The Unipolar Illusion

The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise Author(s): Christopher Layne Source: International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-51 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539020 . Accessed: 19/08/2011 05:12
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Layne The UnipolarIllusion Christopher

WhyNew GreatPowersWillRise
The Soviet Union's collapsetransformed international the system from bipolarity unipolarity. to To be sure,the UnitedStateshas not imposeda "universal monarchy" on theinternational system. Thereare other statesthatare formidable militarily (Russia)or economically (Japanand Germany).1 However, becauseonlythe in UnitedStatespossesses imposingstrength all categories greatpower of it politics.2 capability, enjoys a preeminent in international role Following theGulf Warand theSovietUnion'scollapse, many commentators suggested thatAmerica that shouldadopt a new grandstrategy would aim at perpetthe uating unipolarity.3 that Belief unipolarity favors United States, hence and in shouldbe maintained, as resonated official Washington well.Thisbecame of apparentin March 1992,when the initialdraft the Pentagon'sDefense
international at UCLA. Christopher teaches Layne politics I am grateful thefollowing their to for perceptive helpful and comments thedrafts this on of article: AndrewChase, JohnMearsheimer, Ben JohnArquilla,Ted Galen Carpenter, Kerry I Alan Tonelson, reviewer. am also indebted to Schwarz, Kenneth Waltz,and an anonymous and Harry Kreisler (Institute International of Studies,UC Berkeley) JedSnyder (Washington Strategy Seminar) providing for stimulating intellectual forums helpedrefine thinking that my aboutunipolarity prompted to write article. and me this 1. Germany, Japanand Russiacertainly have thepotential be greatpowers.Germany to and lack Japan cannot today considered be great powers, however, becausethey therequisite military capabilities, especially strategic nuclear arsenals wouldgivethem that deterrence self-sufficiency. Notwithstanding Russia's stillformidable nuclearand conventional military capabilities, economicdifficulties domestic and political uncertainties have undercut greatpower status. its Chinawillbe a strong if contender great for powerstatus it can maintain internal its cohesion. Buoyed itsvibrant by economy, Chinahas embarked a majormodernization expansion on and of its air,naval, and groundforces, including power-projection its capabilities. NicholasD. NewYork Kristof, "ChinaBuildsIts Military Muscle,Making SomeNeighbors Nervous," Times, January 1993,p. Al. 11, 2. I definea unipolarsystem one in whicha singlepoweris geopolitically as preponderant the becauseits capabilities formidable are enoughto preclude formation an overwhelming of balancing coalition against it. S. and 3. Analysts suchdiverse of viewsas theliberal internationalist Joseph Nye,Jr., neoconservatives CharlesKrauthammer Joshua and Muravchick agreethata unipolar worldis highly Nature conducive American to interests. Joseph Nye,Jr., See S. Bound Lead:TheChanging to of American Power (New York: BasicBooks,1990);Charles Krauthammer, Unipolar "The Moment,"
Foreign Affairs: Americaand the World,Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91)and "What's Wrong With The
"At 'Pentagon Paper'?"Washington March13, 1992;Joshua Post, Muravchick, Last,Pax Americana,"NewYork Times, January 1991,p. A19. 24,
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993)
? 1993bythePresident FellowsofHarvard and of Collegeand theMassachusetts Institute Technology.
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Planning Guidance(DPG) forFiscalYears 1994-99was leaked to the New York Times.4 Specifically, document the statedthat,"We mustaccountsuffinationsto discourage them ciently the interests the largeindustrial for of from challenging leadership seeking overturn established our or to the political or economicorder"and that"we mustmaintain mechanisms the for deterring potential competitors even from aspiring a larger to regional global or role."5 The initialdraft the DPG was controversial, a subsequentdraft of and thegoal ofpreserving Neverdeletedthelanguagereferring to unipolarity.6 theless,the availableevidencesuggeststhatthe DPG accurately reflected the official views aboutunipolarity. example, 1991Summer For Studyorgaa nizedbythePentagon's of defined "manageable" Director NetAssessment The worldas one in whichthere no threat America's to role.7 is superpower mainriskto American the security, studyargued,is thatof "Germany and/ orJapan and disconnecting multilateral from security economic arrangements "8 and pursuing independent an course. Duringlate1992and early1993,the a Pentagon's Joint Staff was preparing "new NSC 68" intended establish to an intellectual framework America's for One post-ColdWargrandstrategy. of thisdocument's worldis, by definition, key themesis thata multipolar adminunstable.Thereis as yetno evidencethatthe Clinton dangerously istration's view ofunipolarity differ will from Bush administration's.9 the there shadings difference are of for Although amongthevarious proposals it of perpetuating unipolarity, is fairto speak of a singlestrategy predomi4. Patrick Tyler, E. No "U.S. Strategy Calls for Plan Insuring RivalsDevelop,"NewYork Times, March 1992,p. Al. 8, 5. "Excerpts the FromPentagon'sPlan: 'Prevent Re-emergence a New Rival',"New York of Times, March8, 1992,p. A14 (emphasis added). 6. See LeslieH. Gelb,"They're March 1992, A15;William Kidding," NewYork Times, 9, p. Pfaff, "Does America Wantto Lead Through Intimidation?" Angeles Los March11, 1992,p. B7; Times, and the comments Senator of Joseph Biden(D-Del.) and theBrookings Institution's D. John Steinbruner quotedin MelissaHealy,"Pentagon Cool to Sharing Power," Angeles Its Los Times, March 1992,p. A8; Patrick Tyler, 9, E. "Pentagon DropsGoal ofBlocking New Superpowers," NewYork Times, May 24, 1992,p. Al; MelissaHealy,"Pentagon Maps Post-ColdWarDefense Plans,"LosAngeles Times, 24, 1992, Al; Barton May p. Gellman, "On SecondThought, Don't We Wantto RuletheWorld," Washington National Post Weekly Edition, 1-7, 1992,p. 31. June 7. Undersecretary Defense (Policy),1991 Summer of Study, Net Organizedby the Director, Assessment, heldat Newport, R.I., August 5-13,1991,p. 17. 8. Ibid.,p. 73. 9. Post-election the analysesstressed likelihood substantial of continuity between Clinton the and Bush foreign policies.At his first post-election news conference, President-elect Clinton referred theresponsibilities to imposed theUnited on States virtue itsposition the"sole by of as superpower." "Excerpts News in from President-Elect's Conference Arkansas," NewYork Times, November 1992,p. A8. 13,
TheUnipolar Illusion 7 |
measures nance.Thisstrategy notovertly is aggressive; use ofpreventive the It to suppressthe emergence new greatpowersis not contemplated. is of Rather not,in other words,a strategy heavy-handed of American dominance. the strategy preponderance by of seeks to preserve unipolarity persuading off within orbit an the of Japan and Germany thattheyare better remaining American-led security and economicsystemthan theywould be if they of became greatpowers. The strategy preponderance assumes thatrather thanbalancing againstthe UnitedStates,otherstateswillbandwagonwith of it. Important benefits thought flowfrom perpetuation unipolarare to the ity.In a unipolarsystem, is argued,the UnitedStatescould avoid the it of thatwould attend emergence the unpredictable geopolitical consequences the new greatpowers.Unipolarity would,it is said, minimize risksofboth In of and the strategic uncertainty instability. effect, strategy preponderance aims at preserving Cold War statusquo, even thoughthe Cold Waris the over. In thisarticle, use neorealist I of theory analyzethe implications unito a interI moment" justthat, geopolitical is polarity. arguethatthe "unipolar I witha between2000-2010. start lude thatwill give way to multipolarity even thoselike the verysimplepremise:statesbalance againsthegemons, UnitedStatesthatseek to maintain their stratepreeminence employing by thancoercion. Kenneth Waltzsays, N. As gies based moreon benevolence "In international states politics, overwhelming powerrepelsand leads other In tobalanceagainst it.'"10 a unipolar constraints-balancing, world,systemic uneven growth rates,and the samenesseffect-impel eligiblestates(i.e., thosewiththe capability do so) to becomegreatpowers.I use neorealist to theory explaintheprocessofgreatpoweremergence. to is historical discussion. Mytheoretical argument supported an extensive by A unipolar Therehavebeentwoother worldis notterra comparable incognita. The from those in international unipolar moments modern history. evidence derivedfrom structural realism: uni(1) two eras confirms expectations the own demisebecausethehegemon's contain seeds oftheir the polarsystems of unbalancedpower createsan environment conduciveto the emergence new greatpowers;and (2) the entry new greatpowersintothe internaof relative its tional system erodesthehegemon's powerand,ultimately, preemI the inence.In thefinalsectionofthisarticle, consider policyimplications,
10. Kenneth Waltz, N. "America a ModelfortheWorld? Foreign as A Policy Perspective," PS, December 1991,p. 669.
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and I arguethatthestrategy preponderance unlikely be successful." of is to It willbe difficult theUnitedStatesto maintain Cold Warstatusquo the for the of foundation thepostbecause structural changehas destroyed bipolar I 1945international system. concludeby outlining new grandstrategy a that couldaccomplish two maingeopolitical the tasksfacing UnitedStatesin the the yearsahead: (1) managing potentially the difficult transition from uniin to and American interests themultipolarity multipolarity; (2) advancing will polarworldthatinevitably emerge.
Great Rise-The RoleofSystemic Why Powers Constraints

