DIGESTED CASES PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1.LINO BROCKA, ET AL. VS. JUAN PONCE-ENRIL, ET AL. FACTS:

1st. Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly at the RTC of Quezon City. Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held. However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them. 2nd. Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition without prior notice to their counsel. The original informations filed recommended no bail. They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. Marcos. 3rd. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing the release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the accused filed their respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention by order of the respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were 'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code, following which corresponding cases were filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition. Hence,this petition. ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS: Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy. ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT: Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours. Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA.

ISSUE: The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge. HELD: We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition. GENERAL RULE: is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however EXCEPTIONS, among which are: "a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused "b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions "c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice; "d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; "e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; "f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; "h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; "i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for; AND "j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al. We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the information, We, however, believe that such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985. We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.

2.PNB VS. RITRATTO GROUP, INC. FACTS:

1ST. On May 29, 1996, PNB International Finance Ltd. (PNB-IFL) a subsidiary company of PNB, organized and doing business in Hong Kong, extended a letter of credit in favor of the respondents in the amount of US$300,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages constituted over four (4) parcels of land in Makati City. This credit facility was later increased successively to US$1,140,000.00 in September 1996; to US$1,290,000.00 in November 1996; to US$1,425,000.00 in February 1997; and decreased to US$1,421,316.18 in April 1998. Respondents made repayments of the loan incurred by remitting those amounts to their loan account with PNB-IFL in Hong Kong. 2ND. However, as of April 30, 1998, their outstanding obligations stood at US$1,497,274.70. Pursuant to the terms of the real estate mortgages, PNB-IFL, through its attorney-in-fact PNB, notified the respondents of the foreclosure of all the real estate mortgages and that the properties subject thereof were to be sold at a public auction on May 27, 1999 at the Makati City Hall. 3RD. On May 25, 1999, respondents filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. 4TH. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order. On May 28, 1999, the case was raffled to Branch 147 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The trial judge then set a hearing on June 8, 1999. At the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction, petitioner was given a period of seven days to file its written opposition to the application. 5TH. On June 15, 1999, petitioner filed an opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction to which the respondents filed a reply. On June 25, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and the absence of any privity between the petitioner and respondents. 6TH. (RTC IN FAVOR OF RITRATTO GROUP) On June 30, 1999, the trial court judge issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which writ was correspondingly issued on July 14, 1999. 7TH. (CA in FAVOR OF RITRATTO GROUP) The appellate court dismissed the petition of PNB. HENCE, THIS APPEAL.

ISSUE: 1. WON no cause of action exists against PNB, which is not a real party in interest being a mere attorney-in-fact of PNB-IFL which is authorized to enforce an ancilliary contract. 2. WON the court acted in excess or lack of jurisdiction in the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction over and beyond what was prayed for. HELD:

Supreme Court ruled in favor of PNB.

(ARGUMENTS OF PNB) It argued that it can legally enforce the foreclosure of real estate mortgage in behalf of PNB-IFL, as the latters agent. (ARGUMENTS OF RITRATTO) Based on the aforementioned grounds, respondents sought to enjoin and restrain PNB from the foreclosure and eventual sale of the property in order to protect their rights

to said property by reason of void credit facilities as bases for the real estate mortgage over the said property. AS TO THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE ENTITY OF PNB. Aside from the fact that PNB-IFL is a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner PNB, there is no showing of the indicative factors that the former corporation is a mere instrumentality of the latter are present. Neither is there a demonstration that any of the evils sought to be prevented by the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil exists. Inescapably, therefore, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil based on the alter ego or instrumentality doctrine finds no application in the case at bar. AS TO THE ISSUE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. Anent the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the same must be lifted as it is a mere provisional remedy but adjunct to the main suit. 20 A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy that may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. The dismissal of the principal action thus results in the denial of the prayer for the issuance of the writ. Further, there is no showing that respondents are entitled to the issuance of the writ under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Xxx Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. Respondents do not deny their indebtedness. Their properties are by their own choice encumbered by real estate mortgages. Upon the non-payment of the loans, which were secured by the mortgages sought to be foreclosed, the mortgaged properties are properly subject to a foreclosure sale. Moreover, respondents questioned the alleged void stipulations in the contract only when petitioner initiated the foreclosure proceedings. Clearly, respondents have failed to prove that they have a right protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right22The Court is not unmindful of the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that there may be serious grounds to nullify the provisions of the loan agreement. However, as earlier discussed, respondents committed the mistake of filing the case against the wrong party, thus, they must suffer the consequences of their error. All told, respondents do not have a cause of action against the petitioner as the latter is not privy to the contract the provisions of which respondents seek to declare void. Accordingly, the case before the Regional Trial Court must be dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued in connection therewith, must be lifted.

