5.

The UN Security Council

Primary Responsibility Under UN Charter Under article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security and the authority to act on behalf of all members of the UN.

Chapters VI of the UN Charter Chapter VI deals with peaceful settlement of disputes, providing a wide range of techniques to investigate disputes and help parties achieve resolution without using force.

Security Councils Authority (1) Identify aggressors and commit all UN members to take enforcement measures such as economic sanctions, (2) to provide military forces for joint action

Chapter VII Prior to 1990, all UN Peacekeeping forces were authorized under Chapter VI. In cold War era UNSC used its enforcement powers only on two occasions (Korea and Congo). (http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/3/541.full.pdf) One dramatic change since the Cold Wars end is the Security Councils increased use of Chapter VII, including its provisions for economic sanctions and military enforcement action.

Size of the UNSC The Security Council was kept small in order to facilitate more efficient (i.e. swifter) decision-making in dealing with threats to international peace and security.

Membership UNSC has both permanent (P5) and non-permanent (10) members. P5, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China are the key to Security Councils decision-making since each has veto power. The non-permanent members (10) are elected for two-year terms and participate fully in the Councils work. At least four non-permanent members must vote in favour of resolution for it to pass.

No Country may serve successive terms as a non-permanent member. Five of the non-permanent seats go to Africa and Asia, two each to Latin America and Western Europe and one to Eastern Europe. The designation of permanent members reflected the distribution of military power in 1945.

Criticism The desire to ensure UNs ability to respond quickly and decisively to any aggression is not fulfilled. UN could not undertake an enforcement action either against its strongest members or their concurrence. The current Council composition, however, is clearly an anachronism and discussion of equitable represention is a major reform issue. Any state, including non-UN members has right to bring issues before the Security Council. There is no guarantee of action.

The Secretary-General can also bring the matter to the attention of the Security Councils attention to address problems before they become crisis. Non-members may attend formal meetings and address the Council upon request when they have an interest in a particular issue (have a dog in the fight).

Veto Power The Soviet Union used its veto power frequently during the Cold War, not only to block action on many peace and security issues but also to block admission of westernsupported new member and nominees for Secretary General. The United States did not exercise their veto until the 1970s reflecting its early dominance and many friends. US has infrequently used the veto since the 1990. Early precedent exists of abstentions not to be counted as vetoes. Abstention means registering disagreement, but not blocking action.

Breakthrough for the UNSC In the late 1980s, the Security Councils activity, power and prestige increased again following major shifts in Soviet foreign policy. There was a quick succession of breakthroughs in regional conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, Central America, Namibia and Cambodia.

New Trends - Consensus Building The Security Council also began to conduct more informal, private consultations and to reach more decisions by consensus than by formal voting. Security Councils presidents now play an active role in facilitating discussions and consensus building, determining when the members are ready to reach a decision. The President also confers regularly with the SecretaryGeneral, with relevant states, and other actors not represented on the Council. The presidency rotates monthly between the 15 members.

In addition, P-5 informally consults, a practice that has enhanced their close cooperation, but also fuelled perceptions of Great-Power collusion.

History of Enforcement Since 1987, the Security Council has taken action on more armed conflicts, made more decisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorized more peacekeeping operations and imposed more types of sanctions in more situations than ever before. In 1991, US led coalition forces liberated Kuwait under UN flag. This was undoubtedly UNs finest hour. The confrontation with Iraq in 1990 marked a high point in Security Councils functioning. The strength of agreement among both the P-5 and the non-permanent members of the Council at that time was extra-ordinary.

Yet, the UN was unable to make war itself and had to stand aside while the US and allied forces took the lead without formally reporting to the Security Council as the authorizing organ. Even though the Council resumed its lead role with the ceasefire and punitive sanctions imposed on Iraq, the questions raised about its ability to fulfill the mandate of maintaining peace and security would return repeatedly throughout the 1990s.

1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared his famous Report titled Agenda for Peace [A/47/277 - S/24111 17 June 1992] triggering a debate about what UN can do and what it cannot do in dealing with threats to peace.

In the aftermath of debacle in Somalia where US operated independent of UNPK effort, US stopped paying its commitment to UN making it clear how important US funding is to keep the UN going.

It authorized NATO bombing Bosnian Serb forces in Bosnia in 1995.

It has authorized UN administered protectorates in Kosovo an in East Timor. The decision by US and NATO in 1999 to undertake bombing of Serbia (in former Yugoslavia) without explicit authorization

from UNSC and in the face of Russian and Chinese opposition showed that p-5 was deeply divided. Yet the Security Council assumed a major role in Kosovo with the end of NATO bombing.

It took the unprecedented step of creating War Crimes Tribunal to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

It expanded definition of threats to peace to include terrorism following the September 2001, attacks on the Word Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

The gulf between UNSC and the General Assembly widened in 2001-2002 in during the Secretary-Generalship of Kofi Annan. At special sessions in 2000 and 2001, the Council identified HIV/AIDS epidemic and the multi-faceted crisis in Africa as security threat.

Conflict Resolution When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement.

When a dispute leads to fighting, the Council's first concern is to bring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, the Council has issued cease-fire directives which have been instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. It also sends United Nations peace-keeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keep opposing forces apart and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought. The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action. A Member State against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. A Member State which has persistently violated the principles of the Charter may be expelled from the United Nations by the Assembly on the Council's recommendation. A State which is a Member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that that country's interests are affected. Both Members of the United Nations and non-members, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, are invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council's discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation by a non-member State.

CONCLUSION The UN Charter gives the Security Council enormous formal power but does not give it direct control over the means to use that power. The Security Council has no standing armies. It depends upon the voluntary cooperation of states willing to contribute to peacekeeping missions, to enforce sanctions, to pay their dues, and to support enforcement actions either under UN command or by a coalition of the willing. However, it can be said that, despite these problems demanding major reforms of the organization, UN does represent the twenty-first century and not the post-1945 world.

ASSIGNMENT SAFE HAVENS OF BOSNIA: 1995 READ THE CASE STUDY: The Return of History: Bosnia and the Hour of Europe INTERNET SEARCH: Agenda for Peace Boutros Boutros Ghali - 1992

CASE STUDY The Return of History: Bosnia and the Hour of Europe
Christopher Myer, Getting Our Way, Chapter 9 The Serb Siege of Sarajevo April 1992 The siege of Sarajevo, was an episode of such notoriety in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that one must go back to WW II to find a parallel in European history. Not since then had a professional army conducted a campaign of unrelenting violence against the inhabitants of a European city so as to reduced them to a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in constant fear of death. In the period covered in (Milosevic) indictment, there was no where safe for a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in a hospital, from deliberate attack. Serbian Atrocities Elsewhere in Bosnia, Serbian forces made rapid gains, within months occupying 70 percent of the country. The mainly Muslim inhabitants of Eastern Bosnia were driven out or killed. Refugees poured into Croatia, bringing with them tales of mass killings, the burning of villages and mass rape. The UN estimated that just a month into the conflict, 520,000 people, a twelfth of the population, had been displaced from their homes. Aid convoys destined to help these people were blocked by ground troops. It was a vast humanitarian disaster that would only get worse. Something had to be done. World Reaction to Atrocities In 1992 Margaret Thatcher told the world: Serbia will not listen unless forced to listen waiting until the conflict burns itself out will not only be dishonourable but also very costly: refugees, terrorism, Balkan wars drawing in other countries, and worse. The inaction of the West made it an accomplice to slaughter. UN PROFOR Deployment In June 1992, the UN Peace-keeping force, UNPROFOR deployed to Bosnia. It had been created the previous September during the Serb-Croat War.

It had no peace-making authority. Besides the protection of humanitarian convoys and refugees, its main task was to hold and protect Sarajevos airport. A couple of months later the British government decided to contribute a battalion of 1,800 men. After France, Britain became UNPROFORs largest contributor. The London Conference A weak after the decision to send in British troops, a joint EC-UN conference was convened in London, hosted by the British Prime Minister, John Major, and the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali. The conference brought together 30 nations, including representatives of the Yugoslav Republic. The aim was to halt the violence, alleviate a mounting humanitarian crisis, and put in place a framework within which a final peace could be negotiated. There was particular concern that, as winter approached, over a million refugees could die of exposure and starvation. Tough Conclusions Major opened the conference with words: The people who we represent have been appalled by the destruction, the killing, the maiming the sheer cruelty which has disfigured Yugoslavia. We all seek a just peace. The London conference reached tough conclusions. The warring parties were ordered to halt ethnic cleansing and agree to peace talks in Geneva or face harsh consequences: if the y do not comply the Security Council will be invited to apply stringent sanctions leading to their total isolation UN Retribution The promised UN retribution was nowhere to be seen: no stringent sanctions, no total isolation. Above all, there was no use of force to stop the fighting and the atrocities, and the threat had not even been made in the London communique. This set a disastrous precedent. It led Milosevic and Tudjman, the Croat leader, to believe for over three years that they could face down the international community. Cart Blanche The aftermath of the London conference as good as gave the Serbs and Croats carte blanche in their ethnic cleansing. It was hardly surprising that four successive peace plans subsequently foundered. Neither the Serbs nor the Croats had any incentive to submit to the Mediators plans, when they thought that, without fear of retribution, they could acquire more territory by force of arms.

The cycle of violence was reversed only when the gap between tough talking and weak action became intolerable. This happened with the sorry tale of the safe havens.

Safe Havens Six of these had been created by Security Council in 1993. They included Serbrenica. The idea was that there should be areas where Bosnian refugees could find sanctuary from the violence. Their integrity would be guaranteed by UNPROFOR. The initiative was flawed from the Start. The commander of UN forces requested some 30,000 troops for the task of protecting the safe havens; he got around 7,500 instead.

Air Strikes Dual Key Arrangement The Security Council had provided for air strikes, should the havens come under attack. But the strikes had to be authorized by a UN/NATO dual key a clumsy arrangement which guaranteed impossibly slow responses, if any at all.

The havens became places where Bosnian forces rested before combat. This prejudiced their integrity in Serb eyes and invited attack. UNPROFOR found itself stranded once again in an ill-defined no-mans land between peacekeeping and peace-making. The result was predictable. The safe haven of Serbrenica came under Serb attack in July 1995. the few hundred lightly armed Dutch troops of UNPROFOR could do nothing to protect the thousands of refugees. In one of the most notorious incidents of the whole conflict almost 8,000 men and boys were massacred by General Mladic and his Bosnian Serb Army. It required an atrocity of this scale finally to lead to decisive action. It was taken by an informal club of Great Powers, called the Contact Group US, UK, France, Germany and Russia. NATO Bombing Attacks August 1995 All five were on the UN Security Council. The group seized the reins of Bosnian policy from inside UN and NATO. The Contact Group, led by America, is just like the Great Power Directorate that ran the Congress of Vienna and kept multilateral diplomacy on leash. Bosnian Serbs came under heavy NATO bombing attacks, while the Croats comprehensively defeated the Croatian Serbs in a lightening campaign [in August 1995]. Dayton Accord - 21 November 1995 Wheeling and dealing, not entirely trusted by anyone. Holbrooke delivered where the Europeans had failed. After 21 days of negotiations last minute renegotiation of borders Izetbegovic of Bosnia, Tudjman of Croatia and Milosevic of Serbia were finally brought to initial a deal. It was solemnly signed a month later in Paris. By the time the Balkan bulldozer went into action, the Americans were ready to use force. That was the watershed. Further air strikes, 25,000 US troops on ground to enforce a deal. Criticism Under UNPROFOR, the obligations of the force had been unlimited protect civilians, assist aid deliveries, secure safe zones and so on but its authority was very limited. [Milosevic said]: it was your high technology that defeated us. It was a lesson Milosevic had to learn in Kosovo in 1999 all over again.

The Bosnia crisis. did not present a stark choice between realist and idealist diplomacy. Nor was Dayton agreement a triumph after four long years. Lessons Serbs and Croats paid with their lives for the complexity, as the international community, by trial and error, worked out what it should do. Nobody had a dog in the Balkan fight. When societies fall out, however violently, only then they can bring the crisis to a permanent resolution. We have simply postponed the inevitable day of reckoning. We do not know whether the republics and communities of old Yugoslavia are capable of peaceful coexistence, once foreign forces leave their soil. If Milosevic and Mladic had been confronted by the full force of the United States and NATO in 1991, instead of 1995, over 100,000 lives would have been saved. It required violence, atrocity and instability to seize the worlds attention. Rwanda, the Congo, Darfur or Zimbabwe are no less harrowing. But nations pick and choose. They always will. The decisive factor is the national interest. These things will happen again and we wont always be able to intervene. Politicians and diplomats ignore history at their peril. Sitting on his cloud, Winston Churchill shouts down in frustration to our commanders in Afghanistan and diplomats in Pakistan: Read my 1998 Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War. Its all in there! George Canning is shaking his head in despair. our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and then with a commanding force.