Jacques Ranciere's work seemed to be divided into two separate periods, corresponding to distinct sets of questions. But his interest shifted from the political to the aesthetic in 1996-98. For ranciere, politics is aesthetic (a challenge to dominant social perception); and aesthetics is political.
Jacques Ranciere's work seemed to be divided into two separate periods, corresponding to distinct sets of questions. But his interest shifted from the political to the aesthetic in 1996-98. For ranciere, politics is aesthetic (a challenge to dominant social perception); and aesthetics is political.
Jacques Ranciere's work seemed to be divided into two separate periods, corresponding to distinct sets of questions. But his interest shifted from the political to the aesthetic in 1996-98. For ranciere, politics is aesthetic (a challenge to dominant social perception); and aesthetics is political.
Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Teory 8(2), December 2007, 23055
Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007
REVIEW ESSAY Democratic Aesthetics: On Jacques Rancires Latest Work 1 Jean-Philippe Deranty Jacques Rancire, Hatred of Democracy, Steve Corcoran (trans.) (London: Verso, 2006), isnx 978-1-84467-098-7; Film Fables, Emiliano Battista (trans.) (Oxford: Berg, 2006), isnx 978-1-84520-167-8; Te Future of the Image, Gregory Elliott (trans.) (London: Verso, 2007), isnx 978-1-84467-107-6 Up until recently, Jacques Rancires work seemed to be clearly divided into two separate periods, corresponding to distinct sets of questions. Te rst period, starting with Althussers Lesson (1974) and culminating in Disagreement (1995) and the second edition of On the Borders of the Political (1998), was wholly dedi- cated to the political question and the defence of democratic politics. Te years 199698 marked a turning point as Rancires interest shifted from the political to the aesthetic: rst to literature, 2 and then to broader questions of aesthetic theory and to the visual arts. 3 Of course, Rancires politics from the beginning revolved around the invisibility of the dominated and was dened as a challenge to the hegemonic perception of the social world. It was therefore, from the begin- ning, inherently aesthetic, in the original sense of the term. Conversely, his foray into aesthetic theory can be characterized as the extrapolation of the egalitarian axiom into the sphere of artistic practices. Te apparent division in his career therefore hides a deep unity and coherence. As is now well known, for Rancire, politics is aesthetic (a challenge to dominant social perception); and aesthetics is political (introducing the principle of equality in the practices, representations 1. I must express my gratitude to Danielle Petherbridge and John Rundell for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. 2. J. Rancire, Mallarm: Politique de la Sirne (Paris: Hachette, 1996); La Parole Muette: Essai sur les Contradictions de la Littrature (Paris: Hachette, 1998); La Chair des Mots: Politiques de lEcriture (Paris: Galile, 1998), translated as Te Flesh of Words: Te Politics of Writing, Charlotte Mandell (trans.) (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 3. J. Rancire, Le Partage du Sensible: Esthtique et Politique (Paris: La Fabrique, 1998), transla- ted as Te Politics of Aesthetics, Gabriel Rockhill (trans.) (London: Continuum, 2004); La Fable Cinmatographique (Paris: Seuil, 2001), translated as Film Fables, Emiliano Battista (trans.) (Oxford: Berg, 2006); LInconscient Esthtique (Paris: Galile, 2001); Le Destin des Images (Paris: La Fabrique, 2003), translated as Te Future of the Image, Gregory Elliott (trans.) (London: Verso, 2007). REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 23I Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 and perceptions that count as art and aesthetic experience). Tis profound unity underlying all of Rancires work has come to light more explicitly in the past few years, as he has returned to the political question in a renewed, substantive defence of democratic politics, with Te Hatred of Democracy, 4 and his most recent books published in France 5 now expressly engage simultaneously with the two problematics. Tis essay will focus on the three English translations that have been published in the past year: Te Hatred of Democracy (2006); Film Fables (2006) and Te Future of the Image (2007). Te review of Rancires latest work will be guided in particular by the following questions: are there any noteworthy developments, complements or corrections, in his political theory; what more do these latest books teach us about the link between politics and aesthetics; how does the principle of radical equality concretely help to read the history of the visual arts and particular art works? I shall try to demonstrate that the extrapolation of the egalitarian axiom into art and aesthetic experience in fact helps us to identify the deep philosophical vision at the heart of Rancires thinking, a vision articulated around what could be termed a paradoxical, anti-essentialist materialism, com- bined with a defence of creative praxis. Te Hatred of Democracy Let us begin with Te Hatred of Democracy. A supercial reading could leave the impression that Rancires essay is only a polemic intervention in a debate that is idiosyncratically French. However, the historical reconstructions and conceptual analyses that Rancire proposes in order to diagnose and critique the hatred of democracy at work in todays French public sphere make the demonstration of much broader signicance. Tey make this essay a short but substantive book of contemporary social and political philosophy. From an immanent perspective, the book helps greatly in clarifying some of the key ideas underpinning Rancires theses on politics and modernity. Most importantly, as we shall see, Te Hatred of Democracy provides signicant clarications about the implicit theory of the social underpinning his famous denition of politics. And philosophically, the book conrms that ultimately Rancires project aims to be, against all pessimistic or cynical abdications, a defence of the possibility of political action. 4. J. Rancire, La Haine de la Dmocratie (Paris: Galile, 2005), translated as Hatred of Democracy, Steve Corcoran (trans.) (London: Verso, 2006). 5. J. Rancire, Malaise dans lEsthtique (Paris: Galile, 2004); Te Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics, in Recognition, Work, Politics: New Directions in French Critical Teory, J.-P. Deranty, D. Petherbridge, J. Rundell, R. Sinnerbrink (eds), 2745 (Leiden: Brill, 2007) ); Politique de la Littrature (Paris: Galile, 2007). 232 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 Who, then, hates democracy, and why? In France today, the hatred of democracy represents the nal product of a suspicion shared by a great number of intellectuals towards the core principles of modern life. Democracy in this case does not mean a specic form of political institution, but rather a type of society, with its specic spirit. It designates the spirit of equality that modern soci- ety has created and through which it denes itself, and which, these pessimistic observers argue, threatens the very survival of European society. By attacking all forms of symbolic transcendence, which, according to them, are necessary for social reproduction (rst among which is the relationship of children to their father), the democratic spirit of radical equality leads to nothing short of a cri- sis of civilization. Te perversion inherent in this spirit is supposed to become transparent once its real origin is located. According to this position, the princi- ple of democratic egalitarianism is supposed to express the constant, insatiable demands of the modern consuming individual for the fullment of his endless, narcissistic desires. Modern egalitarianism, the root of the democratic spirit, is therefore accused of hiding the tyranny of the atomized individual of mass con- sumption and postmodern spectacle. Teacherpupil, parentchild, manwoman: all relations forming the core of societal reproduction are said to be perverted when they fall under the sway of the egalitarian imperative, which in fact hides the logic of commercial rationality and selsh individualism. Tis alleged ground of democratic perversion explains why the current, wide- spread critique of the democratic age is propounded in France on all sides of the political spectrum. It can be neatly grafted onto the puristic republicanism that still largely determines the French objective spirit, with variations on all poles of the political spectrum. Also, the ground for the hatred of democracy is so deep- rooted that it allows the bundling together of the most diverse phenomena: the legal demands of gays and lesbians, the struggles of ethnic and cultural minori- ties, the attempts to maintain social and economic rights, and so on. It is worth noting that often these pessimistic diagnostics secure their theo- retical ground by recourse to psychoanalysis, notably in its Lacanian version, as they attempt to demonstrate that the egalitarian spirit of democratic society is destructive of the principle that allegedly determines the possibility of the consti- tution of symbolic orders, the much-bandied-about name of the father. With nets cast so deep, any social struggle pursued in the name of equality becomes synonymous with a descent into barbarism. At the moment, this kind of diagnostic intersects frequently with another radical criticism of European modernity, the type that makes the Holocaust the turning point of modern history. Paradigmatic of such a construct is Jean- Claude Milners extreme attack in Les Penchants Criminels de lEurope, in which Hitler is presented as the man who realized Europes secret wish. Te link with the critique of modern, capitalistic society is made via the distinction between two anthropological and societal principles: the good principle, the respect of REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 233 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 the law of liation, versus the barbarism inherent in models of society and sub- jectivity that refuse their ontological nitudes and embark on the programme of utopian self-procreation. From this perspective, democratic demands, the irreducible anti-Semitic streak in European culture and the dangers of modern technology become just dierent facets of the unique, lethal project dening European civilization. For the European subjects and their society, the most urgent task would then be to delete the name of the Jew because it is repre- sentative of the good law of liation and limitation, the last obstacle to fullling the desire of unlimited consumption and self-creation. 