India's Third Communist Party Author(s): Marcus F. Franda Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 11 (Nov.

, 1969), pp. 797-817 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642225 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 07:35
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey.

http://www.jstor.org

PARTY INDIA'STHIRDCOMMUNIST
MARCUSF. FRANDA

On May Day, 1969.longprocessions wended their way through assembled thelarge open space in in thestreets Calcutta of and eventually which known themaidan.A crowdofmorethan is as of thecenter thecity statement Kanu Sanyal,theleaderof by 10,000peopleheardthefollowing or theCommunist Partyof India (Marxist-Leninist), CPML, India's third communist party. and to at With great pride boundless I wish announce joy today this that a Communist meeting we haveformed genuine Party-theComof was formed munist Party India (Marxist-Leninist) . Our Party .. on a memorable of theinternational Communist movement-the day the 100th birthdaythegreat of Lenin. When Party born, historic our was of Communist ofChina in was Ninth National Congress thegreat Party session under personal the guidance Chairman Tse-tung. feel of Mao I has proudthatthetaskof making historic this announcement been to given me.I firmly believe that great the Indianpeoplewillwarmly this welcome event, realise formationthis of as will the Party an historic for stepforward theIndianrevolution, will comeforward raise and to thestruggle a higher to stageunder leadership theParty.' the of with The CMPL is madeup almost exclusively peoplewhohavebroken of theCommunist the PartyofIndia (Marxist),or CPM, which had splitfrom Communist regular Partyof India (CPI) in 1964. Even thoughmostof a India'scommunists stillorganized are within CPI and CPM (claiming the combined membership morethan200,000), the CPML has alreadybeof comea significant has political force severalIndianstates. in The newparty attracted membership is estimated twenty thirty a that at or thousand;the IndianHomeMinister been seeking has additional powersto deal withit; and thetwoestablished Communist partieshave viewedtheCPML as both a political and ideological challenge. The formation a third of communist of raises a number questions party ofparticular to interested theoperation India'spolitical in relevance those of and the of of system, nature Indiancommunism, therelationship Indiansto movement to international and theinternational communist What politics. that in arethefactors ledtotheformation a third of communist party India? to and Whatis theCPML seeking accomplish how does it hope to achieve
1The full text of Kanu Sanyal's May Day address is reprinted Liberation (Party in Organ of the CPML), Vol. II, No. 7 (1969), pp. 110-122.The quotationis taken from p. 119 of this publishedtextof the address. 797

798

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

one withanpartiesinteract it's goals? How do India's threecommunist communist partyon regional, other?Whatis thelikely impactof a third The following essay national,and international politicaldevelopments? tentative answers thesequestions, such a way as to to in seeksto furnish in provide overview thoseinterested moredetailedresearch. an for
SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT

the The communist movement India has beenled by essentially same in of leadership thepast threedecades.The mainportion thisleadership, for which had joinedtheCPI in thejails and collegesin the 1930's and early high status.Whenthe CPI 1940's,was drawnfromfamilies relatively of of heldit'sfirst PartyCongress 1943,morethantwo-thirds thedelegates in or to the conference of 139) listedthemselves landlords, as traders, (92 halfof the delegates had colmembers "theintelligentsia," of whilealmost lege degrees and morethan90% (126 of 139) had been to collegeforat The among thisleadership wereattracted leasta year.2 morehighly educated of Nehru, Rabindranath Tagore, to communism thewritings Jawaharlal by R. PalmeDutt, and Strachey, other and Marxist writers, HaroldLaski,John of overtheyearswiththeleadership manyofthem had established contacts movements.3 Those who lacked college Europeansocialistand communist the weregenerally the terrorist groupsor from degrees drawn from former men who had initiallyabandonedtheir CongressSocialist organization, The to of to education takepartin the organization resistance theBritish. intellectuals the Indian communist in were recruited Indian in movement the and Europeancollegesand universities; organizational leaders were recruited thejails.4 in Whenthisleadership joinedtheCPI in thelate 1930's and early1940's it a in representednewgeneration Indianpolitics:almost 70% ofthedelegates in to theFirstPartyCongress 1943 wereless than35 yearsin age.5 Subseof theircontrol themainquently, however, thesepeoplemanagedto retain movement streamof the Indian Communist only by excludingleaders thanthemselves from mostprominent in the positions the moveyounger ment.The extentto whichthe older, pre-Independence leadershipnow of Executive dominates Central the Committees boththe CPI and CPM is indicated theaverageage of theCPI Central Secretariat, whichin Febby 1968 was just over60, and by thefactthatall but one of thenine ruary, haveheldparty members theCPI Central of Secretariat leadership positions
2Figuresforthe first Party Congressof the CPI are taken fromPeople's War,Vol. II (June 13, 1943), p. 1 and ibid., August 1, 1943, p. 8. 'The intellectualbackgroundof Indian communism traced out in Sibnarayan Ray, is "India: Intellectualsand Rural Problems," Leopold Labedz (ed.), Revisionism:Essays on theHistoryof MarxistIdeas (London: George Allen and Unwin,1962), pp. 374-386. 'See my forthcoming volume on Bengali Communism an analysis of recruitment for patternsamong Indian communists West Bengal: The Phenomenonof Leftismin in WestBengal, MIT, 1970. 'People's War,June13, 1943,p. 1.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

799

sincethe1940's.6Similarly, average oftheninemembers theCPM the age of in 1969 was just under60 and all ninemembers had Politbureau, January, been activeCommunist leaders the1940's.7The Chairman theCPI (S. in of A. Dange) was bornin 1899 and the GeneralSecretary the CPM (P. of Sundarayya)was bornin 1913. In contrast the two olderCommunist to parties, CPML is led by a the considerably younger Kanu leadership. The Chairmanof the new party, Sanyal,was bornin 1932. The oldestmember theCPML Politbureau of is thepartytheoretician, CharuMajumdar, who was born in 1920, but even he is younger thanall members theCentral of Executive Committees both of the CPI and CPM.8 It is obvious,therefore, the CPML's Politbureau that membersare considerably younger than those in the CentralExecutive Committees boththe CPI and CPM. Moreover, leadership those of the of agitational movements which CPML has beeninvolved in the have also been dominated menofthegeneration Kanu Sanyal,whobecameactivein by of Indian politics after CPML leadershave independence. None of theknown everheldparty positions thenational at level,and indeedveryfewof them have even had experience stateleadershippositions, in but have instead been drawnfrom party committees the district branchlevelsof the at and of movement. largepartthemotivation theformation theCPML can In for be explained terms thefrustrations in of experienced thislowerlevel of by Indian communist leadership it's attempts rise within movement. in to the of The revolt younger leadersbeganto assumesignifiIndiancommunist became cant proportions the early1960's, whenmanypartymembers in the disenchanted withthe eventssurrounding split between CPI and the CPM.9The younger had leadership theIndiancommunist of movement been recruited after independence, through Communist Partymassorganizations and cultural front groups, and it's contributions themovement to throughout the 1950's had been confined almostexclusively electoralpolitics. to a By the early 1960's, however, numberof younger leadershad become
'The membersof the Central Secretariat of the CPI are listed in New 4ge (CPI on Weekly), February25, 1968, p. 6. Information the nine members-S. A. Dange, C. Rajeswara Rao, Bhupesh Gupta, Yogindra Sharma, N. K. Krishnan,S. G. Sardesai, C. Achutha Menon,AvtarSingh Malhotra, and Bhowani Sen-was gathered from Who's Who, Legislative biographies, newspaper clippings,personal interviews, and fromthe biographicalsketchesfurnished Gene D. Overstreet in and Marshall Windmiller, Communismin India (Berkeley: University CaliforniaPress, 1959), pp. 556-575. of 'Members of the CPM Politbureau-P. Sundarayya,B. T. Ranadive, M. Basavapunniah, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Pramode Das Gupta, JyotiBasu, P. Ramamurti, Harkishan Singh Surjeet, and A. K. Gopalan-are listed in People's Democracy: Organ of the CPM, January12, 1969,p. 1. Biographicaldata on the CPM was obtained fromthe same source as thoselisted in footnote 6. 8While biographicaldata on leaders of the CPML is not readily available, some insightinto the natureof the leadershipcan be gained fromSatindranathChakravorti, "A Party is Born," Now: A Political and Cultural Weekly (Calcutta), June 6, 1969, pp. 8.10 and June 13, 1969, pp. 9-11.Data on CPML leaders was also gatheredfromnewspaper clippingsand personalinterviews. 9Aninner-party description the activitiesof the youngerleadership in West Bengal of is containedin The Growth Adventurism WestBengal: CentralCommittee of in Information Document (Calcutta: Communist Party of India Marxist, 1967).

