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..

~pr.2ce~ His arguments for this principle have been a matter of dispute among Aristotelian commentators as the arguments concern the very founda-

PHILOSOPHICAL

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TO CATEGORIES

The word 'category' is commonly used as a virtual synonym for such. words as 'class', 'genus', 'type', and 'kind', but in Western philosophy since' '. Aristotle 'category' has had a technical use that associates it with the fou~dations of philosophy. Categories in this philosophical sense are not ~etermmed by empirical procedures of classification, whether those of common sen.se or of science. they are determined by the very conditions that determme a philosophy, and since Kant the method :of det~mining them is often called

"transcendental argument."

In this paper I am concerned with categories oJ.1lyin the philosophical sense. I outline and contrast what I think are the two main philosophical approaches to categories, the metaphysical approach of Aristotle and the epistemological approach of Kant. I relate the two approaches to conte.mporary philosophies, the essentialism of Kripke and Putnam on the one hand, Quine's naturalism and Strawson's transcendentalism on the other. -Space does not permit consideration of the many other philosophers from Porphyry to Ryle and Russell whose work has had major influence on theories of categories. Although I believe "that the two approaches I corisider stand nearly at opposite ends of a spectrum within which all the others can be placed, I cannot argue this meta-categoreal thesis here. I attempt only to expose the basic presuppositions of each extreme and to indicate how the contemporary positions I consider appear as modifications of them. I. try to' present the arguments in each case sympathetically and make no attempt to pass final judgment. To do so would be to presume the result of a much more.~xtended study than I ca~ undertake in this paper. I
.u ).!JJhe Critique of Pu!! E.eR.Q!t~.~t ~e~arks ~~hat to .search... for ~~~t o! ;!"_ categor~e~~a '~ll entetprise .lV<?~rt!D:.yf ~~ute thmker~lke A~ls~o~le~. ~~t an ""ilslledid so on no principle, he merely picked them up as they cam~.,.h~

tions of his philosophy. It is at least clear, though, from Metaphysics IV that he regarded the distinction betwCZ!ll,!!>s.tance.alJ(a~l9.ellt as s~1!1ethi~..g~.to be invoked in defense 01wliatIiecalled "the most certain principle," me prin-- . apreoTContradlCiio:n:- --' . ~ -" - At l007b 16-18 Aristotle concludes that "there must be something which signifies substance," and that "if this is so it has been shown that contradictories cannot be predicated at the same time."2 This conclusion comes in the course of a "demonstration by refutation" of the principle of contradiction. The demonstration consists in showing that since any significant ut.terance presupposes the principle, anyone who professes to denylhe principle rerutes himself as soon as he says anything significant. The principle is shown to be presupposed if it is shown (a) th~t"sigQ.Ulc.a.tionrequires.~som.ething whicb signifies substance and (b) that nothing !IJPuJgni{i~9...il<:9ntradictories can beeredi~ated,~.u...~~t.i.tne. It would seem, however,. that one cIfn reject Wand accept (b). Signification, Aristotle first argues, requires that an utterance have a definite meaning, that it mean such and such and not at the same time and in the same respect not such and such. This requirement alone seems enough to show that any significant utterance, whether or not there is any signification of substance, presupposes the principle of contradiction. The denial that there must be something which signifies substance is not obviously self-refuting in the way that a straightforward denial of the princi-

ple of contradiction is.

The claim about substance gains plausibility if one holds, as surely Aristotle did, that an utterance can have a definite meaning only if there is somethirig objective to which the meaning is ulti.!:l1atelyreferred. If there were nothing objective there would be nothing to fix signification or meaning. .u:....
.

one holds, as Protagoras is r~d

Jo.bave hebhJh.aUhe..te..is_RO. qbje~~

wi.w, 'CLne=mi~!9.~R.t)6~.t obj~ctiveJt:al~ S~.I;l~Wl~Jn~~e at t~e. sa"!e time true an~" (1009a 9). One IS agam 10 the self-refutmg positIOn of having to deny the .principle of contradiction. Aristotle's claim that there ~. by objective reference, i.e., by reference to what exists independent of human D s1ib.Jec~-". ".. This reference cannot be to objects determined only as sensible objects, since objects are so determined only by the sensations they produce in sentient subjects. The reference to be truly objective must be to objects determined by what they are in themselves (per se) and not by their effects on senmust be, so~C!!~!2.wh~ch ~~i~e~ ..sub~!ance "may then be un~erstood as ~is way 01 makmg the clam. t~~ sl~nill.9a.!!011.ere~Uep?S~S }i"a~IQ'l <!J~~.mng

~~Bloll..t

While there is no hint in Aristotle's writings of a ~~

Pk-rom which it follows that there are exactly th~-.C~t~~s he enumerates, t~~~is !!J1.Pleevidence that h:!-~&l!ni~d_lhStdJ.st1(lCl~et.w.~ mI~tanc~ ~e;Pt as t.be_piJ[9im!:lto.,m~bichany Lsear.chJ.Q.1'_cJ1te.gC)J~e$

tient subjects-in an idiom of the present day, "objects determined by what

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they are in any possible world, in any counterfactual situation, in which they might exist." To use an example from Putnam, an objective reference to water is to an object determined as H20 rather than as something colorless" odorless, tasteless, and thirst-quenching. Without this <1bjp.divere'f~rence one and the same object may be both water and not-water at the same time, depending on how it appears to different sentient subjects. We cannot avoid contradiction by saying that it is water in one respect and not in another, the. different respects depending on how it appears to different sentient subjects. . We cannot say this if we can give no meaning to a term apart from sensible effects produced by an object we refer to with the term. We then have no way of saying what it is that is water in one respect and not-water in another. We cannot invoke a phrase like 'the stuff here', since we will again have no meaning for such a phrase apart from its sensible effects. The stuff here will be.. water and not-water at the same time. We cannot say that in itself it is simply the stuff here, while it is water or not-water depending on how it appears to different subjects. In saying this we presuppose that 'the stuff here' signifies a substance, something that objectively is one thing and not another regardless of how' it appears to different subjects. ba,Lc::Jt~t t ~ithout.si~ificatJQ.n of~bstance t~~ is r.:.L~!!!!1c~opJyJQJi is anything it a ears to .s.e. One it cannot be distinguished from another; for t ere woul then have to be something F such that it is not possibly at the same time not-F, and something else such that it is not-F and not possibly at the same time F. But as anything is possibly F and not-F at the same time and in the' same respect, it follows that "all things are one, and not only op. posites" (lOO7a 6), . With signification of substance there is reference to what is objectively a definite kind of thing and not just to a bare it. Meaning is then: fixed objecthiggs and !t0t sUbjectivel'f'bYthe. effecfs.~o(tfi.ings.on ti~~ Wh~, ~.9..f sen.tJ~p~gs. ~ith meaning thus fixed objectively, ~2.IJ.tra.dictodeshcannQt be predic~~d at the same \.i!p~.Tfie cliiini t~a1-1hey can beis self-refuting ~causejt qe,pies objective mea,ningand therefore the.POiSib.!!ifyo! signifiea:-: 11on.That Aristotle thought of his emonstration by refutatiod' as resting on ~equirement of objective meaning r rom ISmitial statement ofthe condition that produces the refutation. One has only to "say something which is significant both for himself and for another" (1006a 21). Something significant only for oneself is not a significant or meaningful utterance-there is no private language. If signification of substance establishes.obj~ctive meaning, the meaning establ1sliealffilsfbe determined by what the thi~g sign-med is in itself independent of an'y situation it may be in when it is signified. In other words, the

