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December9,2011 PerformanceSinceInception1
HSIK MXCN TPX MXAP OwlCreekAsiaI,LP* Gros s 29.06% 46.38% 56.51% 8.55% 1.79% 0.46% 1.11% 0.99% 0.64% 4.75% 0.19% 8.24% 13.77% 12.94% 9.23% 19.40% 5.24% 36.30% 50.74% 62.45% 5.06% 0.24% 1.89% 5.18% 1.50% 0.47% 3.62% 0.65% 9.37% 16.80% 14.86% 8.28% 20.15% 8.50% 16.42% 40.70% 7.68% 0.75% 1.26% 4.56% 7.62% 2.01% 1.56% 1.32% 0.92% 8.38% 0.37% 0.38% 4.65% 17.26% 55.51% 4.37% 41.57% 37.86% 17.30% 0.77% 0.81% 0.79% 2.84% 2.03% 0.69% 1.54% 8.29% 8.91% 7.67% 6.52% 15.21% 16.40% JulDec2007* 2008 2009 2010 Ja n11 Feb11 Ma r11 Apr11 Ma y11 Jun11 Jul 11 Aug11 Sep11 Oct11 Es ti ma ted Nov11 Estimated YTDthruNov11 Estimated ITDthruNov11 22.32% 21.64% 23.64% 5.80% 0.32% 1.36% 0.40% 5.51% 0.88% 0.48% 5.00% 6.74% 12.62% 6.29% 0.3% 1.6% 23.4% Net 17.86% 21.64% 23.64% 5.16% 0.32% 1.15% 0.32% 4.42% 0.71% 0.36% 4.06% 5.53% 11.56% 6.29% 0.3% 1.6% 18.1% OwlCreekAsiaII,LP* Gros s 23.36% 20.98% 25.47% 7.69% 0.32% 1.41% 0.55% 5.64% 1.34% 0.54% 5.08% 7.06% 12.79% 6.50% 0.4% 1.1% 30.2% Net 18.69% 20.98% 25.47% 6.21% 0.32% 1.19% 0.44% 4.53% 1.08% 0.42% 4.14% 5.80% 11.64% 6.50% 0.4% 1.1% 23.6% OwlCreekAsiaFund, Ltd* Gros s 26.28% 20.54% 34.12% 8.04% 0.33% 1.44% 0.55% 5.71% 1.43% 0.53% 5.07% 7.09% 12.90% 6.79% 0.5% 1.0% 44.0% Net 21.02% 20.54% 32.28% 6.46% 0.33% 1.22% 0.44% 4.58% 1.16% 0.41% 4.13% 5.83% 11.73% 6.79% 0.5% 1.0% 34.1%

*InceptionDatewasJuly2,2007.

DearFriendsandInvestors: Forthethirdquarterof2011,theOwlCreekAsiaFund,Ltd.(theFund)wasdown15.0%grossand 13.4%netbringingourperformancefortheyearto6.8%grossand6.8%net,comparedtoMSCI Chinadown24.2%andTOPIXdown13.5%throughSeptember. In October and November, the Fund was up an estimated 6.3% gross and net bringing our performancefortheyeartoanestimated1.0%grossandnetversusMSCIChinadown20.2%and theTOPIXdown17.3%.

Netnet,theFundhasmanagedthroughthevolatilemarketssofarthisyeartodeliveressentiallyflat performance, outperforming the markets on a relative basis, and protecting capital which sets up theFundwithaportfoliothathassignificantupsidepotentialin2012.Onthepositiveside,theFund hasbeenabletogeneratealphaonboththelongandshortsidethisyear.Wevehadafairlyhighhit ratio on our single name longs and shorts which has produced the Funds flattish performance despitehavingaveragenetequityexposureof5060%fortheyear.Inparticular,SunArt,Brilliance, Aiful, and QR National have been large contributors on the long side, and on the short side, Taiwaneseairlines,constructionmachinery,andtheheavydutytrucksegmentinChinahaveworked outwell.Whatwehavegottenwrongisourlargenetexposuretotheequitymarkets,whichwasthe reason for the Funds drawdown in August and September. We did not have single names that performed disproportionately worse than their betaexposure would suggest nor did we have an issuewithour grossexposures. Weweresimplytoo netlong going intoa severe downturnin the equitymarkets.