3.FRANCISCO MEDINA, ET AL. VS. GREENFIELD FACTS:

1ST. Petitioners are the grandchildren of Pedro Medina from two marriages. In his first marriage to Isadora San Jose, Pedro sired three children: Rafael, Rita and Remegia; in his second marriage, this time to Natalia Mullet, Pedro had five: Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Crisanta and Rosila. Except for Balbino and Crisanta, all of Pedro's children likewise bore children, the petitioners in this case. 2ND. On June 5, 1962, Pedro, his brother Alberto Medina and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Alberto's daughter) executed a notarized Contract to Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield Development Corporation over a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City, then in the Province of Rizal. A notarized Deed of Sale covering said property was subsequently entered into on June 27, 1962, in favor of respondent, and this time signed by Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz, as vendors. 3RD. Thereafter, a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage was executed on September 4, 1964 in favor of respondent over Lot 90-B. Signing as vendors were Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz. By virtue of these sales, respondent was able to register in its name the title to the two parcels of land over Lot 90-A and Lot 90-B. 4TH. On November 6, 1998, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 98-233, an action for annulment of titles and deeds, reconveyance, damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order, against respondent and the Register of Deeds of Makati. Petitioners allege in their complaint that they are coowners of these two parcels of land. While the titles were registered in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and Gregoria, all surnamed Medina, they alleged that they were recognized as coowners thereof. In support of their case, petitioners maintain that the deeds of sale on these properties were simulated and fictitious, and the signatures of the vendors therein were fake. Despite the transfer of the title to respondent's name, they remained in possession thereof and in fact, their caretaker, a certain Santos Arevalo and his family still reside on a portion of the property. 5th. After discovering the annotation, respondent constructed a fence on the property and posted security personnel, barring their ingress and egress. Thus, petitioners sought, among others, the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent and its agents and representatives from preventing petitioners to exercise their rights over the properties. The trial court ruled in favor of Medina, et al. and granted the latters prayer for injunctive relief. On appeal to CA, the appellate court ruled in favor of Greenfield and reversed the trial courts decision. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: The sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial court erred in granting petitioners' prayer for injunctive relief. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Greenfield. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds justifying the issuance of a preliminary injunction, to wit: xxx. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.16 Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites:

1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Hence, petitioners' entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the properties subject of the present dispute. The Court notes that the present dispute is based solely on the parties' allegations in their respective pleadings and the documents attached thereto. (ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS) We have on one hand, petitioners' bare assertion or claim that they are co-owners of the properties sold by their predecessors to respondent, and on the other, (ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS) respondent's claim of ownership supported by deeds of conveyances and torrens titles in their favor. From these alone, it is clear that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. What tilt the balance in respondent's favor are the notarized documents and the titles to the properties. The well-settled rule is that a document acknowledged before a notary public enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In addition, the titles in the name of respondent, having been registered under the Torrens system, are generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein,20 and a strong presumption exists that the titles are regularly issued and valid.21 Therefore, until and unless petitioners show that the documents are indeed spurious and the titles invalid, then the presumptions must prevail at this juncture. (ADVISE TO LOWER COURTS/JUDGES)Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, which in effect, would dispose of the main case without trial.23 The ground relied upon by the trial court in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in this case is its doubt over the acquisition of the properties by respondent.24 Such basis would be virtually recognizing petitioners' claim that the deeds of conveyances and the titles are a nullity without further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine of presumption of validity in favor of these documents. There would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove.

3.CHINA BANKING CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. SO AND NATIVE WEST INTL. CORP.

