ARCILLAS V MONTEJO 26 SCRA 197 MAKALINTAL ; November 29, 1968; LORA

FACTS - Eustaquio Arcillas died intestate. - Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, in the November 12 petition sought the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. - It was claimed that at various dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of their respective shares and participation executed by 4 other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas. - 5 other children of the deceased filed a petition on November 16 praying for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Aurelio Arcillas, the petitioner preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate. The petition states that the deceased left an estate consisting of real property in Zamboanga City with a probable value of not less than P6,000 and that deceased left no debts remaining unpaid. - Petitioner filed his opposition to the November 12 petition on the ground that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was included in the estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration had actually been filed and was awaiting resolution, that petition should be held in abeyance until after the Nov 16 petition was closed and terminated. - Respondent Judge issued an order temporarily holding in abeyance resolution of the November 12 petition until the termination of the intestate proceedings. - In his answer to the November 16 petition Geronimo Arcillas, this time joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was improper. - Petitioner insisted that there were still other properties of the estate of the deceased besides

Lot No. 276; he likewise took issue with respondents' view that administration proceedings could be dispensed with asserting, firstly, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial partition and, secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of their participation in the estate. - Respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the issuance of letters of administration and at the same time gave due course to the November 12 petition. - Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the petition for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority of Section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age HELD - NO. Under Rule 74.1, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. - Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan: sec.1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration, proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may be fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said Section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. - Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under Section I of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely

on the ground that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. - The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in administration proceedings rather than in any other action. Disposition Appealed orders set aside

CIRIACO FULE vs. ANASTASIO FULE 46 PHIL. 317; JOHNSON; Sept 30, 1924 MARGE
FACTS -Saturnino Fule died intestate. Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in CFI Laguna for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as administrator of the estate. The petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino, he was owner of P50T worth of real and personal property in San Pablo, Laguna and about P30T in cash. CFI appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator and required him to give a bond of P8T. Alcantara later presented in court an inventory of the alleged property of the deceased. -Anastacio, et al opposed the petition and the appointment of the special administrator, alleging that they were children of Saturnino Fule, that they were all of age, that the deceased had left no debts and that his property had already been partitioned among his children during his lifetime in conformity with article 1056 of the Civil Code. -Judge Paredes revoked the appointment of the special administrator and ordered him to render an account. He also denied Saturninos petition and initially suggested that the latter amend his petition and present an ordinary action for partition. -Upon hearing on Saturninos MFR/MNT and the opposition thereto, the suggestion was withdrawn and the petition for the appointment of an administrator was denied upon the principal ground that all of the property of Saturnino Fule had been in the possession of his heirs for many

years before his death; and that at the time of his death there were no debts and no property to be administered. From that judgment the petitioner appealed. ISSUE WON the court a quo committed an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule HELD: NO -Under the provisions of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they have also the privilege. The Code of Procedure in civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. -When the heirs are all of lawfully age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the state among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. -And even when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay the debts and divide the property among themselves according to their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case of will, without probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with a complete equitable title to their particular share of state. (Carter vs. Owens, 41 Ala., 217.) Disposition Judgment affirmed, without prejudice to the right of the Ciriaco to commence an action for partition of any property left by Saturnino Fule which had not already been partition among his heirs.

MALCOLM and OSTRAND, JJ., dissent citing the policy of the law: that is to encourage definite and final settlements. They argue that since the estate is alleged to be worth P80T, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there may have had dealings with others from which claims against the estate may arise, the existence of which cannot be definitely ascertained until publication of notice to claimants and creditors has been made. It would seem to be the interest of all parties concerned to have the estate definitely settled and that can only be done properly through administration proceedings. -Re: Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, Bondad vs. Bondad, and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon: In all three of the cases it is admitted that there were no debts and considering the long period which had elapsed since the death of the deceased, there could be but little probability of any new claimants appearing. Under such circumstances the court might well be justified in holding that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary. -In the present case we are confronted with an entirely different situation. Here there has been no partition or distribution by agreement among the heirs, the petition for administration was presented within three months after the death of the deceased, and the estate is large and its settlement may give rise to unexpected complications.

that his mother had other property which during her lifetime she disposed of to the benefit of some of the plaintiffs. - The trial court ordered that the land be divided between the plaintiffs and defendant. ISSUE/S 1. WON the heirs may demand division of the property 2. WON Simona disposed of her property during her lifetime for the benefit of the plaintiffs HELD 1. YES Reasoning It is not a principle authorized by law that heirs of legal age may not demand the division of a real property, left them by their predecessor-in-interest and held by a coheir, without first initiating special intestate proceedings during which a judicial administrator is to be appointed, who alone is vested with the personality to claim the property that belongs to the succession. On the contrary, such heirs are expressly authorized to do so, unless for the reason of there being unpaid debts, judicial intervention becomes necessary, which was not alleged as a special defense in this suit. 2. NO Reasoning Such is a question of fact, which may not be entertained by the Court. The trial court has already declared the document conveying properties to the plaintiffs to be false. And even though the said instrument were not false, the trial court declared it to be void and ineffective. The alleged gift was in fact null and void since there was no acceptance from the donee.

