I.

Powers of Administrative Bodies

II. Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulation Source: Outline Reviewer in Political Law (Nachura)

The powers of administrative bodies are generally classified into:

Quasi-legislative otherwise known as the power of subordinate legislation and permits the body to promulgate rules intended to carry out the provisions of particular laws.

Supplementary or detailed legislation - They are rules and regulations to fix the details in the execution and enforcement of a policy set out in the law, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Interpretative legislation They are rules and regulations construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to be enforced and they are binding on all concerned until they are changed, e.g., BIR Circulars, CB Circulars, etc.. They have the effect of law and are entitled to great respect; they have in their favor the presumption of legality [Gonzalez vs. Land Bank, 183 SCRA 520]. The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent correct application of the law [Manila Jockey Club vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998]. Contingent legislation They are rules and regulations made by an administrative authority on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

o
It may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and implement legislative policy.

Quasi-judicial its power of adjudication enables the administrative to resolve, in a manner essentially judicial, factual and sometimes even legal questions incidental to its primary power of enforcement of the law.

It has been defined as the power of the administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found. The exercise of this power is only incidental to their main function, which is the enforcement of the law.

III. Assigned Cases

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) v. Torres FACTS: As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991,

on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. HELD: The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. It reads: The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and farranging for among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas; it assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty to recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate; and from the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. Said administrative issuances merely restricted the scope or area of PASEIs business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the

establishment of the mechanisms that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hong Kong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries. Said administrative issuances, are intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hong Kong. They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. As announced in Taada vs. Tuvera, All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

prosecution; therefore, it cannot have a penal sanction. Philsa International Placement Service Corp. v. Sec. of Labor Employment FACTS: Private respondents, who were recruited by Philsa for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. Their foreign employer forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When Philsa refused, they filed a case before the POEA against Philsa on the grounds of illegal dismissal, payment of salary differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal exactions/refund of placement fees, and contract substitution. Philsa insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 and 2, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication. HELD: See the landmark ruling in Taada case (supra). The assailed issuances upon which private respondents based their cause of action were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. Hence, Philsa is not liable. and and Exceptions: An administrative regulation may have a valid penal sanction if:

The law it seeks to enforce makes the violation of the regulation punishable. The law it seeks to enforce must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of the regulation. The regulation must be published.

V. Proper Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Power.

The power to act in such manner is incidental to, or reasonably necessary for, the performance of the executive duty entrusted to it. Primary jurisdiction is vested in the agency to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings and draw conclusions from them, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The proper exercise of Quasi-Judicial power requires compliance with two conditions, to wit:

Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the administrative body. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

IV.

Administrative

Rules

with

Penal

Sanctions

Jurisdiction is the competence of an office or body to act on a given matter or decide a certain question. It is the legislature that has the power to confer jurisdiction upon the administrative body and so limit or expand its authority. Thus, the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. There is no uniform rule concerning the jurisdiction of administrative bodies because each body has its own peculiar jurisdiction as conferred upon it by the specific provisions of its charter. The law may also allow some administrative bodies to award certain kinds of damages.

The power to define and punish crime is exclusively Legislative and may not be delegated to administrative authorities. General rule: Violations of administrative regulations cannot give rise to criminal

VI. Doctrine of Necessary Implication

-The right of notice and hearing is essential to due process and non observance will invalidate the administrative proceedings. Essence is opportunity to explain ones side or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not always indispensable, justification for omission urgency of immediate action tentativeness of the administrative action (w/o prejudice to enjoyment of the right in a later time) fact that the right was previously offered but not claimed

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an allembracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. (Chua v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, 7 February 1992, 206 SCRA 65.) VII. The Contempt Power of

accepted exceptions: abatement of nuisance per se preventive suspension of public servant facing administrative proceeding filthy restaurant, obscene theaters (threats to public heath and decency) cancellation of passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution. Summary distraint and levy of properties of delinquent tax payer. Replacement of temporary acting appointee.

