and export of beer and sugar. He also planned to establish a tourist spot somewhere in Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda Reichl, stayed at the Manila Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown Hotel. They stayed there until August 26, 1992. After they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned to Vienna on September 19, 1992.16 Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda around August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco Hernandez was allegedly looking for a European equipment to be used for the quarrying operation of his friend. Before accepting the deal, he made some research on the background of the intended business. Realizing that said business would not be viable, Karl Reichl advised Francisco Hernandez to instead look for a second-hand equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco Hernandez again until he left for Vienna in September 1992.17 Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez allegedly approached him and sought his help in securing Austrian visas purportedly for his relatives. Karl Reichl refused and told him that he was planning to stay permanently in the Philippines. On one occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an excursion at Sombrero Island. Francisco Hernandez told him that he would also bring some of his relatives with him and he would introduce him to them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez and Leonora Perez. Leonora Perez, together with Francisco Hernandez, later went to see Mr. Reichl at the house of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and asked him if he could help her obtain an Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was firm on his refusal.18 In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about Francisco Hernandez's recruitment activities. He said that Francisco Hernandez merely told him that he wanted to help his relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised private complainants that he would give them overseas employment.19 As regards the document where Mr. Reichl undertook to pay P1,388,924.00 to private complainants, he claimed that he signed said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez allegedly told him that private complainants would harm him and his family if he refused to sign it. He signed the document as he felt he had no other option.20 Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her husband and denied the charges against her. She claimed that she was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations, thus, she could not have committed

the acts charged therein. Yolanda Reichl further stated that she did not know of any reason why private complainants filed these cases against her and her husband. She said that several persons were harassing her and pressuring her to pay private complainants the sum of at least P50,000.00.21 After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accusedappellants of one (1) count of illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL 1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529; 2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6434, 6436 and 6528; 3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6439 and 6531; 4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530. The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences: 1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); 2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of Six (6) Years of prision correctional, as minimum to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Narcisa Hernandez in the amount of P150,000.00; 3. In Criminal Case No. 6430, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Leonora Perez in the amount of P100,000.00; 4. In Criminal Case No. 6432, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Melanie Bautista in the amount of P150,000.00; 5. In Criminal Case No. 6438, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Estela Abel de Manalo in the amount of P130,000.00; 6. In Criminal Case No. 6530, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years or prision correctional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Charito Balmes in the amount of P121,300.00; and 7. To pay the costs. SO ORDERED." Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They raise the following errors: "1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment committed by syndicate and in large scale based on the evidence presented by the prosecution which miserably failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment on a large scale by cummulating five separate cases of illegal recruitment each filed by a single private complainant. 3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an automatic guilty verdict against accusedappellant for the crime of estafa after a guilty verdict in a separate crime for illegal recruitment. It is submitted that conviction in the latter crime does not ipso facto result in conviction in the former."22 The appeal is bereft of merit. Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,

utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.23 The law imposes a higher penalty when the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale as they are considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.24 In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and placement under the Labor Code. The evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did not have any license to do so. There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad.25 Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private complainants, which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the document marked at Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private complainants. We are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez, Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda Reichl told them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that they would be able to leave the country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to doubt the truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these witnesses to falsely testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and the latter represented themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in the testimony of these witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants in their brief do not impair their credibility, especially since they corroborate each other on the material points, i.e., that they met with the three accused several times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas employment, and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were not able to leave the country. It has been held that truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.26 Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments given by private complainants for the processing of their papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing, whether in his testimony or in that of his wife, that private complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the document. Mr. Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand the contents of the paper he was signing. When he affixed his signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his obligation to ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide them gainful employment abroad. Such obligation arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him and his co-accused to private complainants. The admission made by accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not negate the fact that they also promised to procure for them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J", accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants paid the amount of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later date, accused-appellants promised to refund to each complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00. This is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the complainants not only for securing visas but also for their placement abroad. Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The acts of recruitment were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand, claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if the spouses were staying in Manila, it does not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the three accused worked as a team and they conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business partners. Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to private complainants that they would seek employment for them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers. There being conspiracy, each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-accused even if he himself did not personally take part in its execution. Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of illegal recruitment in large scale by cummulating the individual informations filed by private complainants. The eight informations for illegal recruitment are worded as follows: Criminal Case No. 6429 "That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor de Hernandez and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa Autor de Hernandez relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law. Contrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6431 "That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Leonora Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Leonora Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law. Contrary to Law." Criminal Case No. 6433 "That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Melanie Bautista y Dolor and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Melanie Bautista y Dolor relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
1wphi1.nt