FACTS:
1ST. China Banking Corporation (China Bank) extended several loans to Native West International Trading Corporation (Native West) and to So Ching, Native West's president. Native West in turn executed promissory notes 1 in favor of China Bank. So Ching, with the marital consent of his wife, Cristina So, additionally executed two mortgages over their properties, viz., a real estate mortgage executed on July 27, 1989 covering a parcel of land situated in Cubao, Quezon City and another executed on August 10, 1989 covering a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong. 2ND. The promissory notes matured and despite due demands by China Bank neither private respondents Native West nor So Ching paid. Pursuant to a provision embodied in the two mortgage contracts, China Bank filed petitions for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties before Notary Public Atty. Renato E. Taguiam and Notary Public Atty. Reynaldo M. Cabusora copies of which were given to the spouses So Ching and Cristina So. After due notice and publication, the notaries public scheduled the foreclosure sale of the spouses' real estate properties on April 13, 1993. 3RD. Eight days before the foreclosure sale, however, private respondents filed a complaint 6 with the Regional Trial Court 7 for accounting with damages and with temporary restraining order against petitioners. 4TH. (RTC in FAVOR OF SPS. SO) On April 7, 1993, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Thereafter counsels for the respective parties agreed to file their pleadings and to submit the case, without further hearing, for resolution. On April 28, 1993, the trial court, without passing upon the material averments of the complaint, issued an Order granting the private respondents' prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction. 5TH. (CA in FAVOR of SPS SO) On January 17, 1995, respondent Court of Appeals held that Administrative Circular No. 3 is the governing rule in extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, which circular petitioners however failed to follow, and with respect to the publication of the notice of the auction sale, the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is the applicable statute, 12 which decree petitioners similarly failed to obey. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: 1) whether or not the loans in excess of the amounts expressly stated in the mortgage contracts can be included as part of the loans secured by the real estate mortgages, (2) whether or not petitioners can extra-judicially foreclose the properties subject of the mortgages, (3) whether or not Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra-judicial foreclosure of the properties, and (4) whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court is valid. HELD: SC RULED IN FAVOR OF CHINA BANK.

As to the ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

It is a settled rule that in a real estate mortgage when the obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold in view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. In fact, aside from the mortgage contracts, the promissory notes executed to evidence the loans also authorize the mortgagee to foreclose on the mortgages. And while private respondents aver that they have already paid ten million pesos, an allegation which has still to be settled before the trial court, the same cannot be utilized as a shield to enjoin the foreclosure sale. A mortgage given to secure advancements, we repeat, is a continuing security and is not discharged by repayment of the amount named in the mortgage, until the full amount of the advancements are paid. (SC RULED IN FAVOR OF CHINA BANK) On the last issue, we find that the issuance of the writ of injunction by the trial court unjustified. A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. But before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. 32 In the case at bench, we fail to see any reason why the foreclosure of the mortgages should be enjoined. On the face of the clear admission by private respondents that they were unable to settle their obligations which were secured by the mortgages, petitioners have a clear right to foreclose the mortgages which is a remedy provided by law. As held in the case of Caltex vs. IAC, it reiterated the rule: . where a debt is secured by a mortgage and there is a default in payment on the part of the mortgagor, the mortgagee has a choice of one (1) or two (2) remedies, but he cannot have both. The mortgagee may: 1) foreclosure the mortgage; or 2) file an ordinary action to collect the debt. When the mortgagee chooses the foreclosure of the mortgage as a remedy, he enforces his lien by the sale on foreclosure of the mortgaged property. On the other hand, if the mortgagee resorts to an action to collect the debt, he thereby waives his mortgage lien. He will have no more priority over the mortgaged property. If the judgment in the action to collect is favorable to him, and it becomes final and executory, he can enforce said judgment by execution. He can even levy execution on the same mortgaged property, but he will not have priority over the latter and there may be other creditors who have better lien on the properties of the mortgagor.

