Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Docket: A-170-07
BETWEEN:
PANCHALINGAM NAGALINGAM
Appellant
and
Respondent
Docket: A-170-07
BETWEEN:
PANCHALINGAM NAGALINGAM
Appellant
and
Respondent
TRUDEL J.A.
[1] This is an appeal from a decision of Justice Kelen (cited as 2007 FC 229) sitting in
appellant) to set aside the Opinion of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the
Minister) pursuant to paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
[2] In making his decision Justice Kelen found, and both parties agreed, that the
removal from Canada, of refugees who have been found to be persons inadmissible on
Preliminary matter
[3] The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is incorrectly named as
the respondent in the style of cause. Upon the parties’ consent, I hereby order that the style
Preparedness with the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration as the proper respondent.
Background
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[4] The appellant is a Sri Lankan Tamil who came to Canada in 1994. He was granted
[5] On August 24, 2001, the Minister issued a report under the former Immigration Act,
Minister was the appellant’s involvement with a Tamil gang known as the A.K. Kannan.
[6] In October 2001, the appellant was arrested and detained by immigration authorities
on the basis that he represented a danger to the public and was unlikely to appear for his
of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) later ruled that the appellant should be
released on certain terms and conditions, that Order was subsequently set aside by Justice
[7] On May 28, 2003, having found the appellant inadmissible to Canada for organized
criminality pursuant to paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Act, the Board ordered that he be deported.
An application by the appellant for the judicial review of this decision was later dismissed
[8] On July 5, 2003, the appellant was notified that a determination would be made
under paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act as to whether he should not be allowed to remain in
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Canada based on the “nature and severity of acts committed.” The appellant provided
submissions and evidence under cover letters dated August 8, 2003 and November 11, 2003.
[9] On July 20, 2004, the respondent sent the appellant a “Request for Minister’s
[10] On October 4, 2005, the Opinion of the Minister pursuant to paragraph 115(2)(b)
was issued, subsequently being upheld by the Federal Court on February 28, 2007. Hence,
Legislation
37. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign 37. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire
national is inadmissible on grounds of pour criminalité organisée les faits suivants :
organized criminality for
(a) being a member of an organization that (a) être membre d’une organisation dont il
is believed on reasonable grounds to be or y a des motifs raisonnables de croire
to have been engaged in activity that is part qu’elle se livre ou s’est livrée à des
of a pattern of criminal activity planned activités faisant partie d’un plan d’activités
and organized by a number of persons criminelles organisées par plusieurs
acting in concert in furtherance of the personnes agissant de concert en vue de la
commission of an offence punishable perpétration d’une infraction à une loi
under an Act of Parliament by way of fédérale punissable par mise en accusation
indictment, or in furtherance of the ou de la perpétration, hors du Canada,
commission of an offence outside Canada d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada,
that, if committed in Canada, would constituerait une telle infraction, ou se
constitute such an offence, or engaging in livrer à des activités faisant partie d’un tel
activity that is part of such a pattern; or plan;
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Protection Principe
115. (1) A protected person or a person who is 115. (1) Ne peut être renvoyée dans un
recognized as a Convention refugee by pays où elle risque la persécution du fait de sa
another country to which the person may be race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son
returned shall not be removed from Canada to appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses
a country where they would be at risk of opinions politiques, la torture ou des
persecution for reasons of race, religion, traitements ou peines cruels et inusités, la
nationality, membership in a particular social personne protégée ou la personne dont il est
group or political opinion or at risk of torture statué que la qualité de réfugié lui a été
or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. reconnue par un autre pays vers lequel elle
peut être renvoyée.