InceptionDatewasJuly2,2007.ThegraphabovereflectsthecompositionofOwlCreekAsiaMasterFund,Ltd'sportfolioateachmonthend.Thecomposition oftheportfoliowillvarydaily.Exposureincludesthenotionalexposureoftotalreturnswapsandfuturescontracts.

Aswehavewrittenaboutinourpreviousletters,webelievedthisexposurewasjustifiedbecauseof the compelling and eventdriven nature of the bottomsup opportunities we found and our top downviewthatthemarketswoulddookay.Whilewehavegottenthebottomsupmostlyright,our topdownviewhasclearlybeenwrongthisyear. Weve always believed our strengths are in the bottoms up, the micro the alpha. But by having sucha largenetequityexposure,weweremakingimplicitbetsonthemacroonthebetathat wevehadlessconvictionin.Wefeelthatbyhavingasmallernetexposure,ourperformancewillbe morerepresentativeofourstrengthsandthatwewillalsobeabletomanagethroughthevolatility of the markets more effectively. We remain longbiased and do want some market exposure, but givenhowuncertainweexpectthemacroenvironmenttoremainfortheforeseeablefuture(years, notmonths),wethinkitisprudenttorunwithsmallernetsgoingforward.So,weexpecttorunwith

a narrower range of net equity exposure going forward, in the 050% range versus our historical rangeofabout080%.AttheendofNovember,ournetequityexposurewasapproximately35%. Wecontinuetolikethemicrostoriesbehindournames,onboththelongandshortside,andfeel that the market is pricing in a much higher likelihood of a China hard landing than we believe is warranted.Overthelastthreemonths,wehavevisitedabouthalfofourportfoliocompaniesand havespokenwithallofthemandfeelstronglythatourinvestmentthesesarelargelyunchanged.We have used the recent volatility in these markets to adjust our portfolio, adding to high conviction namessuchasChinaShanshui,Visteon,FarEastHorizon,andHuiXianREITwhilealsotrimmingour winners such as PICC and Brilliance. Weve added a number of single name shorts across the constructionmachinery,consumer,andtelecomsectorstoreplacetheindexhedgesweputonover thelastfewmonths.Singlenameshortscurrentlyrepresentabout85%ofourshortbook. Whiletheexternalenvironment(EuropeandUS)continuestodriveliquidityandthemarketsinAsia, Chinaremainsverymuchinfluxastheyearlongtighteningbythecentralgovernmenthashadits desiredeffect,aslowingChineseeconomyandlowerinflation.CPIinOctoberwas5.5%,downfrom thepeakof6.5%inJuly,andweexpectittobearound4%bythebeginningof2012.Whilethevery earlystagesofeasingarestarting,liquidityconditionsremaintightinChina.Propertysalescontinue toslowandhousinginventoriesrisewiththehomepurchaserestrictionbeingtheprimarylimiting factor. We expect the next internal catalyst for the Chinese market to be easing in some form of reserveraterequirementcuts,alooseninginhousing,andfiscalstimulus.Weremainconvincedthat a hard landing in China is not in the cards, as the slowdown is primarily selfinflicted through the tighteningwhichleavesthegovernmentroomtoease.Chinaspositioncontrastsstarklywithboth EuropeandtheUS,whohavezeroboundinterestratesandhugebudgetdeficits,whichmakesboth monetary and fiscal stimulus exceedingly difficult. On November 30, China announced a cut in its reserve rate requirement by 50 bps which in isolation is not that impactful, but we believe this signalstheofficialbeginningofeasing. OwlCreekFlagshipFunds OwlCreekOverseasFund,Ltd.wasdown16.5%netinthethirdquarterandisdownanestimated 13.0% YTD net through November compared to 1.1% for the S&P 500. The flagship funds have assetsof$5.1billionasofDecember1. InConclusion TheAsiafundshaveassetsof$325millionasofDecember1.Asalways,pleasedonothesitateto contact us with whatever questions you may have and call or email Kim Smith (kims@owlcreeklp.com)ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutinvestinginthefunds.Wedliketothank youforyourcontinuedsupportinourteamandourprocess. Sincerely,

Jeff Altman

Jeff Lee

JeffreyA.Altman JeffreyF.Lee andtherestoftheOwlCreekTeam.