CASTILLO V CASTILLO 23 PHIL 364 ARELLANO; November 5, 1912 MONCH

FACTS - The subject of the suit is a parcel of land in Batangas owned by Simona Madlangbayan. She died 7 years ago. It is currently in the possession of one of her children, Urbano Castillo. There are other descendants of hers who have the same right to wit: A daughter and some grandchildren of the deceased brother of full blood of Urbano Castillo, named Pio Castillo; the daughter of a sister of full blood of the same defendant, named Alfonsa, likewise deceased; and a daughter of a half-brother of the said Urbano Castillo, named Estefano Libingting, also deceased. They demanded division of the land - Defendant Urbano Castillo endeavored to prove

HERNANDEZ V ANDAL 78 Phil. 196 TUAZON; March 29, 1947 ICE

FACTS -The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land. Intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860.

-After the sale the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property. Cresencia Hernandez; the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from him long after he had bought it, that is when she was about to file her action. Defendant and intervenors asked that evidence be allowed to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had been made. Counsel for the plaintiff objected asserting that "under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the p roof is offered." Upon this objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties. ISSUE WON under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible HELD No. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no. The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. The differences in the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states. However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a

long line of cases to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. In this jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein enumerate void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the action for specific performance. (Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, supra.) On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. "Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been he]d or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty. "In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty. "A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. "A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have

regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties." (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.) It is on the effects of rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition, that there are sharp divergences of opinion among the members of this Court. This section reads: "If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent." It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a public document and its registration. As a general proposition, transactions, so far as the affect the parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 171.) The decisions of this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.) Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential or partition? In other words, is writing the that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be note that where the law intends a writing or other formality be the essential requisite to the validity of the transaction, it says so in clear and nequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as

originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of the states, uses the words "utterly void" with reference to certain transactions. Under the terms of such state transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil Code says that donation may be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to the validity of the contract by using this phrase: " in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public document: "in order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass upon any estate real or personal nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written etc." Other examples might be mentioned. Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against the proposition that a public document and its registration were contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition can bind the parties. 1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part were promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between coheirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of third parties would be to transcend its rule-making power. We bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section

1 of Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's functions and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements to validity to protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because decedents' estates are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of to parties eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the realm of substantive law. Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 of Rule 74, is enlightening and instructive. The former after stating that heirs may apportion and divided the estate among themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an intention to make the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol partition. But what is far, more to the point is that by logical process of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision series to emphasize the necessity of positive and clear language if a given contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect on the parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the prescribed public instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending that such document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190 was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of legislation. 2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments ill acts and contracts with greater liberality with a view to better adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncrasies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of

experience and foresight, and in their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. The advantages of an airtight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made provision for public instrument for all transaction and contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real rights in immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective between the parties. A leading case on this subject is Tunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Willard writing the decision. It was said in that case that when the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract is binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action on the verbal agreement without first bringing an action under article 1279 to compel the execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action." It further says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any special intrinsic form, recognized its enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties an adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public writing or any other special form whenever such form is necessary in order that contract may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its object. This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other legal topic. And it has been extended even to verbal con tracts involving land registered under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate among coheirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If is between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more

intransigent when the transaction is between coheirs and there is no change of ownership but simply designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. Disposition Reversed and remanded

the will of Mariano Lamberto be proved and allowed and that an administrator be appointed to administer the estate of the deceased. - Claudia Mendiola appeared and opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the estate had been completely settled and a partition of the property belonging thereto had been made fifteen years before. The court below granted the prayer of the petition and appointed in administrator. From this order Claudia Mendiola has appealed. ISSUE WON the extrajudicial settlement by agreement or the partition agreed upon should be upheld HELD YES Ratio Where the parties in fact signed an agreement of partition was in the fact made in accordance with that agreement, all proceedings in court for the settlement of the estate of the deceased person were ended. The rights of the parties to the property involved could no longer be discussed nor determined in that proceeding. If it were claimed that the partition was brought about by fraud or that it was void for any other reason, such claims necessarily had to be presented in an ordinary action brought for the purpose of setting aside the partition. Reasoning Court holds that where prior to the adoption of the present Code of Civil Procedure a contract of partition has in fact been made by all the persons interested in the estate of a deceased person, such persons interested being of full age and capacity to contract, no further proceedings can be had for the judicial settlement and administration of that property until the contract of partition has been set aside in an ordinary action brought for the purpose, and that in this case, when it was made to appear to the court below that such a contract of partition had in fact been signed by the petitioners of their grantors, the court should have dismissed the petition. Disposition The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the petition, with costs to the appellant, Claudia Mendiola