800

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

of severely criticalof theoldergeneration Indian politicians(communist India's alike) who had been unable to revolutionize and non-communist to Of and basic political, economic, social alignments. specialconcern the of emphasis theparty CPI was theincreasing of members theunited younger to of and thefailure theparty escape politics and on electoral constitutional the the Throughout periodpreceding splita moorings. from bourgeois it's withthe olderleft allied themselves of leaderstherefore number younger the faction India, whichformed nucleusof the CPM after in communist left eventheCPM beganto moveawayfrom communism 1964.10 Butwhen in coalitions WestBengaland Kerala after split-by joiningMinisterial the leadersof of evermorecritical China-the younger in 1967 and becoming an positionforthemselves. establish independent theparty beganto slowly members theLeftfaction of of for Thecatalyst theopenrevolt theyounger coalitions stateMinisterial on was thedecision thepartoftheCPM to enter in parties 1967. "bourgeois" CPI with "revisionist" and other the in alliance of left a was madeknown, number younger faction As soonas thisdecision of beganto accusetheCPM leadership "neothe throughout country groups that by and becameso intense mid-1967 a number revisionism," factionalism of the journalsbeganto appear,attacking decision the ofunderground party in In party.-" earlyMay, 1967, the dissidents West Bengal organizedthe to ("The Committee Committee AntarPartySodhanbadBirodhiSangramn the ResistRevisionism Within Party") on an ad hoc basis and by late May This had foundan issue aroundwhichtheycould build nationalsupport. of of was the issue of the Naxalbaripeasantagitation the summer 1967, (in of in which started Naxalbarisubdivision DarjeelingDistrict thenorthspread to threecontiguous ern portionof West Bengal), and eventually and Kharibari, Siliguri).The in (Phansideoa, subdivisions thesamedistrict whichforpurposes occurred, area the administrative in which disturbances 100 approximately we of brevity will call "the Naxalbariarea," comprise on bordered thewestby Nepal, strategic squaremilesof highly territory, Tibet, and on the east by Pakistan,and lying30-50 miles fromSikkim, thatpoint where Bhutanto the north.This area is located at precisely the 13 India's narrowest corridor, to 14 mileswide,connects mainportions statesand territories (Assam,NEFA, Nagaof India withit's northeastern and Tripura). land,Manipur,
"0Thesplit in 1964 is traced out in Harry Gelman,"The Communist Party of India: Sino-SovietBattleground,"in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), CommunistStrategies in Asia (New York: FrederickA. Praeger,1963), pp. 101-147; Ralph H. Retzlaff, "Revisionism and Dogmatismin the Communist Party of India," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Revolutionin Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements(Englewood Cliffs, Communist New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,1965), pp. 309-342; and John B. Wood, "Observationson the Indian Communist Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (1965), pp. Party Split," Pacific Affairs, 47-63. l"The mostprominent amongthe underground journals were Commune, ChhatraFaul (Student's Army), Dakshin Desh (The South Country),Bidroha (Struggle), and Santrash (Terror). For a descriptionof factionalismin the CPM immediatelyafter the 1967 elections, The Statesman (Calcutta), May 31, 1967,p. 1 and Link (New Delhi), see May 7, 1967,p. 16 and July2, 1967,p. 16.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

801

in A smallgroupof dissidents theCPM chosetheNaxalbariarea as an place to testtheresolveof theWestBengalUnitedFrontgovappropriate of the to in ernment 1967, in an effort embarrass leadership the CPM.12 led Armedwithtribalweaponsand communist flags,the dissidents small and held by vestedinterests" lands "illegally to bands of followers occupy andpeasantcultivators action"on theside oftribal to attempted take"direct Throughout summer the in wronged land disputes. themselves who had felt politicalassassiwereaccusedof innumerable of 1967 theCPM dissidents of and and arsonist nations, attacks, robberies, a number Indiannewspapers policeactionagainstthe"Naxalites" beganto demand groups and political United Sincethe Communist-led of [supporters theNaxalbariagitation].13 the "to program recognize rights Fronthad pledgedin it's initial18-point and and of workers peasantsto voice theirjust demandsand grievances," and legitimate since it had also pledged"not to suppressthe democratic couldtakepolice of struggles thepeople,"theUnitedFront(UF) Ministry of themas enemies onlyby labelling the actionagainst Naxalbariagitators of state theCommunist-dominated government WestBengal.The leadership the to attempted mediatebetween UF and it's own of theCPM therefore activiand adventurist to in dissidents, an attempt stopthe"sectarian party even but tiesoftheNaxalites," eventually someoftheolderLeftCommunist from central the to leaderssuccumbed publicopinion(and to threats faction of and to HomeMinistry) agreed a waveofarrests thepotential government quashed the Naxalbari In guerillas. mid-July, 1967, the police effectively from beganto withdraw slowly and agitation, manyoftheCPM dissidents theparty.'4 than Perhapsevenmoresignificant thedecisionoftheCPM to acquiesce the which Naxalbari was agitators thesupport of in thearrests theNaxalbari to appealedprimarily India. The movement evokedthroughout movement chordsin but responsive youngpeopleand to urbanintellectuals, it struck as of segments Indian society well.Kanu Sanyal,theleaderof manyother in has depicted theIndianpress movement, sincebeenwidely theNaxalbari

"2Conflicts betweenthe Naxalbari and state units of the CPM are described in the document, Situation in Naxalbari Area: Siliguri Local Committee's CPM inner-party Report, a 19-pagereportwhich appears in On Left Deviation (Calcutta: CPM, 1967), pp. 25-44. Data on the Naxalbari agitationwas also compiled frompersonal interviews in Naxalbari in April,1969. in and speculationabout Naxalbari are broughttogether Naxal"3Most the rumors of bari Agitation: Some Facts and Consequences [Reports Submittedto Bharatiya Jana Sangh WorkingCommittee its meetingat Simla on June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1967 at by Bengal Pradesh Secretary] (Delhi. BharatiyaJana Sangh, 1967) ; see especially pp. 17-19. "4For three perceptiveanalyses of the Naxalbari agitation from radically different pointsof view,see Flibbertigibbet [Niranjan Majumdar], "Trouble Up North,"The Economic and Political Weekly(Bombay), June3, 1967,pp. 993-994; JohnSlee, "Police Actionin Naxalbari," The WeekendReview (New Delhi), July22, 1967, pp. 15-18; and BiswanathMukherjee,"Two Faces of Naxalbari," Link, August 20, 1967, pp. 24-30.

