Administrative Law

V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

A. FACTORS AFFECTING ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS FINALITY OF

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shall be enforced. In such a case, the specification of one remedy normally excludes another. - Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the type of problem involved and the history of the statute in question become highly relevant in determining whether judicial review may be nonetheless supplied. - Sec 2, Ninth of the Act was introduced as a device to strengthen and make more effective the processes of collective bargaining. It was drafted so as to give to the Mediation Board the power to appoint a committee of three neutral persons who after hearing shall within 10 days designate the employees who may participate in the election. That was added so that the Boards own usefulness of settling disputes that might arise thereafter might not be impaired. - If Congress had desired to implicate the federal judiciary and to place on the federal courts the burden of having the final say on any aspect of the problem, it would have made its desire plain. - Congress has long delegated to executive officers or agencies the determination of complicated questions of fact and of law. And where no judicial review was provided by Congress, the Court has often refused to furnish one even where questions of law might be involved. - The function of the Board under Sec 2, Ninth is more the function of a referee. To this decision of the referee Congress has added a command enforcible by judicial decree. But the command is that of the statute, not of the Board. - Under the Act, Congress did not give the Board discretion to take or withhold action, to grant or deny relief. It gave it no enforcement functions. It was to find the fact and then cease. Congress prescribed the command. The intent seems plain the dispute was to reach its last terminal point when the administrative finding was made. This is reinforced by the highly selective manner Congress has provided for judicial review of administrative orders or determinations under the Act. There is no general provision for such review but has expressly provided for it only in two instances: the National Railroad Adjustment Board (concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions), and the machinery for the voluntary arbitration of labor controversies. - The language of the Act read in the light of its history supports the view that Congress gave administrative action under Sec 2, Ninth a finality which it denied administrative action under the other sections. Disposition Reversed Reed, dissent - The problem presented by this case is one of statutory interpretation, whether or not Sec 2, Ninth gives discretion to the Board to split the crafts of a single carrier into smaller units so that the members of such units may choose representatives of employees. - The petitioners may not have an opportunity to impeach or contest an award of a board of arbitration reached after collective bargaining. There is no opportunity for the petitioners to intervene. As a consequence, petitioners are left without an opportunity specifically provided by the Act to contest the ruling of the Board of Mediation. The members of the Switchmens Union and the Union itself, in view of the fact that it was the bargaining representative of its members prior to this controversy, have an interest recognized by law in the selection of representatives. This right adheres to his condition as an employee as a right of privacy does to a person.

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CHEVRON USA v NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC 467 US 837 STEVENS; JUNE 25, 1984
FACTS - Environmental groups filed a petition to review Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations that allow states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single bubble. The regulations were promulgated to implement Sec.172 (b)(6) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, which requires states that have not achieved the national air quality standards established by the EPA to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution. Under the regulations, an existing plant that contains several pollution-emitting devices may install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions from the plant. The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the regulations, holding that the bubble concept was inappropriate in programs enacted to improve air quality. ISSUE WON the EPA regulations are valid HELD YES. Reasoning The EPA regulations allowing states to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single bubble were based on a reasonable construction of the term stationary source in Sec.172 (b)(6) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Congress did not have a specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept and the EPAs use of that concept was a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make. The EPAs interpretation represented a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and therefore entitled to deference. Disposition CA decision REVERSED. EPA regulations held valid.

SWITCHMENS UNION OF NORTH AMERICA v NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 320 US 297 DOUGLAS; Nov 22, 1943
FACTS: - Switchmens Union of North America brought suit against National Mediation Board, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and New York Central Railroad Co and the Michigan Central Railroad Co. - Pursuant to Sec 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act (The Act), the Board was called on to investigate a dispute among the yardmen of the Railroad Co as to their representative for collective bargaining. - The Brotherhood sought to be the representative for all the yardmen of the said lines operated by the New York Central system. The Switchmen contended that yardmen of certain designated parts of the system should be permitted to vote for separate representatives instead of being compelled to take part in a system-wide election. - The Board designated all yardmen of the carriers as participants in the election. The election was held and the Brotherhood was chosen as representative. - Upon the certification of the result to the carriers, petitioners sought to have the determination by the Board of the participants in the election and the certification of the representative cancelled. - District Court upheld Boards decision to the effect that all yardmen in the service of a carrier should select a single representative for collective bargaining. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: WON the District Court erred in taking cognizance of the case HELD YES. The District Court did not have the power to review the action of the National Mediation Board in issuing the certificate. - Section 24 (8) of the Judicial Code gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction of all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce. But that broad grant of general jurisdiction may not be invoked in face of special circumstances obtaining in this case. - The Act in Sec 2, Fourth writes into law the right of the majority of any craft or class of employees to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act. That right is protected by Sec 2, Ninth which gives the Mediation Board the power to resolve controversies concerning it and as an incident thereto to determine what is the appropriate craft or class in which the election should be held. A review by the federal district courts of the Boards determination is not necessary to preserve or protect that right. It is for Congress to determine how the rights which it creates

