Colombia: Drugs and Democracy Author(s): Siddhartha Baviskar Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No.

11 (Mar. 16, 1996), pp. 654-655 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4403910 Accessed: 09/05/2009 13:10
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Colombia:
Siddhartha Baviskar

Drugs

and

Democracy

Thepolitical crisis in Colombiafollowing allegations that president Samperhad authorised multi-milliondollar contributionsto his 1994 electoral campaignfrom the Cali drug cartel has focused attentionon two important points: the inability of the Colombianstate to counter the drug mafia and the basis of US-Colombiarelations in the post-cold war world.
GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, Colombian Nobel prize-winning writer, accuratelysummed up Colombia's current politicalpredicament few weeks ago, when a he referred disgustedly to the "moral catastrophe the politicalclass". The crisis of that erupted in that country a few months ago following allegations that president Ernesto Samper Pizano authorised multimillion dollar contributions to his 1994 electoralcampaignfromthe Cali drugcartel has focused attention on two important points:the inability of the Colombian state to counterthe drug mafia; and the basis of US-Colombiarelationsin the post-cold war world. The case of Ernesto Samper is but the symptomof a far more serious malaise; the narco-corruptionthat has slowly spread across society, finally infecting vital organs of Colombia'sdemocraticgovernment.The production and trafficking of drugs in Colombia is an old, highly lucrative - and for a time, even socially acceptable. business. Drug baronsinvested their illegal funds in real estate, sponsoredprofessional sportand financedpolitical campaigns,trying to gain acceptance in different spheres of Colombian society. State ambivalence and grave inconsistencies in its policy on drug-relatedactivities - dialogue with the traffickers at one moment, repression the next - only helped the drug cartels to consolidate their position. The illegal nature of narcotics-related activities - production, trafficking and consumption togetherwith theirenormous resultedin a spiralof violence profitpotential, as the drug-cartels enteredinto conflict with a statealreadyweakenedby non-acceptance of the guerrillato recognise it as the legitimate representative of the Colombian people. With the high stakes involved, and lacking the legal channels they needed to consolidate their interests, it was perhaps to be expected that at some point the drug cartels' desire to seek immunity from the law would lead them to underminethe institutionsof the democratic regime. That this did not meet with stiff resistance in the past- a consequenceof the most pernicious effects of the patron-client relationships underlyingthe caudillismoandclientelismo which for centurieshave markedlocal politics and provided an environmentthat was conducive to the growth of a venal class of politicians. The rot in the country's democraticinstitutions has spread to dangerous levels, extending to all parts of the national congress and cutting across party lines. Four membersof congress have been imprisoned while 14 others are undergoing various stages of investigation for having received illegal contributions fromtheCalidrugcartel in the 1994 elections. It is estimatedthat as much as 30-40 per cent of the legislature may be implicated in cases of narcocorruption.Corruptionin even the highest echelons of governmentis an all too familiar story today. But it is the sheer magnitude of venalityof Colombianpoliticians,andthe fact that it is this that virtually shelters a death-dealing industry thattakesone's breath away. Small wonder, then, that the national congress lies in disgrace, completely discredited in the eyes of an increasingly sceptical citizenry. Fortunately,the nation's supreme court, and, in particular,the prosecutor general, Alfonso Valdivieso, are notable exceptions to this decay. The new nationalconstitution, framed in 1991, laid the foundations for a strong and independentjudiciary and today this is the one edifice that still stands erect amidst all the rubble of democratic institutions. In presenting the case against the president,Valdivieso has done his job well. But, ironically, the same constitution dictates that charges be first investigated by none other than the congress! Thus, the president,victoriousLiberalpartycandidate in the 1994 elections, is being investigated by a House of Representativescommission dominatedby members of his own partythe same commission, in fact, that months ago cleared his name of similar charges! Evidently, the framers of the constitution did not take into account such a dilemma of political accountability. Who, then, is fit to govern? In a bid to surmountthe crisis of governabilityand fill the dangerous power vacuum that could perhaps lead the country to the edge of a