5. HUTCHINSON PORTS PHILIPPINES, LTD. VS. SBMA FACTS: 8

On February 12, 1996, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA) advertised in leading national daily newspapers and in one international publication,[1] an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of seven bidders who responded to the published invitation, three were declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after passing the pre-qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMAs Technical Evaluation Committee. These are the following: ICTSI HPPL RPSI All three qualified bidders were required to submit their respective formal bid package on or before July 1, 1996 by the SBMAs Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (or SBMA-PBAC). Thereafter, the services of three (3) international consultants recommended by the World Bank for their expertise were hired by SBMA to evaluate the business plans submitted by each of the bidders, and to ensure that there would be a transparent and comprehensive review of the submitted bids. The SBMA also hired the firm of Davis, Langdon and Seah Philippines, Inc. to assist in the evaluation of the bids and in the negotiation process after the winning bidder is chosen. All the consultants, after such review and evaluation unanimously concluded that HPPLs Business Plan was far superior to that of the two other bidders. However, even before the sealed envelopes containing the bidders proposed royalty fees could be opened at the appointed time and place, RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally barred from operating a second port in the Philippines based on Executive Order No. 212 and Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Order 95-863. RPSI thus requested that the financial bid of ICTSI should be set aside. Nevertheless, the opening of the sealed financial bids proceeded under advisement relative to the protest signified by RPSI. The financial bids, more particularly the proposed royalty fee of each bidder, was as follows: ICTSI ------------US$57.80 TEU HPPL ------------US$20.50 TEU RPSI -------------US$15.08 TEU The SBMA-PBAC decided to suspend the announcement of the winning bid, however, and instead gave ICTSI seven (7) days within which to respond to the letter-protest lodged by RPSI. The HPPL joined in RPSIs protest, stating that ICTSI should be disqualified because it was already operating the Manila International Container Port (or MICP), which would give rise to inevitable conflict of interest between the MICP and the Subic Bay Container Terminal facility. On August 15, 1996, the SBMA-PBAC issued a resolution rejecting the bid of ICTSI because said bid does not comply with the requirements of the tender documents and the laws of the Philippines. The following day, ICTSI filed a letter-appeal with SBMAs Board of Directors requesting the nullification and reversal of the above-quoted resolution rejecting ICTSIs bid while awarding the same to HPPL. But even before the SBMA Board could act on the appeal, ICTSI filed a similar appeal before the Office of the President.[7] On August 30, 1996, then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) Renato L. Cayetano submitted a memorandum to then President Fidel V. Ramos. The recommendation of CPLC Cayetano was approved by President Ramos, and a copy of President Ramos handwritten approval was sent to the SBMA Board of Directors. Accordingly, the SBMA

Board, with the concurrence of representatives of the Commission on Audit, agreed to focus the reevaluation of the bids in accordance with the evaluation criteria and the detailed components contained in the Tender Document, including all relevant information gleaned from the bidding documents, as well as the reports of the three international experts and the consultancy firm hired by the SBMA. Notwithstanding the SBMA Boards recommendations and action awarding the project to HPPL, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres submitted a memorandum to the Office of the President recommending that another rebidding be conducted.[11] Consequently, the Office of the President issued a Memorandum directing the SBMA Board of Directors to refrain from signing the Concession Contract with HPPL and to conduct a rebidding of the project. In the meantime, the Resident Ombudsman for the DOTC filed a complaint against members of the SBMA-PBAC before the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for awarding the contract to HPPL. On April 16, 1997, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution absolving the members of the SBMA-PBAC of any liability and dismissing the complaint against them. On July 7, 1997, the HPPL, feeling aggrieved by the SBMAs failure and refusal to commence negotiations and to execute the Concession Agreement despite its earlier pronouncements that HPPL was the winning bidder, filed a complaint[14] against SBMA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75, for specific performance, mandatory injunction and damages. complaint opposing the reliefs sought by complainant HPPL. (ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER) Complainant HPPL alleged and argued therein that a binding and legally enforceable contract had been established between HPPL and defendant SBMA under Article 1305 of the Civil Code, considering that SBMA had repeatedly declared and confirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder. Having accepted HPPLs offer to operate and develop the proposed container terminal, defendant SBMA is duty-bound to comply with its obligation by commencing negotiations and drawing up a Concession Agreement with plaintiff HPPL. (RTC RULED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT) The said motion was denied by the court a quo in an Order dated November 3, 1997 HENCE, this appeal. ISSUE: WON Petitioner is entitled to preliminary injunction, as being the declared bidder the in the case. WON SBMA can make a re-bidding of the privatization,which is in violation of HPPLs right as the highest bidder. HELD: SC ruled in favor of respondents. For an injunctive writ to be issued, the following requisites must be proven: First. That the petitioner/applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right.

