DURA LEX SED LEX

People vs Patricio Amigo GR 116719

Facts: Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the regional trial court,Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and pleads for sympathy. Held: The duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused."Dura lex sed lex". People v. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002)FACTS: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of hisolder brother, Johnny who was taking care of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. Hewas accompanied by hislive-in-partner Rosita. Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, butthe latter declined, saying he did nothave the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house becausea visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she couldtake Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and becausehe trusted her, Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the childleft, Suriaga joined them. More than an onehour has passed but the two failed to return with Nicole. Edwin,Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, thenbegan searching but they could not find their daughter and Rosita. Nicoles grandfather then receivea call from Suriaga asking for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported thecall to the PACC Task Force. The next day,Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself and asked herif she and her husband would give the amount to which the latter responded inthe positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should be delivered to him with awarning that if she will not deliver the money,her daughter would be placed in a plastic bag or thrownina garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and while being tailed by PACC agents, Mercidaproceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and his companionIsidera after Mercida gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty whereRositas sister lived. HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupledwithin dubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child,the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child,there was deprivation of the childs liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive themother of the childs custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping forransomhave been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances:1) appellant, aprivate individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from herfather;

high tide; and (3) Bugayongwas never in actual possession of the land.Subsequently, Bugayong subdivided the land and sold it to different persons/entity and one of them isLourdes Farm,Inc., who in turned mortgaged to the said Petitioner, Land Bank of the Philippines.It was find out later on that the titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands are void ab initioas forest land is part of a public domain and therefore, should be reverted to PUBLIC DOMAIN and theoriginal title No. O.C.T. P-2823 and its subsequent titles be declared null and void. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the OCT P-2823 and its subsequent titles void abinitio. Held: FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation inany form. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the cross-claim of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines against Lourdes Farms,Inc. is REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but werechildless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown bya certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were theparents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario inDecember 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions foradoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and alreadymarried and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michaeland Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived, without informing herparents of their whereabouts;3) He detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnightand the following day; and4) he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions where andhow it should be delivered

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. HELD: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. Incase spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shallsignifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the conceptof joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, itis but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will notsuffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He mustmeet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority ismerely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civicconsciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

,represented by the Director of Lands, respondent.

Obiasca vs. Basallote

Antecedents For purpose of this dissent, the background of this controversy is as follows.On 26 May 2003, respondent Jeanne O. Basallote was appointed to the position of AdministrativeOfficer II, Item No. OSECDECSB-ADO2-390030-1998 of the Department of Education (DepEd), TabacoNational High School in Albay Province by City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso. [3] cralawIn a letter dated 4 June 2003, [4] cralaw the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O.Oyardo (Oyardo), advised School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines(LBP) Facts: Angelito C. Bugayong was able to illegaly acquire a title over a forest land located in Bocana,Kabacan, Davao City on September 26, 1969 which during that time was still not declared 1) alienableand disposable 2) the land was marshy and covered by sea water during

(Gonzales) that the papers of the applicants for the position of Administrative Officer II of the school, including those of the respondent, were being returned; and that a school ranking should be accomplished and submitted to her office fo rreview.In addition, Gonzales was advised that only qualified applicants should be indorsed. The respondent assumed as Administrative Officer II on 19 June 2003.Thereafter, however, shereceived a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz (Diaz), Human Resource Management Officer I, City SchoolsDivision of Tabaco City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the CSCbecause of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales. The respondent sought to obtain Gonzales signature, but the latter refused to sign despite repeatedrequests. When the respondent informed Oyardo of the situation, she was instead advised to return toher former teaching position of Teacher I.The respondent followed the advice.In the meanwhile, on 25 August 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin O. Obiasca to the position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly attested by the CSC. [5] cralaw The respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Oyardo,Gonzales, and Diaz. In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholdinginformation from the respondent on the status of her appointment, and suspended them from theservice for three months; but Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing. [6] cralaw The respondent also filed a protest with the CSC Regional Office V, docketed as Adm. Case No. ND-ARU04-290. The protest was dismissed on the ground that it should first be submitted to the GrievanceCommittee of the DepEd for appropriate action. [7] cralawOn motion for reconsideration , the protest was reinstated, but it was eventually dismissed for lack of merit. [8] cralaw The respondent appealed the dismissal of her protest to the CSC Regional Office, whichdismissed the appeal for failure to show that her appointment had been received and attested to bythe CSC. [9] cralaw The respondent elevated the matter to the CSC, which granted the appeal by its 29 November 2005resolution, approving the respondents appointment and recalling its approval of the petitionersappointment. [10] cralawAggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that theCSC thereby acted without factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment, and praying for theissuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Ruling of the CA In its 26 September 2006 decision, [11] cralaw the CA denied the petition for certiorari , and upheld therespondents appointment effective immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority on 26May 2003, considering that the respondent had accepted the appointment upon her assumption of theduties and responsibilities of the position. The CA found that the respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications forthe position of Administrative Officer II; that due to the respondents valid appointment, no otherappointment to the sameposition could be made without the position being first vacated; that thepetitioners appointment to theposition was thus void; and that contrary to the argument of thepetitioner that he had been deprived of his right to due process by not having been allowed toparticipate in the proceedings in the CSC, it was the petitioner who had himself failed to exercise hisright by failing to submit a single pleading despite being furnished with copies of the pleadings in theproceedings in the CSC. The CA opined that Diaz had unreasonably refused to affix her signature on the respondents PDF andto submit the respondents appointment to the CSC on the ground of non-submission of therespondents PDF, because the PDF had not been required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration

, but his motion was denied on 8 February 2007. [12] cralawHence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari . Issues: The petitioner maintains that the respondent was not validly appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II, because her appointment was never attested by the CSC; that without theattestation, the respondents appointment as Administrative Officer II was not completed and did notvest a permanent title upon the respondent; that for that reason, the appointment might still berecalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority; that under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book Vof Executive Order (EO) No. 292 ( Administrative Code of 1987), every appointment is required to besubmitted to the CSC within30 days from the date of issuance; otherwise, the appointment becomesineffective; [13] cralaw that the respondents appointment issued on 23 May 2003 should have beentransmitted to the CSC not later than 22 June 2003 for proper attestation; and that because therespondents appointment had not been sent to the CSC within the proper period, her appointmentceased to be effective and the position of Administrative Officer II was already vacant when thepetitioner was appointed to it.

In her comment,[14]cralaw the respondent, though admitting that her appointment was not submittedto the CSC for attestation, points out that the reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of herappointment papers to the CSC the failure of the respondent to have her PDF duly signed byGonzales was not valid because the PDF was not even a requisite for the submission of herappointment for attestation by the CSC.

Held: The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the caseof Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that thedeclaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 iswanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy.Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute arenot obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined fromthe language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room forconstruction. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in generalor vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of variousinterpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes"constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied. Petitionerswere not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City whilethe prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged under PresidentialDecree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs tothem.Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while theyconcede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of theirresidence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel"soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search onceinside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers andeffects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absoluteone. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an

arrest; (2) a search of amoving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of hereinpetitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers.While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enterthe house because he did nothave a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized theneed for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted theVeroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy toenter the housebut only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it isundeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not followthat the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but thesubjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. Asearch warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception beingapplicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by theexclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal actionagainst them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides,assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge orvoluntariness there is no crime.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegalpossession of firearms is DISMISSED.

Held: Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized byall the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using, anyother device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spokenword by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The provision clearly and unequivocallymakes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication tosecretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as towhether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or differentfrom those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all personsunauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently,even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another withoutthe knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under said provision of RA 4200. Further, thenature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same neednot be specifically alleged in the information. What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretlyoverhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumeratedtherein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication bymeans of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200.Furthermore, the contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of RA 4200 does notinclude private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a pointof absurdity.

SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Ursua vs. Court of Appeals Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law makes nodistinctions, one does not distinguish. Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorneys fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial courts discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culledfrom a tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As a result of Ramirezs recording, of theevent and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed acriminal case before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled AnAct to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, andother purposes. Ramirez was charged of violation of the said Act, in an information dated 6 October1988. Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the Information on theground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In anorder dated 3 May 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that thefacts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. From the trial courts Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9 February 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial courts order of 3 May 1989 null and void. Consequently, on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed aMotion for Reconsideration which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 June 1990. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the party sought to be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law ought to be a partyother than or different from those involved in the private communication. Facts: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by RA6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases by the RTC of Davao City which wasaffirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name Oscar Perez when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction tothe SC as he reasserts his innocence. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was charged under the wrong law. HELD: The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SChas decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and theevil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept inmind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The courtmay consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. DREAMWORKS CONST VS. JANIOLA Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision[1] in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007[2] and March 12, 2008[3] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004[4] for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 042526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006[5] for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007[6] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.[11]

The Courts Ruling This petition must be granted. The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states: SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases[12] that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,[13] are: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question[7] on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that: Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).[8]

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,*9+ the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled: Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a previously filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.[10] Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45. The Issue

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case. We cannot agree with private respondent.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had.*14+ In the instant case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15] that: Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.) Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.*16+ This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[17] In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply. In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case. This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides: SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings. In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said: Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.[19] Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement. Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy. Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution. We find for petitioner. It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[20] Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases[21] that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,[22] we ruled: It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22. Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Lee v. Court of Appeals[23] is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value. Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser. In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad. At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.[24] (Emphasis supplied.)