6 Te fascination exercised by arguments like these in the French context cannot be underestimated. Te reception to Milners book, for example, was striking for the embarrassment of the reviewers. Te power of intellectual intimidation of that book, and of other writings of that ilk, makes the hysterical witch-hunt currently taking place against alleged anti-Semitic leftist writers, of whom Alain Badiou is the most famous target, a rather sinister aair. Rancires essay, however, is more than just an intervention in a Franco- French debate. He demonstrates convincingly how these extreme denunciations of democracy in fact reect a historical movement and mobilize philosophical references that are much broader and signicant in scope than the shenanigans of the Parisian microcosm. In the genealogy proposed by Rancire in the rst chapter of the book, it is the virulence of the contestation of hierarchies by the social movements of the 1960s that initiated the backlash against democracy. Te events of 1968 are of course the culmination of this contestation. Tis conrms the idea that the interpreta- tion of 1968 is of critical importance in the current political context. Forty years ago, conservative sociologists and political theorists, under the challenge of the assault on the hierarchies prevalent in Western societies, had already identied the double bind of democracy: democracy requires the participation of the many in the aairs of government, but this brings with it a spirit of rebellious- ness that challenges all competences, all forms of expertise and authority, thereby making governing impossible, and undermining democracy itself. Democracy, the well-meaning governments and their intellectual supporters argue, therefore needs to be defended against its own spirit: as a social and political form of life, democracy is the reign of the excess. Tis excess signies the ruin of democratic government and must therefore be repressed by it. 7 For a brief period, as the socialist totalitarian regimes collapsed, human rights and liberal democracy were celebrated, but this episode did not last long. Very quickly the old suspicion against the inherent sin of the democratic spirit resurfaced. Today, the widespread 6. Similar arguments were of course well articulated in Lyotards latest philosophy. 7. Rancire, Hatred of Democracy, 8. 234 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 suspicion among intellectuals of all political persuasions towards the excesses of the democratic fury nds its real, practical enactment in the policies of govern- ments for whom security has explicitly become the sole objective of politics. Te modern suspicion towards democracy can nd a theoretical foundation in a variety of conceptual sources, notably via a return to the classics of political phi- losophy, from Hobbes to Aristotle. However, one philosophical edice in particular serves this purpose most prominently, the philosophy of Hannah Arendt. Tis is why she is the philosopher with whom Rancire engages critically throughout his essay. 8 Beyond the specic content of her political theses, it is the method through which she denes politics and rejects radical democratic movements that presents the exemplary model for all types of hatred of democracy: namely, through an ontological dualism aiming to isolate the specic logics of social and political life, an ontological dualism that can then underpin a critical metaphysics of modernity and a critical anthropology of the modern individual. Arendt is the most sophisticated defender in contemporary political thought of a pure concept of politics, radically detached from social life, and famously dened as the search for the common good by a community of free individuals. Conversely, she provides one of the most sustained critiques of the society of mass consumption, which she views as the reign of atomistic, egotistical desires, and thus as the historical realization of anti-politics. Te modern, democratic individual becomes the anthropological gure of the destruction of real freedom, an anti-political animal that does not quite deserve the human name. Arendt also plays a central role in todays context, through her forceful critique of the French Revolution and the philosophy of human rights attached to it. She pro- vides the philosophical backdrop to the revisionist interpretations of the French and later, twentieth-century revolutions, propounded by liberal historians since the 1980s. 9 Te philosophical and historical interpretations arrive at the same conclusion: the radical search for social equality of the French revolutionaries, which became the matrix of all subsequent revolutions, necessarily ended up in terror because the democratic spirit was not held in check. Tis unveils the real face of democracy and indicates by contrast the principle of good politics: the 8. As Rancires Ten Teses on Politics demonstrated, Arendts political thinking was for him, from the start, an eminent representative of the negation of politics in political philosophy. See a translation of the ten theses in Teory and Event 5(3) (2001), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ theory_and_event/v005/5.3ranciere.html (accessed November 2007). 9. Te rst, groundbreaking interpretation of this kind was Franois Furets Interpreting the French Revolution, E. Forster (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). It culmi- nates in Franois Furet and Mona Ozouf s (eds), A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, A. Goldhammer (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1989), published in the two-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the French Revolution. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 235 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 spirit of equality is in fact nothing short of totalitarian; liberty, not equality, is the true principle of politics. 10 Rancires response to this powerful construct mobilizes his well-known con- ception of politics as the pragmatic enforcement of the principle of equality, an enforcement that is not a priori disconnected from any sphere of social life, nor discards a priori, as non-political, any type of subjective position. What makes this latest essay particularly interesting, however, is the great clarication of his implicit vision of society that has underpinned his political thinking from the beginning, his social theory as it were. Rancires defence of democratic politics cannot be dissociated from his assumption that social life is always necessarily structured, through a kind of natural tendency, by an oligarchic logic that operates simultaneously within social interactions and in the political institutions corresponding to them. Te connection between the two oligarchies (in the social and in the political) is not hard to fathom: social power is precisely the capacity to reproduce and entrench itself, notably in and through political institutions. Two principles in particular structure the iron law of social life: birth and wealth. Birth itself acts in two dierent ways. First, it encapsulates the relation of unequal power that is the relation of authority between the older and the young. Historically, paternal authority has obviously been the paradigm for other rela- tions of authority in human aairs, especially in politics. But birth is also the way in which a minority of individuals are naturally chosen from among all to rule over the majority, simply because they inherit a pre-existing wealth of social power. Combined with gerontocracy, aristocracy is therefore the other time- less tendency of social and political structures. Most of the time, the ultimate make-up of social power is economic wealth, which the oligarchic structures help to concentrate: rst in the basic, quantitative sense, as there is no limit to accumulation; and secondly in a sociological sense, as these structures help to retain wealth within family and class, and transform economic power into all types of symbolic power. In many passages in his previous writings, and again in this essay, Rancire thus makes the domination of the rich over the poor the secret shibboleth of oligarchic structures and institutions. 11 Finally, a third form of oligarchic principle complements and shores up the rst two: the power of the intelligent and the competent over the ignorant, which helps to provide the structure of justication for the overall system of domination. Politics for Rancire consists obviously in the challenge to these dierent forms of oligarchic structures, with their dierent kinds of enforcing and legitimizing 10. See especially the rst three chapters of Hannah Arendts On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1963] 1991). 