802

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

heroes.' in as an heroic, revolutionary leader, themoldofIndia's nationalist himin His willingness surrender landedwealth orderto "integrate to his of in self" withpeasantshas been emphasized a mannerreminiscent the His who of for freedom fighters fought the independence the country.'6 has whichhis movement received personalbackground, the publicity and with India andtheworld, invited has and comparisons contrasts throughout Gandhi, SubhasBose,and a hostofterrorist heroesoftheBengali Mahatma Bengalis) Sanyalis one past.'7 In theeyesofmanyIndians (and especially as of thefewmodern political leaderswho qualifies a "genuinerevolutionof the ary,"seeking support "the masses" in orderto do away withthe whilethe CPI and CPM have compromised theirrevoluelectoral system, In fervor allying with bourgeois parties joiningtheMinistries. in tionary by thisromantic SanyalandtheNaxalbariagitators havefrequentatmosphere, as in of lybeenviewed thevanguard a newwave ofrevolutionaries India,a to of leadership deserves support thosewho are notyetwilling sucthat the cumbto thedictates theIndian politicalsystem. of The CPML was conceived the summer 1967, whenthe Naxalbari of in throughout India and theworld,and it agitation beganto attract attention Left factions a number in quickly gainedsupport from dissident Communist of Indian states."8 an attempt promote to some kind of all-Indiaunity In younger left of amongthesevarioussupporters the Naxalbarimovement, Comcommunist agreedto form all-IndiaCo-ordination an faction members mittee Communist (AICCCR) whichmet throughout of Revolutionaries 1967 and 1968 to discussstrategy tactics.19 identical and Despitethealmost
1"In the words of a correspondent Link, forexample,Kanu Sanyal was described for as follows: "The leader who commands extra-ordinary respect among the peasants, and the mass of the people is Kanu Sanyal. He does not own any land.... He workers has greatcontempt the smug middle class. . . He has been a dreamersince his boyfor hood and has always taken extremepositions.His revolutionary spirit took him to the Communist Party . . . but even policemenseem to have a softcornerforKanu, the misguided dreamer."Link (Delhi Weekly), August 15, 1967, p. 85. "6Forrepresentative discussionsof Indian attitudestowardSanyal and the Naxalites, see Amitava Das Gupta, "Chavan's Wrong Tackling of Naxalite Communists," HindusthanStandard (Calcutta daily), May 13, 1969, p. 4; Ananda Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta daily), May 2, 1969, pp. 1, 5; and Samanta Banerjee, "Naxalbari: Between Yesterday and Tomorrow," Frontier (Calcutta weekly), May 17, 1969, pp. 8-10 and May 24, 1969, pp. 10-11. 17Evena number of Gandhians in India have expressed support for the Naxalbari movement. The most articulate spokesman of this sentimenthas been Jayaprakash Narayan,a Gandhian of great conviction, who stated in June, 1969 that his sympathy forthe Naxalbari Movementand its supportersstemmedfromhis desire to "do somethingforsharecroppers." Narayan explained that he hoped "to persuade the Naxalites to give up violentmeans," but he doubted "whetherby democraticmeans the social revolution could be achieved." He was willingto supportthe Naxalites, he argued, because of his willingness "take to violence . . . if I am convincedthat thereis no deto liverance of the people except throughviolence." See "Gandhians and Naxalites;" Thought(Delhi Weekly), June21, 1969. p. 5. 18Pannalal Das Gupta, "What is the Naxalbari Path?" Mainstream (Delhi Weekly), July8, 1967,pp. 9-11. 19A summary the activitiesof the Naxalites AICCCR is containedin 0. P. Sangal, of "Alphabet of Mao: AICCCR," The Citizen and WeekendReview (New Delhi), Vol. I, No. 5 (May 10, 1969), pp. 21.23.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

803

programs adoptedby thevariousleftcommunist factional groupsin each of thestates, leadership theAICCCR couldnotagreeon thestructure the of of the proposedthirdCommunist Party.Personality differences between TarimelaNagireddy Andhra in and theWestBengalAICCCR surfaced on a number occasions, of whileconsiderable juggling leadership for positions was reported have disrupted to severalAICCCR meetings.20 the final In analysisthe WestBengal Naxalitescould agree on a leadershipcentered aroundKanu Sanyal,but Sanyal and his colleagueswereunacceptable to manyoftheNaxalites Andhra, in Kerala,and other partsof India. In early 1969,therefore Naxalites WestBengaldecidedto launcha third the in Comown. munist Partyon their an whichis Thus farthenew partyhas attracted all-Indiamembership at estimated twenty thirty but usually or thousand, it has been mostactive in onlythree Indianstates-Andhra, Kerala, and WestBengal.In Andhra withtheleftcommunist centered around it has beencompeting leadership form Tarimela Nagireddy (whohas notjoinedtheCPML and might himself an Communist of of a fourth party)forsupport theGirij tribals Srikakulam In an which district. WestBengaltheCPML has attracted activefollowing is from at and morediverse is estimated 5-10,000, it'ssupport drawn sources. of The leadership thepartyin both regionsis derivedfromthe younger members theleftfaction theCPM (Kanu Sanyalis PartyChairman) of of members fromboththe CPM and CPI.21 Moreover, and it has recruited in sincetheCPM has relaxed party discipline considerably orderto prevent of to defections theCPML, somemembers theCPM havebeencollaborating their with CPML whilemaintaining the membership theCPM.22 In addiin a of prition,the CPML has attracted number new politicalparticipants, and the disenchanted urban middle-class. marilyamongcollegestudents is from lowerclasses and the the It's leadership, however, notyetderived of thus disadvantaged. Indeed,manyof themostactivemembers theparty far have been drawnfromamonggraduatesof Americanand European to that collegesandgraduate schools, suchan extent theCPM has frequently the instincts.23 charged CPML withCIA collaborationist thathas pervaded CPML affairs sinceit's formaBecause of thesecrecy of to tion,data on the innerleadership the partyis difficult obtain.The leadersoftheCPML have arguedthattheyare goingto pursuea lugantar followed theCPM and CPI, rather thantheAnushilan strategy strategy by federations Bengal'snationalist of a reference thetwoold terrorist to movement.Unlikethe Anushilan Samity,whichorganizedin much the same in as Communist front manner thepresent parties WestBengal (with groups, mass organizations, so forth),the lugantar revolutionaries and were a
to "0The position theAndhra of Naxalites stated An OpenLetter Party is in Members, byTarimela et Nagireddy, al. (Hyderabad: n.p., 1968),pp.1-26. 2"Link, 26,1969, 11. May p. of '8See "The Growth AdventurismWestBengal," On LeftDeviation in in (Calcutta: CPM,1967),p. 24.
-2Ibid.

