PCIB V. ESCOLIN Short Summary: Mr.

and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their whole estates should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they could inherit. (believe me, this is a short summarycase is long) Facts -Charles & Linnie Hodges, both TEXAN nationals, provided in their respective wills that *bequeath remainder of estate to spouseduring lifetime *remainder goes to brothers and sis of surviving spouse -Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR >in Financial Statements submitted before the court, he made statements that the estate of Mrs. Hodges is 1/2 of conjugal estate >that he allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax declaration in US >for 5 years before his death, he failed to make accounting, failed to acquire final adjudication of wife's estate -Charles died. Magno, initially administratrix of both spouse's estate, later replaced by PCIB for Charles' estate WON Action is prescribed? NO. 33 appeals were timely made -Court did not pass upon its timeliness WON Certiorari and Prohibition is proper? YES. Appeal insufficient remedy -many appeals, same facts, same issues = multiplicity of suits WON THERE IS STILL A RESIDUE FOR MRS. HODGES' HEIRS? YES WON SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF MRS. HODGES ESTATE SHOULD ALREADY BE CLOSED, BASED ON THE DECEMBER 1957 COURT ORDER ALLEGEDLY ADJUDICATING MR. HODGES AS SOLE HEIR? NO .no final distribution to all parties concerned of the estate R90.1 (on RESIDUE): after residue assigned to parties entitled to it, S.P. deemed ready for FINAL CLOSURE: 1. Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate among those entitled

2. Debts Funeral expenses Expenses of administration Widow allowance Taxes Etc. should be paid already 3. Motion of party requesting the same (not motu proprio) Would include distribution of residue of estate -Here: a. No final distribution of residue of Linney's estate b. No special application made by charles/PCIB c. Merely allowed advance or partial payments/implementation of will before final liquidation d. If charles already deemed sole heir, why PCIB needed to file a motion to declare that Charles is indeed the sole heir? 3. ON ALLEGED INTENTION OF MR. HODGES PCIB: He intended to adjudicate whole estate to himself (Thus, no residue left, thus ulit, tapos na special proceeding) BUT SC: 1. Whatever was intended, he can't deprive those who have rights over the estate 2. Order - motion filed merely for exercise of ownership pending proceeding 3. Mr. Hodges was aware that wife's siblings had rights: In FS, stated that 1/2 of conjugal estate belonged to Estate of Linney In Petition for will's probate, he listed the bros and sis as heirs Lawyer of Magno was initially lawyer of Charles when latter was still executor of Linney's estate - so may know hwat Charles' intended Charles admitted omitting a bro of Linney He even allegedly renounced his share of the estate (but was not proven) Charles had duty, as Surviving spouse, of trustee of wife's estate so had to act in GF ON PROPERTIES FOR SIBLINGS: since there's still a residue, can't close SP yet >PCIB: NO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES YET, PCIB SHOULD SOLELY ADMINISTER EVERYTHING TO DETERMINE THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF LINNEY, OVER W/C MAGNO COULD ADMINISTER H: NO. both PCIB and Magno should administer a. It was Charles' fault why no administration of estate yet b. Admin should both be >impartial

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>extent of interest c. Executor (PCIB) of Executor (Charles, over Linney's) Can't administer estate of decedent (Linney) _ R78.6 d. Liquidation of conjugal partnership may be done in either spouse's probate proceedings - R73.2 SUCCESSION: WON THERE'S SUBSTITUTION? None No simple or vulgar substitution (A859, NCC) no provision for: Predecease of T for designated heir Refusal Incapacity of designated heir to accept inheritance No fideicomissary substitution no obligation on Charles to preserve the estate There's simultaneous institution of heirs subject to resolutory condition of Charles' death -Charles was to enjoy the whole estate -but he can't dispose of property mortis causa (because it's already subject to the will made by his wife, which he agreed in the provision of his will) Charles didn't get mere usufruct: he exercises full ownership PRIL: WON RP LAW GOVERNS LEGITIME OF CHARLES? No answer yet. Remanded PCIB Art 16,NCC: applies: law of nationality If we apply Texas PRIL law: Personal property: law of domicile Real property: law of situs (both in RP) So renvoi to RP: RP Law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir, gets 1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the spouse goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then Charles gets 1/4 of the whole conjugal property. Magno IF Art16 applies, then Texas law should govern; Texas law provides no legitime

Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as there's a time difference between this case and that case, thus the Texas law might have changed in between the rulings BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS, PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linney is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal property, they having argued that it is so

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FROM SIR B, WITH LVE

-will executed in Texas - Oklahoma -Charles made executor by Linney, but Charles had no executor - so administrator dapat -as regards foreign laws: Should be proved as a fact R132 on Public documents SIR: Dapat use an expert witness Prove in accordance w/rp law

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SALUD TEODORO VDA DE PEREZ V. HON. ZOTICO TOLETE

Short Summary: Former Filipino Sps mutually made wills with the same provisions, saying that upon death of Mr. Cunanan, his wife would inherit, and in the case that the two die at the same time, the presumption is that Mr. Cunanan died first. Both died with the rest of the family in a fire. Executor appointed in the will had the will probated abroad, but the mother of Mrs. Cunanan petitioned for the probate of the will here in RP w/o notice to the Cunanan heirs and w/o proving the foreign law applicable. The court held that the case should be remanded for the mother to show foreign law and that notice should be given to the Cunanan heirs.

