Foreign Policy Program

October 2011

Policy Brief
Europes Response to the Arab Spring
by Michael Leigh
The death of Muammar Gaddafi and the elections for the constituent assembly in Tunisia in October 2011 mark a new phase in the political transformation of a number of countries in North Africa. Now that the old regimes have been swept away in these countries, citizens face enormous challenges in building up civil society and creating representative forms of government. Today Libya poses the starkest challenge because of the absence of political institutions, administrative structures, and organized civil society. The circumstances of Gaddafis demise, and the countrys clan-based society, will make reconciliation and the consolidation of authority by new rulers particularly difficult. There was a general welcome for Tunisias October elections in Europe and the United States, pending reports from international observers. However the multiplicity of political parties in Tunisia and the strong performance by the Islamist Ennhada party raise questions about the countrys future system of government. Egypt, the pivotal country in North Africa and the Middle East, still remains largely under the old order, pending presidential elections, which are unlikely before 2013. The popular uprising and brutal repression in Syria, as well as tensions throughout the region, confront influential outsiders, including Europe, the United States, and Turkey, with fundamental questions about their strategic approach to the region. The Arab Spring, beginning in Tunisia in December 2010, posed major challenges to Europe, as it did to the United States and Turkey. All three were engaged, to different degrees, with a number of the existing regimes in Arab countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The overthrow of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and later Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, coupled with military intervention in Libya under a NATO umbrella, and the uprising and repression in Syria, challenged the approach taken hitherto by all three external actors. This paper focuses on Europes response and pinpoints a number of principles for constructive engagement with the new political regimes that are starting to emerge in the region. During the two decades preceding the Arab Spring, the European Union and its member states took a twopronged approach to relations with Mediterranean countries. Member states pursued bilateral relations in a pragmatic fashion, establishing close

Summary: During the two decades preceding the Arab Spring, the European Union and its member states took a twopronged approach to relations with Mediterranean countries. Member states pursued bilateral relations in a pragmatic fashion, establishing close diplomatic and commercial ties. The EU institutions, by contrast, were tasked with promoting regional cooperation, good governance, and the protection of human rights. On the eve of the Arab Spring, the EU undertook a major review of the European Neighborhood Policy, and in March, the European Commission and the High Representative put forward a proposed new EU strategy towards the region called Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, which placed democracy promotion at the heart of the EUs Mediterranean policy. Reformers will only embrace the EU initiative if it is implemented with sensitivity, taking into account the fundamentally different situation in each country, and provided delivery mechanisms are swift and effective. The approach of outsiders needs to be flexible, recognizing that conditions of uncertainty, and perhaps civil strife, may persist for several years. 1744 R Street NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 745 3950 F 1 202 265 1662 E info@gmfus.org

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diplomatic and commercial ties. The southern member states, in particular, drew on links going back to colonial times to build a privileged position in terms of trade, investment, public procurement, and energy supply. The EU institutions, by contrast, were tasked with promoting regional cooperation, good governance, and the protection of human rights. The credibility of EU conditionality was sometimes called into question by the interest-based approach of the member states. The most notorious divergence occurred in 2003, the year the EU began its wider Europe initiative. During a visit to Tunisia, French President Jacques Chirac stated The first of human rights is to have food,medical care, education, and housingFrom this point of view, we have to recognize that Tunisia is well advanced compared to many countries.Such sentiments, couched in milder terms, were repeated by senior figures until the eve of Ben Alis overthrow. Italy maintained good relations with Libya under both center-left and center-right governments. Egypt enjoyed close links with many member states despite the continuing state of emergency and the persistence of repression. Spanish and French diplomats and business people gave particular priority to Morocco. protection of human rights, and good governance. Originally conceived to cushion the impact of enlargement on Eastern Europe and to create a zone of stability beyond the EUs borders, the ENP was extended to the Mediterranean region at the behest of Commission President Romano Prodi and the Spanish government. As one Spanish diplomat put it, 700 years of Al-Andalus could not be forgotten. In Spain, neighborhood meant Morocco. Under this initiative, the EU offered to bring neighboring countries into various EU agencies and programs and to give them a stake in the single market, in exchange for fulfillment of a set of commitments. These included specific steps to broaden democratic freedoms and the respect for human rights. An action plan along these lines was negotiated with most partners in the region. A governance facility would provide additional support for countries that performed well. Despite initial enthusiasm, it soon became apparent that, in the absence of an offer of membership, the EU lacked the leverage to achieve the reforms it sought. Arab governments, unwilling to give more freedom to NGOs and opposition groups, had little intention to deliver on political reforms. The EU, with its lengthy procedures, could not deliver substantially on incentives beyond the advanced status accorded to Jordan and Morocco. During the French presidential campaign in 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy promised to set up a Mediterranean Union between all the states bordering the Mediterranean. However, this proved controversial with excluded northern member states, notably Germany, and confusing in relation to the Barcelona process and ENP. Turkey, as a candidate for EU membership, was far from enthusiastic. Eventually the initiative was extended to all member states, rebranded as the Union for the Mediterranean, and effectively merged with the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, as a loose framework for common projects, with a small secretariat in Barcelona. France and Egypt, in the persons of President Sarkozy and President Mubarak, were the first co-presidents. On the eve of the Arab Spring, the EU undertook a major review of the ENP, following extensive consultation of stakeholders. Feedback focused largely on the need for clarity on the policys eventual goal and greater differentiation among partners. Consultations were still underway in December 2010, when street demonstrations began in Tunisia. Many observers considered this a golden opportunity for Europe to support civil society and democratic
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The credibility of EU conditionality was sometimes called into question by the interest-based approach of the member states.
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership, inaugurated in Barcelona in November 1995, encouraged good governance through economic liberalization and people-to-people contacts. But the Arab-Israeli conflict, friction between Arab countries, mixed messages from EU governments, ambivalence over terrorism after 9/11, and mutual suspicion limited the Barcelona processs impact. Nonetheless the Euro-Mediterranean partnership raised the profile of the south in the EUs external relations, at a time when the main focus was on Central and Eastern Europe. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) sought to promote shared values including the rule of law, the