804

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

terhighly secretive organization surfaced that onlyto carryout dramatic roristacts (such as armory raids and politicalassassinations).24 Openly to acknowledging adherence a Jugantar their styleof revolutionary organihas the to their party zation, CPML leadership agreedto meetsecretly, shift headquarters to of frequently, guardagainstpublicawareness partyactivionlywhenrevolutionary activities demandpublicacts. ties,and to surface An organization thistypeobviously of requiresfar more discipline than either CPM or CPI havethusfarbeen able to imposeon their the memberships,and mustnecessarily evenmoreelitist be thaneither CPI or the the CPM. As theJugantargroupwas alwaysdependent one or two leaders on whocontrolled operation theentire of the the organization, CPML can be expected represent politicalwill of Kanu Sanyal and perhapsa few to the of his closestassociates.
THE PROGRAM OF THE

CPML

International support theCPML has comefrom Communist for the Party ofChina (CCP), which nowrecognizes CPML as "theonlyCommunist the of Partyin India." Whilethere no real evidence China supplying is money and armsto thenewparty, members theCPML have stated publicthat of in and verbalsupsuchsupport be forthcoming, constant to they fully expect of portfortheCPML by theCCP makestheallegations a Chinese-Naxalite conspiracy the believable manyIndians.Through 1960's Chinahas purto suedan extremely activeforeign policyin SouthAsia, designed presumably toincrease on bothNewDelhi and instability thesubcontinent toinvolve and in race from Rawalpindi an armaments that woulddetract economic development bothnations.25 thePakistani Peking effecteddiplomatic in On side has a rapprochement thePakistan with government opposition India) while (in to to simultaneously lendingsupport internal communist politicalleaders.26 relations havebeenseverely With to regard India,Chinese diplomatic strained borderdispute.Chineseattempts prevent by thelingering Sino-Indian to bothAmericaand the Soviet Union frompromoting theirobjectivesin far Asia havethus failed, with result theChinese the that South have adopted Indian regime. an increasingly This has hostilestancetowardthepresent confrontation troopson theSino-Indian of botha continuing involved borfor derand Chinese support therebelsin theNaga Hills and in other parts

24Fora comparisonof the Anushilan and Jugantarorganizations, see Cobinda Lall Banerjee, Dynamics of RevolutionaryMovement in India (Calcutta: Sudhir Kumar Ghosh,1965), pp. 18-20. 2"China'sforeign policyin South Asia is traced out in Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict(London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp. 160-213. 26Foran excellentseries of articles on Pakistan, see Dilip Mukherjee, "Pakistan," The Statesman (Calcutta), September30, October 1-3, 1968. For an analysis of the internalpoliticsof East Pakistan by an Indian Bengali, see JayantaKumar Ray, Democracy and Nationalismon Trial: A Study of East Pakistan (Simla: Indian Instituteof AdvancedStudy,1968).

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

805

FromChina'spoint-ofexist.27 movements guerrilla potential ofIndia where the forcethatcan be used to disrupt guerilla viewtheCPML is a potential of functioning theIndianpoliticalsystem. orderly the for support theNaxaliteswithin CPM of indication Chinese The first overRadio Pekingon June28, 1967, of came in theform a radiobroadcast a duringtheperiodthattheUnitedFrontwas in theprocessof evolving In the policythatled to policeactionagainst Naxalbariagitators. whatwas of armedstruggle theIndianpeople," billedas "a talkon therevolutionary as the Radio Pekingdescribed Naxalbarimovement follows: of led struggle bytherevolutionariesthe armed A phaseofpeasants' in Party IndianCommunist has beensetup in thecountrysideDarjeelpaw StateofIndia.Thisis thefront ofthe Bengal of ingDistrict West the by launched theIndianpeopleunder armed revolutionary struggle orithe This teachings. represents general of guidance Mao Tse-tung's The peopleof time. at of entation theIndianrevolution thepresent revoluof hail and rest India,China the oftheworld theemergence this armed struggle.28 tionary fromPeking,the declarations and in subsequent In the same broadcast, in governments India, and thetwoolderestabFront United communist-led by have been described theCCP as "toolsof the lishedCommunist parties, theirrevolutionary to Indian reactionaries deceivethepeople and benumb as has the to the while decision enter Ministries been described militancy," double-dealing." counter-revolutionary "reactionary moneyand armsto a thatChina is supplying While thereis evidence has the in revolutionaries India,29 Indian Home Ministry number other of verbal. for support theCPML has beenentirely Chinese that -thus argued far of has The Home Ministry statedon a number occasionsthat"we are not of the withregardto the eventssurrounding formation silentspectators" with the CPML and it's attachments the Chinese,and the Home Minister take thathe might of a contemplatednumber measures has himself publicly has but to repress newparty, thusfartheUnion government had little the action againstthe Naxalites.Of particular to gain by takingdetermined thatcentralgovernconcernto New Delhi, of course,is the possibility of make"martyrs" theCPML either might the actionagainst Naxalites ment in conflict thoseareas evoke a center-state might leaders,or alternatively partialpoliticalpower. have attained wherethecommunists
27In December,1968, the Union Ministerof state forExternal Affairs, R. Bhagat, B. confirmed reportsthat at least 1,000 Naga rebels had been trained in China for purposes of guerillawarfare and were attempting infiltrate to back into India. For extensive coverage,see AmritaBazaar Patrika (Calcutta), December 24, 1968, p. 1. For Peking's attitudestowardsIndian communism, Hemen Ray, "Peking and the Indian CP," see Problems of Communism, Vol. XV (November 1966), pp. 87-92. "8Thecompletetext of the June 28 and June 30, 1967 broadcasts on the Naxalbari agitationby Peking Radio are reprinted Mainstream (New Delhi), July8, 1967, pp. in 14-16.Quotationsare taken from thispublishedversion. 29A summary some of these activitiesis providedin AnmitaBazaar Patrika: (Cal. of cutta daily), December 10, 1968, p. 7. See also Brines,op. cit., pp. 429 ff.

806

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

Therecan be little question, however, theCPML is makinga deterthat minedeffort maintain support China and to emulate Chinese to the of the exampleof a communist revolution -based peasantuprisings. on Following of of thepronouncementstheCCP, thepoliticalprogram theCPML argues that Indiannationalist the movement led by "thecomprador-bureaucrat was big bourgeoisie India," whose"principal of politicalmouthpiecewas the Indian NationalCongress."30 the After independence, program continues, the. Congress "betrayed nationalfreedom the to struggle serve [its] own narrow reactionary class interests" becoming by "imperialism's agentfor rulingthe country": British imperialist has exploitation notonly continued uninterrupted, butevenincreased. Moreover, other imperialists, specially and [sic], U.S. imperialism, No. 1 enemy theworld's the soof peopleandSoviet cial-imperialism, No. 1 accomplice U.S. imperialism, are the of who jointly working worlddomination forre-dividing world for the and among have into rapid themselves, penetrated India at an increasingly rate. In thethinking theCPML, "theonlyway to achieveliberation of from the existing reactionary system . . is resolutely overthrow armedforce . to by the fourenemies- U. S. imperialism, Sovietsocial-imperialism their and lackeys thiscountry, comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie in the big and the, feudal . landlords . ." But,in thewordsof theprogram, "theso-called communists the other and politicalpartiesin India have refused undertake to thisrevolutionary task."According theCP1\IL, olderCommunist and to the Marxist-left parties "pay onlylip service Marxism-Leninism in practo but, tice,havenever caredto educatetheworkers, youth, students and peasants, thebroad massesin Marxism-Leninism directed nor theirstruggles along theMarxist-Leninist On the contrary, line. theyhave keptthe movement withinthe bounds of laws whichare based on exploitation strictly and them downintothemireof economism, reformism parliamenand dragged tarism." Unlike CPI and CPM, bothofwhich the nowenvisagea two-stage revoluin tion in India, and both of which are participating state Legislative the thatIndian Communists Assemblies, CPML is convinced must"reject thehoaxofparliamentarism" order bring in revoluto about"an immediate tion... through revolutionary people'swar": the the areasthrough Today basictaskis toliberate rural revolutionaryarmed agrarian revolution encircle citiesand,finally, and the to liberate citiesand thuscomplete revolution the the throughout the country.
"0Theprogramof the CPML is contained in two documentsdraftedin early 1969: "Political Resolutionof the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist),"in Liberation,Vol. II, No. 7 (1969), pp. 4-16 and "Draft Political Programme the Revolutionfor ary Studentand Youth Movement,"Liberation,Vol. II, No. 6 (1969), pp. 57-67. All quotations not otherwise noted are taken fromthese two documents.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