Court said that Texas law may apply, but since not proven as Courts can't take JN should show foreign law: As certified by person holding/having custody of such law Certificate that such officer does have custody over said law

Facts: -DR. JOSE CUNANAN and DR. EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN were former Filipino doctors who were naturalized as US Citizens. -DR. JOSE CUNANAN made a will which contained stipulations as ff: o he bequeathed all his properties, wherever situated, to his wife. o If his wife dies first, he'll bequeath all his properties to their daughters. o If there's no way to tell who died first between his wife and him, he is presumed to have died first o His brother, DR. RAFAEL CUNANAN is made executor of the will -DR. EVELYN also made her will, with the same 3rd provision (that her husband is presumed to have died first) -THE WHOLE CUNANAN FAMILY DIED in a fire -DR. RAFAEL had the 2 wills probated. He was appointed as executor of the estate -the year after, MRS. PEREZ (mother of DR. EVELYN) filed petition for reprobate of the wills + prayed that she be appointed special administrator of deceased RTC Bulacan: appointed her special administratrix -as special administratrix, she filed the ff:

Petition to order Philalife to deliver to her the proceeds of the life insurance policy taken by DR. JOSE with DRA. EVELYN and Jocelyn as beneficiaries. >Philamlife's manifestation: it was already delivered to her 2. Motion to order DR. RAFAEL to deliver to her the PhilTrust Passbook and the Family Saving Bank time deposit >NOTICE OF APPEARANCE for the Cunanan's: was unaware of the filing of the testate estate case, requested that the hearing for the motion be deferred and to be given notice of the proceedings >>counter-manifestation by MRS. PEREZ: a. Cunanan collaterals are not heirs nor creditors of DR. JOSE so no legal interest b.Wills of Dr. Jose and Dr. evelyn executed in accordance w/NY laws and had effects in this jurisdiction (both are US Citizens) c. under the wills it was presumed that Dr. Jose died first d. the Cunanan collaterals were not heirs, distributees PROBATE COURT: granted Motion of Mrs. Perez that the said accounts be delivered to her >Motion to nullify proceedings filed by Cunanans: 1. They were deliberately excluded based on misrepresentation of Mrs. Perez that she was the sole heir 2. Dr. Rafael was the named executor of the estate who was not notified of the proceedings before the Bulacan court 3. Mrs. Perez unfit to be an administrator because of her misrepresentation and concealment 4. Dr. Rafael was authorized by Dr. Rafael, Sr. (Father of Dr. Jose) as his atty-infact 5. Dr. Rafael, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator of practically all the estate in the Philippines (probably Dr. Rafael lives in RP) >also filed MOTION to require Mrs. Perez to render an accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate -opposition by Mrs. Perez: 1. She was the sole heir of her daughter, and thus the Cunanans were complete strangers to the proceedings - not entitled notice 2. She could not conceal Dr. Rafael because he was named the executor of the will 3. That in accordance with R77, no notice required to be given to the executor, who is in fact the one who was supposed to have filed the ancillary proceedings in RP 4. If the Bulacan estate came from Dr. Jose, he already gave all his properties to his wife 5. Dr. Rafael unlawfully disbursed money belonging to the estate

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>reply: There was already a settlement between Mrs. Perez and the Cunanan heirs and that R77 still requires notice to be given blah blah blah -basta there was a ruling wherein the probate decree was duly proven but still no NY law shown so the Perez's wanted to show NY law. -now before SC Perez: presented evidence to show that the wills were authenticated, admitted for probatein NY court WON the wills were valid in accordance w/NY law, thus, could be admitted for probate? NO evidence yet -Will valid in RP if will valid in accordance w/ law of nationality -evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside RP: 1. Due execution of the will in accordance w/ foreign law 2. Testator has his domicile in the foreign country 3. Will was admitted to probate in such country 4. Foreign tribunal is a probate court 5. Laws of the foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills Here: Did not prove due execution of the will in accordance w/ NY law and the laws of procedure for the allowance of wills in NY WON the probate of the 2 wills should be consolidated? YES -R1.2: liberal interpretation of the ROC -what is prohibited is the making of joint wills. Here, separate wills though same provisions and concern same conjugal properties - so practical considerations dictate their joint probate WON Mrs. Perez is the sole heir of the estate, and thus the Cunanans are strangers to the proceedings and are not entitled to notice? NO -R77 provides that the will (probated abroad) should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate proceedings - so should follow R76 on publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines and to the executor if he is not the petitioner. -court is of the opinion that the Cunanans are known heirs Disposition: 1. Perez submit evidence of NY law 2. Notice should be given to the Cunanans

