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- Deposits: created by banks&customers - Currency: created by Fed whenever banks redeem their reserves - Assume Normal conditions: interest rates >> 0. Then examine crises.
Fed has authority to impose reserve requirements: r = reserve ratio Reserves r Deposits Symbols: RrD => Deposits (1/r) Reserves D (1/r) R Objectives: 1. Show that Fed can control the monetary base Monetary Base = Currency + Reserves 2. Derive a money multiplier so that Money = Multiplier (Currency+Reserves) 3. Prepare for Fed Funds market analysis
- Introduce concept of defensive open market operations.
MB = C + R M = m (C+R)
- Show that the Fed could control other balance sheet items (e.g. reserves) equally well
Links between Banks and the Fed: Reserves and Discount Loans Fed Balance Sheet: Assets BR Discount loans Securities
Gold Check Float
C R
Balance Sheet of the Banking System: Assets Liabilities R Reserves D Checkable Deposits Loans Other Deposits Securities BR Borrowings Linkages: Discount loans = Borrowed Reserves BR Bank deposits at Fed = Reserves R
[Notes on Mishkin Ch.14 - P.2]
Sources of Reserves: Balance Sheet Analysis Fed Assets Securities BR Discount loans
Gold Check Float Treasury Deposits Foreign CB Deposits
Decompose reserves: R = NBR + BR Borrowed reserves = Discount loans: must be repaid at maturity Non-borrowed reserves = from open market operations (all other sources) - Distinction is conceptual, not identified in reserve accounts - Observe R and BR, compute: NBR = R BR. - Similarly decompose MB: MBn = MB - BR = C + NBR
Example Initial Fed Balance Sheet Assets Securities 99 Discount Loans 1 Liabilities Currency Reserves
100 1
90 6 5 Treasury/CB Dep. - Compute: MB = ___, R = ___, MBn = ___, NBR = ___ - What if the Fed does not want R and MB to change? Question of Fed objective/response: - to control MBn or NBR: no response - to control MB or R: Sell securities (contractionary open market operation) Defensive versus Dynamic open market operations: - Dynamic = intended to change a monetary aggregate under Fed control - Defensive = to prevent changes in a monetary aggregate under Fed control
[Notes on Mishkin Ch.14 - P.5]
99 2
2. Currency Redemption:
Assets Liabilities Currency Reserves => New Balance Sheet: +1 1
91 4 5 Treasury/CB Dep. - Compute: MB = ___, R = ___, MBn = ___, NBR = ___ - What if the Fed does not want R to change? Need for defensive open market operations depends on Fed objective: - to control MB or MBn: no response - to control R or Rn: buy securities Combining results for BR and currency: MBn unaffected by both => Motivates Mishkins focus on MBn.
99 1
Caution: There are disturbances that change MBn w/o Fed initiative. - Suppose Treasury or Foreign CB withdraw Fed balances. - Common examples: Shift balances to a commercial bank, spend funds, buy foreign currency against dollars. - Implication: Funds flow into the banking system => Adds to Reserves Balance sheet analysis
Assets Liabilities Reserves Treasury/CB Dep. - New Balance Sheet: +1 1
99 1
MB R MBn NBR
+ + + +
+ +
0 0
+ + + +
Conclude: If official Treasury or CB balances fluctuate, defensive open market operations are needed to stabilize any of the accounting aggregates. - Other fluctuations with similar impact: Check float, Gold account
[See Mishkins appendix to ch.13 for more details. Optional.]
- MBn is special with regard to BR and currency, but not otherwise. Fact: The Fed focuses mostly on Reserves = Supply of Fed funds.
Key assumption: No excess reserves => When Fed increases MB, banks will create deposits whenever they can: D = (1/r) R
Dont confuse the deposit multiplier with money multiplier (next topic): - Money includes currency: Different answers if customers withdraw currency. Textbook distinction between banking system and a single bank: Single bank is limited to own excess reserves, not a multiple. Outdated: Banks can borrow Fed Funds.
