Analysis

October 10, 2011

Summary: Prior to the Arab Spring, Turkey was admired as the rising star of the region owing to its proactive foreign policy agenda. But the oscillations observed in Turkeys policy during the first few months of the Arab Spring led some analysts to suggest that the countrys regional role was in complete disarray, not least because Ankara failed to anticipate this contingency. Such analyses proved hasty at best, misjudged at worst. Turkey demonstrated flexibility in adapting to the rapidly evolving circumstances and has managed to gain a say in the political processes likely to affect the future of the regional transformation. As the pendulum swings back, Turkey is again being praised as an important regional player. Overall, Turkey has increasingly moved in the direction of putting pragmatism above idealism in the conduct of its regional policies. Yet, a corresponding change has not taken place in the rhetorical parlance of Turkish leaders who continue to advocate an idealist vision of regional order.

Turkeys Middle East Policy Reloaded: Rise of Pragmatism?

by Saban Kardas
The popular uprisings sweeping through the Middle East have put the dynamics of the regional order in flux, forcing the local powers to redefine their foreign policy priorities. As the revolutionary fervor subsides, of particular interest have been the implications of recent developments for Turkeys Middle East policies. Prior to the Arab Spring, Turkey was admired as the rising star of the region owing to its proactive foreign policy agenda. But the oscillations observed in Turkeys policy during the first few months led some analysts to suggest that the countrys regional role was in complete disarray, not least because Ankara failed to anticipate this contingency. Such analyses proved hasty at best, misjudged at worst. Turkey demonstrated flexibility in adapting to the rapidly evolving circumstances and has managed to gain a say in the political processes likely to affect the future of the regional transformation. As the pendulum swings back, Turkey is again being praised as an important regional player. How has Turkish foreign policy fared lately as it navigated the waves of revolution? While it might be wrong to announce the death of Turkeys Middle East policy, it would be equally problematic to argue that Turkey has emerged untainted from this experience. The Arab Spring has presented substantial conceptual challenges to Turkish foreign policy vision, which raised serious questions as to the relevance of the idealist thinking that undergirded Turkeys regional policies. Overall, during the course of the Arab Spring, Turkey has conducted its policy by the dictates of Realpolitik, and pragmatically realigned its external relations. Yet, a corresponding change has not taken place in the rhetorical parlance of Turkish leaders who continue to advocate an idealist vision of regional order. Turkey as a Middle Eastern Regional Power Turkeys assertive involvement in Middle Eastern affairs has been an outgrowth of its foreign policy activism on a range of regional and global issues. As much as the structural conditions creating a permissive environment, Ankaras recent orientation is underpinned by a strong sense of agency, and as such it reflects an effort of its leaders to play leadership roles in their regional neighborhoods and beyond. Indeed, Turkeys regional and global ascendance has coincided remarkably with the rise to power of a new elite, represented by the AK Party.

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Analysis

Turkeys regional and global ascendance has coincided remarkably with the rise to power of a new elite, represented by the AK Party.
The intellectual ownership of new foreign policy is usually attributed to the views articulated by Ahmet Davutolu in his academic writings, where he justifies activism with references to the geographic and historical depth. That said, Davutolu is not alone in believing that geographic and historic imperatives require Ankara to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy agenda, and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoan especially has been a keen advocate of this ambitious vision. The discussion of the AK Partys foreign policy often revolved around the provocative question of the role played by the ideational factors. Analysts have debated whether Ankara was experiencing a shift of axis away from its traditional Western orientation, toward a more Islamist direction, triggered by the ideological makeup of the ruling elite. What was often less addressed, however, was the conceptual framework that undergirded Turkeys new foreign policy vision. Turkeys regional policy had taken largely an idealist turn, in the sense that it was based on the assumption that Turkeys national interests and the conduct of its foreign policy must be informed by a priori moralistic propositions about Turkeys identity and international role. In line with these role perceptions, Turkish leaders have laid out several precepts painting an ideal picture of the Middle East and other regions Turkey is a part of, such as the Balkans and Caucasus and Turkeys place in it. More specifically, they have acted on the belief that they are tasked to pursue a foreign policy that upholds peace, justice and freedom both in immediate regional neighborhoods and the global level. Though labeling them dogmatic would be wrong, they have at times adopted rather rigid and categorical foreign policy positions informed more by their own beliefs about the right course of action than the actual facts on the ground.

Turkeys Self-Perception as an Order-Instituting Country The leading theme in regional engagements has been the idea that Turkey could act as an order-instituting country. Just as other emerging powers, Turkey has aspired to assume a greater responsibility in the creation of more stable and prosperous orders in surrounding regions. In Davutolus parlance, the concept of order instituting has a broader strategic value as he relates it to the concept of central-country. In this view, the extent to which Turkey succeeds in setting up a regional order will be crucial for its emergence as a central country in regional and, consequently, global politics. In addition to such Realpolitik justifications, Turkeys aspirations for order-instituting power also rested on several interrelated arguments, indicating the influence of idealism. First, juxtaposing itself to the U.S. hard power approach to international problems, Turkey has prioritized soft power instruments. Likewise, Turkeys policy of penetrating new markets and initiating economic integration projects with neighbors, accompanied by the removal of visa requirements, added a liberal touch to Ankaras recent activism.