Contrary to Law." Criminal Case No. 6435 "That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Annaliza Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Annaliza Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law. Contrary to Law. Criminal Case No. 6437 "That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling y Coling and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law. Contrary to Law." Criminal Case No. 6439 "That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel de Manalo and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Estela Abel de Manalo relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law. Contrary to Law."

Criminal Case No. 6529 "That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta. Rita Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Anicel Umahon y Delgado and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Anicel Umahon y Delgado relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law. Contrary to Law." Criminal Case No. 6531 "That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at No. 40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Charito Balmes y Cantos and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Charito Balmes y Cantos relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law. Contrary to Law." We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We agree with accused-appellants that they could not be convicted for illegal recruitment committed in large scale based on several informations filed by only one complainant. The Court held in People vs. Reyes:27 "x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment 'committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group,' it must be understood as referring to the number of complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group."28 This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants. The charge was not only for illegal recruitment committed in large scale but also for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty that they would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we hold that accused-appellants should be held liable for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate which is also punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) under Article 39 of the Labor Code. Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the crime of estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.29 It has been proved in this case that accused-appellants represented themselves to private complainants to have the capacity to send domestic helpers to Italy, although they did not have any authority or license. It is by this representation that they induced private complainants to pay a placement fee of P150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against appellants. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, accused. ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were charged with violation of Article [1] 38 (b) of the Labor Code for illegal recruitment in large scale in an information which states

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911 The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE (ART. 38(b) in relation to Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, committed as follows: That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law. That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group penalized under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442). CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-21908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910). Except for the names of the complainants, the dates of commission of the crime charged, and the amounts involved, the informations [3] were identical in their allegations
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908 The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime of ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed as follows: That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended party that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers for overseas employment and that they could secure employment/placement for said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the offended party was later induced to give accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the said amount and far from complying with their commitment and despite repeated demands made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz have remained at large. During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes: Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas

employment. During that meeting which took place sometime in April or May, 1990, accusedappellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21, 1990 signed by accusedappellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.[4] Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.[5] On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellants wife, who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA. [6] The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by the POEA stating that accused are not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).[7] In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de la Cruz for overseas employment. He asserts that it was for this reason that he met all three complainants as they all went together to Amelia de la Cruz house in Novaliches, Quezon City sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow up their applications. Accused-appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was working as an agent for one. He also denied having received any money from any of the complainants or having signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is accused-appellants contention that the complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellants mother-in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.[8] The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in large scale.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo: A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Beny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against the said accused. B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused. C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.

D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as defined and punished under Article 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, and this Court sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. SO ORDERED.[9]
HENCE THIS PETITION

ISSUE: THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE

The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal. The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:
(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and (3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[10]

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-appellants recruitment activities criminal. Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never received any money from the complainants nor processed their papers. Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-applicant of the complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-up their application proves that complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz who received the processing fees, and not accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that complainants could not have honestly believed that he could get them their passports since they did not give him any of the necessary documents, such as their birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI clearance, and marriage contract. Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the straightforward and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have identified accused-appellant as the person who enticed them to part with their money upon his representation that he had the capability of obtaining employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court. [13] The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing. [14] The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.[15] Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural persons. This argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any

manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[16] Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary. [17] It also bears stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority.[18] Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code. It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.[19] The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. [20] The trial court was correct in holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the case at bench. Owing to accused-appellants false assurances that he could provide them with work in another country, complainants parted with their money, to their damage and prejudice, since the promised employment never materialized. Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa is as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxx xxx

xxx

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows
Minimum Period : Medium Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years