11. See for example Te End of Politics, in On the Shores of Politics, Liz Heron (trans.), 537 (London: Verso, 2007), notably 1219. 236 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 mechanisms. More precisely, however, politics for him has to do with the slide that constantly occurs, in reality as in theory, between the social and the political, as domination in the former becomes infallibly entrenched in the institutions, and more importantly, in the representations, the ideas and the discourses that accompany these institutions. Domination becomes not only an institutional fact, but a natural way of viewing the social, which disappears from view as it becomes naturalized. As a result, one particularly urgent task of politics is to con- test the idea that one requires specic entitlements or capacities to participate in politics, because such requirement ends up reproducing the hierarchical system of social domination. Tis explains Rancires consistent suspicion towards the real motives and the practical political outcomes of republicanism. In its sophisticated philosophical guise or as the particular ideology of the French intellectuals, as it attempts to preserve the purity of the political moment through an elitist disre- gard for the pettiness of social life, republicanism in fact vindicates the oligarchic logic and thus amounts itself, through a remarkable dialectic, to a negation of politics. Te republican contempt for the social forces and its rejection of any attempt to found politics in the struggle against social domination, promulgates precisely the continuity between society and politics that is the hallmark of the oligarchic logic itself. Te implicit assumption of republicanism is that only those t to govern should do so. 12 Republicanism in the end represents the spiritual point dhonneur of the police. By contrast, if politics is to have any real meaning, it needs to be dened spe- cically as the severing of this link between social domination and its recupera- tion in the institutions of societal management. Tis is the reason why Rancire equates politics and democracy, where democracy is the practical verication of the equality of all: Democratic excess does not have anything to do with a supposed consump- tive madness. It is simply the dissolving of any standard by which nature could give its law to communitarian artice via the relations of authority that structure the social body. Te scandal lies in the disjoining of entitle- ments to govern from any analogy to those that order social relations . It is the scandal of a superiority based on no other title than the very absence of superiority. 13
In Rancires earlier writings, the anti-oligarchic logic of politics was dened in terms of a paradoxical ontology, as a logic of social functioning that is not one, since it disrupts the natural logic of societies. Rancires terminology, then, 12. Rancire, Hatred of Democracy, 389, with specic reference to Arendt. 13. Ibid., 41. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 237 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 was heavily indebted to Badious grammar of the event: the political dimension was like a void, invisible or intolerable from the perspective of social imma- nence, yet constitutive of it, and bursting at regular intervals and in local settings through the actions of rebellious subjects. Te new book still contains elements of this paradoxical ontology, for example, when Rancire describes democracy as the action of subjects who, by working the interval between identities [between social and political identity] recongure the distributions of the private and the public, the universal and the particular. 14 Mostly, however, the conceptual lan- guage has shifted and the new book articulates the logic of politics more explicitly in terms of legitimacy and justication, as the above quote makes clear. 15 Te famous denition of politics as the part of those without parts now becomes more squarely the title of those who have no title to govern. 16 Tis reformulation of democratic politics in terms of justication allows Rancire to recast his theory in new and very concrete terms. For example, if one follows through consistently the idea that politics exists only when the natural domination structuring societies is interrupted, in particular in the set up of the political institutions, then one is forced to accept what Plato had already encoun- tered in his Laws: the ultimate political title (the title allowing one to govern) is the absence of all titles. 17 And so chance could be a better type of election than the type of elections we currently have. 18 In a community of equals, the only equitable way to elect those who will govern is to leave it to the luck of the draw. 19
Te very fact that we nd such a proposition preposterous is the surest sign that we are not in real democracies, but under the sway of the oligarchic logic. Indeed, as Rancire adds, we cannot even imagine that it does not have to be a law of politics that it should be those who are thirsty for power that should govern us. By contrast, as much as the democratic excess, the great political thinkers, from Plato onwards, were equally concerned about the tendency for political power to be grabbed by individuals whose only motivation was power itself. 20 Rancire now ventures into the eld of political theory, and does not hesi- tate to draw some of the concrete institutional implications of the democratic 14. Ibid., 612. 15. In many passages in his earlier texts, however, Rancire already used the language of rational justi- cation, dening politics as the demand on domination to give its reasons and as the demonstration by the dominated of their capacity to articulate reasons, see for example, Te Uses of Democracy, in On the Shores of the Politics, 3961, esp. 4551. 16. Rancire, Hatred of Democracy, 53. 17. Plato, Te Laws, III, 690a690c. Tis reference, however, and the conceptual point drawn from it were made already in the third of the Ten Teses on Politics. 18. Rancire, Hatred of Democracy, 368. 19. See Rancires concrete reference to the formation of juries for university examinations, ibid., 102 n.34. 20. Rancire, Hatred of Democracy, 42. 238 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 principle, the minimal rules that lay down the minimal conditions under which a representative system can be declared democratic: Short and non-renewable electoral mandates that cannot be held concur- rently; a monopoly of peoples representatives over the formulation of laws; a ban on State functionaries becoming the representatives of the people; a bare minimum of campaigns and campaigns costs; and the monitoring of possible interferences by economic powers in the electoral process. 21
By contrast, the reality of our political systems demonstrates how they have been seized by oligarchic powers, as they are structured through a monopolising of la chose publique by a solid alliance of State oligarchy and economic oligarchy. 22
As democratic politics unsettles the homology between social domination and the institutions of political power, it operates most especially against the pri- vatization of politics. Tis designates rst of all the tendency of political life to reject in the obscurity (Arendt) of the private sphere whatever is supposed to be indierent to the res publica qua public: a tendency that operates the distinc- tion of the public, which belongs to all, and the private, where the liberties of all prevail. 23 As Rancire remarks, however, these liberties each person has are the liberties, that is the domination, of those who possess the immanent pow- ers of society. 24 Te ontologization in philosophical discourse of the separation between the sphere of the common against the spheres of the private only repro- duces at a higher level of abstraction the real logic of oligarchic society. And the privatization of politics goes even further. Once the private has been excluded, the common is itself privatized as it falls in the hands of the representatives of social domination. Democratic politics acts most especially against this double privatization of politics. Once again, in describing this process, Rancire brings welcome clari- cations through reference to concrete developments. Te struggle against the pri- vatization of politics has meant historically, and still does today, the struggle for fair electoral procedures and a fully democratic political system, one in particular that includes all individuals in the process. Most importantly, it also includes all attempts to demonstrate the political nature of what the philosophers, the cyni- cal sociologists and the representatives of power have always rejected, today no less than in the past, as private interests. Today, this concerns in particular the defence by specic branches of industry, professional and social groups, of the labour rights and welfare provisions rst demanded by the labour movement, 21. Ibid., 72. 22. Ibid., 73. 23. Ibid., 57. 24. Ibid. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 239 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 which the post-war period had seemed to institutionalize and universalize. In conducting these analyses, Rancires position becomes very close to the position of thinkers who identify emancipatory politics with social movements. 25