Turkish leaders have at times adopted rather rigid and categorical foreign policy positions informed more by their own beliefs about the right course of action than the actual facts on the ground.
Echoing the Wilsonian idealism, moreover, Turkey has emphasized cooperative policies and institution-building as the best way to advance national interests, as well as to forge a peaceful regional and international order. Turkey, more specifically, has come to value diplomacy, mediation, and engagement over force, coercion, and exclusion, believing that the United States stood for the latter. As a corollary,

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under the rubric of regional ownership, Turkey has advocated for local actors assuming larger roles for the creation of a regional order, which, in effect, has increasingly undermined the ground for coordinated action with the United States. Ironically, the emphasis on an order-instituting role reached its climax on the eve of the Arab Spring. In a January 2011 lecture, Davutolu called for a proactive foreign policy, meaning Turkey should be able to anticipate potential crises and develop appropriate preventive measures. More importantly, a proactive foreign policy meant that Turkey should be in a lead role in the resolution of regional and global crises, abandoning the reactive policies that had characterized the countrys international practices. Post-Arab Spring: Rise of Pragmatism? The Arab Spring has starkly presented the limits to Turkeys ability to understand and shape the regional security dynamics. First, it must have reminded Turkish leaders that the element of uncertainty inherent in international relations presents a major constraint to any attempt at devising an ambitious grand strategy. Perhaps Turkey may not be criticized for failing to anticipate a contingency such as the Arab Spring, as it caught many regional and global actors unprepared. Judged by the earlier grandiose rhetoric of devising proactive policies to ride regional transformation, however, it captures the eye that Turkey was not in the lead position in efforts to address the uprisings, except for the fortunate intervention in Egypt where Erdoans call on Mubarak to leave power earned him applauds. Erdoans knee-jerk rejection of the imposition of sanctions against the regime of Col. Muammar Gaddafi, and his vocal questioning of NATOs possible role in Libya, were driven less by the actual facts on the ground than his beliefs about right course of action. Turkey managed to avoid being sidelined by the pace of events only through a pragmatic change of course, simply disregarding its categorical objections. Turkey, overall, reacted to the Western agenda, rather than proactively determining the policy instruments and platforms that tackled the violent uprising in Libya. In Libya, Turkey bandwagoned with the international coalition, and did so only after much bickering about UN-authorized sanctions and the use of force. Despite Erdoans initial rhetoric, which accused other powers of pursuing

Turkeys overreliance on soft power instruments proved problematic as Turkey addressed the contingencies in Libya and Syria.
neo-imperialistic policies and described Turkey as the only country with a morally-driven and righteous agenda, Turkey soon recognized the rapidly changing circumstances and redefined its policy, which culminated in Erdoans trip to the country. In Syria, again, Ankara lagged behind the Western world which launched coercive measures against the Baath regime and only recently moved in that direction. What is also remarkable is that in both cases Turkey moved to coordinate its policies with the United States, abandoning the early rhetoric of autonomous action. Similarly, Turkeys overreliance on soft power instruments, which almost bred aversion to the use of coercion, proved problematic as Turkey addressed the contingencies in Libya and Syria. On the issue of regime change, Turkey based on the idealist foreign policy vision, Davutolus earlier writings, and the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq defended gradual transformation of existing regimes, standing against regime change through foreign intervention. However, Turkeys soft power tools were of no avail, as it sought to present an Ankara-based solution to Libya and Syria. Syria, in particular, showcased how, after having invested political capital for engaging the Assad regime, Turkey failed to turn its soft power into political leverage. Where Goes Pragmatism? The major principles underpinning Turkeys foreign policy vision beg reconsideration, having failed to stand the test of events sparked by the Arab Spring. At the core of Turkeys pre-Arab Spring vision was a strong belief of its leaders in their ability to understand and shape the region after their own image. Its leaders imagined a Turkey that can lead by example and devise policies with foresight in order to prevent regional crises. Faced with fast-evolving contingencies, Turkey rapidly responded to new conditions, though

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its conduct was not always in tune with the idealist rhetoric. Overall it was successful in adapting to a new Middle Eastern regional order in flux, but Turkey was hardly the actor that proactively led the crisis management efforts in all cases. Turkeys change of course as observed in Libya is pragmatism par excellence, and reflects the ability to follow dictates of Realpolitik in difficult times. What is needed now is a critical self-reflection of its leaders as to how they reconcile the gap between rhetoric and practice. So far, they have refrained from engaging in a deliberate attempt at conceptualizing their practice. Instead, they insist on the validity of the idealist vision and offer ad hoc justifications for their maneuvers. Erdoans presentation at the UN General Assembly attests to Turkish leaders belief in their self-righteousness and reluctance to subject the idealist vision to criticism. However, as the mismatch between the rhetoric and reality becomes ever more apparent, Turkey will benefit from a more nuanced and healthy debate on the idealist vision as the conceptual framework guiding Turkeys regional policies, since this has immense practical implications. At the very least, it raises questions about the gap between capabilities and expectations or sustainability of an idealist agenda in a fluid international environment. These questions are particularly relevant at a time when Turkish leaders aspire to apply the very same ideals at the global level.

About the Author

Dr. aban Karda works as an assistant professor of international relations in the Department of International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.

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