VDA DE MANALO V. COURT OF APPEALS Short Summary: No effort to reach settlement between relatives. Court held that Article 222 is applicable only in ordinary civil actions but here, oppositors are not being sued. This is an ordinary civil proceeding wherein only establish the status as heirs of the decedent. Longer Short summary: the decedent left 11 heirs, 8 of them initiating probate proceedings of his intestate estate. The remaining 3 heirs filed their opposition, which was denied even until court of appeals. The only point they raised on their appeal to the SC is WON the case should have dismissed based on failure to comply with a condition precedent - the absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among the members of the same family, as required by Art222, NCC. Court held that that requirement is merely for ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS, AND NOT FOR SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS THE PROBATE OF A WILL. FACTS: -Troadio Manalo died INTESTATE -he left 11 children and a wife -he left properties in Tarlac, Manila, QC and Valenzuela -8 of his children filed a petition for judicial settlement of the estate of Troadio, -the remaining 3 heirs filed an opposition, which was allowed, but their affirmative defenses were not allowed to be heard for being irrelevant -they appealed via certiorari the denial of a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses to CA CA: denied -they appealed via certiorari to this court WON earnest efforts towards a compromise between family members required to be made (WON this involves an ordinary civil action)? NO DETERMINE FIRST WON ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION OR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION: -depends on: *averments *character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition -here: a. Petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in petition for settlement of estate (fact of death, residence of decedent at the time of death - foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of estate rest) b. Enumerate the names of the heirs, tentative list of properties left by the deceased sought to be settled in the probate proceedings c. Reliefs seek judicial settlement of the estate of deceased father -allegedly, there are certain features which makes the petition a complaint, and thus their opposition is merely an answer with special affirmative defenses -here, clearly a special civil action: the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the

answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. -on Art222, NCC: the said rule is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. "suit" (as used in the provision) refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. -why not adversary proceedings: a. Oppositors not being sued for any COA, no defendant impleaded. b. Petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of estate is a special proceeding; it is a remedy whereby the petitioners seek to establish *facts: fact of death of father *status as heirs of their father

SUMILANG V. ROMAGOSA Short Summary: In Tagalog, the will of the decedent made Sumilang the sole heir. But allegedly, the decedent already sold to the oppositors the property to be inherited by Sumilang. Court held that the Inquirty into the intrinsic validity of the will (that there was already a sale of the property) is not governed by probate proceedings, citing Nuguid vs. Nuguid. Facts: -Hilarion Ramagosa died -he allegedly made a will in Tagalog, making Mariano Sumilang the sole heir of Hilarion -2 sets of oppositors opposed the petition for probate, alleging that it was made under duress and was not intended to be the will of the decedent: 1. Instead of Mariano, they were entitled to inherit the estate of the decedent 2. Next of kin, just prayed for the disallowance of the will -the oppositors moved for the dismissal of the will: NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY REVOKED ALREADY through the sale to some of the oppositors of the properties covered by the estate of the deceased which is sought to be disposed at time of decedent's death, the titles to the properties were already transferred to oppositors >>>DENIED! the allegations goes into the intrinsic validity of the will WON the court properly dismissed the motion to dismiss (WON the court properly ignored grounds for dismissal which goes to the intrinsic validity of the will)? YES 1. Should focus on EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL -what are the extrinsic validity of the will (NUGUID v. NUGUID): Testator's testamentary capacity Compliance w/ formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law if INTRINSIC VALIDITY: premature Efficacy of the provisions of the will Legality of any device or legacy

WON REVOCATION MATTERS? NO -Probate is one thing; validity of the testamentary provisions is another. PROBATE Decides *execution of the document *testamentary capacity of testator VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS Decides *descent *distribution of estate

Jurisdictional facts: Death of testator Residence of the testator at the time of death If resident of a foreign country: that he left his estate in the province where the court sits >>>the following facts were sufficiently showed in Gonzales' petition. >>>the allegation that a petitioner for letters of administration should be an INTERESTED PERSON is not a jurisdictional fact which is required to be shown for the court to acquire jurisdiction 2. Wrong ground: should have filed MTD based on lack of legal capacity to sue (as the provision requires that the petition for letters of administration be filed by an "interested person") -GR: Saguinsin v. Lindayag: INTERESTED PERSON DEFINED: one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. -X: if barred by waiver or estoppel here, there's waiver of ground: the respondents filed an Opposition instead of a motion to dismiss, merely opposing the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzales who was a stranger to the estate. Failure to raise the objection timely is a waiver, in accordance w/ R15.8 lack of capacity to sue, however, cannot be used as an affirmative defense WON the court acquired jurisdiction over them? YES -the administrator (see, Bonifacio Canonoy was indeed made an administrator!) and the other respondents invoked jurisdiction by praying for relies and remedies in their favor in their oppositions -court acquired jurisdiction over them by voluntary appearance

