The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism Author(s): Richard Ned

Lebow Source: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 249-277 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706932 . Accessed: 17/10/2011 21:34
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The longpeace, theend ofthecold of war,and thefailure realism

Ned Lebow Richard

Nation-states engaged a never-ending are in struggle improve preserve to or their relative power positions. -Robert Gilpin Thegreatness theidea ofEuropeanintegration democratic of on foundations consists itscapacity overcome old Herderian in to the idea ofthenation stateas thehighest expression nationallife. of -Va'clav Havel The dramatic events 1989-91are widely of recognized have usheredin a new to era in international relations. Prominent realistsmaintain is thata shift under bifrom to multipolarity. wayin theinternational system Some ofthempredict that a multipolar world will be more conflictual and urge states to acquire nuclear weapons.' Realists and neorealists alike argue that superpower behaviorsince 1945 is consistent withtheirtheories.I contendthatit sharply contradicts thesetheories.

This and the otherarticlesin thisSymposium were preparedforInternational Organization and forRichardN. Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen,eds.,Intemational and Relations Theory theEnd oftheCold War,forthcoming. I gratefully acknowledge support the HewlettFoundationand the of the United States Institute Peace. I would also like to acknowledgethe helpfulcomments of of Friedrich Kratochwil, JohnOdell, KennethA. Oye, Thomas Risse-Kappen,JaniceGross Stein, and Stephen Walt. The two epigraphs are taken from Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 35, emphasisoriginal;and Vaclav Review Books, 18 November1993,p. 3. Havel, "How Europe Could Fail," New York of 1. See JohnJ. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future:Instability Europe Afterthe Cold War," in 15 Intemational Security (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Kenneth M. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure International of Politics," paper presented at the annual meetingof the American PoliticalScience Association,San Francisco,30 August-2September1990. For an argument that therecent realistscholarsmorerelevant thepracticeof to changesmake realismand, in particular, international see relations, StephenM. Walt,"The Renaissanceof Security Studies,"International 35 Studies Quarterly (June 1991), pp. 211-39. For a critique, see Edward A. Kolodziej, Studies? Caveat Lector!" International 36 "Renaissance in Security StudiesQuarterly (December 1992),pp. 421-38. International Organization 2, Spring1994,pp. 249-77 48, ? 1994 byThe 10 Foundationand the Massachusetts Institute Technology of

250 International Organization I develop myargument lookingat realistexplanationsforthreeof the by moreimportant international developments the last halfcentury: "long of the the peace" betweenthesuperpowers, SovietUnion's renunciation itsempire of and leadingrole as a superpower, thepost-coldwar transformation the and of international at system. Realisttheories theinternational leveladdressthefirst and thirdof these developments, and realisttheoriesat the unit level have made an ex postfactoattempt accountforthesecond.The weaknessofthese to raisesseriousproblems therealistparadigm. explanations for

Evaluatingrealism
The realist paradigmis based on the core assumptionthat anarchyis the defining characteristic the international of system. Anarchy compelsstatesto make security theirparamountconcern and to seek to increase power as againstothervalues. Power is definedas capabilityrelativeto other states. Drawing on the core assumptionof anarchyand the "self-help"systemit realistshave advanced a variety sometimes of allegedlyengenders, contradicabout international tory propositions relations. Realistsdisagree,amongother and stability multipolar of things,about the relativewar-proneness versus the importanceand consequences of nuclear bipolar international systems, abouttheweight poweras an explanation of weapons,and morefundamentally of statebehavior.The competing of predictions realisttheoriesmake realism difficult falsify. to Almost any outcome can be made consistent with some variant realisttheory. of Operationalization Testable theoriesrequirecarefulconceptualand operationaldefinitions of theirdependentand independent variables.These definitions mustbe conceptuallyprecise and stipulatehow the variables are to be measured or their Realist theoriesdo not meet these conditions. presencedetermined. They do not share common definitions the core concepts they use to construct of variables.Individualdefinitions nationalinterest, of power,balance of power, and polarity allow foran unacceptably wide range of conceptualand operationalmeaningand makeitdifficult testrealist to propositions againstevidence drawnfrom cases. Neorealism, mostscientifically the self-conscious specific of realisttheories, particularly is inadequate in thisregard,as mycritiqueof its for explanation thelongpeace willdemonstrate. Specification Theories muststipulatethe conditions associatedwithpredictedoutcomes. If these conditionsare met but repeatedlyfail to produce the predicted

Symposium 251 can and unpredicted outcomes outcomes, theories be rejected.If predicted the occur,thetheoriesare inadequately specified. the Powertransition theories comprise branchofrealismthatanalyzesgreat of powerresponsesto decline.These theoriesfailedto envisagethepossibility a peaceful accommodation betweenthe twopoles of a bipolarsystem that or one of themwould voluntarily to relinquish core sphereof influence bring its about that accommodation. Such an anomalous outcome constitutes strong groundsforrejecting power transition theories.Realists have soughtto save theircore insights treating end of the cold war as a special case and by the reformulating theirpropositionsto take it into account.2Anomalous cases for oftenserveas catalysts bettertheory. as the second partof mycritique But will show, realist attemptsex post facto to explain Mikhail Gorbachev's reorientation Soviet foreignpolicy are neither logicallyconsistentnor of empirically persuasive. Utility Good theory based on good assumptions. is Realistsmaintain thattheircore of of assumption anarchyaccurately capturesthe dynamics the international systemand generates powerfulexplanationsof interstatebehavior. Some recentliterature contendsthatthe assumption anarchyhas no theoretical of I contentand cannotgenerateusefulor testablepropositions.3 contendthat is international structure not determining. Fear of anarchyand its consetheir withthe actorsto modify behavior quences encouragedkeyinternational that has The pluralistsecurity goal of changingthat structure. community industrial developed amongthe democratic powersis in partthe resultof this and process. This community the end of the cold war provideevidence that the statescan escape from security dilemma. A critical case? At the finalsession of a 1991 conference international on relationstheory and the end of thecold war,a prominent participant expressedhis dissatisfacwas a "mere tionwiththe proceedings.4 The end of the cold war,he insisted,
Sources of "The International 2. See, forexample,Daniel Deudney and G. JohnIkenberry, 16 Soviet Change," Intemational Security (Winter1991-92), pp. 74-118; Daniel Deudney and G. Large-scaleHistorical JohnIkenberry, "Soviet Reformand the End of the Cold War: Explaining Change," Reviewof Intemational Studies17 (Summer 1991), pp. 225-50; and KennethA. Oye, and BehavioralAdaptationsto the Nuclear "Explainingthe End of the Cold War: Morphological Relations Theory and Peace," in RichardNed Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen,eds.,Intemational theEnd oftheCold War, forthcoming. and 3. See Helen Milner,"International Theories of CooperationAmong Nations: Strengths 44 Is Weaknesses,"World Politics (April1992),pp. 466-96; and AlexanderWendt,"Anarchy What Organization (Spring 46 of StatesMake ofIt: The Social Construction PowerPolitics," Intemational 1992),pp. 391-425. was Relationsand theEnd of theCold War," Cornell "International 4. The conference entitled University, Ithaca,N.Y., October1991.

Organization 252 International data point" that could not be used to test or develop theory.However, If its to neorealismdrewon a singlecase of bipolarity construct theory. that of it case does not fitthe theory, raises serious doubts about the validity the theory. Otherrealisttheorieshave cast theirempiricalnets morewidely.The relations of end of the cold war and the ongoingtransformation international also raise serious problemsforthese theories.This essay does not test in a formalsense any of these theories;such tests are precluded by the lack of as specification well as by my own reliance on only a few cases. Rather, it many evidencesince 1945 contradicts thathistorical to attempts demonstrate realist claims and expectationsand suggeststhe need for alternativeaprelations. of proachesto thestudy international

Realism and thelongpeace

did thatthe superpowers not go to Security specialistsconsiderit remarkable the war as did rival hegemonsof the past. Many realist theoriesattribute which international system, absence ofwarto thebipolarnatureofthepostwar worlditreplaced.All ofthem thanthemultipolar considerless war-prone they of have poorly specified definitions bipolarity.None of the measures of of bipolarityderived from these theories sustains a characterization the at as international system bipolarbeforethemid-1950s the earliest. thatemphasize I For thesake ofbrevity,willdiscussonlytworealisttheories those of Hans Morgenthauand Kenneth of effects bipolarity, the restraining of theories international relations the Waltz.Theyare arguably mostinfluential thecold war era. Measures ofpower and polarity Politics AmongNationscoincidedwiththe The first editionof Morgenthau's beginningof the cold war; in that and subsequent editions,Morgenthau worriedthat the United States and the Soviet Union would stumbleinto a For nuclear war despite their mutual recognitionof its destructiveness. hope.5 the puzzle buta despprate Morgenthau, longpeace was notan analytical Morgenthaubelieved that postwar internationalrelations was shaped by and nuclear weapons. Both were double-edgedswords.Bipolarity bipolarity for good the thatcontainsin itself potentialities unheard-of was ''a mechanism as well as for unprecedentedevil." It "made the hostile oppositionof two that power blocs possible" but also held out the hope of regulating gigantic of by an through equilibrium powermaintained moderatecompetiopposition tion. Nuclear weapons made leaders more cautious and mote insecure.The
5. Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948). Subsequent editionof thiswork(see below). the are to references Morgenthau from fourth