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Doctrine of necessary implications.What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed

CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO LIM v. JUDGE LAGUIO & MTDC

Facts: The petitioners seek to reverse the ruling of the ruling of the RTC regarding the unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 which is entitled- AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA- MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), contends that the City

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that

Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels and that the Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected. The petitioners, on the other hand, argues that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" [Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code] and that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police powers [Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409]. Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. He also granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. Hence, the appeal by the petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 7783 is constitutional Held: NO Ratio: There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its the judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guise of due process and equal protection of lawsof police power. The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the ordinance void is AFFIRMED.

relations) or a confidential employee (they did not act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate and execute management policies related to labor relations). Secondly, granting the petition would not be violative of the separation of union doctrine. The petition for certification election was filed by APSOTEU-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization. True, it was assisted to some extent by ALU and the national federation TUCP. However, APSOTEU-TUCP had separate legal personality from ALU and TUCP, under the principle that a local union maintains its separate legal personality despite affiliation with a national federation.

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., vs. Janiola Facts: Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit for violation of BP 22 against Janiola. Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement. Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. Later, the MTC granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, we have this petition. ISSUE: WON the Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist Held:This petition must be granted. Yes, Under SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter. On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court

Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma [324 SCRA 425, February 2, 2000]
Tuesday, January 27, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Labor Law FACTS: Sugbuanon Rural Bank employed some 5 supervisory employees. APSOLTEU-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, then filed a petition for certification election of the said supervisory employees. The bank opposed the petition on the ground that the supervisory employees were actually managerial/confidential employees. In addition, the union was represented in the petition by ALU-TUCP, and since according to the Bank the latter also sought to represent the rank and file members, granting the petition would violate the principle of separation of unions. ISSUE: Should the petition for certification election be granted, or denied? HELD: It should be granted. For one, the supervisory employees cannot be considered managerial or confidential employees. While the nature of the employees work (evaluating borrowers capacity to pay, approving loans, scheduling terms of repayment of the latter, and endorsing delinquent accounts to legal counsel for collection) indeed constituted the core of the banks business, their functions did not fall within the definition of either a managerial employee (lay down and execute management policies related to labor

and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case. We cannot agree with private respondent. First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. In the instant case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22. Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us. WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition.

GUZMAN VS. COMELEC G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000) FACTS: Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of the law, which is An Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof. HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of election officers.

Parayno vs. Jovellanos Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station where some resisdents of Calasiao petitioned the Sanguniang Bayan (SB) for the closure or transfer of the station toanother location. Upon the investigation conducted by the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection, the SB recommended tothe Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. Petitioner movedfor the reconsideration of the SB resolution but was denied. She claimed that her gasolinestation was not covered by Sec. 44 fo the Official Zoning Code since it was not a gasolineservice station but a gasoline filling station governed by Sec. 21 thereof. Petitioner addedthat the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), in a previous casefiled by the same respondent against her predecessor, barred the grounds invoked by therespondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. The petitioners motion for reconsideration wasdenied by the trail court as well as the CA. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction Held: The Supreme Court explained three points in arriving in its decision. The first is thePrinciple of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind, class or nature), which was used by the trailcourt in its decision. Under this maxim, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will apply only to persons or thingsof the same general nature or class as those enumerated. Instead, what applied in this casewas the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius (the express mention of one thingimplies the exclusion of others). Hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alludedto the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline servicestation under Sec. 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Sec. 21. Indeed,the activitites undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those ingas filling station. Second, the Exercise of Police Power, respondent municipality invalidlyused its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. A localgovernment is considered to have properly exercised its police power only when the followingrequisites are met: (1) the interest of the public generally as distinguished from those of aparticular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed arereasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and notunduly oppressive. The first refers to equal protection clause and the second, to the dueprocess clause of the Constitution. And third, the Principle of Res Judicata, which refers tothe rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction isconclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and mattersdetermined in the former suit. Petitioner points out that the HLURB decision in the previouscase filed against her predecessor by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issuesin Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res judicata

Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec GR No. 162759 8.4.06

F: Petitioners are dual citizens (by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship) who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The Comelec denies on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Constitution. I: WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement. R: Court held that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in thePhilippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Since it is by basic knowledge that duals are likely to be non-residents, RA 9189 aims to enfranchise as much as possible OFW the qualification to vote as court ruling in the case of Macalintal. Furthermore, by the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. EJUSDEM GENERIS This rule means when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified.