Second. That there is a material and substantial invasion of such right. Third. That there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

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To our mind, petitioner HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear and unmistakable right to be declared the winning bidder with finality, such that the SBMA can be compelled to negotiate a Concession Contract. Though the SBMA Board of Directors, by resolution, may have declared HPPL as the winning bidder, said award cannot be said to be final and unassailable. The SBMA Board of Directors and other officers are subject to the control and supervision of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President of the Philippines under Letter of Instruction No. 620, which places the SBMA under its ambit as an instrumentality. As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the direct control of the Office of the President, particularly when contracts and/or projects undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amounts of money. Specifically, Letter of Instruction No. 620 dated October 27, 1997 mandates that the approval of the President is required in all contracts of thenational government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations involving two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) and above, awarded through public bidding or negotiation. The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. It is well-established that the discretion to accept or reject any bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the memorandum setting aside the award previously declared by the SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing that a rebidding be conducted, the same was, within the authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative. Consequently, petitioner HPPL acquired no clear and unmistakable right as the award announced by the SBMA prior to the Presidents revocation thereof was not final and binding. There being no clear and unmistakable right on the part of petitioner HPPL, the rebidding of the proposed project can no longer be enjoined as there is no material and substantial invasion to speak of. Thus, there is no longer any urgent or permanent necessity for the writ to prevent any perceived serious damage. In fine, since the requisites for the issuance of the writ of injunction are not present in the instant case, petitioners application must be denied for lack of merit

6. SPS.NISCE VS. EQUITABLE PCI BANK FACTS:

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On November 26, 2002, Equitable PCI Bank1 (Bank) as creditor-mortgagee filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure before the Office of the Clerk of Court as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. It sought to foreclose the following real estate mortgage contracts executed by the spouses Ramon and Natividad Nisce over two parcels of land. The mortgage contracts were executed by the spouses Nisce to secure their obligation under Promissory Note Nos. 1042793 and BD-150369, including a Suretyship Agreement executed by Natividad. The obligation of the Nisce spouses totaled P34,087,725.76. On December 2, 2002, the Ex-Officio Sheriff set the sale at public auction at 10:00 a.m. on January 14, 2003,3 or on January 30, 2003 in the event the public auction would not take place on the earlier setting. On January 28, 2003, the Nisce spouses filed before the RTC of Makati City a complaint for "nullity of the Suretyship Agreement, damages and legal compensation" with prayer for injunctive relief against the Bank and the Ex-Officio Sheriff. On same day, the Bank filed an "Amended Petition" with the Office of the Executive Judge for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage to satisfy the spouses loan account of P30,533,552.24. In the meantime, the parties agreed to have the sale at public auction reset to January 30, 2003. In the meantime, the Ex-Officio Sheriff set the sale at public auction at 10:00 a.m. on March 5 and 27, 2003.11 The spouses Nisce then filed a Supplemental Complaint with plea for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the sale at public auction.12 Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the plaintiffs plea for a temporary restraining order, and the parties adduced testimonial and documentary evidence on their respective arguments. (RTC IN FAVOR OF SPS. NISCE) On March 24, 2003, the RTC issued an Order47 granting the spouses Nisces plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of P10,000,000.00 (CA RULED IN FAVOR OF EQUITABLE) On December 22, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and nullifying the assailed Order of the RTC. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON the trial court was correct in granting the preliminary injunction in favor of Sps. Nisce. HELD: SC ruled in favor of Equitable PCI Bank. ARGUMENTS OF SPS. NISCE. CA preempted the ruling of the RTC on the main issue even before the parties could be given an opportunity to complete the presentation of their respective evidences. ARGUMENTS OF EQUITABLE PCI BANK. It has the right under the real estate mortgage contract and the amendment thereto to foreclose extrajudicially, the real estate mortgage and sell the property at public auction, considering that petitioners had failed to pay their loans. Petitioners Are Not Entitled to a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction.