Symposium 253 spectacle of politicsto a "primitive nuclear arms race reduced international two giants eyingeach other with watchfulsuspicion." Human survivaldeof of This was not a function the polarity the pended on mutual restraint. of but system oftheskilland commitment leaders.6 international Drawing on Morgenthau's insightthat bipolarityhad the potential to order,Waltz built a formaldeductive promotea more stable international theory to In relations.7 an effort create a parsimonious of theory international the weight thenatureof the system, to level,he gave explanatory at the system the He of and thedistribution theircapabilities. downplayed of number actors, including leadership. powerof stateattributes, explanatory of by in Writing the late 1970s,Waltz was struck the seemingstability the in earlierpredictions orderand thesuccessofthesuperpowers defying postwar the thatthe cold warwould sooneror laterturnhot.He attributed absence of thanmultipolarity. was he which, maintained, less war-prone war to bipolarity, because of miscalculation;states Waltz argued that war arose primarily poweror thepowerand cohesionofopposingcoalitions. the misjudged relative of The latter errorwas more common because of the difficulty estimating and the accurately powerand cohesionof shifting oftenunstablecoalitions.In superiorpowerfor a bipolarworld,wherehegemonsrelyon theirown vastly lessens and coalitions are less importantand "uncertainty their security, are calculations easier to make."8 and as technology a unitattribute outsidehistheory. Waltzregarded military thatthe"perennialforces its He sought minimize consequencesand insisted to thannuclearweaponsin shapingthebehavior ofpolitics"weremoreimportant to incentives avoid war" of nations.Nuclear adversaries"may have stronger than conventionally armed states,but then the United States and the Soviet to Union also foundit more difficult learn to livewitheach other"than more wouldhave."9 and less ideologicaladversaries experienced has variable,the Politics one majordependent Waltz's Theory Intemational of thatis explainedbyone independent of systems, war-proneness international at resides entirely the system of The theory variable,the polarity the system. characteris and property, polarity a structural is level:war-proneness a system in istic of the system.Waltz is unyielding his contentionthat a theoryof variablesat the unitlevel or use relations shouldnotincorporate international
pp. 4th PoliticsAmongNations, ed. (New York: Knopf,1966),especially 347-49, 6. Morgenthau, from whichthequotationsare drawn. 1979). Politics (Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley, of 7. KennethN. Waltz,Theory Intemational whichthequotationsare drawn;and KennethN. Waltz, pp. 8. See ibid.,especially 168-70,from of "The Stability a Bipolar World,"Daedalus 93 (Summer1964), pp. 881-909. On the questionof also of the relativestability bi- and multipolarity, see Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systemsand InternationalStability,"WorldPolitics 16 (April 1964), pp. and Multipolarity, the Future,"Joumalof Conflict 390-406; Richard N. Rosecrance,"Bipolarity, "Chain and 10 Resolution (September1966), pp. 314-27; and Thomas J.Christensen JackSnyder, Organization in Intemational AlliancePatterns Multipolarity," Gangs and Passed Bucks:Predicting 44 (Spring1990),pp. 137-68. Politics, 173-74. pp. of 9. Waltz,Theory Intemational

Organization 254 International to properties predictthe behaviorof individualunits.Bipolarity system-level and constraints incentives by state behavioronlyindirectly structuring affects forleaders.10 contendthat nuclear relationsscholarsand historians Many international the role in preserving peace than weapons have played a farmore important of Waltz has come to accept the contention his acknowledged. Waltz's theory critics.In 1981, he upgradedthe role of nuclearweapons, arguingthat they In for "have been the second forceworking peace in the postwarworld.""1 of 1986, he conceded that the introduction nuclear weapons, a unit-level and In effect.12 a 1990 essay Waltz went further change, had a system-level arguedthat"The longestpeace yetknownhas restedon twopillars:bipolarity and nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons deterredattacks on states' "vital peace weapons servethatend and no other, and "because strategic interests"; has held at the center throughalmost fivepostwardecades, while war has in this Waltz reaffirmed argument 1993.14 ragedat theperiphery."'13 frequently a was undergoing system Waltz's 1990 essay argued that the international the Neorealismrecognized to from bipolarity multipolarity. peacefultransition possibilityof systemchange-although not peaceful systemchange-but were morewar-prone. While not rejecting systems maintained thatmultipolar this core propositionof neorealism,Waltz's essay indicated that it was no longer relevant.The long peace would endure because the superpowers possessed nuclearweapons. Waltz was arguingthat nuclearweapons, by his the can a capability, explainwar-proneness, mostimpordefinition unit-level vitiatesthe need argument Such a "reductionist" tantsystem-level property. relationswhose principalpurpose is to explain for a theory international of backed awayfrom his This maybe why Waltz has subsequently war-proneness. as moving from bipolar to characterizationof the internationalsystem multipolar. remainsbipolar even after system Waltz now insiststhatthe international His thebreakupof the SovietUnion.15 depictionofthe post-coldwarworldas realists. More to at bipolaris strikingly odds withtheviewsofotherprominent of of from definition powerin Waltz's Theory the thepoint,itcannotbe derived Politics. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. Intemational Defense Department studies showed that Japan, the United States, and theirlead over the Soviet Union in WesternEurope were steadilyincreasing
pp. 10. Ibid.,especially 123-28. Adelphi Paper no. MoreMay be Better, 11. KennethN. Waltz, The SpreadofNuclearWeapons: for Studies,1981),pp. 3-8. Institute Strategic 171 (London: International in Politics," Robert0. Keohane, on of 12. KennethN. Waltz,"Reflections Theory Intemational Press,1986),p. 327. and (New York: ColumbiaUniversity ed.,Neorealism Its Critics of Politics,"manuscript Structure International 13. KennethN. Waltz (1990), "The Emerging pp. 1 and 13. Security Politics," Intemational of Structure International 14. KennethN. Waltz,"The Emerging 18 (Fall 1993),pp. 44-79. 15. Ibid.

Symposium 255 the developmentand application of almost all the technologiescriticalto military power and performance.16 Post-Soviet Russia is in a demonstrably weakerposition. What distribution?What capabilities? to of Realist definitions power are imprecise,makingit difficult develop The most thoughtful treatment capabilitiesremains of measuresof polarity. that of Morgenthau.In his chapteron the elementsof national power, he of reviewedthe physicaland politicalcomponents power.These includesize, population, natural resources, industrialcapacity, militarypreparedness, morale, and the qualityof diplomacyand government.17 national character, The discussionis enlightening the emphasisit placed on the less tangible for of and less easilymeasuredpoliticalcomponents nationalpower.Morgenthau was adamantthatno one factoradequatelycapturesthe powerof a state and In castigatedpreviousauthorsfor this fallacy.18 his discussionof industrial of characteristic describedit as thedefining nevertheless capacity, Morgenthau alwayshad the The SovietUnion, he insisted, greatpowersand of bipolarity. potentialof a greatpower,but onlybecame one "whenit enteredthe ranksof the foremost industrial powersin the [19]30s,and it became the rivalof the UnitedStatesas theothersuperpoweronlywhenit acquiredin the [19]50sthe nuclearwar."'19 for industrial capacity waging littlehelp to scholarsinterof offers Morgenthau'sformulation bipolarity status with"the the estedin explaining longpeace. His equationofsuperpower industrial capacityforwagingnuclear war" supportshis judgmentthat the Soviet Union became a superpowersometime in the 1950s. There is a and the long peace date from consensusamongotherrealiststhatbipolarity 1945. Morgenthau's characterizationof superpower status is also vague because it leaves the thresholdof nuclear capabilityundefined.If it is the to capability producenuclearweapons,theSovietUnion could be considereda in superpowerbeginning 1948. If it is the capabilityto produce significant the numbersof nuclear weapons and the requisitemeans of theirdelivery, Soviet Union did not achieve superpower status until sometime in the mid-1960s. from whichit to of Waltz'sconceptualization poweris similar Morgenthau's, Waltzinsists thatstatesdo notbecomesuperpowis derived. Like Morgenthau,
in of of 16. See "Statement the Under Secretary Defense forResearch and Engineering," U.S. and Engineering, Cong.,2d 99th TheFY1987Department Defense Program Research for of Congress, of of sess, 18 February1986,p. II-11; U.S. Department Defense, TheDepartment DefenseCritical Our Assessment, Arming of Technologies Plan, 15 March 1989; U.S. Congress,Office Technology OTA-ISC-449, May 1990; andAviation and in Allies:Cooperation Competition DefenseTechnology, 20 Week Space Technology, May 1991,p. 57. & pp. PoliticsAmong Nations, 106-44. 17. Morgenthau, 18. On typical errors evaluating of power,see ibid.,pp. 149-54. 19. Ibid.,p. 114.

Organization 256 International by of ers because theyexcel in one category power. Rank is determined how resource size of populationand territory, states score on all its components: and and strength, politicalstability economiccapability, military endowment, statusto competence.Waltz ignoreshis own caveat and reduces superpower "forceremainsthe final he "In international affairs," writes, one component. the and the United States and the SovietUnion "are set apart from arbiter," on to technology a large scale and at others... bytheirability exploitmilitary frontiers."20 thescientific Waltz's use of military capabilityas the indicatorof superpowerstatusis of puzzling.He is adamantthat"nuclearweapons did not cause the condition He bipolarity." insiststhatthe worldwas bipolar in the late 1940s,when the since Soviet Union had no nuclearweapons, and has not become multipolar otherstateshave acquiredthem."Nuclear weapons do notequalize thepower do ofnationsbecause they notchangetheeconomicbases ofa nation'spower." but are weapons systems bytheir The superpowers set apart"not byparticular on technology a large scale and at the scientific abilityto exploit military would still"far Had the atom neverbeen split,the superpowers frontiers." threat and strength, each would remainthe greatest surpassothersin military and sourceofpotential dangerto theother."21 a thatsuperpower statusis primarily Waltzseemsto argue,likeMorgenthau, that It and of capability. is thiscapability function advancedscientific industrial to weapons and to fieldlarge, the permits superpowers deploystate-of-the-art not forces. Nuclearweapons are a symbol, a cause conventional well-equipped thatdeveloptheseweapons in theabsence and countries ofgreatpowerstatus, do and scientific infrastructures not become of similarly advanced industrial superpowers. in the On the basis of Waltz's criteria, Soviet Union was not a superpower its-gross the 1940s.At the end ofWorldWar II, and fora longtimethereafter, national productwas a fractionof that of the United States. In 1947, its industrialbase and output were roughlycomparable to Britain's-each withtheUnitedStates' produced12 percentof theworld'ssteelin comparison of 54 percent, and 12 and 9 percent,respectively, the world's energyin a withthe United States' 49 percent.Britainhad moreengineers, comparison and a highly developed financial network, betterand denser transportation base.22Soviet technology remainedbackward.The Red Armywas equipped overGermany was the resultof sheermass withinferior weapons. Its triumph and the abilityof an authoritarian regimeto mobilize almost all available The effort. SovietUnion did notproducea jet engine resourcesforitsmilitary untilthelate 1940s,and thatwas a copyof a Rolls Royce engineobtainedafter
pp. Politics, 131 and 180-81. of 20. Waltz,Theory Intemational 21. Ibid.,pp. 180-81. Table 1. 1949), 1948 (Lake Success,N.Y.: UnitedNations, Yearbook Statistical 22. UnitedNations,