Exceptions Exclusion
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in the case (2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à
of a person l’interdit de territoire:
(a) who is inadmissible on grounds of (a) pour grande criminalité qui, selon le
serious criminality and who constitutes, in ministre, constitue un danger pour le
the opinion of the Minister, a danger to public au Canada;
the public in Canada; or
(3) A person, after a determination under (3) Une personne ne peut, après prononcé
paragraph 101(1)(e) that the person’s claim is d’irrecevabilité au titre de l’alinéa 101(1)e),
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ineligible, is to be sent to the country from être renvoyée que vers le pays d’où elle est
which the person came to Canada, but may be arrivée au Canada sauf si le pays vers lequel
sent to another country if that country is elle sera renvoyée a été désigné au titre du
designated under subsection 102(1) or if the paragraphe 102(1) ou que sa demande d’asile
country from which the person came to a été rejetée dans le pays d’où elle est arrivée
Canada has rejected their claim for refugee au Canada.
[12] The relevant provisions of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July
28, 1951, [1969] Can. T.S. No. 6 (the Convention) are as follows:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, (a) Qu'elles ont commis un crime contre la
a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as paix, un crime de guerre ou un rime contre
defined in the international instruments l'humanité, au sens des instruments
drawn up to make provision in respect of internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des
such crimes; dispositions relatives à ces crimes;
(b) He has committed a serious non-political (b) Qu'elles ont commis un crime grave de
crime outside the country of refuge prior to droit commun en dehors du pays d'accueil
his admission to that country as a refugee; avant d'y être admises comme réfugiés;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the (c) Qu'elles se sont rendues coupables
purposes and principles of the United d'agissements contraires aux buts et aux
Nations. principes des Nations Unies.
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return 1. Aucun des États contractants n'expulsera ou
("refouler") a refugee in any manner ne refoulera, de quelque manière que ce soit, un
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where réfugié sur les frontières des territoires où sa vie
his life or freedom would be threatened on ou sa liberté serait menacée en raison de sa race,
account of his race, religion, nationality, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son
membership of a particular social group or appartenance à un certain groupe social ou de
political opinion. ses opinions politiques.
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2. The benefit of the present provision may not, 2. Le bénéfice de la présente disposition ne
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there pourra toutefois être invoqué par un réfugié
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a qu'il y aura des raisons sérieuses de considérer
danger to the security of the country in which comme un danger pour la sécurité du pays où il
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final se trouve ou qui, ayant été l'objet d'une
judgement of a particularly serious crime, condamnation définitive pour un crime ou délit
[13] On October 4, 2005, the Minister’s Delegate, G.G. Alldridge (the Delegate), issued
an opinion pursuant to paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act that the appellant should not be
allowed to remain in Canada based on the nature and severity of acts committed (AB 1, Tab
[14] In deciding whether subsection 115(2) applied to the appellant, the Delegate
b. the risk to the appellant’s life or of cruel and unusual punishment should he be
[15] In addressing the first point of analysis, the Delegate placed particular emphasis on
evidence supporting the appellant’s membership and involvement in the criminal activities
of the A.K. Kannan. From a report prepared by the Toronto Police Street Violence Task
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Force, the Delegate noted that this gang was responsible for a variety of criminal acts
drugs and weapons offences” (at paragraph 19 of the Opinion). The Delegate further
concluded that two shooting incidents where the appellant and his family had been targeted
appellant’s status as an enforcer within the A.K. Kannan (at paragraph 28 of the Opinion).
[16] The Delegate also addressed the criminal activity of the appellant specifically. To
this end, the Delegate observed that the appellant had incurred relatively few criminal
convictions with two of these convictions resulting in imprisonment for short periods of
time between September 25, 2000 and January 25, 2001 (at paragraph 27 of the Opinion).
Moreover, it was observed that between 1997 and 2000 the appellant had been criminally
charged for possession and concealment of a weapon (a meat clever), threatening bodily
harm and intimidation, fraud, assault with a weapon and breach of probation.
Following from the evidence noted above, including Mr. Nagalingam’s membership and
involvement in the A.K. Kannan, in my view, the nature and the severity of the acts
committed by the A.K. Kannan are serious and significant, and as such Mr. Nagalingam
should not be allowed to remain in Canada (at paragraph 29 of the Opinion).