Whether UnitedStatescan maintain standing thesole great the its as power new greatpowers will rise. To answer that depends largelyon whether we question, need to understand whystatesbecomegreat powers.'2 Thisis
11. In a sense, this articleextendsMearsheimer's examination post-ColdWar Europe's of geopolitical future thegloballevel.See John "Backto theFuture: to in Mearsheimer, Instability EuropeAfter Cold War,"International the Vol. Security, 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990),pp. 5-56. It shouldbe notedthatMearsheimer I come to verydifferent and policyconclusions regarding theAmerican military commitment Europe(and no doubtwe would notagreeon some of to theother policyrecommendations made in thisarticle), the notwithstanding similarity our of analyses. 12. As Kenneth Waltzwrites, greatpowersare defined capabilities: by "States, because they arein a self-help system, havetouse their in combined capabilities order serve to their interests. The economic, and of military, othercapabilities nationscannotbe sectored and separately weighed.Statesare notplacedin thetoprank becausethey excelin one way or another. Their rankdependson how they scoreon all ofthefollowing items: size ofpopulation territory; and resource endowment; military strength; political stability; competence." and Kenneth Waltz, N. Theory International of Mass.: Addison-Wesley, Politics (Reading, 1979),p. 131.Becauseof their capabilities, greatpowerstendto behave differently otherstates.Jack than that Levywrites great powersare distinguished from others 1) a highlevelofmilitary by: that capability makes them relatively self-sufficient strategically capableofprojecting and their powerbeyond borders; a 2) a broad conceptof security thatembraces concern withregional and/or globalpower balances;and 3) a greater assertiveness thanlesserpowersin defining defending and their interests. Levy,Warand the Jack Modern Great Power 1495-1975 System, (Lexington: University PressofKentucky, 1983),pp. 11-19. Recently therehave been severalquestionable attempts redefine to greatpowerstatus.For S. and SamuelP. Huntington example, Joseph Nye,Jr., arguethatonlytheUnitedStateshas the"soft" and powerresources (socio-cultural ideological attractivenessother to that states) Nye and Huntington claimare a prerequisite great of to powerstatus. Nye,Bound Lead;Huntington, "The U.S.-Decline or Renewal?"Foreign Vol. Affairs, 67, No. 2 (Winter 1988/89), 90-93. pp. Thisargument three has it weaknesses. from clearthat others viewU.S. culture First, is far and ideology the same positive in lightthatNye and Huntington America's do. racial, economic, and have erodedothers' educational, socialproblems admiration theUnited for States.Second, it is not unusual forgreatpowersto see themselves cultural ideological as or role models; include Britain examples nineteenth-century and France, pre-1914 Germany and, ofcourse, the Soviet whenitcomesto setting Union.Finally, great powers apartfrom others, powermay soft
TheUnipolar Illusion 9 I
a critical issue becausetheemergence disappearance) great (or of powerscan have a decisiveeffect international on politics; consequential a shift the in number greatpowerschangestheinternational of system's structure. Waltz a in that defines "consequential" shift "variations number lead to different as expectations about the effect structure units."''3 of on Examplesare shifts from: bipolarity either to unipolarity multipolarity; or unipolarity bipolarity to a or multipolarity; or from multipolar multipolarity bipolarity unipolarity; to system withthreegreatpowersto one offouror more(or viceversa).'4 Throughout moderninternational history, therehas been an observable pattern greatpoweremergence. of Although neorealism does not,and cannot,purport predict foreign to the policiesof specific states,it can account in foroutcomesand patterns behaviorthathappen recurrently internaof tionalpolitics. is driven Greatpoweremergence a structually phenomenon. Specifically, resultsfromthe interaction two factors: differential it of (1) growth ratesand (2) anarchy. and Although greatpoweremergence shapedby structural is factors, can it cause structural effects, results from unit-level actions.In otherwords,a states feedback loop ofsorts at work:(1) structural is constraints presseligible to becomegreatpowers;(2) such statesmake unit-level decisionswhether to pursuegreatpowerstatusin responseto thesestructural constraints; (3) ifa unit-level decisionto seek greatpowerstatusproducesa consequential shift polarity, has a structural in it impact.Risingstateshave choicesabout whether become greatpowers. However,a state's freedom choose to to whether seek greatpowerstatusis in reality to constrained structightly by turalfactors. Eligible statesthatfailto attain greatpowerstatusare predictablypunished.If policymakers eligiblestatesare socializedto the interof
be a helpful supplement theother to instruments statecraft, states of but with requisite the hard powercapabilities Waltz'sdefinition) great (per are powersregardless whether of they"stand for idea withappeal beyond[their] an borders." will Another popularintellectual fashion holdsthat Japan and Germany carveout nichesin international politics thefirst as "globalcivilian powers."Hanns Maull,"Germany Japan: and The New CivilianPowers,"Foreign Affairs, 69, No. 5 (Winter Vol. 1990/91), 91-106.As pp. in of civilian powers,it is argued,theywill eschewmilitary strength favor economic power, work through international institutionspromote to global cooperation, "furnish and international of publicgoods, such as refugee resettlement, national disaster relief, development economic infrastructure, humanresources and improvements." YoichiFunabashi, "Japan and America: GlobalPartners," Foreign Policy, 86 (Spring No. 1992),p. 37. In therealworld,however, one does notfindtraditional great powersand "civilian" great powers.One finds onlystatesthat are great powersand thosethat not. are
13. Waltz, Theory International of Politics, 162. p.
14. Ibid.,pp. 163-170.
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thatattaining nationalsystem'sconstraints, theyunderstand greatpower is if statesare to be secureand autonomous.15The status a prerequisite their fatethatbefellnineteenth-century illustrates China whatcan happen to an But statewhenitsleadersignore structural eligible imperatives. nineteenthto of century China is a rather singular exception the pattern greatpower a tried hardto attain emergence. moretypical post-1860 Far is Italy, statethat with. . . greatpowerstatusnotwithstanding it "had morein common that a smallBalkanstateor a colonythana GreatPower"in thatit was economically backward, financially weak,and resource-poor.16
DIFFERENTIAL GROWTH RATES
The processof greatpoweremergence underpinned the factthatthe is by and economic(and technological military) power of statesgrowsat differential,not parallelrates.Thatis, in relative terms, some statesare gaining power while othersare losingit. As Robert Gilpinnotes,over time,"the differential growth the power of variousstatesin the system in causes a fundamental The redistribution power in the system."117 result,as Paul of time and againrelative Kennedy shown,is that has "economic shifts heralded theriseof new GreatPowerswhichone day would have a decisiveimpact on themilitary/territorial "18 The linkbetween order. differential rates growth
15. Kenneth Waltz,"A Replyto My Critics" Robert Keohane,ed., Neorealism Its N. in 0. and Critics (New York:Columbia University Press,1986),p. 343. 16. R.J.B. Bosworth, the of Great Powers: Italy, Least the Italian Foreign Policy before First the World War(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1979),p. 2. In mid to late nineteenth-century China, some attempts were made at "self-strengthening"-adoption of Western industrial, technological, military and innovations. However, initiative suchefforts the for camemorefrom regional strongmen Li Hongzangthanfrom central like the in government Peking.Economic problems resulting from unfavorable demographics, socialand cultural and factors, especially Peking'sinability mobilizethe elitefora centrally-directed to the reform program, undercut a modernization effort. "Late imperialChina experienced profound structural breakdown brought by traditional on forces thatpropelled dynastic cycles.At thisunfortunate juncture the between dynastic breakdown and foreign intrusion, leadership simply lackedtheinternal resources protect to China from other expansive in nations searchofwealthand glory." June and in and Modernization RevolutionChina N.Y.: M.E. Grasso, Corrin, Michael Jay Kort, (Armonk, Sharpe,1991),p. 69. 17. Robert Gilpin,Warand Change World in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13. The roleofunevengrowth p. ratesin theriseofgreat powersis closely connected to longcycleexplanations. Joshua Goldstein, See S. LongCycles: Prosperity Warin the and Modern in Age(New Haven: Yale University Politics Press,1988);GeorgeModelski, LongCycles World (Seattle: University Washington of and R. Press,1987); William Thompson, "Dehio,LongCycles, and theGeohistorical of Context Structural Transition," World Politics, 45, No. 1 (October Vol. 1992), pp. 127-152. 18. Paul Kennedy, RiseandFallofGreat The Powers: Economic Change Military and Conflict From 1500to2000(New York: RandomHouse, 1987),p. xxii.
and great for Unipoweremergence important has implications unipolarity. polarity likely be short-lived is to because new great powerswillemergeas and the theunevengrowth processnarrows gap betweenthehegemon the to as eligible statesthatare positioned emerge itscompetitors. in is Thereare at leastthreeother respects whichgreat poweremergence affected differential by growthrates. First,as eligiblestatesgain relative in to power,theyare more likelyto attempt advance theirstanding the of international system. Gilpinpointsout, "The critical As significance the the is it differential growth poweramongstates that alters costofchanging of the theinternational system and therefore incentives changing interthe for "19 national system. Second,Gilpinobserves, rising powerleads toincreasing their ambition. Risingpowers seek to enhancetheirsecurity increasing by as environment.20 and control overtheexternal Third, Kencapabilities their interests nedy explains,risingpower leads also to increasedinternational and military and commitments. for Oftentimes greatpowers,geopolitical capabilities the consequenceof a process thatbegins with economic are (accessto expansion. Economic expansion leads to new overseasobligations markets rawmaterials, and alliances, bases),which thenmustbe defended.21
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANARCHY: BALANCING AND SAMENESS
is system Becauseit is anarchic, international the political system a self-help In in whichstates'foremost concernmustbe withsurvival.22 an anarchic and system, statesmustprovidefortheir own security theyfacemanyreal or apparent a International thusis a competitive realm, fact threats.23 politics that itself in Specifically, constrains eligible states attain to great powerstatus. that there two manifestations thiscompetitiveness shape great are of power and the "samenesseffect."24 emergence: balancing in is BALANCING. The competitiveness international of politics manifested strong explanathetendency statesto balance.25 of Balancing especially has
19. Gilpin, War Change, 95. and p. a 20. Ibid., pp. 94-95. As Gilpinnotes,rising powercan tempt stateto seek changein the is international system, whichcan trigger "hegemonic war."Thisproblem discussedin more detailin theconclusion. 21. Kennedy, andFallofGreat Rise Powers, xxiii. p. 22. Waltz,Theory International of Politics, 107,127. pp. 23. Kenneth Waltz,"The Origins Warin Neorealist N. of Theory," Robert Rotberg in I. and K. and Theodore Rabb,eds., TheOrigin PreventionMajorWars of (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1989),p. 43. 24. The phrase"sameness effect" from is Waltz,Theory International of Politics, 128. p. 25. Fordiscussion thedifferences of see between bandwagoning balancing and behavior, Waltz,
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that tendstobe short-lived for unipolarity tory powerin accounting thefacts fail and thatwould-behegemonsinvariably to achievelastingdominance. that should generate Structural realismleads to the expectation hegemony of powers. powerin theform new great theriseofcountervailing of a The reason statesbalance is to correct skewed distribution relative attentive changesin to Statesare highly system. powerin theinternational have crucialsepower shifts their relative power positionbecause relative It of rates-the growth curity implications.26 is the interaction differential of distribution poweramongstatesmaincause of changesin the relative In self-help system, and anarchy produces important effects. an anarchic, that relative cathatothers will use increased statesmustalwaysbe concerned or capabilities ditheirown relative pabilities againstthem.By enhancing greater security statesgeta doublepayoff: minishing thoseofan adversary, The is and a widerrangeof strategic options.27 reverse trueforstatesthat Thus,as Gilpinsays,the to powerrelationships. remain indifferent relative "stimulates, maycompel,a state and competitiveness international system's that state prevent toincrease power;at theleast,itnecessitates theprudent its the By states."28 definition, relative increasein the powers of competitor is unbalanced. distribution relative of system extremely powerin a unipolar on in the states pressures eligible system, structural Consequently, a unipolar and become greatpowers should be to increasetheirrelative capabilities If theymaybe overwhelming. theydo notacquiregreatpowercapabilities, exploited the hegemon.Of course,an eligiblestate'squest forsecurity by intended bolster to its dilemma becauseactions maygiveriseto thesecurity of others.29 own security consequence threatening mayhave theunintended and It can be arguedon thebasis ofhegemonic theory balanceof stability new great thata "benign"hegemonmight able to prevent be threat theory These arguments unare and againstit.30 emerging balancing powersfrom in is stability theory usuallyemployed the Although hegemonic persuasive.
Theory International of Politics, 125-126;StephenM. Walt,TheOrigins Alliances pp. of (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1987),pp. 17-33.
26. Waltz, Theory International of Politics, 126. p. 27. Gilpin, Warand Change,pp. 86-87.
28. Ibid.,pp. 87-88. 29. John Herz,"Idealist Internationalism theSecurity and Dilemma," World Politics, 2, No. Vol. 2 (January 1950),pp. 157-180. 30. On balanceof threat see theory, Walt,TheOrigins Alliances, 17-26.Foran overview of pp. ofthebenevolent coercive and strands hegemonic of stability theory, DuncanSnidal,"The see Limits Hegemonic of Stability Theory," International Organization, 39,No. 4 (Autumn Vol. 1985), pp. 579-614.
context international of political it economy, can be extended other to aspects ofinternational politics. The logicof collective goods underlying notion the of a benignhegemonassumes thatall stateswill cooperatebecause they deriveabsolutebenefit fromthe collective goods the hegemonprovides. Becausethey better theargument are off, shouldwillingly goes,others accept a benignhegemonand even help to prop it up ifit is declining. However, as MichaelC. Webband StephenD. Krasner pointout,thebenignversion of hegemonic stability assumesthatstatesare indifferent the distheory to tribution relativegains.31This is, as noted, a dubious assumption. of As Joseph Grieco pointsout,becausestates that worry today'sallycouldbecome tomorrow's rival,"theypay close attention how cooperation to affect might relative capabilities thefuture."32 in Moreover, stability equatedwiththe if is dominant state'scontinuing the of preeminence, stability hegemonic systems is questionable once the hegemon'spower beginsto erode noticeably. As declinesfrom dominant Gilpinpointsout,overtimea hegemon its position because: (1) the costs of sustaining preeminence its beginto erode the hegemon'seconomicstrength, its and thereby diminishing military economic capabilities; and (2) the hegemonic in paradoxresults the diffusion ecoof nomic, and technological, organizational skillsto otherstates, thereby causingthehegemon lose its"comparative to advantage" overthem.33 Frequently, theseothers eligiblestatesthatwillriseto greatpowerstatusand chalare lengethehegemon'spredominance. Thislastpointsuggests thatin unipolar systems, statesdo indeedbalance againstthe hegemon'sunchecked power.This reflects factthatin unithe polar systemsthereis no clear-cut betweenbalancingagainst distinction threat balancing and againstpower.Thisis becausethethreat in inheres the hegemon'spower.4 In a unipolarworld,othersmustworry about the he31. MichaelC. Webb and StephenD. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: Empirical An Assessment," Review International of Studies, 15,No. 2 (April Vol. 1989), pp. 184-185. 32. Joseph Grieco, M. "Anarchy theLimits Cooperation: Realist and of A Critique theNewest of Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, 42, No. 3 (Summer Vol. 1988),p. 500 (emphasisin original). 33. Gilpin, War Change, 156-210. and pp. 34. Traditional balance-of-power theory postulates thatstatesalign againstothersthatare excessively powerful. StephenWaltrefined balanceof power theory arguing by thatstates actually balanceagainstthreats rather thanagainstpowerperse. However, Walt'sbalance-ofthreat analysis moreambiguous is thanit might seemat first glance.Forexample, admits he that every post-1648 for bid European hegemony repulsed a balancing was by coalition. Origins of Alliances, 28-29.Why? pp. Becausewould-be hegemons werepowerful becausethey or were threatening? does notsay directly one suspects He but thathis answer wouldbe "both."Walt
The gemon'scapabilities, its intentions. preeminent not power'sintentions cuts to the Robert maybe benigntodaybut may not be tomorrow. Jervis heart thematter of whenhe notes,"Mindscan be changed, new leaderscan and new opportunities dangers arise."35 can cometo power,valuescan shift, Unlesstheyare preparedto runtheriskofbeingvulnerable a changein to the hegemon'sintentions, otherstatesmustbe preparedto counter caits pabilities.Moreover,even a hegemonanimatedby benignmotivesmay to pursuepoliciesthatrun counter others'interests. Thus, as Waltzsays, "Balance-of-power theory leads one to expectthatstates,iftheyare freeto do so, will flockto the weaker side. The stronger, the weaker side, not threatens themifonlyby pressing preferred its policieson other states."36 Invariably, veryfact the thatothers believea stateis excessively powerful othersto balance againstit. It redoundsto its disadvantage provoking by was precisely this reason that,responding Sir Eyre Crowe's 1907 to for "Germandanger"memorandum, Lord Thomas Sandersoncounseledthat London should tryhard to accommodate rising greatpowerswhile simuldemands.Showing taneously moderating own geopolitical its commendable for empathy otherstates'views of Britain's policiesand its power,he observed that it would be unwise forBritain act as if everychange in to "It international politics menaceditsinterests. has sometimes seemedto me thatto a foreigner .. the British . mustappearin thelight some Empire of huge giantsprawling overtheglobe,withgouty fingers toes stretching and in every direction, whichcannot approached be without a eliciting scream."37
does not downplaythe importance poweras a factor inducing of in balancing behavior; he factor 21). Indeed,powerand threat blendtogether simply says it is not the only (p. almost imperceptibly. thattwo ofhis threat Note variables, geographic proximity offensive and capaWhen Waltsays thatstatesdo not necessarily bilities, correlate closelywithmilitary power. balanceagainstthe mostpowerful he is actorin the system essentially equating powerwith GNP. Whenhe says thatstatesbalanceagainstthreat is sayingthattheybalanceagainst he military power(coupledwithaggressive intentions). Obviously, poweris morethanjustGNP. Whatstatesappear to balanceagainstin reality actualor latentmilitary is capabilities. a In unipolar world,thehegemon's possessionofactualor latent will in military capabilities result of balancing regardless its intentions. in a unipolar If, matter morethan world,capabilities intentions, U.S. monopoly long-range the on power-projection capabilities-that itspreponis, derance military will of as power-probably be viewedby others threatening. 35. Robert Jervis, Underthe Security Vol. "Cooperation Dilemma,"World Politics, 30, No. 2 (January 1978),p. 105. 36. Kenneth Waltz,"The Emerging N. of Structure International Politics," paperpresented at the annual meeting the American of ScienceAssociation, Francisco, Political San California, August1990,p. 32. 37. "Memorandum Lord Sanderson," G.P. Gooch and HaroldTemperley, in by eds., British Documents theOrigins theWar, on of 1898-1914, VolumeIII (London:His Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1928),p. 430.
It is unsurprising thatcounter-hegemonic balancinghas occurred even during periodsof perceived unipolarity. After 1962Cuban missilecrisis, the for instance, French policywas driven thebelief thatthescales ofpower by in theU.S.-Soviet competition wereweighted heavily America's too in favor. French President DeGaulle said thattheUnitedStateshad becomethegreatest powerand thatitwas driven "automatically" extend influence to its and "toexercise preponderant a that weight, is to say,a hegemony overothers."38 DeGaulle's policywas animated the need to redressthisperceived by imbalance.As EdwardKolodziejobserves, theclosing "In yearsofGaullist rule, thepossible developmenta unipolar of system became ofthemajor one concerns of theFrench One of the mostimportant government."39 questionsconcerning international politics todayis whether thispattern balancing of againstthe in dominant willrecur the powerin a unipolar system (actualor perceived) post-ColdWarworld. SAMENESS. As Waltz a toward pointsout,"competition produces tendency samenessofthecompetitors"; is, toward that their imitating rivals' successful characteristics.40 characteristics includenotonlymilitary tacSuch strategies, tics,weaponry, and technology, also administrative organizational but and If effective techniques. others well in developing do instruments compeof tition, state must emulateits rivalsor face the consequencesof falling a behind. Fear drivesstatesto duplicateothers'successful policiesbecause in know that,as Arthur Steinobserves,"failure the anarchic policymakers "41 international system meanthedisappearance their can of states. From this it standpoint, is to be expectedthatin crucialrespects, greatpowerswill look and act verymuchalike. It is also to be expected thatsameness-effect imperatives impeleligible will statesto becomegreatpowersand to acquire all thecapabilities "In attendant thatstatus. Waltzobserves, a self-help to As the of system, possessionofmostbutnotall ofthecapabilities a great power leaves a statevulnerable others to who have theinstruments thelesser that "42 statelacks. Additional lightis shed on the sameness effect the "second image by reversed" whichpositsa linkage between international the perspective, sysand 38. Quotedin EdwardA. Kolodziej, French International Under DeGaulle Pompidou: The Policy Politics Grandeur of (Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1974),p. 91. 39. Ibid.,pp. 90-91(emphasis added). 40. Waltz, Theory International of Politics, 127. p. 41. Arthur Stein,Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance Choice International and in Relations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,1990),pp. 115-116. 42. Waltz,"Emerging Structure," 21. p.
17:4 116 International Security
tem'sstructural constraints a state'sdomestic and structure. CharlesTilly's famousaphorism,"War made the state,and the statemade war" neatly captures concept.43 shows how theneed to protect the Tilly againstexternal dangercompelledstatesin earlymodernEuropeto developadministrative and bureaucratic and finance milstructures maintain, to supply, permanent itary establishments. there moreto itthanthat.As is discussedbelow, But is theevidencefrom 1660-1713 1860-1910 and suggests thatgreat poweremeran to gence reflects eligiblestate's adjustment the international system's thattheway in whichstatesare structural constraints. OttoHinze observed "their relative each otherand their to organized internally reflects position the overallposition theworld"and that"throughout ages pressure in from has without been a determining influence internal on structure."4 are Great becausethey not,and cannot functionally powersare similar be, differentiated. is not to say thatgreatpowersare identical. This Theymay and adoptdifferent strategies approaches; however, ultimately all must they be able to perform the tasks to satisfactorily same security-related necessary The surviveand succeed in the competitive realmof international politics. thattheinternational samenesseffect reflects enormous the pressure system the places on greatpowersto imitate successful policiesof others.Hinze's Theirrespective discussion Prussia-Germany Englandis illustrative. and of in domestic, politicaland economicsystemsdeveloped dissimilarly, large partbecause each was affected differently international by pressures. (MaritimeEnglandwas farmore secure than continental Germany.) But, as is trueforall greatpowers, in othercrucialrespectsPrussia-Germany and Englandwere verymuch alike. That is, bothwere organizedforwar and in entradein orderto maximize their international security a competitive vironment.
to Response Unipolarity: 1660-1714