civil war, various suggestions have been made.Leadingsectionsof Colombian society have called upon the presidentto stepdown, at least while the charges against him are investigated. President Samper, while vehemently proclaiminghis innocence, has suggested holding a national plebiscite regarding his continuance in office in the event that the congressional investigating commission gives him a clean chit, as is widely expected. Such an option, however, would set an unhealthy precedent for any prersident seeking to legitimise his misdeeds before a fickle public endowed with a notoriously short memory. Another recommendation, and one supportedby the prosecutorgeneralbut, till recently, sharply opposed by the president, is to dissolve the congress andbringforward the national elections (scheduled for 1998) via a constitutional amendmentin orderto elect a new presidentandcongress. But with precious little to choose from among the rulingclass. holdingelectionsdoes notappear to be the long-termsolution. Nordoes it find favour among members of parliament untouchedby the scandal who see no reason why they should sacrifice their terms in parliament because of the misconduct of their honourable colleagues. Yet anotheridea, and one thatfinds ready support among certain politicians for its obvious convenience, is a ley de puntofinal. Accordingto this formula,erringpoliticians would be immune from prosecution in exchange forconfessing theirmisdeeds.The only price they would pay would be their disqualificationfromstandingforany public office. But would such a formulaof 'forgive and forget' rcally eliminate the cancer? In Garcia Marquez's opinion, the only lasting solution lies in purging the existing lot of politicians and beginning all over again with new rules designed to rigorously check the credentialsof all futureaspirants to public office and raising the norms of accountability. While this makes sense in the presentcircumstances,unfortunately one cannot visualise Colombian politicians accepting such a radical proposal that is so clearly inimical to their interests. As various observers have pointed out, it is imperativethatdemocracy- as represented by the national constitution- be respected, even in the face of widespread public disenchantment and the resultant crisis of legitimacy that afflicts the government. In other words, the existing power vacuum should not be filled by the authoritarian elements within the nation's armed forces as has occurredin the past with many of its regional neighbours. Colombia's record is comforting in this respect, with only one militarycoup d'etat breakingthe regularity of democratically-elected governments.