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUEL GUZMAN. RAFAELA GUZMAN V JUAN and REINALDO ANOG 37 PHIL 61 CARSON; Oct 26, 1917 BAUZA
FACTS -Sec. 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2331 provides for the summary settlement of estates of deceased persons not exceeding P3,000 in value. -It is alleged that 2 parcels of land belong to the estate of deceased. 2 of deceaseds sons deny this, having been in possession for many years and claiming to be the absolute owners, not by any right of inheritance from deceased, who never was in possession and never had any title to the land in question. - The trial judge proceeded summarily to determine title to the land and to provide for its distribution among the various heirs of the deceased, over the objections of claimants in possession. ISSUES WON the trial judge erred HELD YES. Ratio Reasoning When questions arise as to ownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The CFI, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction to try and determine the ordinary actions mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure. The rules on summary settlement of estates of small value, confers no such jurisdiction. It is clear that there is even less justification for an attempt to exercise such jurisdiction in summary proceedings than in regular administration proceedings.

MENDIOLA V MENDIOLA 7 PHIL 71 WILLARD; November 27, 1906 REAN

NATURE Appeal from CFI decision FACTS - Mariano Lamberto died in Tacloban leaving surviving him his widow, the defendant and appellant Claudia Mendiola, and his mother, Silveria, as his only heirs. In his will, left 2/3 of his estate to his mother and an interest in the other third to Justiniano Mendiola, his stepson, the son of Claudia. Voluntary proceedings were commenced in CFI of Leyte for a settlement of the estate. - Pending such proceedings, Claudia, the mother, Silveria, and Justiniano, the stepson, made an agreement which appears in a notarial document by which they abandoned the proceeding in the CFI, settled the estate and divided the property among themselves. By the terms of this agreement, Claudia took possession of all the property, agreeing to pay the debts, and agreed, to, and did, pay Silveria Melendres, and Justiniano. - Nearly 15 years after this settlement, Justiniano and Juliana Lamberto, daughter of Silveria, presented a petition to CFI of Leyte asking that

Disposition We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed, and it appearing from the petition and the pleadings filed in the court below that the only property sought to be distributed in these proceedings is the real estate claimed by the appellants, and it appearing further, that petitioner's decedent died in the year 1899, we are of opinion that the petition should be dismissed, without costs in this instance, the costs in first instance to be against the petitioner. So ordered.

VDA. DE FRANCISCO v. CARREON 95 PHIL 237 BENGZON; June 28, 1954 RICKY
FACTS - In 1947, Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the CFI of Rizal to settle the estate of her husband Jose M. Francisco consisting of a house and lot. She was appointed guardian ad litem of her three minor children. One-half undivided share was adjudicated to Rosa, and the other half in equal parts to the children. The order was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, who issued a new certificate of title in the names and in the proportion stated. - In 1948, Rosa mortgaged her share of the realty to the Carreon sisters for P13,000. In 1950 she sold to the Carreon sisters her interest in the land. The mortgage and the sale were both inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds. - However, in a motion of March 14, 1950, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, mother of the deceased Jose Francisco, in representation of the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, seventeen, averred that this minor was a recognized natural son of the deceased, with legal right to participate in his estate, that the previous proceedings were void because Rosa Francisco had concealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflict with those of her 3 sons, and that the land was private (exclusive?) property of Jose Francisco of which she could not have been awarded a portion. Tiburcia prayed for her appointment as guardian ad litem of the 4 children; a declaration that Jose Francisco y Palumpon was a recognized natural child of the deceased with the right to inherit; annulment of the previous adjudication (the widow being

entitled to usufruct only); and annulment of the mortgage and sale in favor of the Carreon sisters. - When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal, without prejudice, of Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition. Her request was granted; but the court announced that the 3 minor children's petition for reopening of the order adjudicating one-half to Rosa Francisco, with all consequent effects upon the mortgage and sale, will be taken up later. - Tiburcia, submitted an "amended motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations and prayed for identical remedies except those touching the recognition of Jose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling objections, the court admitted the amended motion, and rendered judgment holding the realty was private property of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it 4 years before his marriage to Rosa Aldana and held that the whole property passed to the 3 legitimate children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of the widow. It annulled the mortgage and the sale in favor of the Carreon sisters, and issued instructions to the Register of Deeds. The Carreon sisters appealed. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in continuing to hear the motion for reopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn from the litigation. 2. WON the lower court erred in taking cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale, which it could not validly consider as a probate court. HELD 1. NO. Ratio Where the title on its face shows that it was subject to the provisions of Rule 74, Sec 4, a third person who accepts it must take notice that he is running the risk of interfering with the rights of minors as provided under Sec 5, Rule 74. Reasoning In her motion, Tiburcia asked for appointment as guardian ad litem for the natural child and for the 3 legitimate children. She asked for remedial measures beneficial to the 4 children. Hence, the motion may be regarded as interposed on behalf of the said 4 children not only a motion of the natural child. At any rate "parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own

