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COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DANIEL COOPER Plaintiff / Appellant v. SUPERIOR COURT, LOS ANGELES COUNTY Defendant / Respondent _________________________________/ Los Angeles County Case No. SD026673

PLAINTIFFS EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND IMMEDIATE ORDER TO STAY INTER-SPOUSAL DEED TRANSFER from the Judgement of the Superior Court Honorable Elia Weinbach, Judge

Daniel Cooper IN PROPRIA PERSONA 1836 10th Street, #B Santa Monica, California 90404 (310) 562-7668 Plaintiff / Appellant 1

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DANIEL COOPER Plaintiff / Appellant

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, LOS ANGELES COUNTY Defendant / Respondent from the Judgement of the Superior Court Honorable Elia Weinbach, Judge

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Los Angeles County Case No. SD026673

PLAINTIFFS EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND IMMEDIATE ORDER TO STAY INTER-SPOUSAL DEED TRANSFER

____________________________________/

Plaintiff (hereinafter Cooper) has been in divorce proceedings since September 11, 2008 in Los Angeles County. On January 20, 2011, Petitioner received confirmation from Los Angeles County Auditor that Judge Weinbach received L.A. County judicial benefits. The same day, Judge Wienbach issued an order striking the statement of disqualification, making his own order of non2

appealability, his own argument of the Sturgeon case, Sturgeon v. County of Los
Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) rev. denied 12/23/08; Sturgeon v. County of Los

Angeles (2010)___Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1 Docket number D056266); and never admitted his receipt of judicial benefits. He then proclaimed his lack of bias without acknowledging the retroactive immunity he received under SBX2 11 and without acknowledging the receipt of Title IV-D monies by the county, or his partnership with the L.A. County Child Support Services Department (CCSD). Then, on the same day, Judge Weinbach ordered an inter-spousal deed to be executed without any protection for, or repair of, Coopers credit rating. The result is and will be Coopers future unemployability as a general contractor. Judge Weinbach additionally ordered child support payments for which Cooper has no feasible means of paying; guaranteeing CCSD will pursue further legal action, including denial of his driving privileges. PETITIONER SEEKS AN IMMEDIATE STAY OF ALL ORDERS AND JUDGEMENTS ISSUED BY JUDGE WEINBACH ON JANUARY 20, 2011.

At the time the instant case was filed in Superior Court in 2008 and throughout the proceedings, Plaintiff / Appellant was not aware that Judge Weinbach was receiving payments from L.A. County. At no time from the commencement of the filing of the case through the present did Judge Weinbach disclose that he was receiving payments from L.A. County. At no time did he disclose that the L.A. County Child Support Services Department (CSSD) received 3

Title IV-D funds from the federal and state governments based upon a percentage of the disbursements ordered by the L.A. County judges plus an incentive for collections above an annual floor. In mid-2010 Plaintiff / Appellant became aware of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied 12/23/08, which held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution and that the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act did not prescribe the payments of judicial benefits by counties to Superior Court judges. Plaintiff sought to confirm that his case was affected by these judicial benefits. He requested L.A. County Auditor data confirming that Judge Elia Weinbach had been receiving L.A. County Benefits. Judge Elia Weinbach was employed by the L.A. Superior Court. SBX2 11 was passed by the California legislature and acknowledged the unconstitutional and illegal nature of the L.A. County payments by granting immunity. Section 5 of SBX2 11 limited the immunity to any liability or be subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge. This ex post facto immunity did not and could not restore Plaintiffs California Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection lost during the proceedings of Plaintiffs family law case SD026673 under Judge Weinbach. Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity and therefore its actual payments to a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by Plaintiff. 4

Both are bribes. Judge Weinbachs acceptance of the L.A. County bribes voided all his orders and judgments. Judge Weinbachs failure to disclose the county payments constituted an extrinsic fraud on the court. All of Judge Weinbachs orders are void. Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. See U.S. v. Throckmorton 98 U.S. 61 (1878) since fraud on the court vitiates the entire case, all orders from that court or any subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order. See Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) a void order is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passage of time. The order is void ab initio. Contrary to Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Elia Weinbachs Order Striking Statement Of Disqualification, the order is indeed appealable as a void order An appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to vacate a void judgement because denial of the motion constitutes an order giving effect to a void judgement and thus is itself void and appealable. [Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151

CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199; Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888; Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125] Furthermore, the order and judgement remains appealable under Code of Civil Procedure 904.1(a)(10) and Family Code 3554.