Tis last remark, however, helps to put a nger on a particular indecision in Rancires argument. Te oligarchic tendencies of societies and their reproduc- tion in reifying sociological and philosophical discourses appear so overwhelming to him that he refuses all possibility of grounding politics in social experiences. He considers it a mistake to look for the social basis of a political struggle, lest one exports the separations of social life into politics and political theory. Tis is what is behind Rancires insistence, for example, that the adequate category of agency in politics is that of subjectivation and not identity. Political subjec- tivity designates a paradoxical place within the social, the place where a twist is at play, between the community managed by the police and the people of equal individuals, which political action can reveal. Anyone can ll that ontologi- cal, or par-ontological void. To ground politics in a sociologically well-dened identity (worker, woman, immigrant) is always to run the risk of falling prey to the homology between the social and the political, and so to reproduce social domination into the political. Tis argument, however, is clearly double-edged. It sounds uncannily close to the very ontological separation of society and poli- tics into pure principles that Rancire rejects. Just like Badiou, Rancires suspi- cion towards the notion of identity in politics often has the same accents as the republican denunciation of the evils of communitarianism. Rancire does not su ciently consider that it is conceptually possible to acknowledge the oligarchic tendency of societies, while locating the imperative of equality within social life itself. In fact, next to the passages rejecting identity-politics, there are also other passages, which in describing the dialectic of domination and equality, implicitly acknowledge that equality is a force operating within the social itself. 26 In this new book, it is a passage of the second chapter that does this most strikingly: Equality is not a ction. Tere is no master who does not sit back and risk letting his slave run away, no man who is not capable of killing another, no force that is imposed without having to justify itself, and hence without having to recognise the irreducibility of equality needed for inequality to function. 27
Te argument then shifts from the social to the political via the issue of justi- cation. However, in the end, Rancire is forced to return to what the beginning 25. Ibid., 556. 26. See in particular, J. Rancire, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, Julie Rose (trans.) (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 55. 27. Rancire, Hatred of Democracy, 48. 240 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 of the extract had already stated: equality is not just a constraining axiom once domination attempts to justify itself, notably when it seeks to institutionalize itself. It is already required within the immanence of social life, for inequality to function: Inegalitarian society can only function thanks to a multitude of egalitarian relations. 28 On that model, politics is not the action that introduces equality into oligarchic society, but rather the moment that unveils, makes manifest an equality that already had to be present. 29 If, however, the demand for equality stems from the social itself, it comes as no surprise, then, that Rancire, despite his stated suspicion towards that paradigm, is naturally led to using the language of recognition: no force is imposed without having to recognise the irreducibility of equality. And in the third chapter, the historical struggles against the privatization of politics are also described through this grammar: namely, through: the recognition, as equals and political subjects, of those that have been relegated by State law to the private life of inferior beings; and the recognition of the public character of types of spaces and relations that were left to the discretion of the power of wealth. 30
In the last chapter of the book, in analysing the reasons for that hatred, Rancire for the rst time ties his theory of democratic politics to a critique of contemporary capitalism, in a robust diagnostic of the current situation. Te imperative of economic necessity, the new dogma declaring that only one model of socioeconomic development is rational, reinforces the pre- existing power of the social elites that was already entrenched in state institutions. Te three logics, of social, political and economic domination, today combine in the most power- ful form of government, whose main aim is to put an end to the very possibility of democratic politics, to nally transform government into a one-way form of police. Te cynical critics of modernity play a most ambiguous role in this game: failing to denounce real, existing injustices, the antidemocratic discourse of the 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Te French text actually emphasizes the dynamic and agonistic aspect of recognition. Rancire writes faire reconnatre: to force, impose or achieve recognition. On the unexpected connections between Rancires politics and a political theory based on the idea of a struggle for recognition, see my Jacques Rancires Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition, Political Teory 31(1) (2003), 13656. Te vocabulary of recognition was in fact frequently used by Rancire in his earlier work, notably in Te Rationality of Disagreement, see esp. Disagreement, 523. See also, On the Shores of Politics, 50. Rancire has explicitly spoken against a recognition approach to his politics in Max Blechman, Anita Chari and Rafeeq Hasan, Democracy, Dissensus and the Aesthetics of Class Struggle: An Exchange with Jacques Rancire, Historical Materialism 13(4) (2005), 285301. As the extracts quoted suggest, I would argue that he is much closer to recognition theory than he acknowledges. Te disagreement might arise because Rancire mistakes Axel Honneths theory of recognition for a version of the masterslave dialectic, and thus misses the plasticity of the latters model of politics. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 24I Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 intellectuals adds the nishing touches to the consensual forgetting of democracy that both state and economic oligarchies strive toward. 31
In this most formidable alliance of oligarchic forces, democratic struggles appear as necessary, as di cult and as uncertain as ever. Te books concluding words aim to retrieve the calm condence of Spinozas Ethics, with a vibrant ode to democracy, as a practice engaged against all domination, and challenging all reication: of history and historical action; of social and political life, and of insti- tutions. Against the grim horizon of assembling oligarchies, but equally distant from the new utopias and fashionable messianic narratives, Rancire maintains the rarity and thus the preciousness of free, democratic action (ironically, though, ending on a political aect that is typically Arendtian): Unequal society does not carry any equal society in its womb. Rather, egalitarian society is only ever the set of egalitarian relations that are traced here and now through singular and precarious acts. Democracy is as bare in its relation to the power of wealth as it is to the power of kinship that today comes to assist and rival it. It is not based on any nature of things nor guaranteed by any institutional form. It is not borne along by any histori- cal necessity and does not bear any. It is only entrusted to the constancy of its specic acts. Tis can provoke fear, and so hatred, among those who are used to exercising the magisterium of thought. But among those who know how to share with anybody and everybody the equal power of intel- ligence, it can conversely inspire courage, and hence joy. 32 Silent speech Tis joy of transformative and creative action, its remaining possible despite the threat posed by the alliance of antagonistic political and economic forces, is the rst common element linking the political and the aesthetic in Rancires thinking. But the overlap between the two in fact goes much deeper than that. Te den- ing gesture characterizing Rancires intervention in aesthetic theory consists in extending the realm of application of the democratic principle, from politics, to art and aesthetic experience. Basically, he interprets the romantic revolution as a democratic revolution. Tis is quite a di cult claim to sustain if we reect on what is entailed in it: it commits one to explaining what is meant concretely by saying that artistic practices and aesthetic experiences are transformed, qua artistic and aesthetic, not just in terms of their social import, by the universalization of the 31. Rancire, Te Hatred of Democracy, 92. 32. Ibid., 97. 