Administrative Agencies -This power is essentially judicial. To be validly exercised by the administrative body, it must be: (1) expressly conferred upon and (2) used only in connection with its quasijudicial as distinguished from purely administrative or routinary functions. The power to hold in contempt must be exercised by the body not on vindictive but on preservative principle. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency, may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the RTC within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt. Pursuant to Sec.12 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt can only do so by initiating them in the proper RTC. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. VIII. Administrative Due Process

While administrative determinations are judicial in nature, no strict adherence to technical rules is to be observe like in true judicial proceedings. It may be the most liberal and expeditious, not bound by technical rule, especially when the order was has only the effect of prima facie evidence. Phil. Long distane telephone company vs tiamson Administrative and quasi judicial body not bound by technical rules but should not be construed as a license to disregard evidentiary rules. Cardinal rights and principle right to a hearing. Present his case and evidence tribunal must consider the evidence presented. Right to present evidence will be futile w/o this. The tribunal should have something to support its decision, if none void. This is based on the principle the law is both a grant and a limitation of power. Evidence supporting the decision should be substantial. Means relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to as adequate to support a conclusion. The decision should be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or atleast contained in the record or disclosed to the parties affected. By confining the decision to the evidence presented the party can be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. The court of industrial relation or its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and the controversy and not simply accept the view of subordinate. Must render its decision in a way that the parties in the proceeding can know the various issue involved and resdons for the decisions rendered.

In the absence of any statute providing for the enforcement of an administrative determination, the same cannot be enforced except possibly by appeal to the force public opinion. For instance, where an administrative body finds that a public utility is charging excessive rates because of mismanagement, this fact may be announced to the people in hopes of shaming the company in reducing its charges. Usually, administrative body is allowed certain sanctions that it may impose directly for the enforcement of its own decisions. Among the more common of the sanctions: Revocation of or refusal to renew licenses; Destruction of unlawful articles (like pornographic materials); Summary closure; Refusal to grant clearances; Issuance of cease and desist orders; and Imposition of fines.

Zambales chromite vs CA and Zaldo vs Calve Doctrine: a peroson that decided or recommended something in his capacity as officer, he cannot affirm it himself. SC called it mockery of justice and violation of due process. Peroson cannot affirm his own decision. Corona vs CA The complainant in administrative proceeding should not be the same official where the appeal would fall. Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex. No man can be at once a litigant and a judge. Unless in exceptional circumstances e.g. waives his right to review the case. Cordero vs public service commission Mere notice by publication is insufficient and violates due process. M.F. Volago vs Oiler tank trucks and NLRC NLRC cannot schedule the hearing of the complaint before the filling of the answer by the respondent, violates due process. Peficianco vs Moral Respondent not entitle to the findings and recommendations of the investigating body or committee. Only to administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record. Office of the Court Administrator vs Sumilang Only Substantial evidence is needed in administrative proceedings IX. Enforcement Decision of Administrative

It is also established that administrative agencies that have not been conferred the power to enforce their quasi-judicial decisions may invoke court action for that purpose. X. Doctrine of Res Judicata

The general rule is that an administrative decision is not considered res judicata so as to preclude its subsequent reconsideration or revocation. Decisions of the previous incumbents of the administrative body may be modified or reversed by their successors in the exercise of their own powers of adjudication. Where the administrative decision has been affirmed by a court decision, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable. The effect of res judicata attaches to the judgment of the reviewing court rather than to the administrative judgment. This rule has however been modified in this jurisdiction. It is now well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasijudicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. This principle is, however, not applicable to all administrative proceedings, such proceedings that are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities

obtaining in courts of law and those exercising purely administrative functions. XI. Doctrine of Prior Resort

Once initial action is taken by the administrative agency in accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the administrative process must continue up to the highest level before resort to judicial tribunals may be sought. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and the Exceptions

If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because of technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view Where 2 administrative agencies share concurrent jurisdiction with respect to a particular issue, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of others

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. When the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all means afforded by the administrative processes An administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides for a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain the case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum A party aggrieved must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also must pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court

Underlying presumption - that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly

EFFECT OF NON COMPLIANCE:

Does not affect the jurisdiction of the court and merely results in the lack of a cause of action which may be invoked in a motion to dismiss if not properly or seasonably invoked, the court may proceed to hear the case. Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest possible time, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by motion to dismiss, otherwise, it is deemed waived. Court has the discretion to require the observance of the doctrine ad may if it sees fit, dispense with it and proceed with the disposition of the case

When the administrative body is in estoppel ex. Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, the resolution of the admin body stated that the opinion of the sec. Of justice were advisory in nature w/c may be accepted or ignored by the officer seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse lead petitioner to conclude that only final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the commission. When the act complained of is patently illegal When there is urgent need for judicial intervention When the claim involved is small When irreparable damage will be suffered When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy When strong public interest is involved When the subject of controversy is private land the