Symposium 257 the war. It exploded an atomicdevice in 1949,but Britainalso possessed the to knowledge producenuclearweapons. the What distinguished Soviet Union fromBritainwas its populationand size; but this had always been so and did not make the Soviet Union a beforeWorldWar II. The SovietUnion did fielda massivearmy, superpower else in 1939.The postwar thaneveryone larger forces butithad proportionately missionof occupation.U.S. was capable of littlebeyonditsprimary Red Army military estimatesin the late 1940s depicted it as a poorlyequipped, poorly base to sustaina majoroffensive the poorly forcewithout logistical led trained, if Untilat least the mid-1950s, not later,therewas little in WesternEurope.23 this the SovietUnion could do to damage the United States,whilethroughout U.S. bombers.The period it was vulnerableto nuclear attackby long-range poweruntilitdevelopeda "blue water"navy SovietUnion remaineda regional capabilitiesin theearly1970s. and airborne "powerprojection" mustbe consideredunipolarin the system By Waltz's criteria international 1940s. It did not become bipolar untilthe mid-1950sat the earliest. the late of This was the assessmentof Morgenthau,who used a similardefinition who carriedout themost of It bipolarity. is also theconclusion PeterBeckman, Combining powerin thisperiod.24 to attempt date to measurerelative rigorous of scoresformostof Waltz's components power,Beckmanrankedthe United followed the SovietUnion and by in Statesfirst 1947witha scoreoffifty-three, By Great Britainwith scores of nine and six, respectively. 1955, the Soviet the Union had begun to narrowthe gap; the United States led at forty-one, each scored and WestGermany and SovietUnionwas second at fifteen, Britain as four.The United States was stillmore than twice as powerful the Soviet device, but it is Union. The Soviet Union had exploded a thermonuclear frontiers of questionableif it met Waltz's conditionof being at the scientific industrial military and technology. What statusis unimportant. The yeartheSovietUnion acquiredsuperpower the is relevant our purposesis thatbyWaltz's definition, SovietUnion was for in nota superpower thelate 1940sand early1950s.The greatpowerpeace that the survived tensest stageofthecold war-the yearsoftheCzech coup,thefirst to Berlin crisis and blockade, and the Korean War-cannot be attributed bipolarity. was Waltz and JohnMearsheimer arguedthatby 1990 bipolarity comingto They predictedthe emergenceof a an end or had already disappeared.25
7 Security 23. MatthewA. Evangelista,"Stalin's PostwarArmyReappraised," Intemational (Winter1982-83),pp. 110-68. Century(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: 24. Peter R. Beckman, World Politics in the Twentieth 1984),pp. 207-9, and 235-38. Prentice-Hall, 25. See Waltz, "The Emerging Structureof InternationalPolitics" (1990), pp. 1-2, 29; and Snyder,"Chain Gangs and Passed Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future"; and Christensen Bucks."

Organization 258 International thatwill retain withall its associated tensionsor a system multipolar system of because of the presenceof nuclearweapons. some of thebenefits bipolarity transformation thatthe worldwas in the course of a system Their contention neorealist theory. was notderivedfrom resourceendowment, of Poweris a function size ofpopulationand territory, and and strength, politicalstability competence. economiccapability, military the In 1985,whenGorbachevassumedoffice, SovietUnioncould be considered on certainly arguedso. By a superpower thebasis ofthesecriteria-neorealists to was 1990,whenWaltz contendedthatthe shift multipolarity underway,the Its resource territory, met SovietUnion stillarguably thesecriteria. population, were unchanged.The Soviet economyhad and military strength endowment, was the same. In 1990 the worldremained declined but its relativestanding realists,it was not until the bipolar. In the judgmentof many prominent came to an end.26 breakupoftheSovietUnion thatbipolarity each claimedthata system transformation In 1990,Waltz and Mearsheimer from retreat was underwaybecause oftheSovietUnion's politicaland military and thereare no was startling dramatic, thisretreat EasternEurope. Although transformation. of By theoretical groundsforits use as an indicator a system it the Politics, did not affect of the criteria expoundedin Theory Intemational thatalliancesare maintains distribution capabilities. of Neorealism, moreover, in muchless important a bipolarworld.The two hegemonswere so powerful vis-a-visthirdparties that they did not need alliances to guarantee their even be interpreted from EasternEurope might Gorbachev'sretreat security. of as confirmation this propositionand as evidence that the international would not expecta greatpowerto system remainsbipolar.Neorealisttheory world. behave thiswayin a multipolar has Since 1990,the pace of change in the international system accelerated. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have ceased to exist. Post-Soviet Russia is a smaller,less populous state, consumed with the problems of and economicdecline.Its ethnic fragmentation, precipitous politicalinstability, leaders are compelled to seek aid fromtheir formeradversariesto build fromthe Baltic republicsand housingin Russia fortroopsto be withdrawn old technical assistanceto dismantle nuclearweapons forwhichtheblueprints no to but have been lost.The Kremlin longerattempts expanditsinfluence to the economicconcessionsfrom West. use whatlittleleverageit has to extract to The mostrecentexampleis Russia's threat ignoreUnitedNationssanctions against Libya unless the Westernpowers make good on the formerSoviet loans to thatcountry.27 Union's outstanding smallerbecause so arsenalremainsrobust-if considerably Russia's nuclear much of it is in Ukraine or in the process of being dismantled-but its
of withvariousscholarsat the annual meeting the AmericanPolitical 26. Based on interviews (letter) Washington, D.C., 1-4 September1993;and personalcommunication Science Association, from StephenWalt,20 October1993. 30 27. TheNew YorkTimes, October1993,p. Al.

Symposium 259 a conventional forces have undergone notabledeclinein size and effectiveness. maintenance, and much lack spare partsand effective Most armoreddivisions in of the former Sovietnavyis rotting portand unable to put to sea. Withthe economicdisruption thatfollowedthe breakup of the Soviet Union and the Russia has fallenfurther behind of partialdismantling itscommandeconomy, and deployment state-of-the-art weapons and of the West in the development technology "on the to has lostfortheforeseeablefuture ability exploitmilitary and a large scale and at the scientific frontiers." Many of itsleadingscientists have gone abroad in searchof employment. engineers to Waltz acknowledges that "no state lackingthe military ability compete ranked among them." He with the other great powers has ever been system and nevertheless contends thatRussia is a superpower theinternational the bipolar.28 any reasonable applicationof Waltz's criteria, international By in of system shifted thedirection unipolarity. has cannot indicatesthat bipolarity Even this cursory reviewof the literature is of satisfactorily explainthe long peace. When Waltz's definition bipolarity it system, lends supportto Morgenthau's applied to the postwarinternational contentionthat the systemdid not become bipolar until at least the midof 1950s.29 This was after mostacute confrontations thecold war. Different the fit do operationalcriteria bipolarity notprovidea better withthelongpeace. of of as of No singlemeasure-or combination the components poweridentified in important realists-indicatesthe onset of bipolarity 1945 and its passing by in 1985-90. Waltzinsists thatthe determination polarity a simplematter. of is "We need The questionof polarity an "is by onlyrank[the powers]roughly capability." and amongrealists, empirical one, commonsense can answerit."30Differences system between the Waltz of 1990 and 1993 about when the international became bipolar and when bipolarityended-or if it did-indicate that no For this,we need "common sense" offers help in determining polarity. of and definitions polarity measuresofpower.31 well-specified

Realism and declining hegemony

and Realist theoriesare foundat the system unitlevels.Realist and neorealist war since 1945 theoriesthat attemptto explain the absence of superpower level. Realist theoriesthatpredictthe foreign policyof operate at the system we individual statesoperateat theunitlevel,and itis to thesetheories nowturn to try explainrecentchangesin theforeign to policyofone ofthetwopoles of a
Politics"(1993), p. 54. Structure International of 28. Waltz,"The Emerging p. Politics Among Nations, 114. 29. Morgenthau, of Politics, 131. 30. Waltz,Theory International p. Intemational 31. The same point is made by R. Harrison Wagner,"What Was Bipolarity?" 47 Organization (Winter1993),pp. 77-106.