Maximum Period :

pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code. When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.[21] Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-appellant: In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.[22] Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the

amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.[23] Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages. In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following modifications: In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages. In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 124671-75. September 29, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LINDA SAGAYDO, accused-appellant. DECISION PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 59 convicting accused Linda Sagaydo of illegal recruitment in large scale and of four (4) cases of estafa, and sentencing her as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered (1) In Criminal Case No. 10838-R, finding the accused LINDA SAGAYDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article 38(b) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended by P.D. 1920 and further amended by P.D. 2018, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00; (2) In Criminal Case No. 10839-R, finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum; (3) In Criminal Case No. 10840-R, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum; (4) In Criminal Case No. 10841-R, finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum; and (5) In Criminal Case No. 10837-R, finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum. The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant Rogelio Tibeb the amount P39,000.00; Jessie Bolinao, the amount of P35,000.00; Gina Cleto, P15,000.00; and Naty Pita the amount of P38,500.00. SO ORDERED.[2]

On December 15, 1992, Baguio City Prosecutor II Estrellita P. Bernabe filed with the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 59, separate informations charging accused Linda Sagaydo with one (1) case of illegal recruitment in large scale, and four (4) cases of estafa. [3] Upon arraignment on August 18, 1993, accused pleaded not guilty to all the five (5) charges against her.[4] Thus, trial ensued. The complainants recounted their respective experience with accused Linda Sagaydo in this wise: Gina Cleto, an AB Political Science graduate and community worker residing in No. 19-A Sumulong St., Holy Ghost Proper, Baguio City testified[5] that she knew the accused for almost a year as the latter also resided at Sumulong Street. Sometime in September, 1991, the accused went to Ginas house and encouraged her to work as a factory worker in Korea. Gina said she had to think it over first since she went back and forth to Tabuk and Baguio City. She and the accused met again in the house of the former in December, 1991, where the accused reiterated her offer of employment to Gina. When Gina asked her whether she was a licensed recruiter, and accused answered in the affirmative. Accused told Gina that she could not have the latters travel papers and passport processed unless she gave an advance payment of P15,000.00. Gina then went to San Gabriel, La Union to get the P15,000.00 required by the accused. They met again in the house of Gina in the last week of December, 1991, where she handed the P15,000.00 to the accused who assured Gina that she was leaving for Korea on January 6, 1992, provided Gina paid her the remaining balance of P30,000.00. Gina then went to Lepanto to ask for money from her brother and sister. She returned to Baguio City on January 2, 1992, with P28,000.00 on hand. Gina and the accused met on January 5, 1992, where the latter informed her that her flight for Korea on January 6, 1992, was postponed. Accused then advised Gina to just hold the P30,000.00 balance until her flight pushed through. About three (3) months later, or in April, 1992, Gina met the accused in Sumulong Street. Gina