EXHIBITS ThePortfolio Ourfivelargestholdings2asofSeptember30,2011are,alphabetically: ChinaShanshuiCementGroup JupiterTelecommunications KweichowMoutai Nufarm SunArtRetailGroup ChinaShanshuiCementGroup ChinaShanshuiCementisanamewehavewrittenaboutpreviouslyandisthelargestproducerof cement in Shandong. The impact from continued liquidity tightening and restrictive policies on propertypurchasesinChinacontinuestodampensentimentontheentirecementsector.However, webelievethatShanshuiskeymarket,Shandong,shouldbemoreresilientinaweakeningdemand environment as it has the highest concentration among the top two players. As evidence, in NovembercementpricinginShandongincreasedwhenotherregionsinChinasawflatpricingora slightpricedecline. Thecementsectorisstilldownover50%fromthehighsandthoughthesectorrecovered1020% fromthe lowsinOctober,wethinkthemarket is still pricing in afairlydraconian scenario;thata slowdown in demand will disrupt the supplier discipline and collapse the price of cement, cutting profits in half next year. At current prices, we believe the market is pricing in an almost 100% probability of the bear thesis, based on applying the halved profit level and using 2008 trough EBITDAmultiples.Notonlydoweseetheriskrewardonthisinvestmentbeingasymmetric,butwe remainconvincedthatthebearthesisisincorrectandmarginswillnotcollapse.Webelievethenear termcatalystwillsimplybethemarketsrealizationthatpricingandmarginsarenotfallingandif that is the case, trading at 4x 2012 P/E, we believe Shanshui could have over 100% upside from currentlevels. JupiterTelecommunications Jupiter Telecommunications (JCOM) remains a top holding for the Fund. Japans largest cable company with over 40% market share continues to perform well fundamentally. While some sell side analysts cite concerns regarding ARPU trends, we believe these fears are misplaced as the companycontinuestogainincrementalsubscribersathighcontributionmargins.Thethirdquarter illustratedthiswithorganictoplinegrowthofapproximately3%.EBITDAmarginsremainstrongat 42% with free cash flow increasing at a faster rate than earnings as the upfront cost of digital migration(namelysettopboxes)isbehindthem.WecontinuetowaitforKDDI,whichboughtover 37% of JCOM in February 2010, to take the next step and buy control of the company. The combination makes strategic sense given the synergies between JCOM and JCN (the #2 cable company in Japan and owned by KDDI) as well as the value that JCOMs network infrastructure bringstoKDDIsfixedlineandmobilebusinesses.Furthermore,JCOMisverycheapat4.3xEBITDA and over 10% free cash flow yield with debt under one turn of EBITDA. Given that KDDI paid Y139,500fortheirstakeandSumitomopaidthesamepricetoraisetheirownershipover40%,we believe that it is only a matter of time until the remaining shares are bought in at that level or better.

