Art. 114 Treason Laurel vs. Misa Facts: The accused was charged with treason.

During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. Issue: Whether or not allegiance to the Philippines can be suspended. Held: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines. Dissent: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasnt sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed sovereign. Art. 122 as amended by R.A. 7659 and P.D. 532 Anti-Piracy Law Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7659 (Article 122 of RPC) is superseded by P.D. 532 Held: Republic Act No. 7659 (Article 122 of RPC) neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws. Art. 134,135 Rebellion, Insurrection, and Coup detat (R.A. 6968) Gonzales, et al vs. Abaya, et al. (G.R. No. 16400) August 10, 2006

Facts: On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an Information for coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same

time that they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.
Issue: Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable by court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts Held: The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. People vs. Umali (G.R. No. L-5803) November 29, 1954 Facts: The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians. During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery? Held: Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Art. 142 Inciting to sedition Espuelas vs People (G.R. No. L-2990) December 17, 1951 Facts: On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Issue: Whether the accused is liable for the crime of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?

Held: If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld. Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration?

Art. 148 Direct Assaults

PEOPLE v. RODIL [109 SCRA 308 (1981)] Facts: Floro Rodil was found guilty of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court for the death of Lt.Masana. Version of the prosecutor April 24, 1971 around 1:00 pm Masana together with Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang Market. While they were eating, their attention was called by Rodil who was outside blowing his whistle. Masana, in civilian clothing, accompanied by Fidel went outside and asked Rodil, after identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked under his shirt had a license Instead if answering Rodil attempted to draw his gun but Fidel grabbed the gave and gave it to Masana. The three went inside the restaurant and Masana wrote a receipt for the gun and he asked Rodil to sign it but the appellant refused to do so. Masana refused to return the gun to Rodil and as Masana was about

to stand up Rodil pulled out his dagger and stabbed Masana several times on the chest and stomach causing his death after several hours. The companions of Masana took the accused into custody. Version of the defense Rodil is claiming self-defense Rodil together with his wife were eating inside the restaurant and while they were waiting for their food Masana approached and inquired whether he was a member of the Anti-smuggling Unit. Rodil answered in the affirmative and Masana invited him to join him in his table. Rodil accepted the invitation. During their conversation Masana asked for identification of Rodil and the latter showed his ID. Masana told Rodil that his ID was fake and Rodil insisted that it was genuine. Masana was demanding that Rodil surrender his ID to him but Rodil refused. When Rodil refused Masana pulled out his gun and hit the accused on the head with its handle for 2 times and as a result blood gushed out from his head and face. Rodil pulled out his dagger and stabbed Masana and then ran out of the restaurant. Rodil went to the direction of the Municipal building where he intended to surrender. On his was he met the Chief of Police and he was accompanied to the municipal building and was given first aid treatment. Issue: Whether or not the crime committed was murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complex with assault upon an agent of authority. Held: Crime committed was homicide (No complex crime but there is a general aggravating circumstance). Information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. Such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority.

Art. 157. Evasion of Service of Sentence

THE PEOPLE vs FLORENTINO ABILONG, Facts: That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy. Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierrois not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code

for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article. The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been in the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt. Issue: Whether or not it is the Spanish text of article 157 of the revised penal code is controlling in the case at bar.

Held: The court agreed with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil. 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 O.G. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.

R.A. 8294, Possession of Firearms and Explosives

PEOPLE V. WALPAN LADJAALAM G.R. NO. 136149-51 Facts: Obtain from the version of the prosecutor, a search warrant was issued against the accused Walpan Ladjaalam. After the briefing in connection with the service of warrant, more than 30 police men went to the house of accused to serve the warrant. When the first group of police men were about to enter the house of the accused, they saw the accused, being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosive device, firing an M-14 file to them that resulted to the death of some of policemen. The court found him guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, for the possession of various firearms and explosive device without necessary permit and license. Issue: Whether or not illegal possession of firearms is a separate offense in the case at bar. HELD: RA no. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate

offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.

Articles 171-172, Falsification

SALUD P. BERADIO, vs THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Salud P. Beradio was an election registrar of the COMELEC in Rosales, Pangasinan, who was convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of falsification of public or official documents of the seven (7) separate informations filed against her for making false entries in her daily time records, as follows: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case CCC-0258; 2) September 4, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and 22, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and 30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0263; and 7) March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0264.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime falsification of the documents.