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change in Tunisia and then in Egypt. The press, however, was impatient for action and criticized the deafening silence from Europe in the first months of the revolt. There were harsh exchanges in the European Parliament about this. In reality, the European Commission and the High Representative acted swiftly, given the wide-ranging consultations required, and in March put forward a proposed new EU strategy towards the region.1 This placed democracy promotion at the heart of the EUs Mediterranean policy through a proposed new Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity. Under this scheme, the EU would offer incentives, including increased grants and loans, better access to the EU market, mobility partnerships and visa facilitation, as well as a new civil society facility, in exchange for commitments to democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance, and the rule of law. Benefits would be calibrated to reforms, on the principle more for more, i.e., those who go further in implementing pro-democracy reformers would receive more assistance. To determine eligibility, the EU would monitor the adoption and implementation of reforms carefully. This approach was swiftly endorsed by the European Council and incorporated in the revised ENP in May. This initiative put more money on the table and, above all, conveyed the message that the EU was ready to respond to new aspirations in the Arab countries. High level visits in the spring and summer of 2011 to Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt reiterated the EUs support for transition to systems based on democracy and the respect for human rights. In June, the high representative set up a Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean, comprised of EU bodies and international financial institutions, and the next month appointed a Spanish diplomat, Bernardino Len, to work with this task force to promote democratic transition. As events evolved, the EU supported the unfreezing of Libyan assets and the imposition of tougher sanctions on Syria following the regimes brutal repression of the popular uprising. Support for the EUs new initiative in the Arab countries was rather muted. Observers in Europe raised questions about the wisdom of placing democratization at the heart of EU policy, in light of the recalcitrance of some of the
1 Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, from the High Representative and the European Commission, 8 March 2011, COM(2011) 200 final

actors there (e.g. Algeria, Gaza, Syria) and uncertainty as to the outcome of popular uprisings. Delivery of expected benefits could become a problem, especially if tightly linked to reform achievements. In the confused conditions of Tunisia, Egypt, and, increasingly, Libya, it was uncertain whether emerging political forces would be ready to take the EU as a model for political, economic, and legal reforms. In Tunisia, there was much emphasis on local ownership and self-help. How did this square with the EUs insistence on strict conditionality? The balance between different political forces in Egypt was constantly shifting, with the army expected to play a significant role at least for a couple of years. If Egypt missed some reform benchmarks, could the EU nonetheless engage actively under the new approach?

In the confused conditions of Tunisia, Egypt, and, increasingly, Libya, it was uncertain whether emerging political forces would be ready to take the EU as a model for political, economic, and legal reforms.
In strategic terms, the proposed partnerships, and subsequent ENP review,2 seem a sensible response to events. In practice, though, reformers will only embrace the EU initiative if it is implemented with sensitivity, taking into account the fundamentally different situation in each country, and provided delivery mechanisms are swift and effective. In particular, partners will be looking for early steps to liberalize agricultural trade and to ease conditions for mobility. Visa facilitation is crucial for people-to-people contacts and as a gauge of the practical value of the EUs support. Concrete and effective assistance from the EU to
2 Communication on a Changing Neighborhood, from the High representative and the European Commission, 25 May, 2011, COM (2011) 303 final