KweichowMoutai KweichowMoutaiisanAsharelistedliquorcompanywithamarketcapofapproximately$30billion andisthepremiumbrandintheChinesewhiteliquorindustrywith40%marketshareintheultra premiumsegment.TheChinesewhiteliquorindustryisa6.5billionbottleayearbusinesswiththe ultra premium segmentsvolume equal to 8090 millionbottles.Whilemostof theChinese liquor volumeissoldataretailpriceRMB2030($35)perbottle,MoutaisretailpriceisaboutRMB1,700 ($260)perbottle.Thereareonly2otherplayersintheultrapremiumsegmentandeachplayerhas capacityconstraintssinceforeachtheagingprocessforultrapremiumwhiteliquoris5years.The result is that demand for Moutais products is out stripping supply by a ratio of 4:1, leading to increases in Moutais exfactory price of 300% over the past 10 years and its retail price of 500% duringthesameperiod. WhatweareexcitedaboutisMoutaismovementtowarddirectsalestocapturemoremarginthan theircurrentexfactorydistributionmodel.MouitaiskeyproductsellsataboutRMB620/bottleex factory to distributors and these products retail at 1,700/bottle. To put that in perspective, ex factory/retailwas620/1300inthebeginningof2011and178/265in2001.In2011,Moutaistarted toselldirecttolargecorporatecustomersatabout770perbottlewhichaccountsforabout1520% ofthegroupstotalvolume.In 3Q11, Moutaiopened about30retailspecialtystoresdedicatedin selling Moutai products at about 1,100/bottle with the long term goal of 800 stores nationwide. Giventheincrementalexpensesareminimum,increasesinMoutaisrealizedpricedropsmostlyto profitsdrivingaboveconsensusearninggrowth. Moutai is trading at a PE of 23x 2012 consensuses with earning growth of 27%. We think the companyshouldbeabletogenerate3540%CAGRoverthenext23yearswithstrongvisibilityand sustainabilitytomaintainthecurrentforwardmultipleayearfromnow. Nufarm NufarmisanAustraliabasedoffpatentagriculturechemicalmanufacturer,whichwehavewritten about in the past.We ownNufarmsperpetual preferred stock,which in September announced a step up of its coupon by 200bps, and which returns a cash yield of 10.5% at current prices. In September, Nufarm announced better than expected June 2011 fiscal year end results and in November,thecompanysignedaA$625millionthreeyeartermloantorefinanceitsbankfacility, whichshouldremovealargeoverhangonthename. Nufarm's net debt position has improved dramatically this past year and leverage ahead of the preferreds has declined from 2.5x EBITDA down to 1.8x. Through the preferreds, leverage is 2.7x, and there remains substantial equity value of 4.8x EBITDA behind the preferreds which should provide value cushion behind our position. Beyond the current yield, the preferreds also have a change of control at par vs. current price at around 80, and we believe there is a good chance a takeoutisinthecards.InDecember2009,SumitomoChemicalagreedtopurchase20%ofNufarm stockatapriceofA$14.00pershare(currentstockpriceisaroundA$4.50)andrecentlyincreased itsownershipto23%,includingbuying1.7%fromtheCEOatA$5.20pershare.Webelievethereis strategic value in Nufarms global distribution network as is evidenced by its competitor, MakhteshimAgan,beingacquiredbyChemChina. SunArtRetailGroup Sun Art is a large hypermarket chain in China that went public in July 2011. We participated as a cornerstoneinvestorinthisIPOwhichprovidedtheFundwithalargeguaranteedallocationbutalso

lockedup the investment for 6 months. Sun Art is the best operator in the Chinese hypermarket landscape. It generates an average sales per store of over RMB300 million per year while its key competitors,CarrefourandWalMart,generate200millionand100millionperstore,respectively. Thecompanyskeycompetitiveadvantageisitsabilitytoconsistentlydrivehighertrafficvolumein its stores across the country, due in large part to better execution on the grocery side of the business which is primary traffic driver in China. As a result, Sun Art is able to generate higher operating margins than its competitors while also charging lower prices. We expect Sun Art to continuetopressitspriceandmarginadvantageagainstitscompetitors.AsofthetimeofIPO,Sun Arthadabout200storesinChina,andweestimatethatChinacanaccommodateabout2,0003,000 SunArtstoresoverthelongrun. The biggest headwind during the IPO was its perceived high headline 2012E PE multiple of 24.5x earnings.WethinkthePEmultipleisverymisleadingastheyownonethirdoftheirstorebaseand haveaconservativedepreciationpolicy.Inaddition,becauseofSunArtsfavorableworkingcapital cycle,itgenerates freecashflowofabout2.53.0xitsreportednetprofit.VersustheIPO priceof $7.20, our valuation cases for Sun Art suggest a value of $1316 per share if you assume the companycangrowitsstorebaseforthenext58years. PortfoliobyAssetClass3

Total * 2007 %ofAverageCapbySecType: LongEquity 105% ShortEquity 63% NetEquity 42% LongCredit ShortCredit NetCredit TotalLong TotalShort NetExposure GrossEquity GrossCredit GrossExposure 0% 1% 1% 105% 62% 43% 168% 1% 169%

