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Hegel's Eschatological Vision: Does History Have a Future? Author(s): Daniel Berthold-Bond Source: History and Theory, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 14-29 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504959 . Accessed: 31/01/2011 02:47
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HEGEL'S ESCHATOLOGICAL VISION: DOES HISTORY HAVE A FUTURE?

DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND ... Behold, I will make thee know what shall be in the last end .. .: for at the time appointedthe end shall be. (Danielviii.19) A central motif of Hegel's philosophy is his effort to trace out a teleological development of human thought and culture, from its initially embryonic, undeveloped stages to ever more evolved and mature forms. And he conceives of this process of development as the Bildung of rationality in history: "history is the process of mind [Geist] itself, the [progressive] revelation of itself from its first .. . enshrouded consciousness ... in order that the absolute command of mind, 'know thyself,' may be fulfilled"1(HPh, III, 7). In this article I will address the question of what this "fulfillment" means for Hegel. I will argue that there is a strongly entrenched ambiguity and ambivalence in Hegel's philosophy between two opposed ways of describing the End, or "completion" of history: what I will refer to as the "absolutist" and the "epochal" readings.2And I will suggest that contrary to the usual way of reading Hegel, we should adopt the non-absolutist, epochal version of Hegel's eschatology if we are to preserve the spirit of his metaphysics. I wish to make it clear from the start that my argument is not that this epochal reading is clearly what Hegel himself intended, so that the great majority of commentators who insist on the absolutist alternative simply misread Hegel. Indeed, the import of my argument will be to suggest that neither the absolutist nor the epochal readings can be interpreted away: I am convinced that a faithful reading of Hegel must result in a confirmation of his deep-seated ambivalence in this matter. I will argue, on the other hand, that we should choose for Hegel, where he was unwilling to, the reading which emphasizes the nonabsolutist pole of the ambivalence as against the absolutist pole.
I. THE AMBIGUITY

Hegel's theory of knowledge, and with it his philosophy of history, are governed throughout by an eschatological vision. For the teleological principle which he
in and to 1. All references Hegel'sworkswill be abbreviated givenparenthetically the text, folwhereappro(or and applicable) pagenumber sectionnumber lowedby the volumenumber(where 3 on Lectures theHistoryof Philosophy, vols,transl. to refers Hegel's "?"). "HPh" priate,designated E. S. Haldaneand F. H. Simson(New York,1974). one 2. Actually,in the courseof my analysisI will indicatea thirdalternative, whichseeks to (see and the synthesize absolutist epochalinterpretations pages 19f,and fn 34 below).I willsuggest, that such a syntheticreadingis finallyimplausible. however,

HEGEL'S ESCHATOLOGICAL VISION

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regards as essential to a true appraisal of the essence of thought makes a consideration of the End indispensable to his anatomy of human knowledge and history. It is precisely the absence of the notion of a consummation of the End that Hegel takes as one of the fundamental failures of the philosophy of the German Aufklarung. In speaking of Fichte, for example, Hegel writes that "Fichte's theory of knowledge regards the struggle of the ego with the object [or of human consciousness and its world] as that of a continuous, [unending] process" (HPh, III, 501), a process which is "a constant progression . . . which never reaches any end" (HPh, III, 492). It is the aim of Hegel's absolute idealist system to show how human knowledge can "wrest itself out of this progress to infinity, and free itself absolutely from limitation"3 (PhM, ?386 Zusatz), by "resolving the infinite progress into the End"4(SL, ?242). Hegel's conviction that truth must be more than an "approximation," more than something relative to finite and subjective consciousness, leads him to posit a "finalconcord" (SL, ?24 Zusatz) of consciousness with the totality of its objects, a "consummation of the infinite End" of knowledge and of the world (SL, ?212 Zusatz). This is in keeping with the systematic aim of Hegel's method, which involves the idea that nothing short of the whole, or totality, of the determinationsof thought can constitute truth. Philosophic knowledge consists in "comprehendingnothing less than the entire system of consciousness, or the entire realm of the truth of spirit"5(PhS, 56). Hegel thus speaks of a "self-closure"of his system, a "sich selbst zusammenschlieflend" of knowledge or spirit (SL, ?242; cf. PhS, 483; PhM, ?379 Zusatz) where "spirit [has reached] ... the completionof its work" (PhS, 486), and "concluded movethe ment in which it has shaped itself" (PhS, 490). In this same vein, Hegel is led to speak of the "absolute End of history"6(PhH, 103), where spirit has fulfilled its eschatological design, the realization of its freedom and the attainment of its complete knowledge of itself. There is no room for dispute that Hegel speaks of the "End of history" and the "conclusion" of the development of spirit in Absolute Knowledge. What is open to dispute is what Hegel means by this. What does Hegel mean when he speaks of "the End," "the completion," "the conclusion," "the consummation," "the fulfillment," of history and of knowledge? There seem to be two basic alternatives: either the completion Hegel speaks of is absolute or it is not. That is, either Hegel's eschatological vision is of a completely final End, where no further progress in history or knowledge is possible, or it is an epochal conception, where the completion he speaks of is the fulfillment of an historical epoch, leaving the future open to progress. It is my feeling that an ample supply of passages in Hegel's texts may be found to support either of these basic alternatives, as well as many passages which can
3. "PhM" refers to Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (Part Three of the Encyclopedia), transl. W. Wallace, with translations of the Zusatze by A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1978). 4. "SL"refers to Hegel's so-called "shorter"Logic (Part One of the Encyclopedia), transl. W. Wallace (Oxford, 1975). 5. "PhS" refers to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, transl. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1979). 6. "PhH"refersto Hegel's Lectureson the Philosophy of History, transl. J. Sibree (New York, 1900).

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be read in either way. And I feel that this reflects a deeply entrenched ambivalence and ambiguity in Hegel's philosophy. That is, I am convinced that we cannot explain away one interpretation or the other and be left with a single, clearly correct doctrine of the End. For the ambiguity represents an internal tension in Hegel's philosophy between two desiderata which are both important to him but which conflict with each other (in a way which cannot plausibly be swept away or "aufgehoben" by Hegel's notorious synthetic method of unifying opposites). On the one hand, Hegel analyzes both knowledge and being as in their very essence dialectical and teleological processes of becoming. Becoming is the pulse of life, the vital principle of knowing and being, for the "satisfaction" of spirit is "that which brings on natural death" (PhH, 74). This suggests that no absolute completion of knowledge or being would be possible without at once destroying their very essence- without literallytolling their death-bell. But on the other hand, Hegel presents his philosophical system as achieving an "absolute knowledge" and "absolute truth" which depends for its absoluteness on being a comprehension of the whole compass or totality of the Gestalten of spirit. This suggests that there must be an absolute completion of knowledge and being and history, a "self-closure"of the circle of development, a final arrival at the End and result which is the truth of the whole. For if the future were open-ended as regards progress in knowledge and being, the whole would never be achieved, but would remain an unfulfilled ideal, and absolute knowledge, the comprehension of the whole, would seem to remain an unrealizable project. This tension is present throughout Hegel's philosophy. It may be seen, for example, in his theory of substance, which seeks to unite Heraclitian becoming with Spinozistic permanence; in his epistemology, which is both committed to the view of knowledge as a perpetual labor of development and to the proposition that consciousness finally achieves an "Absolute Knowledge";in the Hegelian dialectic, which both uncovers the intrinsic opposition and contradiction of all things and also reveals the ultimate resolution of this negativity; in his teleology, which is both described in terms of a continuous process of evolution and at the same time stresses the constant presence and dominance of the End; and in his view that history is both the "slaughterbench"of human happiness and the theater in which all the "wounds of spirit" become healed. While I am convinced that a faithful interpretation of Hegel can only result in a confirmation of his ambivalence, still, I feel that preference should be given to the reading which finally chooses the epochal, dialectically open-ended side of the ambivalence as against the absolutist side. I say this because I feel that the reconstruction entailed by such a choice offers us the chance to revitalize the "magic charm," as Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it,7 of Hegel's dialectical vision of history which his ambivalence places so much into question. This is desirable for two reasons: first, because once the dialectical principle of the Hegelian system is removed (as it unavoidably is under the absolutist reading where the strife of
7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, transI. P. Christopher

Smith (New Havenand London, 1976), 105.

HEGEL'S ESCHATOLOGICAL VISION

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becoming is finally overcome), we have removed the very soul of Hegel's anatomy of spirit; and second, there are practical, ethical consequences at stake for our own historical age. Our age is one of disillusionment and apprehension, an age struggling to find a sense of purpose and moral identity, situated as it is in the aftermath of the Holocaust and towards an anxiety-laden future fraught with the risk of nuclear Armageddon. What message Hegel's philosophy holds for our own age depends very much upon how we interpret his eschatological language of the "completion of the work" of spirit. If, as is usual, we read Hegel literally when he announces the "absolute End of history,"then we must say that history has already achieved its purpose, and we are merely carrying out the last cycle of destiny, spiraling downwardever closer to the final act of death. History, by this reading, is pronouncing its last rites, and the Freudian prediction of an ultimate victory of the death instincts over the instincts of life is achieving its historical fulfillment. If, however, we are successful in our argument for a less absolutist interpretation of Hegel's eschatology, then his message for our contemporary world would obviously be entirely different from the bleak and frankly terrifying destiny implied by the absolutist interpretation. Hegel's message would then stand not as a prediction of doom but as a voice of hope for redemption from our disenchantment with the world -what Freud calls man's Unbehagen, his uneasiness and discontent with his civilization. It would stand, that is, as a challenge to resist the attitude of indifference and despair, and to recognize that reason has the power to transform the world, "beget[ting] revolutions in the world as well as in individuals" (HPh, III, 8), and that it is our highest responsibility to take up and use this power conscientiously. I wish to begin my analysis of the question of completion in Hegel's philosophy with a discussion of the specifically theological dimension of his eschatological vision. Despite the attempts of some commentators to view Hegel's Christian imagery - which is everpresent in his writings - as a purely mythological, symbolic, figurative covering over his basically secular and even atheistic philosophy, I believe that Hegel took his Christian heritage seriously, and sincerely viewed his philosophy as "the true theodicy, the justification of God" (PhH, 457, and see p. 15; cf. HPh, III, 7, 546). We would be confounding the whole spirit of Hegel's philosophy if we were to read his claim that "the philosophic idea is the idea of God" (HPh, III, 11)as somehow merely allegorical, or his equally uncompromising proposition that "religioncan exist without philosophy, but philosophy cannot exist without religion"8(PhRel, III, 148) as only a mythological trapping, or worse, as simply an artificialconcession to the church. Hence Hegel's specifically Christian eschatology is central to his conception of the End or completion of knowledge and history. His Christianity is quite idiosyncratic, however. He does not simply take over the Christian-vision of the "End of the world" and the creation of the new Jerusalem, but has an unorthodoxly historical inon refersto Hegel'sLectures the Philosophyof Religion,3 vols., transl.E. B. Speirs 8. "PhRel" and J. B. Sanderson(London,1895).

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terpretation of the eschatological End. As we shall see, it is precisely because of this unorthodoxy that Hegel is not necessarilycommitted to the common Christian reading of an apocalyptic End - an absolute closure of history - but can also be read as proposing a non-absolutist, epochal conception of the End. A word of warning:we will find that Hegel's Christian eschatology serves more to underscore the conflict in his philosophy between an absolutist and a nonabsolutist conception of completion than to resolve it. The immediately following discussion will thus end in frustration and loss of way, and it will not be until the succeeding sections of the article that we will be led to an attempted resolution of the dilemma of completion. This path of disorientation and uncertainty is not a gratuitous prolonging of our search, however, but is necessary for exhibiting one of the basic contentions of my reading of Hegel, that we look in vain for an unambiguous formulation of his eschatological vision, precisely because he is torn in two opposing directions by conflicting desiderata of his philosophy. The forthcoming discussion of the theological dimension of Hegel's eschatology will serve in this way as an initiation into the pathway of doubt which he left as the legacy of his inconclusive search for a resolution to the question of completion. Only after such an initiation will it be appropriate to turn to an analysis of severalless directlytheological passages in order to support my recommendation for a non-absolutist reading of Hegel's philosophy. Finally, I will return in my conclusion to draw out the implications of this non-absolutist reading for Hegel's Christian eschatology.

II. HEGEL'S CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY

Christian eschatology is based on the Biblical promise of salvation and redemption from suffering and despair, from the irrationality and injustice of the world. It is derived largely from the Book of Revelation, but also from many of the prophetic and apocalyptic visions of both the Old and New Testaments.The Book of Revelation itself, written around 96 A.D., was addressed to a Christian community in the throes of a brutal persecution by the Romans. It promised the annihilation of-the pouring of the "vials of wrath" on-the imperial cult of the Caesars, and the salvation and redemption of the faithful in a new heaven on earth, a New Jerusalem: a 1. And I saw [John writesof his Revelation] new heavenand a new earth:for the first heavenand the firstearth werepassed away;and therewas no more sea. 2. And I Johnsawthe holy city,newJerusalem, comingdownfromGodout of heaven, as prepared a bride adornedfor her husband. of 3. And I hearda greatvoice out of heavensaying,Behold,the tabernacle God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God. 4. And God shallwipeawayall tearsfromtheireyes;andthereshallbe no moredeath, neithersorrow,nor crying,neithershall therebe any morepain: for the formerthings are passed away.

HEGEL'S ESCHATOLOGICAL VISION

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5. Andhe thatsatuponthethrone said,Behold,I makeallthingsnew.... (Rev. 1-5)9 xxi. Thus there will come a new world, where "the former things are passed away," and "all things are made anew."10 This New Jerusalem will redeem man from God's curse - "and there shall be no more curse" (Rev. xxii.3) - and will be an eternal kingdom: as Luke prophesies, "[God] shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end" (Luke i.33).1l It goes without saying that there have been many diverging interpretations of this eschatological vision. Yetdespite this wide divergenceof interpretation,there seems to be substantial agreement among most Christian theologians that the

returnof Christ(at the apocalypse)signalsthe end of history"2 (however much

they differ as to whether this End of history occurs at the outset or the completion of the messianic millennium predicted in the Book of Revelation). Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, expresses this view very clearly when he says that history is but an "interim"for man, in which there is no hope for the fulfillment of the moral and religious ideal, but that this ideal will be fulfilled only "beyondtime,"13 "not within history itself," but at "the end of history."14 The End of history, Niebuhr continues, "is a point where that which exists ceases to be: it is finis"; "the ultimate vindication of God over history . .. [cannot be] reduced to a point in
history."'-'5

The notion that, as the Gospel of Matthew puts it, Christ's return will usher in "the end of the world" (xxiv.3)- that "the field is the world; . . . [and] the harvest is the end of the world" (xiii.38-39)-has thus generally been read to mean that redemption will be the announcement of the End of history, "beyond
9. Cf. Isaiah lxv. 17-19: and new hearsthe Lordsay],I create heavens a newearth;andthe former behold[theprophet 17."For or thingsshall not be remembered come into mind. a for 18. But be glad and rejoicefor everin that whichI create; behold,I createJerusalem rejoicing, and her peoplea joy. in no and in 19.I willrejoice Jerusalem, be gladin mypeople; moreshallbe heard it thesoundof weeping and the cry of distress." 10. Cf. Isaiah lxv. 17. 11. Cf. Rev. xxii.5: "And night shall be no more; they need no light of lamp or sun, for the Lord God will be their light, and they shall reign for ever and ever." 12. See The InterpretersDictionary of the Bible, ed. G. A. Buttrick, et al., 5 vols. (Nashville, Tenn., 1962), vol. II, 138, 610; vol. IV, 61, 69. This orthodox interpretation is not by any means universal, of course. Theologians like Walter Rauschenbusch, Adolf von Harnack, Horace Bushnell, and Harry Emerson Fosdick, to name a few, believe that the redemption is to be continuous with human history, and hence a social and historical overcoming of tribulation. In this, I would argue, they share Hegel's non-orthodoxy exactly. Rauschenbusch, for example, writes that the Kingdom of God (the New Jerusalem) is nothing but "humanity organized according to the will of God"; "a growing perfection in the collective life of humanity" (cited by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in American Political Thought and Life," in Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. R. W. Bretall and C. W. Kegley [New York, 1961], 128).

2 Interpretation, vols. (New Niebuhr,TheNatureandDestinyof Man:A Christian 13. Reinhold

York, 1941, 1943), II, 288, 290 (and chapter X, passim.).

of and A FaithandHistory: Comparison Christian ModernViews Hisof Niebuhr, 14. Reinhold tory (New York, 1949), 235 and passim.
15. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny, II, 287, 289.

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time"as Niebuhrsays.KarlL6withsummarizes basic componentof Christhis tian eschatologyin an articleon "Historyand Christianity":
Whatreallybeginswith the appearance JesusChristis not a new epoch of secular of history, called"Christian," the beginning an end. TheChristian but of timesareChristian only in so far as they are the last time. Becausethe Kingdomof God ... is not to be realizedin a continuous processof historical development, eschatological the historyof salvationalso cannotimparta newand progressive meaningto the historyof the world, whichis fulfilledby havingreached term.The "meaning" the historyof this world its of is fulfilled against itself,because storyof salvation, embodied JesusChrist, the as in redeems and dismantles,as it were,the hopelesshistoryof the world.16 It is from this basic tenet of Christian eschatology -that there is no historical

hope for man, but that the redemption and salvationof man will occur at the End of history,or "beyond history" -that Hegel'svision of the consummation of the Christian telos departs.ForHegel, God'srevelation intrinsically is historical. Hence"thehistoryof the world, ... the processof development realand ization of spirit,is the true theodicy,the justificationof God in history" (PhH, 457). To say that God is a manifestGod, a revealedGod, is for Hegel to say that He is manifestand revealedin the course of humanhistory. St. Paulwritesthat man should"judgenothingbeforethe time,untilthe Lord come,who both will bringto lightthe hiddenthingsof darkness,and will make manifestthe counselsof the hearts: thenshalleverymanhavepraiseof God" and (I Cor. iv.5). But when Hegel says that "manmust know God"(HPh, II, 387), he means that"thedeepestthingsof the Godhead," God'sinnermost natureand purposes, areaccessible humanreasonin history(PhH, 14).Revelation the manifestato is whichis not discontinuous theBildungof humanthought tion of rationality, with in history,but its very expression: God's manifestationis history itself. As I mentionedin the introduction the article,the usual interpretation to of Hegel is to read him as assertingan absolutecompletionof history.Franqois ... chretienne [with Chatelet,for one, saysthat Hegeltakesover"l'eschatologie ... its assertionof the]finde l'histoire [andthe] abolitiondu temps" lock, stock, Marxand Engelsview Hegel's"compulsion makea system... to and barrel.17 to makean endto the historical as [andhencehis] compulsion process" a central 18 failureof his philosophy. AlexandreKojevesays that Hegel "givesup the dialecticalmethod"in order"tolay claimto absolutetruth,"andtherebyrequires that "history is truly completed.'" But, he argues, with "the end of hisIn so-called... disappears. point of fact,the end of time tory ... manproperly
or history . . . means quite simply the cessation of action in the full sense of
in eds., 283 (italicsadded). "Historyand Christianity," Bretalland Kegley, 16. KarlLUwith, Chatelet,Hegel (Paris, 1968), 161. 17. Frangois Philosophy,ed. and Engels,LudwigFeuerbach the Outcomeof ClassicalGerman 18. Friedrich C. P. Dutt (New York,1978), 13. to Introduction the Readingof Hegel, transl.J. H. Nichols,Jr.,ed. Allan Kojeve, 19. Alexandre Bloom (Ithacaand London, 1980), 191,and see 32, 35, 95, 97f., 237.

HEGEL'S ESCHATOLOGICAL VISION

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the term ... [and] the definitiveannihilation of man properly so-called." Stanley Rosen also says that Hegel's philosophy requires a "decisive completion" and "final resolution" of history,21but that "if we achieve the Hegelian science of totality, we must cease to become human."22And Charles Taylor speaks of the Hegelian "total overcoming" of the dialectic of becoming as an expenditure of "enormous energy"to "make [his philosophy] yield an impossible conclusion."23 And we could go on and on.24 My own feeling is that what we have seen to be Hegel's insistence on the intrinsically historical significance of revelation becomes quite hard to explain under the reading of his eschatology which sees it as involving an absolute completion. Indeed Hegel's entire exposition of the Christian message is straightforwardly historical in tone. A good example of this is his interpretation of the notion of the "tabernacle of God." Recall the words of John's revelation: And I John sawthe holy city,new Jerusalem, comingdown from God out of heaven, prepared a bride for her husband. as And I hearda greatvoice out of heavensaying,Behold,the tabernacle God is with of men, and he will dwellwith them, and they shall be his people,and God himselfshall be with them, and be their God (Rev.xxi.2-3). For Hegel, the tabernacle of God is the community of the Church on earth and in history. It is his belief that "one may have all sorts of ideas about the Kingdom of God; but it is always a realm of spirit to be realized and brought (RH, 20). He follows Christ's saying that "the kingdom of God about in man"25 is in the midst of you" (Luke xvii.21).26 "What Jesus calls the 'Kingdom of God,"' Hegel says, "is the living harmony of men; ... it is the development of the divine among men"27 (SXty, 277, v. 267f., PhS, 473). And in his Historyof Philosophy he writes that "the reconciliation of God with Himself is accomplished in the world, and not as a heavenly kingdom that is beyond" (HPh, III, 21). The human
20. Kojeve,158-160(fn 6).
21. Stanley Rosen, Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom (New Haven and London,

1974), 16, xix, and see 9, 15, 45. 22. Rosen, 279. 1977),349. Hegel (Cambridge, 23. CharlesTaylor, who speaksof "dieAntinomiezwischenSystem[i.e.completion] 24. See e.g. RichardKroner, and and in [i.e. und Geschichte becoming]" Hegel'sphilosophy, asks,almostwitha senseof affront [thatis, his "resignaResignation RechtHegel,trotz seinen historische "mitwelchem indignation, of movesbeyondtheresults a particwhichcontinually of progression history, tion"to the perpetual und nehmendurfte" ("System ularstagein history],fur sein SystemabsoluteGeltungin Anspruch KantbisHegel,2 Bande[Tubingen, 252; Logos,BandXX (1931), andcf. Von bei Geschichte Hegel," 1921],II, 518ff.). with his principle See also Hyppolite,who feels that Hegelbecomesunfaithfulto his dialectical of move to the Logic, which leads to "l'immobilisme" spirit(557).
25. "RH"refersto Hegel's Reason in History (the Introductionto the Philosophy of History, drawing

1953). from all threeeditions),transl.R. S. Hartman(Indianapolis, of that saying theKingdom Godis approaching between the throughout Gospels oscillates 26. Christ II, See Dictionary, 136f.for references. withhis ministry. Interpreters arrived andthatit hasalready
27. "SXty"refers to Hegel's The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, in Early Theological Writings,

ed. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia,1977).

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community is the witness to God, being His manifestation in the world. Hence the true elevation of man to a unity with God takes place in history,and specifically, according to Hegel, in the Christian epoch in which man sees his unity with God through the revelation of God in His Son, who is the living symbol of the reconciliation of the human and divine natures. Given this reading of the "tabernacle of God," it seems that the fulfillment of the Christian logos could not possibly take place "beyond time," "outside of history."The Christian "eschaton," the "new world" of prophecy, must itself be subject to the dialectic of history, the dialectic of perpetual becoming. Only under this non-absolutist reading of completion will Hegel not be forced to abandon his Heraclitianmetaphysicsof spirit, his insistence that spirit is simply not capable of a mere "empty repetition [of the present], . . . a monotonous cycle [that is, without evolution]" -which is precisely the situation which would characterize spirit which had somehow superseded history - but rather"in itself, or in its very principle, [the life of spirit] ... contains a progress"(PhM, ?399). Thus if Christianity were to usher in a radical completion of history and time, spirit would cease to be spirit, and God - this seems an unavoidable conclusion - would cease to be God, since for Hegel God is irreducibly the logos, or Word, or spirit. Still, there remains a problem with this non-absolutist interpretation.As I have remarked, Hegel's eschatological vision is fundamentally ambiguous. However much support we may find for a non-absolutist reading of Hegel's theory of the End - most importantly the fact that only such a reading seems to allow for the preservationof his dynamic and evolutionarymetaphysicsof spirit- we can always find passages which support the orthodox reading of Hegel as suggesting an absolute End of history. Hence for example Hegel speaks of the Christian logos as the ultimate "perfection of spirit" (PhS, 413), in which the human spirit gains "liberation"and "reconciliation"from alienation (HPh, II, 2, 3, 6). And he calls this a "final concord" of man with himself, with his world, and with God (SL, ?24 Zusatz). Thus (at least in many passages) Hegel does seem to view Christianity as something which cannot be superseded, that is, as a final End.28But if this is so, then surely the fulfillment of the Christian logos must be beyond history, since for Hegel a central principle of history is that the consummation of one shape of spirit necessarily gives rise to "a new principle" (PhH, 71-79). The "completion of . .. one stage," Hegel says, "is at the same time the rejection of that stage and its transition to a higher"29 (PhR, ?343, and v. ??344, 347 Anmerkung). Time itself is for Hegel out-and-out "negativity,"the perpetual process of the "dissolution of all existence," the subsequent "transcendence of that existence," and the inevitable "production of a new, renovated, fresh life" (PhH, 77, 78, 73). If the fulfillment of the Christian logos is in fact meant to be a final, unalterable state of affairs, clearly it must somehow escape this intrinsic "negathat suggests HegelviewsChrisfor Lowith, example, 28. Evenherethereis someroomfordispute.
tianity as something to be superseded itself (From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth

to City,NewYork,1967],39). I willreturn this questransl.D. E. Green[Garden CenturyThought, tion on page xx below. 29. "PhR"refersto Hegel'sPhilosophyof Right, transl.T. M. Knox (London,1976).

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tivity"of time, and this wouldseemto require that it take placebeyondhistory, the theaterof time. Thus the ambiguityand ambivalence Hegel'stheoryof completionis not in finallyresolvedin his Christianeschatology.For (1) if Chateletand othersare right that Hegel'sChristianeschatologyannouncesthe "abolitiondu temps," then we seem to be incapableof makingsense out of the Hegelianontology: spiritis a progressive becoming,a perpetualdevelopment its veryessence,so in that a non-temporal, suprahistorical spiritwould simplybe a contradiction in terms.But (2) if the "newworld" not the End of historyandtime,thenit seems is impossibleto see how it could persevere without progress,and hence without And if alterationor development to be allowed,then we must ask alteration. is whatsenseit makesto speakof the Christian eschatonas the revelation absoof lute truth,the "finalconcord"Hegel speaksof. For the notion of development relativizes everyparticular stagewithinthe development, unlesswearewilling and to speak of an "absolute" truth which is relativeto the courseof development up to the present that is, a "relative absolute" thenthe idea of an eternal,unchanging"newworld"in history seems to slip out of our grasp. We have reachedan impasseas to how we are to read Hegel'seschatology, and we need to seek furtherto find the way to turn towardsthe absolutistor A the non-absolutist alternative. good placeto beginour searchis with a closer look at Hegel'sconceptionof the "newworld," some of the less directly in theological passagesof his speculationsabout the natureof historyand knowledge. I willarguethat whilethesepassagesdo not completely resolveourimpasse,they do guideus in the directionof the non-absolutist reading Hegel'seschatology. of
III. A CLOSER LOOKAT THE "NEWWORLD"

First, let us look at a passage from the end of the last section of the History of Philosophy,which Hegel titles the "FinalResult,"and wherehe speaks of a "newepoch":
[Absolute knowledge] is the demand of all time and of philosophy. A new epoch has in had arisenin the world.It wouldappearas if the world-spirit at last succeeded stripand itselfat last as absolute pingoff fromitselfall alienobjective existence, apprehending spirit. . . The strife of the finite self-consciousness[man] with the absolute selfconsciousness[God],whichlast seemedto the otherto lie outsideof itself, now comes to an end. .. . Thisis the whole historyof the worldin generalup to the presenttime, and the history of philosophy in particular, the sole work of which is to depict this strife. Now,

which indeed,it seemsto havereachedits goal, when this absoluteself-consciousness,

it had the work of representing, has ceased to be alien, and when spirit accordingly is

realizedas spirit (HPh, III, 551f., italics added).

At firstblush, the eschatologicalmessageof this passageis in doubt. It may its be thatthe "newepoch"is to be beyondhistory,historyhaving"reached goal" of in AbsoluteKnowledgeand the overcoming alienation.Or, on the contrary, it may be that Hegel does not mean to suggestthat the strifeand alienationof

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man has "come to an end"forever, and although it has done so "at the present time," the "new epoch" will have its own history and must face its own strife. And yet in context, the message becomes clearer. The whole tone of the concluding section of the History of Philosophy, the "Final Result" section, is one of taking stock of where we have arrived so as to look to the future. After the passage about the "new epoch" where Hegel says of world-history that "now, indeed, it seems to have reached its goal," he goes on to say that "this, then, is the standpoint of the present day, and the series of spiritual forms is with it for the present concluded" (HPh, III, 552, italics added). This seems to give very strong support to the non-absolutist interpretation of his eschatology, where history is to have a future progression. In this passage, at least, the completion of the development of spirit is epochal, not absolute, and the "whole development" of spirit which Hegel refers to shortly before this passage would seem to mean the whole development up to now, rather than a radically closed whole, that is, rather than the closure of history itself. Further, in the penultimate paragraph of the History of Philosophy, just before thanking his students for attending his lectures, Hegel exhorts them to "give ear to the urgency [of spirit] -when the mole that is within forces its way on, we have to make it a reality."Hegel indeed speaks of the "summons"of the spirit "to bring it forth from its natural condition . . . its lifeless seclusion, into the light of day" (HPh, III, 553). This sense of urgency and this summons would seem inappropriate if the "new epoch" was to be "beyond history." Finally, the concluding section of the History of Philosophy is interspersed with passages which reaffirmHegel's Heraclitian metaphysics - his emphasis on the nature of spirit as a perpetual becoming: "[spirit] goes ever on and on, because spirit is progress alone. Spirit often seems to have forgotten and lost itself, but inwardly opposed to itself it is inwardly working ever forward" (HPh, III, 546f.); "[the] eternal life [of spirit] consists in the very process of continually producing the opposition [of subject and object, or consciousness and world] and continually reconciling it" (HPh, III, 551). In the light of such passages, I would argue that when Hegel speaks of the "consummation" or "completion" or "coming to an End" or "reaching the goal" of spirit, such pronouncements should be read as the fulfillment of the telos of an historical epoch, not of history or knowledge entire-a fulfillment which will give place to a new epoch, a new production and work of spirit. The second "new world" passage I wish to cite is from the Preface to the Phenomenology:30 It is not difficultto see that ours is a birthtimeand a period of transitionto a new era. Spirithas brokenwith the worldit has hithertoinhabitedand imagined,and is of Spiritis it a mind to submerge in the past, and in the labor of its own transformation. indeedneverat rest but alwaysengagedin movingforward.... The vagueforeboding
after was immediately thebodyof thePhenomethat 30. Wemaynotein passing thePreface written a and nologywascompleted, thus servesto illuminate passagefromthe verylast pagesof the work of existence" spirit,a "reinvolvinga "transformed knowledge" whereHegel speaksof "absolute born, . . . new existence,a new worldand a new shapeof spirit"(PhS, 492).

HEGEL'SESCHATOLOGICAL VISION

25

[whichour age feels]of somethingunknown... [is]the heraldof approaching change. ... But this new worldis no more a completeactualitythan is a new-bornchild;it is essentialto bearthis in mind. It comes on the scenefor the firsttime in its immediacy
. . . (PhS, 6f).

This passage is frankly and straightforwardlyanticipatory, a looking-forward to a new era of history. The new world is explicitly portrayed as in its birth-time, as opposed to being the fulfillment and conclusion of time. And finally, there is again the reaffirmationof Hegel's Heraclitian metaphysics, the idea that "spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward." This Heraclitian metaphysics leads Hegel to a view of spirit and its history which, in my view, makes the absolutist version of an End of history and time unacceptable. He expresses this non-absolutist, epochal view clearly in his Philosophy of Right, in a passage we have already partially cited: In history, act of Geistis to gainconsciousness itselfas Geist.... Thisapprehenthe of sion is its beingand its principle,. . . and the completionof apprehension one stage at is at the sametime the rejectionof that stageand its transition a higher(PhR, ?343). to This is Hegel's Phoenix theme, one of the central metaphors of his anatomy of spirit, where spirit is "eternally preparing for itself its funeral pile and consuming itself upon it, but so that from its ashes is produced a new, renovated, fresh life"(PhH, 73). This is a vision of the eternally"restlessmutation and change" of spirit, where the fulfillment or "satisfaction [of attaining] ... what is desired," the principle or telos of a shape of spirit, "signals the death of that shape" (PhH, 72, 74f). "For spirit," Hegel says, "the highest attainment is self-knowledge ... [and] this it is destined to accomplish; but the accomplishment is at the same time its dissolution and the rise of another spirit, . . . another epoch of Weltgeschichte" (PhH, 71). Spirit is destined to achieve its goal, in the recollective epiphany of Absolute Knowledge, but this achievement is episodic, occurring at the culmination of each epoch, where every recollective closure of the circle of an epoch reaches beyond itself to the opening of a new era, regenerating history at each moment of its temporaryfulfillment,just as everysatisfactionrecreates desire at the instant of completion. Given this, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that if history wereto reach a radical consummation, an "absolutefinal End," it would at once undermine the very conditions which animate the world-spirit. The final satisfaction of history would be the final death of spirit. This is why I feel we must sacrifice Hegel's desire to portray an absolute consummation of knowledge and history and being, and seek the merit of his philosophy in an epochal conception of the development of Geist. Only such a sacrifice can avoid the deeper, paralyzing sacrifice of the dialectical soul of Hegel's philosophy.

IV. CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES OF THE EPOCHAL VIEW OF COMPLETION FOR HEGEL'S CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY

If we return now to the question of the meaning and fate of the Christian era, the Christian "new world," and attempt to answer this question from the per-

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spective of a non-absolutist reading of Hegel's eschatology, we have two basic options. One option would be simply to reject Hegel's portrait of Christianity as the "final concord" of spirit. By this account, we would insist that the Christian era, like all other Gestalten of spirit, is destined to "die"when its principle has achieved its historical "satisfaction"-thereby leaving history open-ended, free to assume ever-newly created shapes. thought, KarlL6with, in his impressiveintellectualhistory of nineteenth-century From Hegel to Nietzsche, goes so far as to suggest that this is in fact the position Hegel holds. LUwithbelieves that Hegel viewed his own age and culture as the "end of the history of the Christian logos," where a "great turning [away from] and break with Christianity"would be made, "thusopening a new [post-Christian] era."931Note that this reading entails an oppositeassessment to the one Lbwith gives of Christian eschatology in general, which, as we have seen, he characterizes as a "redemption and dismantling of the hopeless history of the world." Lbwith is indeed one of the few commentators32 who adopts an epochal readingof Hegel's eschatology, seeing him as displacing the post-historical redemption of orthodox Christianity into the course of history, pointing beyond itself to a further epoch of historical progression. My only reservation with Lowith's reading is that it is arrived at too precipitously, without acknowledging just how much it stands in conflict with a great deal of evidence which suggests that Hegel never intended to portray Christianity as just one more epoch of Weltgeschichte, destined to be overcome like all other epochs. Lbwith'sis a way of reading Hegel which Hegel would have been quite uncomfortable with, due to that side of him which felt constrained to posit a radical End of history, a fact that L6with does not explicitly come to grips with. If we are to adopt an epochal reading of Hegel's eschatology, it is important to explicitly recognize that it is a reading which stands in fundamental tension with the other (absolutist, apocalyptic) side of Hegel's ambivalence, a side which in fact often got the better of him in his directly theological musings on history. Hegel fell under the spell of the Christian description of the ultimacy of its own logos, and as a result he compromised his Heraclitian metaphysics, against all of his own principles. If we finally wish to accept an epochal reading such as Lbwith's, we must correct it by seeing how it is in fact a re-reading and reconstruction of Hegel's eschatology, which is necessary to recover the integrity of the Hegelian dialectic from the spell of the absolute End which crippled it. This alternative may well appeal to many readers, but there is also a second option, one which would not requirethe sacrificeof Hegel's commitment to Christianity as the "final concord" of spirit. According to this reading, Christianity
FromHegel to Nietzsche,38, 39. 31. LUwith, 32. In additionto L6with,we maymentionRobertSolomon(In the Spiritof Hegel [NewYork Hegel and the Rise of Social and Oxford, 1985])and HerbertMarcuse(Reasonand Revolution: Solomonadmitsthat However, of Theory[Boston,1969])as proponents an epochalinterpretation. thantheHegelof finalreposeonlyas a matter rather of the he choosesto "celebrate" "Hegel change" acknowledgment withoutthe slightest his develops interpretation (14-16),andMarcuse of emphasis amreading,and hencewithoutdoing full justiceto the deep-seated of the opposing(absolutist) biguityof Hegel'seschatology(see especially224ff.).

HEGEL'S ESCHATIOLOGICALVISION

27

is indeedthe "finalconcord," at the same time it is not for this reasonimbut mune from historicaldevelopment.The Christianera is eternaland absolute, not however the senseof being"beyond in history," in the senseof the "timebut lessness"of its truth.33 logos of Christianity not becomeundermined The will in time. But this truth still requires manifestation,and hence a temporalexistence.Christianity the End, or telos, of humanhistoryin the sense that it exis pressesthe ultimatepurposeand meaningof spirit,but this too mustbe subject to the worldof time, the worldof change:this purposeand meaningmust be workedout and evolvedin history. This second interpretation all the marksof Hegel'sinfamous synthetic has principleof the unity of opposites:the Christianera is both eternaland temporal,absoluteand changing,infiniteand historical.As such, it seemsto place mysuggestion thereareessentially that onlytwo opposedwaysof reading Hegel's eschatology eitheran absolutistor an epochalreading into question, for it seems to allow for a harmonization the two.34 will say shortlywhy I find of I this syntheticapproachtroublesome, firstI wouldlike to note how it bears but striking resemblance one commoninterpretation Marx's to of eschatology. When Marx describesthe approaching communistrevolutionas an event which will bringabout the total "supersession [Aufhebung] self-estrangement," as of and the ultimate"resolution the conflict" of inherentin history,"thesolutionof the riddleof history"35 is usuallyreadin such a way that he is not suggesting -he that historywill come to an end, that communistsocietywill somehowbe "beyond history." Althoughtherewill be no more class conflict,which Marxand Engelsregard the movingforceof all previoushistory,the communistworld as will continueto evolve,not beyondcommunism,to be sure,but still in such a way that will give full place to humancreativityand development.If Marxis able to speakof a "resolution" historywhichstill allowsfor historicaldevelof opment, why should we not permitHegel to do the same? Now I think this last questionis a perfectlyvalid one-that Marxand Hegel do in fact face analogoussituationswith regard their eschatological to visions, and that the two should be judged in a similarway.I confess that for my own withthissecondinterpretation, comfortable wherewemust partI am not entirely envisionan ultimate"solutionto the riddleof history"whichitself will not be
beforenor aftertime"but "absolutely present," as of 33. Hegelin factconceives eternity "neither whichseemsto allow for an historicalunfoldingof the eternal.(ThePhilosophyof Nature[Part transl.A. V. Miller[Oxford,1970],?247Zusatz).Cf. HPh, I, 287;HPh, of TWo theEncyclopedia], II, 84f.; PhH, 79. to (The xiv) 34. J. N. Findlay(in his Foreword Hegel'sPhenomenology, and Emil Fackenheim ReligiousDimensionin Hegel's Thought[Chicago,1967],see 17 and chapter4) offerattemptsat to a syntheticreading.Whileit wouldinitiatefartoo long a digression do theseviewsjustice,I bethus failingto makegood the reading finallycollapsesinto an epochalreading, lievethat Findlay's does not finallyextendhis proposalinto a considerapromiseof a synthesis,and that Fackenheim of tion of the close of history,whichis just wherethe inadequacy a syntheticreadingappearsin its most glaringlight (but choosesinsteadto confinehis discussionto the disputebetweenrightand issue of transcendentalism immanentism). and left-wingHegelianson the metaphysical transl.G. Bentonand R. Livingstone, and Manuscripts, 35. KarlMarx,Economic Philosophical ed. in KarlMarxac Early Writings, Q. Hoare (New York,1975),345, 348.