807

the Relyingheavilyon analogiesto Cuba and Vietnam, CPML program situation:. . . The revolutionary an arguesthatIndia presents "excellent are the and U. S. imperialists theirchiefaccomplice, Soviet revisionists, and enslavethe dirty efforts redivide to difficultytheir in facingincreasing contraclassesare facinginsoluble ruling wholeworld. . ., thereactionary "SocialistChina dictions home."On theother at hand,theprogram argues, culconstruction. greatproletarian The miracles socialist of is performing in of turalrevolution consolidated dictatorship theproletariat every has the man."In his May Day for of conditions thesocialist sphere lifeand created of the speechannouncing formation the CPML, Kanu Sanyal quoted the that of declaration theCCP to theeffect ". . . by theyear2,000,thatis, only from all 31 yearsfrom now,thepeopleofthewholeworldwillbe liberated victory the of kindsofexploitation manbymanand willcelebrate worldwide thought." the wordsof Sanyal, In Mao Tse-tung's of Marxism, Leninism, Throughthisthe directive. it "This is no meredeclaration, is an historic of Partyof Chinapointsoutto theCommunists thewhole great Communist is and, the world howexcellent worldsituation formaking revolution, at the reto boldly. .. thehistoric sametime, directs of them marchforward all of the has forward Indian revolution fallenon our sponsibility carrying in situation" of revolutionary In orderto takeadvantage the "excellent on India,theCPML has thusfarconcentrated two typesof activities:1) of and theorganization educationof student groupson a number Indian workin ruralareas amongtribaland landcollege campuses;and 2) party is lesslaborers. major thrust CPML activities to bridgethegap that The of in eliteleadersand has alwaysexisted Indian Communist partiesbetween In massfollowers. thewordsof theparty program: will and youth college ... theadvanced section [theurban students] from overwhelming . to majority. . if it tries advance the getisolated seccaring inspire backward to the by without intothestruggle itself Taktions order makethem in to in actively thestruggle. participate section, of provided theisolation theadvanced by ingtheopportunity the reactionaries as theCongress the Party, [such will] organise broad of them serve needsof the and to sections thebackward masses utilise counter-revolution. To bridgethe gap between the elite leaders and mass followers, CPML organization of on proposes concentrate thebuilding a newmasspolitical to ofstudents youths, in and with and workers, which fully integrated peasants "the youthamongtheintelligensia, youthand student the masses, [will] in an detachment, theantian section, important notonlybecome advanced but revolution our country, [will] bein anti-feudal democratic imperialist come one withworkers peasants."In the wordsof CharuMazumdar, and "...there can onlybe one criterion whichwe shouldjudge whether a by or or is This is youth a student a revolutionary. criterion whether nothe is himself and to with broad massesof workers peasants, the willing integrate
shoulders."

808

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

and does so in practice, carrieson mass work... thosewho cannotare at and first non-revolutionaries may in some cases join the counter-revoluChina we This tionary campafterwards. is a lessonwhich getnotonlyfrom in every country theworld."31 butfrom
THE CPML AND INDIAN COMMUNISM

a party India has created number in communist The formation a third of and for ofdifficulties bothofIndia's oldercommunist parties, couldconceivIndia policiestowards communist of the ablyinfluence nature international the of as well.The significance theCPML stemsfrom factthatbothof the withthe coalitions, involved stateMinisterial in olderpartiesare actively providetheonlyorganizaNaxalitegroups the result that CPML and other moveof sections theIndiancommunist tionalalternatives thosemilitant for politics. ment whohavelongbeen opposedto a heavyrelianceon electoral appealoftheCPML the to The older communists attempt offset potential can to framework garner constitutional either working withinthe present by thusoffof segments the Indian population, moremoderate support from can or, fringe, alternatively, communist setting loss of the militant the the support demonstrating effecby the attempt outbid CPML formilitant to of key tiveness ministerial office revolutionizing groupsand classesin for have gainedpartialpoliticalpower.While thosestateswherecommunists each as parties havebeendivided to thestrategy bothoftheoldercommunist of the the shouldpursuetoward Naxalites, leadership theCPI has thusfar above,whiletheCPM mentioned the of emphasized former thetwostrategies by beingpursued thetwooldercomThe has optedforthelatter. strategies of politia are toward Naxalites in turn result thegeneral the munist parties thateach has evolvedsincethesplitin 1964. cal programs on politics, its EversincethesplittheCPI has focussed attention national communism allying itself the by to attempting further goals ofinternational policyof the SovietUnion. withtheCPSU and theforeign unequivocally allies,while from Chinaand it'ssocialist for The CPML is appealing support withRumaniaand contacts to theCPM leadersare known have established tied communist a fewother nominally to theCPSU,32and theCPI parties of has unquestionably thebackingof theSoviets.The Chairman theCPI is withall known Moscowas "theloyalDange," theCPI has been favored in and those transactions that and to ofthevisits invitations and from Moscow, Moscow and the CPM have been carried out have takenplace between the the (through via mediaoftheCPI. To further goals ofit's brandof comto "politically munism India the SovietUnion has attempted maintain in
3"CharuMazumdar,"To the Youth and the Students,"Deshabrati (Calcutta weekly), May 2, 1968,pp. 1, 4. 32Noneof the leaders of the CPM attended the Moscow Conferenceof Communist Parties in June, 1969, but several of them-M. Basavapunniah, Pramode Das Gupta, and others-did travel to Rumania and to England, where they kept abreast of dein movement. See Amitava Das Gupta, "Mini-Summitof velopments the international HindusthanStandard,June 3, 1969, p. 4. Communists,"

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

809

correct co-operative and diplomatic relations withIndia" whileat thesame timeseekingto further growth the Indian communist the of movement. Sovietinsistence led to "united has from front above" tactics thepartof on the CPI, underwhichpro-Moscow communists have soughtto ally with "progressive elements thenationalbourgeoisie" of and to build leftunity arounda sloganofnational democracy.33 In thisatmosphere leadership theCPI has argued of the thattheorganizationof a third communist party poses two "dangers"forthe Indian comthe munist movement: first, possibility the"formation theCPML] that [of a will carry and splittism disruption stepfurther" and, second,the danger the of will of that activities thenewparty "meanthedissipation somerevoluchannels."34 Rather tionary energy intowhollywrongand self-defeating movements India's ruralareas, the CPI has in thanlaunchinsurrectionist forces defeat arguedfor"an electoral allianceof all leftand democratic to from in in theCongress theCentre 1972,"13 a policywhich turn at stems the of situation India at thispointof time. in CPI assessment therevolutionary In theeyesof theCPI leadership: Thereis nota ghost a chanceforthattypeof a longdrawnout of armed 22 guerilla warfare which went in Chinafor years succeed on to some in India.Hereandthere of resistance type armed might onfor go time. it cannot youto final as some But take victory in China. India In can the under direct anyrevolution succeed only leadership theproof as with center revolution.36 letariat, cities theleading of In thewordsof theGeneralSecretary theCPI, the newpartycan only of "helpthereactionary forces, landlords other and blood-suckers thepeople of and divert people'sattention forfighting communist the to confuse and the and otherprogressive movement forces."37By splitting Communist the further, CPI argues,the CPML will not onlydiminish movement the the and forcesbut will also enable "the impactof thecommunist progressive and the Congress suppressthe leftforceswithgreater Home Minister to
violence."38 "3The programof the CPI is traced out in detail in DocumentsAdopted by Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of India, Patna, 7-15 February,1968 (New Delhi: in CPI, 1968). See especiallypp. 315ff., which the programspeaks of the installationof a "victoriousnational democraticfront"which "will forma national democraticgovernment . . witha view to.transforming existingsocial-politicalorder and lay the . the foundations buildingof socialism." For an excellentbriefsummary Soviet goals for of in South Asia, see William E. Griffith, Sino-SovietRelations,1964-65 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 117-118. 84New Age (Weekly),May 11, 1969,p. 2. 35The CPI's assessmentof its electoral position in India is contained in Review of FourthGeneral Election,adopted by the National Council of CPI, Calcutta,23-30April, 1967 (New Delhi: CPI, 1967). The quotationis from 48 p. "6C.Rajeswara Rao, "Naxalite Movement:Origin and HarmfulConsequences," New Age (Weekly), June29, 1969,p. 9. 37Ibid. 8S. A. Dange, Law and Order: Whose and for Whom? (New Delhi: People's Publishing, House, 1967), p. 14.