FORTICH VS CORONA 289 SCRA 624 MARTINEZ; April 24, 1998

FACTS - This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. - In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of 10 years under the

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Crop Producer and Grower's Agreement. The lease expired in April, 1994. - In October 1991, during the existence of the lease, the DAR placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. - NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DARAB a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and Land Bank to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject land until further orders. - Despite the DARAB order, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves - The DARAB (a) ordered the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order" (b) nullified the DAR Regional Director's memo and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directed the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of NQSRMDC's subject Property to the DAR until further orders." - The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order - In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6 designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated. - What happened thereafter was: Pursuant to Section 20 of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition. On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association). The Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report, approved the said Ordinance (now Resolution No. 94-95). The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC is supposed to have the following components: 1. Development Academy of Mindanao which covers an area of 24 hectares; 2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park needing about 67 hectares; 3. Forest development to cover 33 hectares; and 4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.

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The said NQSRMDC Proposal was adopted by the DTI, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds: 1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; 2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); 3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable; 4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries; - Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property." - Gov. Fortich appealed" the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon. - To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction - Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao sent a memo to the President favorably endorsing the project. Also, in a memo to the President, Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the DILG, recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use. - CA issued a Resolution ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. - In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President issued a Decision reversing the DAR Secretary's decision, saying that converting the land in would open great opportunities for employment and real development in the area. That the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility, the decision said that the same is not irrigated. On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA), the said NCA was declared null and void by the DARAB as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines to desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner's land. Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated. - DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision. - in compliance with the OP decision, NQSRMDC and DECS executed a MOA whereby the former donated 4 hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School. When

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NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of the actions it filed against DAR in the CA and the appeal to the President filed by Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries. - Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction - Meanwhile, an Order was issued by Exec. Sec. Torres denying DAR's MFR for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days. The said order further declared that the OP decision had already become final and executory. - On October 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound to protest the OP Decision. Others filed a motion for intervention asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside. - President FVR then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance. He created an 8-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem. - the OP resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona: modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries - Bukidnon officials and NQSRMDC filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUES 1. WON the recourse of petitioners is proper. 2. WON the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a MFR of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse. 3. WON the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others with the RTC; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping. 4. WON the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries must be approved. 5. WON the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution. HELD 1. YES. Ratio It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the OP, may be taken to the CA by

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filing a verified petition for review within 15 days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" and was issued with "grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his Corona's jurisdiction" when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. 2. NO. The said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity. 3. NO. Ratio There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Reasoning A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution of the OP, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted. 4. NO. The movants are those purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. 5. NO. Ratio The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Sec. 7 thereof provides: Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

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Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. It is further provided for in Section 9 that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable. - When the OP issued the Order declaring the earlier Decision final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to reopen the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Sec.7 of AO 18 and Sec.4 Rule 43 mandate that only 1 motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second MFR was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first MFR was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the OP in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. Disposition the present petition is hereby GRANTED.

