International Society for Iranian Studies

Nadir Shah and the Ja 'fari Madhhab Reconsidered Author(s): Ernest Tucker Source: Iranian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1/4, Religion and Society in Islamic Iran during the PreModern Era (1994), pp. 163-179 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310891 Accessed: 05/12/2008 10:59
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Iranian Studies, volume 27, numbers 1-4, 1994

ErnestTucker

Nadir Shah and the Ja'fari Madhhab Reconsidered

I. Introduction In less than twenty years, Nadir Shah built an empire across Iran,India,and Central Asia. When he took the throne on the Mughan steppe in 1148/1736, Nadir confronted the problem of how to legitimize his reign after two centuries of Shi'i Safavid rule. He attemptedto solve this problem, in part, by challenging Iran'sTwelver Shi'i identity.1 Nadir proposed to the Ottomans that Twelver Shi'ism be considered a fifth school of Sunni Islam, to be called the Ja'fari madhhab after the sixth Imam, Ja'faral-Sadiq.2 In exchange for Shi'i renunciation such practicesas sabb (the of ritual cursing of the first three caliphs), Nadir proposed that the Ottomans give this Ja'fari madhhab all the privileges enjoyed by the four Sunni schools, and that a fifth pillar be erected in the Ka'bah in Mecca to commemorate it. He asked that the Ottomansallow him to appointthe leader of the annualhajj caravan from Iran. He statedthat the legal opinions of Ja'faral-Sadiq would be considered the cornerstone texts of this madhhab, parallel to the writings of the founders of the other schools. Nadir continued to promote this concept until nearlythe end of his reign. Several explanations have been offered for Nadir's introductionof the Ja'fari Iraninto a Sunni counmadhhab. It has been interpreted a device to transform as try in order to counter the legacy of the Safavids, whose legitimacy had been based, in part,upon their role as defenders of Shi'ism. Some evidence points to its use as a tool to ease tensions between the Sunni Afghan and Shi'i Qizilbash partsof Nadir's army. The proposalclearly had an economic dimension, since it would have offered Nadir a way to control a greaterpartof the revenue of the lucrativeIranianhajjtrade. To explore all these hypotheses fully is beyond the scope of this discussion. Instead, it will focus on why and how the Ja'fari madhhab was depicted in quite

1. The terms "Shi'i" and "Shi'ism," as used in this essay, refer only to Twelver Shi'is and Twelver Shi'ism. 2. The phrase madhhab-i ja'farl has long been used to refer to Twelver Shi'ism. Ja'far al-Sadiq is regardedby Shi'is as one of the foremost scholars of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). See Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. "DJA'FAR AL-SADIK."

164 Tucker differentways for foreign and domestic consumption. Additionally,the reaction to it at home and abroadwill be examinedto gauge its actualimpact. To the Ottomans,Nadir presentedthe Ja'farimadhhabas the eliminationof virtually all distinct Shi'i practices, clearing the way for IranianShi'is to be acanti-Sunniactivities such as the cepted completely as Sunnis. He anathematized cursing of the first three caliphs, calling them Safavid innovations (bid'at-i safaviyah). He tried to transformthe Safavids from defenders of Shi'ism into corruptersof the true faith of Iran, which he claimed to be Sunnism. Nadir explained to the Ottomansin official lettersthat after Safavid corruptionshad been removed, this madhhabwould differ from the four orthodoxSunni madhhabsno more thanthey did from one another. The domestic version of the Ja'farimadhhabalso requiredthatNadir's Shi'i subassociated with the Safavids. In rejects refrainfrom anti-Sunnidemonstrations turn, Nadir encouraged Shi'i rituals less highly charged with feeling against Sunnis such as pilgrimage to the shrines of the Imams (ziydrat).3 Nadir's dooutwardexmestic religious policy redefinedthese n'tualsto be the fundamental pressions of Shi'ism, in which he could play a principalrole, for example, as a patron of holy shrines. Although he prohibitedSafavid-era ceremonies which openly attackedSunnism, Nadir signaled, throughthe way he implementedhis religious policy in Iran, that he condoned dissimulation by Shi'is to maintain inwardbelief in doctrineswhich Sunnis did not accept. In contrastto the way it was presentedto the Ottomans,the domestic version of the Ja'farimadhhabwas portrayedas preservingthe essential facets of Shi'ism, althoughwith the boundof ariesredrawnbetween public and privatemanifestations faith. Such a dichotomy between the foreign and domestic versions of the Ja'fariproposal reveals that it served several distinct purposes:it would have deprivedthe Ottomansof a formal pretextfor waging war against Iranand persecutingShi'is as religious rebels or infidels, while allowing Nadir to legitimize his status as a Sunni ruler in the broaderIslamic world. At the same time, it was designed to establish Nadir's reputation in Iran as a defender of Shi'ism, but a Shi'ism strippedof Safavid associations-a necessary step in securing domestic acceptance of his rule. Nadir could not fully implement the Ja'fari madhhab either at home or abroad, yet the relatively mild reactionto it in both spheresis noteworthy. Considerable evidence suggests that domestic opposition to it cannot be blamed for Nadir's downfall. Greateranger eruptedat Nadir due to the execution of the Safavids at the behest of his son, Riza Quli Mirza, than due to his attempt to impose new religious ideas. Although the OttomanspersistentlyrejectedNadir's formal demands that they recognize the Ja'farimadhhab,they did conclude a peace treaty
3. The Ja'fari madhhab excluded those aspects of Shi'i law (fiqh) which were abhorrent to Sunnis, such as temporary marriage (mut'ah), but retained the details of the systematic application of Shi'i jurisprudence(furui'at-ishar'iyah) that were not offensive to them.

NadirShahand theJa'fariMadhhab 165 with him in 1159/1746 which embodied certain principles the proposal was designed to promote: they formally accepted Iran as part of the Sunni world and agreed to protectthe rights of Shi'i Iraniantravelersin Ottomanterritory. Given it from Safavid religious norms,the fact thatthe the radicaldeparture represented Ja'farimadhhabreceived only a slightly negative reception at home and contributed somethingto the treatyof 1159/1746 indicates that it cannotbe considereda total failure. In the end, though, Nadir's military adventurismand oppressive rule overshadowed moderateimpact. its Nadiremployedthe Ja'farimadhhabin two divergentand somewhatcontradictory systems of external and internallegitimation. The two versions of his idea can be regardedas complimentarypartsof Nadir's early modernattemptto define an Islamic universalism which looked to the past for the ideal of a united ummah, but also tried to find a way not to erase the divisions between Muslims, but to transcendthem in orderto reducethe effects of sectarianconflict on domestic and foreign politics.