initiatives at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just". - Even if the original motion did not afford legal standing to the 3 legitimate children, and that it could not be amended, there is no reason to prevent the lower court from considering such amended motion as a new and independent petition filed on behalf of the 3 minor children. The matter of time might be material in regard to considering the "amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case it is immaterial because under Sec 5 of Rule 74 such motion may be lodged with the court within one year after the minors have reached majority; and they are still minors. - The Carreons complain that they thought such petition for readjustment or reopening could take place only within 2 years as prescribed by Sec 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate of title. However, they are conclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions of Sec 5, Rule 74. They accepted the mortgage with the encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74, Sec 4, and did not specifically mention Sec 5, the fact that Sec 4, Rule 74 was noted should have been sufficient warning that the title was subject to the interest of persons unduly prejudiced. 2. NO. Reasoning Several decisions hold that if during the summary proceeding some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must be decided in a separate suit. In this case however, there is no question that the realty belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit was unnecessary, specially remembering that in these summary settlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and "without delay" "to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them." - The Carreons knew or ought to know the rule permitting reapportionment even after two years. And Sec 4, Rule 74 (which must be deemed extensible to situations covered by Sec 5, Rule 74) expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful participation in the real estate "notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate" and to "issue execution" thereon. All this implies that, when within the amendatory period

the realty has been alienated, the court in redividing it among the heirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these summary settlements. Disposition Order AFFIRMED.

JEREZ v NIETES 30 SCRA 904 FERNANDO; December 27, 1969 JOEY

FACTS - Oct. 3, 1960: Nicolas Jalandoni died. - Oct. 27, 1960: A special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before Judge Nietes, where petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, was appointed as administratrix. - June 14, 1966: project of partition and final accounting was submitted - June 15, 1966: Judge Nietes gave an order approving the partition. - June 29, 1966: respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. - July 8, 1966: Judge gave an order allowing intervention and reopening the proceedings to permit the movants "to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." - Sept. 21, 1966: CA sustained CFI order. ISSUES WON CA erred in sustaining CFI order HELD - It is within the power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and allow intervention. The question remains, however, whether he did so in the appropriate manner. It is not the existence of the power but the mode of its exercise that is open to question. - CA judges were split. The majority held that the determination of a prima facie interest in an

estate to justify reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate court; that, while no supporting documents are appended to the motion to reopen tending to show the personality to intervene, said motion is nevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the probate court has authority to require the submission of at least a prima facie showing of said interest; that the motion to reopen was filed before the order closing the proceedings had achieved finality and during the reglementary period within which the court still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend and control its process and orders; that, because the closure order had not yet become final, the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not apply and, hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds therein stated is not fatal; that the better practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited heirs is to secure relief by reopening the proceedings by a proper motion within the reglementary period, it being desirable that all aspects of a controversy be ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity of suits. - The CA minority held that the better policy is to require the intervenors first to produce prima facie evidence of the claimed civil status before opening the door and letting them in. Under Rule 12.2, 'a person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation.' The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share in the estate cannot be totally discounted specially considering that the present intestate proceedings had been pending for the last 6 years without a motion to intervene having been filed by the present claimants in spite of the notice of publication and the in rem character of the intestate proceedings. On the power to reopen proceedings and allow intervention - Ramos v. Ortuzar: The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion

within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. - Rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been approved. On the exercise of the power - The verified motion on the part of private respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be considered premature. Dispositive CA resolution MODIFIED in the sense that Judge Nietes, or whoever may be acting in his place, is directed to require Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in SP No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni. In the event that they could so justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to proceed conformably to law.

RAMOS V. ORTUZAR 89 PHIL 730 August 21, 1651

CHRIS CAPS FACTS - 1905-1914. Percy Hill cohabited w/ Martina Ramos & had 6 children, incl Richard & Marvin Hill. The others died in infancy. Percy acquired lands and started improving them until his death. - 1914. Percy canonically married Livingstone & had 3 children, now in US. Livingstone died. - 1924. Percy married Ortuzar & had 1 daughter. - 1937. Proceedings for settlement of Percys estate started. Ortuzar was administratrix. - 1940. Distribution of estate was made. - 1947. Ortuzar & her daughter, and Percys children by Livingstone, sold the land to Bustos.