810

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

the concern theCPI is thewayin which CPML and other to Ofparticular into unionsand youthgroupsin Naxalitegroupshave penetrated student of parties.In thewordsof India, at theexpense thetwoolderCommunist one CPI theoretician, the that among rankand file It is butan opensecret largesections in of Parties Kerala are silently support the in ofthetwoCommunist activities. private they In talk hail the extremist [Naxalite]terrorist are the they notsurewhether timeis ripeforsuch terrorists, though students the throughout Stateare fullof . activities. . Left-oriented attacks.39 for leaders' theNaxalite of young praise the'heroic generation Indian leftof To cope withthedisenchantment theyounger of to the study ists,theCPI has attempted lecture Naxalitesand to establish and has also in program explained greatdetail, is circles which party in the launchedby the new party. for expressed support manyof themovements their In addition, bothof the olderCommunist partieshave acknowledged their by failure organize tribalsand landlesscultivators intensifying to the In the activities these in however, twoolderComanalysis, spheres. thefinal from state the the munist parties satisfy Naxalitesonlyby withdrawing can moreextremist Ministries whichthey participating, by adopting in are and to have been unwilling do. policies, and thistheolderparties The principal leadership of attacks theNaxaliteson theolderCommunist coalihas thusfarcentered theCPM, which dominated electoral the on has tionsin bothWestBengaland Kerala since1967. In its party propaganda, andthrough the of activities directed against governments Kerala agitational and WestBengal,the CPML has attempted "expose" the UnitedFront to theirtruenature."The "true governments thetwo statesby "revealing in as coalitions described follows: is nature" theCPM-dominated of . . . the'United to the Front' governments pledged maintain old reare lationsof production. they Faithful the Indian Constitution, are to the of to the neither norwilling solve basicproblem, problem land. able has Theexperience the'United Front' governments onceagaindemof onstrated without that of smashing statemachinery thebig landthe destroying feudalism the in lordsandthebig bourgeoisie without and no can to countryside, benefit be rendered themassesand thetalkof 'relief' reform puredeception.40 or is In a similar with"playing same the the CPM is charged manner Kerala state and Party-thegameoftheIndianreactionaries their gameas theCongress and U. and masters, S. imperialists Sovietneo-colonialists," ChiefMinister at is E. M. S. Namboodiripad said to be "grovelling the feetof big busithe ness."41 thesametime, CPM in WestBengalis labelled"neo-fascist" At by to and becauseit has "resorted lathi-charge shooting thepolice as daily
30C. Surendran,"Extremismand Left Movement,"Mainstream (New Delhi), April 5, 1969,p. 28. "0Liberation, II, No. 3 (1969), p. 6. Vol. "Partha Choudhuri, "Phrases and Facts About Kerala," ibid., pp. 28, 31.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

811

occurrences, in Congress as days,"and theMinisterial leaderoftheCPM in WestBengalhas beenlabelledby theNaxalites "theneo-revisionist as scab of a police minister namedJyoti Basu."42 In reaction theseattacks theNaxalites, CPM itself splitover to by the is thestrategies should it the pursue towards CPML and other political forces in India,andfactional alignments within CPM haveshifted the considerably. The olderleftfaction leadership theCPM, led by 60-year-old of Pramode Das Gupta, has launched widespread a campaignto persuadetheyounger members theCPM thattheparty remain of can within Ministries the while preserving revolutionary it's fervor. a maidan In speechshortly afterthe 1969 specialelection WestBengal,forexample, in Das Guptatoldhis followers: in We haveadopted to the democracy order strengthen democratic struggle, wefirmly but believe that would be able toreachour we not goalthrough Our Parliamentary democracy. goal is socialism for and that required bloody is the revolution. wantto reachthestateof We clashbetween Centre theStatethrough pathofParliamenthe and the tary democracy sucha levelthat wouldsparkoff bloody to it the rev-

olution.43

Within partyDas Guptainitially the attempted stemthe tide of revolt to among younger faction left members proposing campaign by a against those "bourgeois parties"withwhichthe Communists allied themselves West in Bengaland Kerala in 1967,but thisproposalwas voteddownby theCPM Central Committee.44 After the police action in Naxalbari in 1967, Das Cuptathen beganto arguethatunlesstheCPM pulledoutoftheMinistries, theparty wouldbe splitfora secondtime, thistoo failed stirtheCPM but to Central With Committee.45 a largershareof thestateMinistries thesecin ondUF government WestBengal, in Das Guptahas nowstarted campaign a to woo individual prominent Naxalitesback intothe partyin an effort to influence others the through personalpersuasion. thefinalanalysis, In Das Guptahas notbeen entirely without either the statecouncils in influence, oftheparty with Naxalites, his previous or the but position unquestioned of dominance theleft over communist faction (and theinfluence which accrued to himas a result thisdominance)has been severely since of undermined 1967. The ironyof Das Gupta's positionsince 1967 is that he now must a prevent stampede theLeft.Of particular to concern Das Guptaare the to of activities somemembers theCPM who are concerned of with primarily electoral who and politics, wouldlike to enforce party discipline expelfrom all whohave actively theCPAM ofthosemembers the supported "leftdevia42Ibid., Vol. II, No. 8 (1969), pp. 6-7. 43Hindusthan Standard (Calcutta daily), February 17, 1969, p. 7. Das Gupta issued a public modifying to amendment this statement few monthsafterit was published, a under pressurefrom own partyand fromcentralgovernment his leaders. "Link (Delhi Weekly),April23, 1967,p. 9. "Ibid., June4, 1967,p. 17.