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DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND

is overcomeand whichnevertheless compatiblewith historicaldevelopment. It is not that I cannotimaginehistoricalchangeoccurring underan essentially unchangingguidinglogos. Therehas certainlybeen tremendous historicalchange in the commonera, since the beginningof Christianity, I wouldbe willing and that the essentialtruth of Christo accept (at least for the sake of argument) tianityhas remainedunchanged.Rather,it is that this interpretation does just not seemto accordwithHegel'snotionthatthe fulfillment the telosof a shape of of spirit"signalsthe death of that shape,""the rejectionof that stage and its transition a higher." to Thisinterpretation wouldallowfor historicalchange,but not for fundamental change,not for the sort of changewhich is necessaryfor the evolutionfrom one historicalepoch to another.And the most straightforwardwayto readHegel'sdialecticis in termsof a commitment fundamental to the change.Any attemptto harmonize absolutistand epochalreadings mustinevitablyfall into confusion. To speak of an "absoluteEnd of the progression" whichis nevertheless alwaysrelative a furtherdevelopment, to where"absolute" has the usual connotationof being non-relative and if it does not, then the absolutistinterpretation simplycollapsesinto the epochalreading,wherethere arecontinuallyreappearing each relativeto the close of a givenera "absolutes," of history-is to be forcedinto the uncomfortable positionwhere,as Hegel says in anothercontext, we cannot say what we mean to say (see PhS, 60-66). Theremay well be problemswith both of the alternatives havejust given: I the firstseemscounterto the place Hegel allots to Christianity the ultimate as telos of history,and the secondconfrontsus withthe peculiaridea of an eternal logos whichnevertheless alters.A simplesolutionto theseproblems be found can by opting for the readingof Hegel's eschatologywhich sees it as proclaiming an absoluteEnd to history.Such a solution, however, wouldentailthe sacrifice of the Hegeliandynamics his Heraclitian of metaphysics spiritandhistory. And I am convincedthat such a sacrifice wouldamountto the euthanasia Hegel's of philosophy, abandonment the verydynamicswhichgiveslife andpurpose the of and inspiration his analysisof the Weltgeist. to as Further, I notedearlierin the if article,such a sacrifice, takenseriously,would essentiallydoom our contemof poraryworldto indifference despairas a consequence ourrolein carrying and out thelastritesof history. the Thesecircumstances, firstbasedon internal grounds in of consistency Hegel'ssystem,the secondon practical, ethicalconsiderations, shouldinclineus, I believe,to take the non-absolutist versionof Hegel'seschaI tology seriously,and to pursuefurtherone of the two alternatives have suggested for reconcilingthe role of the Christianlogos with this non-absolutist eschatology.As I have indicated,my own leaningsare towardsthe alternative which"corrects" Hegel'sadoptionof the Christianlogos as the finalperfection of spirit,since I findthis reconstruction be the most consistentwith his printo and evolutionof historicaltime. ciple of the "unending" "eternal" In one of the most famouspassagesof the Phenomenology,Hegel says that "thewoundsof spiritheal, and leaveno scarsbehind"(PhS, 407). Thisidea was in wherehe wrote alreadyprefigured his earlySpiritof Christianity (1798-1800), that fromthe "severed of spirit,"lifecan healits woundsagain"(SXty,230). life"

HEGEL'S ESCHATOLOGICAL VISION

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But insofaras Hegel'sportrayal spiritdependsupon his centralprinciple of that "becoming the fundamental featureof all existence" (SL, ?88 Zusatz),then [is] we mustnot supposethatthe "wounds spirit" of everheal overso fully that they will not bleed again,that spiritwill not be throwninto the negativity, strife the and conflict,of self-development. we are to appreciate depth of Hegel's If the analysisof spirit,we must hold him to his view that "thelife of spiritis not the
life that shrinks from . .. the tremendous power of the negative . .. and keeps

itself untouchedby devastation[Verwustung], ratherthe life that endures but it and maintainsitself in it" (PhS, 19).The verylife of spirit,as Hegel portrays it, dependson its immersionin the flux of existence,in the "laborof its own transformation" (PhS, 6), and insuresthat, on pain of death,it will nevercease from becoming,from striving,from exploration,from evolution.
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