In thisand the following evidenceto testmy hysection,I use historical Such a test should be especially pothesesabout greatpower emergence. usefulbecause therehave been two prioroccasionsin history similarto
43. Charles of in Tilly, "Reflections theHistory European on StateMaking," Charles Tilly, ed.,
The Formation NationalStatesin Western of Europe(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1975), p. 42.
44. OttoHinze,"Military and of in Organization theOrganization theState," FelixGilbert, ed., TheHistorical Essays Otto of Hinze(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1975),p. 183.
TheUnipolar Illusion 17 1
today'sunipolarmoment. Francein 1660and GreatBritain 1860were as in in dominant theinternational system theUnited as States today.In neither is case, however,did unipolarity beyond fifty last years. France'sunipolar as moment ended whenBritain Austria and emerged great powers;Britain's whenGermany, Japan and theUnitedStatesascendedto great powerstatus. If the emergenceof those greatpowers correlates strongly with uneven growth rates,the samenesseffect, balancing and againsthegemonic power, it can be expectedthatthe presentunipolarmoment will be displacedby multipolarity within reasonably a short time.
FRENCH HEGEMONY IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD
It is generally agreed thatin 1660,when Louis XIV ascended the French throne, Francewas Europe's sole greatpower,"the strongest richest and "45 state in the world"; it was "a rare situation preeminence. France's of dominant positionreflected own strength therelative her and weaknessof Europe's otherstates.In 1660,Francewas Europe's mostpopulous state, had Europe'smostefficient centralized administration, (bythestandards was of the age) richagriculturally, had the potential developa dynamic and to industrial base.46 contrast, In France'srivalswere declining powers(Spain), orbesetby internal troubles or or (England), lackedFrance'scapabilities the meansto mobilize them(Habsburg Austria).47 France achievedhegemonic standing developing meansto mobilize by the itsassetsand convert themintoeffective diplomatic, military, economic and for FranceunderLouis XIV was responsible whatG.R.R. Treasure power.48 calls the "etatisation" war: "the mobilization the totalresources the of of of UnderWarMinister Michel oftheeconomy, wellas ofmanpower."49 as state, Le Tellier, was brought under and his son and successor Louvois,thearmy theadministrative of and control the central government a standing professional military was completed forcewas created.The Military Revolution and the French in altered and improved such areas as armywas drastically
45. G.R.R. Treasure, Seventeenth France(London: Rivingtons,1966), pp. 257-258. AgreeCentury ing that France was Europe's only great power in 1660 are Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of theGreatPowers,1648-1815 (London: Longman, 1983); JohnB. Wolf, Towarda European BalanceofPower,1620-1715 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 1. 46. McKay and Scott, Rise oftheGreatPowers,pp. 14-15. 47. Treasure, Seventeenth Century France,pp. 210-215, surveysthe relativeweakness of France's European rivals. 48. McKay and Scott, Rise oftheGreatPowers,pp. 14-15. 49. Treasure, Seventeenth Century France,pp. 219-220.
International 17:4 118 Security
selectionof officers, and logistics. recruitment, weapons, tactics, training FinanceMinister Colbertlaboredto strengthen France'sfinancial and economicbase to providethe wherewithal supportits enhancedmilitary to capabilities. These military, economic,and financial initiatives were made possibleby theadministrative that the reforms strengthened central government'spowerand made it moreefficient.50 France was Europe'sonlygreat Although powerin 1660,by 1713England and Habsburg Austria, well as Russia,had emerged great as as powers.The rise of Englandand HabsburgAustria-thatis, the international system's transformation unipolarity multipolarity-is from to directly traceable anto archyand its consequences:the sameness effect and balancing.Because Frenchdominancethreatened theirsecurity and autonomy, Englandand Austria respondedby: (1) organizing GrandAlliancesthat,in the Nine the Years'Warand WaroftheSpanishSuccession, to sought contain France and counter power;and (2) reorganizing its themselves administratively, military, and economically acquiregreat to powercapabilities to comparable France's. Treasureobservesthat,"France'sexampleforced changeon otherstates"; DerekMcKayand H.M. Scott pointoutthat, compete to with France, France's The increasing opponents"had begun to copythe French model."'51 power of governments a responseto external was danger:"International competitionand war,"says William Doyle, "werethe mainspurto domestic innovation."52 dangerto theirsecurity The posed by Frenchhegemony forced Englandand Austria emulateFranceand to developthecapabilities to that would enablethemto standon an equal geopolitical withFrance. footing England'srise to greatpower statuswas a directresponseto France's preeminent positionin international politics.The EnglishKing WilliamIII was concerned withmaintaining a England'ssecurity establishingbalance by ofpowerto preserve "thepeace, liberties, well-being Europe,which and of to In happenedin his lifetime be threatened overgrown French by power."53
50. Forbrief discussions theadministrative, of and military, economic bases ofFrench power, see John Wolf, Emergencethe B. The of Great Powers, 1685-1715 (New York: and Brothers, Harper 1951), 97-103, 181-187; pp. pp. Treasure, Seventeenth Century France, 231-244, pp. 288-320; and William Doyle, TheOld European Oxford Order, 1660-1800 (Oxford: University Press,1978), pp. 244-245. Ultimately, course, of fiscal reforms wereonlypartially successful France and was unabletobearthehugefinancial costsoftheNineYears'Warand WaroftheSpanish Succession. 51. Treasure, Seventeenth Century France, 241;McKay p. and Scott, of Great Rise the Powers, 41pp. 42. 52. Doyle,TheOld Order, 265. p. 53. G.C. Gibbs,"The Revolution Foreign in in Policy," Geoffrey Holmes,ed., Britain After the Glorious Revolution, 1689-1714 (London:Macmillan, 1989),p. 61.
rising great to powerstatus, Englandwas balancing leastas muchagainst at France'shegemonic poweras againsttheFrench threat. Indeed,thedistinctionbetweenpower and threat After was blurred.54 1688,Englandwas at warwithFrancealmostcontinuously twenty-five and theextent for of years its military involvement the continent on increaseddramatically. England maintained sizeablestanding a and thelargest mostpowerful and army navy in theworld.The imperatives war meantthatthestatehad to improve of its ability extract mobilize nation's to and the wealth and,as inFrance, England's administrative capabilities were greatly expandedforthispurposebetween 1688and 1713.France's hegemonic challenge themostpowerful was stimulus to thegrowth poweroftheEnglish of state:England"became, likehermain rivals, fiscal-military one dominated thetaskofwagingwar."55 a state, by as HabsburgAustria, too, emerged a greatpowerin responseto France's hegemonic power,and also theOttoman threat Austria's to eastern interests. The goals of Austria'swestern policywere "establishment a recognized of "56 greatpower positionand the fight againstthe supremacy France. In of thiscontext, Austria,the stakesin the War of the SpanishSuccession for were survivaland emergence a greatpower.57 as Like Britain and France, Austriaundertook administrative reforms aimed at increasing state's the "Thecentralizing drive theHabsburg warmaking capabilities. of government, in latent thesixteenth conscious theseventeenth in and centuries, based was upon a desire to consolidatepower forthe purpose of state security."58
54. Secretary StateCharles of Hedgessaid,"Weareawakeand sensible thetoogreat to growth ofourdangerous neighbor, are taking and for vigorous measures thepreservation ourselves, of and thepeaceofEurope."AndinJune 1701, KingWilliam instructed DukeofMarlborough III the to commence negotiations an anti-French for "forthePreservation theLiberties coalition of of Europe, Property Peace ofEngland, the and and for reducing Exorbitant the PowerofFrance." Quotedin John Hattendorf, B. "Alliance, and British Grand Encirclement, Attrition: Strategy in theWaroftheSpanishSuccession," Paul Kennedy, Grand in ed., Strategy War Peace in and (New Haven:Yale University Press,1991),p. 16. 55. JohnBrewer, Sinews Power: and The of 1688-1783 War, Money, theEnglish State, (London: UnwinHyman, 1989),p. 27. 56. Robert Kann,A History the A. of Habsburg of Empire (Berkeley: University California Press, 1974),pp. 77-78. 57. Ibid.,pp. 84-85. 58. ThomasM. Barker, Double EagleandCrescent: Vienna's Turkish andItsHistorical Second Siege Setting (Albany: StateUniversity New YorkPress,1967), 19. In theadministrative of p. sphere, efforts weresteppedup to subject Hungary bulkofwhichonlycameunderfirm (the Austrian control after Ottomans the weredefeated 1683)toVienna's in control that so Austria coulddraw upon its resources; central a organ,the Hofkanzlei, established conductforeign was to and domestic affairs; Hofkammer established exertcentral the was to control over the finances of Habsburg Austria's possessions; and theHofkreigsrat created administer was to Austria's army centrally remodel as a standing and it on lines.See Wolf, professional army French Emergence
in Austria was considerably successful less thanFrance and England creating mechanismsfor the efficient mobilization nationalreof administrative the in sources.Nevertheless, remains case thatthe need forsecurity the it faceofFrench hegemony forced Austria (likeEngland) bothtoemulate France and to balanceagainstit in orderto attain great powerstatus.59
Response Unipolarity: to 1860-1910

In 1860,Britain was in a position apparently of unequaleddominance an in international as system has been characterized unipolar.60 that Becauseitwas Europe's arbiter and possessorof a worldwideand unchallenged colonial "Britain empire, could not have been metwithan overwhelming balancing "61 coalition. Indeed,Britain's dominance was so pronounced itwas able that in the early1860slargely turnits back on Europeansecurity to affairs and withdraw a "splendidisolation" into that lasteduntil turn thecentury. the of Britain's hegemony was a function its naval power,its colonialempire, of and its overwhelming The economicand financial strength.62 RoyalNavy was as strong those of the nextthreeor fournaval powerscombined. as Britain's levelofper capitaindustrialization morethantwicethatofthe was
oftheGreat Powers, 126-137;R.J.W. pp. Evans, TheMaking theHabsburg of Monarchy (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1979),pp. 148-150. 59. Although Russia'sriseto greatpowerstatusparalleled England'sand Austria's, do not I discussitat length becauseit was unconnected thewarsagainst to French hegemony. 60. The phrase"unequaleddominance" from is Paul Kennedy, Riseand Fall ofGreat Powers, p. 152.MichaelDoyle describes international the system 1860as "unipolar-peripheral"; in that is, in the extra-European world,Britain's power was unchallenged. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell on University Press,1986),p. 236. Building Doyle,FareedZakariadropsthequalifier and describes mid-nineteenth the century international as system unipolar. Zakaria,"Realism and Domestic A Politics: ReviewEssay,"International Vol. Security, 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 186-187. 61. Zakaria,"Realism and Domestic Politics," 187. Thereis empirical p. for support Zakaria's statement. B. of William Moul's measurement the powercapability sharesof Europe'sgreat powersconfirms Britain's In sharewas 43.8percent, hegemonic standing. 1860,Britain's while thecombined sharesofPrussia, France, Austria, Russiaand Italy was 56.2percent. France was thesecond-ranked powerat 19.7 percent. Moul, "Measuring 'BalancesofPower':A Look the at SomeNumbers," Review International Vol. of Studies, 15,No. 2 (April 1989),p. 120. 62. Thisdiscussion, thefigures and are cited, based on Kennedy, andFallofGreat Rise Powers, In pp. 152-157. theUnited Statesthere a spirited is debateaboutthecontemporary implications ofBritain's decline.Forcontrasting viewsin a policycontext, Nye,Bound Lead,pp. 49see to 68,which rejects British the analogy's relevance; DavidP. Calleo,Beyond and American Hegemony: The Future the of Western Alliance (New York: BasicBooks,1987), 129-149, pp. which sees a strong betweenthePax Britannica's parallel demiseand thelikely demiseof thepost-1945 AmeriPax cana.
nextranking power(France), and Britain 1860accounted 53.2 percent in for ofworldmanufacturing output(a bitmorethanAmerica's sharein 1945). In the following discussion, look at the greatpoweremergence GerI of many,the UnitedStates,and Japan(butnot Italy'sattempted to great rise powerstatus),and analyzehow each was affected relative by powershifts and theconsequences anarchy. of Germany's to worldpowerstatus rise was mostobviously direct a responseto Britain's whilein theAmerhegemony, icanand Japanese cases theconnection between unipolarity great and power emergence, though less direct, stilldiscernible. is
BRITISH HEGEMONY IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD
Britain's preeminence a shadow overtheinternational cast system. 1880, By itwas widely that (and correctly) perceived theEuropean great powersystem was evolving intoa system three four"world"powers(whattodayare of or calledsuperpowers).63 International affected this politics was profoundly by trend, which alerted to and policymakers thesecurity economic consequences oftherelative of After distribution powerin theinternational system. 1880, therewas among statesmen prevailing "a view of the worldorderwhich stressed the and theorganization struggle, change,competition, use offorce of national to Britain resources enhancestatepower."M4 was the first world as powerand it was the model thatotherrising powerssoughtto imitate theyclimbed great to powerstatus.In other words,thesamenesseffect was muchin evidence. and PaulKennedy very Speaking Germany, of Japan, Italy, says: In all three societies there wereimpulses emulate established to the powers. By the 1880sand 1890seach was acquiring overseasterritories; each, too, beganto builda modern fleet complement standing to Each was a its army. element the diplomatic in significant calculusof theage and, at theleastby 1902,had becomean alliancepartner an olderpower."' of
63. See Kennedy, andFallofGreat Rise Thistransformation Powers, 194-202. pp. is illustrated by thegreat powers'respective shares total of industrial potential world and manufacturing output. In 1880Germany, France, and Russiaweretightly bunched and wellbehindbothBritain and theUnitedStatesin terms bothtotalindustrial of potential sharesofworldmanufacturing and output.However,by 1913 Britain, UnitedStates,and Germany the had widelydistanced themselves from rest thegreat the of powerpack.In terms total of industrial potential share and ofworldmanufacturing output, third-place a Germany heldnearly 2:1 advantage overRussia, thenextranking power. 64. Ibid.,p. 196. 65. Ibid.,pp. 202-203.
Kennedydoes not mention UnitedStatesin thispassage but he could the have. Although UnitedStatesdid notneed a largearmy and was able to the refrain from joininga greatpoweralliance,it followed same pattern the of building powerful a and modern navy, acquiring overseas colonies, becoming a majorfactor greatpowerdiplomacy. in
GERMANY S RISE TO WORLD POWER
The effect differential of growth rateswas an important in factor Germany's rise to greatpower status.As Paul Kennedyhas pointedout, Germany's economic growth after 1860was "explosive."66 Between 1860and 1913,Germany'sshareof worldmanufacturing 4.9 outputrose from percent 14.8 to and 9.7 In percent itsshareofworldtradefrom percent 13 percent.67 1913, to shareofworldexports was 13 percent 14 Germany's to (compared Britain's percent).68 Germany's rising powerfacilitated Berlin's decision seekchange to in theinternational system. Kennedyobserves, As Germany "either already the possessedtheinstruments powertoalter status of quo orhad thematerial resources createsuch instruments."69 KurtReiszler, to As confidant political ofpre-World I Chancellor War Bethmann was Hollweg,observed, Weltpolitik tightly linkedto thedynamic of growth Germany's export-driven economy.70 Reiszleralso noted how Germany's demands forpower and prestige increasedin proportion itsrising to strength.71 increasPredictably, Germany's ing ambition reflected Berlin's concern withprotecting deepening its stakes in theinternational system. a rising For powersuchbehavior typical: "In is order increase own security, willtry expanditspolitical, to it to its economic and territorial it to control; willtry changetheinternational in system accordance withitsparticular interests."72 rise to worldpower statuswas a direct Germany's responseto Britain's in preeminence international politics."The Germans came to resentBritish power and even British efforts maintain to theirpositionunimpaired."73 Weltpolitik-Germany's fora big navy,colonies, push and equality withBrit66. Ibid.,p. 210. 67. Ibid., pp. 149, 202; Paul Kennedy,TheRise of theAnglo-German 1860-1914 Antagonism, (London:GeorgeAllenand Unwin,1980),pp. 44, 292. 68. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism,292. p. 69. Kennedy, andFallofGreat Rise Powers, 211. p. 70. Quotedin ImanuelGeiss,German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (London:Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1976),p. 9. 71. Ibid.,p. 81. 72. Gilpin, War Change, 94-95. and pp. 73. William Langer,TheDiplomacy Imperialism, L. of 2d A. 1890-1902, ed. (New York:Alfred Knopf, 1965),p. 416.
ain in political influence prestige-was driven security and by concerns and was a clearmanifestation thesamenesseffect. of German leaderswereconcernedthatunless Germany developedcountervailing naval power,its independence and interests international in politics wouldbe circumscribed by Britain.74 Chancellor ChlodwigHohenlohe-Schillingfurst in 1896:"Unsaid less we are preparedto yieldat all timesand to give up the role of world power,thenwe mustbe respected. Even themostfriendly wordmakesno impression international in relations it is not supported adequate maif by terialstrength. Therefore, fleetis necessaryin the face of othernaval a powers."Notwithstanding consequences, an anarchic in the worldGermany had little choicebut to emulateBritain building powerful by a navy.75 rise to worldpower statusand the resulting Germany's Anglo-German antagonism were structurally determined. Unless Germany acquiredworld it powercapabilities, would have been vulnerable stateslikeBritain to that did have them.76 WilliamL. Langerpointsout thatGermany's increasing international interests the need to defendthemin the faceof Britain's and
74. Grand Admiral Alfred Tirpitz von believed Germany couldnotremain great a powerunless it developed intoa first-rank maritime power.Volker Berghahn, R. Germany the and Approach of Warin 1914 (London:MacMillan,1973),p. 29. "Naval power,"Tirpitz said, "is essentialif Germany does not wantto go under";IvorLambi,TheNavyandGerman Power Politics, 18621914(Boston: GeorgeAllenand Unwin,1984),p. 139. 75. Quotation from Lambi,TheNavyandGerman Power Politics, 114. Even Sir EyreCrowe, p. theBritish Foreign Office's leadinganti-German hardliner, recognized in his famous this 1907 memorandum. Croweconcededthat was for it Berlin, London,to determine size ofthe not the navynecessary defend to German interests. Crowealso understood British that opposition to Germany's navalbuildup wouldserveonlytoaccentuate Berlin's security dilemma: "Apart from thequestion right wrong, mayalso be urgedthatnothing of and it wouldbe morelikely than an attempt suchdictation, impelGermany persevere at to to withhershipbuilding programs." "Memorandum Mr. [Sir]EyreCrow,"in Goochand Temperley, by Documents theOrigins on of the War, 418. p. 76. In thelatenineteenth early and twentieth international century, Germany's behavior differed little from Britain's America's. unlike or But Britain, Germany's outward thrust notgo into did a geopolitical vacuum,and unlikethe UnitedStates,Germany lackeda securestrategic and economic base ofcontinental dimension. was in Germany hemmed and itsriseto great power status was too rapid,and too freighted implications others' with for to interests, be accommodated.David Calleo, TheGerman Problem and Reconsidered: 1870tothe Germany theWorld Order, Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1978),pp. 83-84. As W.E. Mosse observes, rise the of Germany's togreat powerstatus "couldnotbutaffect interests policies all others. and Itwas boundto frustrate arousetheopposition someat leastoftheolderpowers."W.E. and of Mosse,TheEuropean Powers the toEngland and German Question, 1848-1871: With Special Reference and Russia(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958),p. 2. In a real sense, therefore, was born encircled. it to Germany Merelyby existing, posed a threat others.Thereis an important lessonhere.A statemustdecideforitself whether strive greatpowerstatus, for to but successhingeson how others react.Some states(such as pre-1914 Germany) mayfacea difficult path to greatpower status,while forothers(e.g., the UnitedStates)the goingis relatively easy.Environmental factors, suchas geographic positioning, a lotto do withthe have difficulties mayconfront eligible that an stateas it attempts riseto great to powerstatus.
preeminence meantthatBerlin driven" London was "virtually intoimitating by pursuing policyof naval and colonialexpansion.Giventhesecircuma could have avoidedcolliding with stances,"it is hardto see how Germany England."7TheAnglo-German rivalry a textbook was example thesecurity of dilemma. Because Germany's to worldpowerstatuschallenged status rise a quo thatprimarily and reflected Britain's predominance interests, Weltpolitik made Britain secureand prompted less Londonto takecounteraction. Thus, the Anglo-German rivalry illustrates the processof greatpoweremerthat if a gencecan trigger Hertz/Avis dynamic a rising greatpoweremergesas theclearchallenger a preeminent to state'sposition.78 The Such statesare fatedto engagein intensecompetition. effect Gerof many'semergence greatpowerstatuson Anglo-German to relations sugis In gestive. 1880,for example, Germany's powerposition (measured share by ofworldmanufacturing was similar to outputand totalindustrial potential) thatof Franceand Russia.79 were on close terms WhileLondon and Berlin duringthe 1880s (whichat timesvergedon de facto alliance),Franceand Russia were Britain's main rivals.80 1900,however,the Anglo-German By had heated up and Germany had by a decisivemargin established rivalry
77. Langer, Diplomacy Imperialism,794. of p. 78. The competition between largest the and second-largest automobile U.S. rental companies (Hertz and Avis,respectively) becamefamous whenAvisranan advertising campaign withthe slogan, "We'renumbertwo; we tryharder."The analogyof the Anglo-German rivalry to firm commercial competition apparentto Tirpitz, was who wrote,"the older and stronger it "The the one before is too late."Paul Kennedy, inevitably seeksto strangle new and rising II's Kaiser German and Weltpolitik: Reflexions Wilhelm PlaceintheMaking German on of Foreign Policy," John in C.G. Rohland NicolausSombart, Kaiser Wilhelm NewInterpretations II: (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982),p. 149. 79. In 1880,thetotalindustrial potential thefour of powerswas: Britain (73.3,whereBritain in 1900is the indexbenchmark 100), Germany of (27.4),France(25.1), Russia (24.5). The four powers' shares of world manufacturing outputwere: Britain (22.9 percent), Germany (8.5 France(7.8 percent), Riseand Fall ofGreat percent), Russian(7.6 percent). Kennedy, Powers, pp. 201-202. 80. This does not contradict argument my thatGermany's to worldpowerstatuswas a rise balancing response Britain's to hegemony. thecontrary: the Berlin London and On during 1880s, wereable to mantain cordial a relationship becauseGermany's relative powerhad notrisento a pointthatthrust the Germany thechallenger's into role.It shouldalso be notedthatduring 1880sthe Anglo-German relationship indirect. was Londonwas alignednotwithBerlin itself and was butwithGermany's alfies, Austria-Hungary Italy.Thisalignment partof Bismarck's intricate allianceschemeand was meantto counter Russianambitions the Near East and in Mediterranean, objective an thatoverlappedBritain's Bismarck's interests. system also was intended isolate to France whilesimultaneously keeping Berlin friendly on terms withEurope's other great powers.After 1890, stunning in Germany's the rise relative manifest. powerbecame Inexorably, Germany pushed down thepathto worldpowerstatus, was and to confrontation withBritain.
in power.Indeed,Germany closing on was itself Europe'ssecond-ranking as and totalindustrial in output Britain terms shareofworldmanufacturing of in and wouldpass Britain thesetwocategories.81 potential, by1913,Germany fueledthe powerpositions The dramatic changein the two states'relative in in relations, and led to a shift European deterioration Anglo-German withitserstwhile rivals, geopolitical alignments Londonsoughtententes as to Franceand Russia,as counterweights German power.
EMBRYONIC SUPERPOWER: AMERICA S RISE TO WORLD POWER
It has been argued thatthe UnitedStatesdid not seek to becomea great had thatstatusthrust upon it.82 This view does not hold powerbut rather a the up, however. themid-1870s, UnitedStateswas contemplatingnew By thrust underwas This rolein worldaffairs, howevertentatively.83 outward the growth rates.In thedecadesafter War pinnedbytheeffect differential of economic capabilBetween States,theUnitedStatesacquiredenormous the base, leadmanufacturing industrial and itiesincluding rapidly a expanding abunin a sector, productive agricultural ership advancedtechnology,highly dantraw materials, capital.84 (and laterinternally generated) ample foreign In 1880, the United States (at 14.7 percent)rankedsecond behind Great
Britain(at 22.9 percent)in world manufacturing output. By 1913, the United
in States(at 32 percent) held a commanding advantage shareofworldman(13.6 perover Germany (14.8 percent)and Britain ufacturing production and technological, cent).85 Kennedyhas observed,giventhe economic, As
81. In 1900,thetotalindustrial potential thefour of powerswas: Britain, Germany, 100; 71.3; output were:Britain, powers'shares world of manufacturing Russia, 47.6;France, 36.8.Thefour Kennedy, Rise Russia,8.8 percent, France, percent. 6.8 18.5 percent, Germany, 13.2 percent, Harcourt, Braceand World, 1961),pp. 269-270.
and Fall ofGreatPowers,pp. 201-202. The Emergence Americaas a GreatPower (New York: of 82. Ernest R. May, ImperialDemocracy: to 1865-1890 (DeKalb: 83. Milton Plesur, America'sOutwardThrust:Approaches ForeignAffairs,
Northern Press,1971)."Whether greatpowerstatuscame in the 1890sor IllinoisUniversity and for earlier, is certain it thattheUnitedStatesdid notmakethedecision colonialism world The whichcaughtthe nationalpsycheoffguard. new involvement a sudden movement in P. in departure itsroots thequietyearsoftheGildedAge." Ibid.,pp. 9-10.Edward Crapol had American foreign oflate has recently surveyed state thehistoriography nineteenth-century the of taketheviewthat United the States consciously sought world power policy. Manyrecent works The Century status. to with Empire: HistoriographyLateNineteenth of Crapol,"Coming Terms History, 16,No. 4 (Fall1992),pp. 573-597. Vol. American Foreign Relations," Diplomatic
84. See Kennedy, Rise and Fall ofGreatPowers,pp. 178-182, 242-249.
85. Ibid.,pp. 201-202.
resource advantagesthe UnitedStatesenjoyed,there"was a virtual inevitability thewhole process"ofitsriseto greatpowerstatus.86 to In thelatenineteenth century, historian the Frederick Turner noted Jackson that interests their as becausestatesdevelopsignificant international political international economicinterests deepen, the UnitedStateswas alreadyon theway to becoming greatpower.87 admina Harrison DuringtheBenjamin in istration, UnitedStatesbeganengaging whatSecretary StateJames the of G. Blaine (echoing WilliamPitt the younger)called "the annexationof trade."88 Focusingfirst LatinAmerica, on U.S. overseaseconomic interests as expandedlaterto encompassAsia and Europe as well. Like Germany, to America'soverseaseconomicstakesgrew(or were perceived grow),its Paul international political interests increased.89 Kennedy also observes that the "growth American industrial of power and overseastradewas accomand panied,perhapsinevitably, a moreassertive by diplomacy by an Amer"90 ican-style rhetoric Weltpolitik. of stakesin theinternational AgainlikeGermany, America's as system deepthe to its As ened,Washington beganacquiring capabilities defend interests. of earlyas the 1870s,proponents naval expansionarguedthat,lackingan and modernized the and enlarged fleet, UnitedStateswould be vulnerable In to Alfred Mahanargued powerless defend interests.91 the1880s, its Thayer thatattainment worldpowerstatuswas thekeyto America's of security. His of arguments about the "influence sea power upon history" displayedan intuitive and he presciently understanding the samenesseffect of argued that,to become a worldpower,the UnitedStateswould have to emulate Britain's naval,colonial, and tradepolicies.92 America's navalbuildupbegan duringthe Harrisonadministration (1889-93)when Navy Secretary Tracy
86. Kennedy, Rise and Fall ofGreatPowers,p. 242. 87. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, The New Empire:An Interpretation American of Expansion,1860-
90. Kennedy, Rise and Fall ofGreatPowers,p. 246. 91. J.A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, Politics,Strategy, American and Diplomacy: Studiesin American Foreign Policy,1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 5-6. 92. On Mahan's views, see Harold and MargaretSprout, TheRiseofAmerican Naval Power,1776-
1898(Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1963),pp. 69-70. 88. Quotedin ibid.,p. 106. 89. American believedthatoverseasmarkets weremorecrucial the nation's to policymakers economic healththanin factwas true.By 1913,foreign tradeaccounted only8 percent for of GNP,compared with26 percent Britain. for Kennedy, andFallofGreat Rise Powers, 244. p.
1918(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1944), 202-222; pp. LaFeber, NewEmpire, 80The pp. 95.
persuadedCongress authorize to construction a modern of battleship fleet.93 Thisbuilding program signalled breakwiththenavy'straditional a strategy of protecting in Americancommerce, favorof one challenging rivalsfor command thesea. Responding an increasingly of to competitive international into a European-style environment, navy chose "to make itself the force readyforcombatwiththe navies of the othermajorpowers."94 America's navalbuildupwas underpinned itsrising by economic power.Naval expenditures a percentage federal as of in spending rose from percent 1890to 6.9 19 percentin 1914 and Kennedyrecountsthe shock of a famousBritish warshipdesignerwhen he discoveredduringa 1904 visitthatAmerica's industrial capabilities were such thatthe UnitedStateswas simultaneously building battleships 13 armored 14 and cruisers.95 The extent whichAmerica'sgreatpower emergence to rewas a direct It is that sponsetounipolarity unclear. is apparent, however, Britain's preeminencewas at least an important factor. The impetusforAmerica'snaval buildupand growing geopolitical assertiveness deepening was apprehension about the Western hemisphere's to vulnerabilty Europeanencroachment, if the especially the Europeangreatpowers shifted focusof theircolonial rivalries from becameconvinced Asia to the Americas.96 that Policymakers "American claimsin LatinAmerica would onlybe as strong the military as force behindthem.Consequently, American as and South stakesin Central "97 America increased, did American so military [i.e., naval] strength. Thus, reaction the threat America's rise to greatpower statuswas a defensive to Until1898,the United overseasinterests. posed by othersto its expanding Statesregarded Britain the main dangerto its strategic commercial and as in interests theWestern No hemisphere.98 doubt,American toward feelings
93. Fora brief discussion, Kenneth Hagan, This see J. People's Navy: Making American The of Sea Power (New York: The FreePress,1991),pp. 194-197. 94. Ibid.,p. 186. 95. Kennedy, andFallofGreat Rise Powers, 243,247. pp. 96. The relationship worries and American and strategic betweensecurity foreign policyis in and explored Richard Challener, D. Admirals, Generals Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Grenville and Young,Politics, Strategy American and Diplomacy. 97. LaFeber, NewEmpire, 229. p. 98. Kinley Brauer arguedthat wereconcerned J. has between 1815and 1860,American leaders abouttheimplications Britain's of expanding globalinterests, various and wereconstrategies naval and economic templated counter threat to the posed by Britain's powerand its formal and informal empire.Although theseproposedstrategic responsesto British powerdid not
International 17:4 | 28 Security
Britian were ambivalent because not onlywas theUnitedStatesthreatened by Britain's hegemony simultaneously was also a majorbeneficiary but it of London'spreeminence. Nevertheless, Britain's predominance tolerated was onlyuntilthe UnitedStateswas strong it. enoughto challenge Backedby growing naval power and unlimited in industrial potential, the mid-1890s the UnitedStateslauncheda diplomatic offensive In againstBritain. 189596, the United States provokeda crisiswith Britain over the seemingly obscure boundary disputebetweenVenezuelaand British Guiana.99 London was compelledto back down and to acknowledge America'shemispheric primacy. 1903, Britain By had given in completely American to demands canal and theboundary concerning control overthe proposedisthmian betweenAlaskaand Canada. Shortly thereafter, Britain bowed to thereality of America's overwhelming regional powerand withdrew navaland military its forces from NorthAmerica.
JAPAN: EXTERNAL
THREAT,
INTERNAL
RESPONSE
differed and The Japan's great poweremergence from Germany's America's. effect differential of rateswas not a factor. Between1860and 1938, growth measuresof greatpower capabilities Japanat or near the comparative put bottom the list. For example,between1860 and 1938,Japan'sshare of of worldmanufacturing 2.6 to outputrose only from percent 3.8 percent.100 drivenby its extreme vulnerJapan'sgreatpower emergence was, rather, as ability. was Indeed, in the 1860s,Japan'sveryexistence a nation-state at risk. was Although Japan'ssecurity-driven poweremergence nota direct great here too Britain's responseto unipolarity, had preeminence its effect. Speit defeatof China in the Opium Wars,and China's cifically, was Britain's thatprovidedan objectlesson forthe consequentloss of independence,
cometo fruition before WarBetween States, the the they nevertheless thegroundwork laid for America's subsequent rise to worldpowerstatus.Kinley Brauer, J. "The UnitedStatesand British Imperial Expansion," Diplomatic History, 12,No. 1 (Winter Vol. 1988),pp. 19-38. 99. Forbrief discussions theVenezuelacrisis, J.A.S.Grenville, Salisbury Foreign of see Lord and
Policy theCloseoftheNineteenth at Century (London: Athlone Press, 1964), pp. 54-73; May, Imperial
The and Democracy, 35-55;LaFeber, NewEmpire, 242-283; "TheBackground Cleveland's pp. pp. of Venezuelan Policy: Reconsideration," A American Historical Review, 66, No. 4 (July Vol. 1961), pp. 947-967.
100. Kennedy, Rise and Fall ofGreatPowers,pp. 198-209.
reformers led theMeijiRestoration.101 weredetermined Japan who They that wouldnotsuffer China'sfate.As Shumpei Okamoto notes,theMeijireformers shareda common purpose:"Throughout Meijiperiod,theaspiration the and resolvesharedby all thoseconcerned withthe fateof thenationwere thatJapanstrive maintain independence a worlddominated the to its in by Western in powers."1102 reformers' was neatly The aim expressed the slogan fukoku kyohei-"enrich country, the strengthen army"-which"became the theofficial program theMeijigovernment, of gearedtoachieving strength the "103 withwhichJapancould resist West. the Drivenby security concerns, Japan'sgreatpoweremergence reflected the samenesseffect. be secureJapanneeded to developthekindofmilitary To and economic capabilities would enableit to compete that withtheWest.In MeijiJapan,therefore, was shaped by foreign domestic politics policyconcerns.104 The era's governmental administrative and reforms, example, for were intendedto reorganize structure Japan'scentral governmental along Western if lines; centralized was seen to be necessary Japan government wereto organizeitself defenditsinterests to from encroachment.105 foreign Similarly, Imperial the Edictabolishing feudaldomains(1871)justified the theactionby observing thatJapanneeded a strong if central government it "106 was "to standon an equal footing withcountries abroad. the Recognizing linkbetweeneconomics national and power,theMeijiera reformers worked and hardtoexpandJapan's industrial commercial strength. Toshimichi Okubo said in 1874: A country's in strength dependson theprosperity itspeople . .. [which] of turndepends upon their And although amountof the productive capacity. in production determined largemeasureby the diligence the people is of
101. Theintellectual background theMeijiRestoration discussed W.G.Beasley, Meiji of in is The Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1972),pp. 74-139. 102. Shumpei Okamoto, Japanese The Oligarchy the and Russo-Japanese (New York: War Columbia University Press,1960),p. 43. 103. Beasley, MeijiRestoration,379. The p. 104. See James Crowley, in B. "Japan's Military Foreign Policies," James Morley, Japan's W. ed., Foreign Policy, -1868-1941: Research A Guide (New York:Columbia University Press,1974).Also see W.G. Beasley,TheRiseofModern and Japan (London:Weidenfeld Nicolson,1990),p. 21, whereit is similarly pointedout thattheMeijiRestoration, its consequent and reforms, were based on theassumption a causalrelationship that between at existed modernization homeand successin foreign policy. 105. See Beasley, RiseofModern Japan, 68-69;and TheMeijiRestoration, 303-304. pp. pp. 106. Quotedin Beasley, MeijiRestoration,347. The p.
a deterengagedin manufacturing industries, deeperprobefortheultimate minate reveals instance no whena country's productive powerwas increased without patronage and encouragement the government its offiand the of
cials.107
in Okubo, a key figure the earlyRestoration had governments, visitedEurope, including His Bismarckian Germany. travels underscored Okubo for the competitive and "convinced himthathe natureof international politics mustestablish Japanthe same bases upon whichthe worldpowersof for "108 theday had foundedtheir wealthand strength. Underhis direction, the government supported expansion manufacturing, and shipping. the of trade, At all times,therewas a sense of urgency aboutJapan'sinternal efforts to enhance its nationalsecurity becominga greatpower. Field Marshal by Aritomo Yamagata,one of the Meiji era's towering political and military figures, in 1898thatifJapanwantedto avoid lagging said behindtheWest, "we cannotrelaxforeven a day from encouraging education, greater proand duction, communications trade."109 From the beginning, almost everyaspect of Meiji policywas directed towardsafeguarding Japan'ssecurity and to vindicating claimto equal its status with the Westernpowers. To this end, Field Marshal Yamagata and navyand to no mustbe sparedto expandJapan'sarmy stressed, effort revisethe post-1853 thatthe Western unequal treaties powershad forced been accomplished 1890.A rising upon Tokyo.These goals had largely by thenbeganto project poweroutwards. its The fearthattheEuropean Japan to access to Chinaled theJapanese powerswould try denyJapaneconomic its leadership concludethat to mustestablish own sphereofinfluence Japan on the mainland.110 withdefenseled easilyto Japan"foundthata concern for War arguments expansion."'11 Japan'spolicyled to theSino-Japanese of and eventually theRusso-Japanese of 1904-05.Japan'smiliWar 1894-95 to
107. Quotedin MasakazuIwata,Okubo Toshimichi: BismarckModern The of Japan (Berkeley: University California of Press,1964),p. 236. 108. Ibid.,p. 175. 109. Quoted in RogerF. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo theRiseofModern and Japan, 1838-1922 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1971),p. 195. 110. Crowley, "Japan's Military Foreign Policies," 14. p. 111. Beasley, RiseofModern Japan, 140. Beasley'sobservation p. seems entirely correct. Fear begets expansion. And expansion itsownconsequences. John As has LewisGaddiscomments, "theprincipal occupational ruleofbeinga great hazardas a general poweris paranoia... and the exhaustion ultimately it produces.""Towardthe Post-ColdWar World," John in Lewis Gaddis,TheUnited States theEndoftheColdWar: and Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press,1992),p. 215.
tary successesin theseconflicts established as theleadingpowerin Northit eastAsia,and Japan's victory Russia"secured recognition a major over her as "112 worldpower.
HISTORY, UNIPOLARITY AND GREAT POWER EMERGENCE
There a strong is correlation between unipolarity great and poweremergence. Late seventeenth-century Englandand Austria and late nineteenth-century balancedagainst dominant the even Germany pole in thesystem. Moreover, whengreat poweremergence notdriven was primarily theneed to counby terbalance hegemon's the power,theshadowofpreeminence an imporwas tantfactor.113 is illustrated theriseoftheUnitedStatesand Japanto This by It greatpower statusin the late nineteenth century. is, therefore, apparent thata generaltendency existsduring unipolar moments: severalnew great the The enter international powerssimultaneously system. eventsofthelate from nineteenth also illustrate how competition established century great to diminish withchallenges from Britcombined powers rising great powers ain's relativepower and erode its primacy. Duringthe last years of the nineteenth century, Britain, mostpowerful the statein thesystem, was the target others'balancingpolicies. "The storyof Europeaninternational of in relations the 1890sis the story the assaultof Russia and Franceupon of theterritorial in position Britain Asia and Africa, thestory thegreat of and of economic duel betweenEnglandand herall-too-efficient German rival."'114 In the late nineteenth the of century, growth American, German,and to its Japanesenaval power compelledBritain forgo policyof maintaining globalnaval supremacy.115 Indeed,Britain pressedhardby itsrivalson was all fronts. 1900,it was apparentthatLondon could not simultaneously By meetthe Germanchallengeacrossthe NorthSea, defendits imperial and colonial its interests from French Russianpressure, preserve position and and in theWestern hemisphere. Britain withdrew from Western the hemisphere
112. Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942 (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 78. 113. The shadoweffect a consequence anarchy. unbalanced is of The distribution powerin of thehegemon's favor implicitly threatens others' security. is because statesmustreactto This the hegemon'scapabilities In rather thanto its intentions. a unipolar concern with system, is even security a compelling reasonfor eligible states acquire to great powercapabilities, ifthey are notimmediately menaced thehegemon. by 1905(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1988),pp. 135-208.
114. Langer, The Diplomacy Imperialism, 415. of p. 115. See Aaron L. Friedberg,The Weary Titan:Britain and theExperience Relative of Decline,1895-
17:4 j 32 International Security
because London realized it lacked the resourcesto competesuccessfully in Ameragainst UnitedStatesand thatthenavalforces the deployed North The Anglo-Japanese ican waterscould better used elsewhere.116 be alliance naval was driven, from London's standpoint, the need to use Japanese by and Britain's East Asian interests thereby powerto protect allow the Royal Navy units in the Far East to be redeployedto home waters.Like the rapproachment Washington thealliancewithTokyo,the ententes and with withFranceand Russiaalso evidenced Britain's relative declining power.By 1907,Britain's geopolitical position "dependedupon thekindness strangof ers." Over thelongerterm, great the of poweremergence theUnitedStates and Japanpaved theway forBritain's as and thenas eclipse,first hegemon a greatpower. In the 1930s,Japanesepower cost Britain Far Eastern its and America'srelative rose position, powerultimately to a pointwhereit could displaceBritain hegemon.Such was theresult Britain's as of policyof a abstainfrom benignhegemony, policythatdid not merely opposing,but had theeffect facilitating emergence new great the of actually of powers.
in the World.? After ColdWar:America a Unipolar

The historical evidencefrom 1660-1714 and 1860-1914 strongly supports the derivedfrom neorealist hypothesis moments cause geopotheory: unipolar liticalbacklashesthat lead to multipolarity. in Nevertheless, principle, a to the declining hegemondoes have an alternative a policyoftolerating rise of new greatpowers:it can actively to attempt suppresstheiremergence. Thus, if Washington were preparedto contemplate preventive measures it (including use offorce), might able tobeatbackrising the be challengers."17 But,although at prevention mayseem attractive first blush,it is a stop-gap measure.It mayworkonce, but overtimethe effect differential of growth rates ensuresthatother will challengers subsequently appear.Givenitsprobable costs and risks,prevention not a strategy would lend itself is that to repetition.
116. See C.J.Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, Mirage Power, I: British The of Vol. Foreign Policy, 1902-14 and (London:Routledge KeganPaul, 1972),pp. 96-106. 117. Whena hegemon finds primacy its threatened, beststrategy "toeliminate source the is the oftheproblem." Gilpin, War Change, 191. and p.
THE STRATEGY
OF PREPONDERANCE
In any event,theUnitedStateshas chosena somewhat different to strategy maintain primacy. its Essentially UnitedStates trying maintain the is to intact theinternational order constructed World it in WarII's aftermath. Melvyn As Leffler pointsout, after 1945American strategy aimed at achieving "prea ponderance power"in theinternational of system."18 Washington soughtto incorporate Western and Europe,WestGermany, Japanintoan Americanled alliance;create open globaleconomy an that wouldpermit unfettered the movement goods, capitaland technology; of and createan international environment conducive America's to democratic values. Whilecommitted to reviving Western Europe,Germany, Japaneconomically politically, and and an Washington also believedthat"neither integrated Europe nor a united nor mustbe permitted emerge a third as Germany an independent to Japan forceor a neutralbloc.""19 maintain preeminence the non-Soviet in To its world,American strategy used bothbenevolent coercive and incentives. In attempting perpetuate to the UnitedStates is pursuing unipolarity, the essentially same goals,and usingthesame meansto achievethem, that it pursued in its postwarquest forpreponderance.120 The "new NSC 68" argues thatAmerican grand strategy should actively to attempt mold the international environment creating secureworldin whichAmerican a by interests protected. are AmericanallianceswithJapanand Germany are viewedas an integral that partofa strategy seeks:(1) to prevent multipolar rivalries; to discourage riseofglobalhegemons; (2) the and (3) to preserve a and healthy worldeconomy. The forward cooperative of deployment U.S. military forcesabroad is now viewed primarily a means of preserving as If unipolarity. the UnitedStatescontinues extendsecurity to to guarantees it Japanand Germany, is reasoned,theywill have no incentive develop to greatpowercapabilities. Indeed, fearthatJapanand Germany acquire will independent capabilities-that thattheywillbecomegreatpowers-peris,
118. Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance P. A of Power: National Security, Truman the and Administration, the ColdWar(Stanford: Stanford University Press,1992). 119. Ibid.,p. 17. For second-image theorists, America's rejection a preventive strategy of war is unsurprising.has been arguedthat addition notfighting It in to other democracies, declining democratic powersalso do not engagein preventive againstrising war Randall challengers. Schweller, "DomesticStructure Preventive and War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics, 44, No. 2 (January Vol. 1992),pp. 235-269. 120. As I discuss below, it was the bipolarstructure the postwarsystem of thatallowed Washington pursuea strategy preponderance to of and successfully thereby smother rethe emergence Japan of and Germany great as powers.
vades the thinking American of strategists. example,a recentRAND For mustmanage in of study American strategy thePacific saysthat Washington allianceand reduceJapanese relations withTokyoto maintain "thecurrent A of incentives majorrearmament."'12' RAND studyof the future U.S. for withdrawal from couldresult in Europesuggests American that forces Europe in Euin Germany reemerging "a heavyhanded rogueelephant Central as in of rope" because it would driveGermany the "direction militarization, nuclearization, chronically and insecure policies."'122 will of Inevitably, strategy preponderance fail.A strategy moreor less a of benign hegemony does notprevent emergence new great the of powers.The whichfollowed sucha strategy, illustrais fateofnineteenth-century Britain, allowsothers free-ride to and tive.A strategy benignhegemony of militarily thehegemon's is economically. Over time,theeffect to erode preeminence. A hegemontends to overpayforsecurity, whicheventually weakens the internal foundation its external of position.Otherstatesunderpay secufor rity, whichallows themto shift additional resources intoeconomically profacilitates diffusion the ductive investments. Moreover, benignhegemony of rivals.As a consequence,differential wealthand technology potential to in growth ratestrigger shifts relative economic powerthatultimately result in the emergence new greatpowers.No doubt,the strategy preponof of derancecould prolongunipolarity as statescalsomewhat, long as eligible culatethatthe benefits freeriding the of outweigh constraints imposedon themby American Over time,however, sucha policy willaccelhegemony. eratethehegemon's relative decline. will Thereis another reasonwhya strategy preponderance not work. of Such a strategy a international articulates visionof an American-led order. to commitment GeorgeBush's New WorldOrderand BillClinton's apparent assertive democratic humanrights and valuesreflect projection America's of But America's desireto "press its preferred policies"on others.123 thereis more to it than that. Other statescan justifiably infer thatWashington's
121. JamesA. Winnefeld,et al., A New Strategy FewerForces:The Pacific and Dimension, R-4089/ 122. RichardL. Kugler, TheFutureU.S. Military in and Requirements the Presence Europe:Forces for
1-USDP(SantaMonica,Calif.:RAND 1992),p. 111.
Post-Cold Era,R-4194-EUCOMINA War (SantaMonica,Calif.: RAND, 1992),pp. 11, 16. 123. As Waltz points out,other states cannot trust excessively an powerful state behavewith to moderation. United The Statesmaybelieveitis acting thenoblest reasons. for of But,he notes, America's definition peace, justice,and worldorderreflects of American interests may and with conflict theinterests other of states."With the Stateshas behaved, benign intent, United and until poweris brought somesemblance balance, its into of willcontinue behavein ways to that frighten annoyothers." and Waltz,"America a Model?"p. 669. as
unipolaraspirations will resultin the deliberate application American of power to compelthemto adhereto the UnitedStates'policypreferences. For example,in a February 1991addressto the New YorkEconomic Club, Bush said thatbecause the UnitedStateshad takentheleader'srolein the Gulfmilitarily, America'srenewedcredibility and would cause Germany 124 to in Japan be moreforthcomingtheir economic relations with Washington. Severalweekslater, Harvardprofessor S. thatthe Joseph Nye,Jr. suggested deployment UnitedStatesforces Europeand Japancouldbe used as a of in bargaining in trade Sucha "leverage chip negotiations thosecountries.125 with In strategy" no mereabstraction. February is President Dan 1992,then-Vice Quaylelinkedthecontinuance America's of commitment NATO to security withWestEuropeanconcessions theGATTnegotiations.126 in The leveragestrategy thehegemonic is stability theory's darkside. It calls fortheUnitedStatesto use itsmilitary statesto give powerto compelother in on issue areas whereAmerica less power.It is a coercive has that strategy in to attempts take advantageof the asymmetries greatpower capabilities thatfavor UnitedStates.The leveragestrategy not new. Washington the is it employed from timeto timein intra-alliance relations the during Cold War. However, American policiesthatothers foundmerely in irritating a bipolar worldmayseem quitethreatening a unipolar in world.Forexample, Japan almostcertainly must realize thatits lack of power projection capability rendersit potentially vulnerable leveragepoliciesbased on America's to the present ability control flow Persian to of Gulf Proponents America's oil. of have missed a fundamental preponderance point:otherstatesreactto the of threat hegemony, to the hegemon'sidentity. American not leadersmay the regard UnitedStatesas a benevolent but cannotafford hegemon, others to takesuch a relaxedview.
REACTION TO UNIPOLARITY: TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
Thereis ample evidencethatwidespread concern existstodayaboutAmerin In ica's currently dominance international unchallenged politics.127 Sep124. Quoted in NormanKempster, "U.S., AlliesMightHelp Iraq RebuildAfter War,Baker Says,"Los AngelesTimes,February 1991,p. Al. 17, 125. William Eaton,"Democrats J. Groping ImageBuilding For Issues,"Los Angeles Times, March 9, 1991,p. A14. 126. William Tuohy, "QuayleRemarks Spark European Alarm Trade Security," Angeles on vs. Los Times, February 1992,p. A4; CraigR. Whitney, 11, "Quayle,Ending Lobbiesfor European Trip, New TradeAccord," New YorkTimes,February 1992, A4. 12, p. 127. It has been suggested thatthePersianGulfWardemonstrates other that states welcome, rather thanfear, America's post-ColdWarpreeminence. this is However, simply notthecase.
tember 1991,French Foreign Minister RolandDumas warnedthatAmerican "might reigns without and he and EuropeanCommunity balancing weight" Commission President JacquesDelors called forthe EC to counterbalance theUnitedStates.128 Some European have said that Soviet the policy analysts Union's collapse means thatEurope is now threatened mainly unchalby lengedAmerican ascendancy worldpolitics.129 viewpoint echoed in This was in Japanin the GulfWar's aftermath. number commentators A of worried thatthe UnitedStates-a "fearsome" country-would imposea Pax Americana in whichotherstateswouldbe compelled acceptroles"as America's to "130 underlings. China,too,has reacted to adversely America's post-ColdWar preeminence. "Chineseanalysts reacted with alarm President to great George Bush's 'New WorldOrder'proclamations, maintained and thatthiswas a ruseforextending U.S. hegemony throughout globe.FromChina'sperthe spective, unipolarity a far was worsestate affairs bipolarity.'' Similar of than sentiments have been echoedin theThird World.Although reactions the of these smallerstatesare not as significant those of potential as new great that unipolarity has engenderedgeneral unease powers, they confirm throughout international the system.At the September 1992 Nonaligned MovementMeeting,IndonesianPresident Suhartowarned thatthe New WorldOrdercannotbe allowed to become"a new versionof the same old
First, was after PersianGulfcrisis it the beganthatothers beganvoicing their concerns about unipolarity. Second,to theextent theGulf that Waris an example states of bandwagoning with the UnitedStates,it is easilyexplainable. Waltpointsout,weak powersthreatened a As by powerful neighbor often will turn an outside to defensive great powerfor support. Walt, Origins ofAlliances, 266. Third,as JeanEdwardSmithpointsout, the UnitedStateshad to exert p. considerable and Saudi Arabiato getthesenations accepttheBush pressure bothEgypt on to administration's decision confront militarily theinvasion Kuwait.Jean to after of Iraq Edward Smith, George Bush'sWar(New York:HenryHolt and Company, it 1992),pp. 63-95.Finally, shouldbe remembered during war,theArabcoalition that the partners restrained United the Statesfrom overthrowing Saddam Husseinand that, July in and August1992,Egypt, Turkey and Syria the that Bushadministration going restrained United States whenitappeared the was to provokea military showdownover the issue of UN weapons inspectors' access to Iraq's Agricultural Ministry. 128. Quotedin "France U.S.: Don't Rule,"NewYork to Times, September 1991,p. A8. 3, 129. Rone Tempest, "French RevivePastimeFretting AboutU.S. 'Imperialism'," Angeles Los Times, February 1989,p. A9. 15, 130. See theviewsofWasedaUniversity Professor SakujiYoshimura, quotedin Paul Blustein, February 25-March 1991,and of TokyoUniversity 3, Professor YasusukeMurakami and Opposition Diet Member Masao Kunihiro, UrbanC. Lehner, in "Japanese A More'Fearsome' See U.S. Following WallStreet American Successin theGulf," Journal, March14, 1991. 131. David Shambaugh, "China'sSecurity Policy thePost-ColdWarEra,"Survival, 34, in Vol. No. 2 (Summer 1992),p. 92.
"In Japan, Seeing The War On A Five-Inch Screen," Washington Post National Weekly Edition,
The Unipolar Illusion| 37
patterns domination the strong of of over the weak and the richover the UN Secretary GeneralBoutros-Ghali warned poor." At this same meeting, that "the temptation dominate,whetherworldwideor regionally, to remains"; MalaysianPrimeMinister Mahathir Mohammedpointedly stated thata "unipolar worldis every as threatening a bipolarworld."''32 bit as As has been shown,thepost-ColdWarworld'sgeopolitical constellation is notunique.Twicebefore international in history there havebeen "unipolar the of of moments." Bothwere fleeting. bothoccasions, effect the entry On new greatpowersin the international system was to redress one-sided the Thereis everyreasonto distribution power in the international of system. will expect thatthepattern thelate seventeenth nineteenth of and centuries recur. impact differential The of growth rates increased relative has the power ofJapanand Germany a way thatclearly in states. marksthemas eligible As theirstakesin the international system deepen, so will their ambitions and interests. will to considerations cause Japanand Germany emSecurity ulate the UnitedStatesand acquirethe fullspectrum greatpowercapaof thatbothwillseek It bilities, including nuclearweapons.'33 can be expected recognition othersof theirgreatpower status.Evidenceconfirming by the of and Germany's exists. expectation Japan's great poweremergence already in affairs. is to its Germany beginning exert leadership Europeansecurity It has assumed primary responsibility providing for economic assistance to theformer SovietUnionand Eastern Europe,and tookthelead in securing EC recognition thebreakaway of and Slovenia. of Yugoslavrepublics Croatia In a suresign thatthe scope of German interests expanding, is geopolitical Defense Minister VolkerRuhe is advocatingacquisition large military of Austransport aircraft.1'4 Chancellor Kohl's decisionto meetwithoutgoing trian President KurtWaldheim suggests thatGermany rejecting exteris the nal constraints is heretofore imposedon itsbehavior. Germany also insisting that henceforth diplomats(who had previously its spoken in Frenchor
132. Quoted in CharlesB. Wallace,"Nonaligned NationsQuestionNew WorldOrder,"Los Angeles Times, September 1992,p. A4. 2, 133. The nuclear issueis beingdebated, albeit gingerly, Japan notin Germany at least in but (or States inGermany and notopenly). Nevertheless seemstobe widely it understood, theUnited in of See and Japan, their that accession thenuclear to clubis onlya matter time. DoyleMcManus, "Thinking Once Unthinkable: the Japan, Germany With A-Bombs," Angeles Los Times (WashingtonD.C. ed.), June10, 1992,p. A8. Fora discussion a nuclear of Germany's strategic implications,see Mearsheimer, "Backto theFuture." 134. Terrence Roth,"New GermanDefenseChiefIs Redefining Agency'sRole," WallStreet Journal, August14, 1992,p. A10.
International 17:4 | 38 Security
whenaddressing English) use onlyGerman will international conferences.135 in Finally, Germany's open expression interest permanent of membership on theUN Security that is Councilis another indication Berlin moving toward great powerstatus.In making Germany's position known, Foreign Minister KlausKinkel pointedly notedthat Security the Councilshouldbe restructured it becauseas now constituted reflects, thepresent not distribution power, of buttheinternational orderthatexisted theend ofWorld at WarII.136 is to Notwithstanding and historical legal inhibitions, Japan beginning seek An strategic autonomy. important is the decisionto developthe capastep to and inbility gatherand analyze politico-military economic intelligence dependently the UnitedStates.137 of Japanhas also begtinimporting huge amounts plutonium of from Europe.The plutonium to be used byJapan's is breeder fast reactors, thereby enabling Tokyoto free itself dependence of on PersianGulfoil and American uranium. Plutonium imports plus the acquiin sitionof othermaterials recent yearsmean thatJapanhas the capability of movingquicklyto become a nuclearpower.138 After prolongeddebate, unarmed Japanhas finally authorized Japanese military personnel particto in UN peacekeeping Thismaywellbe theopeningwedge ipate operations. forJapanto develop military commensurate withgreatpower capabilities status. a specialpanel oftheLiberal As Democratic Party arguedin February 1992, "Now that havebecomeone ofthevery economic we few powerhouses, it would flyin the faceof the world'scommonsense ifwe did not play a "139 and role the of military for maintenance restoration globalpeace. As Japan becomes moreactive theinternational on stage, military powerwillbe needed to support policiesand ensureitis notat a bargaining in its disadvantage its dealings withothers. Unsurprisingly, has planstobuilda full-spectrum Japan
135. Stephen Kinzer, "ThusSprakeHelmut Kohl AufDeutsch," NewYork Times, February 23, 1992,p. A4. 136. "Germany Seeksa Permanent Council Seat,"LosAngeles Times, September 1992, A9; 24, p. Paul Lewis,"Germany SeeksPermanent Council UN Seat,"NewYork Times, September 1992, 24, p. Al. 137. David E. Sanger, "Tiredof Relying U.S., Japan on Seeks to ExpandIts Own Intelligence Efforts," York New Times, January 1992,p. A6. 1, 138. Jim Mann,"Japan's Energy Future Linked Risky to Cargo," Angeles Los Times, February 23, 1992,p. Al. The initial plutonium shipment forJapanfrom left Cherbourg, France, early in November 1992and arrived Japan early in in 1993.Therehas beenspeculation the that January merefactthatJapanwill possess a substantial plutonium stockpile mayserveas a deterrent evenifTokyodoes notacquirenuclear weapons.See David Sanger, "Japan's AtomFuel Shipment Worrying Is Asians,"NewYork Times, November 1992,p. A3. 9, 139. Quotedin TeresaWatanabe, "Shift Urgedon Sending Los Japan's Troops Abroad," Angeles Times, February 1992,p. A10. 22,
navy (including aircraft carriers) capable of operating independently the of American SeventhFleet.140 January In 1993,Foreign Minister MichioWatanabe openly called forJapanto acquirelong-range and naval powerair projection capabilities. Japanis also showingsignsof diplomatic assertiveness, and itsleadingrolein theUN effort rebuild to Cambodiais viewedby Tokyoas the beginning a moreforceful independent of and foreign policy "141 coursenow thatJapanno longeris constrained "obeyU.S. demands. to Japan's a policiestowardRussia,China,and Irandemonstrategrowing willingnessto follow independent an course,evenifdoingso leads to open frictionwithWashington. is suggestive Japan's It of view oftheevolving internationalsystem thatits recently appointed ambassador theUnitedStates to has spoken of the emergence a "multipolar of worldin whichthe United "142 Statescould no longerplay the kind of dominant role it used to play. ThatJapanis measuring itself a greatpower role is reflected its exin for pressed desire forpermanent of membership the UN Security Council.143
BacktotheFuture: Political The Consequences Structural of Change

Since 1945,the Westhas enjoyeda Long Peace.1,'Duringthe post-World WarII era, American has and leadership been maintained, Germany Japan have been prevented from becoming greatpowers,a cooperative economic orderhas been established, and the spread of democratic values has been
140. Thisinformation provided John by Arquilla basedon hisdiscussions Japanese with defense analysts. also David E. Sanger, See "Japanese Discussan ExpandedPeacekeeping Roleforthe Military," New York Times, January 1993,p. A9. The issue of constitutional 10, reform and elimination the"peace clause"has beenraisedagainrecently; of M. Jacob Schlesinger, "Japan's RulingParty WillSeek a Reviewof 1946Constitution," Street Wall Journal, January 1993, 14, p. A13; David E. Sanger,"Japanese Debate Taboo Topicof Military's Role,"NewYork Times, January 1993,p. A7. 17, 141. Quotedin Teresa Watanabe, "Putting Cambodia Together Again," Angeles Los March Times, 3, 1992,p. HI. 142. Quotedin Sam Jameson, "Japan's New Envoyto U.S. Sees 'CrucialPeriod'Ahead," Los Angeles Times, February 1992,p. A4. 18, 143. Sam Jameson, "Japan Seek U.N. Security to CouncilSeat,"LosAngeles Times, January 29, 1992,p. Al. 144. See John LewisGaddis,'The LongPeace:Elements Stability thePostwar of in International System," International Security, 10, No. 4 (Spring Vol. 1986),pp. 99-142, whereGaddisprobed foran explanation theabsenceofgreat of powerwarduring Cold Warrivalry the between the SovietUnionand theUnitedStates.Gaddishas revisited issue and asked whether the certain factors (nuclear weapons, polarity, hegemonic stability, "triumphant" liberalism, longcycles) and have implications thepossibleprolongation theLongPeace intothepost-Cold for of Warera. the Gaddis,"GreatIllusions, Long Peace, and theFuture theInternational of in System," The United States the and Endofthe ColdWar.
the promoted. The strategy preponderance of seeksto maintain geopolitical American statusquo thatthe Long Peace reflects. strategic plannersand alikebelievetheUnited Statescan successfully this scholars perpetuate status quo. This sanguineoutlookis predicated the beliefthatsecond-image on common militate factors (economic interdependence, democratic institutions) forms greatpower competition of againstthe reappearance traditional of whilepromoting forms international hownew of cooperation.145 Neorealists, in the structure ever, believethat LongPeace was rooted primarily thebipolar factor nucleardeterof of the international the system, although unit-level rencealso playeda role.146 Because theyexpectstructural changeto lead to are changedinternational political outcomes, neorealists not sanguinethat theLong Peace can endurein thecoming ofsystemic era change.Neorealist that will theory leads to theexpectation theworldbeyondunipolarity be one in ofgreat powerrivalry a multipolar setting. DuringtheCold Warera,international politics was profoundly shapedby thebipolarcompetition betweenthe UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion.147 The Sovietthreat their to common causedtheUnited Western security States, Europe,and Japanto form anti-Soviet an coalition. Because of America's in Western did military preeminence a bipolarsystem, Europeand Japan not have to internalize their security costsbecause they benefited from prothe tective mantle Washington's At of containment because policy. thesametime, and werecritical Western to Europe'sand Japan's political economic stability the dilemma" containment's success,theUnitedStatesresolved "hegemon's
145. Forscholarly elaborations thisviewpoint, John of see Mueller, Retreat Doomsday: from The ObsolescenceMajorWar(New York:Basic Books,1989);Richard Rosecrance, Riseofthe The of in Modern World BasicBooks,1986);Robert Trading State: Commerce Conquest the and (New York: Jervis, "The Future WorldPolitics: of WillIt Resemble Past?"International the Security, 16, Vol. No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), 39-73;CarlKaysen,"Is WarObsolete?" pp. International Security, Vol. 14,No. 4 (Spring 1990), 42-64;Charles pp. Kupchan Clifford and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security theFuture Europe," and of International Security, 16,No. 1 (Summer Vol. 1991), 114pp. "A 161;Richard Rosecrance, New Concert Powers,"Foreign of Affairs, 71, No. 2 (Spring Vol. 1992),pp. 64-82;James Goldgeier MichaelMcFaul,"A Tale ofTwo Worlds: M. and Core and in Periphery the Post-ColdWarEra," International Organization, 46, No. 3 (Spring Vol. 1992), and similar The Defense documents stress also that spread the pp. 467-491. Planning Guidance and of democracy economic are to interdependence crucial thesuccessof thestrategy preof ponderance. The classicdiscussion the secondand third of is imagesof international politics Kenneth Waltz, N. Man,the State, War(New York: and Columbia University Press,1958). 146. Thisargument presented theEuropean is in context Mearsheimer, in "BacktotheFuture." 147. For a different view, see Ted Hopf,"Polarity, Offense-Defense the Balance,and War," American Political Science Review, 81, No. 3 (June1991),pp. 475-494.Hopfarguesthatthe Vol. international system's stability during Cold Warera was attributable nuclear the to deterrence and that bipolarity an irrelevant was factor.
by forgoing maximization its relative of gainsand pursuing insteada policy of promoting of coalition.148 absolutegains forall members the anti-Soviet For strategic reasons,the UnitedStatesencouraged Western Europe's ecotrade nomicintegration Japan'sdiscriminatory and foreign and investment policies,even thoughthe inevitable consequenceof these policieswas to enhanceWestern Europe'sand Japan's relative powerat America's expense. Bipolarity the decisivevariablein the West'sLong Peace because it was removedthe security dilemmaand the relativegains problemfromthe imagenda of relations among the Western powers. Even non-neorealists in plicitly acknowledge salienceofstructural the factors securing postwar the "liberal peace." MichaelDoyle, forexample,admitsthatAmerican military leadership was crucialbecause it dampenedthe need forWestern Europe and Japanto become strategically the independent (whichwould rekindle the security dilemma)and reinforced bonds of economicinterdependence (thereby alleviating relative the gains problem).Doyle says the erosionof and the American preeminence could imperil liberal peace "ifindependent substantial forces wereestablished" Western military by EuropeandJapan.149 In other words,ifliberated from bipolarstructural the constraints with that, their states likeGerWashington's help, smothered great poweremergence, manyand Japan might respondto new international systemic constraints by and becoming-andacting like-great powers.Here, Doyle is correct thatis precisely point:structure the affects outcomes.
AMERICA IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Cold Warstructure been sweptaway.American must has policymakers now think from whollynew analytical a frameabout international politics in work.This will not be easy. Richard Rosecrance observed 1976,when it was alreadyapparentthatthebipolarsystem to was beginning erode,that
148. Arthur Stein,"The Hegemon'sDilemma:GreatBritain, UnitedStates,and the A. the International Economic Order," International Organization, 38,No. 2 (Spring Vol. 1984), 355pp. 386.Steindelineates hegemon's the dilemma follows: as A hegemonic to itself also a decision enrich is to others morethan power'sdecision enrich itself. Over time, such policieswillcomeat theexpenseof thehegemon's relative standing . and willbring to forth challengers. choosing sustain relative Yet its standing . . is a choice to keepothers impoverished thecostofincreasing ownwealth. at its its Maintaining relative to position obvious has costsnotonly others toitself. but Alternatively, maximizing absolute its wealth obviousbenefits brings has but evengreater ones to others. 149. MichaelDoyle,"Kant,Liberal Legaciesand Foreign Affairs," 1, Philosophy Public Part and Affairs, 12,No. 3 (Summer Vol. 1983),p. 233.
Stein, WhyNationsCooperate, 139. p.
International Security | 42 17:4
in Washington has, since 1945,always had difficulty understanding how thanthe United Western Europe and Japancould have different interests States.150 More recently, StephenKrasnerhas observedthat"U.S. policymakers have paid little attention thepossibility a loss ofpowervis-dto that visfriends could present seriousand unforeseen either difficulties, because friends becomeenemiesor because managing international can the system in may be more difficult a worldin whichpower is more evenlydistributed."'151 The impending structural shift fromunipolarity multipolarity to means thatthe security dilemmaand the relative will again gainsproblem dominate and policymakers' concerns. Japan Germany As becomegreat powers,the qualityof their relations withthe UnitedStateswillbe profoundly altered.152 Relations becomesignificantly competitive, will more great power and even war will be likely, and cooperation rivalries will corresecurity becomemoredifficult. spondingly The implications multipolarity be especially will evident the United in of his of States-Japan relationship.153 Summarizing incisive analysis thepre-1914 Paul Kennedystatesthatthe "mostprofound Anglo-German antagonism, mercial competition betweenBritish German and but firms, rather thateconomicshifts had radically the transformed relative power relationship betweenBritain Germany. and asks iftherelative Kennedy powerrelationship of two greatpowers has ever changedso remarkably withthe span of a The singlelifetime. answermaynow be "yes." Thereis a verygood chancethatearlyin the nextdecade Japan'sGNP Suchan economic mayequal or surpassAmerica's.155 changewouldbe a fact
150. Richard Rosecrance, "Introduction," Rosecrance, in as ed., America an Ordinary Country (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1976),p. 12. 151. StephenKrasner, "Trade Conflicts and the CommonDefense:The UnitedStatesand Japan," Political Vol. Science Quarterly, 101,No. 5 (1986),pp. 787-806. 152. Others have arguedthatAmerica's withJapan and Germany becomemore relations will competitive the post-ColdWar era. A notableexampleis Jeffrey Garten, ColdPeace: in E. A
America, Japan,Germany theStruggle Supremacy and for (New York: Times Books, 1992). Garten's
cause, surely,was economic."154By this, Kennedy does not mean the com-
argument differs from minein twocritical Garten the respects. First, pinpoints locusofrivalry in second-image factors; specifically different the cultural, political, economic and traditions of thethree countries. Second,he discounts possibility waror ofsecurity the of and competitions arguesthattherivalry be primarily will economic. 153. An interesting flawed albeit attempt consider geopolitical to the of consequences thealtered relative powerrelationship Japanand the UnitedStatesis GeorgeFriedman Meredith of and Lebard,TheComing With War St. Japan (New York: Martin's Press,1991). 155. Thisis C. FredBergsten's projection based on thefollowing assumptions: Japan's annual
154. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, 464. p.
ofenormous geopolitical significance. Shouldthisrelative powershift occur, in no doubtJapanwould demandthatpowerand prestige theinternational be its system redistributed reflect new status.Besides demandsforUN to Security Councilmembership, Tokyomight: insist thedecisive (1) on votein international economicinstitutions; demand thatthe yen become the (2) international economy's primary reserve currency; exploit (3) advantageous intechnological, economic, and fiscalasymmetries advanceits strategic to terests; (4) becomea muchmoreassertive and actorgeopolitically. a Whether the United States could comfortably accommodate Japanof equal or greater poweris an open question.The answerwould depend on the moderation, and the moderatetone, of Japan'sdesiderata on the and willingness the UnitedStatesto makereasonable of concessions gracefully. But even skillful and patientdiplomacy both sides could failto avert on In conflict. thatcase, the questionis not so muchwho as what would be I responsible conflict for betweentheUnitedStatesand Japan: arguethatit it and would be theinternational structure theconstraints political system's on exerts greatpowerbehavior. Great Again, history may provideinsight.At the turnof the century, Britain able to reachan accommodation withtheUnitedStatesbecause was America's ambitions not immediately did seem to threaten London's most vitalsecurity concerns.156 the otherhand, Germany's On rising power did It thatthe changing relative appear to presentsuch a threat. is worrisome the betweenthe UnitedStatesand Japancontains same powerrelationship Hertz/Avis thatfueledthe Anglo-German Thus once dynamic antagonism. again,theprospect hegemonic of war,thought have been banishedfrom to witheven as we hope to avoid it. international politics, mustbe reckoned Indeed,it mustbe reckoned withespecially we hope to avoid it. The main if war theory that: is pointofthehegemonic thereis incompatibility betweencrucialelementsof the existing international systemand the changingdistribution power among the states of distribution power is of of superstructure the systemand the underlying
.
within the system. .
. The resolution of the disequilibriumbetween the
growth about4 percent, UnitedStates'is 2 to 22percent, theyenappreciates 100 is the and to to 1 against dollar. the Bergsten, "Primacy Economics," of Foreign Policy, 87 (Summer No. 1992), p. 6. 156. See CharlesS. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Baltimore: Johns The and United Hopkins University Press,1957);Dexter Perkins, Great The Rapproachment: England the 1895-1914 States, (New York: Atheneum, 1968).
International Security | 44 17:4
foundin the outbreakand intensification what becomes a hegemonic of 157 war. Greatpowerwar is nota certainty, because somefactors couldreducethe war-proneness the comingmultipolar of At system. the unitlevel,nuclear deterrence couldmaintain peace amongthegreat the powersin a multipolar system whereeach has nuclearweapons.158In such a system, greatpower conflict mightbe played out in the economic,ratherthan the military, arena.159 Still,the shadow of war willloom overa multipolar system. Consequently, UnitedStateswill have to rethink answerit gave in the the the late 1940sto "the hegemon'sdilemma."Put another way,Washington will have to come to gripswiththe declining hegemon'sdilemma.Precisely because majorshifts relative in economic powerpresagechangein therelative distribution powergeopolitically, UnitedStatesmustbeginto concern of the itself withmaintaining relative its powerrather thanpursuing absolute gains foritself and those who are its partners todaybut may become its rivals tomorrow. Although statescan cooperate readily promote to absolutegains
158. Kenneth Waltz, N. "Nuclear and Myths Political Realities," American Political Science Review, Vol. 81,No. 3 (September 1991), 731-746; Spread Nuclear pp. The of Weapons: MayBe Better, More AdelphiPaperNo. 171(London:International Institute Strategic for Studies, 1981).Fora more pessimistic view of thepossibleconsequences thespreadofnuclear of R. weapons,see Barry Press,1991). 159. Ifdeterrence holdsamongthegreat powersin a multipolar the world, prevailing conventional wisdom that is economic competitions wouldreplace security competitions theprimary as means of greatpowerrivalry. Underthe shadow of war,tradewars thatimprove state's a relative position inflicting pain on a rivalcouldbecomea rational by more strategy. Statesin a position do so couldalso use their to financial overaccessto keytechnologies poweror control to advancetheir interests relative rivals.For a suggestive to cut first at the possiblerole of "economic in statecraft" great in powerrelations theemerging multipolar see system, AaronL. Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship BetweenEconomics and NationalSecurity," Political Science Quarterly, 106,No. 2 (1991),pp. 272-274. Vol. One shouldbe careful aboutassuming thateconomics entirely will displacemilitary power. Deterrence rests military on strength. it Moreover, couldbe expected thatarmsracesand tests of resolvewould be employed the greatpowersas substitutes actualfighting. great by for A powernuclear could have twoother stalemate effects. as theCold War important Just military superpowers in Korea,Vietnam, did Angolaand Afghanistan, great the powersin a multipolar system couldwage war through proxies. Also, deterrence thenuclear at levelcould,notwithstanding riskof escalation, the cause the greatpowersto fight attempt fight) (or to limited conventional wars. Here, it maybe usefulto revisit earlyCold Warliterature limited the on war.See Henry Nuclear Kissinger, Weapons Foreign and Policy (NewYork: Harper Row,1957); and Robert Osgood,Limited (Chicago:University ChicagoPress,1957). E. War of
Posen, Inadvertent Escalation:Conventional War and NuclearWeapons(Ithaca: Cornell University
MajorWars, 25-26. of pp.
157. Robert Gilpin, "TheTheory Hegemonic of in War," Rotberg Rabb,Origin Prevention and and
for whentheshadowofwaris absentfrom all their the to relations, barriers cooperation becomeformidable whentheshadowofwar is present.160
STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
Because multipolarityinevitable, is pointless debatethe comparative is it to merits unipolar, of bipolar, and multipolar systems. Rather thanvainlyand a the counterproductively pursuing strategy preponderance, United of States needs to design a strategy thatwill (1) safeguard interests its duringthe difficult transition unipolarity multipolarity; (2) enabletheUnited from to and Statesto do as well as possiblein a multipolar world.America'soptimal is strategy to makeitspowerposition similar Goldilocks' to porridge: too not whichwouldfrighten strong, others intobalancing the against United States; nottoo weak,whichwould invite others exploit to American vulnerabilities; but just right-strong enough to defendAmerican interests, without provoking others. The transition from unipolarity multipolarity challenge United to will the Statesto devisea policythatwillarrest relative declinewhileminimizing its the chancesthatotherstateswill be provokedinto balancingagainstthe UnitedStates. Relativedeclinehas internal and external causes. Relative declinecan be addressedby policiesthatfocuson either both of these or causes. It would be counterproductive the UnitedStatesto attempt for to maintain relative its to the powerposition attempting suppress emergence by ofnew greatpowers.Thisapproachwould heighten others' concerns about the maligneffects uncheckedAmerican of would power,whichprobably accelerate rise of new greatpowers,and increasethe probability the that balancing behaviorwould be directed againstthe UnitedStates.American need to remember otherstatesbalanceagainsthegemons that policymakers
160. Robert Powell,"The Problem Absolute of and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, 81,No. 4 (December Vol. 1991), 1303-1320. pp. Joanne Gowa pointsout thatfreetradeis morelikely prevail bipolar in to international systems than in multipolar ones. Becausetheriskofexitfrom bipolar a alliance less thanfrom alfiance is an in a multipolar system, are bipolar alignments morestable.Consequently, alliances bipolar are better able to internalize security the externalities free of trade(themembers notneed tobe do concerned with relative gainsbecausetoday's is unlikely be tomorrow's ally to rival). Moreover, in a bipolar alliance, dominant the partner incentives act altruistically has to towards allies its because it benefits when theydo. All of theseincentives reversed multipolar in are systems whereexitrisks(i.e., defection allies)and buckpassing/free tendencies of rider force statesto hardaboutthewisdomof acting ponderthe relative gainsproblem and to think unselfishly. Freetrade in thusis problematic a multipolar system. Gowa,"Bipolarity, and Multipolarity Free