demanded from the accused the return of P15,000.00 advance payment she had given her, but the accused just answered that she would process her papers. The next time they met was in November, 1992, where Gina again asked the accused to return the P15,000.00, to no avail. This prompted Gina to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) regional office in Baguio City to inquire whether the accused was a licensed recruiter. The POEA issued a certification dated November 25, 1992 [6] stating that the accused was not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or any part of the region. Rogelio Tibeb, a farmer and resident of San Gabriel, La Union, testified[7] that he was informed by his townmate Domaan Samanillo that the accused was engaged in recruitment. Sometime in December, 1991, Rogelio went to the residence of accused to inquire on the requirements for overseas employment. Accused replied that he needed to submit his 2 x 2 pictures and a passport. The accused then told him to secure P39,000.00 as placement fee. In the last week of December, 1991, Rogelio handed the P39,000.00 to the accused who told him to go home and wait for the date of his flight. Accused did not issue a receipt. Rogelio waited for months but his flight never pushed through. He then went to the Baguio POEA office with his co-complainants Jessie Bolinao and Naty Pita where they found out that the accused was not a licensed recruiter, per certification dated November 25, 1992.[8] Naty Pita, also a resident of San Gabriel, La Union testified [9] that sometime in November, 1991, she visited her sister-in-law who happened to be a neighbor-boarder of the accused at 19-A Sumulong Street, Baguio City. Upon being informed that the accused was a recruiter, Naty and her sister-in-law went to the room of accused where the latter recruited her as factory worker in Korea. The accused asked Naty to prepare P38,500.00 for the fare and travel documents plus P1,500.00 for the passport. Naty went home to look for money. On December 26, 1991, Naty handed P38,500.00 to the accused who told her that she would be leaving for Korea on January 6, 1992. After that, Naty went home. On January 4, 1992, Naty went to the boarding house of accused in anticipation of her January 6, 1992, flight. Accused told her that she could not leave because she had no visa. So Naty asked the accused to return her money. The accused instead offered her a placement in Taiwan to which Naty agreed. Naty was told to wait for the call of accused. Days passed and Naty had not received any call from the accused. Naty then went to the Baguio POEA office where she, too, found out that the accused was not a licensed recruiter. Jessie Bolinao, a farmer and resident of Lon-oy, San Gabriel, La Union recalled[10] that the accused was his neighbor in Lubnagan, Kalinga-Apayao until 1982, and was even a distant relative of his father. In the second week of December, 1991, Jessie went to the house of the accused and gave her P35,000.00 as placement fee for his employment to Korea as factory worker, on the assurance that he would be leaving on December 28, 1991. Jessie, however, was not able to leave on that date because according to the accused, his travel papers had not been processed. Jessie returned to the house of accused more than ten (10) times thereafter to follow-up his papers, until he found out that accused was no longer residing there. He thereafter inquired at the Baguio POEA office whether the accused was a licensed recruiter, in answer to which the office issued a certification[11]stating that accused was not a licensed recruiter. The accused denied having recruited any of the private complainants. She claimed that they came to her voluntarily after being informed that she was able to send her three (3) sons to Korea. While accused admitted having received money from complainants Gina Cleto and Naty Pita, she said she used their money to buy their plane tickets. Gina and Naty were not able to leave because the Korean government imposed a visa requirement beginning January, 1992. When asked why she was not able to return the money of Gina and Naty, accused said that she returned the plane tickets to the Tour Master travel Agency for refund but said agency did not make reimbursements. With respect to complainants Jessie Bolinao and Rogelio Tibeb, the accused denied having received any money from them.[12] The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the complainants and rejected the denial of accused. Thus, on October 25, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting her of the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa, the decretal portion of which is quoted in the opening paragraph of this opinion. Hence, this appeal.[13] In this appeal, accused-appellant claimed that she was erroneously convicted of illegal recruitment and estafa because the trial court failed to consider that she only processed the travel documents of the private complainants as tourists, and that no recruitment for employment abroad took place.

We sustain accused-appellants conviction. Illegal recruitment has been defined to include the act of engaging in any of the activities mentioned in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code without the required license or authority from the POEA. Under the aforesaid provision, any of the following activities would constitute recruitment and placement: canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Article 13 (b) further provides that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two (2) or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. [14] This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[15] All the aforementioned requisites were present in this case. The accused-appellant made representations to each of the private complainants that she could send them to Korea to work as factory workers, constituting a promise of employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. From the testimonies of the private complainants that the trial court found to be credible and untainted with improper motives, there is no denying that accusedappellant gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[16] As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants, mere denial of accused-appellant cannot prevail.[17] We thus defer to the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of the complainants as there is no showing that any of them had ill motives against accused-appellant other than to bring her to justice for the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa. Their testimonies were straightforward, credible and convincing.[18] As to the license requirement, the record showed that accused-appellant did not have the authority to recruit for employment abroad, per certification issued by the POEA Regional Extension Unit in Baguio City, [19] stating that ...the name LINDA SAGAYDO per existing and available records from this Office is not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or any part of the Region." It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment unlawful or criminal.[20] Anent the last requirement, accused-appellant engaged in illegal recruitment against four (4) persons, namely, complainants Gina Cleto, Jessie Bolinao, Rogelio Tibeb and Naty Pita. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy because illegal recruitment and estafa are distinct offenses. Illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which criminal intent is necessary.[21] Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.[22] Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their money upon the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to leave for work abroad nor get their money back.[23] The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao failed to produce receipts as proof of their payment to accused-appellant does not free the latter from liability. The absence of receipts cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. [24] As long as the witnesses can positively show through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the absence of receipts. [25] With respect to the penalty, accused-appellant having been found guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 10838-R, was aptly meted out the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 under Art. 39 (a) of the Labor Code.[26] As to the estafa cases, the pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).- any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the

amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which maybe imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be; xxx."