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Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when the following have been established:xxx The grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with great caution. The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of the parties substantive rights and interests. The sole aim of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo within the last actual status that preceded the pending controversy until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such right;59 and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the plaintiffs right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction. However, to establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction, the evidence to be submitted by the plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete.61 The plaintiffs are only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.62 A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence.63 Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided. We agree with respondents contention that as creditor-mortgagee, it has the right under the real estate mortgage contract and the amendment thereto to foreclose extrajudicially, the real estate mortgage and sell the property at public auction, considering that petitioners had failed to pay their loans, plus interests and other incremental amounts as provided for in the deeds. It was the burden of petitioners, as plaintiffs below, to adduce preponderant evidence to prove their claim that respondent bank was the debtor of petitioner Natividad Nisce relative to her dollar deposit with PCIB, and later transferred to PCI Capital in Hong Kong, a subsidiary of respondent Bank. Petitioners, however, failed to discharge their burden.

7. ASSET PRIVATIZATION CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS (PDF FILE)

8. BACOLOD CITY

9. AQUINO VS. LUNTOK FACTS:

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The records show that petitioners, in their capacity as Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, State Auditor I of the Provincial Auditor's Office and State Examiner of the Provincial Auditor's Office, respectively, conducted an audit of private respondent's accounts as Municipal Treasurer of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and found a cash shortage of P274,011.17 under his accountability. Allegedly pursuant to Section 157, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, petitioners seized private respondent's cash, books, papers and accounts and the latter was suspended from office. As a consequence, private respondent requested reinvestigation by the Commission on Audit. Pending action on the request, private respondent filed a petition dated August 26, 1987 with the trial court, presided over by respondent judge, for prohibition with injunction and with a prayer for a restraining order and damages. 1ST TRO. (RTC in favor of RESPONDENT) Forthwith, respondent judge issued the TRO of August 27, 1987, enjoining all respondents therein, their agents and/or representatives, for a period of twenty (20) days from date thereof, to desist from proceeding or taking action against private respondent based on petitioner Yumang's report and from exercising such derivative powers and functions. 2ND TRO. On September 16, 1987, which was the last day of effectivity of the TRO, respondent judge, on motion filed by private respondent, issued an order extending the efficacy of the TRO for another period of twenty (20) days, or until October 6, 1987. 3RD TRO. On October 6, 1987, the last day of the extended effectivity of the TRO, private respondent filed another motion for extension of the efficacy of the restraining order. On the same date, respondent judge issued an order directing petitioners to refrain from taking any action against private respondent until the motion is resolved. Petitioners instituted in the Court of Appeals an original action for certiorari, with an application for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, precisely putting in issue and assailing the validity of the aforesaid multiple restraining orders dated August 27, 1987, September 16, 1987 and October 6, 1987. While said petition was pending, respondent judge issued an order, dated November 4, 1987, granting the application of private respondent for a writ of preliminary injunction. 11 A day later, respondent judge issued another order, dated November 5, 1987, approving the bond filed by private respondent. 12 On November 11, 1987, respondent judge issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction. As an offshoot thereof and as hereinbefore noted, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on May 11, 1988 dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 13186 on the ground of mootness, since respondent judge had already granted the writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: THE VALIDITY OF EXTENSION OF TROs and the subsequent issuance of preliminary injunction.

HELD:

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In the present case, we are inclined to subscribe to private respondent's invocation of the urgency of judicial intervention, as one of the admitted exceptions to the rule, 18 which likewise would be in keeping with the court's broad discretion in granting injunctions. Whatever circumstances warranted the grant of injunction in the court below would be no different than the circumstances which created the urgency, and there can ordinarily be no better judge to determine the existence thereof than the trial court itself. Thus, it has been said that the court which is to exercise the discretion of granting an injunction is the court of original jurisdiction and not the appellate court; 19 and a preliminary injunction will usually be granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is an interlocutory order or writ issued by the court as a restraint on the defendant until the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction can be determined, thus going no further in its operation than to preserve the status quo until that determination. When such determination is made, the whole force of the order ceases by its own limitations and become functus officio, having by then served its purpose. 21 On this basis lies the mootness of the issue on the propriety of the issuance of successive restraining orders upon the approval of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, as ruled by the Court of Appeals. With the grant of the writ, hearing the petition which sought the annulment of the three antecedent TROs would be inutile as the writ has been substituted for and subserves the purpose of the prior restraining orders. The 20-day period of effectivity of a TRO is non-extendible; the restraining order automatically terminates at the end of such period without the need of any judicial declaration to that effect. 22 Any extension would, therefore, ordinarily, be disallowed. But, when injunction is subsequently granted, as in the case at bar, any defect in the order brought about by the extension of its enforceability is deemed cured.