242 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 equality principle. What does it mean to talk about equality regarding a practice, notably regarding the techniques and practices of art? And what is equality in experience, notably in aesthetic experience? As we shall see, Rancire does not shy away from the di culties, indeed the radical conclusions, one is forced to embrace, once these questions are taken seriously. Indeed, it is the idea that equality reaches into the aesthetic that helps identify the paradoxical materialism that is implicit in Rancires defence of creative action. In the genesis of Rancires writings, this expansion of democratic equality, from the political to the aesthetic, is performed in La Parole Muette. We need to focus briey on this book because it is there that he develops in the greatest detail his vision of aesthetic modernity. All of his later aesthetic writings, including Te Future of the Image and Film Fables, draw extensively on these developments. Sadly, the contingencies of editorial work, especially as it pertains to transla- tions, might well make this essential text one of Rancire few books not to be translated into English. Rancires interpretation of romanticism is underpinned by the idea that the democratic revolution that occurred in the social and the political produced an equivalent democratic revolution in the aesthetic. Te shift is well encapsulated in the metaphor of a change of regimes. Te demise of the old order in society is paralleled in the aesthetic by a succession of corresponding regimes. Concretely, the old regime of aesthetics that collapses at the same time as the social order was inherited from Aristotle and rened through the successive poetic theories. Rancire calls it the representative regime of aesthetics, because it is centred on the system of normative rules dening proper representation. Tese rules enunci- ate the ways in which it can be ensured that the mimetic world conforms to the social hierarchy external to it, by respecting in particular the modes of speaking and of appearing that ideally bet the characters referred to. Te rules are not restricted to the level of language. Te choice of a king or of a peasant as a cen- tral character determines the entire subsequent aesthetic of the representation: the genre, the style, the type of narrative, the set, and so on. Social oligarchy is paralleled and ideally conrmed in an oligarchy of art forms, narratives, types of action, genres, modes of speech and topics. In this aesthetic, action is the central notion, around which the art work is constructed and judged. Te highest genres are those that depict men of high status who reveal their distinctness through speech and action. 33 Te parallel with republican politics is duly noted by Rancire, who characterizes this oligar- chic ordering of aesthetics as the republican order of the system of representa- tion. 34 Te centrality of action justies the primacy of speech over the image, 33. H. Arendt, Te Human Condition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 176. 34. Rancire, La Parole Muette, 27. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 243 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 and the parallelism between social and aesthetic oligarchy is translated in rigid separations between art forms, and, as said, all other related aesthetic aspects. Despite these strict, hierarchical separations, though, what makes art forms com- mensurable is precisely the fact that they all depict actions; that they tell stories that can be translated into narratives and have moral, social and political signi- cance. Tis is true even of painting. Every painting must always be easily trans- lated into a meaningful narrative, which is why the highest genres in classical painting draw from a limited eld of mythological and historical narratives. In that regime, the critic plays an important function, evaluating and demonstrat- ing the propriety with which the artist has managed to link the ways of being, acting and saying of its characters. Te critic has the task of verifying whether kings speak and behave as kings are supposed to, and peasants as peasants, and of revealing the implicit moral of the story. With the demise of this order, the new aesthetic regime introduces the demo- cratic revolution into modes of representation themselves. Te new principles directly oppose each of the principles of representation. Against the primacy of action, the new regime asserts the primacy of expressivity, of language as poetic power and as an end in itself, beyond its mimetic function. In opposition to the oligarchy of genres, the aesthetic regime refers to the equality of all sub- jects. Rancire opens La Parole muette with Victor Hugos Notre-Dame de Paris. Rereading the critiques of the time, he contends that the real scandal in French romanticism was not the poetic licences of Hernani, but the fact that a cathe- dral became the main subject of a book. Te cathedral could become the main protagonist of the artwork on the basis of the rst principle: the cathedral is as expressive, contains as much or indeed more poetic potential, than the tradi- tional actions of kings and peasants. Expressive art thus translates the expres- sivity of the world itself. Beyond the equality of all subjects, a third principle must therefore be added, the principle of indierence. Against the imperative of propriety, the aesthetic regime of art asserts the indierence of style in relation to the represented subject. Here, the paradigmatic artist for Rancire is Flaubert, who made the subject irrelevant in comparison with style, the only true subject of literature. 35 In Flaubert, the same care is taken to describe a farmyard and a love scene, the mediocrity of lives in provincial France or the extraordinary lives of ancient heroes and saints. Te romantic revolution, however, has its own contradictions. We know that the contradiction of republican politics is that it must presuppose the radical equality of all individuals, even as it ties each to their proper place within the social hierarchy. A similar contradiction aects the new aesthetics. At rst, the contradiction is between the principle of total expressivity and the principle of 35. See again in Rancire, Politique de la Littrature, 5984. 244 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 indierence. Te rst principle establishes a substantial link between the imma- nent poeticity of the world and the artistic work. According to it, the poem is the expression, at a higher power of concentration, of a meaning that was already that of the world itself. Tis is obviously the principle at the heart of German romanticism. As Rancire shows, this is also the principle uniting the modern art form par excellence, the novel, and the new hermeneutic practices emerging in the nineteenth century: in each case, the meaning of a time, the spirit of a community, are seen to be already inscribed in the materiality of the world and oered to the interpretive gaze of the writer and the social scientist. Balzacs descriptions oer the prime example of this new paradigm. Te idea of an immanent poeticity of the world of which the art work is the expres- sion, implies that the language of the poem is constrained by the most absolute necessity, as it must become the channel of the worlds own expressivity. Tis substantial continuity between the artists work and the world itself, however, is directly contradicted by the principle of indierence, since the latter denies that any expression should be privileged in any kind of necessary way (social or aesthetic) for any given topic. Tis contradiction, however, is only the most supercial one. Underneath it lurks a more troubling contradiction that takes us to the heart, not only of Rancires aesthetics, but of his philosophical vision. Romanticism attempted to oer a solution to the initial contradiction, by declaring, via the recourse to Fichtes idealistic solution, the possibility of synthesizing the radical subjective freedom of the creator and the objective necessity of the world expressed in his work. Hegel, who plays the central role in Rancires aesthetic thinking, con- vincingly demonstrates the illusion hidden in this solution: the alleged synthesis is only the ideal of classical times (of a perfect correspondence between form and matter, between meaning and form), which the constraints of the modern world make illusory. Hence the fate of modern art, and especially of its most representative genre, the novel. Rather than achieving the ultimate reconcilia- tion of nature or of a people in the work of art, modern art is condemned to documenting the irreducible gap between the ideal and the prosaic reality of bourgeois modernity. Te Hegelian deation of the romantic programme points to the deepest contradiction of modern aesthetics, between the principle of expressivity (that everything speaks) and what Rancire calls the principle of literarity. Tis lat- ter principle, at the heart of the modern experience, is the ultimate consequence of the demise of the oligarchic regime. Te latter had put constraints on the use of language and the rules of mimesis by tying them strictly to the propriety of representation on the basis of the norms attached to social hierarchy. Once the democratic revolution makes this arrangement collapse, language and representa- tion are freed, as it were. Te simplest way to understand this is on a sociological level. It means that ideally everyone and anyone is now entitled to intervene in REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 245 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 any form of discourse, to use any language, to be addressed by any discourse, and be the subject of any representation. Rancire lists the fates of numerous nineteenth-century novel characters, most notably Emma Bovary, who embrace the specically modern experience of a letter that has become available to all, empirically, through the development of techniques of mass distribution, and more essentially, because of the fundamental lack of propriety of writing. 36 All these characters provide narrative allegories of the erring letter, a letter that is no longer tied to specic elds, reserved for certain speakers, but rather has been freed from the strictures of proper representation. 