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WON they could oppose the proceedings, they being not w/n the 5th degree as provided by law? NO. should be interested parties to be allowed to intervene PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. DUMLAO Short Summary: Interest of Petitioner was assailed as supposed to be part of the jurisdictional facts to be indicated in the application for probate. Court held that interest of a party/witness involves the intrinsic validity of the will, and is not covered by probate, need not be alleged. Interest of the Petitioner who was sought to be made the administrator is irrelevant as to jurisdictional facts. Facts -Ricardo Gonzales, an employee of Shell Phlippines, filed a petition for a Letter of Administration for the Intestate Estate of Regino Canonoy -The heirs of Regino Canonoy filed an opposition, saying that Gonzales was a complete stranger to the intestate estate: Not an heir Not a creditor Not a resident of Butuan, where most of the properties of the estate are located He is an employee of Shell Philippines, one of the creditors of the estate so he would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate they also prayed that one of the decedent's sons be appointed as administrator (in accordance with the preference in R78.6) ---malabo ung proceedings sa gitna. I thought the suggested person to be the administrator was indeed appointed, and Shell made their claim. ...However, there's also a motion to dismiss filed by the Canonoy administrator based on the lack of jurisdiction of the court - that Gonzales was not the "interested person" contemplated in R79.2. court granted this motion to dismiss and apparently this is the reason why Pilipinas Shell is appealing. The latter set of facts also appears to be the main topic of this case. WON the petition was correctly dismissed on the ground that Gonzales was not an "interested person"? WON interest in the probate proceedings is a jurisdictional requirement? 1. What does R79.2 contain: Contents of the petition for letters of administration

FROM SIR B, WITH LVE

Probate Proceedings should also include Testamentary Capacity of the Testator (understanding of the nature of acts, understands for whom the property is being given, the object of the bounty) Who would you choose to be a witness to the execution of your will? >DOCTOR: to attest to the soundness of your mind >LAWYER: to guide you in the formalities required by law

INTESTATE ESTATE OF FELIPE BUENAVENTURA VS. ILOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION Short Summary: The encargado of the estate (the Administratrix assigned to him the administration of the estate) authorized the swapping of the lot already assigned to an heir to another lot, without the latters consent. The court held that the heir was not bound by the decision of the encargado. Facts -FELIPE BUENAVENTURA died -he left 20 parcels of land located in Negros Occidental and a building of strong materials -having married 2x, he also left 2 sets of children: 1st marriage 1. Pedro Buenaventura 2. Nicasia Buenaventura 3. Flora Buenaventura 4. Anacor[e[ta Buenaventura-FRANCISCO 5. Luz Buenaventura 6. Emilia Buenaventura 7. Simon Buenaventura, Sr. - deceased, so represented by wife and children 2nd marriage 1. Purisima Buenaventura 2. Rodolfo Buenaventura 3. Thelma Buenaventura 4. Phoebe Buenaventura 5. Jose Buenaventura 6. Antonio Buenaventura 7. Sally Buenaventura -ANACORETA was appointed as Judicial Administratrix. She left the administration of the estate to her ENCARGADO, her son MICHAEL FRANCISCO -some of the heirs sol their share in the estate, one of the vendees being ILOG AGRICULTURAL CORP (IAC) = got 18/29 including LOTS 2194 and 2380. Assignee of IAC intervened -JOINT SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS: Arnulfo Nono and Angel Gabriel >submitted project of partition: Approved Project of Partition -to prepare the physical partition of the estate, the ff were appointed as COMMISSIONERS/SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS: 1. Michael Francisco 2. Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura 3. Atty. Nilo Sorbito for AIC -the Commissioners recommended the Physical partition of the estate which Micheal did not sign although he actively participated in the preparation of the plan. The proposal gave NICASIA Lot No. 1871B. Court took JN that he did participate -Michael objected to the proposed partition on the ground that it was incomplete and erroneous: IAC already occupied Lot. 2194 before the approval of the project of partition, already harvested the produce therefrom BUT IAC agreed to cede the lots it bought (Lot 2194 and 2380) ifo ANACORETA and BEETHOVERN in exchange for LOT 1863-B -so ATTYs. BEETHOVEN and NILO made a new parcellary map -Conference was held wherein Michael manifested that the share of NICASIA in Lot 1871-B was to be swapped with LOT 2194 which IAC assigned to ANACORETA and BEETHOVEN. So what was agreed upon: Lot 1871-A (originally to NICASIA): swapped to equivalent area in Lot 2194 (which was originally assigned to ANACORETA and BEETHOVEN by IAC) Portion of Lot 1871-A and residue of LOT 2194 allotted to ATTY. BEETHOVEN Lot 1871-B to IAC -but revised it again:

NICASIA was given portions of Lot 2194 and 2380 (which was assigned originally to ANACORETA and BEETHOVEN) The rest of Lot 2194 to BEETHOVEN Lot 1871-B went to IAC -NICASIA OBJETED, with BEETHOVEN as counsel, to the swapping of the 2 lots (originally owned by IAC): 1. That during the hearing for the approval of the original physical partition plan, MICHAEL FRANCISCO manifested that her (NICASIA's) share which was w/n Lot 1871-B was to be swapped to the WHOLE Lot 2194 2. When the swapping was brought to her attention, she vehemently denied that she was ever consented or ever authorized MICHAEL FRANCICO to swap her share. She wants LOT 1871-B (which went to IAC) TC: set another conference: noted that the parties agreed to the earlier partition (the last revision) except for the share of NICASIA. Later held in abeyance the distribution of Lot 1871-B and a portion of Lot 2194 -NICASIA manifested that she would agree to the swapping of lot 1871-B if IAC would lease her a portion of the said lot -TC: disposed disputed share (based substantially on the testimony of MICHAEL FRANCISCO): o Lot 1871-B = IAC o Entire share of NICASIA in Lot 1871 = ANACORETA o Lot 2194 = NICASIA -NICASIA Appealed, alleging that she did not authorize MICHAEL Francisco to represent her and she was not consulted of the swapping, and just knew about it after the revised partition CA: ifo NICASIA (would own Lot 1871-B) -ANACORETA filed petition for review (she was the JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATRIX) WON MICHAEL FRANCISCO COULD BIND NICASIA TO THE PARTITION? NO -petitioner heirs failed to prove that NICASIA knew, through BEETHOVEN (her brother) and MICHAEL FRANCISCO that Lot 1871-B (already assigned to her) was to be swapped with a portion of Lot 2194 -NO evidence that NICASIA authorized MICHAEL FRANCISCO nor BEETHOVEN to agree in her behalf to the swapping -Michael Francisco was merely the encargado of the administratrix, a member of the Joint Commissioners tasked to effect a physical partition of the estate. Any recommendation made in such capacity is still subject to the action of the court after due notice to the heirs; unless and until all the parties are notified of any report/recommendation, thereafter duly heard by the court, the heirs cannot thereby be bound. -NICASIA is not bound by BEETHOVEN's agreement to the revised partition, as he was acting as the heir of the deceased and not for NICASIA -as to MICHAEL FRANCISCO's testimony: only said that NICASIA went to him to ask for amounts as an advance of her inheritance for the death anniversary of the decedent, and that he only agreed to give NICASIA a portion of what she was asking >MICHAEL also, in opposing to the proposed physical partition, did not oppose to the allocation of Lot 1871-B to NICASIA so affirm CA. NICASIA would own Lot 1871-B

PAULA V. ECSAY Summary: Lessee of Hacienda Puyas which was entitled too 10% of the produce from the Hacienda claims from the administrator. Court held that the 3P may claim against the administrator, who is under the courts direct supervision, but administrator cant claim by mere motion against 3P. *Claims against administrator may be presented in the Administrative proceeding but not against 3P Facts: -JOSE ECSAY(lessee) and RUFINA PAULA (Administratrix) entered a lease agreement wherein Administratrix was obliged to deliver 10% of the produce of the Hacienda Puyas to Ecsay, amended to close until 1942-1943 harvest. This was approved by the court. -ECSAY claimed from the Administratrix 10% -Administratrix PAULA opposed: 1. it cannot be presented as a claim because the administration proceedings were commenced since 1932 and the claim (made 1954) cannot be presented under R87.5 2. The probate court has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim against the adminsitratrix TC: claim was properly filed; claim was an offshoot of a contract approved by the probate court WON Probate court has jurisdiction over the claim? YES - We do not have probate courts dedicated to the trial of probate cases alone; our courts of first instance have jurisdiction of probate proceedings, such as administration and distribution and guardianship, jointly with the civil or criminal actions, and when taking cognizance of probate cases they do not hold court or sessions at specified places, or periods, or terms, and their power over the same is not separate and distinct, as is the case in common law countries where the same court may at one time sit as a court of common pleas, at another as a probate court, and still at another as a court of claims. - the practice has been for demands against administrators (not by those against third parties) to be presented in the court of first instance where the special proceeding of administration is pending, if the demand has relation to an act of administration and in the ordinary course thereof. - administration is under the direct supervision of the court and the administrator is subject to its authority. -When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person. For obvious reasons, the demand can not be made because third persons not under the jurisdiction of the court are involved. -HERE: 1. Lease contract was entered by the Administratrix w/ court approval in the ordinary coure of administration 2. the purpose of the claim is to make the Administratrix comply with the obligations contracted in the course of administration w/ the courts consent and approval 3. court has jurisdiction of the administrator so far as the property and the contract are concerned 4. court acquired jurisdiction over 3P when he submitted himself to the court and filed the claim -though he could file an independent action, not prohibited from doing so 5. Estate would only be responsible for the amount which the Administratrix is legally entitled to receive as rentals; not for the excess of the amount collected over and above rentals due under the lease Administratrix would be liable for the excess BAYOT V. ZURBITO Summary: the decedent in whose behalf the parties here are acting had dealt with each other during their lifetime. The plaintiff in this case filed a claim against the defendant, and defendant filed a claim for setoff. The commission disallowed the claim of defendant, and also of the plaintiff saying it had no jurisdiction over the claims. Court held that executor can independently commence an action to recover any COA which accrued to decedent during his lifetime. Facts:

-FRANCISCO BAYOT during his lifetime, made business contracts with LUCAS ZURBITO during their lifetime. -ZURBITO allegedly owed BAYOT a debt worth almost P10k. Bayots Administratrix filed a claim against ZURBITOs estate, which was allowed -ZURBITOs estate now wants to claim against BAYOT for alleged amounts belonging to ZURBITO when BAYOT acted as manager for ZURBITOs ranch. The committee on claims of the Bayot estate disallowed the same, was appealed by Zurbito but SC denied it with finality. -Since the Zurbito claim was denied, counterclaim (this is weird, di ko alam san ung counterclaim) by BAYOT estate against ZURBITO was denied by the committee in the estate of Bayot also disallowed. BAYOTs Administratrix did not appeal the decision so it was deemed final WON the committee on appraisal of the estate of BAYOT had jurisdiction over counterclaim? YES - A creditor who presents a claim against an estate submits himself to the jurisdiction of the committee, and the circumstance that his claim is found to be without merit in no wise defeats the authority of the committee to allow the set-off against him. WON the claim by Estate of Bayot is barred by res judicata? NO -decision does not exhibit the requisites essential to create the bar of res judicata: not judgment on the merits - The action of the committee on claims in the estate of Francisco Bayot was expressly based upon the idea that the jurisdiction of the committee to allow the set-off in favor of said estate was destroyed by the disallowance of the principal claim presented by Zurbito against the Bayot estate; and the Court of First Instance merely held, as this court also held, that the claim could not be allowed in the Court of First Instance because no appeal had been taken. In neither tribunal was any consideration paid to the merits of the claim; and no court has ever passed upon this point. ON the correct interpretation of Section 696, NCC: "Claims in favor of the estate and against a creditor who presents a claim for allowance against the estate shall be barred, unless so presented by the executor or administrator as an offset." - by failing to appeal from the action of the committee, the plaintiff was precluded from relying on this claim as an offset in the Court of First Instance in that proceeding. The court was not called upon to decide whether an independent action could be maintained. "SEC. 701. An Executor or Administrator may sue. - Nothing in this chapter shall prevent an executor or administrator from commencing and prosecuting an action commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, for the recovery of a debt or claim, to final judgment, . . -evidently recognizes the right of an executor or administrator, not only to continue the prosecution of an action already begun, but also to institute an action upon a cause which accrued in the lifetime of the deceased but which had not been made the subject of action by him. This of course supposes that the cause of action is such as to have survived to the estate. - Section 701 supplies general authority for the institution of an action by an executor or administrator upon any claim, in the nature of a debt, which accrued in the lifetime of the decedent; and the exception made in the opening words of Section 701 is such as to give absolute precedence to the rule therein expressed over anything to the contrary in Section 696 or any other part of chapter 38. In other words the provisions of Section 701 necessarily overrule so much of section 696 as purports to bar absolutely all claims in favor of an estate which are not made effective as offsets. - the claim on which this action is based is not barred by the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute it with effect as an offset in the former proceeding; and inasmuch as the judgment entered in that proceeding cannot, for reasons already stated, be considered binding as res judicata, the result is that the plaintiff is entitled to be heard on the merits in this action. CABUYAO V. CAGBAG Summary: the lone compulsory heir of the decedent spouses adjudicated upon himself the estate of his parents but since the title to the land (and occupation to some of it) were still with his uncle and

cousins, he filed case against them. The defense of his uncles and cousins is that he has no legal capacity to use, he having been not yet declared as the sole heir. Court held that no need for judicial declaration in order for him to exercise the COA. An allged heir has right to assert COA, though not yet judicially declared as an heir. Facts: -PRUDENCIO and DOMINGA died (though not the same time) and left 11 parcels of land -their alleged only son, DAMASO adjudicated the 11 parcels to himself pursuant to R74.1 (had affidavit of extrajudicial adjudication in his favor) -however, the corresponding TCTs of the 11 parcels cannot be issued because the original owners duplicate certificates were with his uncle, who was, with his cousins, unlawfully occupying the said property -he filed case against uncle cousins -MTD: no capacity to sue, not having been judicially declared lone compulsory heir -granted by lower court WON a judicial declaration as lone compulsory heir is required for the plaintiff to have COA to recover properties in dispute and to quiet his alleged title thereto? NO -R74.1 -requisites under R74.1: 1. decedents left no debts 2. that the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians *if no creditors claim 2 years after the death of the decedents, then presumed that no debts - the title to property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claim of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purposes of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent the immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. - There is no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate estate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor MARABILES V. QUITO Summary: Plaintiff filed case against the heirs of the deceased (who was named as the transferee of the title claimed by the plaintiff) but as a defense, the defendants argued that they were not yet declared as the heirs of the deceased, thus cannot be sued. Court held that no judicial declaration of heirship necessary to be made liable Facts: -Severina Marabilles (probably the wife of Patricio) filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur against Alejandro Quito and Aida Quito (father and daughter of deceased who was named the transferee of the property in question). -allegations: the title which was originally ifo Patricio Marabilles was fraudulently issued in the name of Guadalupe Saralde (wife and mother of defendants) by Alejandro Quito (defendant) and had it registered in the formers name -MTD: 1) plaintiffs had no capacity to sue; 2) no COA; 3) prescription -TC: granted MTD: 1) lack of judicial declaration of heirship ifo Severina (Patricio died, no judicial declaration that she and her children were the heirs) = lack of capacity to sue 2) no COA: Alejandro and Aida were also not yet declared as the heirs of Guadalupe in whose favor the title was transferred 3) prescription: the action already prescribed: registration was notice to the whole world, started counting from date of registration