Plaintiffs denied motion sought to achieve certainty under the law with a new judicial officer who had not taken the illegal bribes. Plaintiffs motion for recusal was most timely in that sale of the home would finalize Plaintiffs credit record beyond any remedy by the Court. Plaintiffs motion further sought to identify the nature of the bias introduced by the illegal payments. The linkage of Title IV-D to the county budgets and the CCSD partnership with Judges is sufficient evidence of real and probable judicial bias against Plaintiff, purchased by the countys illegal payments. This linkage is documented in Exhibits A, B, and C of

the attached declaration by Plaintiff/Appellant.


The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in the Sturgeon case clearly stated that the judicial payments during Plaintiffs case in Superior Court were unconstitutional. The legislature confirmed the payments were illegal by giving the judges limited immunity due to the bribes. Plaintiffs case was heard during this time in L.A. Superior Court. Plaintiff has established the nature of the bias bought by the county. The orders and judgements in case SD026673 are void. Judge Weinbach has refused to recuse himself. This Court must issue an EMERGENCY Writ of Mandate staying Judge Weinbachs orders of January 20, 2011. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------There are two issues before this court. The first is the criminal action of counties giving and judges receiving bribes. The second is remediation of the civil

rights impaired by the biases introduced by the judges into the decisions of individual cases such as Plaintiffs. The Sturgeon case clearly addresses the first and seeks an end to the bribes. This Writ of Mandate seeks to void Defendants judgements and orders associated with those bribes and seeks closure on past decisions and the appearance of justice in future proceedings. The remedy on this issue is an un-bribed judge. This appeal further seeks remediation of Plaintiffs impaired civil rights. The countys welfare biases introduced by the bribes can be partially ameliorated with an un-bribed judge. However, finding an un-bribed judge who is also familiar with California family law and un-biased by over 25 years of county-participation in Title IV-D funding incentives will be difficult. Plaintiff is seeking his constitutional rights, not easy solutions. Plaintiffs opening brief will document the impairment of his rights in a single area, spousal support. Full remediation for the Plaintiff, likely includes, at a minimum, the complete separation of the family courts from the countys Title IV-D funded agencies. The current court partnership, built over 25 years of county bribes and federal incentives, is corrosive to the State of Californias due process and equal protection guarantees and even to its fundamental constitutional guarantee that, SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

L.A. Countys bribes guarantee that plaintiff is not and will never be free and independent from his ex-spouse following his L.A. County divorce. Plaintiffs first choice is to have this matter fully addressed and decided by the Appellate Court. If this appeal is not successful, Plaintiff will pursue his constitutional rights with additional challenges and remedies as anticipated by the Fourth Appellate Court in its December 28, 2010 ruling on Sturgeon II. Future challenges may be directed at the civil and professional accountability of individual judges for taking illegal payments. Petitioner is actively preparing a civil suit against Judges Weinbach and Levanas at this time. This Appellate Court has an opportunity to protect those individual judges by mandating, for example, the complete and immediate separation of the family courts from the countys Title IV-D funded agencies. The taking of money by a judge who does not throw the case is still corrupt. Justice Posner of the 7th Circuit stated in his remarks relating to Sir Francis Bacon, that the judge who does not fulfill the bargain after he has taken the money is equally as corrupt as the judge who takes the money and fulfills the bargain.

Dated: January 28, 2011

Respectfully submitted,________________________________ DANIEL COOPER 8

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