[Emphasis added]
[18] The appellant claimed that if returned to Sri Lanka he would face a substantial risk
of torture, or a risk to life or to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. This claim was
[19] While the Delegate acknowledged the appellant’s status as a Convention refugee, he
also noted that the conditions in Sri Lanka had undergone “a significant change in
circumstances.” As a result, the Delegate concluded that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that it is more likely than not that the appellant would face a substantial
[20] Despite the presence in Canada of the appellant’s common law spouse, their
Canadian born child, and other family members, the Delegate concluded that the appellant
writes:
51. …There is nothing in the material before me that would indicate that the child
has suffered adversely from separation from his father while he’s been incarcerated
and in detention for the past four years (and I make the same observation with
respect to Mr. Nagalingam’s other family members – including his common law
spouse ...)
[21] Proceeding on this basis, the Delegate opined that he “…need not undertake a
balancing exercise whereby the risk, the nature and severity of acts committed, and the
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humanitarian considerations are weighed against each other in accordance with the legal
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada, as this simply does not arise in this
case” (at paragraph 55 of the Opinion). Accordingly, the Delegate concluded that the
[22] The appellant sought judicial review of the Delegate’s decision on October 25, 2005.
In doing so, the appellant filed applications for a stay of the execution of his removal order
with the Federal Court and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on November 16, 2005 and
December 4, 2005 respectively. As each of these applications was dismissed in due course,
[23] In dismissing the application which forms the basis of the appeal before this Court,
Justice Kelen addressed four issues beginning with the question of whether the Delegate had
erred in concluding that the appellant’s removal to Sri Lanka would not expose him to a
substantial risk of torture or a risk to life or to cruel treatment or punishment. On this point,
Justice Kelen rejected the notion that the Delegate had failed to consider the appellant’s
removed from Canada. The Delegate’s ruling on this issue was approved (at paragraph 39 of
In Justice Kelen’s view, given that the Delegate had reasonably concluded that there was no
risk of harm, the non-refoulement provisions under subsection 115(1) did not apply and as
such there was no need to “balance” the competing interests under subsection 115(2).
patently unreasonable, there was no basis for the court to review the Delegate’s assessment
of the nature and severity of acts committed or to engage in a balancing of that assessment
against the risk of harm upon the appellant’s removal (Ibid. at paragraph 47).
[25] In light of this finding, Justice Kelen stated that it was no longer necessary to address
the issue of complicity and whether one should consider the “nature and severity of the acts
committed” by the criminal organization rather than the appellant personally. Moreover, it
was equally unnecessary to consider whether the Delegate had erred in failing to account for
the appellant’s risk of persecution or the general constitutionality of the impugned provision.
Nonetheless, recognizing that he could be wrong, Justice Kelen continued his analysis on
[26] On the issue of complicity and its relationship to the application of paragraph
115(2)(b), Justice Kelen concluded that the Delegate’s assessment should rest on the nature
and severity of the subject’s personal acts rather than the acts of the group with which he or
she is associated. In his view, the acts of the group would only gain relevance if it was
demonstrated that the subject was a personal and knowing participant in such acts, i.e.
complicit (Ibid. at paragraph 65). In the case at bar, Justice Kelen held that the Delegate had
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erred by basing his opinion on the criminal acts committed by the A.K. Kannan without ever
making an express finding that the appellant was actually “complicit” in those acts (Ibid. at
paragraph 68). He went on to state that if it were not for his approval of the Delegate’s
earlier authoritative conclusion on risk, he would have no choice but to refer the matter back
of the gang for the purposes of paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act (Ibid. at paragraph 68).
[27] Finally, Justice Kelen rejected the arguments that the Delegate had failed to consider
Specifically, Justice Kelen held that the Delegate had adequately canvassed the issue of
persecution throughout his decision and that due to the absence of risk in that regard, the
appellant’s Charter rights under section 7 were not engaged (Ibid. at paragraph 74).