II. SecondaryScholarshipon the Ja fari Madhhab Few scholars examine the Ja'fari question at length. LaurenceLockhart,in his biography of Nadir Shah, states that "Nadir's adoption of the term 'Ja'fari' to designate the fifth sect of the Sunnis which the Persian people were to form is somewhat mystifying; his action made the word ambiguous." Lockhart concludes that the Ja'fari proposal constituted "the substitutionof the Sunni for the Shi'a religion."4 He notes that it may have been motivated by political considerations,but does not addressthe possibility that it may have been framedin two very differentways for foreign and domestic consumption. A. E. Schmidt portraysNadir's religious policy as a political ploy and ascribes the IranianShi'i ulama's willingness to go along with the council of Najaf to their simple fear of Nadir. He concludes that "Withregardto the actualreconciliation of Sunnis and Shi'is, even within the area under Nadir's control, this staged event [the council of Najaf] ultimatelydid not producereal results."5 In a similar vein, Riza Sha'bani believes that the Ja'fari madhhab formed part of Nadir's "religiouspolitics." Sha'baniobserves thatNadir adoptedan opportunistic approachto religious affairs, honoring Sunni and Shi'i symbols as his quest for powerdictated.6

4. Laurence Lockhart,Nadir Shah (London: Luzac, 1938), 279, 271. 5. A. E. Schmidt, "Iz istorii Sunnitsko-Shiitskikh otnoshenii," in A. E. Schmidt and E. K. Betger, eds., "'Iqd al-juman": V. V. Bartol'du Turkestanskiedruz'ya ucheniki i pochitateli (Tashkent: Tipo-Litografiya Kazgiza, 1927), 105. 6. Riza Sha'bani, "Siyasat-i madhhabi-yi Nadir Shah Afshar," Vahid 7 (1349 Sh./1970): 1132-56. For another view that fundamentally agrees with Sha'bani's thesis about the political nature of Nadir's policy see Emine Giirsoy, "An Analysis of Nadir Shah's Religious Policy," BogaziVi Universitesi Dergisi 2 (1974): 13-18.

166 Tucker Two other authorsaddressthe theological ramificaitonsof Nadir's actions more directly. B. S. Amoretti observes that since "to renounce the execration of the three caliphs [i.e., sabb] is not, for a Shi'i, an indicator of theological aberration," Nadir's Mughandeclarationcould be viewed as the sign of the definitive end of inter-Muslimjihad, with Shi'ism accepted, de facto if not de jure, as a fifth juridical school.7 Hamid Algar, in a general survey of religious trends in hyIran,calls Nadir's Ja'farimadhhab"an unnatural twelfth/eighteenth-century brid, a truncatedShi'ism that he [Nadir]sought to integrateinto the Sunni mainstream of Islam."8 He focuses on how the proposal, if viewed as a serious attemptto reconcile Sunni and Shi'i theology, would have requiredabandoningintegral parts of the imamology of Twelver Shi'ism. Although cognizant of the questions which he and others raise, this article will attempt to explore how Nadir used the Ja'fari madhhab not simply as a political ruse, nor as a genuine programof religious reconciliation,but as something between the two-a compromisedesigned to reducethe effects of sectariandifferencebetween Sunnis and Shi'is as well as preservecertainaspects of Shi'ism throughrecourseto selective dissimulation. III. TheBeginningof the Ja fari Madhhab The Ja'farimadhhabwas not an issue duringthe first few years of Nadir's career. He appearsin chroniclesand documentsas an unflaggingdevotee of the Safavids and Shi'ism from the beginning of his rise to power until his assumptionof the throne. When the Safavid Shah TahmasbII, son of SultanHusayn, chose Nadir to be his deputy,Nadir assumedthe name TahmasbQuli ("slave of Tahmasb"). The first known diplomaticcontactsbetween Nadir and the Ottomansprovideevidence of this loyalty. Nadir, as Tahmasb'sdeputy, sent a letter to the Ottoman sultan in the fall of 1142/1729, imploringhim to help reestablishTahmasbover domainslong ruledby his fathersand grandfathers...."9 In general, "hereditary the letterpresenteda strongcase for the ancestrallegitimacyof the Safavids. Otherevidence confirms Nadir's Shi'i affiliations duringthe early 1140s/1730s. Nadir gave his first two children typically Shi'i names, Riza Quli and Murtaza Quli. He proclaimed that he had achieved victory over the Ottomans in 1144/1731 under "the happy auspices of the House of Haydar ['Ali] and the Twelve Holy Imams.... This day is great with ruin to their enemies and with joy to the sect of the Shi'ah, the discomfort of the evil-minded is the glory of

7. B. S. Amoretti, "Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods," in Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart,eds., The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6:655. 8. Hamid Algar, "Shi'ism and Iran in the Eighteenth Century,"in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds., Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History (Carbondale:Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 291. 9. MuhammadRiza Nasiri, ed., Asnad va mukatabat-itcrikht-yiIran, vol. 1: Dawrahyi AfshMrtyah(Tehran: Nima, 1364 Sh./1985), 206.

NadirShahand theJa fari Madhhab 167 the followers of 'Ali."10 He endowed a waqf at the shrine of the eighth Imam, 'Ali Riza, in Mashhadto celebratea victory over the Abdali Afghans. The deed for this waqf is datedMuharram 1145/June 1732, and bears Nadir's personalseal which employed an unmistakablyShi'i formula: "Thereis no exemplary youth save 'Ali, no sword except Dhu'l-Fiqar. I am the rarityof the age, by the grace of God, servantof the Twelve [Imams]." II Nadirthus made a clear declarationof Shi'i faith less than four years before his accession to the throne. However, he offered hints of a change in religious policy as early as 1146/1734, when he sent a message to the Ottomans that he would order the names of the first four caliphs to be recited in the khutbah and have the phrase "'Ali is the deputy of God" taken out.12 By 1148/1736 Nadir felt that he had achieved enough prestige throughmilitary victories to take the thronehimself. He assemblednomadicand sedentaryleaders from all parts of the Safavid empire into a vast encampment on the plain of Mughan. When he asked them to choose either him or one of the Safavids to rule the country, they declared him their sovereign. In a speech outlining the conditions underwhich he would accept the throne,Nadir introducedthe Ja'fari madhhab concept as part of a peace proposal to the Ottomans. This proposal consisted of five principles: (1) recognition of the Ja'fari madhhab as a fifth school of Sunni Islam; (2) erection of a pillar in the Ka'bah to commemorateit; (3) appointment an Iranianhajj caravanleader;(4) exchange of permanentamof bassadorsbetween himself and the Ottomansultan;and (5) exchange of war prisoners and prohibition of buying and selling them. He stated that in returnfor Ottomanacceptanceof these principles,Shi'i practicesobjectionableto the Sunnis such as the cursing of the first three caliphs and denial of their legitimacy (sabb and rafd) would be prohibitedin Iran. Nadir's speech condemned certain followers of Shah Isma'il I for introducingthese practicesin Iran: The leaderpraisedby the world, Shah Isma'il Safavi, may God make his earthpleasantand may He makeheavenhis abode,in the beginningof his rule,for the good of his state(binabarsalaih-i dawlat-ikhud)... propagated andpromoted Shi'ism. In addition that,sabb andrafd, which are empty to actionsand sourcesof corruption, began to be pronounced the tongues by and mouthsof the masses and the underclass . and the soil of Iranwas . stainedwith the bloodof chaosanddisorder.13 Nadir tried to portraysabb and rafd as innovations of Isma'il's followers which had turnedIranaway from the pathof Muslim unity, althoughhe was careful not

10. Lockhart, Nadir Shah, 60. 11. "La-fata' illa 'Ali, la sayfah illa Dhu'l-Fiqar, Nadir-i 'asram zi luff-i haqq, ghulam-i hasht u char" (Riza Sha'bani, Tarikh-i ijtima'-yi Iran dar 'asr-i Afshari-yah, 2 vols. [Tehran: Khushah, 1365 Sh./1986], 1:375). 12. Willem Floor, Hukumat-iNadir Shah (Tehran:Tus, 1368 Sh./1989), 73. 13. Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi, Tarikh-ijahangusha-yi Nadirl, ed. Sayyid 'Abdullah Anvar (Tehran: Bahman, 1341 Sh./1962), 269.

168 Tucker to depict the introductionof Shi'ism itself in such a negative light.'4 Immediatelyafterhis coronation,Nadir sent an embassy to the Ottomansto present his proposals. His emissaries carriedletters reiteratingand intensifying the message of his coronation speech. Addressing the Ottoman ruler Mahmud I, Nadir claimed that "afterthe appearanceof Shah Isma'il . . . words issued from him steeped in fanaticismand extremismwhich caused mutualmistrustand strife [to arise] among the groups of Muslims."'15In his letter to the Ottomangrand vizier, he announced,"We [Nadir] stated [at Mughan] that these useless affairs [Iran'sforeign wars] resultedfrom the corruptfanaticismof the Safavid dynasty and were againstthe sayings of [Muhammad]. . . and the GreatCompanions."16 In his letters to the Ottomans,Nadir chastised Isma'il and the Safavids far more directlythanin his coronationspeech for Iran'scurrentwoes. The Ja'farimadhhab,as presentedin these letters,was designed not only to excoto riate the Safavids, but also to convince the Ottomansthat Iranhad "returned" Sunnism. Nadir assertedto Mahmudthatbefore the Safavids, "we [the Iranians] had been favored, as the people of the sunnah, to follow in the path of the Prophet." He called Sunnism "the clear faith which has been inheritedby the people of Iran."'17 In response, the Ottomanslauded Nadir's attemptto bring Iranback to the Sunni fold, but totally rebuffed any idea of creating a Ja'fari madhhab. Sultan Mahpractices mud's reply commendedNadirfor removingthe innovationsandcorrupt that had arisen during the reign of the Safavids.18 Nevertheless, it rejected the two proposals concerning the Ja'fari madhhab as contraryto both Islamic law

14. Such popular manifestations of piety as sabb, in addition to affirming distinctive aspects of Shi'i belief, also helped mobilize public sentiment in favor of the Safavids as defenders of Twelver Shi'ism. Thus, elimination of such rituals would mark not just a change in the expression of religious identity in Iran, but also the end of a potent symbol of dynastic and political allegiance. Given that the Safavids themselves, though, had agreed to refrain from sabb in two peace agreements with the Ottomans, in 998/1590 and 1049/1639, Nadir's proposal to eradicate it signaled less of a departurefrom actual Safavid precedent, at least in the foreign sphere, than his criticism of them in this speech would suggest. See R. K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 18-19; I. H. Uzunqarqili,Osmanli tarihi, 8 vols. (Ankara:Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), 3:1:206. Some theologians, such as Shaykh Yusuf al-Bahrani, a prominent Akhbari Shi'i scholar from Bahrayn who spent part of his career in Shiraz in the early 1150s/late 1730s, even argued that Shi'i doctrine forbade sabb. See Etan Kohlberg, "Aspects of Akhbari Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Nehemia Levtzion and John Voll, eds., Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 148. 15. Nasiri, Asndd va mukatabat, 82. 16. Ibid., 88. 17. Koca Ragib Pa~a, "Tahkikve tevfik," in Inlaat-i Ragib PaEa, MS Topkapi Sarayi Yeni Yazmalari 763, lllr-113r. Kutuiphanesi 18. Ibid., 154r.

Nadir Shahand theJa fari Madhhab 169 and the strategicinterestsof the Ottomanstate.19 For the Ottomansto have accepted Nadir's proposals would have requiredthem to set aside centuries of traditionand to rethinktheir complex relationshipwith the rulers of Mecca, neither of which they were preparedto do in the uncertain atmosphereof the 1140s/1730s following the PatronaHalil revolt of 1142/1730. Therefore they congratulatedNadir on his assumptionof the throne of Iran and agreed to accordhim full legitimacy as the sovereign of that country,but only if he would embrace Sunni Islam as defined by the Ottomans,which emphatically did not include a madhhabbased on the teachingsof Ja'faral-Sadiq. This attitude towards Nadir's proposals would define the official Ottoman position on the Ja'farimadhhabuntil the end of his reign, and the Ottomansonly signed a peace treaty when Nadir appearedto accept Sunni Islam unconditionallyin 1159/1746 (see below). In contrast, coins, seals, and documents of Nadir's court show that Nadir presented the Ja'fari proposal to his own subjects as an appeal to dissimulation which, while allowing for reconciliation with the Sunni world, would leave the foundationsof Shi'ism, as Nadir defined them, undisturbed.In a majority-Sunni ummah,selective dissimulationwould permitNadir's Shi'i subjects to maintain their innerbeliefs while outwardlyseeking concord with Sunnis. Nadir's coronationspeech itself exemplified this phenomenon. He assertedthat Isma'il I had introducedShi'ism "for the good of his state,"even though in his letters to the Ottomanshe describedIsma'il's supportof Shi'ism as the source of corruptionin Iran. In his speech, Nadir blamed the introductionof sabb on an ignorant rabble, in contrast to his letters to the Ottomans, in which he charges Isma'il himself with propagatingsabb. Although the difference in emphasis is subtle, when addressing a domestic audience Nadir moderatedhis rhetoricjust enough to indicate that his true intention was to focus criticism on certain antiSunni rituals, not Shi'ism as a whole, while in letters to the Ottomans, he depicted Iran as an essentially Sunni country that had been corrupted by the Safavids. The Ja'farimadhhabwas represented,in a documentsent to the ulamaof Isfahan soon after the Mughancoronationin 1149/1736, as nothing more or less than an attemptto keep peace between Sunnis and Shi'is. The document announced a ban on reciting any special blessing upon 'Ali and justified this prohibitionby asserting that it caused enmity between Nadir's Sunni and Shi'i subjects. It specified, though,that 'Ali would continueto be reveredas one specially beloved of by God, implicitly arguingfor abandonment an outwardritualin orderto foster harmonious relations with Sunnis while allowing for the preservation of inwardfaith in 'Ali's exalted status.20

19. Ibid., 156r. 20. See the text of this document in Muhammad Husayn Quddusi, Nddirndmah (Mashhad: Chapkhanah-yi Khurasan, 1339 Sh./1960), 540.

170 Tucker Nadir's post-1148/1736 coins and seals adoptedanothersort of dissimulationby avoiding obvious references to either Sunni or Shi'i symbols. Nadir neitherincluded the names of the first four caliphs on his coins-a device often employed by Islamic rulers who wished to emphasize their Sunni orientation-nor mentioned any of the Imams on them, as the Safavids had done.21 Instead,he chose coins and seals that avoidedany specific sectarian a motto for his post-coronation references:"Whenthe seal of state and religion had been displaced,God gave order to Iranin the name of Nadir."22 As a matterof policy, Nadir suppressedaspects of Shi'ism which connotedovert hostility to Sunnism. However, he not only did not prohibit outward signs of Shi'i devotion which he did not perceive as inimical to Sunnis, he actually promoted them. In fact, one of the staunchest anti-Nadir chroniclers of the twelfth/eighteenthcentury, Shaykh Muhammad'Ali Hazin, recordedthat Nadir had the shrine of Imam Riza decoratedand repairedin honor of his coronation, revealing that Nadir was careful to display at least one sign of Shi'i piety in the wake of his removal of the Safavids from power.23 After assumingthe throne,Nadir kept up his role as patronof the shrinesof various Imams, continuing to pay for the improvementof the mausoleumof Imam Riza. He issued afirmdn appointinga new custodian from among the ulama of Mashhad for that shrine in 1154/1742.24 Nadir also financed the renovationof the dome of the shrine of 'Ali in Najaf after his invasion of Iraqin 1156/1743.25 Such venerationof holy shrines constituted an essential expression of Shi'i devotion but was not highly objectionable to the Sunnis, at least in its outward manifestations. IV. The Council of Najaf Soon after establishinghimself on the throneat Mughan,Nadir embarkedon an expedition which culminatedin his conquest of India in 1151/1739, a feat communicated to the Ottomans through an embassy that broughtthem lavish gifts from the Mughal treasury.26Even after such largesse, the Ottomansdid not re
21. See, for example, the coinage of Mahmud and Ashraf, the Sunni Ghalzay Afghan monarchs of Iran, in H. L. Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shahs of Iran (London: n.p., 1910), 48-50. qarar dad khudac 22. "Nigiln-idawlat u din raftah buidchun az ja/bi-nam-i Nadir Iramn 1148 [17361" (ibid., 52). 23. See MuhammadMalayiri's summary of Hazin's account in Nadir Shaih(Tehran: Intisharat-i Bunyad, 1357 Sh./1978), 153. 24. 'Abd al-Husayn Nava'i, ed., Na-dir Sha-h va bdzmandagainash: hamra-h bd namahha-yi sal.tanatziva asnad-i siyasc va iddri (Tehran: Intisharat-i Zarrin, 1368 Sh./1989), 480-81. 25. Lockhart, Nadir Shah, 197, 233, n. 1. Nadir also visited the tomb of Abu Hanifah during his 1156/1743 Iraqi campaign, perhaps as a gesture to both the Ottomans and his Sunni followers. 26. For a list of the gifts he sent them, see Nava'i, Nadir Shah, 303-4.

Nadir Shahand the Ja'fariMadhhab 171 consider their rejection of the Ja'fari madhhab concept. When they finally decided to go to war against Nadir in 1155/1742, their Shaykh al-Islam issued a fatwa condemning the Ja'fari madhhab as a heretical innovation.27 To counter this rejection, Nadir summonedulama from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistanand Central Asia to the shrine city of Najaf during his 1156/1743 invasion of Iraq to a formal council to ratifythe Ja'farimadhhabidea. 'Abdullahal-Suwaydi, a Shafi'i 'alim from a prominentBaghdadfamily sent by the Ottomangovernorof Baghdadto observe this event, wrote the most comprehensive eyewitness account of it.28 His work confirms the dual nature of the Ja'fariproposal,showing how Nadir simultaneouslypursuedthe divergentgoals of its foreign and domestic versions at this meeting. For example, al-Suwaydi noted that on the way to Najaf, Nadir visited several shrines,including the tomb of the ninthImam,Muhammadal-Jawad,and that he was holding the council at the shrine of 'Ali.29 In a private audience with alSuwaydi,Nadirtold him thathe had convened the council because in my realmthereare two areas,Afghanistan Turkistan, which they and in call the Iranians infidels. Infidelityis loathsomeand it is not appropriate that there shouldbe in my domainsone people who call anotherinfidels. Now I makeyou my representative go andremoveall of the charges into of fidelity and witness this in front of the three groupswith whateveris required.You will report that everything you see andhearto me andrelayyour account to AhmadKhan [AhmetPasha, the Ottomangovernorof Baghdad].30 Through his visits to holy sites on the road to Najaf, Nadir emphasized his commitmentto certainparts of Shi'i tradition. At the same time, his remarksto al-Suwaydi indicated that he wanted to end the Sunni labeling of Shi'is as infidels in his own domains. Finally, by using al-Suwaydi, an Ottoman cleric, to witness an agreementon his religious ideas, Nadir could also addressthe foreign context of the Ja'fariproposalby having an Ottoman 'dlimcertify that it was indeed a shift to Sunnism. The council of Najaf, however, was not an occasion to harmonizethese different aspects of the Ja'farimadhhab,but to establish them as distinct but relatedparts of Nadir's religious policy. Al-Suwaydi quickly graspedthat the real purposeof the meeting was not to produce a true reconciliation between Sunnism and Shi'ism. He portrayedNadir's chief religious official, the Mullabashi 'Ali Akbar, as a man not interestedin the nuances of theological discussion. Curiously, the only real debate occurredover whom the prophetMuhammadhad designated as his successor, a dispute that Nadir would seem to have made irrelevantby his
27. Ba?bakanlik Arivi, Istanbul, Muhimme defteri 142: 227, 243. 28. 'Abdullah b. Husayn al-Suwaydi, al-Hujaj al-qat'iyah li-ittifdq al-firaq alIslcmi-yah (Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-Halabiyah, 1905). 29. Ibid., 5. 30. Ibid., 11.

172 Tucker ban on cursing the first three caliphs. In discussions with al-Suwaydi, Mullabashi went to some lengths to prove that Muhammadhad designated 'Ali to be his successor, citing two ahaldithwhich the Ottoman observer summarily rejected as weak traditions. 'Ali Akbarthen quoted a Qur'anicverse-"Your protectors are God, his Apostle, and those who pray, give alms, and bow down before God"-and stated that most people believed that this referred to 'Ali.31 'Ali Akbarcomplainedthat When al-Suwaydi disagreed with his interpretation, perhapsbecause his own Arabic was not very good, al-Suwaydi had not understood what he was trying to say. This was the end of any formal debate, which clearly had been put on for show. The real purpose of the meeting became clear when Nadir Shah assembled the ulamaand invited al-Suwaydito witness the signing of a documentby the clerics of Iran, Afghanistan, and Transoxianawhich would confirm the removal of all the mukaffirdt,the specific practices, such as sabb, which led to the denunciation of Shi'is as infidels. They gathered under a canopy that had been constructedover the tomb of 'Ali, a gesture calculatedto heighten the impact of the
agreement.32

After they had assembled, the Mullabashiasked the Sunnis to explain why they declaredthe Shi'is infidels. He did not appeal to fine points of theology, but recited a litany of Sunni authorities'opinions:
We have not been declared infidels, even by Abu Hanifah. He said in his

Jami' al-usul that Islam encompasses five madhhabs, the fifth being the
imdmi madhhab, and knowledgeable scholars consider the imdmi madhhab to be one of the Islamic sects.... Abu Hanifah, in the Fiqh al-akbar, says that the ahl al-qiblah must not be declared infidels. The authorof the Sharh hidayat al-fiqh al-Hanafi wa'l-sahih said that al-imdmiyah was an Islamic sect, yet your authorities who followed [them] have declared us infidels and our authoritieswho followed have declared you infidels.33

Reverting to basic theology, the qad1 of Bukhara,Hadi Khwajah,pointed out, "We declare you infidels because you curse the two shaykhs" [Abu Bakr and 'Umar]. The Mullabashiresponded,"We have stoppedthis practice." The qddi observed thata personcould not simply repentfrom this cursingand added,"We also declare you infidels because of your disparagementof the Companionsof the Prophet." The Mullabashireplied, "All of the Companionsarejust." When the qddi(mut'ah), 'Ali Akbar marriage" asserted,"You practicetemporary answered, "It is forbiddenand only ignorantpeople accept it."34 The qddi next
31. Ibid., 17, quoting Qur'an 5:58. 32. Al-Suwaydi, al-Hujaj al-qat'iyah, 18-20. Al-Suwaydi included a detailed list of the participants, who represented the major ulama of Iran, Afghanistan, and Transoxiana. Of the Iranianparticipants,only one, Sayyid Ahmad of Ardalan, was a Sunni. Like al-Suwaydi, he was a Shafi'i. 33. Ibid., 19-20. 34. Ibid., 19.

NadirShahand the Ja'fari Madhhab 173 chargedthatthe Shi'is preferred'Ali to the othercaliphs and believed thathe was the successor of Muhammad. The Mullabashi responded, "The most excellent human being after Muhammadis Abu Bakr, followed by 'Umar, then 'Uthman, and then 'Ali. Theircaliphatesoccurredin thatorder."35 The qa-dithen asked what authoritythe Iranianswere relying on for their theological interpretations. The Mullabashireplied that they followed al-Ash'ari.36 As the Mullabashibegan to recite the ways in which the Iranianshad conformed to Sunni practice,the qadi of Bukharakept repeatingunderhis breath, "cursing the two shaykhs [i.e., Abu Bakr and 'Umar] is unbelief (kufr)."37 Al-Suwaydi explained that the qadi's intention was to emphasize that the sin of cursing the first three caliphs could not be expiated according to the Hanafi madhhab, and since most of these Iranianshad cursed these caliphs at one time, they could not now be forgiven. In response, Mulla Hamzah,an Afghan delegate, asked the qadi if he could produce evidence that anyone present had cursed the first three caliphs. The qddi confessed thathe had none, and on this inconclusive note the Mullabashideclared the theological discussion to be over.38 The delegates then signed a document reiteratingNadir's prohibitionon sabb and restatingmost of the proposalshe had made to the Ottomansin 1148/1736.39 At first glance, the documentappearsto have accepted the legitimacy of the first four caliphs-one of the bedrock foundations of Sunni doctrine. Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and even 'Uthman, were duly accorded their Sunni honorific titles and salutations.40 More careful examination, however, reveals importantambiguities. A good example can be found in its citation of what 'Ali was reportedto have said about the first two caliphs. His words can be interpretedeither to mean "they were two just and righteous leaders, [ruling] according to the truth [i.e., God] and dying accordingto the truth[i.e., God]" or "they were two unjust and tyrannical leaders, [ruling] against truth, and dying against truth."'41 This

35. Ibid., 20. This statement contradicted 'Ali Akbar's earlier assertions about Muhammad's designation of 'Ali as his successor (see above). 36. Ibid. Moojan Momen observes that the Akhbari school of Shi'i theology adopted an "almost-Ash'ari" approach to theology, so 'Ali Akbar's statement might be evidence of an Akhbariorientationamong some of Nadir's ulama. See Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 222. 37. Al-Suwaydi, al-Hujaj al-qat'iyah, 21. 38. Ibid., 20-21. 39. Ibid., 23-5. A more complete Persian version of the Najaf document appears in Mahdi Khan, Tdrikh, 388-94. Another complete version of the text can be found in 'Abbas Iqbal, "Vasiqah-yi ittihad-i Islam-i Nadiri," Yddgar 6 (1326 Sh./1947): 4355. 40. Al-Suwaydi, al-Hujaj al-qat'iyah, 22; Mahdi Khan, Tdrikh, 392; Iqbal, "Vasiqah," 52. 41. "Humd imaman 'adilan qasitan kana 'ala al-haqq, wa mdta 'ala al-haqq" (alSuwaydi, al-Hujaj al-qat'lyah, 23). See also Mahdi Khan, Tdrikh, 393; lqbal, "Vasiqah," 52.

174 Tucker phraseis a well-attesteddouble entendrein Arabiclexicography.42Juparticular dicious use of such ambiguityprovided the only way for the two divergent versions of the Ja'fari madhhabto coexist. Sunnis could sign the Najaf document interpreting'Ali's words as praise for the first two caliphs. Shi'is could sign it interpretingthem, inwardly of course, as blame. By employing such multivabelent phrases,the documentassuredthatboth could preservetheirfundamental liefs, the Sunnis openly and the Shi'is throughdissimulativeinterpretation. Because it appearedto him to representa conversion to Sunni belief on the part of Nadir's ulama,al-Suwaydisigned the documentand describedthe whole event as "a time witnessed as one of the curiosities of the world, which broughtjoy and happiness to the Sunnis. Nothing like it has occurredthroughthe ages. No wedding feast or holiday celebrationcan be comparedto it. Praisebe to God for it."43 Al-Suwaydi was clearly glad to welcome the Iraniansto the Sunni fold, in however suspicioushe might have been of what had actuallytranspired Najaf. After the signing ceremony he noted that Nadir's soldiers suddenly were overflowing with praise for the first three caliphs and all the Companions of the Prophet. Although suspicious of their sincerity, al-Suwaydi recordedtheir apparentlyunabashedexpressions of Sunni piety. After invoking the names of the first four caliphs and the Ottoman sultan, the Mullabashioffered a blessing for Nadir Shah and led a ritualprayer.44Al-Suwaydi became more suspicious when he realized that this prayerdid not conform to any of the four Sunni madhhabs and complainedaboutit to Nadir. Nadir replied that he should ignore minordiscrepanciesin the prayerand focus insteadon how he was to informAhmet Pasha that the conflicts between Sunnism and Shi'ism had been resolved by the ratification of the Najaf document. This admonitiondid not satisfy al-Suwaydi, who confrontedthe Mullabashiand asked him why the Iranianshad prayedin such an unorthodoxway. The Mullabashi explained that the Iraniansfollowed the madhhab of Ja'far al-Sadiq-the first mention of the Imam in al-Suwaydi's account. Al-Suwaydi retortedthat if that were so, then they could do almost anything, since Ja'far excused almost any activity on the pretext of ritual dissimulation (taqiyah).45 Al-Suwaydi asked several 'alims how they could act on the basis of his sayings. The Mullabashi responded,"Ourmadhhabis such that if a person is competentto perform ijtihad (independentjudicial reasoning),he should do so accordingto the words of Ja'far."46 Ultimately, al-Suwaydi was alarmed to discover that the entire council of Najaf might have been a gigantic exercise in taqiyah, in which case
42. It is said that the same words were used by a woman to insult the Umayyad governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf (41-95/661-714), but that she was spared when he interpretedthem with their positive meaning. Al-qasitun was also used to refer to the followers of Mu'awiyah at the battle of Siffin (37/657). See E. W. Lane, ArabicEnglish Lexicon, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1984), 1975, 2523. 43. Al-Suwaydi, al-Hujaj al-qat'iyah, 24. 44. Ibid., 27. 45. Ibid., 28. 46. Ibid.

NadirShahand the Ja'fariMadhhab 175 the agreementhe had signed would have been of doubtful validity, if not totally meaningless in his eyes. As depictedby al-Suwaydi,the council of Najaf broughttogethervariouspartsof Nadir's religious vision. To al-Suwaydi, as official representativeof the Ottomans, the Ja'fari madhhab was presentedemphatically as a returnto Sunnism. To the Iranianparticipantsit was offered not as an attemptto resolve longstanding theological quarrels, but as a formula to defuse the power that those disagreementshad to create sectarianstrife. It appealedimplicitly to dissimulation as a way to protectthose aspects of Shi'i belief and practiceto which al-Suwaydi and the Sunnis raised objections. Finally, since it was signed at Najaf, it underscored Nadir's commitmentto promotethe venerationof Shi'i holy shrines. The juxtaposition of the foreign and domestic versions of the Ja'fari proposal at the council of Najaf so thoroughlydisconcertedal-Suwaydi that he decided to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca immediately upon returningto Baghdad, perhaps to cleanse his soul of the uncertaintiesproducedby this experience. Although alSuwaydi appearsto have been delightedto see the Iraniansdeclarethat they were giving up heretical practices, he remained suspicious that the Ja'fari madhhab might be a trick. His confusion reflected the actual natureof the Ja'fari madhhab-a compromise designed not to reconcile, but to set aside sectariandifferences.

V. TheEnd of the Ja'fari Madhhab In the end, despite al-Suwaydi's approvalof the Najaf agreement, Nadir made peace with the Ottomansonly after a long series of militarycampaignsand after he abandoned his call for a Ja'fari madhhab and a pillar in the Ka'bah. In 1159/1746, he signed a treaty with them that ostensibly recognized the conversion of Iranto Sunnism and definitively prohibitedthe ritual cursing of the first three caliphs in his empire. However, an appendixto the treatyimplied thatIranianswould continueto make pilgrimages to the shrine cities ('atabdt-i 'dliydt)of Iraq. It specifically admonished Ottomanofficials from Baghdad not to seize the propertyof Iranianswho were visiting those places.47 In fact, Nadir's treaty with the Ottomans appears to have been the first Iranian-Ottomanagreement that explicitly secured the rights of Iranianpilgrims in Ottomanterritory. The guaranteeof protection for Iraniansvisiting the tombs of the Shi'i Imams, hardly budding converts to Sunnism, recalled Nadir's own devotion to the holy shrines. This agreement signaled the end of conflict between the Ottomansand Nadirand clearedthe way for them to establish formal relations. The agreementachieved a basic goal that the Ja'farimadhhabconcept had been

47. Mahdi Khan, Tdrikh, 418.

176 Tucker designed to promote:the formal recognition of a Sunni frameworkfor international relations which would also maintainessential facets of Shi'ism as defined by Nadir. Moreover, subsequent Iranian-Ottoman accords, such as the 1238/1823 Treaty of Erzurum,relied heavily on the frameworkestablished by the 1159/1746 agreement-an enduringlegacy of Nadir's tenureon the throne.48 Unfortunatelyfor Nadir, this success in foreign affairs coincided with the complete disintegration of his regime at home; he was assassinated by his own troops only a few months after making peace with the Ottomans. Nadir'sdeathsignaledthe definitiveabandonment the Ja'farimadhhabconcept. of His grandson Shahrukh,who emerged as his successor after 1163/1750, cast himself explicitly as a staunchdefenderof orthodoxTwelver Shi'ism.49 In the domestic sphere, despite the constantrebellions in various partsof Iranin the latteryears of Nadir's reign which culminatedin his assassination,resistance to Nadir's religious innovationsappearsto have remaineda less important factor in domestic unrestthan angerover his displacementof the Safavids. Contemporary accounts clearly distinguishedbetween the effects of Nadir's deposition of the Safavidsand the impactof his Ja'farimadhhabconcept. An early example is the account of ArutinEfendi, an OttomanArmenianmusician who traveled extensively through Iran in 1151-53/1738-40. His work is importantbecause he talked with many minor Iranianofficials, offering a window, however cloudy, on the perceptionsand opinions of some of Nadir's subjects. Arutin Efendi harshly criticized Nadir's assumption of the throne and dwelt on Nadir's complicity in the murderof Shah Tahmasp II, which he regarded as a criminal act.50 He did not even mention the Ja'fari madhhab, but offered a revealing anecdoteconcerningNadir's approachto religion. According to ArutinEfendi, Nadir Shah, soon afterhis coronationat Mughan,sent out heralds on four successive days. On the first day, the herald proclaimed that the shah was Sunni (charyari), on the second day, that he was tribal Shi'i (qizilbash), on the third, that he was Armenian (i.e., Christian), and on the fourth,that he was Jewish. When asked his motives for such actions, Nadir said that he was trying to prevent intercommunalstrife by holding out the chance that each community could claim him as its own. Nadir warned that all the communities should treat each other with friendship, otherwise he would "cut their heads off like meat."51 Such a story, however fanciful, suggests that Nadir's principalreligious goal may have been perceived, at least by some of his subjects, not to have been the suppressionof Shi'ism but the unequivocalimpo

48. For the text of the Treaty of Erzurum,which in fact explicitly stated that its basis was the 1159/1746 treaty, see J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 1:219-21. 49. See, for example, Shahrukh's coins, which resumed the Safavid practice of including the names of the Twelve Imams (Rabino, Coins, 55-6). 50. TanburiArutin Efendi, TahmasKulu Han'in Tevarihi,ed. Esat Uras (Ankara:Turk Tarih KurumuBasimevi, 1942), 43-6. 51. Ibid., 44.

Nadir Shahand the Ja fian Madhhab 177 sition of religious toleranceamong them. One of the most important Persian chroniclers of Nadir's reign, Muhammad Kazim Marvi, did not even mention the Ja'fari madhhab concept until he described the 1156/1743 council of Najaf (see above), seven years after Nadir's coronation. MuhammadKazim simply noted that even after Nadir forbade the open performanceof ta'ziyah or any commemorationof the battle of Karbala, faithful Shi'is continued to hold these ceremonies in private-virtually the only referenceto the effects of Nadir's religious changes.52In contrast,a large partof the work attemptedto show how Nadir's reign was doomed because of his responsibility for the deposition and eventual execution of Tahmasp II and his sons.53 Marvi criticized Nadir less for his attempt to transform the outward manifestationsof Shi'ism than for his perceived complicity in attemptingto extinguish the Safavid line. A similar approachcan be discerned in one of the latest contemporaryaccounts of Nadir, the Sefaretname-iKesriyeli Ahmet PaEa, the narrativeof an Ottoman embassy sent to congratulate Nadir on the successful conclusion of the 1159/1746 peace treatywhich instead witnessed the turmoilthat engulfed Iranat the time of Nadir's death.54 Its author,Kirimli Rahim Efendi, a noted Ottoman poet and the official scribe of the embassy, interviewed several of Nadir's senior commanders who had fled to Ottoman territory.55His account reveals that an inability to establish political legitimacy dogged Nadir to his death more than his problemsand questions surrounding religious policies. RahimEfendi summarizesthese commanders'principalcriticismof Nadir: Aside from the fact thatNadirShah,in origin,was not of the dynastiesof
kings or sultans and that it was therefore impossible for the people of Iran to obey him, it can be concluded that they would not be loyal to his sons either. He was seized with the evil idea that no one should remain to oppose his sons after him. Since [Nadir's] army was composed of Uzbeks, Afghans, Afshars, and Qajars, and because he had no need for Iraniansin the army, he got rid of the Iranians in the army, each under a different pretext, and he fined prosperous peasants into poverty, neglecting the noble saying, "a government endures despite [the ruler's] unbelief, but it does not continue in spite of [the ruler's] oppression."56