37 As Rancire notes, the bourgeois novelists cannot help being attracted to such narrative lives that best capture the modern experience of literature (meaning and the letter are liberated from the rules of propriety). At the same time, these writers cannot help being scandalized by the radicality of the egalitarian claims their characters make: the bourgeois novelist has an Arendtian position in aesthetics he believes that art is threatened in its purity if it is embraced by individuals who should remain in the spheres of private life and labour. As a result, they never fail to make their heroes pay the full price for their democratic impudence (Emma Bovarys suicide). More fundamentally, therefore, the liberation of language means for Rancire something like an ontological disorder, a disorder introduced between the levels of reality. In a restricted sense at rst: with the destruction of the representative logic, it is not just the social separations between individuals that are challenged (who can speak, to whom, about whom), but also the choice of objects. In the aesthetic regime, any object is worthy of artistic representation, down to a urinal. If we think about it, though, once this democratic revolution within the aesthetic is considered in all its implications, it challenges much broader and deeper ontological separations. Indeed, it is the very fact of ontological separation itself that is unsettled. Tis is what the notion of mute/silent speech, parole muette ultimately points to: beyond the speech of mute things (expressivity), it is the muteness, the silence of all speech, that is to say, the impossibility to relate speech to xed ontological places: 36. As is often the case, Plato oers the paradigmatic example of a philosophical and anti-democratic (the two are intrinsically linked for him) counter-model, both for the clarity and honesty of his anti-democratic approach, and for the philosophical power of his construct. Here, it is Platos condemnation in the Phaedrus, of writing as orphan letter, incapable of defending itself and avail- able to all, that represents for Rancire the typical philosophical critique of the democratic essence of writing (La Parole Muette, 815). Equally signicant is Rancires implicit rejection of Derridas deconstructivist reading of the same dialogue. 37. See David Bell, Writing, Movement/Space, Democracy: On Jacques Rancires Literary History, SubStance 103 33(1) (2004), 12640, a special issue on Rancires aesthetics. Bell emphasizes very well the link between Rancires early sociological (or rather, anti-sociological) work on the nine- teenth-century proletarians seized by the letter and the generalization of their experience as indicative of the general aesthetic paradigm. 246 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 To the poetics of representation was supposed to succeed the grand world- poetry (posie-monde), that is the poetry of the everything speaks, of the speech already present in every silent thing. But this poetic is always already lined with its opposite: the silent speech that incarnates itself only to ruin all bodies carrying speech. 38
Te gure that best incarnates the radical nature of literature once it is seized by the demon of democracy, is Don Quixote, the character and the text that radically challenge all clear distinctions between the real and the ideal, the vis- ible and the invisible, art and life, word and thing. Te real contradiction is therefore between a principle declaring that everything already speaks, and the other principle, which is in fact the underlying one (just like inequality presup- poses equality), denying any substantial or univocal connection between the symbolic and the material, indeed rejecting any hard separations between the dierent orders of reality. Modern literature is caught up in these contradictions and attempts with every new work to resolve them: the contradiction between the expressivity of the world and the indierence of expression; between the idea of an absolute necessity of poetic language and the anarchistic nature of modern literary forms; between the radical freedom of the artist, the ultimate paradigm of free creativity, and the innite passivity of the material this activ- ity attempts to let speak; between the vision of art as superior knowledge and the innite idiocy of a world, which art, however, is supposed to take to its full expression. Aesthetics as creative action: Te Future of the Image and Film Fables Tis idea that the shift to modernity involves the emergence of new, constitutive contradictions is the guiding thread of Rancires subsequent books of aesthetic theory. In them, Rancire generalizes the conclusions reached in the study of modern literature by applying the full range of contradictions listed above, to the other art forms. We shall focus on Te Future of the Image rst, as it extends the contradictions of literature and the principle of literarity to a number of visual arts (painting, photography, cinema, design), before looking at the way in which Film Fables applies similar principles to the case of cinema. 39
Te democratic premise, as we saw, leads to the radical rejection of all ontologizing discourses and all ontological separations. Applied to aesthetics, this leads Rancire to adopt a perspective that eectively runs counter to some of the 38. Rancire, La Parole Muette, 88. 39. Te Future of the Image, like Hatred of Democracy, is a collection of essays, written by Rancire for conferences in various art institutions. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 247 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 most inuential positions in contemporary continental aesthetics. In the case of literature, for example, this amounts to a scepticism towards interpretations of romanticism and modern literature that underpinned the rise of poststructural- ism and played a decisive role in European aesthetics; interpretations that make the auto-telism and intransitivity of writing not only the essence of modern literature, but more generally the paradigm of the modern art work. 40
Put in general terms, Rancires aesthetic theory thus presents an alternative to all the modernist and post-modernist theories that dene the dierent art forms on the basis of the ways in which the latter gradually dene and appro- priate their aesthetic specicity by liberating themselves from the imperatives of mimetic logic. A most famous example of such a position, this time in relation to the history of modern painting, is Greenbergs thesis that, as each art develops and progresses by becoming ever more aware of the specicity of its medium, progress in the history of painting resides in the conquest of atness. To take another example, Rancires stance implies a critique of Barthess famous analysis of photography, relating its specic aesthetic power to its punctum eect, its ability to incarnate a this-has-been, a pathetic moment of the world. 41
Te anti-essentialist gesture makes Rancire equally reticent towards recent attempts to dene a specic status and function of the artistic image by isolat- ing its essence, in contrast to the images of mass communication and mass consumption. In all the ways of thinking the image today, whether in the case of the naked image (a brute extract from the real undercutting all attempts at re-presentation), the ostensive image (the image as pure power of presence against the capture of images at the hands of economic and ideological powers) or the metamorphic image (the image as rearrangement of existing images), a dialectic is at play. Rancire argues that this dialectic confuses the levels between types of images, as well as between reality and representation. 42 Finally, his anti- essentialist approach makes Rancire especially critical towards the teleological tendencies usually at work in modernist and postmodernist theories. One of Rancires consistent targets is the kind of deconstructive narrative that ties the theory of modern aesthetics to the broader programme of a deconstruction of metaphysics. Lyotard is again emblematic of that direction for Rancire, but a more recent representative would be Agamben. Such deconstructive critiques usually shift from a negative politics to an aesthetics of the sublime and the 40. Rancires account of modern literature, as a series of practical attempts to deal with its contradic- tions, his account of silent speech as the contradictory unity of activity and passivity, are explicitly developed as counters to Blanchots famous account of the same notions. For a recent, sophisticated discussion of similar auto-telic conceptions of literature and their philosophical underpinning, see Alison Ross, Te Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy: Presentation in Kant, Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 41. Rancire, Te Future of the Image, 1011. 42. Ibid., 229. 248 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 unrepresentable, which, ironically, imposes the most rigid ontological jacket on artistic practices (last chapter). How, then, does Rancire eectively propose to apply the related yet opposed principles of expressivity and literarity to the visual arts, with all the attached contradictions; what does la parole muette become in the visual arts? Te logic remains the same: on the one hand, la parole muette denotes the meaningfulness of the things themselves. Tis is crucial for the visual arts as it opens them up to the possibility of revealing meanings about the world by producing, or even just by extracting, pictures of it. As the visual arts are liberated from the constraints of representing action, liberated from the hegemony of language, they can claim to present the world itself. But in a second sense, the silent speech of things is on the contrary their obstinate silence, 43 that is, their refusal to deliver a univo- cal, meaningful message. Tis second sense of the principle governing modern aesthetics points to its deepest level. With the demise of the ontological scaf- fold ordering (separating yet connecting) the dierent arts, genres, vocabularies, subjects, on the basis of the ontological scaolding of social oligarchy, a general confusion ensues in the eld of experience itself. Tis is why Rancire calls the new regime of artistic practice and experience, the aesthetic one, as it is no longer grounded in the rules of proper representation, but in the relation to the world itself, in a new form of aesthesis. Te principle of art is no longer to be found in a term of measurement that would be the proper one for each art, but on the contrary where any such proper collapses; where all the common terms of measurement have been abolished in favour of a great chaotic juxtaposition, a great indier- ent melange of signications and materialities. Let us call it the great parataxis. 44
