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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

A-

Hitachi Aircraft Company


(Hitachi

Kokoki

KK)

CORPORATION REPORT NO.


(Airframes and Engines)

VII

Aircraft Divisioa

February 1947

f>

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Hitachi Aircraft Company


(Hitachi

Kokuki KK)

CORPORATION REPORT NO.


(Airframes and Engines)

VII

Aircraft Division

Date of Survey:

November 1945
Date of Publication:
February 1947

APR

^'^'

This report was written primarily for the use of the JJnited States Strategic in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conchisions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as hmited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the ligiit of further studies conducted by the Survey.

Bombing Survey

II

FOREWORD
cstiihlished

The United States Sti'iitcgic Bombing was by the Secretary of War on 3 Novemtlie late

ber 1944, pursuant to a directive from

to conan impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to ])e used in connection with air attacks on Jjipan and to estabIts
(hict

President

Roosevelt.

mission was

evaluatmg the importance and potenpower as an instrument of military strategy for planning the future development of the United States armed forces and for determming future economic policies with respect to the national defense. A summary report and some
lish a basis for tialities of air

200 supporting reports containing the findings of

Survey in Germany have been published. 15 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the
the

On

types of air attack in the war against submitting reports in duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the N avy. The officers of the Sm-vey during its Japanese phase were:
effects of all

Japan,

and 500 (uihsted men. 'i'iie was drawn from the Army to the extent of 00 perceni, and from the Navy to Ww extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possil)l(^ assistance in furnishing men, sui)j)lies, transport, and information. The Suivey operated from headquarters established in 'i'okyo early in September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with niol)ile teams operating hi other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's econoiiiy and war production, plant l)y plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leadcivilians,

350

officers,

military segment of the organization

ing to her acceptance of unconditional surrender,

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.

the course of health and morale population,


the
effectiveness
civilian defense organization,

among
of

the civilian

PaulH.

Nitze,

the

Japanese
the

Hemy

C. (Alexander, Vice Chairmen.

and the

efl'ects of

Harry L. Bowman, J. Kenneth Galbraith,


Rensis Likert,

Frank A. McNamee, Fred Searls, Jr.,

Jr.,

Mom-oe E. Spaght, Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,


Theodore P. Wright, Directors. Walter Wilds, Secretary.

The Survey's complement provided

for

300

atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of the study. The Survey mterrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government, and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many documents which not only have been useful to the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements have been made to tm-n over the Survey's files to the Central InteUigence group, through which they will be available for further examination and distribution.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Hitachi Aircraft Co. (Corporation Report No. VII) The Corporation and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry The Air Attacks Production Statistics Evaluation of Pre-attack Intelligence Appendix A. Planned, Actual, and Capacity Production Facing Hitachi Chiba (Plant Report No. VII-1) Hitachi Tachikawa (Plant Report No. 11-2)
=,

6 6 8
p. 8

47

t-


THE CORPORATION AND
Introduction

ITS

IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY


K K),

The

lli(!i(lii

Aiicrafl ('o. (irilMclii Kokiiki

prodnccf of bolli cn^rincs iiiul iiirfViiiiics, oixTiilcd Fioin Jiiniiiiry 1041 iiiilil (lie end of (lie 5 pliiiits. war till' coiiipniiy produced 1:5, 571 aircrnfl ciifiincs
of 14 (ypcs, rcpi-cscntiiif;-

produced
period.
aircraft
airci'aft

l.(i pcrcculof all ('iii;iii("S Japanese manufacturers during- that, The airframes division produced 1,783 of 4 types, or 2.(3 percent of Japanese producetl from January 1941 llirougli
1

l)y

August 1945.

The cori)()ration prinei|)ally was concei'ucd with the i)roduction of small engines for training aii'craft, and also the assembly of trainer aircraft.
Toward
to
tlie

end of the wai- attempts were


into the pi-oduction of

made

bring

Ilitaciii

combat

aircraft
al)ru])t

both

in

and combat aircraft engines, but the ending of the wai- found production of a relatively experimental status (Table 1).
1.

T.\BLE

List of products, Hitachi Aircraft Co.

AIRFRAMES

Scliiiiicll

cslalilisJicd olliccs at

the ('liilm

jjluiiL

Organization and operation


Aircraft Co. was main office set ))olicies afi'ecting the o])eration and organization of the plants and made cuntracts with government
nniin
ollici' n{' tiic llilaclii

for

lisiiing

tho purpose of aiding plant engineers in estabmass ])r(i(liietion assenibly line (celiniciues.
ideas

The

located in Tokyo.

Tii<;

The

ceived,

advanced by Seliniidt wei-(^ \v(^ll reand sections of the Cliiba i)laiil were
n(>\v airci'aft.

assigned lo jji-oduction of this


fusion created
dispersal,

Due
end of

agencies,

(ieiieral

suj)crvision

of

the

com])any

to seai'city of building materials, tlu^ general con\>y

and the

raj)id

the war, the j)rojeete(l ])lans never materialized.

Since the company ])roduce(l equijnuent for both the services, the Army and Navy each had uispectors and supervisors working with the company. Ciovernmeut insix'ctors ])erformed routine

was handled by the board of directors through the vaiious department heads (Fig. 2). The resjjonsibility for j)ro(luction of airframes and engines was placed on the particular dejjartmental chief and the efficiency of any department was attributa])le to management Ijy the individual
in

not and acceptance duties but any time. Hitachi's earnest efforts to fulfill contracts removed all necessity for government operation, and no special interest was shown exec])! by the Army in 1945 for till' development of the Ha-51 engine antl bj' Xaval interest in develophig the Cliiba plant
inspection

did

charge of the dej)artment. Materials required by the five plants A^ere com-

exercise financial duties at

puted by the department heads at meetings held with the directoi-s. Previous to the meetings,
individual plant managers supplied the depart-

ment

h(>ads with the requirements of their par-

ticular plants.

largest plants,

to

assemble Frances.

directors of

The plant managers of the two Chiba and Tachikawa, were also the company.

DEPARTMENTALORGANIZATION CHART
BOARDOF DIRECTORS

AIRFRAME

ENGINE

MACHINE TOOL

INSPECTION

MATERIAL

FINANCE

PERSONNEL

GENERAL AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT

TECHNICAL RESEARCH
LABORATOFTC

Within

tlu-

fompany,

tlu'

Tatlukawa plant was

the largest engine pioducer and the Chiba plant The Omori the largest producer of airframes.

chat\gcd to two r2-hour shifts and worked until May 1945 on that basis. In May it reverted

back to the single

shift

system

The engine

divi-

from late 1942, had berime a "feeder" plant for Chiba engine production, and production at Omori was rechiced to tlie complete assembly of only one engine, the Temjiu o. The Ilaneda plant had been engaged in the production of trainers (tyi)es 'A. 14, and 9.'!) u]) to At that time il loo became a feeder late 1944. for Chiba and concentrated on the assend)ly ])lant of parts for the trainer A6M5K (Zeke) and for the
plant,
1

sion always used the two-shift basis.

The Omori engine


shift

plant used a single 8-hour

Februaiy 1944. From February until July 1944 two 10-hour shifts were used and from
until

July 1944 until


laborers

1945 the addition of student to convert to three 8-hour shifts. From May 1945 until the end of the wai' the plant reverted back to a singh

May

prompted the management

"

8-hour

shift.

fighter

A6M5

(Zeke).

Haneda and Kawasaki used


at the

the

single-shift

To
to

aid in the

assembly of airframes

Chiba

basis at

all

times.

Haneda plant transferred many workers new company plant in November 1944. Similarly, the Omoii jilant had sent many trained
plant, the
tills

The

dispersal

program
Aircraft Co. began plans for exten-

The Hitachi

workers to Chiba to oi-ganize the engine assembly


lines.

sive dispersal in

Decend)er 1944.
of the

Initial govern-

ment

orders to disperse were received at that time

Kawasaki plant always remained purely a casting foundry supplying Tachikawa, Chiba, and Omori until it was destroyed by B-29s in an area
Tiie

and the directors

company

assuuKMl the

responsiliility for achieving

the dispi'rsal.
activities.

Individual plant managers actually chose the


sites for dispersing their

The plant produced both ahuninum and magnesium alk\y cylinder heads,
attack on
1.5

April 1945.

own

The

tw(

largest plants, Chil)a anel

Tachikawa, chose mainlj

reduction gear housings, crankcases, and casingsfor distributors, oil and fuel pumps, and carburetors.
Tiie Hitachi Aircraft Co. reached

peak employ-

unde'iground and se^miunderground locations anc used school builelings to a great extent (USSBS Aircraft Division, Reports VII-1 and VH-2).

ment
1
i

iu

September
were

1944.

In that month 34,277


13,896
at

Haneda and Omori plamied


small shops,

to disperse to build

|)eo|)!e

employed,

Tachikawa,

ings near the parent plants in the

hope that
to

thesi

,978 at Chii)a, 4,576 at Omori, 2, 852 at Hanetla,


97.5 at

although

adjacent

the

already

and
thai

the

Kawasaki foundry
Feltruary

(fig. 3).

From

time

tnitil

Chiba conliiuied

to rise, reaching 14,467.