Total 2008

Total 2009

Total 2010

1stQtr 2011

2ndQtr 2011

3rdQtr 2011

Total 2011

Since Inception

75% 46% 29% 1% 2% 1% 74% 44% 30% 121% 3% 124%

57% 29% 28% 12% 2% 14% 69% 27% 42% 86% 18% 104%

86% 33% 53% 19% 0% 19% 105% 33% 72% 119% 19% 138%

117% 33% 84% 22% 0% 22% 139% 33% 106% 150% 22% 172%

111% 32% 79% 21% 0% 21% 132% 32% 100% 143% 21% 164%

86% 23% 63% 20% 1% 21% 106% 22% 84% 109% 21% 130%

105% 29% 76% 21% 0% 21% 126% 29% 97% 134% 21% 155%

82% 38% 44% 10% 1% 11% 92% 37% 55% 120% 13% 133%

*InceptionDatewasJuly2,2007.

PortfoliobyIndustryType4,5
Long Exposure Short Exposure Net Exposure

IndustryExposureasof9/30/11 Sectors Ma teri a l s Medi a Food,Bevera ge&Toba cco Di vers i fi edFi na nci a l s Tra ns porta ti on Hous ehol d&Pers ona l Products Food&Sta pl es Reta i l i ng Automobi l es &Components Rea l Es ta te Li qui da ti on Tel ecommuni ca ti onServi ces Ins ura nce Ca pi ta l Goods Softwa re&Servi ces Other Uti l i ti es Pha rma .,Bi otech.&Li feSci ences Reta i l i ng Hea l thCa reEqui pment&Servi ces Technol ogyHa rdwa re&Equi pment Cons umerDura bl es &Appa rel Ba nks Energy Cons umerServi ces Tota l

11.6% 10.1% 8.8% 8.1% 6.5% 6.0% 5.8% 7.0% 6.2% 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 1.5% 2.8% 1.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 2.6% 90.0%

0.5% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 2.2% 1.4% 0.0% 1.4% 1.3% 0.5% 1.9% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.9% 1.7% 2.1% 4.4% 2.6% 7.9% 32.4%

11.1% 9.9% 8.3% 7.5% 6.1% 5.7% 5.6% 4.8% 4.8% 3.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.9% 1.7% 2.1% 2.1% 2.6% 5.3% 57.6%