By destroying the hierarchical frame that predetermined the categories used in the experience and representation of the world, democracy does not just chal- lenge sociological boundaries, but, much more deeply, the pre-ordered schemes of experience. It liberates the eld of experience, in such a radical way that it even challenges the separations between the material and the ideal, as well as between materialities. When the thread of history is undone, it is not simply the forms that become analogous; the materialities themselves directly mix into each other. 45
In the new regime, the eld of possible experience is therefore up for grabs, open for new restructurings. Here three possibilities can be distinguished. Te 43. Ibid., 13. 44. Ibid., 42. 45. Ibid. I have slightly altered some of the translations of Te Future of the Image. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 249 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 rst is a degree zero of experience: the great schizophrenic explosion where the sentence sinks into the scream and meaning into the rhythm of bodily states. 46
Tis is the temptation, often explored by modern artists, to make art the direct communication of the paratactic state of the world, that is to say, of the innite, orderless juxtaposition of aects, emotions, physical states, ideas, symbols and so on. Te most famous names of those who ventured down this path are Nietzsche, Maupassant, Van Gogh, Rimbaud and Virginia Woolf. At the other end of the spectrum stands the reordering of the community through the imposition of a new homogeneous logic, the logic of the consensus. Two types of historical gures have explored this possibility: the utopia of an art that would directly register the movements of the community itself (the constructivist utopia), or the forms of discourse and representation that have abandoned all ambition to separate themselves from the language of the commodity. Between these two extremes lies the main avenue of aesthetic practice. Since no pre-ordered, pre-given structures are available any more, which would dene what can be said, in what form, in what language, and to whom, art in the aes- thetic regime consists of limited and always fallible attempts or propositions, for a local restructuring of the eld of experience. Such propositions operate by introducing a local order, some form of sense, in the great parataxis. Te core category, therefore, in aesthetics as in politics, is that of practice. Like egalitarian politics, art is only ever the set of relations that are traced here and now through singular and precarious acts. Between politics and art, however, there is an interesting dierence. Politics for Rancire is simultaneously the name of the egalitarian principle and that of the singular and precarious acts that attempt to verify it. For these acts, Rancire often likes to use the model of theatre, and call them staging. 47 In aesthetics, the acts reordering the sensible have their own names and the model is a dier- ent one. Te productions of art are called by him alternatively image, phrase- image (sentence-image) or montage. With these notions, Rancire intends to designate those particular operations that locally associate elements drawn from dierent levels of reality, notably materialities and discourses. Tese opera- tions always perform a specic synthesis, that is, always also a disguration or an alteration as they bring together elements by simultaneously altering or disguring an expected ontological order. 48 Te image understood in this sense is the attempt to combine the two principles of modern experience: the attempt to show sense, to link elements meaningfully (the sentence or phrase function of art works), and the necessity to take into account the chaotic dimension of 46. Ibid., 45. 47. See Peter Hallwards in-depth study of the theatrical aspect of Rancires politics, in Staging Equality: On Rancires Teatrocracy, New Left Review 37 (2006): 10929. 48. Rancire, Te Future of the Image, 6. 250 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 experience, without, however, being absorbed by it, and so, by instating rup- tures, shifts, within the immanent presence of the world. Accordingly the image is not the preserve of the visual arts and ideality that of the arts of the word. Te image is rather the result of the operation that establishes a specic relation between meaning and visuality, text and image. Again Flaubert is a particularly good example here, for the visual power of his style. Conversely, one can cite the way in which many visual works today draw their meaning from their message rather than the content and form of their composition. In the third chapter, Painting in the Text, dedicated to the shift in the relation between paint- ing and writing, Rancire shows in detail in what way the primacy of the word over the image, through the predominance of the narrative and the norms of repre- sentation expressed by the critics, is transformed in the new regime, in such a way that the word now operates directly on the image as it displaces the gures on the canvas through its own gures. Words no longer prescribe, as story or doctrine, what images should be. Tey make themselves images so as to shift the gures of the painting, to construct this surface of conversion [between materialities and idealities], this surface of form-signs which is the real medium of painting. 49
And again, these degurations, regurations and conversions are always local, circumscribed, experimental, precarious, pointing always to other possible or future operations. In the history of modern art, one only needs to think of the dierent modes of mixing word and image from Cubism to Dadaism to Pop Art to have a simple illustration of what Rancire is describing here. Te particular case of photography helps us to see concretely what Rancire means by the circulation between practices, materialities and discourses that is characteristic of the aesthetic regime, and the scope of this circulation. 50
Photography is exactly the art that, with every one of its operations, attempts to combine the two principles of the expressivity of the banal, and the idiotic resist- ance of the real. In particular, photography, as the technological invention typical of the nineteenth century, points to a specic dimension of the great intermin- gling that characterizes the aesthetic age. 51 In it, the exchange is not just between 49. Ibid., 87. 50. Ibid., 1517. 51. Te emergence of intermingling as a core concept, after that of silent speech and the dissolution of the boundary between the visible and the invisible, forces me to draw an unexpected parallel with Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Pontys own theory of silent speech is famously developed in the central chapter of Te Prose of the World, as well as in key pages of Te Visible and the Invisible. Te idea of an intermingling of ontological layers is a driving principle of his later work, notably in the 1957 lectures on nature, and in the preparatory notes for Te Visible and the Invisible. Rancires own materialism, of course, is only paradoxical; he clearly does not pursue the ontological and vital- istic aims of the late Merleau-Ponty. But they are both exemplary defenders of two fundamental philosophical options: the freedom and creative productivity of human praxis, and the rejection of ontological reication. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 25I Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 images (in the mimetic sense) and the critical discourses, notably the great herme- neutic discoveries of the century (Marx, Freud and their literary equivalents, for example, Balzac). Te exchange or the solidarity is also between the images of art, the critical discourses, and the social forms of imagery, as the nineteenth century is the time that corresponds with the onset of that specic modern phenomenon: the attempt by society to dene and locate itself through the mass production of new images. With this, the frontier between art images and social imagery, notably the whole imagery of the commodity, is for the rst time abolished, setting modern aesthetics on a course in which it is still engaged. In the history of modern art, Rancire often likes to isolate a specic sequence, between 1880 and 1920, between symbolism and constructivism, because it illustrates most clearly the particular contradiction of the aesthetic age. During that time, most avant-garde projects are dened by the radical application of the possibility of ontological decompartmentalization, as they attempted to directly equate art with non-art, to make art and life coextensive. Two opposing direc- tions aimed to realize that programme: the ideal of a pure art whose creations would no longer re-present anything, but simply create ideal life forms; and the art that abolishes itself by making itself synonymous with social life, nota- bly politics. Tis period was dreaming of an art beyond images, of an art that would take the dimensions of the world itself. For Rancire, as for so many of the French philosophers of his generation, the central gure in this sequence is, of course, Mallarm. Te fourth chapter of Te Future of the Image, entitled La surface du design, gives an astonishing political and materialist reading of the prince of poets. Te chapters most amazing claim consists in arguing that there is a deep similar- ity between Mallarms project and the work of the pioneer of industrial design (and the creator of corporate brand identity), Peter Behrens. Tis is where the collapse of boundaries is demonstrated in the most fascinating way. What makes those two seemingly opposed creative practices comparable is their common goal: to dene a new texture of common life. 52 Te lines of the symbolist poem and the line of industrial products all aim to create artistic forms that would be immediate forms of life, by purifying the forms, the objects and the materiali- ties extracted from everyday social life. In this reading, the surface of graphic design becomes the most striking illustration of the principle of the aesthetic age. Like the canvas of painting, it is a surface of conversion, in which the immanent, operating principle is the equal footing on which everything lends itself to art, where words, forms and things exchange roles. Like other artistic media, the creations of designers outline the shape of a world without hierarchy 52. Rancire, Te Future of the Image, 97. 