[28] Consequently, Justice Kelen dismissed the application for judicial review and
certified the questions which are stated above at paragraph [2] and form the basis for our
OUTLINE
Analysis
A. Standard of review.................................................................................................paras. 29-35
B. Certified Question #1 ............................................................................................paras. 36-45
C. Certified Question #2 ............................................................................................paras. 46-76
(1) Standard of proof.............................................................................paras. 47-50
(2) Acts committed.................................................................................paras. 51-68
(3) Nature and severity of the acts .......................................................paras. 69-76
D. Application to the Delegate’s findings.................................................................paras. 77-80
E. Remedies sought ....................................................................................................paras. 81-82
Conclusions ...............................................................................................................paras. 83-84
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Analysis
A. Standard of Review
[29] Pursuant to paragraph 74(d) of the Act, a decision of the Federal Court on an
application for judicial review may be appealed to this Court only if a question is
importance” is the trigger by which an appeal is justified. However, the object of the
appeal is still the judgment itself, not merely the certified question (Pushpanathan v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 at paragraph 25).
Therefore, I propose to address all the issues raised by this appeal (Baker v. Canada
[30] As it arises from a decision of a judge sitting in judicial review, the principles
outlined in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 apply: the selection of the proper standard of
paragraph 43 [Dr Q]). Ultimately, should this Court identify an error at this stage of the
analysis, it will become necessary “to correct the error, substitute the appropriate standard of
review, and assess or remit the [Delegate's] decision on that basis” (Lai v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 125 at paragraph 19; See also Dr Q, supra at
paragraph 43).
[31] On March 7, 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada issued its long awaited decision in
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 where it revisited the approach to be taken in the
judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals. Among the most salient features
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was the Supreme Court’s decision to reduce the available standards of review from three to
two, collapsing the standard of reasonableness and patent unreasonableness into “a single
remaining two standards would be appropriate in a given set of circumstances, the Supreme
[32] In this case, drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Suresh v. Canada (Minister
determined that the factual findings of the Delegate required a reviewable standard of patent
unreasonableness (at paragraph 18 of the Reasons for Judgment). In light of Suresh, and
more recently Dunsmuir, I agree with Justice Kelen that a high degree of deference is to be
afforded to the Delegate’s factual findings such that the appropriate standard of review is
reasonableness.
[33] As for questions of law, Justice Kelen applied a standard of correctness (at
paragraph 19 of the Reasons for Judgment). In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court indicated that
questions of law could at points attract either standard of review. To this end, Justice
55 A consideration of the following factors will lead to the conclusion that the
decision maker should be given deference and a reasonableness test applied:
- A privative clause: this is a statutory direction from Parliament or a
legislature indicating the need for deference.
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[34] In the case at bar, I note that there is no privative clause in the Act, rather the right to
judicial review before the Federal Court is expressly provided so long as leave is granted
(sections 72 to 75). Additionally, the questions of law in this appeal demand the
interpretation and application of general common law and international law principles for
which the Delegate does not have more expertise than the Court. As a result, I conclude that
Justice Kelen applied the proper standard of review to the questions of law raised in this
[35] Therefore, as no error was committed by Justice Kelen in the determination of the
B. Certified Question #1
[36] Both certified questions call for a proper understanding of the international legal
principle of non-refoulement, found at Article 33(1) of the Convention and incorporated into
Canadian law by subsection 115(1) of the Act. Subsection 115(1) prohibits the return of
Convention refugees and protected persons to any country where they would be at risk of
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persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group
[37] While it is acknowledged that this rule forms the cornerstone of asylum in
turn incorporates Article 33(2) of the Convention into Canadian law, expressly allows to
derogate from this principle where the subject is (a) found inadmissible on grounds of
serious criminality and constitutes, in the opinion of the Minister, a danger to the public in
rights or organized criminality if, in the opinion of the Minister, the person should not be
allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature and severity of acts committed or of
[38] Applying this principle to the first question at issue, I agree with the parties that
Justice Kelen erred when he held that an analysis of the nature and severity of acts
committed by the appellant under subsection 115(2) of the Act became unnecessary in the
absence of risk to the appellant upon his removal from Canada (at paragraph 40 of the
[39] In Ragupathy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 151
[Ragupathy] this Court set out a logical sequence of analysis when discussing the elements
of a ‘danger opinion’ issued under paragraph 115(2)(a). Specifically, this Court held that
once the protected person has been found inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality,
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the next logical step is to assess whether the individual poses a danger to the public (at
18. If the delegate is of the opinion that the presence of the protected person does
not present a danger to the public that is the end of the subsection 115(2) inquiry.