Trade," American PoliticalScienceReview, Vol. 79, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 1245-1266.
17:4 j 46 International Security
and they should not want the United States to be seen by othersas a and toes." A policythatconcentrates "sprawling giantwithgoutyfingers declinewould be the causes ofrelative U.S. energies redressing internal on than a strategy preponderance. of perceived othersas less threatening by renewalmight cause frictions withothersover Although vigorousinternal geopolitical repercussions economic policy, is less likely have negative it to thana policythataims at perpetuating unipolarity. thatwhile the UnitedStatesmay Washington also needs to remember The willhave different perceptions. regard hegemony benign,others its as reembeddedin a strategy preponderance of international orderobjectives The more the United inforce others'mistrust American of preeminence. and the Statesattempts pressitspreferences valueson others, morelikely to view,overweening American itis that they willreactagainst whatis, in their todaycould power.Moreover, policiesthatarouse others'fearof America It carry overintotheemerging multipolar system. makesno senseto alienate usefulto the needlesslystates(such as China) thatcould be strategically the world.To avoid frightening others, United UnitedStatesin a multipolar and moderate bothitsrhetoric Statesshouldeschewa value-projection policy and itsambitions.161 emergence new great of The UnitedStatesmustadjust to the inevitable American role of forward-deployed forces now is to powers.The primary from becoming greatpowers.Thereare three dissuadeJapanand Germany in forward Asia reasonswhyAmerican deployments Europeand Northeast could deployment should be phased out soon. First,a policyof forward where the unnecessarily entanglethe United States in overseas conflicts thantoitself. are to stakes moreimportant others Second,becausetheUnited the and economic costsof Statesfacesseverefiscal constraints, opportunity such a strategy high. Third,such a policycannotwork. Indeed, the are is of strategy preponderance probablythe worstoption available to the UnitedStatesbecause it is not coercive enoughto prevent Japanand Gerenoughto antagonize manyfrom becoming greatpowers,but it is coercive themand cause themto balance againstthe UnitedStates.If the analysis a in is to Gerpresented thisarticle correct, policyof attempting smother would be unavailing because many'sand Japan'sgreatpower emergence
161. For a discussionof value projection a grandstrategic as optionsee Terry Deibel, L. "Strategies Before Containment: Patterns theFuture," for International Security, 16, No. 4 Vol. (Spring 1992),pp. 79-108.
j TheUnipolar Illusion 47
structural pressures will impelthemto becomegreatpowersregardless of what the UnitedStatesdoes or does not do. Simplystated,the declining hegemon'sdilemmais acute: neither benignnor preventive strategies will prevent emergence challengers the consequent the of and end of thehegemon'spredominance theinternational in system. American grandstrategy mustbe redesigned a multipolar for world.In a multipolar system,the United States should followa policyof strategic independence assuming posture an offshore by the of balancer.162 Traditionally,America'soverriding strategic objective been to ensurethata hehas gemondoes notdominate Thatobjective wouldnotchangeunder Eurasia.163 strategic but the means of attaining would. Ratherthan it independence, assuming primary responsibility containing riseof a potential for the hegemon,theUnitedStateswould relyon globaland regional powerbalancesto attain that goal. Strategic independence notan isolationist is that rules policy outtheuse ofAmerican powerabroad.l54 Strategic independence differs also from selective-commitment the variant offshore of balancing articulated by Van Evera,whereby United the Mearsheimer Stephen and States would John be relatively indifferent ThirdWorldeventsbut would remain to militarily "165 engagedin Europe and Northeast Asia in orderto preserve"stability. Strategic independence a hedgingstrategy would commit United is that the Statesmilitarily butonlyif,other if, states failed balanceeffectively to against a rising Eurasianhegemon.The UnitedStateswouldneed to remain alert to
162. I first used the term"strategic independence" 1983 and I elaborated it in 1989. in on Christopher Layne,"Ending Alliance," the JournalContemporary Vol.6, No. 3 (Summer of Studies, 1983),pp. 5-31; and Layne,"Realism Redux:Strategic Independence a Multipolar in World," SAIS Review, 9, No. 2 (Summer-Fall Vol. 1989),pp. 19-44.Ted GalenCarpenter, has also who embraced form strategic a of independence, acknowledged I was thefirst articulate has that to theconcept to so nameit.Ted GalenCarpenter, and "Introduction,"Carpenter, Collective in ed., Institute, 1989),p. xx,n. 7. The mostrecent explication his viewson strategic of independence
is Carpenter,A Search Enemies: for America's Alliances the After Cold War(Washington,D.C.: Cato Defenseof Strategic Independence: Alternative Strategies the Future (Washington, D.C.: Cato for
Institute, 1992). 163. See John LewisGaddis,StrategiesContainment York: Oxford of (New University Press, 1982), chap. 2; GeorgeF. Kennan,Realities American Princeton of Foreign Policy (Princeton: University Press,1954),pp. 63-65; Hans Morgenthau, Defense theNational In of Interest (Lanham,Md.: University ofAmerica, Press 1982, of America's reprint 1951edition), 5-7; Nicholas pp. Spykman, 1942),part1. 164. For the isolationist approachto post-ColdWar American see grandstrategy, Earl C. Ravenal, "The Case ForAdjustment," Foreign Policy, 81 (Winter No. 1990/91), 3-19. pp. 165. Mearsheimer, "Backto theFuture"; Van Evera,"WhyEuropeMatters, Stephen Whythe Third World Doesn't:American the GrandStrategy After Cold War," Journal Strategic of Studies, Vol. 13,No. 2 (June1990),pp. 1-51.
Strategy World in Politics:The UnitedStatesand theBalanceofPower(New York: Harcourt,Brace,
International Security 17:4 j 48
theeventsthatwould require moreengagedpolicy:(1) theappearanceof a and a "careful" external balchallenger able to cloakits ambitions ward off of relative ancing against (2) a dramatic it; narrowing America's powermargin of overJapan; (3) theinability other or states actas effective to counterweights due to internal difficulties.166 Strategic independence aims to capitalize America's on inherent geopoliticaladvantages.167 First, a relative in sense,theUnitedStatesis probably the most secure greatpower in history of because of the interlocking effects geography, nuclearweapons, and capabilities diminished which,although relatively, stillformidable absoluteterms.Such "strategic are in security enablesthe balancerto stayoutsidethe central balanceuntilthe moment "168 whenitsintervention be decisive. America's can meansthatit insularity can benefit in from strategically geography another way, as well. Because Americais distantfromthe likelytheaters greatpower conflict, a of in to to multipolar worldothersare unlikely view it as a threat their security. Indeed distancewould enhanceAmerica'sattractiveness an ally. (In a as unipolarworld the UnitedStatesloses thisadvantagebecause hegemons rather repelothers thanattracting them).Finally, because ofits stillconsiderablegreat in powercapabilities, a multipolar worldAmerica's intervention would decisively the scales againstan aspiring tip hegemon.
166. Fora discussion the"careful" of challenger, John see Arquilla, "Balances Without Balancing," paper presented the annual meeting the American at of Political ScienceAssociation, Chicago, Illinois, September 1992. 167. It is notneorealist heresy suggest to that United the Statescan playan offshore balancer's in role.I do notclaim that there a functionally is differentiated for balancer theinternational role a like system. Rather, Waltz,I am saying thatunder'narrowly defined historically and unlikely conditions," certain statescan play thisrolebecause of their unit-level attributes (especially geography and capabilities). The UnitedStatestoday meetsWaltz's criteria: American (1) the strength added to a weakercoalition would redress balance;(2) America (or oughtto has have) no positiveends-its goal is the negative one of thwarting aspiring an hegemon;(3) America's powerfor foreseeable the future be at leasttheequal ofanyother will state's.Waltz, Theory International of Politics, 163-164.It should also be notedthatbalancers pp. oftenare attractive that alliesprecisely because theydo nothave ambitions threaten others. George As Liska notes,Britain its in Europewhenever was readyto she benefited from "/attractiveness meetan actualor potential hegemonical threat" from had Europe.To win allies,"Britain only to abstainfrom direct acquisitions the continent on and, when called,limit her voluntarily
wartimegains overseas." George Liska, TheQuestforEquilibrium: America theBalanceofPower and
on Landand Sea (Baltimore: John The HopkinsUniversity Press,1977),p. 13. For additional discussion the criteria of thata stateshould meet to be an effective balancer, Michael see in Sheehan, "ThePlaceoftheBalancer BalanceofPowerTheory," Review International of Studies, Vol. 15,No. 2 (April 1989),pp. 123-133. 168. Sheehan,"The Place oftheBalancer," 128. p.
j TheUnipolar Illusion 49
An insulargreatpower in a multipolar system enjoysa widerrangeof strategic optionsthanless fortunately placed states.169 would certainly This be truefortheUnitedStates.Because ofitsrelative immunity from external in threat, a multipolar worldthe UnitedStatescould standby and could rationally adoptbuck-passing strategies force that others "go first."170 to The emerging greatpowersare locatedin regions whereother potentially powerful actors present are (Ukraine, Russia,China,and Korea,whichprobably will be reunified the nextdecade) and wherethe potential intense in for The emerging security competitions exists. also great powers(and theseother actors)are likely be keptin checkby their to own rivalries. Thereare three reasonswhythissituation couldbe beneficial theUnitedStates.First, to the factthatthe emerging greatpowersare involvedin regional will rivalries have the effect enhancing of America'srelative power.171 Second, Japan, America's mostlikely future geopolitical rival,couldbe contained others by without UnitedStateshavingto riskdirect the confrontation. Third,if the emerging great powersare compelled internalize to their security costs,they no longer willbe free concentrate to on that primarily trading-state strategies givethem advantage their an in with economic competition theUnited States. Strategic independence responsive the constraints theimpending is to of structural changesin the international thatwould system.It is a strategy serve in America's It interests theemerging multipolar system. is, admittedly, a competitive But is strategy. sucha strategy neededin a worldwheregreat withbothsecurity economic and will powerrivalries, dimensions, be a fact ofinternational At thesame time, life. is strategic independence a restrained
169. Liska,Quest Equilibrium,12. for p. 170. Fora discussion the"buck-passing" of phenomenon ThomasJ.Christensen Jack see and Snyder, "ChainGangsand Passed Bucks:Predicting Alliance Patterns Multipolarity," in International Organization, 44, No. 2 (Spring1990),pp. 137-168; Vol. Waltz,Theory International of Politics, 165.John p. defines Arquilla "bystanding" a state'spropensity avoid conflicts, as to if itcan do so, forself-preservation reasons.Arquilla, "Balances Without Balancing." 171. An offshore balancer benefit can from others' rivalries: themid-1890s, by America's navy was powerful, thoughstillsmaller thanBritain's thoseof Europe'slending and powers.But "suchequality was notnecessary. growing The of instability theEuropean political equilibrium seriously tied the hands of the GreatPowersof thatContinent, rendered and progressively improbable determined any aggression from thatquarter againstthe interests the United of in States thenorthern oftheWestern in part Hemisphere. European instability,short, enhanced the relative power and security the UnitedStates."Harold and Margaret of Sprout,Riseof American NavalPower, 222 (emphasis original). p. in Similarly, during nineteenth the century, Britain was able to enjoya relatively highdegreeof security whilespending proportionately less on defense thantheEuropeanpowers,precisely becausetheEuropeanstates werepreoccupiedwithsecurity competitions amongthemselves.
International 17:4 j 50 Security
and prudent policy that would(1) avoidprovocative that actions wouldcause others regard UnitedStatesas an overpowerful to the hegemon; minimize (2) the risksof open confrontation the emerging with greatpowers; and (3) attempt enhanceAmerica's to relative powerindirectly mathrough skillful nipulation thedynamics multipolarity. of of Strategic independence also a morerealistic is policythanthe strategy of preponderance, whichis based on preserving statusquo and on mainthe taining stability. "Stability" defined a worldwheretheUnitedStatesis is as are unchallenged rivalsand its interests undisturbed international by by The unheaval.172 strategy preponderance of political aimsat attaining cona ditionthat approximates absolute security the United States. In this for it respect, is another form American of It exceptionalism. is a transcendant that less strategy seeks nothing thantheend ofinternational politics. Howunwanted unanticipated and in ever, events happenall thetime international in politics; thisrespect, is "instability" normal.War,the security dilemma, theriseand fallof greatpowers,theformation dissolution alliances, and of
172. For a devastating critique America'sstability of obsession,see Benjamin Schwarz, C. "Rights and Foreign Policy:Morality No Mantra," is NewYork Times, November 1992,p. 20, A19. The focuson instability meansthatthestrategy preponderance of leads inexorably the to open-ended proliferationAmerican of commitments, ofwhich seenas "interdependent." all are The UnitedStatesmust,underthisstrategy, worry aboutboththeriseof new greatpowers and turmoil strategically in it peripheral areas. The latter, is feared, could set off cascading a series effects wouldspilloverand affect of that American interests. important There particular is thatAmerican concern economic interests As couldbe harmed instability. Bush'sSecretary by ofDefenseDick Cheneysaid: "We are a trading and our prosperity linkedto peace is nation, and stability theworld.... Simply in the market we'repartofcannot that stated, worldwide thrive whereregional violence, instability, aggression it at peril."Dick Cheney, and put "The Military Need in the Future," We VitalSpeeches theDay,Vol. 59, No. 1 (October 1992), of 15, p. 13. Fora similar argument Van Evera,"WhyEuropeMatters," 10-11. see pp. Thisline of thinking an ironic is twist theinterdependence/trading concept, on state which holds thatterritorial conquestdoes not pay because the mosteffective means of increasing national poweris through trade, that and waris toocostly be a viableoption economically to for powerful states.Rather thanbeinga stimulus peace, underthestrategy preponderance for of economic means thatthe UnitedStatesmustmaintain forward a interdependence military and presence be prepared wage war,in order ensure that is notcutoff it to to from markets the with it which has becomeeconomically interconnected. twoflaws thestability-oriented of Here, strategy preponderance of there a failure consider is whether benefits becomeclear. First, to the ofmaintaining the to stability abroad outweigh costsofattempting do so. Admittedly, instability conceivably could harmthe UnitedStates.The issue, however, whether harmwould is this exceedthecertain costsofmaintaining American forward-deployed and thepossible forces costs ifcommitment toinvolvement a conflict. in leads is Second,there no consideration alternative of For strategies. example, relying its largedomestic by on market if (whichwillgetbigger the North American FreeTradeAgreement intoeffect) diversifying overseas goes and its markets, the UnitedStatescould minimize economicdisruption the thatcould accompany possible in geopolitical disturbances Europeand EastAsia.
Illusion 51 TheUnipolar j
The and greatpowerrivalries enduring features international are of politics. and goal ofa unipolar worldin whichtheUnitedStatesis unthreatened able to shape the international environment alluring it is a chimera. is but No statecan achieveabsolutesecurity because no state,not even the United States,can rise above the international politicalsystem'sstructural constraints.
THE COMING TEST
The coming yearswillbe ones of turmoil international in politics. Systemic change occasionedby the rise and fall of greatpowers has always been traumatic. doubt neorealism's No critics will continue pointto secondto imagefactors reasonsto takean optimistic as view ofthefuture. doubt, No too, the debatebetweenneorealists and their critics continue. this will But one is notfated dragon inconclusively. coming In the to years, international views of intersystem will providea definitive fieldtestof the contending national politics offered neorealists their by and critics. Fifty yearsfrom now, and probably and we muchsooner, willknowwhowas right whowas wrong. will their Structural realists be confident events vindicate can that predictions: (1) Because of structural factors, American an strategy preponderance of or an attempt perpetuate will to unipolarity doomedto failure; unipolarity is (2) stimulate emergence eligible the as will of states great powers;(3) unipolarity cause otherstatesto balance againstthe UnitedStates;(4) in a multipolar will nottraditional of system, patterns greatpower competition reemerge and the of withstanding effect second-image factors; (5) ifdifferential growth rateeffects the allow Japanto challenge America's leadingposition, United will and States-Japan relationship becomehighly competitive thepossibility ofhegemonic willbe present. war

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The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise Author(s): Christopher Layne Source: International Security,

Layne The UnipolarIllusion Christopher

International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993)

? 1993bythePresident FellowsofHarvard and of Collegeand theMassachusetts Institute Technology.

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Great Rise-The RoleofSystemic Why Powers Constraints

14. Ibid.,pp. 163-170.

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to Response Unipolarity: 1660-1714

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Response Unipolarity: to 1860-1910

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EMBRYONIC SUPERPOWER: AMERICA S RISE TO WORLD POWER

85. Ibid.,pp. 201-202.

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International 17:4 | 28 Security

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in the World.? After ColdWar:America a Unipolar

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1-USDP(SantaMonica,Calif.:RAND 1992),p. 111.

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The Unipolar Illusion| 37

International 17:4 | 38 Security

BacktotheFuture: Political The Consequences Structural of Change

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within the system. .

. The resolution of the disequilibriumbetween the

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MajorWars, 25-26. of pp.

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International 17:4 j 50 Security

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