meaning must be a specification true of the thing in any possible situation in which it might exist. Otherwise it would be impossible to say what the thing can ~nd,whaUt, cannot be. We cannot even exclude the situation in which. it is... at the same time and in the same respect F and not-F. If we say tha.t whatever the thing is it cannot be in this contradictory situation, we presuppose signification of substance. For in making this statement we are saying that :!he thil1g)s..at least something definite in itself and not just anything whatsoever. To recognl?:~..t.fu!.nece~s.Hy..fut_&ignificatjQJl of ..substance. is. .also-to recognize a distinction between substance~OJi.i!ccident. The specification of Qossible sJt.l!ilti.Q.t:Lio~hich~i~m.ight.exist..contr.asts..with ~hat a thing is in ~!!'y a sQecific!i~j2n.~L':Yhati! 1s in one as distinct from another situation. A particular, thil1g, f<?rexal1.1ple,may exist iQa place at a time, an~pe~ifying the
.

place and time we specify what is accidental to the thing itself insofar as its

being in that place at that time is only one possible situation in which it might exist. Again, a thing may change in size, alter qualitatively, and stand in different relations to other things while it remains the kind of thing it is specified as bei~g when. it is signified. as ~. substance. ~t~Uhat.place., time, ~.ntlty-'...,..q~YJ-an9_r.e1a.ti.0.Jl...Q.mW9-Q.llst.ilu.te.-gene(al headings UJJ<U<J ,,;,hich w~~?mmo.!]JYspeSify wl1aL~J:1stancei,U!l-o.Q,e rather thlill..llJUlQ!Jw' '. ,sItuatIOn. they provide what Aristotle called "~res oL~on," Jor.. short "predicates" or "categor~ateg2!Jl!!.=.. to predicate). While there is p.Jmclple according to which an exact number of categories can be deter~ mined, any search for them must proceed from the princiQle that distinguishes substance from accident. Pr~gication throu.gh which there-rs sp~cification of whaTls true omfiing in any possible situation in which it ~ght exist niu~ b~ distinguisfieCl ~from ,Predication through which there is s.Qecifica~ion_ nly of_what h!lPpens to be true of.a thing in a p~rticular situa~ ~' S~gnific!!tiopoLsubs~nce, then, must be distinguished from s.ignificaJiQ!1 2f_accldents, of places, times, qualities, quantities, relations, and the like. With 'man' or 'animal' 'Socrates is signified as a substance; with 'in the Lyceum yesterday', 'pale', 'six feet tall', and 'husband' he is signified only as a subject of accidents. Although accidents themselves can be signified, as that place, that time, that'tomplexion, height, or marital status, a.c~id!;.nts..cannot. exist a~.t.t...ftQnLSubs.tanGes.An accident is always the place, time, complexion, height, marital status: or the like of some substance.Ihe .2.iit.!!Lc!.!2!!
betw~elLsubstan~e.<

~d !;,;Ident

t~usmarks..!.2istiv'<;J.i(;m_betwesn_tw9

kind.~..

SU~.Ollal tor Lnc!~~Q~t) ami accidental 0~dent) being, aUQ 9Jffere1lLcl!!~gories of a<:.cislcm1~ ma!l<...Qifferent.kinds..aLaccicUm1aL~

of~g,

4:

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MANLEY THOMPSON
are ~bp!.Qn.tclQgical. They P.I.9-vid~the..b.ighest,.g~neta

PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO CATEGORIES

341

..

~n8-ang~ "th~on!Y..$enera"p.!.2~ .. . are not species. i1'J ... ". II

~nce they are t,he~olJly geng~\.w~i.~ll

A common objection to the Aristotelian approach to categories runs as follows. While accidents cannot exist apart from.. ~.!.lb.st}nces.Jhel!l.tl..e.r,,!!J least in thecase of matepal !iu6~!l.l1ces" C.i.J1D9Wist,..ithout...the.CoI;met.. A ~tenal SUbstance always exists at a place and time. situateQ.in...x!l.!!.2!!!.~y.s_ . .

q~litatively a.[1d_q~~~!i.~t~y~~!1.~Ldif~rentlYA~i!o y~!ou~.?~su~-

'

stances exi~~il1g~tt.h~tim~ How are we to distinguish its essence from its ac:. Cloent!;,ie., what is true of it in any pOSS'inte silui:ltion-hrwhkh it might ex-ist from what happens, to be true of it because of its accidents in every situation in which we have observed it? Ibere seeIJl1iJo b~ no..baID.s-U:>L ,!aim that the this distinction can..be..dr.a.wn-ohjectiY.el. .;. --.-- The reply suggested in Metaphysics IV, as I have already indicated, is '\{ that unless 'we!.e3!1iz~..the. distinction a!2!?~gi~ we destroy the ppssibility 4 of si nific~n. JLwesay_that a sul?st~!lce is F o,!lJY ~ecause wehaye alway o serv~ .Jt to b.e.F, we cannot ruleout..the possibilitY9r..~i!!1atjo.l!sin which it is' not-F.. If we have to say this no matter what predicate 'F' may represent, -we cannot even exclude the possibility of situations in which the thing is F and not-F at ~he same time and in the same respect. For we cannot e~~ anything ~~Ue_a~~m_ th.at Jh~ thing~.has .\il!-es~!1S~,_th@t th~re JL. something it is necessarily no matter what we have always observed it to be. It wllrilOCCloto saY thai however tfilngs~may'b; in th;~seTve;we c~not pos~ sibly observe a thing to be F and not-F at the same time and in the same respect. Unless we rule out the possibility of things in themselves being in this contradictory sffiiiilion we can make no claim t.o obj~ctive reference. We -wouldh-aveto admit that one who denies the principle of contradIction just might be referring to things in themselves although we can attach no meaning .,. to his reference.' in modified form with a proposal Aristotle's p~is r~~ urged 'recently b~ and\.P~!n~ml Weare to accept a statement purportedly specifying a thing's essence, e.g., that water is H20, as epistemically cOI}~i!l.gs:J!t~e.~<ml1'(sicall~~,~q~)!. if "tj'l,I.p.JitJlJ!::. With thIS-proposaCwe seem to undermine the force of the objection that any distinction between essence and accident can only be relative to our ,observations. We recognize t.!t... 4 relativi~Y2Y ackJlowledgip~ the epis~m.t~~tiqgS1.X. Q.Ul1egis.t~n!ion as it iraererlTlin~ at !nY...!!m.e the act!!a.!.2.1!ts_e_of~inquiry,~y'et Ptes.,~rveobit! Vf.e ,F5i.xjjy- by-also.recognizing any such qet~jiQJ1..as..m.eta.J>.hY..!ically neces-