[40] While Justice Kelen correctly noted that the Delegate had first assessed the nature
and severity of acts committed and second, determined that that the risk of harm upon
removal was non-existent, he erred when declaring that pursuant to Ragupathy, the
Delegate could reverse his order of analysis (at paragraph 46 of the Reasons for Judgment).
In Justice Kelen’s view, the need to assess the nature and severity of acts committed
became inconsequential as there was no risk of harm upon the subject’s return. That being
the case, the principle of non-refoulement as outlined in subsection 115(1) of the Act was
[41] Respectfully, I find that Justice Kelen ignored the structure of section 115, as well
as Canada’s overall responsibilities with regards to the Convention, when finding that the
absence of risk for the appellant, if returned to Sri Lanka, was determinative of his right to
non-refoulement.
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[42] The scope of section 115 is such that the principle of non-refoulement continually
applies to a protected person or a Convention refugee until one of the two exceptions listed
applies simply because the conditions in the protected person’s or the Convention refugee’s
[43] The approach of Justice Kelen essentially forces the Delegate to act beyond his
jurisdiction, ruling on the appellant’s status as a Convention refugee, rather than whether
the nature and severity of the acts committed deprive him of the benefits associated with
that status (i.e. not to be refouled). To this end, I agree with the respondent that the
Ragupathy approach ensures that the Delegate maintains his jurisdiction as his role is not in
any way to remove or alter the subject’s status as Convention refugee (respondent’s
memorandum at paragraph 71). Proceeding in this manner guarantees that the Delegate’s
function will not usurp the role of the Refugee Protection Division on a cessation
[44] By way of summary then, the principles applicable to a delegate’s decision under
paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act and the steps leading to that decision are as follows:
(1) A protected person or a Convention refugee benefits from the principle of non-
(3) If the individual is inadmissible on such grounds, the delegate must determine
the nature and severity of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada;
(4) Once such a determination is made, the delegate must proceed to a section 7 of
the Charter analysis. To this end, the Delegate must assess whether the
individual, if removed to his country of origin, will personally face a risk to life,
his or her status to trigger the application of section 7 of the Charter (Suresh,
(5) Continuing his analysis, the Delegate must balance the nature and severity of the
acts committed or of the danger to the security of Canada against the degree of
[45] That being said, I propose to answer “no” to the first certified question as the
Delegate failed to follow the steps suggested above in forming his opinion.
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[46] In addressing the second certified question, I propose to discuss the following:
(1) the standard of proof required to bring the appellant under the exception of
paragraph 115(2)(b);
(3) the appropriate threshold that must be met before an act is considered of such
nature and severity that the perpetrator should no longer be allowed to stay in
Canada.
(1) Standard of proof under paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act: reasonable grounds
[47] The determination of the proper standard of proof required to bring the appellant
under the exceptions of paragraph 115(2)(b) is important, as an error on the standard would
undeniably permeate the interpretation of the law and the review of the evidence.
[48] As noted above, subsections 115(1) and (2) of the Act incorporate the principle of
[49] Although subsection 115(2) does not explicitly re-state the evidentiary threshold of
“reasonable grounds” found at Article 33(2) of the Convention, it does confer to the
Minister a discretionary power to decide “if, in (his) opinion, the person should not be
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allowed to remain in Canada.” In my view, this discretionary power, examined within the
structure of section 115 of the Act, is consistent with a standard of reasonable grounds.
hasten to add “that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed
fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter” (Baker, supra at
paragraph 56).