Held: Where non-faithful statement of daily hours of work in time record has not caused damages to the Govt, no crime of falsification can accrue. While it is true that a time record is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is necessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest.

Art. 178. Using Fictitious Name and CA 142

LEGAMIA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT Facts: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971. From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes." For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to Felicisima.

Issue: Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated? Held: In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.

Art. 218 Failure to Render Accounts

ROSULO LOPEZ MANLANGIT Vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: On October 16, 1998, petitioner, as Officer-in-Charge for Information, Education and Communication of the Pinatubo Commission, received P176,300 to fund the 6th Founding Anniversary Info-Media Activities of the Commission.A few months thereafter, he resigned without accounting for the fund.

March 5, 2001,[7] the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon filed an informationagainst petitioner for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. It presented as evidence the affidavit-complaint of Sampang, the counter-affidavit of petitioner, and the reply of Yap.

Meantime, in a letter dated August 12, 2001,[8] Undersecretary Mario L. Relampagos of the Department of Budget and Management Task Force Mt. Pinatubo informed Ombudsman Aniano Desierto that petitioner had already rendered an accounting and requested the withdrawal of the case. After the Ombudsman rested its case, petitioner, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. He insisted that there was no criminal delay on his part since there was no demand from the COA for an accounting. Further, the sanction provided in the COA circular for failure to render account was simply the withholding of wages. Moreover, petitioner averred that the case was rendered moot and academic by the letter of Undersecretary Relampagos. Issue: Whether or not demand is element of Article 218. Held: Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none provided, the court may not introduce exception of conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.

Art. 246. Parricide

People vs Francisco Jumawan, et.al. G.R. Nos. 39303-39305 March 17, 1934

Facts: On the basis of a written statement made by Vicente Recepeda on July 18, 1976, and an affidavit executed by Trinidad Alcantara on July 19, 1976, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Sariaya, Quezon, on July 19, 1976, by Station Commander Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr. against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan for the death of Rodolfo Magnaye. The lower court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye, Manuel Jumawan, and Francisco Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to indemnify jointly and severally the parents of the victim in the amount of Twenty-four Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos. It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal case. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara. The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation from his wife so that both he and his wife will be free to marry again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document. On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought Rodolfo Magnaye and his mother to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for the assistance of Sgt. Mortilla to assist her daughter in securing a separation from Rodolfo Magnaye but they were told by Sgt. Mortilla that it cannot be legally done. Issue: W/O accused-appellants be liable of the crime of parricide or simply murder? Held: Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime. The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary votes, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The jugment of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs. So Ordered.

Art. 247. Death or Physical Injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances

People vs Marciano Gonzales G.R. No. 46310 October 31, 1939

Facts: At the trial, appellant Marciano Gonzales testified that at midday on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the woods, he surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told her that the man was the very one who used to ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to do the act again. The accused left the house again and went towards the South to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at above five o'clock in the afternoon, and not finding his wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place covered with underbush, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house. The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife, in the afternoon of the date in question, under circumstances indicative that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal code providing: "Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill either of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant committed the crime under Art 247 of the RPC? Held: No. The court cannot entirely accepts the defense sought to be established by the accused, first, because his testimony is improbable. It is not conceivable that the accused had only mildly counseled his wife not to repeat committing adultery with Isabelo, instead of taking harsher measures as is natural in such circumstances, if he were true that he had surprised the two offender in the act of adultery on returning to his house at midday on the date in question. Neither is it likely that a woman thirty years of age, like Sixta Quilason, and twenty-five-year old Isabelo Evangelio, both of sound judgment as is to be supposed, had dared to have carnal intercourse near the toilet of the offended party house, a place which is naturally frequented by some persons. Secondly, because even assuming that the accused caught his wife rising up and Isabelo cannot invoke the privilege of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of committing adultery, but thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had committed the carnal act. (3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 96; People vs. Marquez, 53 Phil., 260).Taking into account the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention on the part of the accused to commit so grave a wrong as that committed upon the person of the deceased, and of his lack of instruction, the appealed judgment is modified, and the accused is sentenced to the penalty of twelve years and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal and indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000 with the costs.