s,!!Y if it is true at all. With this modified position, as Putnam admits'in a later work, we take truth to be "r.adiCall'( no.o.:!;;ni~~';'5 No matter how well confirmed, our observational determination of essence may still be false; we.cIaim only that if it is true at all it is metaphysically necessary. This Krip~e,pJ.D!m..proposal is mQre accurately characterized as ~rlln_ cated" rather than "mo.dified" ALisjotelianism.. The proposal is not accom:panied by dialectical arguments in defense of the claim to metaphysical necessity, purporting to show that signification of substance with consequent determination of essence is necessary for any signification.6 Also. there is no recognition of any determination of essence in natural science that can be more than epistemically contingent. At the end of the A na/ytics Aristotle distinguishes opinion and calculation from scientific knowledge (episteme) and i.ntuition (nous). The former, as epistemicstates, admit of error while the latter are always true. Intuition is more accurate (akribesteron) than scientific knowledge and it is through intuition that the principles of the latter are apprehended. The interpretation of these epistemic states and the defense of an epistemology in terms of them has been a matter of constant dispute in the history of Aristotelianism. 7 The problems are bypassed wh~n tr~th is taken as r~dically nonepistemic and specified as the condition of metaphysical.necessity in a determination of essence-if true, then metaphysically necessary. I want to urge that concern with t.~!!..~ ~.pistemologiGal.issues.leads.with Kant to a radically different ae!:2!ch to categories. But i want first to
de'VC10lf"$-61hesaIiCitf pOints-of contraIt..Eetwee~_ t~e ~o 2Eproaches...

III
. With the AristoteliaILoQ~9IQgi!(a~alUIIJUlCh, we JtIU!!Ul9~, lhere J! !!O ~ principle by whlcfi an exact number of accidental categories is determined. ..' .

1'Iieft~~ib,~;pti~c.i~~th~

~i~~~~~_ef~u~st~~!!:<?m!!pc!~f:_~n

the focus ISon this pnnclple, ~s It ISwltli Knpke and Putnam, the question of distinguishing different accidental categories need not even arise. The important thing is to see that a statement like 'Water is H20' expresses a genuine identity (a determination of essence) and is fundamentally differenffrom a statement like 'Water is thirst-quenching'. It is not a question of like moment whether the latter represents predication in the category of quality or of rela.tion. or even whether two such categories should be distinguished at all...Wi.tb.. a Ka~t~,1! e~i~lU9.lQgi!::aJ.!lu~tQ8,ibon the othe~ it is di~ult fJ.1A~

<...t1ieonus seeki!t~ an exhaustive li~t...2!..~g~ of

A-ramttrmental difference between the two approaches stands O\1.t learly c
'

in the way each uses the notion of combination in determining the number of
categories. According to Aristotle, an expression in no way combined

--

..

--

...-

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signifies an entity falling undeLa categ.l>ry, so that the number of categories correspondstotl1e diff~ennorms o! u.nc2Il1pin~_a~R!s.iQIlS~(Caiegories ~). WitlrKant, on the other hand, the differenl!.~.Qlt.2lc?!!!EW~a!~on (synthesis) disclosedj)Y~Ji.Mb:~s...2f combined (sY.!J!.~~d) tx~~~orresponds t~ the number oLcateg2ties (A 70-80 = B 95-106). !b.~.t~R!PPL~hsm.~ thus be cont!asted.roug.1!.!y ~J 2ne whic~ b~gin~ ~!th...a_cl.assif!:ation of terms i!iafSlgniry thjngs (categQr~~ti~r.ms) !nd prpceeds to a cla~i[i~!rd_n'~' forms of PJgp.Q~itio1l.LPf()~h,c~ by_ c.Q.!D..Piping rlbese t~ms (as Aristotle proceea8from Categories to De Interpretatione),!,!'ld o1)e~hiqh~moyes.in th~ ~e.posi~cz.J!Y:.~Sti>.1l (as K~t J'.ro.~eeds.from_a table of .wrms of judgments to categories as conc<;.pts2f j\n obJ~,t..)n_~ne!.~p. g . -TO ti&e "the difference between the approaches as that of opposing attitudes toward wor9-m~a~il1g and selJ!en..~~g places an emphasis on language that is foreign to both Aristotle and Kant. F.Qf Aris!o_tle, what makes an expression one and in no way combined is northat it consists of what counts grammatically as a single word but that it signit'j~s S'Ps...t.h!.ng.:, 'Two-footed land animal', though composed of several words, signifies ~ thiD&t~ ~at\1ralls}!!9.; and 'in the Lyceum' signifies a single accident, a place that happens at some time to belong to a particular substance.8 'Musical man', though, is not one expression, for it does not signify one thing b~_cQ'mp.Qsite of substance aqsi ~c!dC(nt.Bu!.!!.b~s,omes one,combined ex~s.siQ~when ~ncat~~oremaEc wo_rdsar..(Ladd~d~.p..P.J.S>P.Ji!!iely~ 'Some as in man is musical', which is a single affirmation signifying one thing about one thing. 'Man is a two-footed land animal', one the other hand, as a (real) definition has the unity of an uncombined expression, for it signifies one thing.9 A la Putnam and Kripke, it expresses a genuine identity and is like 'Water is H20' in contrast to the single affirmation 'Water is thirst.

whatever the categorematic terms comprising subject and predicate. With the introduction of infinte nouns and modal terms in the later chapters, further forms are distinguished. Kant saw in this analysis an exhaustive list of possible forms of combination under the headings of quantity, quality, and modality. He saw the list as complete with the addition of a further heading, relation, in which concepts are related as subject and predicate and judgments are related as antecedent and consequent and as members of a disjunctive

series.