Organization 260 International system.For realists,these two levels of analysis are bipolar international of behaviorcan alterthedistribution distinct related.Changesin unit-level but A of system. capabilitiesand bydoingso changethe polarity the international of transformation the internationalsystemwill in turn have important behavior. consequencesforunit-level sharp can thatgreatpowersand superpowers experience Realismrecognizes the Hegelian notionthat relativedeclines.Some realisttheoriesincorporate carrieswithit the seeds of subsequentdecay.32 expansioninevitably successful All realist theories that address the question are unambiguous in their or to states,in thewordsof Waltz,"try arrest reverse thatdeclining prediction Realists contendthat stateshave no choice. Because of the theirdecline."33 they must maintaintheir system, anarchical characterof the international by beingvictimized others. poweror risk relative Power transitiontheoriesand the Soviet Union on theoriesfocusspecifically Withinthe realistparadigm, powertransition Many of these the problem of hegemonicdecline and its consequences.34 theoriesargue that hegemonicwar is most likelyto occur when the power increaseto the pointwhere and dissatisfied challenger capabilitiesof a rising in about prediction state.Theydiffer their approachthoseofthedominant they the willinitiate war.35 hegemon or the whether challenger thedeclining theories maintainthat hegemonicdecline will Not all power transition lead to war. Gilpin argues that the firstand "most attractive" inevitably war against the risingpower while the response is to launch a preemptive A powercan also expand advantage. declining statestillhas a military declining and moresecurefrontiers thereby partiesin thehope ofobtaining againstthird
examplescan be foundin RobertGilpin,Warand Changein World 32. The twomostprominent The Press,1981); and Paul Kennedy, Riseand Fall ofthe University (New York: Cambridge Politics from1500 to 2000 (New York: Random GreatPowers:Economic Change and Military Conflict House, 1987). Politics"(1990), pp. 7-8. of Structure International 33. Waltz,"The Emerging Motivation is by 34. This literature reviewed JackS. Levy,"DecliningPowerand thePreventive Politics40 (October 1987), pp. 82-107; and Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides, forWar," World Theory,and the Causes of War," in RichardNed Lebow and BarryS. Strauss, PowerTransition to From Thucydides theNuclearAge (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, Rivalry: eds., Hegemonic 1991),pp. 125-68. 2d Politics, ed. (New York: Knopf,1967), pp. 202-3; A.F.K. 35. See A.F.K. Organski,World of and JacekKugler,The WarLedger(Chicago: University ChicagoPress,1980), chaps. 1 Organski Comparative and 3; George Modelski,"The Long Cycleof Global Politicsand the Nation-State," 20 and Histoty (April 1978), pp. 214-35; WilliamR. Thompson,ed., Contending Studies Society of Approachesto World SystemAnalysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); Raimo Vayrynen, and Wars BetweenMajor Powers," PoliticalManagement, "Economic Cycles,PowerTransitions, 27 International StudiesQuarterly (December 1983), pp. 389-418; and Gilpin,Warand Changein in World Politics. Doran and Parsonsarguethatthisis onlyone of the situations whichhegemonic war is likely.See Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons,"War and the Cycle of Relative Power," 74 ScienceReview (December 1960),pp. 947-65. American Political

Symposium 261 at reducing burdenofdefense.The Romanswerepastmasters thisstrategy. the to The Austrianand Russian empirestriedwith less success. Their efforts expandin theBalkanswas a majorcause ofwarin 1914.36 as Gilpin describesretrenchment a more peaceful response to decline. A state can tryto slow its decline and preserve the core of its power by and The commitments. Roman, Byzantine, abandoningsome of itsperipheral timesin their withdrawals different at Venetian empiresconductedstrategic history, and Gilpin considersthe Nixon Doctrine a possible modernanalog. with alliance and accommodation through Decliningstatescan also retrench of in powers.They attemptto share the benefits hegemony less threatening with in its preservation. Britain pursued this strategy returnfor assistance form successin thedecade beforeWorldWar I. The mostdifficult considerable of retrenchment appeasement. It attemptsto buy offa risingchallenger is throughconcessions. When appeasement conveysweakness, as it did at demands.Gilpinassertsthatall forms Munichin 1938,itcan encouragefurther thanexpansionofretrenchment fraught are withdangerand are less attractive iststrategies.37 War and Change in WorldPolitics was published in 1981. In analyzing hegemonic decline,Gilpin'sfocuswas verymuchon theUnited States and the economic and military decline. He possible consequences of its continuing of foresawthe possibility a relativeSoviet decline broughtabout by a U.S. powerfulChina, Japan, and resurgenceand alliances with an increasingly in the thata superpower decline,facing prospect Western Europe. He worried moreaggressively.38 of encirclement, wouldrespondbybehaving withrealist Until the late 1980s,Soviet foreign policyappeared consistent theories. Moscow tried to expand its influencein the Third World and consolidateit in EasternEurope. Sovietleaders suppressedrebellionsin East in Germany 1953 and in Hungaryin 1956,invadedCzechoslovakiain 1968 to in to communists power,and used the threatof intervention restorehard-line powerin Poland. from 1980to keep Solidarity inconsistent Under Gorbachev,Soviet foreignpolicybecame increasingly from and disengagement withpowertransition otherrealisttheories.Military at carriedout in 1988-89,could be explainedas retrenchment the Afghanistan, nuclear forceswas problematic The 1987 treatyon intermediate periphery. gain. The Soviet was not motivated a concernforrelative by because it clearly the Union agreed to removemanymoremissilesfrom European theaterthan as to was did theUnitedStates,and thetreaty widely interpreted advantageous theWest. from EasternEurope was moreanomalous.Realists The Sovietwithdrawal as like Gilpin who recognize retrenchment a possible response to decline
Politics, 191-92 and 197. pp. 36. Gilpin,Warand Changein World 37. Ibid.,pp. 192-97. 38. Ibid.,pp. 231-44.

Organization 262 International In not sphereofinfluence. all of expectitto occurat theperiphery, in a primary to Gilpin'sexamples,statesretrenched marshaltheirresourcesagainsta rising by The Soviet retreatappears to have been motivated a combinachallenger. politicalconsiderations.39 tionofideologicaland domestic froma regionthe controlof whichhad always The Soviet Union retreated been regarded as essential to blunt attack fromthe West. The communist of governments Eastern Europe faced opposition,especiallyin Poland, but by in were firmly controluntiltheywere undermined Gorbachev's calls for withdemocratizaand reform his promisenot to use Sovietforcesto interfere by tionin the region.Gorbachevmayhave been surprised the pace of change, of had begundiscussing possibility the He butnotbyitsresults. and his advisers loose EasternEurope as farback as 1987.40 cutting from EasternEurope notonlywentfarbeyondanyrealist The Sovietretreat but conceptionof retrenchment stands in sharp contrastto a core realist to assumption:hegemonsare expected to make everypossible effort retain can be traced to ThucyThis proposition theirprincipalsphereof influence. whomrealists claimdescent.41 One ofthe mostfamousspeechesof dides,from empirebeforetheSpartan is history theAtheniandefenseoftheir Thucydides' assembly.The Athenians make no pretense about theirmotivesor of the expectedconsequencesof actingotherwise: And thenatureof the case first compelledus to advanceour empireto its honourand interest though fearbeingour principal motive, presentheight, afterwards came in. And at last,whenalmostall hated us,whensome had and had been subdued,whenyou had ceased to be the alreadyrevolted it friends once were,and had become objectsof suspicionand dislike, you especiallyas all who leftus appeared no longersafeto giveup our empire, in wouldfallto you.And no one can quarrelwitha people formaking, matthatit can foritsinterest.42 the tersof tremendous risk, best provision and Leonid Brezhnevwould neverhave JosephStalin,NikitaKhrushchev, Like Cimon a revealing but it capturestheirmotives nicely. made such speech, withan iron and Pericles beforethem,theyruled theiralliance-cum-empire
Oleg Grinevsky, Georgyi withMikhailGorbachev,AnatoliyDobrynin, 39. Personal interviews Shakhnazarov,and Vadim Zagladin, Moscow, New York, Stockholm,Toronto, and Vienna, of and Ideas, Interests, theRedefinition 1989-93.See also RobertHerman,"SovietNew Thinking: CornellUniversity, preparation. in of Security," Ph.D. diss.,Department Government, 40. Ibid. Alliances: see 41. On the analogy, RichardNed Lebow, "SuperpowerManagementof Security of ed., The SovietUnion and the WarsawPact," in Arlene Idol Broadhurst, TheFuture European three (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1982), pp. 185-236; and the following Alliance Systems RobertGilpin,"PeloponnesianWar and Cold Hegemonic Rivalry: chaptersin Lebow and Strauss, PowerTransition, the Causes of War," pp. 125-68; and and War" pp. 31-52; Lebow, "Thucydides, pp. Conflict," States, and International MatthewA. Evangelista,"Democracies, Authoritarian 213-34. War,trans.Richard Crawley(New York: Random House, The Peloponnesian 42. Thucydides, see 1982), p. 44. Gilpin cites thisparagraphin supportof his own argument; Warand Changein p. World Politics, 207.

Symposium 263 hand forfearthatanydefection would put the alliance as a whole at riskand constitute intolerable an threat their to security. RealistsacceptedtheseSoviet of concerns legitimate, many as and deemed preservation theSovietpositionin Eastern Europe essentialto superpower peace.43How thencan theyexplain theSovietretreat? realisttheories in The Sovietresponseto relative declineconfounds existing a otherimportant ways.Insteadof launching preventive war,theSovietUnion withthe United States,its principaladversary and soughtan accommodation rivalhegemon, and made concessionsthatgreatly enhancedthe relative power of theUnited States and itsNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO) ally, the Federal Republic of Germany.Under Gorbachevand Boris Yeltsin,the Soviet Union has been contentto play a subordinaterole in international affairs.44 At The Sovietresponseto declineis not one capturedbyanyrealisttheory. to all thevery least,thosetheoriesare underspecified. Theyneed first identify of the genericresponsesof great powers to decline and then to specify the conditions underwhicheach will apply.Untilsuch timeas theydo, the realist paradigmconsistsof a fundamental axiom-that the pursuitof power is the principal objective of states-and a collection of loose propositionsand theories that attemptto apply this maxim in diverse and underspecified sometimes for contradictory ways.This makes it impossible realiststo predict muchof anything beforethe fact, all too easy forthemto explainanything but once ithas occurred. Realism afterthefact Some realistscontendex postfactothatSovietforeign policyafter1985was and is a logicaland longoverdueresponse notinconsistent withrealisttheories to the Soviet Union's economic decline. Perestroika and glasnost were for to the and providetheresources intended revitalize economy necessary the Soviet Union to resume the role of a superpower. Foreign policy was to withdrew Red Army the from subordinated thisgoal. Gorbachev temporarily Afghanistan, negotiatednuclear and conventionalarms controlagreements
21 43. See John Lewis Gaddis,"One Germany-in BothAlliances,"TheNewYorkTimes, March 1990, p. A21; Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment:AnalyzingU.S. Grand speech at Strategy," International Security (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; Lawrence Eagleburger, 14 13 Georgetown University, September1989,TheNew YorkTimes,16 September1989,p. Al; and the arguesthatbecause theWestwantsto maintain Mearsheimer, "Back to theFuture."The latter in the in has peace, "It therefore an interest maintaining Cold Warorder,and hencehas an interest developmentsthat threatento end it are the continuationof the Cold War confrontation; dangerous"(p. 52). policythathave developed 44. For a description the severalpost-coldwar schoolsof foreign of Security 18 "Russia's ForeignPolicyAlternatives," Intemational in Russia, see Alexei G. Arbatov, withthe accommodation of (Fall 1973), pp. 5-43. For the viewsof critics the Gorbachev-Yeltsin in Lenin'sTomb:TheLast Days oftheSoviet Empire(New West,see theinterviews David Remnick, York: Random House 1993),passim.