252 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 where functions slide into each other, thus concretely rebutting any denition of a medium in terms of an ontological principle. 53 Given that one of the names that Rancire elects to designate the specic productivity of artistic operations is montage, it is not surprising that cinema should play an exemplary role in his aesthetic thinking and that he dedicates much of his writing today to cinema. In fact, the modern artist playing the most signicant role in Rancires aesthetic theory is probably a cinaste: Jean-Luc Godard. Cinema, for Rancire, is the art par excellence that combines the expres- sivity and symbolism of the everyday, the imagery of social life, with the innite passivity and obtrusiveness of material bodies. Cinema also unites the radical freedom of the auteur, as the last incarnation of the romantic poet, with his radical dependency on external powers. And Godards practice of establishing an innite circulation, a giant metonymy among cinema images, images from the history of painting and photography, critical texts (Faures and Malrauxs art histories, Barthes, Foucault, etc.), poetic and novelistic extracts, and of using these collages and layered montages as a visual commentary for the critique of the images of the spectacle, is the most denite vindication in practice of Rancires account of the aesthetic age. Film Fables, published in France in 2001, brings together Rancires lm essays published in lm journals (notably Trac and Cahiers du Cinma), as well as conference papers on the topic. Te studies on individual lms and lmmakers (Eisenstein, Murnau, Lang, Mann, Rossellini, Marker, Ray, Godard) oer a com- pelling demonstration of the fruitfulness of Rancires pragmatist, or we could say operationalist, approach to art works. It is impossible for a review of this kind to do full justice to these studies. Each of them is a treasure of conceptual mastery, aesthetic sensitivity and art-historical memory. In each case, Rancire studies the specic operations with which the lm-makers produced their own visual world as they encountered, each in their own way, the potentialities and constraints of the aesthetic age. One of the most remarkable aspects of these individual studies is the precise attention to the specic techniques employed by the artists in the composition of their images: the scenography of gazes and the transformations of shadows in Murnau; the struggles between perspectives in Lang, that is, the material, narrative and political confrontations between the views from modern society, the outcasts, the masters of the image, the naive, horizontal gazes of children, etc.; the poetics of errancy in Anthony Mann, materializing narratives of fortuitous encounters and of actions without ideals in the very detail of the mise en scne, through the movements of bodies and the placing of symbolic objects, and so on. 53. Ibid., 1067. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 253 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 Of course, with the reference to a specic array of techniques available to cinema, a contradiction seems to emerge, since it appears to imply an essence of the medium. Indeed, if cinema was said to incarnate the principle of modern aesthetics, the unstable unity of opposed principles, that would dene an essence, if only a paradoxical one, of the art. Rancire would then be committing the same mistakes as those philosophers he constantly denounces, who, on the basis of a grand narrative of modernity, distil the essence of an art form by reducing it to the possibilities and limitations of its medium. Chapter 7 of Film Fables conducts a critical reading of the paradigmatic philosophical characterization of the cinematic medium, the equivalent of Lyotards aesthetics of the sublime in painting: Deleuzes famous two books on cinema. Rancire uses the introduction to dispel this suspicion of self-contradiction, by showing that his approach to cinema does not in eect re-essentialize it. Te cinematographic fable, is a thwarted one, he claims. 54 Te specic contradic- tion the other arts have to face is that they have to actively seek to descend into the expressive passivity (the silent speech) of the world. Te camera, in contrast, is always already, by its very nature, the passive medium that the others aim to become: Camera cannot be made to be passive because it is passive already. 55
And so, the continuity between cinema and the aesthetic revolution that made it possible is necessarily paradoxical: even though the basic technical equipment of the cinema secures the iden- tity of active and passive that is the principle of that revolution, the fact remains that cinema can only be faithful to it if it gives another turn of the screw to its secular dialectics. Te art of cinema has been constrained, empirically, to a rm its art against the tasks assigned to it by the indus- try. But the visible process by which it thwarts these tasks only hides a more intimate process: to thwart its servitude, cinema must rst thwart its mastery. It must use its artistic procedures to construct dramaturgies that thwart its natural powers. Tere is no straight line running from cinemas technical nature to its artistic vocation. 56
In other words, the ultimate paradox of the aesthetic age is that it sees the emergence of an art, cinema, which, because it is already the perfect incarnation of its principle (the unity of expressivity and indierence, passivity and activ- ity, knowledge and ignorance), is forced to engage in new kinds of operations and procedures, in order to fully exploit the potentialities of the new aesthetic age. Otherwise, it is always going to become the servant of some other interests. 54. Rancire, Film Fables, 9. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., 11. 254 JEANPHILIPPE DERANTY Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 Cinema is therefore obliged, like all the other arts, to construct specic opera- tions. It can never just rely on its alleged essence, since that essence makes it immediately the prey of economic and other interests, including the interest in retelling stories in the old-fashioned, representative way, as a neat, linear unfolding of causes and eects, for the aim of individual and/or collective cathar- sis. Tis then provides the criterion to distinguish cinema as an art form from the cinema that has succumbed to its masters. Te cinema that fulls the potentiali- ties of the aesthetic age is the one that introduces operative ruptures, that can be described concretely, within the classical representative mode, by obeying the aesthetic principles, that is to say, by proposing innovative ways to combine the expressivity of the world with its brute obstruction to meaningfulness and, in particular, its resistance to narrative causality. Te great lm-makers listed earlier each have their own way of doing precisely that. Tis way of watching how lm-makers deal with the aesthetic equation (unity of the contraries, circulation of materialities and meanings, and so on) has the great advantage of focusing on the specic traits of their individual technique, and on their creative originality. It gives them the full status of creators and allows one to take the full measure of their originality, or, as the case may be, their genius. Instead of investing their work with a philosophical depth they would have had no consciousness of, running the risk of providing an intel- lectualist interpretation radically at odds with their stated intentions, Rancires pragmatic approach, focused on the individual achievements of each art work within the context of the aesthetic age can follow the operations of the art work in its immanence, as a local machine of sense and beauty. Just as Hatred of Democracy ended with a passionate ode for democratic action, the lesson of Film Fables is thus inspired by the conviction of the constant pos- sibility of concrete, creative artistic practice in the alleged era of the spectacle and the end of art: A longstanding lamentation in contemporary thought wants us to bear witness to the programmed death of images at the hands of the machine for information and advertisement. I have opted for the opposite perspec- tive and have tried to show that the art and thought of images have always been nourished by all that opposes them. 57 In politics as in aesthetics, Rancires writings oer us a rare and precious defence of creative action. 57. Ibid., 19. REVIEW ESSAY: DEMOCRATIC AESTHETICS 255 Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2007 Jean-Philippe Deranty is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney. 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