Kant's claim,to have presented a complete list of logical forms of combination has received little acceptance and I do not propose to argue the '!!li~!l A.r.i~!..o~ " claim. JI He accepted his list ~ affordi.!!g_!!t~ .P!i!l_c!pJe,_ J!C~s,j.9r ~1.~r:miQ1ng(providing "the clue" to the discovery of) .a.com.plete., table of ca.!gg,des. I want here to c.onsider 'first how Kant's t;.pjstemologi.cal
approa~h placed him under the

of providing

an exhaustive

list of

categories, and then turn to a further basic requirement of a theory of categories demanded by his approach. (1) We noted that Aristotle regarded signification of substance as a necessary condition for any meaningful utterance and that he argued from this necessity to the certainty of the principle of contradiction. As he ititially formulates it in Metaphysics IV, the principle declares that "the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not bel1hg to the same subject and in the same respect" (1005 b 19-20). In the dialectical argument for the certainty of the principle, the distinction between subject and attribute or predicate is given ontological import as the distinction between ~ubstance and accident. Ontologically, !.h.S:J..!.s then...butone.<form of combination, that of S~~~!!.!lC(..iM..acclaent,...and_bul Qn~e fO.Tmof 1111itX.tbat_()fsubstance. Different categories of accidents do not determine further forms of combination
.

quenching'.

The fundj~~.JHl.U,Y.J:or Kant is in the thou~h.!.~p.res~2 r..ath~!..~!fn in the16il)&.~Jgllifi~d. It is a unity YW~ghJ~r2~gh.. cl?mbinatiol! or. syqtbe~l~ of r~2!eSentations...and.iiOr toe unity of an obj~ct in jtsel( indeRe~d~nt",Qf. repiesent~tiol). The forms of combination found in ..Ar.llio~ De Interpretatione provide cOQ<J,itio.ntf<u:J!1!i!Y...gf ~j)&e"lJtl!.tion, whatever the objects represented, although abstraction from all reference to objects was hardly intended by Aristotle. With this abstraction from all content, a~ Kant phrased it, there is no distinction to be made between the unity of a single affirmation and the unity of a real definition. 'Water is thirst-quenching' and 'Water is H20' do not differ as forms of combination. AristoEJi3:n es..sen,: tialism ha~.!!? ..P~~_iJ!..~n!j,~.n.ltl].llscende.ntqJ..tWlosop.hy.~10 The square of opposition in De Interpretatione 7 distinguishes forms of combination determined solely by differences in syncategorematic terms

categorematj.wolds pr~l1Ppoe a1J.din"nO:W:-~y_det~mi~~~~l!2de~. ~w. ,non.e~d to argue for the cedainty of the principfe oX,.CQfJJra<ti;gon; It was for him a "!!1erely f?rmal" priI1ciRle, "'!Yithout c.gntent." As "the universal and completely sufficient P':i!icjp.!!. f:aij anajytic know/~dge" its certainty was assured (A 151 = B 191). ~s "Jl~alytic" it was l1n9!1sJl0I}a~ly a priori for Kant and his contempor:ari.es. His concern was to argue for a previously unrecogrnzeo ~.J!!hs.ti.!...P!ic.!riwhile he assumed an already admitted analytic a priori. His theory of ~ategories provided the foundations for _OfC 'ec\ ~<;/' this undertaking.tC"entral t9 ~~e.p!,9.JS.! was his.claim thaUh~ejo.r.1pJ. O!.ll: bination qiscloseOJ5Y formallpp;ip e~l~c9.r.r.t;.~P9nd to the fOI:f\\~under . --"0/" which a manifold of sensible intuition is united in the cognition of an object. ~syntl1eticelem-eiit is IDtroauced bVJlJ.eJ.!1;therc~aimthat tfie manifold is in.

but only different headings under which what is accidental to a substance is specified. ~~m~ o.(JQgical combinatioJ1marked by _ u~l?s _Q(.1lifft;ren~

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time, so that.tpe~ob~t i itially giv~~Y,'!2e! for~s of_re_<zJ.!ivi9'..!.~ace_~!1d c~nizea a~_sp..atiotempo[aI. 2!'.ills ~! ~m.~nation _ <:.anthus JU!1~o~ a~
.

~e2ori~s.-!. c.9J1.Cepts applicable to obj~cts-Q!lly ~nqer ca~d~.!ls,,!hatre.llilcliheir ~ppJication to spatiotemporakobjects. In KantiaqJ~I.roil}.2.128Y."

categoriesust~,:~s.ch~m.a!iz~~"}n, qrder tof!.1~cti2~ as 7.at~g2!ies. Forms receptivity introduce a synthetic element because the principle of contradiction does not provide a sufficient condition for their determination as it does for the analytic relations in Aristotle's square of opposition. Lt is not self-contradictory to deny the three-dimensionality of space or the onedimensionality of time as it is to deny the incompatibility between universal .

tor) is the 4itinction between substan~ :md a\;c~dent.-On the~pi!~!!l2!.2gi~l eJ~i,stemic side th~_a ,.riori f~ct.o.~ is._a5=commod~t~~_b.x..c!!~~?!i.ul~~~~..an . . 1'aCliftY for the apprehensIOnof essence(nous or IOtUltlve reason)'from the ap,

prehension through sensibiihy of accide~ts. Without prior support from ontolOgfthis epistemoiogical distinction has seemed ad hoc and arbitrary.

affirmative and particular negative judgments.

of' But although not determined by analytic truths, the formal 4.et~JmW!ltions of space and time w.r.D.Q!l~Jheess a priori, Ka..ntar~ues, b~cause they l rested OR-pure q.edoJi i,ntJlition. 1J.1s..sch~matization of categories no less tnan, tb~_analy.tiq.",determination. of their number i~.Jhus_t() b~ esta!?Us~ed 13.. J>lWi. I.!!.,maki!l8.. claim to a prioriknowledge Kant is under the onus of this pr:oviding not only an exhaustive list of forms of judgment DY which the nY9)b~r o(c~t~gqries is fixed" butillso.aii exh~ustl;e"1ist o"f'forms'of receptivity by ~I.!!~tegories are~hema~i~ed. To renounce the onus would be to accept that subsequent inquIry may always disclose further categories or further forms of receptivity, and with this acceptance the inquiry becomes a posteriori. In maintaining the completeness of his table of judgments Kant intended nothing like completeness in the s~nse of a completeness proof of first-order predicate logic. There is no indication that he ever thought of proving the completeness of his table any more than the completeness of his enumeration of forms of receptivity. Indeed, he seems to have regarded the question of completeness in the two cases as on the same footing. He sp-oJ5,CU1f:'why, ~~_ have just thes~..and !!22ther functions of judgment, ~r ,,!hyJ~c~, a_n~time ate_ ~y forms of our possible in.tuitton"as question,s equ~Jly,incapJlb~ 9f e~J!l!n~!iQn. 01.146). But in addition to the demand for completeness Kant's 9"') .1 epistemological approach imposes a further basic reqyJrem~nt on a theory gf ~

~if~g..9rjes.

(2) Kandan in_c2!1!ra~Lto ~istote~clUegQrjes .!;iCe "concep,ts of an ~ Q~ct in ~eneral" (B 128) rather tha~ghest.genera_9fob~ts. They thus (as () schematized) provide criteri;:i for deciding what counts as an object at all .. -, , ._ OWI_, rather than what~nt;-;; . an object of one or anothersort. Arist;tle, as we ~~..,.. _~ _ ".~... ' ' have seen, argued ~ialecftcaHylfiat slgmfication presupposes an objective world consisting of substances with essential natures and accidents incapable of existence apart from substances. In the enumeration of categories the only

Beginning epistemologically as Kant did, we,must ask how objects.are determTned at;ll.before ;e~'Sk~' sUbst;;;ce~~r~ ~Q:Vn ;e~rt -(tOijV.c.cidents_ TIle-distinction between subsiance and accident may then emerge, as it did 'with Kant, as a single category within an a priori scheme rather than a principle presupposed in an a posteriori enumeration of categories: Kantian a priori intuition and Aristoteli./ln nous, in their epistemological functions, contrast as determinations, respectively, of individual and specific identity. Through nous an object is..aBPJ:.t;h~IUle(Las ~ember,()f a}la~~!al a kind but n01 as one rather than another individual member. Aristotle often speaks ollOdividuals of the sa~~cr;s' :;" diTr;ring in their accidents, but he does not adduce a principle that limits the extent to which they may be alike in their accidents. Since he included place and time among his accidental ,c~~ort~, one ..!!!igbt con;l.Y.dC!. t6~t ~o~ever much t\Y..o.. individuals.. of the same species may be aliJ<einJheir accidents they cannot share the accident of b~nj in a gJven.,ela~elll.!,giveE...H!!1j.Jlut diis conclusion hardly goes with examples like 'in the Lyceum' and 'yesterday'. Individuation with Aristotle remains a question for the metaphysics of form and matter and is not to be decided by an application of categories, which distinguish only kinds of being. In epistemology he could maintain that "though the act of sense perception is of the particular, its content is universal-is man, for example, not the man Callias" (An. Post, 100a 16-b 1). In Kant's..ep.is..t~1)1.olog.y, the other hand, in~tead of intellectual intuion \~~ tion o~r':i'ousthat apprehends essence there is sensible intuition wi~b.A.JUiw'i foi'iTiS;s ace an'-"~tfiat serve to individuate ob~ts. Even if there is no diference whatever in the conceptual determinations of two objects, "diffi:r.cw:e ,of..8J!a!Ll!lp()itj()l\.l!,t o~and the same time.is still an adeguategr9~2 [o!!l:e numerical dif[e.!!J{()f t!leQl>,iss.t" (A 263 = B 319). Th.e..statement .that_ categorie& ate..c.QJlc.\WJ .of.,l\u, o~j~ctjn ~enet!lLJs !h.P~ lim.i.ted, whe.n_tb~e. an categories _are ~~hematized, \2.. concepts <>L object individuated by ,spatiotemporal position. There is no place for an Aristotelian doctrine of caTegories tliat presupposes a principle for the individuation of substances established a priori in metaphysics and offers an a posteriori enumeration of accidental categories. The .K.a.ntian doctrine remains eJ2iste!n.9.lQgLc.il throu~hout and presuppo.~~~,~~ing_ f~~~'!1_ ~~_t~hy"s.ic~.It was to provide an
_... , ~ ,.., .: .,......---...-

factor immune to alteration as inquiry proceeds (hence the only a ~ri

fac.

met~hysics onJhe Ql!isof whichjts I!-J}.tbor <;ould a~riori ~.~!?~.!,Of wr!!~ prologomena tQ any future metaphYJiics.

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That ~ theory of categories should be accompanied by a claim to completeness and that it should provide a principle of individuation are requirements of Kant's epistemological approach that have had considerable acceptance in subsequent theories of categories. The acceptance, however, has been mainly of the requirements themselves rather than of Kant's proposals for meeting them.

IV

~'The quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation," uin.~writes in Word and Objeci," is not to be distinguished from a quest of. u timate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality."'2 The pattern of canonical notation Quine intends is that in which "the constructions on sentences" (forms of combination) "are limited to quantification and truth functions" (231). He claims completeness for the pattern in the sense that while it excludes. constructions using intentional idioms it contains all we need if "we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality" (221). Although, as with Kant, this is not completeness in the formal sense of a completeness proof, it also differs essentially from the completeness claim Kant made for his table of judgments and forms of.intuition. As Quine renounces any claim to a priori knowledge, analytic or synthetic, he is under no onus to claim completeness in the sense of being immune to revision. He associates the com~~nes~of hi~ canonical notation with the ~doe.~ tion of a certain philosophic!!! "attitude." The attitude'is one that proclaims the emptil1cssorrnlentfonal1dioms In philosophical use while acknowledgirtg their practical indispensability in daily life (221). Although Quine clearly intends to persuade his readers of the reasonableness of this attitude, he offers no arguments to show the unavoidable necessity of adopting it. Since all such transcendental arguments in their pronouncements of necessity must make philosophical use of intentional idioms, they are precluded by the attitude in question and cannot be invoked to justify its adoption. Although the ~ttitude

...

With his di~vo~~,Il~le!!ge Qu~also develops a radically ~nKantian way 0 satls ~ing the .secoqg requirement imposed ~y".aKa!ltia.!LoJ;\ ep'lsTemQIogifl!.!.:t["e.,ory-oLs!!l~g~, th3! Qf P.I"9vidi.Qg_ princip~ of jn~ a dividuation. Kant's RrinciQle, as we noted, indivtdua~ f2y.Rrocla,i!.riipgdif;.:~ Ference in spati~11JltoraI19~tion..M.J.uffi<:ie.!1t t9_es~abIlsh the nwnerica/.di}. ference of the object~ Since two objects may thus differ and yet be identical in all their conceptual determinations (in all the predicates that distinguish them as conceivable objects), Kant's principle does not afford a sufficient criterio!) for numerical identity-for conceptually identifying an individual object uni- -I quely. Such identification remained for Kant an a posteriori matter, and because of the logical possibility that two existing objects may be identical in all their conceptual determinations. there is no a priori assurance that the i~entification can be accomplished. All that is a priori is the knowledge that arty obj~1.PJ>ssible.~~p~d.eQ.ge (anl obJect t9 j0!w6~~~Jegoty~'of existence can be applied) necessarily diffc:.rslro!11_e.Y~ry-o.!ber in!ts.~patial.posi; tion-at"'a 'given~tijpe, -wfi'ii'tever'its conceptual determinations. ~ Wi!ltout a IS~~n view 9.fP.!i~and ti!!!e as a 12!!2ri~2fjntuiti0!1.:.. spatiotem..,0!:!l12!d!th>!Uem.ail!s.~impJy an.,other C2IlCc;P.!I,!!Lq~tC?tm1!ta!ion of oojects and there is no apriori assurance that all existing objects are .spatiotemporally determined. Individuation must then be faced directly as a question of conditions for applicatiori of the identity predicate itself and not indirectly as a question of numerical difference among conceptually indistinguishable objects. While Kant had no place for Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles as a principle applicable to existing objects (A 272 = B 328), Quine maintained a "mild" form of this principle as indispensable in his <"I..canonical notation (130). With Kantiall s.ateg,9!Jc;.s ther~js no pbject wjthout V the conditions of possible experience; with Quineari canonical notation there

..

isnoeiITiWWiI1UUUJ~1f$': - - 0

does not preclude explaining its adoption or nonadoption as the result of psychological and sociological factors, such explanation is not to: be confused with justification. This confusion, Quine has noted ~lsewhere, leads one into the paradoxical situation of maintaining that since all attitudes are culture-

bound all are justified,includingthe attitude that some are not culture-i'
bound.13 With Quinean "naturalized epistemology" one eschews any notion of ultimalCjustifu:aUOh":"lfi"1tdoptiiigQuine's attitude toward the completness of canonical notation one can only say, as Quine does: "I philosophize from t~a"ta~e eoint only ~f our own ~rovincia.tconceptl1;U.schemeluJ sCienOI1~ epoch. true; but I '!now_no ~better...::J4 ..

--

In K.antj1!!!.JC!~IJ1~, ~n~s..re~cli2.IL.o! s~;.e an.s.ti"!e ~~)~ie!,qil!gjlJ?_rinc!gle of ind!!!~~~lli>qjs t~t~9ttP")'ejpctJo!1. .of the.J).eeQ..to..spb~matize ~a!.egori~s. Strawson is close to agreement with Quine concerning "the clue" to categories provided by formal logic. When Kant's table ofjydgments is reduced to "the minimum that the logician must acknowledge in the way of logical ~orms," it yields, Strawson contends, but a "single notion" to which "we must turn" if "we are to make any use of the clue provided by formallogic."15 This notion is the distinction between the general and the singular-between predicates and definite singular terms. But when formal logic is further reduced by Quine's elimination of. singular. terms, the "single notion" becomes just the distinction between predicates and variables of quantification. The notion in this reduced form satisfies the completeness requirement for the formal conditions determining concepts of an object in general if we

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adopt Quine's attitude and proscribe philosophical use of intentional idioms. Strawson, however, adopts a different attitude and argues that quantification presupposes "the identificatory function characteristically performed by

definite singular terms referring to particulars."'6

Th~ntificat~IY.. [\!Qction, as Strawson views it, cannot be analyzed without use of intentional idioms. T.beJu,!.1ctionis performed when a ~eaker succeeds in identifying for ot~ 2l.!~l'i!i!E..(fed ref~,~ence.Success ~s-pOssibl~lyif speak~r and a~~!.i~~ .!har~!!. H~~ary sp~tiotemporal frame~ort..wlthin..which they. b~Ul have a p!~. Spatiotemporal objects are toen "the basic particul;rs" p;'esupposed in all signification. "This point," Straws on comments, "is the same as that made by Kant in saying that space and time are our. only forins. of lJ;1t!!!Iion."'7 Like-Kant an<funlike Quine, ~n thu;bas...!SeJQatj~~d.ca~~gQW:s and therefore has no place in his categoreal scheme for a version of Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles as a principle applicable to primary existents. Yet unlike Kant, Strawson does flot hqJ9 tgat ~t~lishing ~pace and, time asa prion forms ofi'!.t!Etf~rsJt!frlcknt..,tQ.~sfv. the re9J!.iL&.ooen,UQilt athe~y ..!.tego~~s p~ic:!C?U'!W.cili>~ ~diY.~~l.!2n. .Even if we \<n~wa priori that bodies (basic particulars) are a ways observed 10 space and time, this knowledge, as Kant recognized, assures us only of the npm~J~cal difference of bodies observed in different places at the same time.lt<!2giJ1ot ~s: sure us"of1lie numerical identity of a body observed at different times. Yet unless we are at'leasts<imetimes assured 'Ofthe Tatter we"11"ave- basis, no Strawson argues, for maintaining that bodies observed at different times are observed in the same space. For we can attach no meaning to 'in the same space' except with reference to a point of origin for a set of spatial. coordinates. If we could never reidentify a point of origin during stretches of discontinuous observation, we could never know whether the objects observed during different stretches were in the same' space or were merely spatial. Reidentification of basic particulars is thus a nece~sary_condition for a .un: .}. itary !pa..~l<?_tem..E0ra! f!9:..mew~k w!thi~ ,!~h spe~~~~~~audie~c~ co~e "01iavea place. APart from sucli a rramework sChematJzeo categones cannot provide Ii principle of individuation for objects observed at different times, and identification can at most succeed momentarily while speaker and audience are both observing the same object. Strawson's argument in Individuals for the necessity of reidentification has been celebrated as a paradigm of transcendental argument. I do not have space to discuss the argument. I want here only to suggest that whether:called "transcendental" or not it is fundamentally different from the sort of arguments one finds in the Critique of Pure Reason in support of Kant's theory of \ categories. I remarked above that e~tablishing .the numer-ical identHy .Qf..au.
'.,

object-conceptually identifying it uniquely-was an a posteriori matter for ~t. The same holdsL Uhink, for .!~id~ti!!.cation'.Vf-e haye no~a priori ~,s: .J surance that we can ever discern properties of an object that wIll suffice to ~eidentifY,..itt~~ ~e'S.t!i~e~':..e 2~~!.Y.fit: 'y et daim~ of reidentification are . commonplace in our expenence. In makmg such claims, Kant would agree, we necessarily presuppose that all objects of possible experience are given in a single space and time. This presupposition is purportedly established as a synthetic a priori truth in the Transcendental Aesthetic, providjvg the fOUJ1..datiol for a doctrine of schel11..~izedcategories.
'
,

Strawson finds Kant's a~ent

in the Aesthetic insufficientto establish

the objectivity of space and time, and in effect his argument is the reverse of Kant's. Instead of arguing for the necessity of the presupposition he argues , for the necessity of realizing in experience the condition of its employment. We' presuppose that our world consists of objects in a single spatiotemporal system, and "the condition of having such a system is precisely the condition that there should be satisfiable and commonly satisfied criteria for the identity of at least some items in one sub-system with some items in the other."IS Without this reidentification we could not employ the presupposition, for we would have no assurances that with each stretch of discontinuous observation we do not experience objects in totally different spatiotemporal systems rather than in sub-systems of a single system. ~ant's transcendentaLargu;; ments in ~e.~~!~,eti~, a.s.~tra)N.so~in.t.e&pr.ets..them,assu.re..us~at-most-t.hat .

~ ~'possibl.e e~eri~nce further necessary condltWD.Lor ~ &mgle.obJ<t,.c are ~Qiectivel~slZati~t~m~ral. !h~ oJ. successful reidentJficatJon IS a
tiV~!J)(~mpo(aUEamewoH<."
SiraWS'OIii app.~~J!O t~e f~9t of !uccessJ!ll reiaentification.has led some to claim that transcendeQtaLargumc;.nj}Jeston a. verlficatio~ princie.1e, but ].EQ.nQt iWllk Sl!S a~~ume1l!!J1,(~K~!}ti~..'9.

v
At the close of section II I said I wanted to urge that concern with epistemological issues spawns Kantian approaches to categories. A~t\!~stotle .

developed the point that significatio~resuPPoJ~r~!i0!1 qLl11~aplQg jective ~eJ.s!re !lbec!..I1!C?J~.2P.l<M-Qg~1octrin..e)!t~.w~ wo~~.,.on..slst~?f d sU6Siiinc~~}Yj!h r~!lt~.e~~Q.!!.~LJi.nP. accidentawr.qp,ertJ~s. 00 the

~~-

eplstemolo~ical si~ !h.ete~a_~ .PJ!.r~~jn~pI:.o.c.lajmWg

an,P!S!!f.!Dj

faculty for the apprehension o~~nc~ a~-!!istin~m~e 'p:!cel't!~n, wliICIican only al?P're!t~ggJ!.cidei1ts.The ground for this division of faculties w;Sontologicaf" or-metaphysical and not epistemological. To deny the division is to deny the possibility of identifying substance apart from a collection of accidents, and thereby the possibility of signification, of meaning fixed ob-

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MANLEY THOMPSON

PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO CATEGORIES

351

jectively by what an object is in itselfrather than subjectively by appearances. The distinction between substance and accident is basic not only for ~111010gyl5uratsofor 1ogIC,-as even -the prInciple of contraalCtionis - 'this Aristotelian appro~ch' may b;10110wed as long as one does not question the objectivity of an identification of substance apart from a collection of accidents. But if the objectivity of what is advanced as the condition of objectivity is questioned, a radically different approach is in order. The crucial issue is whether on!..~~estion the f!..bj,ectfv!JJL !.~i~_conditio"-.. of w~thout a~ the sam..!.ti!!!e q~~s!!!!,'!!..niJli/:;i.inciP.leoi.ntaMii.(jon.-rr;contrary to Aristotle, one can, then formal logic by itself provides conditions of coherent discourse within which one may debate conditions of objectivity and find the clue to a complete list of categories as a priori concepts of an object in general. Initially, then, one assumes no epistemic faculty other than that of thought or discursive activity, and conditions of objectivity are determined as categories are related to the input of sensibility, a second epistemic faculty. ObiectivityjUbuLaco~qt~<lfQr...epi!.t~mi9.qlly lYitb9~t m~t!!..ehY.!!~~~~!PPtions about the constitution of ob~~cts in themselves. ~th categgr.Ui.L~ <;oncepls~or an object in geneni\..oi~viiy_h~coriies simply aquestion of~s,.:.. ,\ ta11lm1ing"tlrat"tlierc'are objects and not that there are substances apart from collections of acciaents. IndiViduation becomesa queSTIOn howan 06Jecf Is or k!10wn as_a.!1 i~~<!.tJ_~l r~h~ thanpo)Yjt diff~,tsJrom other 0.b1ect~ identjs:& in s~cies. The conditions of individuation must be soughtin the conditions of .0 ~nsibility and nofiilthe _co.!iSli(ut!<m,Q'f"'an obje.c1a.~'S2~posite of form and ~. But then the q~estion re111.~il1$ whether !.Q!iori forms orsen~bili!y are sufficient to establish a single objective framework for individuation or of-2bj~~ "~ijinN:'ili'~-':~WO!!<. is sh2~~ W~!~j~~d~n!i!i.!tio",l'J'.. transceE~tal_aJgYmenLt.o_J2.e_a..illtt~~9.D.d.u.LQn_ One may bypass aU questions of establishing objectivity by transcendental arguments if one takes a Quinean attitude toward philosophical use of intentional idioms. While Quine finds conditions of individuation within the framework of his canonical notation without reference to conditions of sensibility, he still turns to sensory input in the form of "observation sentences" when he offers an epistemological account of truth in natural science. The account is epistemological, of course, only in the Quinean sense of naturalized epistemology. The truth of science is accounted for within science itself and not within an epistemology that claims to transcend science and to establish its presuppositions. Although Quine views logical truth as truth determined solely by the dictates of canonical notation and as tending to remain fixed while truth determined inductively within the course of science varies, he does not find in this view any reason for according logical truth a special epistemic

defended ul'ifmately by aQpeal to-the-distinction. -

'-

status to be marked by labels like 'analytic' and 'a priori'. Ultimate categories determined by canonical notation are "ultimate" only in the rel~tive sens.e of representing what we are least likely 'to give up. To demand absolute ultimacy IS to abandon the Quinean philosophical attitude. Th~ absolut~ IIltimacy-Atistotle f2u.l1c!in tije distintiQn hp.t}Vp.p.Q substan~e and ~c:iden~ is ~~~!~r~ed