264 International Organization withNATO, and retreated fromEastern Europe to freeeconomicresources and laborforagriculture industry. and Withdrawal from EasternEurope would also help secureloans and credits from West.45 the This explanationis not persuasive. If Gorbachev had been a moderate an reformer whose foreign policywas essentially extension Brezhnev's, of the same realistswho now advance thisexplanationwould have regardedSoviet withtheirtheoretical None of them consistent policyas entirely expectations. thattheSovietUnion's relative declinedemandeda leader wouldhave insisted democraticreforms, who would introduceWestern-style hold relatively free of elections,acknowledgethe legal right republicsto secede fromthe Soviet revolutionsin Eastern Europe, agree to Union, encourage anticommunist dissolvethe Warsaw Pact, withdraw Soviet forcesfromthe territories its of formermembers,accept the reunification GermanywithinNATO, and of whenconfronted withgrowing demandsforindependence exerciserestraint by constituent let republicsof the SovietUnion. Such recommendations, alone a predictionthat all this would soon come to pass, would have been greeted of as derisively theheight unrealism. Sovietforeign policyhad been living beyonditsmeansfora longtime.Stalin, and Khrushchev, Brezhnevall pursuedenormously expensive military aid and programs. Brezhnevdid thiswell afterthe disparity betweenSovietgoals and resourceshad become painfully apparent.By themid-1970s, Sovietgrowth the had rate had declined to about 2 percent;by the end of the decade, growth was relatively this constant and stopped.Throughout period,military spending A consumed an increasingshare of the gross national product.46 realist thatdepictsGorbachev'sradical reorientation Sovietdomestic of explanation and foreignpolicy as a response to the country'sdecliningeconomy has for difficulty accounting thestatusquo underBrezhnev. Realists mightrespond that theirtheoriespredicttrendsbut not timing. to Leaders and political systemsvary enormouslyin their responsiveness economic changing capabilities.Brezhnevwas slow to recognizethe country's problemsand reluctantto initiatethe necessarychanges. As the economy dissatisfaction withthe statusquo mountedand facilitated the deteriorated, riseto powerof a reformist leader.
45. See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 53-54; Waltz, "The EmergingStructure of InternationalPolitics," p. 8; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: The and Societies (Spring1989), 3 GorbachevRegime and EasternEurope," Eastern EuropeanPolitics pp. 235-67; Valerie Bunce, "The SovietUnion Under Gorbachev:Ending Stalinism and Ending theCold War,"InternationalJournal(Spring1991),pp. 220-41; and Oye,"Explaining End of 46 the theCold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory theEnd oftheCold and War, chap. 3. 46. On the Soviet economyand military spendingin the 1970s, see U.S. Congress,House Permanent Select Committee Intelligence, on CL4 Estimates Soviet of DefenseSpending (WashingD. ton,D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980); and Franklyn Holzman,"Politicsand Guesswork: 14 CIA and DIA Estimatesof Soviet Military Spending,"International Security (Fall 1989), pp. 101-31.

Symposium 265 This interpretation belied by the evidence.Brezhnevallocated enormous is sumsofmoney themilitary, to and weaponsresearchand development, foreign aid in thehope of making SovietUnion a globalpowerequal to theUnited the States. He was nevertheless trendof increasingly disturbed the downward by theSovieteconomy and itslong-term implications theSovietUnion's status for as a superpower. theearly1970s,he recognized By thattheSovieteconomy was and performing sluggishly thatthegap betweenthe SovietUnion and theWest was likelyto increase. He tried to rectify this situationthrough series of a limitedreforms intendedto "rationalize" planningand investment. also He supporteddetentewiththe West to gain access to advanced foreign technology.47 Brezhnev'sstrategy failed.Administrative reform massiveinvestment and in agriculture accomplishedvery little.The cumbersomecommand economy, whichBrezhnevand his colleagues hoped to reform and make more efficient, was the cause of, not the solutionto, the Soviet Union's economicmalaise. Detente also failed to produce the expectedtransfer technology of fromthe West; this was the principalreason Brezhnevwas willingto sacrificeit in of pursuit unilateral advantagein theThirdWorld. The stasisof Brezhnev'slateryearswas not the resultof politicalimmobilisme.Far-reaching reforms shifts spendingpriorities or in would undeniably have antagonizedsome of the powerful interests, especiallythe military, that Brezhnevhad initially co-opted to build and sustainhis authority. However, Brezhnev had longsinceconsolidatedhis authority thepointwherehe could to A have promotedmajor policyinitiatives withoutfear of being overthrown. more likelyexplanationis his inability, afterthe failureof his reforms, see to or any alternative one thatwould not pose a challengeto the Sovietpolitical and the privileges itsnomenklatura of system (upper party cadres). In his last ill also tookitstoll. years, healthprobably and Brezhnev'sgoals and the constraints faced,his foreign he Considering a domesticpolicies, while ultimately were nevertheless direct unsuccessful, to responseto theSovietUnion's perceiveddecline.He attempted managethat the military with decline by strengthening central authority and providing to enough state-of-the-art technology maintainthe Soviet Union's claim to superpowerstatus. To buttressMoscow's position in Eastern Europe, he sought and obtained Western recognitionof the region's Soviet-imposed and territorial morelatitudefor boundaries.He allowedtheseregimes regimes links withtheWest. economicexperimentation, trade,and investment
see George W. 47. On Brezhnevand his responseto the Soviet Union's economicproblems, in Soviet Politics (London: Allen Breslauer, Khrushchev Brezhnev Leaders:BuildingAuthority and as and Politburo theDeclineofDetente and Unwin,1982), pp. 137-268; HarryGelman, TheBrezhnev Politicsand (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 1984); and RichardAnderson,"Competitive and in Ph.D. diss., SovietForeignPolicy:Authority-building Bargaining the BrezhnevPolitburo," of at 1989. Department PoliticalScience,University California Berkeley, of

Organization 266 International to would recognizeBrezhnev'sattempt A morepersuasiverealistargument cope withthe relativedecline of the Soviet Union and depict Gorbachev's of by versionprompted the bleakercircumstances as strategy a moreextreme of betweentheprograms the similarities There are indeedmany themid-1980s. to the Gorbachevsought revitalize Sovieteconomy twoleaders.Like Brezhnev, withthe West whilepreserving and accommodation domesticreform through the core of Soviet state structure-itscommand economyand all-powerful and Gorbachev'smoreradical domesticreforms his accomParty. Communist decline be withtheWestmight explainedas a responseto thefurther modation in relative Sovietcapabilities. The SovietUnion's of This interpretation Gorbachevis equallyproblematic. the during yearsbetweenthefailure economicdeclinewas gradualifpersistent and of Brezhnev'sreforms Gorbachev'saccessionto powerin 1985. Its relative for because thesewerenotyearsof greatgrowth the declinewas onlymarginal United States,whichwas itselfa decliningpower relativeto Japan and the in The European Economic Community. sharpdownturn the Soviet economy as and Gorbachevbegan his reforms largely a resultofthem. came onlyafter The shadow of the future mightalso be invoked to account for the but was pessimistic anticipated betweenthe twoleaders. Brezhnev differences only a gradual erosion of the Soviet Union's relativestanding.By 1985, the the withdeep foreboding; economy Soviet politicalelite regardedthe future were anticipated-and the cost of shortfalls had stoppedgrowing-budgetary with the West had increased. There were compelling competition military approachto economic reasonsforGorbachevto adopt a moreradical,ifrisky reform. the to Gorbachevwas undeniablycommitted revitalizing Soviet economy. However,in his sixyearsin powerGorbachevtalkeda lot about the need for Until but stepsin thatdirection. economicrestructuring took fewmeaningful 1989, he made no major cuts in defense spending.Between 1985 and 1989, defenseconsumedabout the same percentageof grossnationalproductas it had under Brezhnev. After 1989, it consumed more.48Gorbachev never attemptedto dismantle the command economy or to encourage private in initiatives this his ventures. backed awayfrom mostimportant He capitalist fromconservative party and directionwhen they encounteredopposition public opinion. Until the unsuccessfulcoup of August 1991, he remained in Communist Party thepolitical to committed the"leadingrole" ofa reformed to struggled preserve Gorbachevthereformer and economiclifeofthecountry. that stood in the way of the domesticstructures archaic and dysfunctional the to economicgrowth necessary preserve SovietUnion as a greatpower. were "an exterthat Gorbachev'sdomesticreforms The realistcontention It flawed.49 is outside and empirically is nallyimposednecessity" conceptually
Army Reappraised." "Stalin'sPostwar 48. Evangelista, Politics,"p. 8. Structure International of Waltz,"The Emerging 49. The quotationis from