10. BUREAU OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS VS. HON. ALIGAEN AND JOSE BELO

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FACTS:
The petitioner alleged that he, Belo, was the grantee of a Congressional franchise, Republic Act No. 2957, as amended, to establish, maintain and operate a telephone system in Roxas City and in the province of Capiz, which franchise was confirmed and given effect by the order, dated June 26, 1961, of the Public Service Commission; that pursuant to said franchise he had put up in Roxas City, since July, 1961, at a cost of P417,041.27, an automatic telephone system which had been operating and rendering good service with 410 telephones and sufficient reserves for additional lines when needed. Bureau of Telecommunications, through therein respondents, was starting to establish, maintain and operate in the same geographical area of Roxas City another local telephone system which would directly compete with, and seriously prejudice, the telephone system that he was already operating and would render ineffective his franchise; that the Bureau of Telecommunications was not authorized to establish an additional local telephone system in places where there was no demand for it, as in Roxas City, that no prior inquiry was ever made by the authorities concerned if there was any need for another telephone system in Roxas City; that therein respondents had never attempted to negotiate with him for the use of his facilities in conjunction with the national hook-up of a telephone system. Belo then prayed the Court of First Instance of Capiz that due to the urgency of the matter a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte, enjoining therein respondents from establishing another local telephone system in Roxas City; that after hearing, the writ be made permanent; and that damages be assessed against therein respondents in their personal and individual capacities. (RTC RULED IN FAVOR OF BELO)On the same day, August 1, 1969, Judge Jose A. Aligaen of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, entered an order authorizing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for upon Belo's posting a bond of P5,000, and, accordingly, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued, restraining therein respondents, their agents, and representatives, from further committing and continuing the acts complained of, and from constructing another telephone system in Roxas City. Petitioners filed a motion to dissolve the writ of injunction and made a counter-bond. Belo filed his opposition to the motion of petitioners. Aggrieved, the instant petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed with this Court by herein petitioners. CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: 1.Respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing ex parte the orders and writ of injunction complained of despite the fact that respondent Belo's complaint states no cause of action and, therefore, he is not entitled to the main relief; and it follows that he is not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction; 2. Respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in refusing to dissolve the ex parte writ of preliminary injunction despite petitioners' offer to put up a counterbond. HELD: SC RULED IN FAVOR OF JOSE BELO. It is clear that the Bureau of Telecommunications is empowered to establish telecommunications service in places where such service does not exist, but in places where such service already exists it may only negotiate for, operate and maintain a telecommunication system by utilizing such existing

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facilities in cities, towns and provinces under such terms, conditions or arrangements as may be agreed upon with their owners or operators. It is not denied that respondent Belo had already established, since July 1961, an automatic telephone system in Roxas City. Respondent Belo was operating the telephone system when the Bureau of Telecommunications, through petitioners, took steps to establish another local telephone system without having made any negotiation with respondent Belo for the utilization of the existing facilities being used by said respondent under terms, conditions and arrangements that would be satisfactory to all concerned which acts gave rise to the filing by respondent Belo of Civil Case No. V-3192 for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Capiz on August 1, 1969. The court of first instance has no jurisdiction to restrain by injunction acts committed outside the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces or districts. In the instant case, the acts relative to the establishment of a local telephone system by petitioners were being done within the territorial boundaries of the province or district of respondent court, and so said court had jurisdiction to restrain them by injunction. It does not matter that some of the respondents in the trial court, against whom the injunctive order was issued, had their official residences outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. It follows, therefore, that since the acts to be restrained were being done in Roxas City, or within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent court, the latter had jurisdiction to restrain said acts even if the office of respondent Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications is in Manila, and that of respondent Regional Superintendent of Region IV is in Iloilo City. We believe that respondent court had acted in accordance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. By its order it can be gathered that respondent court had found respondent Belo (petitioner below) entitled to the relief demanded, when it said "that the continuance of the acts complained of would work serious and irreparable loss and injury to the petitioner unless restrained." The respondent court considered it necessary to issue the writ because the continuance of the acts of installing the new telephone system by the respondents below (petitioners herein) would render the judgment in the petition for injunction ineffectual.