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that, in imposing a prison sentence under the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that, which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.[27] The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty is left to the sound discretion of the court, to fix from within the range of the penalty next lower without reference to the periods into which it may be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[28] In Criminal Case No. 10840-R, where complainant Gina Cleto was defrauded of P15,000.00, there being no modifying circumstances, the accused may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.[29] In Criminal Case Nos. 10837-R, 10839-R and 10841-R where the respective amounts defrauded from complainants Rogelio Tibeb, Jessie Bolinao and Naty Pita exceeded P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed by law therefor is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, to be imposed in its maximum period. The penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, and the maximum penalty therefor is six (6) years eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days to eight (8) years, plus an additional one (1) year since the three (3) amounts had an excess over P22,000.00, of only P17,000.00, P13,000.00 and P16,500.00.[30] Thus, accused-appellant may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, in each case.[31] WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellant LINDA SAGAYDO for illegal recruitment and estafa, subject to the MODIFICATION that: (1) In Criminal Case No. 10840-R, she is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and (2) In Criminal Cases Nos. 10837-R, 10839-R and 10841-R, she is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, in each case. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the private complainants the following amounts: Gina Cleto - P15,000.00; Rogelio Tibeb - P39,000.00; Jessie Bolinao - P35,000.00; and Naty Pita P38,500.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. With additional costs in this instance. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 97044-46 July 6, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GENER TURDA alias "Boy" (a.k.a. GUADALUPE TURDA, JR.), accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Tan, Manzano & Velez for accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.: GENER TURDA alias "Boy" (a.k.a. Guadalupe Turda, Jr.) together with his wife Milagros Turda and Carmen Manera, was charged with illegal recruitment in Crim. Case No. 57218 and two (2) counts of estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. 57219 and 57220. However, Milagros Turda and Carmen Manera were never apprehended so that only Gener Turda could be arraigned and tried. As the three (3) cases involve the same factual milieu, they were jointly tried. In the first week of August 1986, appellant Gener Turda, his wife Milagros Turda nicknamed "Mila," and Carmen Manera went to the house of complainant Florante Rosales at 28 Ilocos Sur St., Bago Bantay, Quezon City, to convince his family that the former could secure an overseas job for Florante in Italy and another for his sister Shirley Cabalu in France for a fee. Florante and Shirley accepted the offer and their father, Roberto Rosales, paid P70,000.00 for both. However, he did not ask for a receipt because of his trust in appellant and his wife who were Shirley's "compadre" and "comadre" for the past seventeen (17) years. 1 On 13 August 1986, the spouses Gener and Mila, together with Carmen Manera, brought Florante and Shirley to the airport for their supposed departure for abroad at five o'clock that afternoon. The Turdas used their Volkswagen in bringing their two (2) "recruits" to the airport for the customary "send-off." After a long wait, appellant and his coaccused told Florante and Shirley that their passports had not been released and that their departure had to be rescheduled, with the assurance however that they could leave as soon as their papers were released. 2 Despite several promises, Florante and Shirley were still unable to leave. They visited the Turdas several times at their house but the former were given more promises instead. Florante even went to the agency of accused Carmen Manera, the International Friendship and General Services, at Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, but was unable to talk to her because at that time there were many applicants inside the office. Complainant and his sister finally demanded the return of their money, but the Turdas failed to give their money back. Consequently, Florante Rosales went to the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City to file the corresponding complaint. Sometime before September 1987, another complainant, Celina Andan, learned that her application for an immigrant visa with the Canadian Embassy was denied. While her application was pending, Celina's mother, Milagros Andan, was persuaded by Milagros Turda to entrust to her the processing of Celina's papers since she (Milagros Turda) had already been abroad and had gone through the application process previously. The Andans and the Turdas had known each other for more than ten (10) years as their stores which sold rice and LPG, respectively, were near each other. 3 After the denial of Celina Andan's application, Gener and Mila undertook the processing of Celina's travel papers for which they were given a downpayment of P25,000.00 with the promise to refund the amount if she would not be able to leave for Canada within 45 days. However, should they succeed, Celina would have to pay them an additional amount of P35,000.00 upon delivery to her of her visa. On 14 September 1987, the mother of Celina gave a check in her store for P14,500.00 and cash of P500.00 to Mila Turda for which the latter gave a receipt in the presence of appellant Gener. On 22 September 1987, Celina's mother again gave a check to the Turdas in the amount of P10,000.00 for which a receipt was likewise issued by Milagros Turda. After forty-five (45) days, Celina Andan was still unable to leave for abroad. She went with her mother to the house of the Turdas where they only met appellant. They were told that Mila went somewhere. Celina wanted to get her passport and money back because nothing happened to her visa application, but appellant told her that he would just relay the message to his wife. Celina returned the following day only to be told by the spouses that her passport had been sent to her mother's store and that their downpayment of P25,000.00 could be withdrawn from the person to whom they (Turdas) gave it. Celina went back to the house of appellant but she never succeeded in talking to the spouses. They were always out. Hence, she decided to charge the Turda spouses with estafa and illegal recruitment. On 22 February 1989, Gener Turda, his wife Milagros Turda and Carmen Manera were jointly charged with illegal recruitment and two (2) counts of estafa in three (3) separate Informations.