1945 employment at Tachifairly constant


l)ut

bombed plants, would not lie bombed again. The Kawasaki fotuidry at first planned to continue production in buildings near
the'

plant,

hu

kawa employment remained

the increasing
this policy

tempo

of air attacks

on the

Kawa

eni|)ioyment at the 3 small iilants di'opped sharply.

From

Fel)ruary

1945 until

tiie

air raids

and dispersal caused

end of the war, continued decline

at all ])lants.

management te) abandor some of the sitef selee'ted by tiie Tachikawa engine plant. Like other aircraft companies, the Hitachi Co
saki see'tion forced the

and

to ])lan to utilize

There ai)|)eare(l to l>e no set company policy on the use of single <>v nniltiple shifts of employees at the various plants. Policy eliangcd at each
location.

stressed

inadequate transportation as the


its

chiei

pioblein in completing

dispersal plan.

Manj

The
to
I

T.Mcliikawa ])lant used a single-shift basis

.November 1943 and then changed two 12-hour shifts when govei'mnent orders for lie lia ]3Ko and na-26 engines increased heavily at that time. In September 1944 the plant management again r'hanged the system to thice shifts of 8 hours each and continued on lli.-it basis until
(11 hvjin-s) until

spre'ael throughout the' e'oimtry-l by drayage e'om|)anie's that were side, abande)neel forced to use' true'ks and oxcarts for otlu-r purposes Particularly in the Oami in the' summe'r of 1945.

machine' tools were'

se'e'tion (a Cliilia elispe'rsal site') we're'


te)

countless machines
anel

be'

see'ii

e)n

siele

re)aels

on

railwaj;

sielings,

lielativcly

sle)w

progre-ss of

the Oami,
attribu'{^

Ye)ke>ta,

and Yasliima
e'onditions at

(uniU'l syste'Uis

was

ted to lack of labor aiul elynamite.

the end
Tiie
division.

f)f (lie

war.

Labor
dilVeicnt

the elispersal plants wercS

Chiba plant used

The airframe
shift

gle

9-hour

systems for each division worked on a sinbasis until October 1944 llien

said to

be'

be'tter since the emi)loye'e's we're'

under
llieir

less

mental

sli'iiin

work

(hie to !ilerls

and and attacks.


lost

less

working time from

Offii'iiils

of the

company found
of disporsal

it

ilifiicult

to

estimate
ihiction,

tlio ('(foct

due to

llic fact

that air

on company proattacks and alerts,

a complete production l)reak-down in the event the assembly building of the main plant was hit.

as well as dispersal, caused losses in the

same

Coupled with the air attacks against other period. compani(>s upon whom Hitachi was dependent for supplies, an assessment of relative loss due to
dispersal
of 15

The Omori works at Kawasaki was damaged by Twentieth Air Force urban area attacks, namely, the Tokyo attack of 23 May and the Yokohama strike of 28 May. The latter damaged
twice

was doubly hard to compute. percent was expressed as "only an

figure

ajiproxi-

mation."

The Oami tuimel system, chief dispersal site of was an extremely elaborate and well-planned unit. The entire excavated
the Chiha air-frame plant,

contained an area of 483,720 square feet. It was approximately 40-percent completed, and the tunnels and semiunderground shops well-l)uill promised to become one of the blotter dispersal
site

approximately 1,191,485 square feet of the plant. Like Haneda, the Omori plant had moved to nearby buildings, and production in the main j)lant was not greatly influenced. Hitachi's Kawasaki foundry was almost completely destroyed by the Twentieth Air Force double attack of 15 April, against the Tokyo south ui'ban area and the Kawasaki urban area. From February until the end of the war the Tokyo-Chiba area was under attack many times, interrupting pi'oduction because of the necessity
of

plants

in

the Empire.

the

woi-kers

leaving

their

jobs

for

air-raid

The Vasliima undergrouml factoi-y, one of the plaimed dispersal sites of the Tachikawa plant,
was
to contain 248,500 square feet,
it

shelters.

Similarly, attacks against the city of

which would

have made

tories in the aircraft industry.

one of the biggest und(>rground facAt the end of the

Chiba caused a loss of many man-hours at the Chiba plant. In addition, since most of the dispersed shops of the Hitachi Co. were in the cities
of

Tokyo

or Chiba, the attacks against the subof these cities often damag(>d Hitachi's

war the Yashima factory was ajiproximately 20percent completed.

urban areas

dispersal locations.

THE AIR ATTACKS


Air attacks against the Hitachi Aircraft Co. plants caused a jjioduction loss of a])proximately 70 percent. Since all live plants were located in
till'

PRODUCTION STATISTICS
Peak airframe production was reached in June 1944 when 95 aircraft (88 Willows and 7 Zeke trainers) were produced. This represented lOOi
percent of capacity for that

liiuhly

iiiilnstrialized

Tokyo-Chiba

region,

month

(Fig. 4

andi

attacks against the area were the greatest factor


in Hitachi's

appendix A).

production
to the
to

loss.
tiie

Damage

Maximum
most

engine production was in July 1944

Tachikawa plant was

serious blow

the production cajjacity of the

company (USSBS Aircraft Division, Report Vll-2) since Tachikawa was its principal engine producer. The attacks against this plant on 17 February and
operative.

when 575 engines were produced, of which the Ha-23 (Tempu series) engines represented abouti
55 percent of the total (Fig 5 and appendix A).

The Airframe Division The Haneda plant was the original site for the company's airframe production, and produced the K2Y2 Type 3 primary trainer fi-oni May 1939 to October 1940 (never more than 7 a month), the K5Y1 Type 93 trainer (Willow) from December
1940 to

24 April 1945 rendered the plant completely inPhysical damage to the plant was
ii|)pnixiruiil('ly

50 percent.

The
by
ing,
tiie

Cliiba i)lant

was only

superficially damageil

three attacks
to the plant

made

against

it.

Physical

damage

was

negligible, only

one buildAir-

November 1944

(peak production 88

in

a guardhouse, being

damaged (USSBS

craft Division,

Report No. VII-l).

The Haneda |)lant was damaged only once, in the Xavy strike against the Ilaneda airfield on 17 February, and damage was negligible. Attacks
against the area, however, were so intense that machines and assembly lines were removed to .small buildings within the plant eonipoiind. This form of dispersal was efreet<(l in order to |)revent

June 1944), and the KOWl Type 14 trainer from April to August 1943, ]3eak production being 15 in May. AYillow ])roduetion was sus])ended from December 1942 through April 1943. During 1944, however, emphasis began to be placed on produe-, tion at Chil)a, and Haneda ])roduction gradually became the fabiieation of sections which were shipped to the Chiba |)laiit for fiiud assembly. The Chiba plant was engaged from May 1944 to

^m

PLANNED, ACTUAL, a CAPACITY PRODUCTION


MAY 1939
/l/^^^^/iffJ iyy///OA/

AUGUST 1945

HITACHI AIRCRAFT

COMPANY
^r^^j9*3rv^.

CHIBA PLANT REPORT No.


(Airframes and Engines)

VlI-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pasje

The Plant and

Its Function in the Airckaft Indisthy

10

Attack Data Effects of Bombing Evaluation of Pre-attack Intelligence Vulnerability Appendix A. Map of Plant, with Bomb Plot Facing page Appendix B. Organization of Plant Appendix C. Flow Chart, Airframes Facing page Appendix D. Flow Chart, Engines Appendix E. Employment Statistics _. Appendix F. Orders vs. Receipts, Raw Materials Appendix G. Orders vs. Receipts, Components Appendix H. Suppliers of Raw Materials and Components Appendix 1. Planned, Cajjacity, and Actual Production Statistics. Appendix -T. Analysis of Air Attack Damage Appendix K-1 Dispersal Program, Engines
.

20 20 35 35 36 37 38 39 40
41

41

42

42 43 43 44 45 46

K-2. Dispersal Program, Airframes K-3. Dispersal Map No. I K-4. DispersalMapNo.il

THE PLANT AND


Introduaion
Cliiha, the newest

ITS

FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY


volved in reclaiming the land was not started until February 1941, and in October Hitachi received permission from the governor of Chiba prefecture to lay the foundations of the plant. Erection of plant buildings began in November 1941. In April 1942 the Naval Branch ordered Hitachi to plan for expansion over original buildings for the assembly of the Zeke fighter, and in October 1943 the company was ordered to construct the additional buildings for the assembly
of

and largest of the 4 plants of K), the Hitachi Aircraft Co. (Hitachi Kokuki produced both engines and airframes. It began production in April 1942. The plant contained 41 buildings, with a floor area of approximately 2,209,838 square feet (Appendix A). It was encased in the assembly of the A6M5K Zeke trainer, the Tempu 11, Tempii 21, and Tempu 31 engines, and planned to assemble the bomber

PlYl (Frances) and the fighter A6M5 (Zeke). The Chiba plant was located on reclaimed land about 2 miles south of the city of Chiba, on Tokyo
Bay.
3,

Frances.

The

physical

construction of the

plant

1941 and

Construction of the plant began in February was completed in April 1942 (Photos 1, 2, and 4). The period from April 1942 to July

1944 was devoted to organizing the plant, training employees, setting up machine shops, installing production lines, and to manufacturing small parts for the Oniori plant, another Hitachi plant located
in

was financed by the Hitachi Holding Co. All products of the Chiba plant were produced Production of the A6M0K Zeke for the Navy. trainer began in August 1944 (Photo 5), that of the A6M5 Zeke fighter was planned for August 1945, and that of the PlYl bomber (Frances) for Production of the Tempu 21 FebruaiT 1946. engine began in July 1944, of the Tempu 31 in

November

1944, of the

Tempu

11

in April 1945,

the

Tokyo suburbs.