The M1 Money Multiplier Include currency and non-zero excess reserves in a simple way. Define: c = C/D = Currency-deposit ratio e = ER/D = Excess reserves-deposit ratio - Assume both ratios are constant. - Modify the derivation of the deposit multiplier. Step 1: Reserves are a fixed fraction of deposits: - Definition of total reserves: R = RR + ER - Definition of required reserves: RR = r D - Assumption about excess reserves: ER = e D => R = r D + e D = (r+e) D Step 2: Monetary base is a fixed fraction of deposits: - Definition of monetary base: MB = R + C - Assumption about currency: C=cD - Know reserve-deposit relation: MB = (r+e+c) D => Invert: D = MB/(r+e+c)
[Notes on Mishkin Ch.14 - P.10]
Step 3: M1 is currency plus checkable deposits: M1 = C + D = (1+c) D = (1+c)/(r+e+c) MB Result: The M1 money multiplier m = (1+c)/(r+e+c) Economic reasoning: 1. Money multiplier = Ratio of M = D + C to MB = R + C. - Ratio of D to R is 1/(r+e) ~ 10. Ratio of C to C is 1. => Ratio of M to MB normally between 1 and 10. 2. If the Fed increases reserves, banks seek to expand deposits until - Bank customers withdraw currency (c) - Reserves are tied down as required reserves (r) - Reserves are held as targeted excess reserves (e) 3. Derivation: All quantities are proportional to deposits.
Interpretation: practical use of the multiplies If m is constant, any change in MB translates into a proportional, predictable change in M1: M1 = m MB where m = (1+c)/(r+e+c) and MB = MBn + BR - Numerator: items that make M1 larger than D - Denominator: items that absorb MB (require large MB) Quantitative Example #1 Normal Conditions: (2007 data, $bill.) - Data: C=760, D = 620, R = 64.5, BR=0.1 - Implies: M1 = 1380, MB = 824.5, MBn= 824.4, NBR= 64.4, RR=62, ER=2.5 - Ratios: c = 760/620 =1.2258, e = 0.0040, r = 0.10. 1+c 1+1.2258 2.2258 m = r+e+c = 0.1+0.004+1.2258 = 1.3298 = 1.6738 - Verify: M1 = 1. 6738 824.5 = 1380 - Lesson: $1 open market purchase/sale will raise/reduce M1 by $1.67.
[Notes on Mishkin Ch.14 - P.12]
Quantitative Example #2 Financial Crisis and Quantitative easing (Spring 2009, $bill.) - Data: C=860, D = 740, R = 765, BR = 404 - Implies: M1 = 1600, MB = 1625, MBn= 1221, NBR= 361, RR=62, ER=691 - Ratios: c = 860/740 =1.1622, e = 0.9338, r = 0.10. 1+c 1+1.1622 m = r+e+c = 0.1+0.9338+1.1622 = 2.1622 = 0.9846 2.1960 - Verify: M1 = 0.9846 1625 = 1600 - Question: Will a $1 open market sale reduce M1 by $0.98? (Depends on banks!) What if banks stop holding excess reserves? If Fed then stops lending? 1+c 1+1.1622 - For e=0, m = r+e+c = 0.1+0+1.1622 ! 1.713 , so M1 = 1.713 1625 = 2874 - For BR=0, MB = MBn= 1221, so M1 = 1.713 1221 = 2165 Scenario with MB=880 (no crisis response): M1 = 0.9846 880 = 866
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(Is the Fed in control? Only through MBn. All other changes are problematic!)
The M2 Multiplier Why focus on M1? (M2 more difficult but practically more relevant.) Use same approach for M2. See Mishkins online Appendix14#2 - Simplified definition: M2 = D + C + T + MMF where => Conclude: - Multiplier idea works for any concept of money, if bank and customer behavior is stable, if everything is proportional to D - If the M1 and M2 multipliers are stable, Fed can easily control M1 and M2. If multipliers fluctuate, controlling the money supply is difficult. T = time and savings deposits = t D MMF = money market funds etc. = mm D m2 =(1+c+t+mm)/(r+e+c)
Problems with Unstable Money Multipliers For stable depositor behavior, M1 and M2 should respond proportionally to changes in MB Recall from ch.3: Growth rates of M1 and M2 diverge => Money multipliers are not constant Find: Ratios C/D, ER/D, do vary. (Optional reading: Appendix14#3) Economic Issues: 1. Asset Allocation Perspective - Monetary assets: C, D, Other-M2. 2. Bank Management Perspective - Liabilities: D, BR, Fed-Funds,.. - Assets: R, Securities, Loans,.. => Economic incentives suggest that money multipliers vary when nominal interest rates vary.
[Note on 2008: Rise in e but stable c. FDIC has prevented bank runs!]
Conclusion by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz: The Fed should have stabilized M1. Policy mistake made the Great Depression worse. General lesson: The money stock must be monitored in problem situations, e.g., during financial crises; also, in financially unstable countries.