Art. 262-266
US vs Punsalan Facts: On or about August 11 of the present year (1910), the said accused did maliciously and criminally attack Juan de Jesus with a penknife, inflicting upon him injuries in three fingers of his lefthand, as a

result of which said fingers have become useless. The motive was that the accused suspected that the victim knew about the abduction of the former's sister.

The trial court found the defendant and appellant guilty of the crime of lesiones graves (serious physical injuries) as defined and penalized in paragraph 2 of article 416 of the Penal Code (para 2 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code). Issue: Whether or not the loss of capacity to bend three fingers of one hand should be taken to be equivalent to the loss of the use of that and so as to sustain a conviction of the violation of the provision of paragraph 2 of article 416. Held: It is the provision on paragraph 3 of article 416 is the law that should be applied in this case at bar. The allegation contained in the information is merely to the effect that the injured party lost the use of three of the fingers of his left hand, and there is no allegation touching the loss of the use of the hand itself. The fingers of the hand are not principal members, and it is evident, therefore, that without an allegation that as a result of the loss of the use of several fingers the use of the hand itself had been lost, the information charges the infliction of injuries of the class defined in paragraph 2 of article 416.

People vs Mangalino Facts: At about 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning of March 7, 1984, Marichelle Carlos, 6 years old was playing "takbuhan" alone at the first level (ground floor) of the two-story apartment of the accused, Semion Mangalino. The accused called out to Marichelle and motioning her to go inside his bedroom or "sleeping quarters". Once inside the bedroom, the accused handed the girl a two peso bill (P2.00) and told her not to tell anybody about his calling her to his bedroom. The girl assented. The accused then laid Marichelle down, removed her jogging pants, and placed them beside her feet. He kissed her and fondled her infantile breasts. He inserted his finger into the private part of the victim, and then forcibly and repeatedly introduced his sexual organ into her undeveloped genitalia, but in vain. However, Mirichelle told everything to her mother and on the afternoon she brought the victim for physical and genital examination. The result of the examination is as follow: No evidence (or) sign of any extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination. Hymen, intact and its orifice, narrow. Sign of recent genital trauma, present. Dr. Garcia opined that the vestibular mucosa contusion could have been caused by a hard object like an erected penis and such bruises at such part of the girl's vagina if caused by an erected penis would be an indication of an unsuccessful penetration. The defense vigorously argues against the probability of the rape having been committed on two points: 1) The commission of the crime was impossible, taking place as claimed, in broad daylight, and 2) there

were at least eight persons including the accused and the complainant on the ground floor where the rape was supposedly consummated. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape. Held: Rape was in fact committed. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided in Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Marichelle, a little over 6 years of age at the time, was raped. Beyond that, proof of intimidation or force used on her, or lack of it, is immaterial. The Court has consistently held that for rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Indeed, even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.

Art. 267-269 Kidnapping and Illegal Detention People vs Lim FACTS: That in the morning of July 1, 1986, Aida Villanueva and her younger sister Avelyn Villanueva, 10 and 7 years old, respectively, were sent on an errand by their father Charlito (should be Charito) Villanueva to buy rice in Masbate, Masbate. The Villanuevas lived in Mobo, a neighboring town of the capital of the province. Upon their arrival at the poblacion of the capital town of Masbate at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Aida and Avelyn went to the pier, staying there up to 12:00 noon, to meet their mother whom they thought would arrive by boat from Manila. They left the pier when their mother did not arrive and went to Helen Theatre on Zurbito Street, Masbate, Masbate, to see a picture. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day while they were in front of the Helen Theatre, they were called by the accused Carmen Lim, in a loud voice. "Come here Nene" and asked them to go to her house just infront of the moviehouse. Aida and Avelyn went to the house of the accused and got inside passing through the front door. After a brief conversation with the two children, the accused gave Aida and Avelyn rice and kangkong for lunch. After they had finished eating, Aida was told by the accused to take a bath. The accused gave Aida a dress to wear. From July 1, 1986 to July 15, 1986, Aida Villanueva was detained in the house of the accused doing household chores such as cleaning the kitchen, scrubbing the floor, washing the plates including removing lice from the head of the accused and fanning her. Avelyn, the younger sister of Aida, was brought by Carmen's mother (should be sister) in Cebu on the same day they arrived in the house of the accused. On July 15, 1986, Charito Villanueva, father of the two minor children, found his daughter Aida in the house of the accused. He asked the accused to let Aida go home with him, but the accused refused. Charito came back to the house of the accused the following day, July 16, 1986, accompanied this time by Sgt. Antonio Ariate of the 266th PC Company at Camp Bonny Serrano, Masbate, Masbate, who had with him an armalite. After Identifying himself to the accused, the soldier told the accused that he was taking Aida with him. Without resistance but uttering slanderous remarks, the accused released Aida to Sgt. Ariate. Charito Villanueva and his daughter Aida were brought by Sgt. Ariate to the 266th PC Company