Serrano vs. Severino Santos Transit,

August 9, 2010 G.R. No. 187698 August 9, 2010

RODOLFO J. SERRANO, Petitioner, vs.SEVERINO SANTOS TRANSIT and/or SEVERINO SANTOS, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Serrano has been an employee of Severino Santos Transit for 14 years. Petitioner applied for optional retirement from the company whose representative advised him that he must first sign the already prepared Quitclaim before his retirement pay could be released. As petitioners request to first go over the computation of his retirement pay was denied, he signed the Quitclaim on which he wrote "U.P." (under protest) after his signature, indicating his protest to the amount of P75,277.45 which he received, computed by the company at 15 days per year of service. Petitioner soon after filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter, alleging that the company erred in its computation since under Republic Act No. 7641, otherwise known as the Retirement Pay Law, his retirement pay should have been computed at 22.5 days per year of service to include the cash equivalent of the 5-day service incentive leave (SIL) and 1/12 of the 13th month pay which the company did not. The company maintained, however, that the Quitclaim signed by petitioner barred his claim and, in any event, its computation was correct since petitioner was not entitled to the 5day SIL and pro-rated 13th month pay for, as a bus conductor, he was paid on commission basis. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serrano. In the same Labor Advisory on Retirement Pay Law, it was likewise decisively made clear that "the law expanded the concept of "one-half month salary" from the usual one-month salary divided by two. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to which respondents appealed reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling and dismissed petitioners complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the computation of retirement pay as given by RA 7641 HELD: Yes. Admittedly, petitioner worked for 14 years for the bus company which did not adopt any retirement scheme. Even if petitioner as bus conductor was paid on commission basis then, he falls within the coverage of R.A. 7641 and its implementing rules. As thus correctly ruled by the Labor Arbiter, petitioners retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of the 5-day SIL and 1/12 of the 13th month pay.
NOSCIITUR A SOCIIS Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction of contracts which assist resolution of ambiguity. The meaning of a word may be ascertained by the context within which it appears.
Buenaseda vs. Flavier G.R. No. 106719 (226 SCRA 649, 21 September 1993) 0 Written on 10:42 PM by Jan Ponente: Quiason, J. Petitioners: Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Lt. Col. Isabelo Banez, Jr.,Engr. Conrado Rey Matias, Ms. Cora S. Solis, and Ms. Enya N. Lopez Respondents: Secretary Juan Flavier, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and NCMH Nurses Association, represented by Raouilito Gayutin PETITION for certiorari to nullify the order of the Ombudsman This petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated 7 January 1992, issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners without the opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them. It also seeks to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa Rosero of the office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners for manifest partiality and bias. FACTS On September 10, 1992, this court required respondents to Comment on the petition and thereafter, received a Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifestation from petitioners dated September 14 and 22, 1992. On the same day of September 22, 1992, the court Resolved to REQUIRE the

respondents to MAINTAIN STATUS QUO pending filing of comments on the original supplemental manifestation. On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 and in a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion. On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading entitled Omnibus Submission. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them. On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Supplement to Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22 September 1992 Resolution and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; xxx. This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required respondent Secretary to comply with the said status quo order stating that: xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective positions xxx, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act xxx until further orders from the Court. ISSUE Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 Preventive Suspension The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. RATIO DECIDENDI The court held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, and that the status in question is procedural. In contrast to penal statutes, which are strictly construed, procedural statutes are liberally construed. As to the preventive suspension, it is imposed as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. And in order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation where the need to suspend the respondents may arise to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner. The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers, as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. As such, said statute, particularly its provisions, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided. A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created. Further, as it can be inferred from the Ombudsman Law, the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of the whether they are employed in his office or in

other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be in his authority and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension. In the claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting o lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them, the order for preventive suspension is validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the Motion for the Preventive Suspension of petitioners; (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23cases f harassment by petitioners of the members of private respondent; and, (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complaint and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation. The motion for Contempt which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by he Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health cannot prosper. The motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was field, with the Ombudsman. The court find the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients. However, the court take cognizance of the intemperate language used by the counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel. A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients cause. The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes disrespect to dignity of the court of justice. As to the Motion for Disbarment, it has no place in the instant special civic action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. CONCURRING OPINION: BELLOSILLO, J. I agree as to the authority of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before him pending the investigation of the complaint to avoid prejudice in respondents continued stay in the prosecution of the case. But in the case at bar, the facts that were presented were not adequate to reasonably place the petitioners under preventive suspension. It is also important to determine whether it is necessary to issue the preventive suspension under the circumstances. I do not see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension. I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension of petitioners. The court may be suspending key government officials and employees on the basis of mere speculation, which may not serve the ends of justice but would deprive them of their right to due process. Petition dismissed.