The

first

aircraft

was

built in July 1944,


21*8,

and the first engines, Tempu were completed in August 1944. The ])lant was divided roughly in half, the northern part used for engine, and the southern part for airframe assembly, with a combined floor area of This figure excludes an 1,671,735 square feet. office, dining hall, repair shop, and a projected store room, machine shop, and sheet-metal shop which were the initial 1)uildings of a new addition being constructed for the assembly of Frances. The entire area south of buildings 16 and 23 was to be devoted to work on this aircraft, and new land was to be reclaimed at the southwest corner of the plant on which to construct additional buildings. It iiad lieen planned to begin asseml)ly of Frances in February 1946, but this did not allow for the effects of air attack and dispersal.

and of the Tsu 11 in May 1945. In the case of the Tsu 11, Chiba served as a modification center where the Italian Campini type jet unit was produced and fitted to Hatsukaze 1 engines sent in by the Navy, the resulting engine being redesignated Tsu 11 (Photos 6, 7, and 8).
1

Note. The Tsu 11 engine was intended for the Oka 22 (Baka) suicide plane, which differed from Oka 11 in that it was jet-propelled instead of rocket-propelled.
Plant organization and operation

The
also

ciiief of

the Chiba plant, Kajiio Ideta, was


director
of

an

executive

the

eor|joration.

Immediate responsibility at the ])lant fell upon Yusaku Fukada, head of the airframe factory, and
Hiroshi Moroi,
jjendix B).
cliicr

of

the engine factory (ap-

The Hitachi Cori)oration received instructions from the Naval Air Board in November 1938 to
and began the search for a In Novemb(>r 1940, it was decided to reclaim tiie land south of Chiba, and a contract was made between the Hitachi corporaActual work intion and the Chiba citv office.
expand their
facilities,

new

site at that time.

Both divisions of the ])lant were organizetl for mass production. The airframe division in particular was modeled after the Nakajinui plant at The front, center, and rear fuselage Koiztmii. assemblies were ])laeed on a wooden-rail system aliout 4 feet above the floor, and were staged along
the rail until they rolled off completely assembled

and ready

to

be transported by barge to the

10

t^^^i

Photo

CHIBA

PLANT. General view

of the buildings of the engine division photographed from the

administration building.

7ia.;:i7-47

:i

11

Photo

CHIBA

PLANT. General view

of the buildings of

tfie

administration building.

Note the dismantled buildings

that

airframe division photographed from were being removed to dispersal sites.

12

mm
jlS^

11.

Photo

CHIBA

PLANT. Newly

constructed engine test cells

at

the Chiba plant (four stands).

13

Photo

CHIBA

PLANT. Interior

view of the engine

test cells.

14

Photo

CHIBA PLANT. Side view of the Zeke trainer


trainer.

auxiliary fin necessary to reduce flutter in the tail section caused by the addition

manufactured by the Chiba plant showing the installation of an of after cockpit and the added

"greenhouse" on that type

15

Photo 6

CHIBA

PLANT. Photograph
the

Tsu

1 1

type, for installation in

of additional impeller ring added to Ha-11 engine for conversion to Oka 22 (Baka) suicide plane.

l6

photo

CHIBA

PLANT. Front view

of the Campini type turbine that was added to the to construct the Tsu 1 1.

Ha-11 engine

in order

17

Photo 8

CHIBA

PLANT. General

view of the assembled Tsu

1 1

engine.

18

PRODUCTION

ZEKE TRAINER

SCHEDULE (AGM 5-K)

S STRATEGIC

90WBIWG SUHVEY
CO.

HrTACHI

AIRCRAFT CHIBA PLANT

noURE

January 1945, when a rate of 126 units per month was attained.
Rebuilding and repair of airplanes and/or engines

ATTACK DATA Continued


Intelligence data

Continued
144 tons (577 M64 GP's).

HE-nunilx'r, weislit, and tyjx'-

X AN^
tail.

No
engines
M'su
tion.
1 1

rebuildiuo;

or

repairing

of

airphines

or
of

was done

at Cliiha.

The produetion

engines, however, was in reality a modificaHa-11 engines which had originally ))e<m

HE-fuzing 1/100 nose, IB-nuniber, weight and type.. None.


Oii-tlie-ground findings:

ND

manufactured elsewhere were modified into the Tsu engine.


1
1

HE-iiuniber

in

plant area. 55.


building None.

HE-number
hits.

of

Diversion of plant capacity and effort to experimental aircraft and engines

HE-number

of

UXB

None.

The Chiha
work or

j)lant

never engaged in experimental

EFFECTS OF
The
air attacks

BOMBING
3

research.

ATTACK DATA
Intelligence data:

Although the plant suffered A light damage was sustained.


8

attacks,

only

strike

carrier-based planes against vessels at


of

by Navy Chiba on

Date and hour

atUwk
.

10 .June 1045, 22-15.

Type of attack__. Time on target


Attacking unit
Altitude

Direct.
1

minute.
feet.

Twentietli Air Force.

16,500
27.

X umber of aircraft over target20

1945 spilled over onto the plant hut resulted almost no damage. In the Twentieth Air Force B-29 raid of lU June, 3,000 square feet of the office building of the airframe division (Photos 9 and 10), li.OOO s(iuiii-e feet of an airframe disin

May

TEMPU

II

a TSU

II

TEMPU
PLANNED

PLANNED
31

a
APRIL

ACTUAL

PRODUCTION
1945

SEPTEMBER

ACTUAL

PRODUCTION
HPU T^MPU
Tl
II II

NOV. I4-JUNE 1949

(S (GOVI

(a(VERNMENT I^LANNED PRODUCTION) (ACTUAL PROOMCTION) HNMENT PLANNED PROtUCTlONl

T^U

II

(ACTllAL PROOUCt'lON)

PUNNED

TO

PR PROI UCTION ^IBUTEO EX TREMELr P( OR

GOVERNMENT PI ANNING *y kOV Bt IP T a

PARTS f lOM SUlB-CONTRACT )RS


I

J^i
M iCHANIOAL

\/

/\

a3.sTH*Ttaic

HrrACHI

aomiwa uffvt> AIRCRAFT CO. OHIBA PLANT F19URE 4

u.fTW*Te4H:

OMiiw u>vm
CO.

HfTACHI

AIRCRAFT CHIBA PLANT


FIGURE

As none of the direct attacks on tlio main plant wore very effective', the practical value of the precautions cannot be accurately judged, but it seems im])robable that miK'h could have been accomj)iished in the event of an accurate and effective
attack
oji

Secondary

effects

were the disruption of

trans-

portation facilities and shipping schedules.


ing shipment to users (Photo 12).

This

resulted in accumulation of finished engines await-

the

main

Interruptions to supplies

plant.

Interruption to production due to alerts

Air attacks had a serious effect on receipts


materials and components.

o1

Altiiough physical
ings,

damage

negligible, interruptions,

to the plant was caused by air-raid warnto

Kisarazu were very low in 1945 because of interruptions

Engine receipts fron April, ^lay, and Juiu


in

supply from

were

serious

obstacle

jjroduction.

The Tokyo industrial area, which included C'hil)a, was a target foi' frequent attaclcs and the j)lant was warned whenever Allied air and naval forces
were
in the vicinity.

Nakajima. Propeller receipts from Sumitomo were also seriously reduced due to attacks on the Sumitomo plant at Kanzaki.
instruments of all types waf seriously curtailed in July, while special steel tubmg, bars, and light alloy metals of all ty])es; were in extremely critical shortage because of
of

The supply

As

a result, time loss due to


in ])i()(luc-

alerts in July 1945

exceeded time s])ent

tion (Fig. 7).

Interruptions to production due to area attacks


'i'he

attacks

against

Sumitomo's Amagasaki

plant,
the!
of'

principal effect of area attacks

was the

Mitsubishi's steel plant at Fukagawa, and


general attacks against the metal industries

Whenever planes W(>re i'ej)orted in tiie was warned, and workers left in large numbers and were slow in returning. If the homes of workers were destroyed
increase in absenteeism.

area the factory

or damaged, they took time off to find places to


live or to repair

sources of su])i)ly were'l unsuccessful since small factories were affected by area raids and demands of other manufacturers'!
to find

Kobe. Attempts

new

j:

damages.

were equally pressing.

Ii

22

INTERRUPTION IN PRODUCTION DUE TO AIR ATTACKS


120

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
ATTACK OF 8 MAY,
100

RECUPERATIOf^

ATTACK OF TJULY'

80

60

40
APRIL

MAY

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

120

100

80

60

40

MONTHLY DUE

MAN-HOUR
TO ALERTS

LOSS

700000

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

Photo 9

CHIBA

PLANT. Photograph

of

bomb

crater

from 500-pound bomb dropped

in the attack of 10

June 1945.

25

Photo 10

a direct hit

1945. Damage occurred from by a 500-pound bomb. This was the only serious damage to the plant by the attack and did not influence production since the building was used as a guard station.