812

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

tionist" Naxalites(estimated 4,000-6,000 theCPM's 17,000members at of theprincipal leadersof theNaxalitefactions, any actionon thepartof' but the CPM to expelthe majority thosesidingwiththe Naxaliteswould of virtually wipe out his own factional support. Das Guptahas thusfar succeededin at leastslowing rateof withdrawals the from party, only the but by relaxing rulesof party the discipline thepointwhereinner-party to debates are carriedout in public and partymembers attackone regularly another thepress. in In addition the influence to whichthe Naxaliteshave exerted inneron partyalignments within CPM, the new partyhas had a considerable the on impact thepoliciesof thestateMinistries by theCPM, and particuled larlyin WestBengal.Within stateMinistries CPM has been highly the the of conscious theparty's weakposition theleaderofshaky relatively as statewidecoalitions. Whiletheparty labelledthe1967 elections publicly results as "another greatlandmark theprogress our people'sstruggle," in of it's internal of assessment it's electoral was muchmorerealistic. a position In review the1967 elections, Central of the of Committee theCPM pointed out members bothof themajor Communist to party that partieshad been outpolledon an all-Indiabasis by fourothernationalparties(Congress, Jan and Sangh,Swatantra, SSP), and thatthemargin whichCongress by lost it's majority eightstatesin 1967 was "veryclose." Furthermore: in [Congress] polled37.87[sic] percent thevotes[fortheLok has of Sabha] as against 44.72percentin 1962. . . [but] except Kerala in andMadras, even the states in 8 where hasbeen it reduced a minority, to themargin between andthecombined it opposition very is small. Even in KeralaandMadrasit has polled35.4percentand 41.5 percentof thevotes respectively. thedemocratic So movement theCommu[i.e., nists]must underestimate strength reaction must not the of and always be prepared facethecounter-attacktheCongress to of party the and vested interests. Whatform willtakeandwhat it counter-measures the democratic government thedemocratic and forces mustadopt, to are be carefully studied evolved.47 and Compared with Congress, the whichsecuredat leastone-third thevote of in every Indianstate 1967,theCPM was mostsuccessful Kerala,where in in it obtained only23.51% of thevote,and in WestBengal,whereit received 18.11%. In all otherIndian statestheCPM finished withless than8% of thevote,and it's totalsfortheLokSabhawerea mere4.21% as compared with 40.73% fortheCongress. lightof theobviousminority In positionof theparty, bothstateand central at levels,theCPM Central Committee has
"'Ibid., May25,1969, 11. p. '7Election Review and Party's Tasks. Adopted by the Central Committee the Comof munistParty of India (Marxist) at its session in Calcutta, April 10 to 16, 1967 (Calcutta: CPM, 1967), pp. 4-5. The official electionvolumeof the Election Commission for the 1967 electionslists the Congresstotal for the Lok Sabha at 40.73% of the vote, a significantly highertotal than thatmentionedby the CPM in its electionreview.

in West Bengal alone).~4 Das Gupta has agreed to the expulsion of some of

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

813

optedforan immediate short-run strategy strengthening party of the organizationand mass movements thosetwostateswherethe partyis already in strong, an attempt solidify hold of the partyon the two state in to the nistshave not been neglected but receded entirely, theyhave temporarily intothebackground light thenecessity consolidate strong in of to two state partyorganizations. In this the of faction theCPM and thesubsequent of context, revolt theleft formation theCPML has been of central of importance theformulation to of CPM policieswithin Ministries. it werenot forthe revoltof the the If younger faction left members within CPM, the partymight able to the be pursuethefairly rigorous program thathas been outlined CPM theoreby ticianssincetheelectoral successoftheUnitedFrontgovernments 1967. in According thisprogram CPM shouldbe pursuinga "neo-Maoist" to the strategy "unitedfront and from below" tactics, policywhichcalls for a a two-stage revolution withtheCommunists comingto complete poweronly in thesecondstage,and onlyafter preconditions have been established in thefirst.49 Duringthefirst stagetheCommunists to allywiththebroadare eststrata thepopulation of (particularly peasantsand workers, also the but petty and the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie sectionsof the bourgeoisie)by the outbidding nationalist reformist and parties(such as theCongress and itsoffshoots) their for support. Moreover, "neo-Maoist" a strategy insists on of leadership theallianceby the"true"communist party, and on a power base forthe"true"communist party whichis separate from thatofboththe nationalist partiesand theother partiesin the alliance.5 This latter insistencestemsfromthe need to constantly exertpressure the nationalist on and to prevent parties parties alliedwiththe"true"communists from backon sliding theroad to thesecondstageof therevolution. short, insisIn the tenceon leadership theUnitedFronts WestBengaland Kerala by the of in CPM stems from needfora united the front from below.In thewordsof a resolution the CPM Central of Committee: The main pillar ourtactics united of is front from below. Thatis so becausethere a powerful forunity themassesand without is urge in giving expression it,without to strengthening turning intoan and it activeforce, reformist revisionist the and leaderswill nothavejoint action unity action. or of Without pressure from below, from ranks the
"This is pointedout in Political ResolutionAdopted by the Eighth Congress,Cochin, December23-29,1968 (Calcutta: CPM, 1969), pp. 45 ff. "While the CPM has published a separate pamphletunder the title Programmeof the CPI(M), the party programis elucidated in much greater detail in two other pamphletsdirectedagainstthe ideological attacksof the Naxalites. See Letterto Andhra Comrades (Calcutta: CPM, 1968), pp. 11-17 and WVhy The Ultra-'Left'Deviation? (Calcutta: CPM, 1968), pp. 49-52. '0For an analysis of the "neo-Maoist"communist strategy and "united front frombe. low" tactics,see JohnH. Kautsky,Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Postwar Evolution of InternationalCommunistStrategy (Cambridge: Massa, chusetts Institute Technology, of 1956), pp. 10 ff.

ministries.48 Questions of national and internationalimportanceto commu-

814

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

will and the masses in general,the reformists continueto evade joint action and weaken and disruptthe struggle.51 If it were not for the existence of the CPML, the CPM mightbe able to count on the support of all of the left communistforces in India, and it could thenconcentrate using these forcesto exertpressure on nationalist on and reformist "progressive elements" for more radical policies. However, in the presentsituation,the CPML and the Naxalites have sought to coopt the leftcommunistforces for themselves,with the result that the CPM has had to struggleagainst "conspiracies" on the leftas well as the right.Moreover,the effectiveness the CPML and the Naxalites has been enhanced by of tactical their willingness and ability to align themselves on a short-term basis with "bourgeois" and "reactionary" forces (including the Congress to and some of the UF partnersof the C.PM) in theirefforts "reveal the true nature of the neo-revisionists."52 Perhaps the dilemmas which the Naxalites pose for the CPM in this complicated electoral and ideological situation can be explained more clearly with referenceto concrete cases. To take one example, the CPML has soughtto invitepolice attacksagainst itselfin both Kerala and West Bengal in an attemptto expose the repressivenature of the two CPM-led coalition Ministries.In the face of provocation,the police have insisted on at least a minimal degree of law and order, and have thereforeoccasionally resorted have been killed. The West to police firings which Naxalite demonstrators in Bengal Police Association has even issued a report which has been summarized as follows: particular. . . policemen have been suffering from sense of insecurity, a on quarters[of policemen ly sincethe... attackby students the family at Durgapur] . . . recently the police have been subjected to assault and humiliation riotousmobs as a resultof whichthe moraleof the by at force been shattered. has Therehave beenmanysuchincidents Kasba, Islampur,Kultali, Amdanga,and Bally. Recently police in West Bengal has not onlybeen debarredfrom the its duties of maintaining law and order but its performing minimum is functioning being interfered withby the local partybosses. ... Poand licemendo not evenhave therightto defendthemselves theirfamilies in the face of mob fury . . the police forceis no longerprepared . to take this kind of thinglyingdown.53 Faced witha potentialrevoltof the state police force,the CPM-led United Front in West Bengal has been seriously divided as to what can and should
51Taskson the Trade Union Front,Resolutionof the Central Committee the Comof munist PartyofIndia, Marxist (Calcutta: CPM, 1967), p. 33. "20fparticularconcernto the CPM has been the willingnessof the Naxalite students in West Bengal and Kerala to ally with Congress student groups in anti-UF demonstrations. See, forexample,"The StudentFrontin West Bengal," People's Democracy, May 25, 1969,p. 10. 5""Policemenin West Bengal," The Citizen and Weekend Review (New Delhi fortnightly), June14, 1969,p. 21.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