52. Muhammad Kazim Marvi, Thrikh-i 'alam-drd-yi Nddirf, ed. Muhammad Amin Riyahi, 3 vols.(Tehran: Naqsh-i Jahan, 1364 Sh./1985), 982. 53. For an analysis of Marvi's view of Nadir's relationship to the Safavids, see Ernest Tucker, "Explaining Nadir Shah: Kingship and Royal Legitimacy in Muhammad Kazim Marvi's Tarikh-i 'alam-a-ra--yiNddiri," Iranian Studies 26, nos. 1-2 (1993): 95-115. 54. Kirimli Rahim Efendi, Sefaretname-i Kesriyeli Ahmet Paza, MS Topkapi Sarayi Kutuphanesi Hazinesi 1635. 55. For a recent Persian translation and discussion of this work, see Muhammad Amin Riyahi, Safdratnamahha-yiIran (Tehran:Tus, 1368 Sh./1989), 205-42. 56. Rahim Efendi, Sefaretname, 44r-44v.

178 Tucker He suggested that Nadir's biggest problem was his lack of legitimacy and oppressive rule, not the taint of impiety that his religious proposals might have implied. The relative indifference with which these diverse sources treated Nadir's religious ideas, in contrast to their severe criticism of his treatmentof the last Safavids, suggests that the Ja'fari proposal itself may have been perceived within Nadir's realm as less threateningthan and quite distinct from his depositionand eliminationof the precedingdynasty. Interestingly,the chronicles of Safavid loyalists of the late 12th/18thand early 13th/19th century condemned Nadir as a tyrant, but did not upbraid him as stronglyfor the Ja'farimadhhabidea as might be expected. For example, Khalil Mar'ashi Safavi, one of the most ardentSafavid loyalists of the post-Nadirperiod, although bitterly critical of Nadir for executing prominentShi'i clerics in the latterpartof his reign, describedhis ban on public Shi'i ceremoniesafter the Mughancoronationas a relatively benign imposition.57 The Fawa 'id al-Safavlyah, a pro-Safavid chronicle written around 1211/1796, confined its discussion of Nadir's religiosity to a single anecdote. It seems that when Nadir came to Najaf (presumablyin 1156/1743), his companionstold him that wine which was broughtto Najaf would turnto vinegar, but he did not believe them. When he commandedsome Armeniansto bring wine into Najaf, all of it turnedto vinegar when it enteredthe city. Thus, Nadir decided to gild the dome of the shrine of 'Ali in Najaf.58 While this tale did not exactly celebrate Nadir, it also did not depict him as a destroyerof Shi'ism. As far as Nadir's reputationamong later Shi'i clergy goes, a 13th/19thcentury Shi'i biographicaldictionary,the Rawdakt al-jannat, mentioned Nadir's attempt to have a fifth pillar erected in the Ka'bah as the last in a long series of efforts by Shi'i rulers to gain acceptance in the Sunni world. It noted that Nadir was willing to give up sabb, but that Sunni rulersdid not accept his offer and, thereThe work fore, "theImamites [Twelver Shi'is] did not change their practices."59 criticizedSunni refusalof Nadir's proposalinsteadof the proposalitself. VI. Conclusions The Ja'farimadhhabconcept can be easily regardedas ephemeral. HamidAlgar shows how it flew in the face of long-establishedShi'i traditions. He notes that to abandonpublic Shi'i rituals such as sabb meant giving up practices that had

57. Mirza Khalil Mar'ashi Safavi, Majma' al-tawarikh, ed. 'Abbas Iqbal (Tehran: Tahuri, 1362 Sh./1984), 84. 58. Abu'l-Hasan Qazvini, Fawad'idal-Safaviyah, ed. Maryam Mir-Ahmadi (Tehran: Mu'assasah-yi Mutala'at va Tahqiqat-i Farhangi, 1367 Sh./1988), 153-4. 59. Muhammad Baqir b. Zayn al-'Abidin al-Khwansari,Rawdat al-janndt (Tehran: Nasir-i Khusraw, 1340 Sh./1961), 1:190.

Nadir Shahand the Ja fari Madhhab 179 become integralpartsof Shi'ism by the twelfth/eighteenthcentury.60 However, Nadir did not worry about how consistently the Ja'fari madhhab followed existing Shi'i practice. Instead, he sought a basis for reconciliation with the greaterSunni world which at the same time discardedpublic religious ceremonies closely associated with the Safavids. In compensationfor the hindrances imposed by the Ja'fariproposal,Nadir took some pains to defend those facets of Shi'ism which did not impede his quest for legitimacy. He called, ultimately, for selective dissimulationin orderto presentthe Ja'farimadhhabconcept to his Shi'i subjects as a minor sacrifice for the greater glory of his empire and the peace of the Muslim ummah which also preserved essential facets of Shi'ism, albeit in an alteredform. Although he did not succeed in establishing the Ja'fari madhhab at home or abroad,it is significant that the spirit of his proposal was embodied in the treaty that he signed with Ottomansin 11]59/1746and that, accordingto contemporary sources, anger over his religious innovationswas less a factor in populardiscontent with his reign than his oppressive administrationand his deposition of the Safavids. Nadir's failure to attractthe supportof either the Ottomansor his subjects for his proposal, though, testifies to the immense power of Twelver Shi'i orthodoxyin Iranas it had developedby the end of the Safavidperiod. With his focus on Ja'far al-Sadiq, Nadir evoked the Muslim community of the 2nd/8th century-an era in which enmity between Sunnis and Shi'is had not yet been fully exploited to legitimize conflict between Islamic empires. At the same time, in its breathtakinginnovation, Nadir's Ja'fari madhhab idea also looked forwardto later proposals for bringing the Muslim world together, anticipating subsequentattemptsto forge a unified Islamic bloc based as much on recognition of common political interestsas on reconciliationof religious differences. ErnestTucker,HistoryDepartment,U.S. Naval Academy

60. Algar, "Shi'ism and Iran," 298.