Accused-appellant Gener Turda, on his part, denies having ever engaged in illegal recruitment activities. He claims that he was himself a victim of the illegal recruitment activities of his co-accused Carmen Manera. Bienvenido Villanueva, brother-in-law of appellant's wife, and Darlene Turda, appellant's daughter, corroborated appellant's testimony that sometime in January 1986 his wife brought Carmen Manera and the latter's secretary to their house where she told him that Manera was engaged in recruitment for overseas jobs and was running a recruitment agency in Ermita, Manila. His wife further told him that she would be given a commission for every person sent abroad. Appellant then informed Manera that he also wanted to apply for a job in the United States. One week later, Manera returned and told him to pay P100,000.00 so he could go straight to the United States without passing through another country. He then paid the agency an initial amount of P30,000.00. At that time, Bienvenido Villanueva, Armando Revilla, Shirley Cabalu and Florante Rosales were also there to pay their fees. After a week, he gave Manera a diamond ring worth more than P30,000.00. Appellant further contended that when he could not leave for abroad, he and his wife started to have fights which in fact resulted in their eventual separation. He also denied any knowledge of the payments made by complainant Celina Andan or that they were made in his presence. He admitted however having made several trips to the airport but explaining that he was also supposed to leave for abroad himself, and on several occasions, drove for his wife in her recruitment activities. The court a quo sustained the prosecution. It found the following circumstances supportive of the guilt of accusedappellant in the three (3) cases: (a) Appellant was aware of the recruitment activities of his wife and of Carmen Manera; (b) The meetings between the three (3) accused and the complainants were held at the Bago Bantay residence of appellant where he was always around to provide the "moral support" by "seconding" whatever Mila or Carmen would say about their capability of sending applicants for overseas employment; (c) The amounts of P25,000.00 and P70,000.00 paid by Celina and Florante, respectively, were received by his wife in their residence in the presence of appellant; (d) Appellant took active part in making it appear that complainant Rosales and his sister Shirley were to take their departure flight by driving them to the airport in his Volkswagen car and waiting along with them at the terminal and, on the pretext that their passports were not yet released, brought them back to their house in Quezon City to await their scheduled flight, which never materialized. In its joint decision dated 30 August 1990, the trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 57218 of illegal recruitment under Art. 39, par. (a), in relation to Art. 38 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. In Crim. Case No. 57219, the court a quo convicted appellant of estafa under Art. 315, 1st par., in relation to 4th par., subpar. 2(a), of the same article, and imposed upon him an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days as maximum. The trial court further ordered appellant to refund the amount of P25,000.00 to complainant Celina Andan. In Crim. Case No. 57220, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under the same penal provision and imposed upon him an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum. The court also directed appellant to refund the amount of P70,000.00 to complainant Florante Rosales. 4 Appellant now assails the trial court for not acquitting him since not all the requisites of criminal conspiracy were present, and for imposing a penalty under a statute enacted in 1990 for an act done in 1986. He argues that nothing in the record shows that he and his two (2) co-accused had come to an agreement concerning the commission of illegal recruitment and/or estafa and that they decided to commit the crime thereafter; that he even disapproved of his wife's recruitment activities that led to frequent altercations between them; that his presence during the transactions between his wife and complainants was only natural as these took place in his house; that his supposed active part in the aborted departure of complainant Florante Rosales and Shirley Cabalu was sufficiently explained by him during the cross-examination, i.e., that he was even among those slated to leave for employment abroad so he rode with them to the airport; that as stated in the Information, the unlawful acts of illegal recruitment were committed sometime between August 1986 and September 1987 at which time the law on illegal recruitment only imposed a penalty of imprisonment for not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years; and, thus the trial court erred in imposing upon him a life sentence based on the new law on illegal recruitment which was not yet in force at the time the alleged acts were committed. The pertinent portions of Art. 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, read Art. 38. Illegal recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article. (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. Article 13, par. (b), of the same Code defines recruitment as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner,

offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement." A review of the testimonies of complainants leads us to no other conclusion than that appellant, his wife, and Manera were conspirators in the illegal recruitment business by contributing acts in pursuance of the financial success of their joint venture for their mutual benefit. All the complainants have testified that in every recruitment transaction, appellant was always present with the other accused. With respect to the recruitment of Rosales and Shirley Cabalu, both testified that the three (3) accused went to their house to induce them to apply for overseas work for a fee, and that appellant was likewise around when the amount of P70,000.00 was quoted by the other accused as the recruitment service fee. For her part, complainant Celina Andan categorically testified that appellant and his wife were together when the latter was paid the downpayment in check for her trip to Canada. Celina further asserted that the Turdas were always together in their recruitment transactions; in fact, all the complainants confirmed that appellant even drove them to the airport for the supposed trip abroad not only once but thrice. Appellant's explanation that his reason for driving the complainants to the airport was because he himself was also scheduled to leave for abroad, is weak and uncorroborated. It is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over his positive identification by the complaining witnesses as one of those who actively participated in recruiting them. Besides, how could he be driving his Volkswagen to the airport if he himself was leaving for abroad, unless he was ready to abandon his car after taking off? The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that said court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which do not obtain in the present case. There is no doubt that the acts of appellant and his wife conclusively established a common criminal design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished through coordinated moves. Such acts constitute enlisting, contracting or procuring workers or promising them overseas employment under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code. 5 Since appellant did not have the license or authority to recruit 6 and yet recruited at least three (3) persons, he is guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment under Art. 38, penalized under Art. 39, of the Labor Code. We are not persuaded by appellant's argument that the trial court erred in imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment because this was imposed by a new law not in force when the offense was allegedly committed. P.D. No. 2018 7 has increased the penalty to life imprisonment if the illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. As defined in Art. 38, as amended, illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage if undertaken by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Art. 38. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 2018, promulgated on 26 January 1986, has provided for its immediate effectivity. It was published on 10 February 1986 in Vol. 82, No. 6, Page 922, of the Official Gazette. Hence, when appellant committed the acts of illegal recruitment from August 1986 to September 1987, the amendments to the law, which took effect on 28 July 1986, 8 were already in force and effect. The rule is settled that the recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary recruiting permit or authority from the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however, where some other crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes. In People v. Alvarez 9 we said: . . . the test for determining whether or not a prosecution for one crime constitutes an obstacle to a subsequent action for another distinct crime upon the same facts, is to inquire whether the facts alleged in the second information, if proven, would have been sufficient to support the former information, of which the accused may have been acquitted or convicted. The gist of the question is whether or not the same evidence supports the two actions. Stated in another way . . . . where two different laws define two crimes, the conviction of one of them is no obstacle to that of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other . . . . "The safest general rule is that the two offenses must be in substance precisely the same or of the same nature or of the same species, so that the evidence which proves the one would prove the other; or if this is not the case, then the one crime must be an ingredient of the other" (16 C.J., 264, sec. 444) . . . . "A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and, if each statute requires proof of an additional act which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other. And there is no doubt that it is within the power of the legislature to create two or more offenses which may be committed by a single act, each of which is punishable by itself. A conviction or acquittal in such case under either statute would be no bar to a conviction under the other, for the accused would not be twice in jeopardy for one offense, but only once in jeopardy for each offense" (8 R.C.L., 149, sec. 135). Applying the foregoing principle, not all acts which constitute estafa necessarily establish illegal recruitment, for estafa is wider in scope and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment activities. More importantly, the element of damage, which is essential in estafa cases, is immaterial in illegal recruitment; 10 and, while estafa is malum in se, illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum. Hence, as to the two (2) counts of estafa, we need only reiterate our ruling in People v. Romero 11