- Martina Ramos, Richard & Marvin Hill brought this action in CFI Nueva Ecija to annul partition of estate and the sale. - Court found that Ramos had not been married to Percy, that Richard & Marvin were acknowledged natural children, that the sale was null and void. Court allotted estate among Richard & Marvin Hill, and Percys children by 1st and 2nd wives. - Both parties appealed. ISSUES 1. WON Martina Ramos and Percy Hill were legally married 2. WON CFI was correct in giving course to the action to annul the partition HELD 1. NO - No certificate of marriage or entry thereof in Civil registry was presented, nor has explanation of the absence been offered. - Ramos story: She and Percy were living together when her husband said he was going to get a helper. Percy came back with a woman who did not look like a maid at all. Percy begged her to forgive him. She let the woman stay provided her husband gives her a house where she can run a store and she continues to manage the lands in question. Court: This conduct only confirms that they were not married. And no intelligent man like Percy would be so unmindful and so reckless to publicly marry twice while first wife was alive and live with his new wife in plain sight of his former wife & children. - Also, soon after Ramos and Percy separated, Ramos and Teodoro Tobias began living together. TCT, mortgage deed, deed of sale, birth certificates of their children say that Ramos and Tobias are husband and wife. 2. NO - Ramos never entered appearance in Percys intestate proceedings. She came forward claiming to be Hills wife 6 yrs after partition & adjudication of estate and after records have disappeared. - Percy and Livingstone possessed these properties adversely, exclusively and publicly and in concept of owners. Whatever right Ramos had has been lost by prescription. She slept over her alleged right for more than 30 yrs.

- It also appears that in Percys intestate proceedings, Richard & Marvin Hill intervened or sought to intervene. Hearing was held and testimony was taken, but the petition to intervene was denied. It appears that all the facts raised in this present suit were alleged, discussed and adjudicated in the expediente of Percys intestate. - Proceeding for probate is one in rem. Court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, thru publication of notice. Any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them. A final order of distribution of estate vests title to the land of estate in distributees. There is no reason why these shouldnt apply to intestate proceedings. - The only instance in w/c a party interested in probate proceeding may have final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or thru mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice is reopening of the same case by proper motion w/in the reglamentary period, not an independent action w/c might have effect of another judge throwing out a decision already final and executed.

settled the partition. (For perspective, the property in question is some 226k sqm.) -Ma. Elena asked the collaterals and the widow for her share. They refused to give her because shes not a blood relative. So she filed an action in the CFI to annul the partition. CFI dismissed for being filed out of time. The action was filed 3 years 10 months after the extrajudicial settlement. CA affirmed CFIs dismissal. ISSUE WON the period in Rule 74.4 (2 years) applies in this case. HELD NO. - The 2-year period in Rule 74.4 applies only for validly executed extrajudicial settlements wherein the one assailing the same participated. A valid ej settlement, per Rule 74.1, means that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. - The contention that Ma.Elena was represented by the adoptive mom doesnt hold because she wasnt a minor anymore. The fact that the ej settlement was published after the partition is also of no value because the notice is supposed to be given BEFORE the ej settlement, to call all the heirs to participate. The exclusion of heirs in the ej settlement is fraudulent. - Clearly, the 2-yr period doesnt apply to Ma. Elena. The action to annul a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud may be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. - Since Ma. Elena is the adopted child, she along with the widow are the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez, to the exclusion of the latters collateral relatives. The collaterals, who got around 90% of the estate in the ej settlement, have no right to the same. However, the properties that were already transferred to 3rd persons must be recovered in a separate case because there can be no collateral attack on Torrens Titles. - Ma. Elena wasnt able to prove damages due her so the court awarded nominal damages of P100k.

PEDROSA v. CA 353 SCRA 620 Quisumbing, J.; March 5, 2001 INA

FACTS - Ma. Elena Rodiguez Pedrosa is the adopted child of spouses Rosalina and Miguel Rodriguez. The spouses had no other children. When Miguel died, his collateral relatives filed an action in the CFI to annul the adoption of Ma. Elena. (surprisingly, the adoptive mother was one of the petitioners there.) The CFI upheld the validity of the adoption. The collaterals and the widow appealed to the CA; but while the proceedings were ongoing, they entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Miguel, without the participation of Ma.Elena, who was already of majority age at that time. Eventually, the CA upheld the validity of the adoption. But by this time, the collaterals and the widow had partitioned the estate. They published in a newspaper the fact of partition AFTER they