[50] I therefore conclude that the proper standard for a determination under subsection
115(2) of the Act is reasonable grounds. In doing so, I note that this standard has previously
(2) The acts committed by the appellant in the context of organized criminality:
Complicity
[51] I agree with Justice Kelen that the “acts committed” which are relevant under
paragraph 115(2)(b) are those committed personally by the appellant. This proposition is
supported by a basic reading of the French version of the provision and namely its use of the
phrase “ses actes passés” (literally translated by “his past acts”). As Justice Kelen noted, this
passage is plain, unambiguous and best reflects the intention of Parliament that the acts to be
considered are those committed personally by the appellant (at paragraphs 59, 60 of Reasons
for Judgment). That said, I further agree that such a finding does not negate the possibility of
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established that the appellant was complicit in the commission of those acts.
[52] However, I do not agree with Justice Kelen when he relies on Ramirez v. Canada
complicity in the context of organized criminality. The definition he adopts, usually referred
offence in respect of certain international crimes covered by Article 1F(a) of the Convention
(crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity), and by analogy in the case
of acts contrary to the international purposes and principles sought by Article 1F(c) of the
Convention (Zrig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 178, at
[64] This test for complicity under the Act has been settled by the Court with
respect to crimes against humanity. Such crimes are also part of paragraph
115(2)(b), and this is a reasonable one for the purposes of establishing complicity
under paragraph 115(2)(b). See my decision in Catal v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1875 at paragraphs 8 and 9.
[54] “Complicity by association” has been applied in Canadian immigration law in the
context of section 98 (subsection 2(1) of the former Immigration Act) as well as section 35
Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.); Zazai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
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[55] In Ramirez, supra, the most controversial legal issue dealt with the extent to which
13. It was common ground to both parties during argument that it is not
open to this Court to interpret the "liability" of accomplices under this
Convention exclusively in the light of section 21 of the Canadian Criminal Code
[R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46], which deals with parties to an offence, since that
provision stems from the traditional common law approach to "aiding" and
"abetting."4 An international convention cannot be read in the light of only one of
the world's legal systems.
[56] Article 1F(a) of the Convention refers to international instruments and section 98 of
the Act incorporates Article 1F into Canadian law. It is in that context that the traditional
[57] While I concede that the approach taken by Justice Kelen would apply to a
determination under paragraph 115(2)(b) where a person has been found inadmissible under
section 35 (human or international rights violation), I do not think that the same can be said
(Emphasis added).
[58] I would suggest that this wording constitutes a clear invitation to apply our domestic
laws to determine whether a person is complicit in the commission of certain acts within
organized criminality. Unlike in Ramirez, I can find no reason in the case of organized
[59] Section 21 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Criminal Code or Cr.C.) sets
out the liability of principals and parties to an offence. It will most often apply when dealing
21. (1) Every one is a party to an offence 21. (1) Participent à une infraction :
who
a) quiconque la commet réellement;
(a) actually commits it;
b) quiconque accomplit ou omet
(b) does or omits to do anything for the d’accomplir quelque chose en vue
purpose of aiding any person to d’aider quelqu’un à la commettre;
commit it; or
c) quiconque encourage quelqu’un à la
(c) abets any person in committing it. commettre.
(2) Where two or more persons form an (2) Quand deux ou plusieurs personnes
intention in common to carry out an forment ensemble le projet de poursuivre
unlawful purpose and to assist each other une fin illégale et de s’y entraider et que
therein and any one of them, in carrying out l’une d’entre elles commet une infraction en
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the common purpose, commits an offence, réalisant cette fin commune, chacune
each of them who knew or ought to have d’elles qui savait ou devait savoir que la
known that the commission of the offence réalisation de l’intention commune aurait
would be a probable consequence of pour conséquence probable la perpétration
carrying out the common purpose is a party de l’infraction, participe à cette infraction.
to that offence.