Symposium 267 of any realist theoryand is not logicallyderived fromrealist assumptions. contendthat decline can be a catalystfor Realists who make the argument it change. Grantedthat thisis a valid proposition, is not a helpfulone. The responsesto decline. policies of Brezhnevand Gorbachevindicatedifferent policy-as predictedby foreign include a more aggressive Other possibilities policy"thatdeniestheproblem, theories-or an "ostrich mostpowertransition the apparent preferenceof the current"red-brown" coalition in Russia above,to As right. mentioned and communists thenationalist betweenformer the wouldhavebothto identify rangeof theories realist accountforGorbachev, to underwhichtheyare likely the responsesto decline and specify conditions be adopted. a policywould stillconstitute problembecause it went Gorbachev'sforeign of way beyond the requirements realism.In Eastern Europe, there were a rangeof optionsshortof those the Soviet Union took (allowingpro-Western the to governments come to power, dismantling Warsaw Pact, withdrawing within of NATO). For and agreeing thereunification Germany to Sovietforces, domestic changein EasternEurope example,Gorbachevcould have permitted governments butmade it clear thatthe SovietUnion expectedpostcommunist the the within WarsawPact. Neither UnitedStatesnortheEuropean to remain they wouldalmost of members NATO wouldhave opposed sucha compromise; concerns. Sovietsecurity to sensitivity havewelcomeditand displayed certainly in On thecontrary, hisfamous exploredthatoption. Gorbachevneverseriously their own April1987Praguespeech,he called on EasternEuropeans to reform when mass protests to did nothing dampen the resulting He politicalsystems. regimes. of of threatened survival many theregion'scommunist the they policyin Eastern Europe with to It is verydifficult reconcileSovietforeign in argue thatalliances are less important a bipolar realism.Neorealistsmight do worldbecause the superpowers not depend on alliances fortheirsecurity world. But this postulate applied the way great powers do in a multipolar and and equallywellto theSovietUnion ofKhrushchev Brezhnev, bothleaders the to wentto greatlengths preserve Sovietpositionin EasternEurope. In two riskedwar withthe United States to shore up the Berlin crises,Khrushchev communist regime. of authority East Germany's faltering Nuclear deterrenceas an explanationis even more problematic.Some from EasternEurope because of withdrew have arguedthatGorbachev realists his confidencein nuclear deterrence;the Soviet Union no longerneeded a invade But thendid Brezhnev invasion.50 why it defensive glacisto protect from Czechoslovakia and threaten to invade Poland to restore and preserve Nuclear deterrencewas a realityin 1968 and was pro-Sovietgovernments? as certainly robustin 1980 as itwas in 1985. Nuclear deterrenceis intended to protecta state or its protege against to threats security thatitis effective againstinternal attack.No realistcontends
the 50. See Oye, "Explaining End ofthe Cold War," forsuchan argument.

268 International Organization But thisis a principal reasonwhy arising from ideologicalor ethnicopposition. in past Soviet leaders maintainedtheir authority Eastern Europe. Before ordering the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia,Brezhnevconfidedto Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulkathatall WarsawPact nationsneeded to participate unrest might spill in theinvasion because in theabsence ofEast bloc solidarity, remark Brezhnev's indicatesthatSovietleaders overintotheSovietUkraine.51 thattheloss of in subscribed a dominotheory EasternEurope. Theyworried to woulddestroy alliance,and thatthedemiseofthe the anyWarsawPact country borderprovinces of alliancewould seriously weaken theirhold on thewestern to the SovietUnion,whose peoples were unreconciled Sovietrule and wanted borders. The with acrosstheir independenceor reunification their compatriots the of fears. eventsof 1990-91demonstrated validity Brezhnev's The mostfundamental tenetof realismis that states act to preservetheir decisionto abandonEasternEurope's commuterritorial Gorbachev's integrity. of called the integrity the SovietUnion intoquestion.It nistregimes wittingly demandsforindependencefrom Balticsto CentralAsia thatled the triggered policyunder Gorbachevis to the demise of the Soviet state. Soviet foreign outside the realistparadigm.To explain it, the analystmustgo outside that paradigmand look at the determining influenceof domesticpolitics,belief and systems, learning.52

The emerging international system(s)

In the Hobbesian world of realism,there are only two orderingprinciples: Multiand hierarchy. by anarchy Unipolarworldsare characterized hierarchy. to and bipolarsystems anarchical, are thereis likely be morestructure although in a bipolarsystem because ofthewayeach hegemondominates ownbloc or its alliance system.A tight bipolar world might even be described as two of underconditions anarchy. hierarchies competing Stalin imposed a tight,hierarchicalstructureon the Soviet bloc. The Westernalliancewas alwaysmuchlooser. Paradoxically, hierarchy both the of blocs began to decline almost as soon as the international systembecame bipolar in the mid-1950s.By the late 1970s, the United States was at best primusinter pares withinNATO; it had to negotiate changes in military and arms control policies with its allies. doctrine,weapons deployments, and negotiations thatbore little Consultations led frequently to compromises of relationto the distribution powerwithin alliance. The influence the the of of UnitedStatesin NATO and withmany itsnon-NATO allieswas constrained
51. TheNew YorkTimes, August1980,p. A4. 28 52. For attempts such explanations, Richard Ned Lebow, "When Do Leaders Initiate at see and RelationsTheory theEnd of Conciliatory Policies," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen,Intemational theCold War;and JaniceGross Stein,"PoliticalLearningby Doing: Gorbachevas Uncommitted and MotivatedLearner,"in thisissue ofIntemational Organization. Thinker

Symposium 269 less allies. On bynormsof cooperationand consensusthatbenefited powerful arms control and other issues, some of these allies also benefitedfrom to on transnational coalitionsthatimposedconstraints theU.S. capacity shape
NATO policy.53

anarchicalbecause thereis no system stilltechnically is The international However,relationsamongthe developed,democratic enforcement authority. be statesof Asia, NorthAmerica,Oceania, and WesternEurope can hardly inescapableconsequencesof The allegedly characterized a self-help as system. that anarchyhave been largelyovercomeby a complexweb of institutions disputes. relationsand provide mechanismsfor resolving governinterstate and help sustaina consensusin favor consultation of reflect These institutions and compromisethat mute the consequences of power imbalances among a of states.In the course of two generations, community nationshas evolved and economic thatis bound together the realizationthatnationalsecurity by withotherdemocratic well-being requireclose cooperationand coordination and democratizing states.54 In 1957, Karl Deutsch and colleagues developed the conceptof a security of where"thereis a real assurancethatmembers thatcommunity community but willnot fight each otherphysically, willsettletheirdisputesin some other in communities, which betweenamalgamated security way."They distinguished and units, independent there been a formal has of merger twoor morepreviously in retain legalindependence.55 separate governments pluralistic communities,which of There is good reason to consider the community developed nations Since 1945,therehave been above a pluralistic security community. identified no wars or war-threatening crises between its members.The most serious in of and fishing overNorthern rights thevicinity Ireland,Gibraltar, conflicts, to involved. Contrast, of Iceland, are testimony the restraint the governments and largely constructive response forexample, RepublicofIreland'scareful the and to the troublesin the North with the more interventionist escalatory in or responsesof Greece and Turkey Cyprus Pakistanin Kashmir.56 Perhaps the best evidence for the existence of a pluralisticsecurity member is plans byone community community thegeneralabsence of military
53. See, for example, Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO Md.: Johns Press,1990); Thomas HopkinsUniversity Since1949 (Baltimore, Out-of-Area Problems (Boulder,Colo.: Westview Germany, ArmsControl and Risse-Kappen,TheZero Option:INF, West Press, 1988); and Richard C. Eichenberg,"Dual Track and Double Trouble: The Two-Level Politicsof INF," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson,and Robert D. Putnam,Double-edged of Press, University California Politics (Berkeley: Bargaining Domestic and Diplomacy: Intemational 1993),pp. 45-76. Iceland, Ireland,the United Kingdom, in 54. I includethe following countries thiscommunity: NetherNorway,Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Portugal,Spain, France, Belgium,Luxembourg, Austria, Canada, United States, Mexico, Japan, South Korea, lands, Germany,Switzerland, and New Zealand. Taiwan,Singapore, Australia, Philippines, Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: and 55. Karl W. Deutsch et al., PoliticalCommunity theNorth Press,1957),pp. 5-6. Princeton University 56. Lebow, "Ireland,"p. 264.

Organization 270 International In developeda plan forthe foroperations againstanother. 1969,theIrishArmy but it was shelvedafterthe cabinet crisis.57 Ireland, occupationof Northern Spain may retain an operational plan for the occupation of Gibraltar,but think thatitis not an optionthey about,plan authorities insist Spanishmilitary members clearly community amongsecurity planning for, rehearse.Military or to thatrelations amongthemwillcontinue be peaceful. the reflects expectation This is most and Manyoftheseplans are collaborative testedinjointexercises. between in evident NATO, butthereis also close,ifless publicizedcooperation Japan, South Korea, and the United States and between Australia, New Zealand, and theUnitedStates. ties that binds togetherthe Jointplanning is only one of the military for manyprograms community. Theyhave established members the security of share officers. They routinely common trainingand exchanges of military intelligenceand have established bi- and multilateralagreementsfor the and weapons systems. Integraof technology development advanced military nationalities staff tion is evident in NATO, where officersof different or commandsto whichmemberstatescontribute earmarkforces.France and and are establishinga joint brigade, Germanyhave gone a step further a that ago. something wouldhavebeen unthinkable generation member stateswere Within for was NATO, theimpetus integration twofold: the threat from SovietUnion butwantedto responding a perceivedmilitary to force.The independentGerman military preventthe emergenceof a strong, and their publics Soviet threat has disappeared, but NATO governments integraat to committed the alliance and its efforts military remainstrongly officers indicate the tion.58Interviewswith defense officialsand military in to ways. widespreadbeliefthatNATO contributes European stability many integration provides, They emphasize the politicalreassurancethat military role in Europe. Manyofficials especiallyto thoseconcernedabout Germany's in to also stressNATO's contribution buildingdemocracy Greece, Portugal, and to the of and Spain through efforts professionalize transform worldview its
A to for plan called fora borderincident be stagedas the pretext invasion. 57. The IrishArmy was on in Republic ambulance,requestedbya Catholicphysician Londonderry, to be fired while was to securethe crossing CraigavonBridge.In response,the SixthBrigadeof the IrishArmy the Meanwhile, an armored column would cross into the bridge and march into Londonderry. off the cornerofUlsterand strike Lurganand Toome Bridge,cutting Belfastfrom at southeastern rest of Ulster. The two forces were to link up and "liberate" Belfast. The plan assumed Henderson, Army. See RichardNed Lebow, "Ireland," in Gregory noninterference the British by (New York: eds.,DividedNationsina DividedWorld G. RichardNed Lebow, and John Stoessinger, David McKay,1974),p. 247. 58. See NATO Heads of Government, CopenhagenDeclaration,7 June1991; "New Strategic of Meetingof the Rome, 8 November1991; Ministerial Concept,"Communiqu6 NATO Summit, 10 Issues at the NorthAtlanticCouncil in Athens,Final Communiqu6, June1993; and Statement Meetingof the NorthAtlanticCooperationCouncil in Athens,11 June1992. For publicopinion 9 36-Herbst1991,"Frankfurter Zeitung, December 1991; Allgemeine data, see "Europabarometer and Reticence," documentno. and Ronald D. Asmus, "National Self-confidence International N-3522-AF(Santa Monica,Calif.:RAND Corp., 1992).

Symposium 271 thosecountries' military organizations. Theyhope NATO might playa similar role in the East.59Civilianand military authorities non-NATO members in of the security community also speak of the continuing importanceof military cooperation.60 The nature and extentof postwar military cooperation and integration amongthedevelopeddemocracies unprecedented. is accordingly are It difficult to make confident judgments about theirlong-term politicalconsequences.If analogiesto economicintegration valid,military are integration createhigh will exit costs. Cooperative training, deployment, and coproductionof weapons of encouragean economy scale thatmaximizes comparative the advantagesof If participants. integration progressed has sufficiently it maybe extraordifar, narilydifficult the short-term-andthis is the criticaltimeperspective in in manyconflicts-to disengageand develop equally capable and fully national forcesand the weapons industry necessaryto supportthem.The veryact of disengagement would sound a loud politicalalarmand encourageotherstates to takeprecautionary measures. It is also reasonableto suppose thatmilitary cooperation, like its economic buildsa greatersense of community counterpart, amongparticipants. Armies thattraintogether, companiesthatworktogether, like develop profitable ties and evenloyalties thatthey anxiousto preserve. are The Frenchexperience a is case in point. After President Charles de Gaulle withdrewfrommilitary in of participation NATO, Frenchmilitary officials developeda dense network informal linkswiththeircolleaguesin NATO and keptcooperationalive as far as was politically feasible.61 Further evidenceforthe existenceof a security is community the beliefon the part of otherstatesthatsuch a community exists.In Eastern Europe the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland seek membership NATO and the in in European Community the expectationthat this will confer significant at securityand economic benefits.In the Far East, too, expanded efforts multilateral cooperationin theeconomicand security spheresare underway. The pluralistic that security community now spans fourcontinents (Australia, NorthAmerica,NorthAsia, and WesternEurope) began as at least two communities: separate security Canada-United States and Norway-Sweden. Deutsch and his colleagues countedMexico and the United States as a third In securitycommunity.62 the firstdecades of the twentiethcentury,the
59. Personal interviews withvarious officials Lisbon, Madrid, Paris, Brussels,the Hague, in Bonn,Rome, and Copenhagen,1991-93. in 60. Personalinterviews Wellington, Canberra,and Tokyo. 61. See Diego Ruiz Palmer, FrenchStrategic Optionsin the 1990s, Adelphi Paper no. 260 (London: International Institute Strategic for Studies,1991). ElizabethPond, in BeyondtheWall: D.C.: BrookingsInstitution, Germany's Road to Unification (Washington, 1993), p. 66, quotes interviews with NATO officials.See also David G. Haglund, Alliance Within Alliance? the Franco-German Military Cooperation theEuropeanPillarofDefense(Boulder,Colo.: Westview and Press,1991). 62. Deutsch et al.,PoliticalCommunity theNorth in Atlantic Area,pp. 28 and 68.

Organization 272 International was community extendedto theUnitedKingdom security Canadian-American grew to include all of and Ireland, and the Norway-Swedencommunity was community Scandinavia.By 1957,Deutsch et al. believedthatthe security in developing the widerNorthAtlanticarea. From the vantagepointof 1994, It larger, appears robust. is also growing community Atlantic security theNorth also security communities withthe accessionof Spain and Portugal.Pluralistic have developedbetweenAustraliaand New Zealand and betweenJapan and could security community therestofthedevelopedworld.One largepluralistic muchof EasternEurope, some of encompassall of thesecountries, eventually of Soviet Union, and the countries the rapidlydevelopingPacific the former rim. Deutsch and his colleagues found two essential conditionsfor pluralistic of the communities: compatibility major values relevantto political security politicalunitsto respondto and the capacityof participating decisionmaking each other's needs, messages,and actions quickly,adequately,and without was of the condition, mutualpredictability behavior, to resort violence.A third to also thought be important.63 is sharedvalues makeresponsiveThe mostvitaloftheseconditions thefirst; of community develsecurity possible. The pluralistic ness and predictability oped democraciesis based on manycommonvalues and ideals. In a recent of address to the General Assembly the Council of Europe, Czech President the Havel identified commonvalues of Europe as "respectforthe uniqueness and freedom of each human being, the principlesof a democratic and and a civicsociety withthe rule a economy, politicalsystem, market pluralistic and in of law. All of us [also] respectthe principleof unity diversity share a nationsand betweenthedifferent creative cooperation to determination foster spheresofcivilizationand groups-and thedifferent ethnic, religious, cultural thatexistin Europe."64 communities closely parallel the The appearance and spread of security and successfulmarketeconomies.65 developmentof democraticinstitutions and capitalismare necesindicatesthatdemocracy The Deutsch formulation communities. Responsivefor security but conditions pluralistic sary insufficient also ness and predictability are essential,and theyare encouragedbygreater withincountriesand more intensepersonal and ecopoliticalparticipation also between or among them. Cross-nationalinteraction nomic interaction of to contributes thedevelopment a "we feeling"amongpeoples.66
63. Ibid.,pp. 66-67. p.3. of Review Books, 18 November1993, 64. Vaclav Havel, "How Europe Could Fail," New York other do governments not fight 65. There is considerableresearchthatarguesthatdemocratic on Mirror theWall ... Are Freer See, governments. forexample,SteveChan, "Mirror, democratic 20 Resolution (December 1984), pp. 617-40; Zeev of CountriesMore Pacific?"Journal Conflict 1816-1976,"Joumalof Conflicts, Maoz and Nasrin Abdolai, "Regime Types and International and "DomesticStructures 33 Resolution (March 1989),pp. 3-36; and Randall L. Schweller, Conflict 1992),pp. 235-69. 44 Politics (January War: Are DemocraciesMore Pacific?"World Preventive Atlantic Area,pp. 117-61. in 66. Deutsch et al.,PoliticalCommunity theNorth

Symposium 273 SovietUnion, and the of Some of the countries EasternEurope, the former and of democracy to Pacificrimappear committed the development pluralist for economies.Success would establishthe essentialprecondition freemarket To community. the extentthat the principlesthat govern a wider security relationsamong the industrialdemocracies come to characterizerelations a security betweenthemand some or all of these countries, singlepluralistic could come to encompass most of the developed world. In its community conflictpresentor expanded formit will coexistwiththe more traditional, relationsamongother of thatcontinueto characterize pronepattern relations Armenia-Azerbaijan), former communist states(e.g., Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia, and amongmanylesserdevelopedcountries, betweenthemand the developed
world.67

Adaptation versus learning or Realists and neorealistsshare a "structuralist" "positional" ontology.68 theirinteraction. and generateits structure through Unitsprecede the system It of Structure the unintendedby-product unit interaction. is immuneto is is Waltz efforts modify or mitigateits effects. to it Once structure formed, "the creatorsbecome the creaturesof the market[thatis, the system] insists, And thisis why"Throughall the changesof thattheiractivity gave rise to."69 of boundaries,of social, economic,and politicalform, economicand military politics remain strikingly the activity, substance and style of international constant."70 the the For realists, of statescannotescape from predicament anarchy; best relations. The realitiesof international theycan do is adapt to the underlying thatstateson the claims of realisttheoriesreston the assumption predictive and constraints wholedo adapt and therefore waysto similar respondin similar opportunities.Neorealism maintains that adaptation is facilitatedby an process. Like Darwin, Waltz assumes that the environment evolutionary in (internationalstructure, the language of neorealism) rewards certain and adaptationsin structure behaviorand punishesothers.Througha process of natural selection,well-adapted units prosper and the unfitdecline or become extinct.71
argument been made byJamesM. Goldgeierand Michael McFaul, "A Tale of has 67. A similar 46 Organization (Spring in Two Worlds:Core and Periphery the Post-coldWar Era," Intemational 1992),pp. 467-91. 68. For an elaboration, see Richard Ashley, "The Povertyof Neorealism," Intemational Problemin 38 Organization (Spring1984), pp. 225-86; AlexanderWendt,"The Agent-Structure 41 Organization (Summer1987), pp. 335-70; and Relations Theory,"Intemational International Organization 43 Debate," Intemational David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-structure (Summer1989),pp. 441-73. Politics, 90. p. of 69. Waltz,Theory Intemational on Politics," 329. p. 70. Waltz,"Reflections Theory Intemational of of Politics,p. 118; and Waltz, "Reflectionson Theory 71. See Waltz, Theory Intemational of " Politics, pp. 330-31. Intemational