HEIRS OF REYES V REYES APPLE CUIZON v RAMOLETE 129 SCRA 495 GUTIERREZ; May 29, 1984 JOJO
FACTS In 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City. The decree of registration and the OCT was issued in 1976 in the name of Mariano; and in that same year, a TCT covering the property in question was issued to his child Irene. - In 1970, he distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and Irene Cuizon. Part of the property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which eventually became the subject of this controversy. - In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of the petitioners: Francisco & Rosita Cuizon(children of Rufina) and Purificacion Cuizon. However, the sale was not registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene. - In 1978, Irene died. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the decedent including the property in question. After the notice of the extrajudicial settlement was duly published in a newspaper of general circulation, Rufina thereafter, executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the deed of sale of 1971 executed by the late Irene and renounced and waived whatever rights, interest, and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, a new TCT was issued in favor of the petitioners. Thereafter, a petition for letters of administration was filed before the Cebu CFI by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the 17 heirs of Irene to act as administrator of the estate of the decedent. The petition was granted. - Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He included in the inventory the property in question which was being

administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. In 1979, the probate court granted Antiguas motion asking the court for authority to sell the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator. Subsequently, on 3 different occasions, respondent Segundo Zambo with the aid of several men, sought to enforce the order of the court. Hence this petition. - The thrust of the petitioners' argument is that the probate court, as a court handling only the intestate proceedings, had neither the authority to adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest them of their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the same to the administrator. Petitioners further contend that the proper remedy of the respondent administrator is to file a separate civil action to recover the same. On the other hand, the administrator contended that the deed of sale of 1971 lost its efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree in favor of Irene Cuizon in 1976. ISSUE WON a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the inventory of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator. HELD NO It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. - For the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision

in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. - As held in Siy Chong Keng v CIR, the mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the property of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership recognized in the above quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It does not even matter that the issue is raised after approval of the inventory because apparently, it is not necessary that the inventory and appraisal be approved by the Court. - In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold 7 years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a TCT issued in the name such third parties, the probate court should have denied the motion of the administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons their possession and ownership of the property. - Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale of December 1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.

LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. vs. PASTOR T. QUEBRAR, ET AL. MAKASIAR; January 31, 1984 ATHE
FACTS

- Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the Quebrar, as administrator of estates of Chinsuy and Lipa. In consideration of the suretyship wherein the Luzon Surety was bound jointly and severally with the defendant Quebrar, the latter, together with Kilayko, executed two indemnity agreements. - Defendants paid P304.50 under each indemnity agreement or a total of P609.00 for premiums and documentary stamps. - CFI approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of defendant-appellant - Luzon Surety demanded from the defendantsappellants the payment of the premiums and documentary stamps from August 9,1955. - The defendants-appellants ordered a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares. The court ordered the bonds cancelled. Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case, hence, a total of P4,872.00 for the period of August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962. The defendants-appellants refused to pay the said amount of P4,872.00 arguing that both the Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project of partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the nonpayment of the stated premiums. ISSUE WON the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the year that they were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled, therefore, defendants are liable to Luzon Surety HELD YES. Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134). Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of

the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of administration it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship. Reasoning: a. It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957. The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses (Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957. And in the case of Montemayor vs. Gutierrez (114 Phil. 95), an estate may be partitioned even before the termination of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the administration proceedings. Notwithstanding the approval of the partition, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental still had jurisdiction over the administration proceedings of the estate of Chinsuy and Lipa. b. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants. The probate court possesses an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over the administration proceedings and it cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the every purpose for

which it was filed. It is the duty of the courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estate of the deceased persons by intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may be done thereto

DIEZ v. SERRA 51 Phil. 283 VILLAMOR; December 24, 1927 GLAISA

FACTS - Diez applied to the CFI Occidental Negros for letters of administration of the estate of the deceased Florencia Diez alleging that he is a brother of the said Florencia Diez who last resided at Negros; that the deceased at the time of her death was a widow and left no will; that the deceased left realty consisting in a share of onethird of lots; that the deceased left seven children. - Court granted the application, ordering the appointment of Diez as administrator, upon his filing a bond in the sum of P5,000. Diez presented an inventory of the property under his administration. - The administration functioned for two years until a child of Florencia, Tomas Serra for himself and as guardian of his six minor brothers and sisters, put in a special appearance, contesting that court's authority to take cognizance of this intestate estate, on the ground that the deceased Florencia Diez resided in the municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, at the time of her death, as evidenced by the death certificate. - The North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. filed an intervention in this case, as creditor of the intestate estate for a mortgage loan granted to the administrator, with the authorization of the court, maintaining the validity of these proceedings, and asking for the dismissal of the special appearance of Tomas Serra et al. - The court denied the petition of the special appearance. ISSUE WON Tomas Serra et al can contest the competency and jurisdiction of CFI of Occidental Negros to take cognizance of and act in the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Florencia Diez