PortfoliobyRegion6

RegionExposureasof9/30/11

Long Exposure 53.2% 19.0% 7.8% 7.8% 0.0% 0.9% 1.3% 0.0% 90.0%

Short Exposure 15.4% 5.9% 0.0% 5.3% 0.2% 1.5% 2.6% 1.9% 32.4%

NetExposure

Chi na /HongKong Ja pa n Aus tra l i a USA Other Europe Korea Si nga pore Tota l

37.8% 13.1% 7.8% 2.5% 0.2% 0.6% 1.3% 1.9% 57.6%

Disclosure Theinformationinthisletterisintendedonlyforthepersontowhomithasbeendelivered.Thisletterisnotanofferorsolicitationwith respecttothepurchaseorsaleofanysecurity.AnyinvestmentdecisioninconnectionwithOwlCreekI,L.P.,OwlCreekII,L.P.,OwlCreek OverseasFund,Ltd.,OwlCreekSociallyResponsibleInvestmentFund,Ltd.,OwlCreekAsiaI,L.P.,OwlCreekAsiaII,L.P.,andOwlCreek AsiaFund,Ltd.shouldbemadebasedontheinformationcontainedintheConfidentialMemorandumfortheapplicableFundwhichwill bemadeavailableuponrequest.Thisletterisstrictlyconfidentialandmaynotbereproducedorredistributedinwholeorinpartnormay itscontentsbedisclosedtoanyotherpersonunderanycircumstances.Thisletterisnotintendedtoconstitutelegal,tax,oraccounting adviceorinvestmentrecommendations. Footnotes: 1.PerformanceDisclosures: Netperformance:Netofallfeesincludingmanagementfeeandincentiveallocation/fee.Foronshorefunds,assumesthatunrealized gains (if applicable) on special investments would first be offset by any loss recovery account (LRA) and, for the offshore funds, assumesthatunrealizedgains(ifapplicable)onspecialinvestmentswouldnotbeoffsetbyanyLRApriortoaccruingforincentive. GrossPerformance:Netofmanagementfee,doesnotincludeincentiveallocationfee. Performanceisbasedontheassumptionthataninvestorwasinvestedinthefundssinceinceptionwithnosubsequentsubscriptions orredemptionsandwaseligibletoinvestinnewissues.Thisincludestheappreciation/depreciationofthefairvalueofanyspecial investment and income/loss from new issues. Investors who invest with the funds in the middle of a particular year (after the establishmentofaspecialinvestment)orwhodonotparticipateinnewissueswillhavedifferentmonthlyandyearlyperformance numbers and thedifference may be substantial. Additional performance information is available uponrequest. Past performance shouldnotbeviewedasindicativeoffutureresults.InformationforYTD2011issubjecttorevisionpendingcompletionofDecember 31,2011audits. AnnualandInceptiontoDateperformancenumbersarecalculatedbygeometricallylinkingmonthlyperformancefortherelevant period. TheHangSengIndex(the"HSI")isaselectionof45companiesfromtheStockExchangeofHongKong,mainlycomposedofCommerce and Industry, Finance, Utilities, and Properties. The Tokyo Stock Price Index (the TPX) is a capitalization weighted index of all 1663 companieslistedontheFirstSectionoftheTokyoStockExchangeandsupplementedbythesubindicesofthe33industrysectors.The MSCIACAsiaPacificIndex(theMXAP)isacapitalizationweightedindexthatmonitorstheperformanceofaselectionofstocksfromthe Asia Pacific Region. The MSCI China Free Index (the MXCN) is a capitalization weighted index that monitors the performance of a selection of stocksfrom China.These indicesareunmanagedand therefore do nothaveanytransactioncosts,advisoryfees or similar expensesthatareassociatedwiththeirperformance.Onecannotinvestintheseindices.Theinvestmentprogramofthefundsmanaged by Owl Creek is not restricted to the securities comprising these indices.The investment program of the funds include trading and investmentsindebtsecurities,aswellasothersecuritiesandinstrumentsoftroubledcompanies.Inaddition,thefundsportfoliosmay contain options and other derivative securities, short sales and leverage, may not be as diversified as the indices and may experience differingdegreesofvolatility.Fortheforegoingandotherreasons,theperformanceofthefundsmanagedbyOwlCreekandtheHSI,TPX, MXAP,andMXCNmaynotbecomparable. 2.ThefivelargestholdingsconsistofaminorityofissuersinOwlCreekAsiaMasterFundLtdsportfolio,anditshouldnotbeassumed thattheseholdingswereorwillbeprofitable. 3.ThetablereflectsthecompositionoftheOwlCreekAsiaMasterFundLtdsportfolioasofasinglepointintime.Portfolionumbersare calculated bytakingaverageexposureof monthendexposures.The composition oftheportfolio will vary daily.Exposureincludesthe notional exposure of total return swaps and futures contracts. Gross credit figures may not foot with Long and Short credit figures becauseofCDSpositionswhichmayresultinnegativelongsandpositiveshorts. 4.ThetableabovereflectsthecompositionoftheOwlCreekAsiaMasterFundLtdsportfolioasofasinglepointintime.Thecomposition ofthe portfoliowillvarydaily.Exposure includes the notionalexposureof totalreturnswapsandfutures contracts.Indiceshavebeen brokenoutintothecorrespondingexposuresoftheunderlyingholdingsofeachindex. 5.StartingonApril30,2011,OwlCreekbreaksdownindustrybasedonGICSindustrygroups;OwlCreekhasmadeadjustmentstothese classificationswhen,initsownjudgment,ithasdeterminedthatGICSclassificationiseithernotreflectiveoftheunderlyingexposureorif GICSdoesnotprovideaclassification.ThefollowingnonGICSbucketsareincludedintheindustryexposure: 1) LiquidationEquitiesandcreditsofacompanythatisanticipatedtobeinliquidationproceedingsinthenearfutureor iscurrentlyinliquidationproceedings. 2) OtherincludesforwardforeigncurrencyexchangecontractsandanyGICSindustrygroupswherethelongandshort exposureislessthan0.5%ofNAV. 6.ThetableabovereflectsthecompositionoftheOwlCreekAsiaMasterFundLtdsportfolioasofasinglepointintime.Thecomposition oftheportfoliowillvarydaily.Exposureincludesthenotionalexposureoftotalreturnswapsandfuturescontracts.