WON the TC erred in ruling ifo Quitos? NO 1. The plaintiffs had legal capacity to sue -The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. - the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself -There is no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor 2. There is COA against defendants though not yet judicially declared as heirs -to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered - it appears in the complaint that Guadalupe Saralde is the wife of Alejandro Quito, the defendant, and as said Guadalupe has already died, under the law, the husband and his daughter Aida are the legal heirs. We have already said that in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. 3. NO PRESCRIPTION YET - While legally the registration of real property serves as a constructive notice on which an action based on fraud may be predicated, however, this cannot be invoked in the present case, for there is an averment in the complaint that the issuance of such title has been accomplished by defendant Alejandro Quito through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation and not through a valid and voluntary transfer. - when a person through fraud succeeds in registering the property in his name, the law creates what is called "constructive trust" in favor of the defrauded party and grants to the latter a right to vindicate the property regardless of the lapse of time.

PAVIA V. DELA ROSA Summary: The former executor of the will wasted the funds of the estate then died. The guardian of the minor heir of the estate sued the heirs of the executor for recovery of the amounts due. The court held that the executor/administrator of the deceased executor should be sued instead. Facts -Pablo Linart e Iturralde died, leaving minor Carmen Linart Pavia as heir. Rafaela Pavia is the guardian of Carmen -Executor Jose de la Rosa, while in possession of the property of the estate, wasted the funds of the estate. He then died -Rafaela sued 2 of the heirs of Jose, Bibiana and Salud del a Rosa (sisters of Jose), for the amounts due to the estate of Pablo -Answer: not liable for damages caused by Jose no settlement of his estate yet -Decision probably granted ifo defendants WON the heirs of the executor could be made liable for damages incurred through the actions of the deceased when he was still alive? NO (note: in the previous cases, it was held that even if no judicial declaration of heirship yet, the heirs may be made liable. Here, requires that the executor or administrator of the deceased be sued first thus requires settlement of estate of deceased. Whats the difference? Note also that this is an older case compared to Cabuyao and Marabiles) - The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the purpose of appraising the property of the estate and deciding as to the claims against said estate (Secs. 641, 642, 656, 660, 668, 669, Code of Civil Procedure.) - after the death of a person the only entity which may lawfully represent a testate or intestate succession is the executor or administrator appointed by the court charged to care for, maintain, and administer the estate of the deceased in such of lands, or for damages done to such lands, shall be instituted or maintained against him by an heir or devisee, until such time as there is entered s decree of the court assigning such lands to the heir or devisee, or until the time or period allowed for paying the debts of the estate has expired, unless the executor or administrator surrenders the possession of the lands to the heir or devisee. - with regard to estate or intestate succession, it is deduced that the heir lawfully succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his inheritance only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same and the adjudication of the residue of the estate of said deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by law to consider all claims against the estate of the deceased and to attend to or consider the same is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent judge or court. Disposition: ifo of Bibiana and Salud BUT w/o prejudice to plaintiffs right to institute proper action against executor/administrator of Jose (so would have to initiate settlement proceedings of estate of Jose) PASTOR VS. CA Summary: the illegitimate child of the deceased wanted the delivery of his share (allegedly a legacy) even before the probate proceedings have been terminated, and he wanted the shares of stock which was alleged by his legitimate brother to be his. Court held that a legacy is not a debt which could be paid even before the final determination of the estate of the deceased and that the determination of ownership of properties during the probate proceedings is merely provisional. Facts: -ALVARO PASTOR SR. died

-he left as his heirs: * Wife SOFIA (but died months after) *2 legitimate children >Alvaro Jr. >Sofia de Midgeley *1 illegitimate child: Quemada -Quemada petitioned for probate the alleged holographic will of their father wherein a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Alvaro Sr.s 42% sharein Atlas Consolidated Mining was given -Quemada also prayed that he be made a special administrator of the estate -Probate court appointed him as special administrator of the whole estate -Since he was the special administrator, he instituted against Pastor Jr and the latters wife ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE allegedly because Pastor Jr. held the properties subject of his legacy >PASTOR JR.s defense: he holds it in his own right, not as heir of PASTOR SR. -The case was brought until SC, which remanded the case to the probate court. Probate court did not make a ruling on it -After remand to the probate court, QUemad filed a pleading asking for an advance payment of his legacy and also the seizure of the shares in the property of PASTOR JR. PROBATE COURT: Awarded the legacy to Quemada, ordered execution on the shares held by Pastor Jr. -PASTOR JR. and his wife filed petition for certiorari before CA, but CA Affirmed. Hence, they went to SC WON the probate court resolved the issue of ownership with finality? NO - In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. - for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. - Nowhere in the dispositive portion of the probate courts order is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. - the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. WON Quemadas legacy could already be delivered? NO - no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy. - The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. -there was no liquidation of the community property of Pastor Sr. and his wife yet -no payment of estate tax yet - it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs. -R88.6: provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom execution is authorized to be issued