10

HELD - NO. This administration has functioned for two years, and the appellants after that period have appeared in this case, too late to avail themselves of the benefits offered by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it would seem that the only remedy left to them is to ask for the reopening of the proceedings in the lower court that assumed jurisdiction. - In order to render valid a grant of letters of administration the view is generally accepted that certain jurisdictional facts must exist. These facts are that the person on whose estate the letters are being granted is in fact dead, and that at the time of death he was a resident of the county wherein letters are being granted, or if not a resident that he left assets in such county. It has been said that the fact of the death of the intestate and of his residence within the county are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration in any county. A probate court has jurisdiction to grant administration of the estate of a person who at the time of his decease was an inhabitant or resident in the county, without proof that he left an estate to be administered within the county. - Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance for the settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the lack of jurisdiction appears in the record. In the present case the lack of jurisdiction did not appear in the record at the time when the court a quo that appointed the administrator found itself competent, and no appeal was taken from the order decreeing said appointment.

(respondent) was appointed the administrator and was declared the only heir of the deceased under the will. The administration proceedings was closed. Joaquin Basa (petitioner) filed a motion praying that proceedings be reopened and alleged that court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing and that Ing Katipunan is not a general circulation in Pampanga as prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure: SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. When a will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses." - First publication: June 6, 1931 Third: June 20, 1931 Hearing: June 27, 1931 NOTE: only 21 days after the date of the FIRST publication instead of THREE FULL WEEKS BEFORE the day set for the hearing ISSUES 1. WON Sec 630 means publication requirement constitutes three full weeks before the date of hearing 2. WON Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in Pampanga HELD 1. NO Ratio First publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. Reasoning - HISTORY OF Section 630 > Code of Civil Procedure of State of Vermont. SC of Vermont stated in In re Warner's Estate: Date of examining and allowing final account of administration and for decreeing the residue of the estate to the lawful claimants of the same: December 19, 1919

Order to this effect: November 28, 1919 Date of Publication: December 4, 11 and 18, 1919 (three weeks successively) NOTE: This was 'public notice' to all persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing said account and making decree of distribution, and was sufficient even though the hearing on the administrator's final account was set for December 19, only fifteen days after the date of the first publication. 2. YES - record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation as it is > published for the dissemination of local news and general information > has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribes > published at regular intervals and > trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." - no attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination - fact that there is another paper published in Pampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies also have a larger circulation in that province is unimportant. No fixed number of subscribers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation. Disposition TC affirmed

RODRIGUEZ V BORJA 17 SCRA 418 REYES JBL; June 21, 1966 TERRY
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - Fr. Rodriguez died in Manila. On March 4, 1963, respondents Pangilinan and Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.On March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to

BASA V MERCADO 61 PHIL 632 GODDARD; July 26, 1935

OWEN FACTS - CFI Pampanga allowed and probated last will and testament of Ines Basa. Atilano Mercado

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examine the alleged will, which was withdrawn - On March 12, 1963, the Rodriguezes, petitioners herein, filed before CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. - On same day, Pangilinan and Jacalan filed a petition for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paranaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paranaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. - The Rodriguezes contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in CFI Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. - Pangilinan and Jacalan, aver that the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in CFI Bulacan therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963. ISSUE WON CFI Bulacan had jurisdiction over the case HELD YES - The jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Fr Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices as under Sec 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court - The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time

when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to CFI Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in CFI Rizal only on March 12, 8 days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan is incontestable. - But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all CFIs, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan. That is sufficient in this case. Disposition Petition for certiorari is DENIED.

ISSUE WON the CFI erred in allowing the will HELD NO Ratio the evidence shows that the will of Dona Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in conformity with the law. Reasoning Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: No will xxx shall be valid to pass any estate, real of personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and each of the other. xxx - all that the quoted provision requires is (a) that the will be in writing, and (2) either the testator sign it in himself, or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by someone in his presence and under his direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference - here, the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer, but this fact is of no consequence (court did not elaborate). - the only purpose of the proceedings under the code for the probate of a will is to establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will (Sec. 625) - judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. The court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could not in this case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for the property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or was not a suitable person to discharge such trust. All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. - grounds on which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634 (now sec.9, rule 76). Unless one of those grounds appears, the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the