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because All in all, fifty (50) days had elapsed from his receipt of the order sought to be reconsidered to the filing of the herein motion. Consequently, the said order of this office dated July 14, 1955 had already become final and executory pursuant to the aforecited regulation (*From the time the movant received notice of the order sought to be reconsidered on July 28, 1955, to the time he filed his first motion for reconsideration on August 20, 1955, twenty-three (23) days had elapsed; and from his receipt of the order of this Office dated September 10, 1955, denying the first motion for reconsideration on November 22, 1955, to the filing of the instant motion on December 19, 1955, twenty-seven (27) days had elapsed.) - On August 27, 1956, however, the Executive Secretary rendered a decision sustaining the appeal and reversing the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 14, 1955. This order of the Executive Secretary awarded the entire forest concession in question to the respondent-appellee, Aquiles B. Zayco. (*reasoning: It appears, however, in the affidavit of the appellant and in the records of this case that he was not duly represented by counsel in the main stages of the proceedings, and that he was not aware of the reglementary period within which to take the various steps to protect his rights. Moreover, there was no advertence on notice by that Department upon the herein appellant that he had to exercise his rights within certain fixed periods.) ISSUE WON the Office of the President still retains or possesses jurisdiction to review on appeal a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which has become final. HELD NO - In a long line of cases,1 the Supreme Court has ruled that compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement ( Miranda vs. Guanzon) Such failure has the effect of rendering final the judgment of the court, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. The dismissal of the appeal can be effected even after the case has been elevated to the Court of Appeals (Rule 52, Section 1[a]). Appellee's failure to file a motion for dismissal of appeal in the court of origin before the transmittal of the record to the appellate court, does not constitute a waiver on his part to interpose such objection - That administrative rules and regulations have the force of law can no longer be questioned. Only recently, in the case of Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture, The Court held that it cannot be contended, as the court a quo intimated, that an administrative regulation should not be given the same weight as to rule of court but should rather be given a more liberal interpretation for, as is well known, a regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. In fact it is a wise policy that administrative regulations be given the same force as rules of court in order to maintain the regularity of administrative proceedings. - The appellees' view that the period fixed in Administrative Order No. 6-2 of the Director of Forestry cannot bind the Office of the President since the latter has supervision and control over the former cannot

ANTIQUE SAWMILL INC VS ZAYCO GR No. 20051 REGALA; May 30, 1966
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Court of first Instance of Manila FACTS - A public bidding was conducted for the award of a 12680-hectare forest area. Those who submitted bid applications with the Bureau of Forestry are as follows: the petitioner-appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc., the respondent-appellee, Aquiles Zayco, Crisencio Milendez and Pedro T. Lo. The Director of Forestry awarded the bid to the respondent-appellee, Aquiles R. Zayco. Thereafter, the losing bidders appealed the above award to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, on March 23, 1955, however, affirmed the same. - All the losing bidders filed a motion for reconsideration with the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources and acting on this motion, the said Secretary issued an order on July 14, 1955 modifying the original exclusive award to Aquiles R. Zayco. Under this July 14, 1955 order, the forest area in question was awarded in equal portions to Aquiles R. Zayco and the petitioner-appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc. Zayco received a copy of the above-mentioned order on July 28, 1955, and on August 20, 1955, he filed against it a motion for reconsideration. On September 10, 1955, this motion for reconsideration was denied. Zayco received a copy of this order on November 27, 1955. - On December 19, 1955, Zayco filed with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a second motion for reconsideration. The latter held that the second motion for reconsideration was filed too late

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commend itself to sound public policy. Even administrative decisions must and sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery).

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UY v PALOMAR GRN L-23248 ZALDIVAR; February 28, 1969]
FACTS - Postmaster General issued Fraud Order No. 3, dated November 22, 1963, declaring Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency as conducting a lottery or gift enterprise and directing all postmasters and other employees of the Bureau of Post concerned to return to the sender any mail matter addressed to Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or to any of its agents or representatives with the notation "Fraudulent" stamped upon the cover of such mail matter, and prohibiting the issuance or payment of any money order or telegraphic transfer to the said agency or to any of its agents and representatives. - This fraud order is in connection to a "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan. The plan was designed to boost the sales of tickets for the PCSO Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw. According to said plan, the appellee's sub-agents and purchasers of whole sweepstakes tickets sold by appellee and his sub-agents may, in addition to the regular prize money of the December 15, 1963 draw, win bonuses and awards. - Uy advertised his "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan in the metropolitan newspapers of nationwide circulation, the first of such advertisements appearing in seven such newspapers in their issues of November 18, 1963. The newspaper advertisements were repeated almost every week after November 18, 1963, with the last of them published in the issue of the "Daily Mirror" of December 7, 1963. The fraud order in question was issued by the Postmaster-General under date of November 22, 1963. However, it was only on December 10, 1963 Uy came to know of the issuance and context thereof when he sought clarification from the Manila Post Office why his parcels containing sweepstakes tickets for his sub-agents, as well as his other mail matters of purely personal nature, were refused acceptance for mailing the day previous. - The Postmaster General claims that he had made his decision based upon satisfactory evidence that the "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan of appellee is a lottery or gift enterprise for the distribution of gifts by chance, and his decision in this regard cannot be reviewed by the court. ISSUE WON the court can review the Postmaster Generals decision HELD Yes. - The Postal Law contains no provision for judicial review of the decision of the Postmaster General. This Court, however, in Reyes vs. Topacio had stated that the action of the Director of Posts (now Postmaster General) is subject to revision by the courts in case he exceeded his authority or his act is palpably wrong. And in "El Debate" Inc. vs. Topacio, this Court said that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts (Postmaster General) as to what is, and what is not, mailable matter unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. In other words, the courts will interfere with the decision of the