Headquarters where the complaint of Charito was recorded in the blotter by CIC Vincent Elliot Vasquez of the I & I Section. Issue: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the crime charged despite the fact that Aida Villanueva was not detained. Held: There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's residence through the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an essential element in the crime charged, was not clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. (See People v. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501, 506 [1984]; US v. Cabanas, 8 Phil. 64, 67 [1907]). The appellant's residence has a store fronting the street where many customers presumably come and go. The place is busy with a movie house in front. There is no indication that Aida was locked up, physically restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.

Art. 286-289. Coercions

Timoner vs People Facts: At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes PiaRebustillos. These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner which is also the mayor of the town acted in good faith in the performance of his lawful duty when he implemented the recommendation made by Municipal Health Officer and be guilty with the crime of grave coercion. Held: In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability .The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.

R.A. 6539 Anti-Carnapping

Izon vs People Facts: That on or about the 8th day of September, 1977, in the City of Olongapo, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and by means of violence and intimidation applied upon the person of Reynaldo Togorio committed by the accused Jimmy Milla y Castillo and Pedro Divino y Batero who were armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio and used in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who helped in mauling him thereby inflicting upon said Reynaldo Togorio physical injuries,which injuries shall require medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days, barring complications, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) motorized tricycle with motor No. B100-25-648 with Chasis No. B120-05589 and Plate No. MCH Q4102 or with a total value of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency belonging to Reynaldo Togorio to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the

aforementioned amount of Pll,000.00. However, the motorized tricycle Zukurmi 120, Motor No. B1OO-25648 with Chasis No.B-120-05589 was recovered. Pleading guilty upon arraignment, petitioners were sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Car-napping Act of 1972. However, petitioner contented that the motorized tricycle is not a motor vehicle under the definition of the aforecited Act. Issue: Whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the AntiCarnapping Act of 1972. Held: Any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.

Art. 315 Estafa

LEONILA BATULANON vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006) Facts: Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative. During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered.4 Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, that she did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify those commercial documents (cash/check vouchers), and made it appears that the those names on the voucher was granted a loan and received the amount when in truth and in fact that those persons was never granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the loans and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI. The following are the names which the accused falsified and the amounts. 1. Criminal Case No. 3625 That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 with Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao for the amount of P4,160, which is not a member. 2. Criminal Case No. 3626 That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 with Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion for the of P4,000.00 which is also not a member. 3. Criminal Case No. 3453 That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 to Ferlyn Arroyo amounted to P3,500.00, a member of the cooperative. 4. Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 to Dennis Batulanon which is the son of the accused and a minor, in the amount of P5,000.00. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of falsification of private documents under article 171 of RPC for four information filed against her. Held: In Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Moreover, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315. RICARDO CELINO vs.CA G.R. No. 77569 June 29, 1988

Facts: That sometime on or about March 17, 1978 and subsequently thereafter, at Brgy. San Nicolas, Bay,
Laguna the accused falsely pretending to possess power, influence and/or imaginary transaction, induced one JOSE TAN KAPOE to believe that hidden treasures can be recovered in the latter's yard as what was said by the dwarf who entered to the body of one on the accused and as a consequence thereof, demands the sum of P50,230.00 in exchange to such treasures. The accused convicted by the Court of appeal by the crime of estafa under paragraph 2 of article 315. The accused contention was the transaction between him and the victim was a partner in a joint venture and if he is liable his liability is merely civil in nature. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged.