CASTANEDA V ALEMANY GR 1439 WILLARD; March 14, 1904 MAIA

NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Manila allowing will of Dona Juana Moreno FACTS - the CFI Manila allowed the will of Dona Juana Moreno, holding that all the legal formalities had been required with in the execution of the will - appellants (through Alemany, administrator of the properties of minors Leandro and Paz Gruet, children of Dona Juana) question this ruling, contending that said will was not written in the presence and under express direction of the testatrix as required by Code of Civil Procedure. - on the other hand, appellees contend that the grounds for the disallowance of a will are limited to those enumerated in the same code

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personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in this proceedings to pass upon questions raised by appellants relating to the appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased. - It is claimed by appellants that there was no testimony to show that the will executed was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that the document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. However, it appears that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for appellants that it was not the same instrument. Disposition Petition is denied. Decision affirmed

court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above indicated. ISSUE WON the probate of the will of the deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will HELD YES. - Sec. 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of judgment: "SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: "1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate: Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. It says: "SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution." In Manahan vs. Manahan (58 Phil., 448, 451), we held: ". . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds

authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding. In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said: "The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery." The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. This court held in the case of Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil., 938): "The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them. "Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is binding against the world."

ATILANO G. MERCADO V JUDGE SANTOS 66 PHIL 215 LAUREL, J: 1938 BSJ

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the CFI of Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno F. Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27, 1931, admitted the will to probate. Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings. Because filed ex parte, the motion was denied. The same motion was filed a second time, but with notice to the adverse party. The motion was nevertheless denied by the probate court on May 24, 1934. On appeal to this court, the order of denial was affirmed on July 26, 1935. It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., 16 sixteen months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace

FLUEMER VS HIX G.R. No. L-32636 MALCOLM; March 17,1930 MEL

NATURE Appeal from CFI decision denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. FACTS - Petitioner alleges that the will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by

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Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. Judge of First Instance Tuason denied the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. - While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. ISSUE WON the will should be allowed HELD NO Ratio: No attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia. Reasoning As stated by the lower court, the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the

original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. - In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.) - It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed

WON Teran managed and administered estate of Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906

the

GUERRERO VS TERAN
13 Phil 212 JOHNSON; March 19, 1909

EVA
NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI FACTS - Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz, filed an action against Leopoldo Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 on the theory that Teran had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906. - Teran admitted he owed Guerrero P188.39 but claimed that the latter owed him P482.14. - CFI found that Teran, as administrator of said estate, owed Guerrero the sum of P3,447.46. ISSUE

HELD NO. Teran was the duly appointed and recognized representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Masria del carmen in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Munoz from Sept.17, 1901 until March 18, 1902. - Teran was appointed as administrator of said estate on Sept.17, 1901. He entered into a bond of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties as such representative. - On March 18, 1901, the CFI of Albay appointed Maria Munoz y Gomez as guardian for said minors and she gave the required bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian. - While there are some indications that Teran continued to act as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of Maria Munoz y Gomez, up to Oct.6, 1906, yet the fact exists that said Maria Munoz was the actual representative of the minors from and after March 18, 1902 until Oct.6, 1906, and therefore she, as such guardian and administratrix of the estate, must be held responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the period while she was their actual guardian. - Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not a resident of the Philippines at the time of her apppointment, was removed as guardian by the CFI. Felix Samson was then appointed as guardian. The mere fact that she was removed as guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. If during the time that she was the guardian she allowed other persons to handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. Therefore, if any loss occurred to the minors between March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906, they have a right of action only against said Maria Munoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under the law the administratrix of the property of their estate. - Teran was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal representative of the said minors in the management of their estate, from Sept.17, 1901 up to the time that he was superseded by Maria Munoz y Gomez, on March 18, 1902. There is no proof showing that

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any of the losses claimed by Guerrero occurred within this period. Thus, Teran is liable only for the amount of P188.39, the amount he admitted he owed the plaintiff. - On appointment of administrators or guardians: Maria Munoz was removed on the theory that her appointment was void because she was not a resident of the Philippines. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. Notwhithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators or guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here, otherwise, the courts will find much difficulty in complying with the duty of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc. DISPOSITIVE Reversed.

KOOKY FACTS: - Juan Navas L. Sioca is the surviving spouse of the deceased Geronima Uy Coque. The probate court appointed Jose Garcia as the administrator of the deceaseds estate. Sioca maintains that the court erred in this respect. ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in not appointing the deceaseds husband, Sioca, as administrator of the estate. (NOTE: The SC first held that the question raised is res judicata as there was no appeal taken from the order of the lower court refusing to appoint Sioca as administrator. But the SC proceeded to state another reason why this appeal is without merit.) HELD: NO. - A probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to

SIOCA v GARCIA 44 Phil 711 Mar 27, 1923; OSTRAND

the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a persons suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the lower court was in error. - the probate court based its ruling on the fact that Sioca had adverse interests in the estate of such character as to render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. Disposition Affirmed.

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