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Postmaster General if it clearly appears that the decision is wrong. This Court, by said rulings, recognizes the availability of judicial review over the action of the Postmaster General, notwithstanding the absence of statutory provision for judicial review of his action. It may not be amiss to state that said rulings are in consonance with American jurisprudence to the effect that the absence of statutory provisions for judicial review does not necessarily mean that access to the courts is barred. The silence of the Congress is not to be construed as indicating a legislative intent to preclude judicial review. In American School of Magnetic Healing vs. McAnnulty, the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking on the power of the courts to review the action of the Postmaster General under a statute similar to our Postal Law, said: "That the conduct of the post office is a part of the administrative department of the government is entirely true, but that does not necessarily and always oust the courts of jurisdiction to grant relief to a party aggrieved by any action by the head, or one of the subordinate officials, of that Department, which is unauthorized by the statute under which he assumes to act. The acts of all its officers must be justified by some law, and in case an official violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief."

VICENTE SOTTO vs. JUAN RUIZ G.R. No. 17419 MALCOLM, J. (1921 March 18)
NATURE Petition for mandamus. FACTS - SOTTO is the proprietor of the periodical The Independent, while RUIZ is the Acting Director of the Bureau of Posts. Copies of the January 29, 1921 issue of Independent were set for distribution through the mails. RUIZ, however, refused such distribution on the ground that the publication contained libelous matter. RUIZ was referring to the printed message on a postal card consisting of the telegram from one official in Cebu to another in Manila. Hence the petition. ISSUE Whether or not RUIZ is justified in refusing the distribution of the subject periodical. HELD NO. - The Administrative Code declares that no printed matter of libelous character shall be carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any employee of the Bureau of Posts. On the other hand, whether an article is libelous is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the courts in case he has abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. - The duty of determining whether a publication contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director and involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. The rule is that courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. - The propriety of a periodical distributing copies of a confidential telegram sent by one official to another may well be questioned. But to do so is not libelous per se. Even the squib following the copy of the telegram is no more than attempted humor and would not be taken seriously by the reading public. Disposition We reach the conclusion that the action of the Director was wrong. An order shall issue to RUIZ, directing him to receive, to carry, and to deliver, the package containing the January 29, 1921 copies of Independent.

MANUEL v VILLENA, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY 37 SCRA 745 MAKALINTAL, J : February 27, 1971
FACTS This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 4226 entitled "Magno Manuel vs. Mariano Villena, the Director of Forestry and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources," wherein the plaintiff sought annulment of the decision of said public officials rejecting his application for a Tree Farm Permit over a 20-hectare parcel of public land, which was included in a 66-hectare area covered by a similar application of private defendant Mariano Villena. - The main thrust of the complaint is that the administrative decision sought to be set aside violated the plaintiff's right to due process. The averments in support thereof are substantially as follows: that the plaintiff had been in continuous possession of the land in question since 1939; that being an ignorant farmer he did not file his Tree Farm application (No. 13312) until June 1954; that the Director of Forestry rejected the same because a prior application (No. 3852) had been filed by Mariano Villena in November 1955; that two motions for reconsideration of the rejection order were turned down; that the plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, but the appeal was dismissed by him; that on motion for reconsideration the Secretary found that the previous investigation conducted by the District Forester was not in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bureau, and so ordered another investigation to be made; but that before said investigation was terminted the Secretary rendered a decision dismissing the appeal.