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specific sectors where particular countries have immediate needs will have a positive impact. Quick start-up initiatives that boost investment and jobs will help to alleviate some of the sources of discontent that prompted the uprisings and that increase migratory pressures. Such immediate benefits are particularly important in the crucial months ahead; the negotiation of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements is clearly an ambitious long-term goal. Sensitivity is needed in developing the proposed partnerships because of the burden of the past and because of pride in local ownership of the movements that brought down former autocratic leaders. These movements are quite distinct from the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe. Any temptation to view the Arab Spring as a repetition of the events in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, calling for the same tool box, would be misleading. The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe took place at the end of the Cold War among peoples seeking to return to Europe under the umbrella of EU and NATO membership. Several countries in transition could draw upon earlier traditions of bourgeois democracy. Stipulation by the EU of reform priorities was perceived as legitimate, given that it formed part of the accession process. To be sure, there are useful lessons to be learned from the earlier experience, including ways and means to support civil society, monitor elections, improve the business environment, and strengthen administrative capacity. Issues like the fight against organized crime and corruption, transparent tendering procedures for public procurement, and the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary pose challenges everywhere. However, reformers in each country face specific challenges and, therefore, have specific short-term priorities. In any event, none of the countries in North Africa is eligible for EU membership for geographic reasons; they are not European countries, despite profound involvement with Europe over the centuries. The EU does not, therefore, have the same basis for insisting on the adoption of European standards, be they political, economic, or judicial. Where governments or civil society groups in the region themselves request assistance in such areas, Europe needs to respond rapidly. But clearly there can be no question of imposing such standards from outside.

Any temptation to view the Arab Spring as a repetition of the events in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, calling for the same tool box, would be misleading.
More for more is a sound principle provided it does not automatically mean less for less. It may be a long road from an uprising against the old regime to the establishment of a well-functioning liberal democracy. Road blocks along the way may hold up progress or divert political development into quite different channels. Europe will still need to engage with societies that encounter such difficulties and to provide appropriate forms of support adapted to evolving needs. This underlines the importance of flexibility in adapting Europes approach to changing circumstances. Above all, to succeed, the EU and its member states need to speak with one voice, and to convey the same message through bilateral and multilateral channels. Europe, as well as the United States and Turkey, need to recognize that the revolution in North Africa and, perhaps, tomorrow, in the Middle East, is unfinished. There will be a range of outcomes in the different countries, which will be in constant evolution for a considerable time to come. In Tunisia, the October elections mark a turning point. Preservation of the countrys secular order will be among the challenges faced by the constituent assembly. In Egypt, the military no doubt wish to return to barracks as soon as possible. This may, however, take some time. For the moment, the country is still largely under the old order, despite aspirations for political and economic freedom among those who were decisive in overthrowing Mubarak. It remains to be seen whether the new parliament, for which elections begin on November 28, will function independently when it meets next March. Recent outbreaks of sectarian violence, which have claimed many victims, give cause for concern.
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In Libya, despite massive Western support, the national transitional council met fierce resistance before the final collapse of the Gaddafi regime. This indicates the ambivalence of parts of the population to the Benghazi team and the difficulty in achieving a national consensus. This is further highlighted by the absence of national institutions or even of organized civil society bodies. In Syria, the continued brutal repression and courageous resistance will make a sustainable outcome, embracing all groups in society, hard to achieve. Under these circumstances, the approach of outsiders needs to be flexible, recognizing that conditions of uncertainty, and perhaps civil strife, may persist for several years. The offer of partnership should be viewed as a menu from which items are to be chosen according to each countrys evolving needs and aspirations. If state structures are weak, or contested, the civil society dimension should be emphasized, with support channeled to non-state actors. Where civil society itself is largely absent, there is a role for nongovernmental bodies abroad in advising on ways to fill the gap. Quick delivery projects, which strengthen local business and create jobs, are particularly important. Markets should be opened, without protracted negotiations, to exports in the few sectors where the region enjoys comparative advantages. This will also start to reduce the push factors leading to emigration. At the same time, people-to-people contacts are essential in building systems based on political and economic freedom. This means moving ahead with visa facilitation, without imposing onerous conditions. Above all, the situation calls for a certain prudent modesty on the part of outsiders who wish to help. There is no call for triumphalism on the assumption that states in the region have decisively chosen a certain model, be it European, American, or Turkish. Rather outsiders need to dialogue with reformers and adapt their offers of assistance to evolving needs and aspirations.
About the Author
Michael Leigh is a consultant and senior advisor to GMF in Brussels. He focuses on European Neighbourhood Policy, post-Lisbon Europe, Chinas growing role in the European Union neighborhood, and EU relations with Israel and the Middle East. He began his current role after more than 30 years in EU institutions, most recently as directorgeneral for enlargement and deputy director-general for external relations.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.