815

led dissidents be done.One section thestate of government, by theCongress measuresagainst has sterner in theBangla Congress, advocated repressive law theNaxalites and a conscious policyofmaintaining and order(thusthe However such a policyhas served repression theNaxalbarimovement). of boththeCPI and CPM, and has worked to increase factionalism the within to the advantage theNaxalites.Both Communist of partiesnow staunchly of for oppose such a policy.Insteadof working the repression Naxalite activities, WestBengalHomeMinistry the (whichis headedby thelegislato tiveleaderof theCPM) is now attempting discipline police forcein the those instances wherethe police have used strongmeasuresagainstthe CPML. of But whilethispolicyhas thusfarprevented large-scale defections the the of Naxalitesfrom CPM, it has virtually the destroyed effectiveness the sidedwith Naxalites, the CPM party program. theCPM has increasingly As thelaw and ordersituation WestBengalhas deteriorated in considerably, loss This witha resulting in industrial production agricultural and output. in turn alienated has manyof thoseverysegments thepopulation of which theCPM seeksto attract.54 it's attempts becomeall things all people In to to whilesidingwitha left -allying with broadest the strata thepopulation of communist fringe which militantly is opposedto thealliesoftheCPM-the UF government becomeineffectual is confronted has and withincreasing opposition from number directions. a of
THE IMPACT OF THE CPML

If Indiawere a highly not segmented pluralist and one argue nation, might that communist-led the Ministries Kerala and WestBengalwouldhave an in interest creating in chaotic and anarchicsituations these in twohighly volatileareas. Feedingon anarchy Kerala and WestBengal,thecommunists in could conceivably revolutionize moreand moreof thepopulation these in twostates-or at leastconvince significant numbers electoral that democracy is inadequate India'sneeds-and thisfeeling for might thenspreadto other partsof India.But,as Myron Weiner pointed has out,India is bothsocially and politically segmented a degreeunknown any other or nation to in maj of the world: To a remarkable degree thosepolitical developments which occur in one segment notaffect do developments another . . one consein . quenceofsegmentation is thatdiscontent localized is and instabilities are often quarantined. feature theIndiansystem helpus This of may understand itis that anyonetime at why many theIndianstates of are but unstable, thenational governmentunaffected unperturbed. is and Wereall thestates unstable the orsimultaneously, national Congress ganization thenational and government hardly could remain stable.
54Production trendsin West Bengal since the assumptionof power by the United Frontare traced out in "Industry West Bengal," a 12-pagesupplement The Statesin of mnan (Calcutta), June22, 1969.

816

INDIA'S

THIRD

COMMUNIST

PARTY

disBut typically onlyfouror fivestatesat any one timeare seriously turbed ... truckwith four An analogymight made to a large twelve-wheel be tireson each of threeaxles. A flaton one tiredoes not createa flaton another, and it is possible forthe vehicle to keep movingeven if one In the carriesenough or twotiresare notfunctioning. anyevent, driver so spares to keep thevehicleworking long as he does not have a large number flats of simultaneously.55 It is preciselythe segmentationof Indian political and social life that has plagued the communistmovementsince Independence. For, while the communists have increased their strengthin Kerala and West Bengal rather steadily,the movementhas declined in two other states (Andhra and Punjab) and has remained relatively insignificantin the rest of India. The obvious danger for the two older Communistparties in the present context is that ineffective governmentsin Kerala and West Bengal may diminish theirelectoralsupporteven in these two states,withoutaffecting rest of the India. Moreover,the possibilityof a communistrevolutionbeing staged in India in the near futureis considered by most communists(including both of the older communistparties and the CPSU) to be much more remote than the Naxalites would like to think.Even if the Congress should lose it's electoral majority in New Delhi in the 1972 elections, there is a strong possibility that it will be able to form a stable coalition government, either with the rightist parties (Swatantra and Jan Sangh) or with regional parties (such as the Dravida Munetra Kazagharn of Madras or the Akali Dal in Punjab), all of which are more well-established state political systemsthan are the in Communists.Should Ministerialcoalitions fail in New Delhi at some point in thefuture Communistswould thenhave to face severe opposition from the a highlyinstitutionalized military,police, and bureaucratic networkwhich is unreservedly anti-Communist and highly intenton maintainingthe unity of the nation. Conscious of the task which confronts them,the CPM has attemptedto educate the Naxalites and the CPML on the realities of Indian political life: They [the Naxalites] are anxious to teach the 'ignorant'CPM the elementary truth thatthe present Indian state is a bourgeoise-landlord stateled by thebig bourgeoisie, and thatstate poweressentially in lies the military, police, courts,judiciaryand bureaucracy. Since the state poweris not in any way brokenor weakeneddue to the electoraldefeatsof the Congressparty, is 'atrocious'on the part of the CPM to it speak about 'breakingthe Congressmonopoly power!' of .. . May we, first all, tell our criticsthattheydo not understand of thedifference between conceptof breaking the statepowerand thecon"5Myron Weiner, "Political Developmentin the Indian States," in Myron Weiner (ed.), States Politics in India (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UniversityPress, 1968), p. 53.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

817

of cept of breakingthe monopoly that power by one political party, namely the Congress Party? state power can never be broken except The bourgeoi.s-landlord But or revolution socialist revolution. througha people's democratic
before that . . . breaking up the one-party monopoly of power is con-

and step forward, thusthe slogan of breaking sideredas an important it is the Congressmonopoly advanced.If anyoneis to understand as a whichalone can break revolution to substitute the people's democratic statepower,he shouldblame his colossal politithe bourgeois-landlord cal ignorancein the matter.56

Many of the CPML leaders and theoreticiansare fullyconscious of the between the concepts of breaking state power and breaking the difference monopoly of the Congress,yettheyare convinced thatthe focus of the communists should be on the formerrather than the latter. These people look forward to a period of great chaos in India in the next few years, perhaps brought about by the defeatof the Congress in 1972, perhaps as a resultof Congress partyfactionalismand major splits in the Congress movement,or perhaps as a consequenceof economic collapse. They look forwardto a series of internecinewars between India's competingregional politicians, and to Chinese assistance for their guerilla activities,which are intended to take advantage of a state of anarchy. But because of their emphasis on historian models-Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam-the ideology of the new party has an air of unrealityabout it which is reminiscentof India's experience with Communismsince the 1920's. In the words of CPI theoreticianMohit Sen, " [the Naxalites] have cultivated remarkableabilityto simplyexpunge from a theirminds the summingup of four decades of revolutionaryactivity; they seen to be unaware of the basic tenetof successfulCommunistsin this century,thatthe ideology does not commit. .. the revolutionariesin any countryto only one formof revolution,any one type of struggle."57Like their older formercomrades in the Indian communistmovement,the Naxalites are possessed with revolutionaryfervor,and they appear to be at least as tenacious and perseveringas those who have been attemptingsince the of 1930's to promotethe interests the communistmovementin India. Howhave some impact on the shape of Indian poliever, while theywill certainly tics during the course of their lifetimes,one can only wonder if they will come any closer to the revolutionarygoals that have been espoused by Indian communists so many years. for

"Ideological Debate SummedUp By Politbureau (Calcutta: CPM, 1968), pp. 163-164. Italics in original. "Mohit Sen, "What is a Revolutionary?" Mainstream, April 19, 1969, p. 31. MARCUS F. FRANDA is a memberof the Political Science Department Colgate Uniat versity and is currently India as a Senior Research Fellow of the AmericanInstitute in of Indian Studies.