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- On December 6, 1966 the court issued an order finding the defendants' objection meritorious, but allowing the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within a period of ten days. - On March 21, 1967 defendant Villena moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that it did not cure the defects of the original one, and still contained sufficient allegations to make out a cause of action or to confer jurisdiction upon the court to set aside or annul the administrative decision complained of. The court found the motion meritorious and hence dismissed the complaint in its order of June 24, 1967. The said order of dismissal is the subject of the present appeal. ISSUE WON the decision of the Director of Public Forestry should be annulled. HELD No. - Courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that nonlegal factors, such as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions. - The proceedings challenged in the complaint refer to the approval or rejection of an application for a Tree Farm Permit. Under Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code, this function falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The power thus conferred on the Director of Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is basically executive or administrative in nature. And courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions. There are, of course, limits to the exercise of administrative discretion. Administrative proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that "the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion" or that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. The complaint here alleges denial of due process and grave abuse of discretion, in that appellant was not formally represented by counsel at any stage of the proceedings before the Director of Forestry and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; that there was no showing that notice was sent to him so as to afford him an opportunity to obtain the services of a lawyer; and that the Secretary dismissed the appeal before the completion of the reinvestigation he had ordered. The above circumstances however do not necessarily constitute a violation of due process or grave abuse of discretion. Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code does not require that the investigation be in the nature of a court trial. In deciding administrative questions, administrative bodies or officials generally enjoy wide discretion. Technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced, and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable. 4 It

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is sufficient that the substantive due process requirement of fairness and reasonableness be observed.

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B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PASCUAL V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA 106 PHIL 446 GUTIERREZ DAVID; October 31, 1959
FACTS - October 6, 1956 > Acting Provincial Governor of Nueva Ecija filed with the Provincial Board three administrative charges against Arturo B. Pascual, elected mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in November 1951 and reelected in 1955, for [CHARGE NO. 3] "Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Judicial Functions," committed by willfully, feloniously, criminally, without legal authority, and with grave abuse of authority, assumed and usurped the judicial powers of the justice of the peace by accepting the criminal complaint filed in the said court, conducting the preliminary investigation thereof, fixing the bail bond of P6,000.00, and issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest; and after the accused in the said criminal case had been arrested, while the justice of the peace was in his office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Pascual, in defiance of the express refusal by the justice of the peace to reduce the bail bond of the accused, acted on the motion to reduce bail and did reduce the bail bond to P3,000.00, - Pascual filed with the Provincial Board a motion to dismiss CHARGE NO. 3 above referred to, on the ground that the wrongful acts alleged had been committed during his previous term of office and could not constitute a ground for disciplining him during his second term. Motion to dismiss was denied by resolution of the Board. - Pascual filed with SC a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija from taking cognizance of CHARGE NO. 3, but the petition was denied by minute resolution "without prejudice to action, if any, in the CFI." - Accordingly, Pascual filed with CFI Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the said Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing of CHARGE NO. 3, for lack of jurisdiction. - Provincial Board moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that it states no cause of action because the Pascual had not complied with the cardinal principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies before he could appeal to the courts, and because the Provincial Board had jurisdiction over CHARGE NO. 3. - CFI issued an order dismissing the petition "for being premature," for the reason that the Pascual had not first appealed to the Executive Secretary. From that order, the case was brought before us on appeal. ISSUES 1. WON it was legally proper for Pascual to have come to court without first bringing his case to the Executive Secretary for review 2. WON disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act he committed during his immediately preceding term of office is valid HELD 1. YES Doctrine Where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be