The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third party (People vs. Ong, 204 SCRA 942 [1991]). In the instant case, all the elements of estafa are present because complainant Doriza Dapnit gave the total amount of P21,000.00 to accused-appellant on the latter's promise that she will be sent to Taiwan as a factory worker as soon as she paid the placement fee. It will be observed that accusedappellant gave complainant the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work so that complainant was convinced to give her the money she demanded to enable her to be employed as a factory worker in Taiwan . . . . While we also affirm the conviction of the accused for estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. 57219 and 57220, we modify however the penalties imposed by particularly denominating them in accordance with the Revised Penal Code as well as amend accordingly the penalty imposed in Crim. Case No. 57220. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty for estafa 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. In Crim. Case No. 57219, the amount defrauded was P25,000.00. The imposable penalty under Art. 315 is prision correccional in its maximum period, the range of which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to prision mayor in its minimum period, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. Dividing the range of the penalty prescribed for the offense, i.e., prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum into three (3) periods in accordance with Art. 65, the minimum period should be from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, to five (5) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days, the medium period from five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days, and the maximum period from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one days (21) to eight (8) years. Considering the amount defrauded, the maximum penalty should be taken from the maximum period prescribed by law, i.e., prision mayor minimum, the range of which is six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years, while the minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional minimum and medium, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) year and two (2) months, in any of its periods. From the facts of the case, the trial court is correct in the imposition of the proper penalty except that the minimum should be taken from prision correccional minimum and medium, while the maximum from the maximum period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum.
As regards Crim. Case No. 57220 where the amount defrauded was P70,000.00, the same principle as in the preceding case should apply, except that for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 a prison term of one (1) year should be additionally imposed. Since there are four (4) P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, and any excess below P10,000.00 not being considered, the proper penalty should be the maximum of the imposable penalty plus four (4) years. Consequently, the maximum penalty to be imposed in Crim. Case No. 57220 should be six (6) years, eight (8) months and twentyone (21) days, to eight (8) years, plus four (4) years, i.e., ten (10) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to twelve (12) years as maximum, while the minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree as aforesaid, or six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional minimum and medium. Apparently, in Crim. Case No. 57220, the trial court erred in imposing the maximum penalty on the accused. WHEREFORE, the conviction of the accused GENER TURDA for ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON LARGE SCALE in Crim. Case No. 57218 (G.R. No. 97044), for ESTAFA in Crim. Case No. 57219 (G.R. No. 97045) and Crim. Case No. 57220 (G.R. No. 97046) is AFFIRMED except that in Crim. Case No. 57219 (G.R. No. 97045) the penalty should read: "two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum," while the penalty in Crim. Case No. 57220 (G.R. No. 97046) is modified to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum as maximum. Appellant Gener Turda is further directed to refund to Celina Andan and Florante Rosales the amounts of P25,000.00 and P70,000.00 respectively, which appellant unlawfully collected from them. In the service of the prison terms herein imposed on appellant, Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code should be strictly observed.