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affects both; the former demands and the internal affairs, reducing the Colombian latter endeavours to comply. Mounting decision-making process to a series of pressure and frustrationin the US at the reactions to its demands, but even set the setbacks suffered by its gigantic and tone and agenda of debate outside Colomlogistically impressive anti-drugsinitiative biangovernmentcircles, impedinga rational - setbacks attributedincreasingly to insti- and objective appraisal of the situation. tutionalised narco-corruption Colombia in Inthe wakeof investigationsintopresident - have only contributedto making bilateral Samper's involvement with the Cali drug relations more abrasive. cartel,theClintonadministration decided has From another perspective, the demands to withdrawthecertification-of good conduct thatthe US makeson its southernneighbour to the Sampergovernmentwhile, atthe same seem unreasonable. Only 4-5 percent of the time, continuing assistance to Colombian US federalanti-narcotics budgetis allocated agencies in their anti-drugs effort. Such a to the producer countries taken together, responsewas to be expected,especiallygiven most of which are struggling to cope with that this an election year in the US and pressing problems of poverty while issues president Clinton has to be seen taking a of nationalsovereignty are brushedaside in tough stand against any perceived threatto the demand for extradition laws. On the US nationalinterests.Hisdecision was surely other hand, the US could do much more to made easier by the fact that, in the changed strengthenthe Colombian economy. While post-cold war scenario, Colombia is no the greater part of the funds generated by longer viewed as a valuable ally against the drugs trade ends up in foreign destina- Soviet aggression in South America. In tions (and most of the value added occurs Colombia the measure has been widely in the sophisticatedconsumer-markets), the interpreted a vote against Samperand not as Colombian economy is adversely affected his men. Indeed, US diplomats singled out by the atmosphere of instability that is a the nation's prosecutorgeneraland the head productof the structuralviolence relatedin of police for praise while confirming their partto thedrugsproblemandwhichfrightens overall negative evaluation. away foreign investment. In the face of such outright humiliation, This narco-diplomacy has had another, it is hardlysurprisingthatpresidentSamper US-COLOMBIA RELATIONS more subtle, effect. Having failed to control should have decided to go it alone andadopt Theall-pervasivenatureof the drugstrade the problemwithin its own borders,the anti- an independentposture,rejectingfutureUS hasgiven riseto a special vocabulary:narco- drugscampaignhas become even morethan anti-narcotics assistanceandplanningcloser trafficking, narco-terrorism, narco-funds before, a 'war against drugs' for the US ties with the European Union, its secondand narco-corluption. The term narco- government. 'War' justifies the use of the most importanteconomic partnerafter the diplomacy succinctly describes the rather most coercive policy options - eradication, US, to counterpossibleeconomic embargoes prickly focal point of bilateral relations extraditionand a steadily increasingmilita- by the superpower. Should Samper be between Colombia and the US, especially risation of the problem- completely dis- successful in overcomingtheeconomic costs since the 1980s: the unwelcome depen- carding more controversial but possibly of US measures - and many analysts feel dency betweenone of the world's majorpro- more successful alternativessuch as nego- that these would be insignificant - then the ducers of drugs and its biggest consumer- tiationwith thedrug-traffickers legalisa- US would lose a majorpartof the leverage and market. tion of drugs owing to their politically it has had till recergly with the Colombian 1986 markeda watershed in this narco- sensitive nature.Formulatedin such terms, government.That is, of course, in the event diplomacy. Having failed in its efforts to US foreignpolicy towardsColombiahas not that Ernesto Samper manages to hold on to tacklethe narcoticsproblemin the domestic only interfered directly in that country's his presidency. arena,that year the Reagan administration unilaterally introduced an instrument of coercion into its foreign policy towards countrieslinked to the trafficking of drugs in a bid to shift the focus of the problem onto the supply side. Countries- among Rs. 250 Street Children in India / W.S.K. Phillips them Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Nigeria,Lebanon,Iranand Syria Rs. 250 Child Labourin AgrarianSociety / U.C.-Sahoo - were to be certified on the basis of their Rs. 1 60 Juvenile Delinquency / Shipra Lavania success in combatingdrugs.Desertification, reflecting a lack of progress can lead to Rs. 200 Child Abuse / G.S. Kewalramani diverse economic and financial sanctions, Rs. 250 Women and Child /Jaishree Chandra ranging from the cutting off of US antinarcoticsassistanceand developmentaid to Rs. 300 School, Family & Media / Ehsanul Haq blockageof loans from multilaterallending Rs. 250 Parent Education/S. Kulkarni agencies and creating barriersto the entry of imports from offending countries. The asymmetrical character of USRAWATPUBLICATIONS Colombia bilateralrelations is thus clearly 3-Na-20, Jawahar Nagar, JAIPUR 302 004 illustrated.The two countries are not allies Phone: 0141-567022 Fax: 014_1-567748 that join forces to tackle a problem that

While there is a notable uneasiness within the ranks of the armed forces, it seems to have more to do with their own organisational insecuritythat stems from their concernover the militaryinstitutionbeing made a scapegoatfor the crisis in the government. This is not as improbableas it may appear, given that the US had refused entry to the commander of the Colombian military forces giving rise to speculation over his involvement with the drug cartels. Strangely enough fora presidentco-opted by the drugcartels. 1995 was a golden year for the Colombian anti-narcotics offensive, with the captureof the leaders of the Cali drugcartel. This gives rise to a raft of questions and doubts to which no certain answer can be offered at present. What is sad is that this scandal only serves to reinforce the Colombianstereotypethatcentres on the circle of drugs, corruption,violence andinstability,just whenthecountryseemed to be slowly breakingthe mould into which it hadcastitself.Till a week ago the president was issuing vehementdenials regardingthe infiltration the drug mafia in his election of campaign;now he admits that illegal funds may have been received without his knowledge.

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