[61] Paragraph 21(1)(b) makes an accused liable as a party for acts or omissions which
are done for the purpose of aiding a principal to commit an offence while paragraph 21(1)(c)
[62] Although the terms aiding and abetting are commonly associated, the two concepts
are not the same. To aid under paragraph 21(1)(b) means to assist or help the perpetrator
while to abet, within the meaning of paragraph 21(1)(c), includes encouraging, instigating,
paragraph 26; also cited in: R. v. Smith, 2007 NSCA 19 at paragraph 148; Zrig v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 178 at paragraph 166 by Décary J.
(concurring).
[63] In elucidating the meaning of aiding and abetting, Justice Dickson in R. v. Dunlop,
[64] Complicity in Canadian law is however not limited to this concept of aiding and
abetting. For example, subsection 21(2) of the Cr.C. extends the liability of the principal and
parties beyond the wrongful act originally intended. In the absence of aiding and abetting, a
person may even become a party to an offence committed by another which he knew or
ought to have known was a probable consequence of carrying out the unlawful purpose:
[65] Our Criminal Code also contains provisions relating to (a) other forms of liability
such as sections 23 and 463, accessory after the fact; section 465, conspiracy; and (b)
liability of a secondary party such as section 146, assisting escape and section 240,
accessory after the fact to murder, to name a few that appear more relevant in the context of
organized criminality.
[66] However, it is not necessary nor is it appropriate for this appeal to address all the
provisions that might apply to a particular situation. Suffice to say that, in the context of
paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act, when a person has been found inadmissible for organized
criminality, one has to refer to Canadian law and not international law, in order to establish
if the person was a party to an act of such nature and severity as to warrant his or her
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removal. One must also note that section 37 of the Act contains its own definition of
organised criminality distinct from that of subsection 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code (on
subsection 467.1(1) of the Cr.C., see R. v. Terezakis, 2007 BCCA 384, leave to appeal to the
understood that the provisions of the Criminal Code will play an important role in a
subsection 34(2) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21), it is not excluded that other
subsection 4(4) of the Cr.C). Second, reference to criminal law in the context of
immigration matters has to be made with circumspection and with the required adaptations,
especially since the proper standard of proof applicable to subsection 115(2) of the Act is
[68] That being said, I have reached the view that when applying paragraph 115(2)(b) in
of the Act), there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed, himself
or through complicity, as defined in our criminal legal system, acts of organized criminality.
[69] In addressing my final point of analysis on the second certified question, I accept the
appellant’s argument that the “fundamental character of the prohibition of refoulement and
Page: 28
establishing a high threshold for the operation of exceptions” (Lauterpacht, sir E. and D.
[70] This idea of a “high threshold for the operation of exceptions” is supported by the
wording of the Act itself and the choices made by Parliament. Specifically, I note that
paragraph 115(2)(a) applies where the person has been found inadmissible for serious
criminality, as defined by subsection 36(1) of the Act, that is, for convictions relating to “an
imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed.” Conversely, inadmissibility for
criminality pursuant to subsection 36(2) does not fall within the exceptions of paragraph
115(2)(a) or (b), thereby indicating that minor offences were not contemplated as meeting
this particular threshold. This is even more so when we consider that, for paragraph
115(2)(a) to apply, the individual has to be found, in the opinion of the Minister, to be “a
186. The text of Article 33(2) makes it clear that it is only convictions for crimes of
a particularly serious nature that will come within the purview of the exception. This
double qualification-particularly and serious- is consistent with the restrictive scope
of the exception and emphasizes that refoulement may be contemplated pursuant to
this provision only in the most exceptional of circumstances. Commentators have
Page: 29
suggested that the kinds of crimes that will come within the purview of the
exception will include crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery, arson, etc.