GODOY V. ORELLANO Summary: Administratrix negotiated the sale of decedents dredge which was under the probate courts jurisdiction w/o the probate courts approval. The seller now wants the delivery of the dredge. The court held that since the sale was unauthorized, it is void. It is only the court that has the power to authorize the sale. A power of attorney executed by the heirs in favor of the administrator gives no legal effect to the sale made without authority of the court. Facts: -JULIO ORELLANO died -one of his properties is a DREDGE -he left as heirs the ff: DEMETRIO JOSE GUILLERMO ALFREDO PAZ -administratrix appointed: FELISA PANGILINAN -administratrix entered negotiation with EUSEBIO GODOY for the purchase of the DREDGE >Eusebio entered an option to buy the dredge (consideration for the option: P1k) for P10k >GODOY was given 20 days w/n which he could pay the dredge >PANGILINAN can grant the option PROVIDED the coowners (heirs) ratified the option contract >the option contract was never ratified >so when GODOY was ready to pay, PANGILINAN cannot deliver the dredge because the coowners would not let her do so (apparently, there were other bidders for the dredge who were offering to buy it for a higher price) -GODOY now files a complaint against the co-owners and PANGILINAN -PANGILINAN's answer: Property belongs to the intestate estate of Julio Orellano Plaintiff and defendants knew of that such property belonged to the intestate estate so she thought she was authorized to enter the option agreement Since she thought she was authorized to enter the option contract, she applied to the probate court for permission to sell the dredge BUT on the day of the hearing for the allowance of the option contract, her codefendants opposed as there were other bidders for the dredge So she asked for authority to sell it through public auction, and it was sold through a public auction (court authorized the public auction) That she did not refuse to deliver the dredge, the court did not allow her to deliver it That she wanted to tender the P1k consideration for the option but plaintiff refused to accept the same TC: Defendants ordered to reimburse GODOY P2k WON the administratrix was authorized to sell the dredge? NO -it was admitted by PANGILINAN that the dredge in question is part of intestate estate of Julio Orellano and cannot be disposed of w/o proper authority of the court

-A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a will devising property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than by a direction to pay the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchase. (Huse vs. Den, 85 Cal., 390.) -A sale by an administrator of the personal property of the estate, without the authority of an order of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of jurisdiction, does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding administrator. (Wyatt's Adm'r vs. Rambo, 29 Ala., 510.) -Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney. MANECLANG V. BAUN Summary: When the property of the intestate estate of the decedent was sold, only the surviving spouse was given notice and the other heirs who were of legal age. No guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the minor children. The court nullified the sale, there being no complete notice to all the heirs. The notice, which must be in writing, must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to the interested parties. These requisites are mandatory and essential w/o them, the authority itself, as well as the sale or encumbrance is void. There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the ntice may be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs, are the presumptive owners. Since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latters death, they are the persons directly affected by the sale or mortgage and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law. Facts: -MARGARITA SURI SANTOS died intestate -she left as surviving heirs her husband SEVERO and 9 children, 7 of whom were all minors then. -2 years later, the administrator of the estate asked for authority from the probate court to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts of the estate -Court granted the administrator authority to do so w/o notice to the other heirs - only to the husband SEVERO and to the counsel (SEPTEMBER 1949 ORDER) -in accordance with the said order, the new administrator (now of legal age OSCAR) sold some parcels of land belonging to the estate to the city of Dagupan, wherein the public market was built -13 years later, the new judicial administratrix ADELAIDA (was 13 when her mother died and was 15 when the 1949 order was issued) contested the validity of the sale to Dagupan, arguing no notices were given TC: partial decision against City of Dagupan

>>>it was essential and mandatory that the interested parties be given notices of the application for authority to sell the estate or any protion thereof which is pending settlement in a probate court (I just focused here because it's the point why the case was assigned) WON the lack of notice is a ground for nullifying the sale to the City of Dagupan? YES -the provisions of the Civil code on which the City of Dagupan relied on (that the notice to the father was notice to the minor heirs, being assigned as the legal representative of the minor children) was impliedly repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure on guardianship -it does not follow that for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. -Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid Article 159, incorporates the amendment that if the property under administration is worth more than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), the father or the mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. -Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule state explicitly that the notice, which must be in be writing, must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to the interested parties. -There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio. -The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs, as the presumptive owners since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latter's death, are the persons directly affected by the sale or mortage and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law. LEE VS. RTC QC Summary: The decedent left legitimate and illegitimate children as well as his surviving spouse. His first family executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate even pending probate proceedings, w/o giving notice to the illegitimate children. The first family sold the shares of the decedent, as they partitioned it, to FLAG. The illegitimate children now contests the validity of the sale and the CA as well as the SC already ruled that the sale was void. Still, the purchasers of the shares insists that they are entitled to it. The court held that it is NULL and VOID for not giving notice to the other heirs. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.

Although the ROC do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court, acted w/n its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.