274 International Organization of For evolutionto bringabout a worldof betteradapted units,the effects with long necks have an natural selection must be cumulative.If giraffes and advantagebecause theycan reach moreleaves, moreof themwill survive will on average have longer necks than the reproduce. Their offspring to generation whichtheir parentsbelonged,and theprocesswillcontinueuntil the most advantageousneck lengthis reached. This is not true for states. resources and increaseits country's Clever,adaptiveleadersmaymobilizetheir to skillsare nothereditary. Accomplished powerrelative otherstates.But their are statesmen just as likelyto be followedby hacks or leaders whose foreign and theircountry by policyis severelyconstrained domesticconsiderations, Prussia advantage.Frederickthe Great transformed maylose its competitive fiefdom into a greatpower. Otto von Bismarckand froman inconsequential an WilliamIV made Prussiathedominant unitwithin enlarged KingFrederick and extraordinarily powerfulGermany.Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler squandered Germany'sresourcesand reduced its size and relativestanding throughpoorlyconceived bids for hegemony.Because bad leadership and are domesticconstraints recurrent problems,and largelyindependentof the to successor failureof the foreign policiesof previousleaders,it is unrealistic in of expecta significant improvement theperformance unitsovertime. The twentieth centuryofferslittle support for the neorealist notion of evolutionary adaptation.We need only note one of the supremeironies of frommultipolarity to neorealism:that the previoussystemtransformation, about bythe blatantfailureof keyunitsto respondto bipolarity, brought was structural Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union were grossly imperatives. ineptin theirforeign policies. Germanyand Japan challengedpowerswhose The SovietUnion helped to unleash combinedstrength manytimestheirs. was and the world'smostdestructive by refusing balance againstGermany war to gains. Britainand bandwagoning instead,in the hope of makingterritorial France were equallyculpable; theyneglectedtheirmilitary powerand triedto appease ratherthanoppose bothBenito Mussoliniand Hitler.If one or more still ofthesestateshad been betteradapted,theworldmight be multipolar. do to Naturalselectionand interspecific competition not requireorganisms workbestwhentheirmechanisms are how they work.In fact, understand they is unknown. Thisprinciple well-illustrated thenowextinct Oligocenehorned by gopher,Epigaulus.In the matingseason, males locked hornsin combat,with all thewinner taking theavailablefemales.Large hornsseem to have conferred and over time an advantagein combat,so largerhornedanimalsreproduced, the species developed largerand largerhorns.The pointwas reached where and bigger burrows the thehornsbecame dysfunctional: gopherneeded bigger in whichto hide and thusbecame morevulnerable predators. to the IfEpigaulushad recognized suicidalnatureofsexualselection combat, by criteria. Such a femalesmight have chosentheirmateson thebasis ofdifferent of would have requireda relatively shift understanding evolution sophisticated would also and familiarity the fateof overspecialized with species. Individuals

Symposium 275 have had to develop a longer term perspectiveon themselvesand their intellectual capabilitiesof giventhe limited This environment. was impossible Epigaulus. it of An understanding structure creates the possibility modifying or of of Human beingspossess this some of its apparentconsequences. escapingfrom the evolutionof theirown and other They have already affected capability. species in dramaticways. Some of these changes are a directresultof our understanding evolution.We have developed and maintainmany farm of animals and plants throughselectivebreeding.Modern maize and camels cannot reproducewithouthuman assistance. Natural selection would have who workeddifferently amonghumansifwe did notcare foror heal individuals would not otherwisesurviveto reproduce. Modern technologyraises the genetic reshapingof our species through of possibility a more fundamental engineering. and Knowledgeof structure processhas enabled humanbeingsto altertheir in social environment profoundways. Smith,Malthus, and Marx described Their what theybelieved to be inescapable laws thatshaped humandestiny. at predictionswere not fulfilled, least in part because their analyses of populationdynamicsand economicspromptedpolicies intendedto prevent themfrom to coming pass. relations.Throughout the A similarprocess is under way in international the century, greatpowersbehavedon and half nineteenth first of thetwentieth world the whole like Epigaulus.Prodded by the examplesof two destructive withnuclear of wars and the possibility a thirdthat would likelybe fought weapons, leaders soughtways to escape fromthe deadly consequences of They developed and nurturedsupranationalinstitutions, self-helpsystems. for norms,and rules that mitigatedanarchyand providedincentives closer the democraciesbound themcooperationamongstates.Gradually, industrial in selvestogether a pluralistic community. security of Superpowerleaders were also conscious of the destructiveness modern In in warfare nevertheless but became entangled an intensepowerstruggle. the in bothwere late 1940sand early1950s,policymakers Moscow and Washington about theirchances of avoidingwar over the course of the next pessimistic In generation.72 these years,and again in the early 1960s, the superpowers in of came to thebrink war in tenseconfrontations Berlinand Cuba. tenseaftermath werecharacterized crises by The cold war and itssometimes and arms races but also by attemptsto reduce the threatof war through and reassurance.Americanand Sovietleaders armscontrol, accommodation, became convincedthat theiroppositeswere as anxious as theyto gradually avoid war. Some influential figuresin both camps came to the equally importantrealization that attemptsto gain unilateral advantage through
Do States Jump Through Them?" 72. Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Intemational Security (Summer1984),pp. 147-86. 9

Organization 276 International Througha fail invariably or evenbackfire.73 weapons deployments threatening moved back fromthe abyss.With the series of small steps,the superpowers advent of Gorbachev,theytook giant steps. Human intellectand a mutual and alliestheunderstandto commitment avoidwargavethesuperpowers their dilemma. theirsecurity ingand courageto escape from consequences.A bipolarsystem Elite learning the unitlevel had systemic at is definedby its poles. Because the Soviet Union and the United States relationsas a self-helpsystemand repudiated the notion of international theirrelationship changedthe rulesbywhichtheyoperated,theytransformed system.Superpower and, by extension,the characterof the international dilemmaindicatesthatunitsare not always success in escaping the security reflective but intelligent, victimsof some abstract,foreordainedstructure, actors who, by their coordinatedbehavior,can and have transcendedthe as consequencesof anarchy depictedbyrealism. The postwarexperiencesuggeststhat an "atomist"or "transformational" is conceptionof structure more appropriateto the studyof contemporary relations amongthe developeddemocracies.In thisformulation, international is structure both an antecedentand consequence of unitbehavior.In the first enables action and constrainsits possibilities;but it is instance,structure reshaped by that action. Language and its set of semanticand subsequently possible.Speakersof any rulesmake certainkindsof communication syntactic and and newvocabulary grammar dropold words introduce languagegradually the of as and forms; a resultof theirbehavior, structure the languageevolves. relations developing of by Postwarleaders changedthe structure international norms,and rules. The altered structureencourages and new institutions, rules kindsof behaviorthe way new semanticand syntactic rewardsdifferent facilitate different of a language. a use Realism and thefutureof greatpower relations In is Realists maintainthat this achievement illusory.74 the absence of a humankind doomed to repeat endlesslythe cycleof is hierarchical structure, expansion and decline and war and renewal. Only nuclear weapons, some of greatpowerwar. realistsaver,hold out thepossibility preventing The pessimismof realists derives from their view of the fundamental between domestic and international society.The formerhas a differences in encase theirfists velvet, how delicately Leviathan.No matter governments theyhave the power to enforcetheirdecrees and to maintainorder. Such
Fifty Years ChoicesAbouttheBomb in theFirst Dangerand Survival: 73. See McGeorge Bundy, (New York: Random House, 1988); JohnLewis Gaddis, TheLongPeace; RichardNed Lebow and Press,1994). University N.J.:Princeton JaniceGrossStein,WeAll Lost theCold War(Princeton, when theydevelop in and of 74. Waltz writesthat"Rules, institutions, patterns cooperation, be." See otherwise whattheymight from are systems, all limitedin extentand modified self-help " Politics, p. 336. of "Reflections Theory Intemational on

Symposium 277 level.I contendthatthedifference does not existat theinternational authority when the can Governments onlyenforcelaws and regulations is overdrawn. complies. When compliance is vast majorityof the population willingly marijuana U.S. laws concerning or Prohibition withcurrent absent-as during limit-law enforcement agencies are speed and the fifty-five mile-per-hour has to largely helpless.It is no exaggeration say thatpolice authority more or less ceased to functionin many sections of American cities where their opposed by by is authority viewed as illegitimate citizens and is forcibly well-armed drugdealers. has amongthedevelopeddemocracies takenon many relations International in of of the characteristics relationships domestic societies. An increasing their of numberof stateshas begun to acknowledgethe necessity regulating and agreements. As through rules,norms, politicaland economicintercourse by in domesticrelations, thishighdegree of complianceis motivated enlightened self-interest. the of structure recognizes possibility changein The conceptof evolutionary of It different directions. maybe thatthe community developed nationswill become more peaceful and generate structuresthat encourage peaceful could bringabout a developments behavior.It is also possiblethatunforeseen withrealism. and the kindof behavioridentified to system return a self-help level relations scholars whoworkat thesystem Onlytimewilltell.International tools that and to develop the intellectual need to recognizeboth possibilities if the structure theyare of willenable themto monitor evolution international to makepredictions based on it. tradition. Some of a Realism descendsfrom long and venerableintellectual like E. H. Carr and Morgenluminaries twentieth-century its mostimportant thau embracedrealismin the darkdecades of the 1930s and 1940sbecause it from ravagesof a new the humankind the appeared to offer besthope ofsaving remaincommitted thegoal to and moredestructive Contemporary war. realists to of peace but findit difficult accept thatthe postwarbehaviorof the great powers has belied their unduly pessimisticassumptionsabout the conseand someofthepolicy recommentheir theories Ironically, quencesofanarchy. worldwe all seek. dationsbased on themmaynowstandin thewayofthebetter