[References omitted]
this paragraph, inadmissibility on grounds of organised criminality is treated with the same
violating human or international rights (section 35). Under those two sections, a person is
[73] Despite the critical nature of these infractions, Parliament has nonetheless given the
Minister the discretion to assess the nature and severity of the acts before determining if the
subject should be refouled under paragraph 115(2)(b). This, to me, suggests that paragraph
115(2)(b) will only be triggered where the acts committed are of substantial gravity.
[74] Consequently, I endorse the ruling of Justice Kelen that “the logical reason to
examine the nature and gravity of the personal acts committed by the refugee is that the
unless the acts in which he was involved warrant removal”(Emphasis added) (at paragraph
Page: 30
61 of Reasons for Judgment). The high threshold lies in the nature and severity of the acts
committed.
Convention refugee or a protected person if, in the opinion of the Minister, that
person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature and
[76] Therefore, the Delegate had to reasonably link the appellant to the acts of the
organization in which he was a member, taking into consideration, if applicable, his role and
responsibilities within the criminal organization. In doing so, the Delegate had to caution
himself that it is only in exceptional cases that a Convention refugee or a protected person
will lose the benefit of subsection 115(1). Thus, only acts which are of substantial gravity
[77] Justice Kelen found that the Delegate failed to “make an express finding that the
applicant was complicit in the serious and significant criminal acts of the gang.” (at
paragraph 68 of the Reasons for Judgment). I agree in part. The Delegate failed to conduct
Page: 31
required (Sittampalam v. Canada (M.C.I. and M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FC 687 at paragraph 43).
[78] In this case, the Delegate found that the A.K. Kannan was a criminal organization
that group. This is not sufficient to meet the threshold of paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act. On
this point, I note that the specific rank of the appellant within the A.K. Kannan criminal
organization is unclear. In the Request for Minister’s Opinion, supra, the appellant is said to
be a “leader” by a source “confirmed [to be] reliable” (at paragraph 24), whereas in the
[79] While this general approach used by the Delegate would be consistent with a
determination under paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Act, it falls short of meeting the personalized
fact-driven inquiry dictated by paragraph 115(2)(b) of the same Act. Ultimately, not having
to make an express finding of complicity does not mean that the Delegate was not required
to conclude, on reasonable grounds, that the evidence pointed to the appellant as being
complicit in the acts of organized criminality committed by the organization, acts that were
of such nature and severity as to warrant his removal. The Delegate failed to do so.
[80] To that effect, I propose to remit the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration
in accordance with the law. Considering that conclusion, it is therefore not appropriate to
E. Remedies Sought
[81] The appellant requests, among other remedies, that this Court compels the
respondent to assist him to return to Canada on an urgent basis so that he may remain in
Canada while his case is being reconsidered (appellant’s memorandum at paragraph 76).
to act in a particular fashion. Despite the legal errors committed by the Delegate during the
examination of the appellant’s file, his rights to a fair process were never breached. Indeed
such an issue was never raised in argument. Furthermore, the Minister is acutely aware of
his obligations under the Act and this Court has no reason to intervene, or to presume that
Conclusions
[83] In light of the foregoing, I would allow the appeal without costs, set aside the
decision of the Federal Court, allow the application for judicial review and remit the matter
back to the Delegate for re-determination in accordance with the present reasons.
Question 1
and Refugee Protection Act , the Minister finds that a refugee who is inadmissible on
grounds of organized criminality does not face a risk of persecution, torture, cruel
and unusual punishment or treatment upon return to his country of origin, does such
Page: 33
a finding render unnecessary the Minister’s consideration of the “nature and severity
Answer: No
115(2)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to be applied “on the
basis of the nature and severity of acts committed” by the criminal organization of
considered for removal (including acts of the criminal organization in which the
Minister, that person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the
nature and substantial gravity of acts committed (in the context of organized
“Johanne Trudel”
J.A.
“I agree
Robert Décary J.A.”
“I agree
M. Nadon J.A.”
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
DOCKET: A-170-07
APPEARANCES:
SOLICITORS OF RECORD: