G-2 19400513

REFERENCE COPY

LI

9400513

ASUALTIES
PUBLIC OPINION
&

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

Implications for U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies

DO NOT DESTROY 30 DAYS LOAN

RETURN TO AFSAA/SAMI 1777 NORTH KENT STREET, 7th FLOOR ROSSLYN, VA 2?20<V (703) 588-E

20101015369
CO

in
1

Lcgjey Number: 9400513

The research described in this report was sponsored jointly by the United States Army, Contract MDA903-91-C-0006 and by the United States Air Force, Contract F49620-91-C-0003.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Schwarz, Benjamin C. Casualties, public opinion, and U.S. military intervention : implications for U.S. regional deterrence strategics / Benjamin C. Schwarz. p. cm. "Prepared for the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force." "MR^31-A/AF." Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-1526-5 1. United StatesMilitary policy. 2. Military assistance, AmericanPublic opinion. 3. Battle casualtiesPublic opinion. 4. United StatesPublic opinion. 5. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975Public opinion. 6. Korean War, 19501953Public opinion. 7. Persian Gulf War, 1991Public opinion. I. United States. Army. II. United States. Air Force. III. Tide. UA23.S369 1994 355'.033'073dc20 94-7905 CIP

RAND is a nonprofit institution that seeks to improve public policy through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors.

Cover Design: Peter Soriano Published 1994 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310)451-6915; Internet: order@rand.org.

7V-C50S-/3

CASUALTIES
PUBLIC OPINION
&

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

Implicationsfor U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies

Benjamin C. Schwarz

DO NOT DESTROY
30 DAYS LOAN RETURN TO AFSAA/SAF PENTAGON, RM1D363 , ^5"
Prepared for the United States Army/United States Air Force

RAND
Arroyo Center/Project AIR FORCE

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

PREFACE

This report assesses polling data collected during the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars to analyze the influence of American public opinion on U.S. military intervention and its implications for U.S. regional deterrence strategies. The study should interest policymakers and military leaders concerned with U.S. deterrence strategies and with the implications of American military intervention. This analysis, part of a larger research effort exploring the problems of post-Cold War regional deterrence, was conducted jointly in the Strategy and Doctrine Programs of the Army Research Division's Arroyo Center and Project AIR FORCE. The Arroyo Center and Project AIR FORCE are two of RAND's federally funded research and development centers.

CONTENTS

Preface Figures Summary Chapter One INTRODUCTION Chapter Two AMERICA'S ACHILLES' HEEL? Chapter Three VIETNAM AND KOREA Withdrawal Korea Vietnam Escalation Korea Vietnam Chapter Four THE GULF WAR A Divided Public A Gloomy Public A Resolute and Ruthless Public Chapter Five CONCLUSIONS Observations and Policy Implications Massive Retaliation Redux?

iii vii ix 1 3 7 9 9 10 12 12 13 17 17 18 20 23 23 25

FIGURES

3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4.

Casualty and "Approval" LevelsKorea Casualty and "Approval" LevelsVietnam Respondents Favoring WithdrawalKorea Respondents Favoring WithdrawalVietnam Respondents Favoring EscalationKorea Respondents Favoring EscalationVietnam "Support" for Gulf Intervention Expectations of Duration of Gulf Intervention Ultimate Goals Favored by PublicGulf Intervention . . Public's Willingness to Use Nuclear WeaponsGulf War

7 8 11 12 14 15 18 19 20 21

vii

SUMMARY

A view commonly held by America's military and political leaders as well as by America's potential adversaries is that the U.S. public is particularly sensitive to casualties and that, if met with a great number of casualties in a regional military intervention, the U.S. public will demand a withdrawal of America's commitment. Sensitivity to casualties, then, is believed to be America's Achilles' heel. America's absolute military power makes it extraordinarily unlikely that any regional adversary could defeat U.S. forces if the United States were to mobilize fully. However, potential adversaries hope that, if met with a high cost in U.S. lives, America will withdraw from a military intervention, believing that an all-out effort would entail a prohibitive number of casualties. This belief is supposedly supported by the U.S. experience during the Vietnam and Korean conflicts. In these conflicts it is believed that, largely because of mounting casualties, U.S. public opinion became increasingly disenchanted with American military involvement, provoking popular support for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from these wars. A detailed analysis of polls taken during both wars shows that as the conflicts continued and as casualties and other costs of intervention mounted, public opinion did indeed become disillusioned with America's involvement, with more and more Americans regretting the original decision to intervene. There was, however, very little movement in the percentage of Americans polled who wished the United States to withdraw from the conflict. In fact, a growing number of Americans favored escalation of the conflicts to bring them to a quickand victoriousend. During

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

both wars polls showed that the public would have supported strategiesthe use of atomic weapons in Korea, an invasion of North Vietnamdeemed too risky or extreme by the U.S. political leadership. Much "anti-war" sentiment during the Vietnam War, for instance, expressed a dissatisfaction with the Johnson Administration's decision to intervene and with its conduct of the war but, nevertheless, favored not a withdrawal from the conflict but an escalation of it. Polls taken during the Gulf War support observations made in analyzing the two earlier regional interventions: Once committed, regardless of its opinion concerning the initial decision to intervene and regardless of costs incurred or costs that are feared, the public shows little inclination to quit an intervention and instead strongly supports an escalation of the conflict and measures it believes necessary to win a decisive victory. At the same time, however, polls taken during the Gulf War highlight public concern about high casualties, which could dissuade the public from supporting an intervention in the first place. Since once U.S. forces are committed to an intervention there will likely be little popular support for withdrawal, the potential for casualties makes the public's political will vulnerable primarily before intervention. The public will likely be more supportive of a decision to intervene if it believes that vital U.S. interests require intervention or that the cost in U.S. lives of intervention will be low. A proper understanding of public opinion regarding U.S. military intervention can support U.S. regional deterrence strategies. This is best illustrated by Saddam Hussein's threats, made repeatedly during the Gulf crisis, to turn the Kuwaiti desert into a killing field for U.S. soldiers. The Iraqi leader had hoped that such threats would turn U.S. public opinion against military intervention. But Saddam was probably very lucky that his threats did not come true. Had many American lives been lost in the struggle against Iraq, the U.S. public would likely have intensified its demands to escalate both the means and the ends of the conflict. Under such circumstances there would have been tremendous pressure on the U.S. political leadership not to cease hostilities until the Iraqi regime was toppled which was clea-ly the public's preference even without high numbers of U.S. casualties.

Summary

xi

Regional deterrence strategies could be aided if the following could be communicated to potential regional adversaries: Involving the United States in a war perforce ignites public passions. In the past, these passions have lead to cries for escalation. There is no reason to believe that they will not do so in the future, especially if the public is confronted with the factor likelihoodof high U.S. casualties. Although there may be advantages that the U.S. political and military leadership recognizes in keeping the means and ends of conflict limited, once war beginsthat is, once deterrence failspublic feeling takes on a momentum of its own and can, as it has often in the past, easily become hotheaded, unpredictable and, from the enemy's point of view, ruthless. In short, should deterrence fail, public passion could push decisionmakers to escalate quickly and unpredictably, beyond the limitations decisionmakers might wish to place on the conflict. In this situation, hostile regimes would be at the mercy of an impatient and ruthless U.S. public.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

This report analyzes the influence of U.S. public opinion on American military intervention. It specifically assesses the effect of rising American casualties1 on public support for U.S. military intervention and on public demands that the United States withdraw from military commitments. The report, part of a larger study on the problem of determining regional adversaries in the post-Cold War era, addresses how perceptions of the public's reaction to casualties can thwartand aidU.S. deterrence strategies. This study examines the three most recent cases of major U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts: the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf conflicts. Concerning Korea and Vietnam, it is widely held that U.S. public opinion regarding casualties led to a decline in public support for the intervention and, concomitantly, a surge in public demand that America withdraw its military commitments. In the Gulf War, U.S. policymakers and military leaders, having learned the apparent "lessons" of the Vietnam conflict, feared that, if confronted with high casualty rates, public support for the American intervention against Iraq would decline and the public would demand American withdrawal from the conflict before the United States achieved its geopolitical objectives.
'This report uses casualty figures, rather than the more restricted death figures, for two reasons. First, the public reacts to deaths and to injuries and dismemberment. Second, the literature on this subject examines public reaction to casualties, not only deaths. Comparisons of the findings of this study with those of other studies require that the same factors be used.

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

Perhaps even more important, the Iraqis also learned the "lessons" of U.S. public opinion and military intervention. Iraq embarked upon a strategy of threatening the United States with high numbers of casualties, believing that if America were to intervene, Iraq would provoke a dramatic increase in U.S. public opposition to the U.S. involvement by imposing a very high price on that involvement. Clearly, the U.S. threat to intervene in regional conflict loses its effectiveness as a deterrent if the United States or its potential adversaries believe that either America will be "self-deterred" from involvement or that such involvement will be forced to an end because of public opinion regarding casualties. This report, then, analyzes America's experience in these three conflicts to understand the constraintsand opportunitiesthat U.S. public opinion imposes upon policymakers, separating apparent lessons from real ones. In attempting to assess public opinion regarding these three conflicts, this study is faced with an unavoidable obstacle: It can rely only upon polling data compiled during the conflicts. This means that, often, the questions that pollsters in fact did ask are not the questions that this study would have asked and that, given historical hindsight, the timing of certain key questions was "off." Specifically, during the Gulf War, there are no reliable poll results from the period during the decisive ground operations against Iraqi forces, since these operations were completed so swiftly. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the polling question asked most frequently, and that so shaped future perceptions of public opinion during those conflicts, was quite vague and did not answer the fundamental questions with which this study is concerned. In short, the analysis in this report is limited by the questions that were of interest to pollsters at the time of these conflicts, which may or may not be the questions of most value in assessing the issues raised by this study. The study relies exclusively on pre-existing polling data. It explores, and in many cases, synthesizes, the results of Harris, Gallup, Roper, National Opinion Research Center (NORC), Survey Research Center, and national newspapers (New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post) polls.

Chapter Two AMERICA'S ACHILLES' HEEL?

A state's success in war is not due exclusively to its absolute power. It is not only the economic strength, quality of weapons systems, training, and leadership that determine military outcomes. Such intangible factors as morale, popular support, and a tolerance for pain also play a roleoften a decisive role. A state's war power is predicated on the society's willingness to suffer (what is often termed "cost tolerance") as well as on its ability to achieve the state's military objectives. A superior cost tolerance, or the ability to exact asymmetrical costs, of an otherwise weaker state can sometimes offset the greater military or material strength of the country with which it is waging war. A big nation can thus lose a small war if its pain threshold is insufficiently high. America's pain thresholdspecifically, its perceived sensitivity to casualtiesis believed, by many U.S. policymakers and military leaders, as well as by potential adversaries, to be its Achilles' heel. Based largely upon the apparent lessons of America's involvement in the Vietnam and Korean Wars, there is a widely held perception that, as casualties mount, public opinion will demand a withdrawal of U.S. military commitment. This perceived vulnerability is often exploited by America's potential enemies. In the months preceding the Gulf War, Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, repeatedly asserted that America "does not have the stomach" for a costly and prolonged conflict with Iraq. And Saddam's strategy, while unsuccessful, was to impose extraordinarily high casualties on the United States in the hope that the resulting domestic U.S. opposition would force a cessation of the conflict on terms favorable to Iraq. More recently, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, has warned the West, and specifically, the

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

United States, that NATO countries "cannot bear the pain" that the Serbs would inflict if those forces intervened in Bosnia. Americans, too, believe that their society is particularly impatient with long and bloody wars and that, when American soldiers return from foreign intervention in body bags, public outcry will demand a withdrawal from these conflicts. During preparations for the Gulf War, for instance, then Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono understood that America's military forces could prevail against the Iraqi military, but he nonetheless feared that America's "political will" would be dealt a severe blow if U.S. casualties mounted, resulting in an end to hostilities before U.S. military goals were reached. The belief that America's ability to intervene is weakened by the public's concern for casualties is perhaps best summarized by a passage in a 1984 RAND report: In the future, a President may elect to delay or forgo direct US military intervention in a Third World conflicteven though it may be needed to defend legitimate US interestsbecause of concern that public support may decline or collapse once the United States is deeply committed. Even if public support for a specific intervention is initially high, it can be demonstrated that continuing US casualties over time will seriously erode public support.1 Clearly, this perception adversely affects America's regional deterrence strategies. If potential adversaries believe that U.S. inter vention can be defeated by simply imposing a high price on that intervention, then they are unlikely to be deterred by U.S. threats to intervene. However, U.S. public reaction to casualties is historically more complex than America's potential enemies believe; this reaction has implications that can enhance rather than hobble U.S. deterrence strategies. Nevertheless, if properly understood, public opinion regarding casualties in surprising ways is still likely to constrain the options available to policymakers and military leaders in regional interventions.
'Mark A. Lorell, Charles T. Kelley, Jr., with Deborah Hensler, Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War, RAND, R-3060-AF, November 1984.

America's Achilles' Heel?

The belief that the U.S. public will demand a withdrawal from a military intervention because of a sensitivity to casualties is somewhat surprising. After all, Americans slaughtered each other for four years in their Civil War, producing horrific and completely unanticipated casualties. And that war ended, not when the South sued for peace because of an intolerable number of deaths, but only when it was invaded, ripped apart, and occupied. In this century, Japan's strategy against the United States was in many ways quite similar to Iraq's. Knowing that they would definitely lose a war if the United States mobilized fully, the Japanese reasoned that their only choice lay in a preemptive strike to cripple existing American military forces. Japan's leadership hoped to force the United States to negotiate a settlement rather than wage a prolonged war requiring great sacrifice.2 This calculation, of course, proved catastrophic for Japan. The United States made war against Japan with full force, culminating in the only atomic attacks in history. One can argue that the Civil and Second World Wars were "total" wars, arousing passions within the American public qualitatively different from those aroused by "limited" or regional wars. In fact, however, there is a striking and largely ignored historical continuity in the public's attitude during these earlier wars and during later limited conflicts. Domestic discontent and frustration with the way war was conducted increased in both the Civil and Second World Wars,3 as it did in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. That frustration did not lead to increased cries for American withdrawal from the former wars. Did it in the latter wars?
2 Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan's Decisions for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1967. 3 During the Civil War, popular support for Lincoln and the Union effort ebbed and flowed not in response to casualties but because of public perception that decisive action was or was not under way. When the conflict was taken to the enemy, public support for Lincoln increased, regardless of the casualties incurred. This public preference is not limited to the war fought from 1861-1865

Chapter Three

VIETNAM AND KOREA

In a National Security Council meeting in July 1965, as President Lyndon Johnson was agonizing over the decision to commit American ground troops to the war in Vietnam, Undersecretary of State George Ball, who opposed U.S. commitment, showed the President a briefing chart displaying a decline in "public support" over time for America's involvement in the Korean War as American casualties in that war mounted (Figure 3.1). Ball argued that the same thing would happen if the United States chose to intervene in Vietnam.
RAND20J 3 10294

120,000 - 100,000 80,000 16 w

as

60,000 a > 40,000

Cumulative casualties Percent approving intervention

20,000 0

I I I I I I I I I I _LASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMA

1950

1951 Year

1952

1953

SOURCE: George Ball's NSC briefing chart, based on Gallup and NORC polls.

Figure 3.1Casualty and "Approval" LevelsKorea

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

Ball's chart showed the lesson that America's leaders had already learned from the Korean Wara lesson that they would apply in full to the Vietnam War. During both conflicts, pollsters asked the public many questions regarding its attitude toward the wars being fought, but the one question asked most frequently during both wars and displayed on Ball's chart"Given what you now know, do you approve of the decision to go to war?"is the prism through which public attitudes toward both wars are understood. The lesson seems clear: As the war continues, as casualties mount, public "support" for the war declines. During both conflicts, the results of these polls were widely regarded as the whole story of the public attitude. The public attitude toward the war in Vietnam is thus understood to be encapsulated by two lines in Figure 3.2a decline in those responding affirmatively to the question "In view of the developments since
RANDJ0M4 2-0294

7 200,000 180,000 160,000 - 140,000 i 120,000

CO

100,000 m > 80,000 I 60,000 |

Cumulative casualties Percent approving intervention

40,000 20,000 0

i SON DJ FMAMJJASON DJ FMAMJJASON DJFMAMJ J A

1965

1966 Year

1967

1968

NOTE: Although American military involvement in Vietnam continued through 1973, this study discusses poll results only for the period from July 1965 (when U.S. ground troops were committed) through August 1968, when it was clear that the United States would pursue serious negotiations with Hanoi to end the war. After this date, the public understood that American withdrawal from Vietnam was only a matter of time and polling questions regarding withdrawal and escalation, which were consistent from July 1965 through August 1968, were asked less frequently and were of a qualitatively different character, making continuity in analysis of public attitude impossible.

Figure 3.2Casualty and "Approval" LevelsVietnam

Vietnam and Korea

we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" as casualties accumulate. This is unfortunate, for the question is of very limited value in understanding public opinion. The question does not ask "What policy should the U.S. now pursue?" nor "Should the U.S. now withdraw from its commitment?" It simply asks whether the initial decision to commit forces was correct. However, it is not surprising that this was the most frequently asked question during both conflicts. Domestic politicsand political news coveragerevolves around the perception of the Administration's popularity or approval rating. For the Administration in power, then, poll results that report the public's attitude toward the Administration's most important policythe decision to go to warare vital. For the Administration that initiates conflict, the public's attitude toward that decision will largely determine the Administration's political fortune. In showing the above chart, Ball was appealing to Johnson's political instincts. He was arguing not that U.S. intervention was or was not sound policy but that if the President chose to commit U.S. ground troops to Vietnam, his popularity would suffer tremendouslyas indeed it did. The poll results summarized in the above charts do not indicate what the public's preferences were during these conflicts. Fortunately, pollsters asked many questions regarding the public's preferences during both conflicts, even though the results of those polls were not nearly as widely reported at the time as were the "approval" polls. When the results of these polls regarding public preferences are examined, a far more complex picture of public opinion regarding American military intervention emerges. WITHDRAWAL Korea It is a commonly held view that in the Vietnam War, and to a lesser extent in the Korean War, as U.S. casualties mounted, as public "approval" of the conflict declined, increasing numbers of Americans wanted the U.S. to withdraw its forces. This understanding is largely

10

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

responsible for American policymakers' fear and American adversaries' hopes that high U.S. casualties will force American withdrawal from regional interventions. An examination of polling data during these conflicts points to a different conclusion. Not surprisingly, in August 1950, at the beginning of U.S. involvement in Korea's war, when 66 percent of those polled approved of America's intervention, only 12 percent of respondents to a Gallup Organization poll wanted the United States to "pull out, stop fighting" in Korea. Four months later, the public's attitude toward many aspects of the war had dramatically altered. With the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, American casualties increased tremendously and extraordinarily quickly. Confronted with the reality that intervention in Korea would be costly and probably prolonged, public "approval" of America's decision to involve itself in Korea's war declined precipitouslyfrom 66 percent in August to only 39 percent in December. But, asked by the Gallup organization "What do you think we should do to bring the war in Korea to an end?" only 11 percent of those polled chose the option "withdraw." Six months later, when a NORC poll asked "Do you think we should continue to keep our troops in Korea, or should we pull them out," the number choosing the option "pull out now" had climbedby 3 percent (Figure 3.3). Although only 37 percent "approved" of the decision to go to war in Korea, 76 percent chose the "continue" option (10 percent chose "no opinion"). Over the next 22 months, as casualties rose to 120,000 and as "approval" hovered around 40 percent (with a brief rise to 45 percent when truce talks began in 1951), various polls showed the number of respondents favoring a withdrawal from Korea fluctuating between only 12 and 17 percent. Vietnam When, in July 1965, the United States committed ground troops to Vietnam, 62 percent of those polled by the Gallup Organization "approved" of the decision to intervene and only 9 percent wanted the United States to "pull out" of Vietnam. By April 1966, the United States had suffered nearly 20,000 casualties, "approval" had dropped to 47 percent, but only 11 percent of those polled by NORC wished to see an American withdrawal from Vietnam. By March 1968, after the

Vietnam and Korea

11

Cumulative casualties

RAND *504-33-0294

70 60 50 S 40

Percent approving intervention Percent tavonng withdrawal

120,000 100,000 80,000

S.

30
20 10 V 0
ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMA

60,000 <D >

40,000 |

3 o
20,000 0

**

1950

1951 Year

1952

1953

SOURCES: Gallup, Harris, Roper, and NORC polls.

Figure 3.3Respondents Favoring WithdrawalKorea

publicly perceived disaster of the January 1968 Tet offensive, with 150,000 cumulative U.S. casualties, with the rate of casualties accelerating significantly over the past year, and with "approval" of the war down to 40 percent of those polled, only 12 percent of respondents, asked by the Roper poll "Which of the following do you think we should do right now in Vietnam?," chose the option "pull out of Vietnam." By August 1968, public "approval" had declined to 32 percent, casualties had risen to 200,000, but only 9 percent of respondents favored the withdrawal option offered by the Roper Organization. From the period July 1965 to August 1968, public "approval" of the Vietnam War had declined by 30 percentage points, casualties had accumulated horrifically, but the number of Americans favoring withdrawal from Vietnam was nearly unchanged (Figure 3.4). In both the Korean and Vietnam Wars it is clear that "disapproval" of the war did not translate into a public desire to withdraw. In fact, a strong majority regretted the decision to intervene, but an overwhelming majority did not wish to quit. What did Americans want?

12

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

RAND#204-3 4-0294

200,000 180,000 160,000

ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA

1965

1966

Year

1967

1968

SOURCES: Gallup, Harris, Roper, and NORC polls.

Figure 3.4Respondents Favoring WithdrawalVietnam

ESCALATION In both wars, far more Americans preferred to fight (harder) than to quit. In both conflicts, as the war dragged on, as casualties and other costs accumulated, and as "approval for the initial decision to intervene fell, polls showed an increasing number of Americans wishing to escalate the fighting. In fact, polls in both wars show an inverse relationship between "approval" of the intervention and the public's desire to escalate to achieve decisive results. Korea During the Korean War, various escalation options were presented to the public by different polls at different times. Sometimes the escalation option was not specific (respondents were given a choice, for instance, in an April 1952 NORC poll, among: (1) "pull our troops out of Korea"16 percent; (2) "keep our troops in Korea"31 percent; (3) "go on the attack against the Communist Chinese"49 percent; and "no opinion"4 percent). Other times, the escalation option

Vietnam and Korea

13

was clearly spelled out (a December 1951 Gallup Organization poll's option, for instance, was "bomb themuse A-bomb"). And still other times, the escalation option was implied (a February 1952 Roper poll's options were: (1) "pull our troops out of Korea"14 percent; (2) "continue the war"34 percent; (3) "attack the Communist forces with everything we have"47 percent; and (4) "no opinion"5 percent). Over time, more and more respondents preferred the escalation option. Throughout the conflict, as we have seen, roughly 77 percent of respondents preferred not to withdraw (an average of 10 percent of respondents held no opinion). Those who preferred to escalate rather than to continue at the present level of fighting grew from just over 20 percent at the beginning of the conflict to 40 percent following the Chinese intervention and then held between 45 percent and 49 percent (except for a modest drop to 43 percent at the beginning of the truce talks) from July 1951 through August 1953. Those favoring escalation always greatly outnumbered those favoring withdrawalfrom a margin of 2 to 1 at the beginning of the conflict to almost 5 to 1 for the period after July 1951. Clearly, as the war continued and casualties rose, the public became increasingly frustrated with the war (shown by the decline in the percentage "approving" the war). Frustration, however, led not to cries to withdraw but to a desire to escalate (Figure 3.5). Vietnam Vietnam presents an even sharper picture of the public passion for escalation as conflicts continue. As was the case with the Korean War, different polling organizations presented different escalation options and even the same polling group would at different times present different escalation options. The atomic option was asked only three times by the polls examined; that option, for reasons discussed in the next chapter, was less popular than during the Korean conflict (preferred, though, by 37 percent of those polled in April 1968). Usually escalation was confined to one option; occasionally, however, polls had two escalation options (an August 1968 Roper poll, for example, gave respondents two escalation choices: "gradually broaden and intensify our military effort" (24 percent), or "start an all-out effort to win the war quickly, even at the risk of

14

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

- Cumulative casualties Percent approving intervention

MHO/204-350294

70

Percent lavoring withdrawal Percent favoring escalation

120,000 100,000 jj 80,000 I

60,000

s
a >

40,000 |

o
20,000

1950 1951 Year

ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMA

1952

1953

SOURCES: Gallup, Harris, Roper, and NORC polls.

Figure 3.5Respondents Favoring EscalationKorea

China or Russia entering the war" (30 percent)). The most common escalation option was "take a stronger stand, even if it means invading North Vietnam"an option, which, if taken, was widely believed to entail both high U.S. casualties and the risk of Chinese and/or Soviet intervention. As was the case with the Korean War, as the conflict continued, as casualties mounted, and as "disapproval" of the commitment grew, an increasing number of those polled found escalation the most attractive option. From July 1965 to August 1968, an average of 77 percent of those polled preferred remaining in Vietnam to withdrawal (an average of 12 percent favored withdrawal and 11 percent held no opinion). By July 1966, and continuing to the end of July 1968, more of those 77 percent preferred escalation to continuing the war at the present effort. By November 1967, those favoring escalation exceeded those favoring fighting at the same level of effort by nearly 5 to 2, and those favoring escalation exceeded those favoring withdrawal by nearly 5 to 1. "Approval" of the war was inversely related to the desire to escalate the conflict (Figure 3.6).

Vietnam and Korea

15

RAND#2W36-flaW

200,000 180,000 160,000

m

140,000 2 - 120,000 w 100,000 a

>

80,000 ra 0 |

o
ASONDJ FMAMJJASONDJ FMAMJJASON DJFMAMJ J A

1965

1966

Year

1967

1968

SOURCES: Harris, Roper, NORC, and New York Times polls.

Figure 3.6Respondents Favoring EscalationVietnam Much anti-war sentiment, in fact, reflected a disillusionment with the war and the concomitant desire not to withdraw troops but instead to escalate the war to get it over on terms favorable to the United States. This explains a curious and overlooked fact. In the 1968 New Hampshire primary, the dovish anti-war candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy polled a surprisingly high 42 percent of the vote against President Johnson, convincing the President that his popular support had so eroded that reelection was impossible. McCarthy's strong performance was widely interpreted at the time as a pro-peace vote. Those who voted for McCarthy in the New Hampshire primary were very dissatisfied with Johnson's Vietnam policies. But among the McCarthy voters, those who were dissatisfied with Johnson for not pursuing a harder line in Vietnam outnumbered those who wanted a withdrawal by a margin of 3 to 2. Indeed, of those who favored McCarthy before the Democratic Convention in June but who switched to another candidate by November, a plural-

16

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

ity had switched to the hardline candidate Governor George Wallace.1 Public opinion during the Vietnam conflict became increasingly "anti-war," but not in the way that word is generally understood. Indeed, although Americans were disenchanted with the way the war was conducted, an increasing number wanted the United States to wage a kind of war that was generally understood would bring more death and destruction to the Vietnamese. Expert pollsters in 1970, examining the results of a Harris poll on public reaction to the mass rapes and massacre by U.S. troops at Mylai, concluded that although general discontent with the war was strong, that disenchantment was pragmatic: reaction to the Mylai massacre, they concluded, could "best be described as bland."2
1 Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolte, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, December 1969, p. 1101. 2 Philip E. Converse and Howard Schuman, "'Silent Majorities' and the Vietnam War," Scientific American, Vol. 222, No. 6, June 1970.

Chapter Four THE GULF WAR

A DIVIDED PUBLIC On the eve of American military intervention against Iraq, the U.S. public was far more divided concerning the wisdom of intervention than it was before either the Korean or Vietnam Wars. There is strong evidence that the public's ambivalence was largely because of a concern that military operations against Iraq would entail many American casualties. The public debatewithin Congress, on the op-ed pages, and, according to the polls, within American householdsrevolved around an agonizing question: Is ejecting Iraq from Kuwait worth the lives of a good many American soldiers? The public believed that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was an unpleasant man; it certainly believed that important U.S. interests were involved in the Gulf crisis (although it was frustrated that the Bush Administration was unable to articulate those interests), but it was left wondering if those facts merited the U.S. waging what was almost universally believed would be a bloody and prolonged conflict. With the Gulf War now regarded as America's most "popular" war since World War II, it is easy to forget the public's ambivalence during the months preceding intervention. On the eve of the least popular war in U.S. history, the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the President broad powers to direct military operations against North Vietnam, passed the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2. On the other hand, the Senate vote in favor of military action against Iraq before the Gulf conflict barely squeaked by, with a vote of 52 in favor of granting the President authority to use force against Iraq and 48 opposeda four vote margin. The public was slightly less divided than

17

18

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

its representatives. A Gallup poll conducted six days before the Senate vote showed 52 percent of respondents favoring the "United States going to war with Iraq to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait" and 39 percent opposing that measure. Six weeks earlier, when asked the same question, only 37 percent approved of American intervention, and 51 percent disapproved. Once the United States was committed to action against Iraq, however, the public quickly rallied around the flag. On the eve of the air offensive against Iraq, the public had shifted significantly: 79 percent in favor, 15 percent opposed. A little over two weeks later, the public was even more firmly behind the intervention: 83 percent in favor, 15 percent opposed (Figure 4.1). A GLOOMY PUBLIC What is most interesting about these poll results is that, despite a high approval of intervention, the public firmly believed that war against Iraq would be a very bloody affair indeed. Although in retrospect this was an unreasonably gloomy view of the conflict, the pubRND?(K 4 f-0294

90 80 "Do you favor or oppose the U.S. going to war with Iraq to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait?" o 70

w0000.

>
c c

60 50 40 30 20 10 n
11/18 12/2

/ Air campaign begins

/
/ -

"

S
9

12/9 12/16 1/6

1/16

1/20

1/22

1/26

2/3

1990 Year SOURCE: Gallup polls.

1991

Figure 4.1"Support" for Gulf Intervention

The Gulf War

19

He, once committed, wanted to see the war come to an end. In early February, 83 percent of the respondents to a Gallup poll "approved" of U.S. intervention, even though: 83 percent believed "the situation will develop into a bloody ground war with high numbers of casualties on both sides." 82 percent believed "Iraq will use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons." 77 percent believed that "U.S. citizens will become victims of Iraqi terrorism."1

The public also believed the war against Iraq would not be an agony quickly over. Sixty-two percent of respondents to the same poll believed the war would last months. Nineteen percent believed it would last a year. Only 12 percent believed it would be over in weeks. And a minuscule 2 percent foresaw a war finished in days (Figure 4.2).
HAND* 204-4 2-0294

No opinion (5%) Year (18%)

Davs 2%

) Weeks (12%)

"Now that the United States has taken military action against Iraq, do you think the fighting will continue for just a few days, a matter of weeks, several months, or a year or more?"

Months (62%) SOURCE: Gallup poll, February 3, 1991.

Figure 4.2Expectations of Duration of Gulf Intervention

Gallup poll, February 3, 1991, Survey, No. GOT 22015.

20

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

A RESOLUTE AND RUTHLESS PUBLIC Perhaps, then, because of the Vietnam and Korean Wars, the U.S. public was conditioned to expect that a major military intervention would necessarily mean a protracted war with high U.S. casualties. But, despite these bleak expectations, the public showed little sign of wanting to withdraw from the conflict. In fact, believing firmly that war with Iraq would be a horrible experience for America, most Americans nevertheless wanted to continue making war against Iraq even after Saddam's forces were ejected from Kuwait. Evincing a thirst to go well beyond the UN mandate, as well as its government's policy goals, 67 percent of respondents did not want the United States to stop the war if Iraq removed its forces from Kuwaitthey wanted America to press on until Saddam was removed from power. Clearly, the public wanted a decisive victory (Figure 4.3). Moreover, along with a desire for complete victory, the public increasingly supported the use of whatever means would be necessary to defeat Iraq and thus save American lives. Asked by the Gallup Organization in early January, when U.S. military action against Iraq was a vague possibility, if they favored or opposed American use of
RAND#204-< 3-0294

No opinion (5%) End war with Iraqi pullout (28%) "Do you think the United States should stop its military action against Iraq if Iraq pulls its troops out of Kuwait, or only if Saddam Hussein is also removed from power?"

SOURCE: Gallup poll, February 3, 1991. Figure 4.3Ultimate Goals Favored by PublicGulf Intervention

The Gulf War 21

nuclear weapons against Iraq if it might save the lives of U.S. troops, only 24 percent of respondents approved. By the last week in January, however, when the United States was already at war with Iraq, respondents' answers were dramatically different. Forty-six percent now approved. In early February, before ground operations against Iraq had begun, 48 percent approved, and only 46 percent opposed (Figure 4.4). It is important to note that the Gallup question did not ask whether Americans approved of using nuclear weapons in response to Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction. It merely asked whether Americans approved of nuclear weapons use if it might spare U.S. lives. The public, then, was expressing support for a nuclear first strike against Iraq; a position at variance with both U.S. policy and international law. The Gulf War experience shows that the U.S. public is perhaps more cautious to support an intervention in the first place than it had been before the Korean and Vietnam Wars (although in these earlier wars a significant percentage of public opinion had, too, been skeptical of involvement on the eve of conflict). Public opinion data from the
MH0I2O4-4 4-0294

100 90 80 snt in favor o o o "Would you favor or oppose the U.S. use of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf if it might save the lives of U.S. troops?"

_ -

Don't know I Approve

2 o -

40 30 20 10 0

1 Oppose

"

Ea liy 1 /91 SOURCE: Gallup poll, February 3, 1991.

1 l _
La te1/ 91 El irly 2 791

Figure 4.4Public's Willingness to Use Nuclear WeaponsGulf War

22

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

Gulf War, however, reinforce a trend clearly evident in America's earlier regional conflicts: Once involved, regardless of its opinion concerning the initial decision to intervene, and regardless of costs incurred or costs feared, the public shows little inclination to quit an intervention and instead strongly supports an escalation of the conflict and measures it believes necessary to win a decisive victory.

Chapter Five CONCLUSIONS

OBSERVATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS In both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, a decline in public "support" for those conflicts coincided with mounting casualties. But in neither conflict did a fall in the public's "approval" for the war translate into a public cry to withdraw. On the contrary, as costs grew, the public's cry that grew loudest was the cry to escalate. Although the Gulf War was over too quickly for this trend to repeat itself exactly, the conflict against Iraq showed a public that, despite uneasiness with the decision to intervene, despite its strong belief that intervention would mean a long and bloody struggle, nevertheless committed itself firmly to waging war with full force against Iraq. The calculation of many of America's actual and potential adversariesthat the U.S. public is impatient and intolerant of long and costly wars and that, when body bags begin to return to America, the public will respond with demands to withdraw from a conflictis not supported by the evidence. Although the public can, perhaps, be characterized as impatient, that impatience is far more likely to manifest itself in support for escalating conflict rather than for withdrawing from conflict.1
'This report does not argue, based on the cases of the Korean, Vietnamese, and Persian Gulf conflicts, that the public is not extremely concerned with U.S. casualties. Rather, in these conflicts the public's strong desire to limit American casualties was reconciled with its equally strong desire to see the struggle through to a successful conclusion by its favoring rather unlimited strategies that promised to end these conflicts on terms favorable to the United States as quickly as possible, thereby sparing American lives. The public's callousness toward casualties was limited to

T.\

24

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

In short, concern over intra-war resolve should not pose a great problem for American policymakers and military leaders in their calculations regarding American intervention and regional deterrence. However, the public is likely to be quite skeptical of intervention, largely because of anxiety regarding U.S. casualties, before a commitment is made. To policymakers, this is good news and bad news. Potential enemies could thwart American deterrence strategies by making credible threats that, if the United States were to intervene in a given conflict, U.S. casualties would be very high. Such threats would likely make public support for a decision to intervene ambivalent at best. Of course, given trends in public opinion in earlier, "unpopular" U.S. interventions, even an ambivalent public will not favor withdrawal and will support decisive action to see the war to a successful conclusion, once America is committed to conflict. Winning public support, then, is like getting one's foot in the doorthe initial effort may be extremely difficult, but, if successful, subsequent withdrawal is very unlikely. (As will be discussed below, however, although the public will not likely demand withdrawal, it is likely to demand other actions that may not be to policymakers' liking.) Policymakers have several tools at their disposal to help the public make the difficult decision to support intervention. If the public can be convinced, either during a crisis (or better yet, before a crisis), that the security of a particular region, resource, or state is a matter of vital American interest, then the public is more likely to support intervention if that security is threatened, even if intervention might encasualties suffered by the enemy. Other cases of U.S. military intervention, in conflicts that were not perceived at the time as involving American interests to the same extent as in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, may point to different lessons regarding public opinion and casualties. But these interventions must be examined carefully before lessons are drawn. In the case of Somalia, for instance, it is widely believed that the American public demanded a withdrawal of the U.S. commitment there after a small number of American combat deaths. In fact, however, poll results show a more complex public attitude. A poll conducted by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes found that only 28 percent of those surveyed favored immediate withdrawal; 43 percent polled wanted to remain committed in accord with U.S. policy; 27 percent wished to have U.S. troops remain in Somalia "until we have stabilized the country," even beyond the U.S. deadline for troop withdrawal. Furthermore, other polls found majority sentiments favoring increased involvement in Somalia, at least in the short run. CNN/USA Today and ABC News polls found 55 to 56 percent of respondents favored sending more troops. Before U.S. hostages held by the Somali warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid were released, ABC found that 75 percent of those polls favored a "major military attack" against Aidid.

Conclusions

25

tail high U.S. casualties. The public is also more likely to support a decision to intervene if it believes that intervention is likely to exact a low cost in treasure and, far more important, in blood. Many policymakers are concerned that, because of the low U.S. casualties in Operation Desert Storm, the public will expect low casualties in a future U.S. military intervention and if, instead, the public is met with unexpectedly high casualties once conflict has begun, it will want to withdraw. This scenario is unlikely. Confronted with a shocking rise in casualties when China intervened in the Korean War, just three months after the conflict began, the U.S. public responded with a decline in support for the original decision to intervene, but no outcry for U.S. withdrawal and, instead, mounting belief that America should escalate the war. If, in the future, an expectation of low casualties makes the public support an intervention, but that expectation is not fulfilled, the "difficult" task of rallying public opinion will already have been done and, with the commitment already made, the public is very unlikely to desire withdrawal. (The political fortunes of the Administration in this case are another matter and will be examined below.) Finally, an American "forward presence" in an area regarded as important to U.S. interests can also aid efforts to win the all-important initial public support for intervention. If forward deployed U.S. forces are engaged, that is, if America is suddenly committed to conflict, then the public is likely to respond as it has in previous situations: Once a commitment is undertaken, regardless of the wisdom behind it, the public is very unlikely to call for a withdrawal. Of course, the above discussion of the means to win initial public support suggests that such efforts could easily entail cynical, and even dishonest, manipulation by policymakers. MASSIVE RETALIATION REDUX? The nature of U.S. public opinion, once America is committed to military intervention, can be a powerful, if potentially dangerous, tool in deterring regional adversaries. If potential adversaries could be convinced that the U.S. public's likely response to regional intervention is not a call to withdraw, but instead a call to escalate, then regional deterrence could be gready aided.

26

Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention

In a way, the lesson potentially hostile regimes have learned from the Gulf War is that, if they tangle with the United States and the gamble does not pay off, they in fact lose very little. In the case of Iraq, while Saddam Hussein failed to gain Kuwait, having lost the war, he was left with the status quo ante: His regime was untouched. The Iraqi leader was very lucky that his strategy did not work. Had Saddam Hussein been able to turn the Kuwaiti desert into a killing ground for American soldiers, as he had promised, the U.S. public would very likely have responded with a cry to escalate the conflict, as is indicated by the public's predilection, even without Iraq inflicting great damage to U.S. forces, to employ nuclear weapons against Iraq. And with 67 percent of respondents favoring toppling Iraq's regime before the ground war began, had the ground operations proved costly in terms of U.S. lives, that percentage would likely have grown considerably. There is a tendency for war to become absolute. This is borne out by America's experience during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, when the public responded to a limited war with polling responses favoring escalation. During the Vietnam War, President Johnson repeatedly told his aides that what scared him most was what he called "the great beast" of American public reaction which would demand a dangerous escalation of the conflict. Johnson, perhaps more attuned to the voting public than any President in U.S. history, understood that many "anti-war" votes that would be cast against him were, in fact, pro-escalation votes. Johnson understood that he could have salvaged his political fortunes by "taking the gloves off in Vietnam. But, at the height of the Cold War, Johnson found that any escalation of the conflict that would satisfy his public risked a wider warpossibly leading to a superpower nuclear war. In the post-Cold War world, future policymakers are unlikely to believe that escalatory action that would satisfy the public and bring an intervention to a successful conclusion would carry the same risks as they were believed to have carried during the Vietnam War. Policymakers, then, would find great domestic incentives to retaliate massively in a regional intervention, even if there were vague geopolitical or international disincentives to do so. The public has shown in World War II, the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars that it embraces an "all or nothing" approach to war. Adminis-

Conclusions

27

trations that were unable to wage war according to this conception suffered politically. When acceding to public demands possibly meant nuclear war, Administrations kept intervention limited. Without that constraining fear, future Administrations may find the domestic political cost of limiting intervention more prohibitive than unlimited intervention. Such a view, if properly explained, could aid U.S. deterrence strategies. It is, essentially, delivering to political adversaries "a threat that leaves something to chance."2 It would be explained to potential adversaries that involving the United States in a war perforce ignites public passions. In the past, these passions have lead to cries for escalation. There is little reason that they will not do so in the future, especially if the public is confronted with the factor likelihoodof high U.S. casualties. Although there may be advantages that the U.S. political and military leadership recognizes in keeping the means and ends of conflict limited, once war beginsthat is, once deterrence failspublic feeling takes on a momentum of its own and can, as it has often in the past, easily become hotheaded, unpredictable, and, from the enemy's point of view, ruthless. In short, should deterrence fail, public passion could push decisionmakers to escalate quickly and unpredictably, beyond the limitations decisionmakers might wish to place on the conflict. In this situation, hostile regimes would be at the mercy of an impatient and ruthless U.S. public. Such an understanding of American public opinion could powerfully aid deterrence strategies. Such an understanding also, however, demonstrates that multilateral approaches to regional deterrence are inherently difficult for the United States. The American public has consistently shown its frustration with any restrictions on the U.S. ability to escalate. Given that allies' concerns in the Persian Gulf, for instance, may well lead to a "limited" approach to conflict, the U.S. public is likely to respond angrily toward both American allies and the American political leadership. The public's pressure to escalate, moreover, could lead to serious inter-allied disputes, which could have very serious consequences if future U.S. regional security duties are truly multilateral.
2

See Thomas Schelling, 77ie Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960; and Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1966.