CHIBA PLANT. Damaged building destroyed during the air attack of 10 June

26

Photo 11

CHIBA PLANT. Photograph of earthed-over


All personnel shelters at the plant

shelter used by the plant as the headquarters of the air-raid


to

defense force.
inadequate.

were of similar construction and appeared

be completely

719637-47

27

Photo

12 CHIBA PLANT.View Tempu

of interior of the main engine assembly shop showing the great

number of

21 engines that were awaiting shipment.

28

Photo

13 CHIBA PLANT.-

-Photograph of abandoned machinery resulting from the hurried dispersal program of the Chiba plant. Oami area of Chiba Peninsula.

29

Photo 14

CHIBA PLANT. Photograph of the entrances

to tunnels

Nos. 4 and

of the

Oami

tunnel system.

30

Photo 15

CHIBA

PLANT. Photograph

of machinery installations in tunnel No.

of the

Oami

tunnel system.

71i7 47

(i

31

Photo 16

CHIBA

PLANT. One

of

many semiiinderground shops located


to the

in the

Oami

area.

Close inspection reveals

the ventilator

on top of the earthed-over shop and the entrance

shop may be seen

to the left of the photo.

32

Photo 17

CHIBA

PLANT. Photograph

of a dispersal

site in

the heavily

wooded

area outside of the city of Chiba.

This particular site, the Miyazaka factory, was one of several dispersal divisions that were located in forests. Natural coverage from the trees and the technique of building the shops without destroying any of the forest
increased the effectiveness of the location.

33

Photo 18

CHIBA

PLANT. Photograph

of machinery installations in the forest plant

at

Miyazaka.

34

Dispersal of plant operations

Beginning
u])()ii

in Ajiril

194'),

both divisions of the

The
(lirics
l.'i,

('liil)a

plant cniharkcd

a very

<"x((!n-

])la)it

atti'ibutcd disjjcrsal activities as the


loss,

major

^i\^ dispersal

program in liic i'all of 1944 (Appiu)K-1, K-2, K-3, and K-4; photos 13, 14,
17,

16,

18).

The

initial

oi'dcr

to

dis])crs(',

activities of the airframe division

was received

in

October 1944 and at that time, as primary


persal sites, the
a.irfiani<> officials

dis-

but it was hoped that this loss could be completely overcome by Decem})er 1945. Table Xo. 1 below lists the percentag(! of jiroduction loss by months.
contributing factor in production

selected several
city

above-ground locations
mol)ilized
vac'ant,
foi'

in

the

of

(^hiba.

Table

Since largo numbers of school chihlri'n had been


factory work, school buildings weiv
for

and these locations were selected

initial dispersal sites.

Three school buildings were used: the Chil)a High school, the Cliiba Commercial School, and Tokyo Imperial University (engineering Secondly, two abandoned buildings branch). were converted to wing and fuselage assembly
Girls'

shops.

In addition, the
district.

company

built a

number
in the

of tinuiels

an<Usemi-underground buildings
of

Oami

Officiiils

the engine divisions also selected


dispersal
locations.

schools

foi-

i)riniary

Eight

school buildings were


1945,
all

made

available and by June

locations were in operation.

In addition,

four small plants were built in the forest east aiul

south of Cluba and a location, "Chichi])u," similar to Oami was selected for tunnels and semiunder-

ground shops. Although installations were not complete at any of the locations chosen by the company, officials did not iinticipate anj^ difficulties in o])tain-

ing an adecjuate supply of labor or that bottlenecks woidd develop in power supply or transportation. Afauv laborers were already at work in the new ])lants and morale was high since at Oami, Chichibu, Miyazaki, Aradate and Someya, the largest dispersal sites, workers were relatively safe
fi'om

bombing and working conditions were good.

KO OF
BUILDINS

CO

o
< I

> z <

O <u
1

< < T < 1 I

O
1

z"

o on o
_J

< N Z <

< z LU
< Q
LLl

1 a:

DIAGRAMMATIC

PRODUCTION

FLOW

CHART

APPENDIX
Employment, airframe
division,

!:

China

plant,

March 1943-July 1945


Productive

Men
WiS

Students

Total

Nonproductive

Total

New

hired

March
April

772
2,231

6
137 134

777

236 292 319 318


2,

641

777
2,

450
1,193

2,368
2,311

076

3(W

May
June
July
.

2,177
_

1.992

2,311

508 76
164

2,633
2.671

153
153

2,786
2.

2,468 2,509 2,666

2,786
2,824

8?4

315
321

August
Scptorabcr

2,804 2,977
3,431

182 192

2,986
3,

2,986
3,

175

169

2,286 2,629
2,721

883
1,002 944
1,044

169

483
61

October

200
251

3,631
3,

3,631
3,

Novonihcr

3,414

665

066

373
102

December
I

3,760
Hi
;

274

4,034

2,990

4.034

JatMmry February

3,

838
867
147

290

4,
4, 4,

134

3,

149

985
1,065
1,

4,

134

245 377
2, .596

3,
4,
,S.

486
533
1.49(1

353

3,288
3,

4, 3,53

Mareh
April
-M ly

680

455

225 689

4,680
7,274
7,

6y
.14

85

7,274

4, .585

2,

286
661
1.57

,1,

1,469
1,8.55

325
348 809
931
931
1,

7,335
7,
7, 7,

4.281
5, ,587

3, 0,54
2,

335

June
July

---

\ SMS
4. i|4(l 4,
.

(Ml

014
481

7, liOl

1.451

200
100

4,719
4, 4,

2.
2, 2, 2,

7. 2110
7.

16

August September
October.,.

732

1.437

772 676

328
438
195

KKI
114

4.748
4. .368

1,435 1.465
1,304 1.296

7,114
6,

7,
(h.

249
491

UKl

993

4,798
5, 5,

993

November
December
ys.i.i

4,!ll
.i.

1,574 1,613

7,868
8.

274

2, ,594

7,

868

442
.152

412

321

420

2,

901

8,321

January

..

5. 32,') 5.
!i,

1.3.56

1,779 1.879

8,460

5, ,571
.5,

2,889
2. 8,55
2, 2,

8. 46(1 8,
8, 8, 8, 8,

361

February.-.

337
110

1,651

8,767
8,

912
848
751

767 795 746 625

102

March
April

1.485 1,455 1.438

2,200
2,
2,

795

6,110
5.
.5.

6S5 898

30
61

4. 1131

360
397

8,746
8.

.May June July

4,791)

625

2,874

22 26

4.628 4.359

1.438
1,403

2, .544

8,610 8,306

5,740
a.

2,870
2,690

610

2,544

616

8,306

Employment, engine

division,

Chiba plant, March 1943-July 1945


Total

Men
Wis

Women

Students

Productive

Nonproductive

Total

March
.\l>ril

...

661
9.59

668 989 966


1,089
1,088

276 285 288 292 292 292 988


105 132

393
704

668

111

30
31

989 966
1.

222
128
7

May
June
July
Aueu.^t

935
1.051

678
797

38 39 58

089

1.049

796 978
489

1.088
1.

185

1.212
1.384

1,270
1,477 1,478

270

216
18

September October
.

93
103
121

1.477 1.478 1.542


1.691

1.375
1,421

373 410 446

117 156

November. December
January February..

1,642
1,691

1,566

126

1,245

206

laa
1,758
141

1,899

1.322
1,824

577 734
711
1,

1.899
2. .5.58

6:iO

2,312

246 278 746


58

2,568 2,696 4,009


4,071

158

March
April

2,418 3,205 3,122


.

1,985

2.696
4. IK)9

1,341
163

2,403

606

May
Jime
July...
..

732
950
4.52

217
233
541
62:1

2,472 2,622 2,688


2,
2,

1,,599

4.071
4. 3. 4. 4.

204 444
12 4

2,%9
2,721
2,

4,152
3,

1,,W0 1,026
1,924 1,470

152

714

714

AUKUSt September.
October

993

684 684 686


610

4,300
4,313
4,

376 843 804 857

300 313

3,006 3.179 3,082

623 775
1,061

302
10
101

640
643

2, 2,

1,836 1,786 1,886

4. 64(1 4,

NovemberDecember..

4.

643

3,129

677

1,077

4.883

2,(198

4,883

244

ima
January February.
.

3,

336

,581

1, 1,

186 186

5.

102

3,

397

1.705
1.9I>2
2.

6.
,5,

102

440 84
21

3,628
3, 5:S6

700

5.514
5. .565
.5.

3, 5,52 3, 3, 3,

514

March
.\ [)ril
.
. .

562 447
468

1,467
1,

376 332
519

189

,5,

515 207 482

3,

186

574

207

1.875
1.9ft3

5,
5,

293

May
June
July
-.

3,416 3,177 2,930


--

1,,598
1,

.5.

482

35
43
7

442
531

(197

6.316
.5.158

3,290
3,

2,026
1,829

6,

316

1,697

329

,5,158

40

APPENDIX

F
(.tons),

Comparative aiiiounls of raw materials ordered and received

engine division, Chiha plant

APPENDIX H
Raw
Nippon
Seitetsu

material

and component part manufacturer s^ Chiba Plant


Special steel plate and bar.

KK Yahoto-Kojo.
-..

Kawasaki Jukogyo KK Daido Seiko KK Toshiba Kokan KK Sumitomo Kinzoku-Kogyo KK Sumitomo Denki-Kogyo KK

Edomitsu-moti, Yahata \Vakihama-machi, Fukiai-Ku, Kobe Hoshizaki-Cho Minomiku, Xagoya


Minato-cho, Kawasaki (Kanagawa-Ken)

Special steel plate.


>._

Special steel plate bar Special steel pipe.

and wire.

Amagasaki, (Hyogo-Ken)
Shinaya-cho, Kanohana-Ku, Osaka

Do.
Light
alloyed
materiiils,

propeller,

governor,

and

generator.

Nippon Kokan

KK KK KK Fukagawa-Kojo.. Nippon Tanko KK KK Kobe Seikosha Akano-Kojo... KK Kobe Seikosho Chofu-Kojo__ KK Kobe Seikosho Nagoya-Kojo Furukawa Denki-Kogyo KK Tokyo Seiko, KK Hitachi Kokuki KK Kawasaki-Kojo....
Mitsubishi Seiki Mitsubishi Seiko
.

Kawasaki, (Kanagawa-Ken) Oshima-cho, Joto-Ku, Tokyo

Special steel pipe. Special steel bar. Special steel forged parts.
_

Fukagawa-Ku. Tokyo ._ Naka-gun, Kanagawa-Ken Akano-machi. (Okayama-Ken)

Do. Do.
Light alloyed bar, pipr, extruded, and forged parts. Light alloyed bar and pipe. Light alloyed bar, pipe, extruded, and forged iarts.
Cable.

Chofu-machi. Shimonoseki (Yamaguchi-Ken) Koonji-cho, Kita-Ku, Nagoya. -.. Nikko. Koitsu-gun, Tochigi-Ken Kawasaki (Kanagawa-Ken) Fujimi-cho Kawasaki (Kanagawa-Ken)
Kisaya7i, (Chiba-Ken).__
__

Daini Kaigim Kokyusho Kyushu Hikoki IJainippon Kika; Kogyo KK_ K K Tokyo Keiki Seisakusho Yokokawa Denki Seisakusho

-..

Light alloy castings. Aero engine (supplier).

KK

KK

Tanaka Koku-Keiki KK Tokyo Kiki-Kogyo KK

Naka-machi, Chikugushi-gun, Fukuoka Aoto-machi. Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo Higashikonagawa, Kamata-Ku, Tokyo. Musashino Kitataina-gun, Tokyo Omori. Oniori-Ku Tokyo Nakashima, Kawasaki (Kanagawa-Ken)

Wheel. Oleo-pneumatic shock abstjrber. Vacuum pump and inertia starter. Magneto and electric tacliometers. Tach indicator and press gage.
Carburetor.

APPENDIX
Planned capacity, and actual production
statistics,

April 1944-August 1945, Chiba plant, Hitachi Aircraft Co.

.-

APPENDIX
J

Analysis of air attack damage

AIRFRAME DIVISION
Area
\V('U]K)I1

Machine
tools

Buildings

(square feet)

8
111

May 45
.luiic 4:)

Cal. 50
ri()ii-iiiiiinil

--

None
:i.

HE

oiju

Office building.
rias plaiU damaged

School) Dispersed pluiil in Chiba damaged (Prcfectural Oirls' High

3,(K)0
.

1,(XXI

Dispersed

pliinl, in

Dispersed plant in

Chihn area damaged (Prefeetural Clirls' High School). Chitia area damaged (Tokyo Imperial University) ....

2,100 5,000

1.1

50

ENGINE DIVISION
10 .Time 45

50n-pound

HE.

July 45

IB

Dispersed plant damaged (Chiba Oirls' Normal School)... Dispersed plant damaged (Municipal Oirls' High School) Dispersed plant damaged (Prefeetural Technical School)

5,800

850

4,000

APPENDIX

K-1

Dispersal program, engine division, Chiba plant

Area

No.

Dispersal location

Type

of building

(square
feet)

Products

Number Number of
machine
tools

Degree

of

of

em-

Began production

ployees

progress (percent)

Map
No.

iMay

1945

A
B

Kemigawa primprj' school.


Nohuto, primary school.
Saraukawa,
school.

Converted school.
....do ....do
....do.

4.

455

Small parts

of light alleys.

23

79
89

100

((April 1945)..-.

jMay
3, 4fi5

1945

Rocker arms
Testing

27

100

{(April 1945)....

(May

1945.

primary

6.

930
655

39

115
l(

100

April 1945)
1945
100

jMay
primary
3,

D
E F

Anegasaki,
school.

Small parts of light metal. Small parts of


steel

18

55

1( April 1945)....

,May
...do
....do.;
13, 3'20

1945:
1945)...

Mohara, middle school.


Chiba, technical school.
Chiba, mimicipal, high school.
girls'

101

407

100

((March

jjuly 1945
4.

995
620

Gears
Finishing

30

119

100

'.(June 1945)

do do
do...

10,

jMarch 1945 300 (March 1945)...

100

,May
. .

1945

H
I

Normal

school (boys)

8,910

Masterrodsandcams
Link rods
Finishing

52

240

100

((April 1945)....

JAprill945

Normal school
Miyazaki

(girls).

5,

175

38

151

100

((March

1945)...

March
J

1945
1945)...

do do
-.

3,600
21,330

20

120

100

((March (August

1945....

K
L
*I

Owada
Someya
Aradate.
Mia?.aki_

Assembly and
ning.

test

run-

15

600
450

80

((June 1945)

[June 1945..
158

Forest plant

35, 100

Cylinder head and small


parts of steel.

100

((June 1946) |Junel946


((April 1945)....

do

17,820

Castmg
Cylinder barrels and heat
treatment.
Jigs

63

102

100

[August 1945....

do
.do.
ITndergi'ound (tunnel)

42,300
26, 730
10,

116

376

70

{(April 1945)....

[August 1945....
145

Nitona.,

and

tools..

450

30

Chichibu A.

665

General machine work

((April 1946)...-

596
15 15

2,500

(October 1945).

ChiehibuB. Chichibu C.

(Buried)

53,

370

Hut

27,900

Finishing and assembly.. Heat treatment boring,


casting and test running.

600
400

do
.do.

Note. Month

in parentheses

when completion was planned.

43

APPENDIX K-2
Dispersal -program, airframe division, Chiba Plant

No.

Dispersal location

Building type

Area
(sq. ft.)

production

Semiunderground.
Oanii,

133, 100

113,800

May

1945

Underground
N'islii-Cliiba
I

120,200 116,820

Constructed building.
73,

310

Dairokuten
rhiha,
girls'

-do
high school.
.d(i_

5,230

20,950
7,370

Chiba, commercial school.

[The Department
gineering
I

of

EnTokyo,
of

..-do.

17,460

Imperial University.

CHIBA

PLANT
I

DISPERSAL MAP NO.

CHIBA BUDDHIST TEMPLE

US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY


HITACHI AIRCRAFT

CO

CHIBA PLANT APPENDIX K-3

45

CHIBA

PLANT

DISPERSAL MAP NO.


TO NARITA

C HO SH

U S STRATEGIC BOMBING

SURVEY

HITACHI AIRCRAFT CO.

CHIBA PLANT

APPENDIX K-4

46

TACHIKAWA PLANT REPORT


(Engines)

No. VII-2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

The Plant and its Function Attack Data Effects of Bombing


Intelligence Check Vulnerability

in

thk Aircraft Industry


,

48
51

55
56 56

Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix

A.
C.

Map

of Plant,

With

Bomb

Plot

Facing

p.

58 59

B. Flow Chart

Employment
.

Statistics

Materials and Suppliers E. Orders and Receipts of Materials and Parts F. Planned, Capacity, and Actual Production

60 60
61

62

47

THE PLANT AND


Introduction

ITS

FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

The Tacliikaun
of

plniit

(T;icliika\va Scisakuslio)

tho

Hitachi

Aiivral't

Corporation
at

(Hitachi
TACHIKAWA PRODUCTS PERIOD OF PRODUCTION

Yamato, about 19 miles west of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, and a few miles north of the city of Tachikawa. The plant area embraced approximately 10,460,000 square feet, and the 67 buildings contained a total

Kokuki

K) was located

ENGINE DESIGNATION

of approximately
area.

1,111,900 square feet of

flooi'

Built in 1938, the original plant area was

expanded to a[)i)roximately 4 times its original size, the floor area increasing from the original 429,000 square feet through successive additions of shops and offices (Appendix A). When the Hitachi Aiicraft Corporation was formed in 1939, the Tachikawa plant was one of those taken ovei- from the Hitachi Manufacturing Co. (Hitachi Seis^d^usllo). The Tachikawa plant had been engaged in making small radial engiut's for Army aiicraft, and in the new company it
contimied in the same ca|Dacity. In 1942. Tachikawa. undertook production of larger engines of the l.OOO-liorsepowcr class, ami in 1945 produced a few of the 2,.500-horsepower class (photos 1

and

2).

The Tachikawa

plant was the biggest engine

manufacturing plant of the company, producing approximately 2.50 engines each month in 1944, representing about -^O percent of the Hitachi
output.

The plant was confined


Japanese

to production for the

Army and
at
all

there were

members
the

of the

Army

present

times in

capacity of

material

No other and acceptance inspectors. the officials were connected with plant in any way, and the plant was never subsidized or supported, in any of its activities, by govcrmnent fiiumcial aid. Although concerned only with the production
govei-nment
of radial aircraft engines,

the

Tachikawa plant

since

1939 had assembled some seven different types, ranging from 300 horsepower to 2,500 horse-

power. At the enxl of the war it was producing three engines in quantity (Ha-13K0, 450 horse-

power; Ha-31-15, 880 horsepowei-; and Ha-33-62, 1,250 horsepower) and conducting hurried experiments on the new Armv engine designated Ha-5
(Fig. 1).

Photo No.

1.

Ha-112

(Ha-33 model 62) engine, side view, building 1, Tachikawa plant

in

assembly shop,

Photo No.

2.

Ha-51

engine, rear view, showing engine without blower section.

50

2,S00,OOQ

2,000,000

1,500,000

oO I<o oQ O
or a.

Z>

<

to
0^

o < <Q LU >< O

Q. I-

Q.

<

O
Z

o o o ? = " o
=>

o o
( I

>

o
I

52

PLANNED.ACTUAL, & CAPACITY PRODUCTION APRIL 1943-MARCH 1945


^ J~l HAHi3 E^NGII^E (I^A2S M0b.l3-35pHfi

^^^
FIGURE 5

40

FIGURE 6

MAMJJASONOJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONO 1945
'

1943

1944

MAMJ JAS ONDJFMAMJ JASONOJ FMAMJ J ASONO 1945


1943 1944

FIGURE 7

FIGURE 8

ENGINE (HA33M0D.62)-IE50HP

MAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND
1943

MAMJ JASONDJFMAMJ JA SONDJFMAMJ


1943

ASONO

1944

1945

1944

1945

320

a
< o < X

at

< _J
Q_

I X o < o o cr
CL _i

or

<

or LU CL


EFFECTS OF
The
air attacks

BOMBING

(lie

(laniago sustained
to

in

lie

17

l"'(l)i

iiaiv

attack

was estimated

be

about

MOO, ()()().

The 24
it

April attack (lien wrecked the f)lanl coniplelely.

Located in an area that abounded with small aircraft plants, Army arsenals, and small manufacturing plants, the Tachikawa. plant was attacked
only
twice.

No
was

repairs were
tiiougiil
l)e

undertaken thereafter since


lime
i-e(|uiri'(l

tlie

lor

rejjair

cdidd

better

ein|)j()yed in construction of the


sites.

vaiious

The

plant

was

severely
carrier

undergi'ound (bspersai

damaged by the United States Navy


Nakajima's

list

of tiic nund)er of niai:-iiours lost because

plane strikes of 17 Fc^bruary 1945 directed against

of air-i'aid

damage
1.

is

siiown
lost

in '{'able 1.

Tachikawa Aircraft main plants; the 24 April attack by the Twentieth Air Force produced very heavy damage to the main plant (photo 3). The plant was approximately 50-percent deMusashi
and
stfoyed
as

Table

Alan-hours

dut

result

of

the

air

attacks.

The

assembly shop, heat-treatment shop, and the jig and tool-making shoi)s were rendered inopei'ative, thus com]detely curtailing any further production unless exhaustive repairs were made.

The number

of man-hoiu's required

to

re])air

Countermeasures

As

a coiinti'rnu'asiiii' in

(()inl)atiiig: llio

iiu-nacc

ol'

coiitiiuK'cl b()nil)iiigs,

the plant had organized two

district air-raid dofcnsc details.

Ono, the "Special

Air Defense Corps" was composed of workers from


sections

coniplelcd, weie in operation (Fig. II). few i)uildings at the Tachikawa plant wei'c to be retained and the other sites selected were in the geneial vicinity of the plant. t)fiicials estimated iccovery from dispersal would be accomfull
.\

percent

every de{)artment of the plant divided into four known as (1) the (luard Section (2) the Fire Brigade (>) the Repair Section and (4) the (ias anil Relief Section, each jierforming functions
\>y llieir lilies.

plished in

December 1S45 (Photos

4 and 5).

The

dispersals were located in the


(Fig. 12).

Tokyo area

and adjoining prefectures

as inilicaled

In addition, a "I'nil

INTELLIGENCE CHECK
Data was not
of
I

Air Defense Corjjs" was organized in each oflice and shop whose function was similar to the Special Air Defense Corps, hut whose responsibility was
limited to the immediate area of their respective

iixailable

be

lighter

engines

on intelligence estimalcs produced by Tachikawa,

War Department Military Intelligence Service ((i-2) did not estimate montlily producsince

shops.

In addition to these defense ])arties, the |)lant provided air-raid shelters in the ])lant compi)und
for personnel of the plant.

After the

initial

air

attack, the safety of these shelters, which were

poorly
icjected

made

of

wood

Estimates based on production of the Un :'>\-\r) engines when checked against actual ])roductiou were found to be high in most cases. Although little was known about Tachikawa's
tion rat(>s of trainer engines.

incom])lete

iid'ormation

of

covei'cd

with earth, was

|)io(luclion

of the

by most workers who

Ha-42

or
to

Ha-33-62 engines,
the (>nd of the war

pi'eferred the fields

investigation subsequent

and

forests adjacent to the plant.

Interruptions due to alerts

Incomplete recoi'ds at the ])lant did not reveal nund)er of man-houi's lost because of alerts, but the plant manager estimated that from February until June, appro.ximately 20 percent of the employees' time was lost because of this reason. Absenteeism because of alerts ran extremely high, about SO jjci'cent from .Fuly until August 1945.
llie
1

has shown the former had been produced in July, August, September, October, and November 194:i, and the latter was in production at the rate of 10 i)er month when the war ended.

VULNERABILITY
The |)lan( was proved vulnerable not oidy to duccl attack, which put it out of action, but also to shortages in supplies due to attacks on supi)liers,
of

Dispersal

Receiving oi'dei's in the fall of H!44 from the Hitachi main olHce to disperse the activities of the
various shops and assembly lines, the Tachikawa
idaiit

and to air-i-aid man-hours.

alerts causing

absenteeism ami

loss

The

location of the plant hi an area with


factories

many

early as

began to move some sections of the plant as December 1944. At the end of the con-

Hict all sites for dispersal except the Yashinia undergroimd. factory, which was approximately 2U

and industrial facilities was a further invitation to attack, and the early start and high degree of completion of the dispersal l)rogram i-eflccts the management's realization of
aircraft
this.

56

DISPERSAL LOCATIONS

719637

47 (Face

p.

56)

Photo No.

4.

Machine

tool installations in tunnel

No.

4 at

Yokota

(dispersal location

of Tachikawa plant).

Photo No. 5. Entrance

to

Yokota tunnels

(dispersal location ol

lachikawa

plant).

57

GENERAL PLAN AND BOMB DAMAGE

MACHWE AND ASSEMBLE SHOP


JIG

a TOOL MAKING SHOP

EXPERIMENTAL SHOP
HEAT TREATMENT SHOP MACHINE SHOP
DINING

O
o

BOMB HITS, RAID OF 17 FEBRUARY 1945 BOMB HITS.RAID OF 24 APRIL 1945

HALL

PRESSING.WPING a

WwTINS SHOP

BOILER

P.'^OM

ENGINE TESrmo

BLOCKS

U. S.

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

HITACHI AIRCRAFT
20,615

COMPANY
APPENDIX A

TACHIKAWA PLANT
719637

DISPERSED MACHINE SHOPS

47 (Fac

p.

58)

APPENDIX C
Employment
stalistics,

Tachikatca

f)lant,

April 1943-Aiigii>:t

1945, Hitachi Aircraft Co.

Year

ci

rt

S s

00

^
1

;c

iM

g i S g I: 5 c ri
at:

-f

-r
tC

-r
'-i

o cc
I-

Si ic

31

w ^ ^ O

CI

M 3 ^

cy

'

g 8 8 S n 00-5x1-

gO
Oi

00 -<

O lO 'T 31 O N O O
r-.

ss

o o O o ^ o O Q 00 OC m o o
-t"

r<N II-

o O lo :C <c o ^ ^ C^ O

<M

CC

o " 30 o a: - -^ cs o o
I'-.o

M
-H

O O O O O C O ^ O C ^ 31

1-*

"O

O O

35

-r

-f

"*

TP OS CC

Q O f3 C X 00 O -f

c CO M ec CO ^ M ^ O CO o CO (N O (C
'-C

^^ cs

o o o o o O X CO X W ^ X

to rt~

^ O M
<Xi

8 8 X 8 s o O' 8 >n CO O t' (N


-T-

OJ

>ra

CO

CO

C O lO O O Q CO -C f O CO CO CS X O 35
O' -f
co'

I-'

c"

(M*

co"

ro"

cf

c: o o o oi O CO O CO ^ O C ? X O

o o X O

35
CO

CO
--

:d CO

O -^ X in O O o tM CO -H IC
"<*

31
^^
IN

o Sx O
c;

O O

to CO CO

CD

o lO o -^ o O o lO o C "O o I- lO M tP l~ rf ^ M CO (N
s

lO iM O O -H 31 ^ CI w O ^ o o
"3"
(>)

u^

ffi

CO *T

Q O O lO 31

-X) T*Tj-

-O t-

^
lO
-H

lO o O -O o ^ I- r- rV O I- " c c^ I- -r

O O ^ O O

-J*

CO
I*

CO
II-

I-

CO

C CO . 1^ >o o O 1C tC o ^' ^ ^

c
2

S!

."^

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY


LIST OF
The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be purchased from the Su])erintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C.