Held: No evidence was adduced by petitioner in support of his contention that he and the complainant were
partners in a "joint venture" transaction. The case of U.S. v. Clarin [17 Phil. 85 (1910)] cited by the petitioner is therefore not applicable. The facts clearly show that petitioner together with his sons pretended to possess power to find hidden treasure in order to fleece the complainant of his hard-earned money. Contrary to the petitioner's allegation, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law and jurisprudence laid down by this Court on the matter. Under the cases of People v. Scott [62 Phil 553 (1935)] and U.S. v. de los Reyes[34 Phil. 693 (1916)] bearing similar facts as the case at bar, the acts committed by the petitioner constitute a classic case of swindling under Art. 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) People v. Nitafan G.R. No. 75954 October 22, 1992

Facts: On January 20, 1985, aid accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383 in the amount of P143,000.00 He knew that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank. The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay Sasaki the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five banking days after receiving said notice. Private respondent, Mariano Lim moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note in thus, is civil in nature. On 1 September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government. Issue: Whether or not a memorandum check issued postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation is within the coverage of B.P. 22. Held: A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check is subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment" A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum .

Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness

People vs Enrique Ceballos (G.R. No. 196642) Facts: Enrique Ceballos Jr. y Cabrales (appellant) was charged with six counts of rape, five on complaint of his minor daughter AAA, and one on complaint of another minor daughter BBB. The Informations were filed on November 23, 1998 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. C-55119, C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan. By Decision of October 14, 2002, the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 128, found the testimonies of AAA and BBB straightforward, categorical and convincing and accordingly convicted appellant of rape in all the charges except that in Criminal Case No. C-55119 where it convicted appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. However, the appellate court modified the decision for the penalty for acts of lasciviousness and mace it as prision correccional for there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance alleged and proven in this case, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period.

Criminal Case No. C-55119: One nighttime in December 1997, AAA and four of her siblings were sleeping at the second floor of their house in CaloocanCity when their father-herein appellant touched AAAs breast and vagina, catching her by surprise.Appellant thereafter removed her short pants and underwear and tried to insert his penis inside her vagina but failed, drawing him to, while AAA was in a lying position, instead insert his finger inside her vagina and mash her breasts. She boxed appellant but she was subdued by him. And she cried, but appellant covered her mouth, rendering it difficult for her to breathe. Appellant thereafter dozed off to sleep. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in modifying the penalty for the act of lasciviousness. Held: The appellate court, however, erred in finding that no aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven in the case for acts of lasciviousness.Relationship, which was alleged in the information and admitted by appellant, is under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code (alternative circumstances) aggravating in acts of lasciviousness. Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional. Appreciating relationship as an aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to six (6) years of prisioncorreccional as maximum. Further, the amount of P30,000 as moral damages may be awarded to the victim. The award of exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness is also justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, there being an aggravating circumstance. This Court finds the amount of P2,000 reasonable for the purpose.

Art. 353 Libel

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 Facts: On March 29, 1960, the New York Times carried a full-page advertisement entitled, Heed Their Rising Voices, which contained several paragraphs describing unfair treatment of Alabama State College student protestors, two of which specifically mentioned unfair treatment by the police. Respondent L.B. Sullivan was one of three commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama. One of his main duties was the supervision of the city police department. Although none of the statements made within the advertisement directly named Sullivan, he argued that, as supervisor of the city police department, he was being accused of allowing the described treatment of the students. It was found that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs in question were not accurate descriptions of what had actually occurred and placed the police department in a very unfavorable light. Additionally, all witnesses who testified stated that they did not believe the statements in reference to the respondent.

Respondent Sullivan brought a claim of libel against four of the individuals whose names, among others, were in the advertisement and against the New York Times for publishing the advertisement. The trial court found for respondent and awarded him damages of $500,000 against all defendants on the grounds that the statements in the advertisement were libelous per se [legal injury being implied without proof of actual damages], false, and not privileged. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision. Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Issue: Can a public figure receive damages in a civil libel action, if malice is not proven? Held: No. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that petitioner was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. As such, a public official [respondent] was prohibited from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless it could be proven that the statement was made with actual malice.