11. ZACARIAS AQUINO VS. FRANCISCO SOCORRO FACTS:

On February 14, 1964 the Court of Appeals, upon petition of Francisco Socorro issued a writ of preliminary injunction in his favor upon his posting a P1,000 bond. The writ of preliminary injunction, among others, restrained Zacarias Aquino "from entering, cutting, hauling, selling and/or exporting logs or other forest products from the forest area" subject of litigation. Aquino, however, filed a counterbond in the amount of P2,000, effecting the immediate dissolution of the writ. The Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1964, dismissed Socorro's petition re the main action, for lack of jurisdiction to entertain the same. Socorro subsequently appealed the decision of the appellate court to this Court. We affirmed the appellate court's decision in a resolution dated December 24, 1964 in case G.R. L-23608. On July 15, 1964, before the appellate court's decision dismissing Socorro's petition became final, Aquino filed with the appellate court his claim for damages in the amount of P199,000 on account of the wrongful issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court denied Aquino's claim, for want of bad faith and malice on the part of Socorro in filing his petition and securing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Aquino's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his claim for damages.

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(ARGUMENT OF AQUINO) Aquino contends that the respondent appellate court erred in denying his claim for damages on the ground of want of bad faith and malice on the part of the respondent Socorro in filing the petition for certiorari re the main case and securing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. He invokes the provisions of Section 9, Rule 58 in relation to Section 20, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court. Section 9, Rule 58. (ARGUMENT OF SOCORRO) Socorro, on the other hand, plays for the dismissal of the present petition on the following grounds: (1) The petitioner "refused to prosecute his claim for damages ... in the main action then already on appeal to this Court;" (2) The petitioner "failed to state in his motion claiming for damages the facts upon which his rights thereto are based;" (3) The petitioner, if "suing on the bond ... has no more cause of action as the said bond had already been dissolved 2 upon motion by the petitioner Aquino;" and (4) The petitioner, if "suing beyond the bond ... failed to show, or there is no showing that the respondent Socorro," in filing his petition for certiorari and securing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, "was motivated by malice or bad faith." ISSUE: WON Aquino can recover damages as a result of the improvident issuance of preliminary injunction against him. HELD: SC ruled in favor of Socorro. In Pacis vs Comelec, this Court said that "damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully obtained injunction may be recovered upon the injunction bond required to be filed with the court." The same provisions permitting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction require the filing of a bond before the grant of the writ. "The statutory undertaking of the bond is that it shall answer for all damages which the party to be restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite would make the filing of the bond a useless formality." Section 20 of Rule 57.' " Under this provision, the party restrained, if he can recover anything, can recover only by reason of and upon the bond the only security and protection conceded to him by the rules. Consequently, the rule limits the amount of recovery in a suit on an injunction bond to the sum thus fixed, the amount measuring the extent of the assumed liability. In the case at bar, the record reveals that the petitioner Aquino, in the proceedings before the respondent appellate court filed a counterbond in the amount of P2,000 and opposed the injunction bond filed by the respondent Socorro on the ground of its insufficiency. In effect, those brought about the immediate dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction. Thus Aquino pursues his claim for damages in the amount of P199,000 no longer upon the injunction bond in the amount of P1,000 filed by Socorro with the respondent appellate court. This being the case, applicable here is the holding in Molina vs. Somes, supra, that an application for damages on account of the improvident issuance of a preliminary injunction writ must be governed by the same principles applicable to an action for the wrongful bringing of action. Before the respondent's liability can attach, it must appear that he filed his petition for certiorari re the main action and obtained the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction maliciously and without probable cause. These two essential requisites, malicious prosecution and lack of probable cause, are neither alleged nor proved in this case before us. Nothing in the record tends to establish the liability of the respondent Socorro.

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