REPORTS
21

Vcreinigte Deutsche .Melallwcrke,

llildcslii-ini,

Ger-

many
22 23
Metallgussgesellschaft

24
2.5

m b H, Germany Gebrneder Ciiulini G m b II,


Ahuniniumwerk
(i

\n

b 11, Leipzig, Germany Plant No. 2, Bitlcrfcid,

European War

Luftsehiffbau, Zeppelin

Ludwigshafen, Germany b H, Fricdrichshafen

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN


*1

26 27 28 29

on Bodonsee, Germany Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany Rudolph Hautcnbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solingen,

Germany
Deutsche
Metallwerke,

*2
*3

The United States Strategic Bonil)ing Survey: Summary Report (European Wan The Ihiited States Strategic Bonil>ing Survey: Overall

Lippewerke Vereinigte .-Muminiumwcrke A G, Lunen,

Germany
Vereinigte

Heddernheim,

Report (European War)


Effects of Strategic

Germany
30

The

Bombing on

the

Germany

War Economy

Duerener iSIetallwerke & Waren, Germany

G, Duren Wittenau-Berlin

AIRCRAFT DIVISION
(By Division and Branch)
*4
5
Aircraft Division Industry Report Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report)

AREA STUDIES DIVISION


*31

32 33
34

Airframes Branch
35
G

.lunkers Aircraft

and Aero Engine Works, Dessau,


36

Germany
7 8
9

Erla Maschinenwerke

A T G

Maschinenbau,

G m H, Heiterblick, Germany G m b H, Leipzig (Moekauj,


li

Area Studies Division Rejiort Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Hamburg A Detailed Study of the EflFects of Area Bombing on ^\'up]5ertal .\ Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Dusseldorf A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Solingen .\ Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on

37
38

Germany
10
11

12 13 14

Gothaer Waggonfaljrik, A G, Gotlia, Germany Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant. Bremen. Germany (Over-all Report Messerschmitt A G, Part A Augsburg, Germany Part B [Appendices I, II, III Dornier Works, Friedriclishafen & Mmiich. Germany Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, German \Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu|

39

Remscheid Detailed Study of the Effects of ,\rea Bombing on Darmstadt A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Lubeck A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Berlin, .\ugsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dortmund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen

CIVILIAN
*40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

DEFENSE DIVISION

stadt, Austria

Aero Engines Branch


15
16
17

Civilian Defense Division Cologne Field Report Bonn Field Report Hanover Field Report

Final Report
I,

Bussing N.\G Flugmotorenwerke


wick.

G m

Hamburg

b H, Bruns-

Bad Oldesloe

Germany

Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke

G m

Field Rejiort ^'ol Field Report .-Vugsburg Field Report


in

Text Vol
;

II,

Exhibits

b H, Taucha,

Reception Areas

Bavaria,

Germany

Germany
Bavarian Niotor Works Inc, Eisenach

&

Durrerhof,

Germanv
18 19

EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical

Bayerische

Motorenwerke A

G (BMW)

Munich,
*48 49

Germany
Henschel Flugmotorenwei'ke, Kassel, Germany
Light Metal Branch

Branch

CJerman Electrical Equipment Industry Report

Brown Boveri

et Cie,

Mannheim

Kafertal,

Germany

Optical and Precision Instrument Branch

20

Light Metals Industry (Part \Part of Germany

I.

;\himinum

II,

Magnesium

*50

Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report

63


Abrasives Branch
*51

Submarine branch
92 93

52

The ficrinaii Abrasive Industrv Maver and .Schmidt, Offenbacli on Main, Gernianv
Anti-Friction Branch

German Submarine Industry Report


Maschinenfabrik
l)urg,

Augslnirg-X'^urnberg

G,

Augs-

Germany

*53

The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry


Machine Tools Branch

94 95 96
97 98 99 100

Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Deutschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenl)au, Bremen, Ger-

many
Friedrich

Krupp Germaniawerft,

Kiel,

Germany

*54 *55 56 57 58

Machine Tools it Macliinery as ('ai)ital Eiiuiijment Machine Tool Industry in Germany Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Ciermany Naxos Union, Krankfort on Main, Germany

Howaldtswerke A. G, Hamburg, Germany Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany

Ordnance Branch
*101 102

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION


59 60
61

The Defeat of the German Air Force V- Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign


Air Force Rate of Operation Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Operations in the European Theatre

Ordnance Industry Re]X)rt Friedrich Krupj) Grusonwerke A.

G Magdeburg,
A
G,

Germany
103 104 105 106
107 108

Bt)chumer
Henschel

Verein

fuer

Gusstahlfabrikation

62
63
64
()4a

Bochum, Germany

Bombing Accm-acv, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO Descrii)tion of R.\F Bombing The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics

& Sohn, Kassel, Germany Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany Hermann Goering Werkc, Braunschweig, Hallendorf,
Germany
Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany

MORALE DIVISION
*64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale
"(Vol. I

OIL DIVISION
*109

&

II)

Medical Branch
*().')

*110
*111

Oil Division, Final Report Oil Division, Final Report,

The
in

Effect of

Bombing on Health and Medical Care


112
113
114
15,

Germany

Appendix Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and .let Projjellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report #1) Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger-

MUNITIONS DIVISION
*66 67 68 69 70
71

many
The German
78
Ministerial Report on Chemicals
Oil
Oil Industrv, Ministerial

Report

Team

Heavy Industry Branch The Coking Ind\istry Report on Germany


Coking Plant Report No.
1,

Sections A.

C &

IJ

Gutehotfnungshuette, Otterhausen, (iermany Fricdrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany Xcuiikirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-

Branch

115

Aminoniakwerke Merseburg

many
Reichswerke Hermann
Goering

many
116 117

2 Appendices
A

G m

b H, Leuna, Ger-

G,

Hallendorf

Germany
72 73 74 75 76
.\ugust

Friedrich Ivrupp

Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger-

many
Dortnuind Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund,

lis
119

A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany G, Leutzkendorf, Germany Ludwigshafen-Opiiau Works of I G Farbenindustrie A G, I.udwigshafen, Germany Ruhruel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, GerBraunkohle Benzin
Wintershall

Germany Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Ciermany Bochumer Verein fuer Ciusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany
Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch

many, Vol. I, Vol. II Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A


Refinery,

G,

Harburg

Hamburg, Germany

120
121

Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook


Refinery,

Hamburg, Germany

*77

*7S 79 80
81

German Motor Tank Industry

\'ehicles Industry Rejiort Rei)ort

122
123 124 125

Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelnisburg Refinery, Haml)urg, Germany Gewerkscliaft Victor, Castro|)-Rauxel, Germanv, Vol,
I

&

Vol. II

G. Unterturkheim, Germany Daimler Benz Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris
.\

Kuropaeische Tanklager imd TransjKjrt

G,

HamHamVol.
I

Aflani Oi)cl. Russelheini,

Germany

82 83
84 85 86

Daimler Benz-(iaggenau \\'orks, Gagenau, Germany Aug.sburg-Xurnljerg, Xurnbcrg, Maschinenfabrik

Germany Ebano .\sphall Werke A


liurg,

G, Harburg Refinery,
Oil Plant

burg, (iermany

Germany
Auto I'nion A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, (iermany Henschel & Sohn, Ka.ssel, (Jermany Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, (iermany Voigtlander, Mascliinenfabrik A G, Plauen Ciermanv
,

Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Svnthctic

&

Vol. II

Rubber Branch
126 127 128 129

87 88 89 90
91

V'olkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Bussing XA(i, Brunswick, Germany Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger-

Deutsche

Dunlop

Gummi

Co.,

Hanau on Main,

Germany
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germanv Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant Ministerial Rei)ort on German Rubber Industry

many
Friedrich

Knipp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg,

(jerman_\-

64

Propellanls Branch
130
131
l';iokti()clioniischewcrko, Munich, Germany Srh<K'iiol)eck Explosivp PlanI, Lifjiioso Sprongsloff

184 1S5
ISCi

Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany


Synl,heli(t Oil

Plant,
\ icior.

Meerbeek-Hamburg, Germany

(lewcrkscliaft

Wciko G
132
Triiisdorf,

ni

I)

FI,

l$u(i Siilzcnioii,

Gcrniaiiv

Plants of Dynaniil

(!,

Vornial,

Clausfliiil,

Alfml NohVl & Co., Drunmifl and Dunc^herg,


1)

87 188 189 190


I

Caslrop-Rauxel, Germany Klockner Humboldt Deutz, I'lm, (!(rrmany Ruhroel Ilydrogenat ion Plant, Bot tro[)-Boy, Germany

Germany
133

191
(! ni

Deutsche Sprongchcniic

H, Kraiburg,

Germany

192 193
194

OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION


134
Over-all Kcononiic Effects Division Report Gross National Product. Special
i)apers

N'eukirclien I'lisenwerke A (!, Neiikirchen, Germany Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, (iermany Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg. Germany Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany Fire Raids on German Cities I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol I

&
195 196 197 198 199

Vol II

Kriegseilberielite which together Herniaini Giiering Works. comprise the Food and Agriculture. above report 134a Industrial Sales Outjiut and Profluctivity

in Marshalling ^'ard, LHm, Germany I G Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany C'hemische- Werke, Heuls, (iermany Gremberg Marshalling Y'ard, Gremberg, CU'nnany Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany

Roundhouse

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
*200
134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETC) 135 Villacouhlay Airdrome, Paris, France I3fi Railroad Reijair Yards Malines, Belgium 137 RailroafI Rei>air Yards, Louvain, Belgium 138 Railroad Re])air Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 139 Railroad Rei)air Yards, Namur, Belgium 140 SuJ)marine Pens, Brest, France Po\vder Plant, Angouleme, France 141 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 145 Gnome et Rhone, TJmoges, France 14fi Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, France Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
201 202
Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Regensburg, Nurnberg, and Munich Divisions German Locomotive Industry During the War German Military Railroad Traffic

The

203 204

UTILITIES DIVISION
205 206 207 208
Electric L'tilities Industry Rejjort to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 21 liheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G
1

German

Pacific

War
War)

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN


*1

V Weapons

in

London
in

Summary Report
The
Effects of

(Pacific

City Area of Krefeld Public Air Raid Shelters


sack,

Germany
Switching Station, Brau-

*2 *3

Japan's Struggle to

End

the

War

Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and

Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap-

Nagasaki

Germany

Brauweilcr Transformer
weiler,

&

CIVILIAN STUDIES
Civilian

Germany

Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach,

Germany
4 5 *6 7

Defense Division

Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany Henschell & Sohn G m b H, Kassel, Germany Area Survey at Pirmaseiis, Germany Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany

MAN

Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Erla Maschinenwerke,

GmbH,
m

Germany
Heiterblick, Ger-

many A T G Maschinenbau G

8
9

b H, Mockau, Germany Erla Maschinenwerke Mockati, Germany Bayerischc Motorenwerke, Dnrrerhof, Germany Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,

GmbH,

*10
*11

Germany
Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamljurg, Germany
Multi-Storied Structures, Hamliurg, Germany Continental Gunirniwerke, -Hanover, Germany Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany Animoniawerke, Merseburg, Leuna, GernianxBrown Hoveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Adam Opel A G, Russelsheini, Germany Daimler-Benz A G, ITnterturkheiin, CJermany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo. Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and .\llied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan No. 1 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan

Medical Division
*12
*13

The

Effects of

Bombing

o:i

Health and Medical Serv-

ices in Jajian

The

Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

and Medical

Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany

Morale Division
*14

Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany

The

Effects of Strategic

Bombing on Japanese Morale

65

ECONOMIC STUDIES
Aircraft Division

*33

*lo *16

The Japanose Aircraft Industry Mitsubi.-lii Heavy Industries. Ltd.


Corporation Report So. I
(Mitsiibislii

*34

Jukogyo
it

KK)

Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report A^o. AT/// (Nissan Jidosha KK) (Engines) .\rmy Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report Xo. XIX (Airframes & Engines)

*35

Japan Aircraft Underground


Report Xo.

(Airframes

Engines')

XX

*17

Makajinia Aircraft Company, Ltd.


Corpornlion Report \o. II

(Xakajima Hikok
(Airframes
it

KK)
*36

Basic Materials Division

Engines)

*18

Kawanishi Aircraft Company


Corporation Report Xo. Ill

Coal and Metals in .Tapau's

War Economy

(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha)


*19
(Airframes) Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. Corporation Report Xo. /T (Kawasaki Kokuki Kog^vo Kabusliiki Kaisha) (Airframes & I^ngines) Aichi Aircraft Company Corporation Report Xo. V
(.\ichi

Capital Goods,

Equipment and Construction Division

*37 *38 *39

The Japanese Construction Industry Japanese Electrical Equipment The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric

*20

Power

Division

Kokuki KK)

*40
*41

*21

Sumitomo Metal

(.Virframcs it Ijigines) Industries, Propeller Division

The The

Corporation Report Xo.


Seizosho)
(Propellers)

VI (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera


*42

Electric Electric ports)

Power Industry of Japan Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re-

Manpower, Food and

Civilian

Supplies Division
uf Living

*22

*23

Hitachi .\ircraft Com])any Corporation Report Xo. VII (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes it Engines) Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report Xo. VIII

The Japanese Wartime Standard zation of Manpower

and

I'tili-

Military Supplies Division

(Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo


(.\irfram(>s)
*2-t

KK)

*43 *44 *45


*4f)

Japanese

War

Production Industries

.lapanese Naval Ordnance

Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing C'omi)any Corporation Report Xo. IX (Xippon Cakki Seizo KK)
(Propellers)

*47 *48

Japanese Army Ordnance Japanese Naval Shipbuilfiing Jajjanese Motor Vehicle Industry Japanese Merchant Sbi])building
Oil

*25

Tachikawa

.\ircraft

Company

Corporation Report Xo.


(.\irframes)

X
49 50
51

and Chemical Division


Japan's Japan's

(Tachikawa Hikoki KK)


*26

Fuki Airplane Comjiany Corporation Report Xo. (Fuki Hikoki KK)


(Airframes) Showa Airplane Company Corporation Report Xo.

Chemicals Chemicals

in in

XI

52

Oil in Jajjan's Oil ill Japan's

War War

War War .Appendix

Appendix

*27

Over-all Economic Effects Division

XII (Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK)


(Airframes)

*53

The

*28

Ishikawajima

.Vircraft Industries Company. Ltd. Corporation Report Xo. XIII

(Ishikawajima Kaisha)
(fJngines)

Koku

Kogyo

Kabushiki

Bombing on Japan's War (Including Appendix A: IT. S. Economic Analysis and Comijarison; Intelligence on Japan .\]jpendix B; Gross Natimial Product on Japan and Its Components; .Appendix C: Statistical Sources).
Effects of Strategic

Economy

*29

Xippon Airplane Company


Corporation Report Xo. XIV (X'ippon Hikoki KK)
(.Virframcs) .\irplane Company

Transportation Division

*54

The War Against


1945

.lapanese Transportation,

1941-

*.30

Kyushu

Corporation Report Xo.

XV
Urban Areas Division
*55
''SG

(Kyushu Hikoki KK)


(Airframes)

*31

Shoda Engineering Company


Corporation Report Xo. (Shoda Seisakujo)

Effects of Air Attack on .Iapane.se Ilrban

Economy

XVI
*57 *58 59 60

(Summary Report)
Effects of Air Attack on

I'rban

Complex Tokyo-

(Components)
*32

Mitaka

Aircraft Industries Corporation Report Xo.

X \' 1

(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Components)

Kawasaki- Yokohama Effects of Air .\ttack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on

tne City of

Xagoya

(Jsaka-Kobe-Kyolo the City of Nagasaki the City of Hiroshima

66

MILITARY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division

S7

Hcpurl of Ships

I'.iiiiibanlnient

closure 1), ComuK'nts of Amniunil ion

Survey Party (Enand Data on lOlfecliveness

88
(il

lieporl

of Ships

Air Forces Allied xvidi Ihc riiilcd Stales

in

he

War
89

closure' J),

lioinbardmenl Surv<-y Party (En('onunents and Data on Accuracy of

Againsl Japan
(i'J
(i.'i

Japanese Air Japanese Air

I'liwer
\\'eai)iins

ami Tactics

1)4

The

EU'ect uf Air Action on Jajianese (Jromul

Army

Firing lieporls of Ships lioinbardmenl Survey Party fEiiclosure K), IJfects of Surfac<^ Bombardments on Japanese War Potential

Lofrislics
()5

iMnploynienl of Forces Under Ibe Smil hvvcsl Pacific


('(iininand
'I'lie

Physical
tin

Damage
(

Control

(id

()7

Stratenie Air Operations of \'ery Heavy Bomin the War Against Jajian (Twentietli Air Force) World War Air ()])crations in China, Bnrina, India
liardnienl

IJfecl of the Iiic<'ndiary

Honjl Allack: ib

Japan

(a

Uei>ort on
91

loiglil

'ities)

II
(iS

The

Air Trans])ort

Command

in

the

War

Against

Japan
(19

92 93
94

70
71

The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Jajjan The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War
Against Japan

95
in

l')ffecls of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on Jal)anese Targets (a lieporl on Xine Incidents; Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Jai)ancse Targ'Us (a Report on Five Incidents) Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five

The

The Fifth Air Force

the

War

Against Japan 96
I

Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets

(a

Naval Analysis Division


*72
*73 *74 *75 70
*77 78 79

Report on Eight Incidents) Report on Physical Damage


Report)

in

Japan (Summary

The

Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols;

and
97

G-2

Division

II)

Camjiaigns of the Pacific W ar The Rednction of Wake Island The Allied Campaign Against Rabanl The American Campaign Against Wotj'e, Maloelap,
Mille, and Jahiit (V'ols. I, II and III) The Rednction of Trnk The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Foreword, Introduction, Conolu,sions, and General

99 100
101

Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japajiese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report Evaluation of Photograi)hic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields pA'aluation of Photograjihic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part III, Computed

Bomb

Plotting

Summary
80
81

82 83

Re|)ort of Ships Bombardment Survey Party closure A), Kamaishi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party closure B), Hamamatsu Area Report, of Shijjs Bombardment Survey Party closure C), Hitachi Area

(En(En(En-

102 103
104

Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage pjvaluation of PhotograiJhic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics Flvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part \'III, Beach Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part X, Roaits and Railroads Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

Report Report

of Ships of Ships

Bombardment Survey Party (En-

closure D),

Hakodate Area

105

84
85 86

Bombardment Survey Party (En-

closure E), 5luroran Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure F). Shimizu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-

*106
'107

108

Saki Areas

67
U. S.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1947

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