B~ msof~r a~ ITie reaffirmation IS supported finally by an affirmation of truth as ~~carIY nonepfsteriiic;~'ifssupport reduces to a-pnilos(jphkal' at=~cre:-:rfie a~titud~, .though, unlike Quine's does not preclude phiiosophical use of mtentlOnal IdIOms, so transcendental arguments for the unavoidable necessity of its adoption need not be self-referentially incoherent. 20 Incoherence will come, if it comes, from failure to accommodate both eplstemic. demand.1!:tat truth J1e c!!flr1!l~d .by oJ)s~r.Y!tion and~ht!... m~taphyslcal demand that truth depends on what is the case and not on what we.1ak~ ,to bethe cas~: BOth ~.;;~;a-s ;re !.e~o&niz;j I~ ~if(erent ways in Anstotehan and.-Kant.lan~!!pproacQ~()..a~gories, and claims to satisfy them are sur1l2..orled Yctranscendental argumeIJts21 w~henfiley are supported ~

~~e_ eS~l2!!aJism

of Kripke and Putnam.

and not;reducedto ., philosophical attitndes. __ ~, ,'r,

The University of Chicago

- - .~.-

Manley Thompson

NOTES
.1. All quotations from the Critique are from the translation by Norman Kemp Smith, 1929. 2. All quotations from Aristotle are from the Oxford edition of The Works of Aristotle ~~anslated into E..ngli~h,ed. W. D. Ross. In the passage quoted above, the Oxford editIOn translates semamon as "denotes" rather than ..signifies I prefer the !atter because "denotes" suggests a contrast with "connotes," which I think was not Intended by Aristotle. I have used "signify" here because 'it is how the Oxford translators usually render the verbsemainon, though in this case "represent" might be clo~er to Aristotle's meaning. 3: See the note to 986a 23 in the Oxford edition. 4. Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer. sity Press, 1975), p. 233. '5. Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London & Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 125. With this admission Putnam finds his earlier essentialism as "metaphysical realism" to be incoherent. .6. I~ his most recent book, Reason. Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge Umverslty Press, 1981), Putnam seems close to arguments of this sort. See esp. the paper "Bra!ns in .a Vat.:' But wit~ the .qualifications he expresses on p. 16 he stops short of Anstoteltan claims to a dialectical demonstration of metaphysical necessity.

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MANLEY THOMPSON

He says his "procedure has a close relation to what Kant called a 'transcendental' investigation," although it is not "wholly independent. of empirical assumptions.'.' I make no attempt to characterize Putnam's lattir position. 7. For a recent discussion of the issues, see Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics Translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 256-60. 8. Cf. J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione Translated with Notes and Glossary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 73-74.

THINKING,

THOUGHT,

AND CATEGORIES

9. Ibid., p. 126.

. .
..

10. This is not to say that Kant drew no distinction between a real definition and the mere ascription of a property. See Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Theory of Definition," Philosophical Review, 65 (1956): 179-91. Reprinted in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.,

Thinking is often thought of as a kind of connecting-in the sense of

1967),pp. 23-36.

II. The ~Iaim has been defended in detail by Klaus Reich, Die Vollstandigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel (Berlin: Richard Schoetz, 1932; 2nd ed., 1948). .Reich's defense is expounded sympathetically by James Ellington, Immanuel Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Translated with Introduction and Essay (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), pp. i50-73. 12. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), p. 161. Page references to this work are given in the text in parentheses. 13. "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World," Erkenntnis, ~ (1975): 327-28. 14. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New Yor~: Columbia University . Press, 1969), p. 25.. ..

15. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds o/Sense (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), pp. 80-81. 16. "Singular Terms and Predication," Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1961): 411. RepriQtedin Words and Objections,eds. D. Davidson & J. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Hoiland: D. Reidel publishing Co., 1.969)p. 115. 17. Individuals (London: Methuen & Co., 1959), p. 119. 18. Ibid., p. 35. 19. The need for a verifi~ation principle has been argued by Barry Stroud, "Transcendental Arguments," Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 241-56. Stroud's paper has sparked a number of replies. For a critical discussionof the issue, see Peter Hacker, "Are Transcendental Arguments a Version of Verificationism?" American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1972): 78-85. For further: references, consult the bibliography in Jonathan Bennett, "Analytic Transcendental Arguments," TranscendentalArguments and Science, eds. P. Bieri, R. Jlortsman, & L. KrUger (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979),pp.~~'-64. For the reader interested in locating the issue of verificationism in Kant, I suggest turning, not to the transcendental arguments in the Analytic, but to the Appendix to the Dialectic, esp. A 648 - B 676 and A 651-54 = B 679-82.
.

searching for pre-existent connections and exhibiting what has been found; in the sense of making connections and exhibiting what has been m.ade; or in some third sense which combines the former with the latter in some way: In explicitly or implicitly employing certain methods in one's thinking one ipso facto uses so-called "categories," Le., concepts of high generality, char;1cterizing aspects of whatever exists or can be thought. Aristotle, who conceived of thinking mainly as finding, Kant, who conceived of it mainly as making and some of their successors set themselves the task of listing, clarifying and justifying a set of categories, which in each case was judged by the philosopher who propounded it to be uniquely necessary and thus absolutely . perferable to any competing set. The aim of this essay is rather different. It is to locate the origin of categories in certain general methods of thinking; to draw attention to the po~sibility of different and mutually exclusive sets of categories being legitimately employed; and to throw light on the relation of a set of categories to the system of beliefs of which it forms part. The essay begins by considering.the methods of deductive organization and epistemic stratification (I). It then discusses classification and instantiation as well as composition and partition (2); interpretation, objectivization and idealization (3); and the distinction between independent and dependent particulars and attributes (4). After these preparations some category questions are raised and answered (5). The essay concludes by briefly explaining the notion of a categorial framework and by indicating how using it avoids the mistakes of both a priori absolutism and psychologism (6).' 1. Deductive organization and epistemic stratification Deductive organization and epistemic stratification constitute constraints on all thought and thinking, including thinking in and about categories. To organize one's thinking deductively or logically is to conform to principles of consistency and principles of deductive inference, defined in terms oflogical implication between compound propositions, the components 0'( which are combined by means of connectives, quantifiers and, sometimes, modal or other operators. There are more ways than one of deductive

20. For arguments close to this sort., see the references to Putnam above, nn5 and 6. 21. A reading of Aristotle's arguments in Metaphysics IV for the necessity of distinguishing substance from accident and accepting the principle of contradiction as

'1-

transcendental arguments is given .in T. H. Irwin, "Aristotle's Dis.covery of Metaphysics," Review of Metaphysics 31 (1977): 210-29. See esp. pp. 225-26.