Reasons for the doctrine:

Administrative superiors, if given the opportunity can correct the errors committed by their subordinates

In quo warranto proceedings admin remedies are neither a prerequisite nor a bar to the institution of quo warranto proceedings *SC further ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies need not be applied when the issues submitted have become MOOT AND ACADEMIC

Courts should as much as possible refrain from disturbing the findings of administrative bodies in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers On practical grounds, it is best that the courts which are burdened enough as they are with judicial cases, should not be saddled with the review of administrative cases Judicial review of administrative cases is usually effected through the special civil actions of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, which are available only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy

XII. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action No resort to the courts will be allowed unless the administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in the administrative structure. A party aggrieved must not only initiate the prescribed administrative proceeding, but must pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention.

Exceptions:

When the question purely legal

raised

is

Courts are reluctant to interfere with action of an administrative agency prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that absent a final order or decision, power has

not been fully and finally exercised, and there can usually be no irreparable harm. EXCEPTIONS: Interlocutory order affecting the merits of a controversy; Preserve status quo pending further action by the administrative agency; Essential to the protection of the rights asserted from the injury threatened; Officer assumes to act in violation of the Constitution and other laws; Order not reviewable in any other way; Order made in excess of power

XIII. Public Office and Public Officer Public Office the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law by which for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the state to be exercise by him for the benefit of the body politic. Public Officer is that person to whom the said right, authority and duty created and conferred by law is vested to for a given period of time and involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the sovereign functions of the government given to the said public office. XIV. Assigned Cases (by: Rafael D. Pangilinan) Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan (piclaro ung nasa questionnaire pero Tuanda ung lumabas sa GR. No. na given) FACTS: Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary of the Department of Local Government. They took their oath of office. Petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives. Undaunted, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives. Meanwhile, private respondents also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against petitioners for violation of section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 on the ground that petitioners refused to give them their per

diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits as sectoral representatives. Petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in the civil case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete City. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of the Local Government Code. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Is the legality or validity of private respondents designation as sectoral representatives a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners? In the event that private respondents designations are finally declared invalid, may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered? HELD: The issue in the civil case constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners. The facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: 1) There must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan FACTS: Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Regional Director or his

authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Ancla, a subcontractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue, assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt. Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the distrained truck from Azarcons custody. For this reason, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code. Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the BIR as a depositary of distrained property? HELD: Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes. Azarcon obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither can his designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority. While it is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve a distrained property there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The charge against Azarcon should forthwith be dismissed.

office of Senator of the Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continuously collected the salaries, emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having been filed by Rodriguez against Tan, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring Rodriguez to have been duly elected to the office; and that by reason of such usurpation, Rodriguez suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest. Can Tan, who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of Senator, be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to Rodriguez who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal? HELD: Tan acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position. Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed that Tan is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position (article VI, section 14, 1935 Const.). The petition must fail. Monroy v. CA FACTS: Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Comelec. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Comelec approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, Felipe del Rosario, then the vicemayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question. Did Monroy cease to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961? HELD: Yes. The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election

XV. Assigned Pangilinan)

Cases

(by:

Rafael

D.

Rodriguez v. Tan FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. claims that on December 30, 1947, Carlos Tan usurped the

Code (which reads Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other then the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy) makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position. Nevertheless, if the defendant, directly or indirectly, had committed unlawful or tortious acts which led to and resulted in his proclamation as senator-elect, when in truth and in fact he was not so elected, he would be answerable for damages. In that event the salary, fees and emoluments received by or paid to him during his illegal incumbency would be a proper item of recoverable damage. In this case, the award of salaries and other emoluments to Evangelista is improper. Malaluan was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, Malaluan exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. Malaluan is a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.

Malaluan v. Comelec FACTS: Luis Malaluan and Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor. But Malaluan filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared Malaluan as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. The lower court found Evangelista liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Except for moral damages, the decision was affirmed by the Comelec when it found Malaluan liable for attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995. Is Evangelista entitled, in particular, to unearned salary and other emoluments appurtenant to the position of mayor during the above period? HELD: As a general rule, notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the Comelec as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that office, is entitled to the compensation,