SAN MIGUEL CORP V LABOR SEC, NLRC, YANGLAY 64 SCRA 56 AQUINO; May 16, 1975
FACTS - this is a labor case regarding the dismissal of Yanglay from San Miguel Corp (SMC) for allegedly trafficking drugs (medicines) to his fellow employees (apparently, SMC gave its employees some medicines to keep then healthy. What Yanglay did was buy the rations of his fellow employees after the company has distributed the same) - the case was submitted to the NLRC. Mediator-fact-finder Cruz issued recommendation that Yanglay be reinstated (although it admitted that SMC did not commit ULP). The NLRC adopted this recommendation. Thus, SMC filed this certiorari. Yanglay then contests the jurisdiction of the SC to over the case, alleging that SC cannot review decisions of NLRC and Sec. of Labor under the principle of separation of powers and that judicial review is not provided for in PD21. ISSUE WON SC had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari HELD YES Ratio It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute Reasoning The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions - It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. - Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya vs. Vicente; Macatangay vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion). - The courts may declare an action or resolution of an administrative authority to be illegal (1) because it violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provision of the law or (2) because it is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious (Borromeo vs. City of Manila and Rodriguez Lanuza; Villegas vs. Auditor General). - WRT to the labor case, SC declared the dismissal to be a too drastic punishment for the drug trafficking (it held that buying of the drugs (given by SMC in gratis) of other employees should not have been done, but the act merely was a misconduct term used by SC). Only disciplinary action should have been imposed. Disposition Petition denied. Reinstated WITHOUT backwages

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followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated (Ang Tuan Kai vs. Import Control Commission etc). Ratio The rule will be relaxed where there is grave doubt as to availability of the administrative remedy; where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; where although there are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts, merely matters of from, and the administrative process, as a process of judgment, is over; or where the administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy. A litigant need not proceed with optional administrative process before seeking juducial relief. Reasoning - Mondano vs. Silvosa > granted a writ of prohibition against the provincial board of Capiz, notwithstanding the fact that he did not appeal to the Executive Secretary, the only question involved being WON the charged filed against the municipal mayor of Calibo, Capiz, constituted any one of the grounds for suspension or removal provided for in sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. 2. NO Ratio The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Reasoning - SC resorted to American authorities. The weight of authorities, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe. Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. - The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.

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for passing the examination for Superintendent of Private school given by the Civil Service Commission. - Anacleto Alzate, Principal of a High School in La Union, has been in service for 24 years, the last one as secondary principal. His salary was adjusted based only on his number of years of service as secondary principal ( 9 years, 8 months, 15 days) and his having passed the test as earlier mentioned was not considered. He appealed this but even before the ruling from the Bureau of Public School, he filed a mandamus proceeding in the CFI of La Union fearing that the amount appropriated for the payment of the salary adjustment of public schools teachers and officials, if not disbursed or committed before the expiration of the fiscal year on June 30, 1958, would be reverted to the general funds of the Government. - Thereafter, respondents filed their motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition stated no cause of action against respondents; that petitioner had not exhausted all administrative remedies before coming to court, and that the lower court had acquired no jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to file an appropriate action at the opportune time. -Hence this appeal to the SC ISSUE/S WON the CFI as correct in dismissing the case for non exhaustion of administrative remedies HELD No. There is merit in petitioner's contention. The fact that the parties had to agree and the court had to approve the agreement that the Director of Public Schools shall recommend to the proper officials not later than June 30, 1958 and before the closing of office hours on that date the commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed by petitioner, to accounts payable in order to prevent its reversion, is a recognition by the parties as well as the court of the validity and urgency of the action taken by the petitioner-appellant. It would seem, therefore, that in the particular circumstances of the present case, petitioner had sufficient cause of action at the time of the filing of his petition on June 11, 1958, and a resort to the court without awaiting for the final decision of the administrative officers is not, in view of the special situation, premature. - . It appears from the petition that the reason for its filing without awaiting the final action on the part of the respondent Director of Public Schools was the urgency of preventing the automatic reversion as of July 1, 1958, after the expiration of the then current fiscal year, of the sum appropriated in Republic Act No. 2042 for the adjustment of salary of public school officials and teachers pursuant to Republic Act No. 842. Petitioner contends that if he waited for the final decision on his petition for reconsideration which was not forthcoming, and in fact did not come, before June 30, 1958, whatever action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even if favorable to petitioner, would be of no avail after the reversion of the funds appropriated for the purpose of salary adjustment. Hence, he claims, that to require him to exhaust the administrative remedies would, in the circumstances of the case, in effect amount to a nullification of his claim. Disposition Petition is granted.

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CIPRIANO v. MARCELINO 43 SCRA 291 CASTRO, February 28, 1972
FACTS - Cipriano served as record clerk in the office of municipal treasurer Gregorio P. Marcelino of Calabanga, Camarines Sur. On the latter date she resigned. Because the respondent municipal treasurer, upon her severance from the service, refused to pay her salary for a certain period, as well as the commutation equivalent of her accumulated vacation and sick leaves. - Cipriano filed an action for mandamus to compel the said municipal treasurer to pay her the total amount of P949. She also asked for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. - Marcelino moved to dismiss upon the ground that she had not "exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the present action," arguing that exhaustion of all administrative remedies is a condition precedent before an aggrieved party may have judicial recourse. Granting the motion, the court a quo ordered the dismissal of the case. Cipriano's motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE WON Cipriano did not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing the present action. HELD - NO. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception, not is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. - It is altogether too obvious that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the small total of nine hundred forty-nine (P949) pesos, would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent. - The theory that a party must first exhaust his remedies in the administrative branch before seeking the aid of the strong arm of equity must give way to the reality that a government employee must depend for the support of himself and his family upon his salary, and were he to be deprived of that even alone for a few months, possibly even lees, that must mean starvation because more often than not, a government employee lives hand-to-mouth existence and he awaits with eager hands the arrival of the forthnightly envelope because upon it must hinge the supply of rice and fish and clothing of his spouse and children and himself and with it only can be maintained, and therefore were the dogmatic rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies be made to mean that he should wait for the most final administrative decision in his case, the only logical result must be vital disaster to his dependents and to himself, so that this is the reason why the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies has always been understood to

ALZATE v ALDANA 107 Phil 298 Barrera, J.; Feb 29, 1960
NATURE Appeal from an order of La Union CFI FACTS - RA No. 842 was enacted to adjust the salaries of Public school teachers and personnel. Under the law salary adjustment of 4 grades was to be effected for every five years of service plus another grade

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mean that the same have furnished a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. - All the documents required to support payment of Cipriano's salary and the cash commutation of her unused vacation and sick leaves have been accomplished. Cipriano having thus earned the right to the said payment, it has become the corresponding duty of the respondent treasurer to recognize such right and effect payment. Disposition petition is granted. The municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Calabanga, Camarines Sur, is ordered to pay to petitioner, without further delay, the total sum of P949.

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HELD NO. - There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the one at bar. The fact that the President had, in two instances cited in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from decisions of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded as precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of condescension on the part of the Chief Executive. - While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the petitioner is not bound to observe them, considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank. In Castillo vs. Bayona, et al., we said that Section 14, Republic Act 265, creating the Central Bank of the Philippines, particularly paragraph (c) thereof, "is sufficiently broad to vest the Monetary Board with the power of investigation and removal of its officials, except the Governor thereof. In other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a special provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central Bank, though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations in other respects." - In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered petitioner resigned from the office to which he has been legally appointed as of the date of his suspension, after he has been duly indicted and tried before a committee created by the Board for the purpose. An appeal to the Civil Service Commission would thereby be an act of supererogation, requiring the presentation of practically the same witnesses and documents produced in the investigation conducted at the instance of the Monetary Board. Moreover, considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central Bank provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to the investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the Governor, coupled with the fact that petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the noncompetitive or unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and voluntary.

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for registration of patents and trademarks and Rule 59 of A.O. No. 2 which prohibited the filing of multi-class applications, that is, one application covering several classes of goods. - Petitioners, who are registered patent agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop public respondents from enforcing the aforementioned administrative orders 2 and to declare Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and Rules 15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2, series of 1992 of the BPTTT null and void. - CA dismissed the petition for prohibition and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners. Thus, this petition. ISSUES 1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. 2. WON the CA erred in not holding that the questioned administrative orders are null and void for failure to comply with the publicationrequirements of both the Administrative Code and BP 325 3. WON the CA erred in not declaring null and void Rule 59 of Administrative Order No. 1 on the ground that the public respondents do not have the power to amend the Trademark Law HELD 1. NO. Ratio Prohibition is not the proper remedy. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available administrative' remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. - Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise, is generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the writ. Reasoning The proposed rates and charges still have to obtain the imprimatur of the Cabinet, and prior to which, they have to undergo Cabinet scrutiny. Thus, there is the contingency that the same may not obtain the approval of the Cabinet. 2. NO. Ratio B.P. Blg. 325 requires Cabinet review and approval of the impugned administrative orders before their publication. However, since the Cabinet has yet to review and approve the proposed revised rates of fees and charges, there can be no proper publication. 3. NO. - Since the challenged administrative orders have not yet been submitted to the Cabinet for its consideration and approval, this Court finds it untimely to discuss and resolve the merits of the questions of whether or not the rate increases and charges are just and reasonable sufficient to cover administrative costs, and/or that the same are practicable and uniform for similar or comparable services and functions, and/or that those rates conform with the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance. - Courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative action prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that absence of a final

CORPUS VS CUADERNO G.R. No. L-17860 DE LEON ; March 30, 1962

FACTS - Corpus held the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines a position declared by the President of the Philippines as "highly technical in nature and placed in the exempt class. - He was charged in an administrative case, for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc. preferred against him by employees of the Bank. This resulted in his suspension by the Monetary Board and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The committee was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. The committee submitted a Final Report which finds that there was no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action against Corpus. The report recommends that he immediately be reinstated. - The MB did not agree with the committee report and adopted Resn. No 957 which considered "the respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension as his continuance of service would be prejudicial to the best interest of the bank. - Corpus filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages - Filemon Mendoza, a central bank employee filed a petition for intervention. Together with the other respondents, they filed a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was granted based on the ground that Corpus was not able to exhaust all administrative remedies. - The lower court was of the opinion that Corpus should have exhausted all administrative remedies available to him, such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, under Republic Act No. 2260, or the President of the Philippines who under the Constitution and the law is the head of all the executive departments of the government including its agencies and instrumentalities. ISSUE WON Corpus should have exhausted all administrative remedies available to him such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the President of the Philippines

DE LARA v CLORIVEL
(Giulia)

PAREDES vs. CA (NAVARRO) 253 SCRA 126 KAPUNAN; Feb 11, 1996
FACTS - Public respondents promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 1992, revising the rules of practice before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to take effect on 15 March 1993. Among the provisions of said administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and Rule 15 of A.O. No. 2, which increased the fees payable to the BPTTT

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order or decision, the power of the administrative agency concerned has not been fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm. Reasoning a. To prevent the courts from being swamped by a resort to them in the first instance b. Rule on comity and convenience

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCGG) v SANDIGANBAYAN 255 SCRA 438 FRANCISCO; March 29, 1996
FACTS - Petitioner PCGG issued separate sequestration orders against Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation, allegedly part of Lucio Tans ill-gotten wealth. 2 separate petitions were filed by Sipalay and Allied before the SC assailing the sequestration orders. The SC referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. - The petitions were jointly heard. The Sandiganbayan ordered the submission by PCGG of its formal evidence in writing, but the latter instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. This motion to dismiss came nearly 7 years after Sipalay and Allied originally filed their petitions before the SC. The ground was Sialays and Allieds alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that Sipalay and Allied should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking the PCGG Rules and Regulations. - The Sandiganbayan denied the motion and voided the orders issued against Sipalay and Allied. ISSUES WON Sandiganbayans denial of PCGGs motion to dismiss is proper HELD YES - Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. The Court approves of the filing of a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action at any stage of the proceedings. - As a general rule, a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads (Sec 1 Rule 16 Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage of the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of action. - These principles, at first impression, appear to favor the PCGG. Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations indeed provide an administrative mechanism for persons or entities contesting the sequestration orders issued against them. Section 5. - Who may contest - The person against whom a writ of sequestration or freeze or hold order is directed may request the lifting thereof in writing, either personally or through counsel within 5 days from the receipt of the writ of order. Section 6. - Procedure for Review of writ or order - After due hearing or motu propio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ or order unconditionally or subject to such condition as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission may be appealed by

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the party concerned to the Office of the President of the Philippines within15 days from receipt thereof. - Neither an initial request before the PCGG for the lifting of the sequestration orders nor an appeal to the Office of the President was made by Sipalay and Allied before they filed their respective petitions in court. The PCGGs motion to dismiss was anchored on lack of cause of action, albeit filed beyond the period to answer. - However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principles aforestated. The Sipalay and Allied petitions were both filed on the third quarter of 1986, while the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss only in the middle of 1993. Nearly 7 years came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. Sipalay and Allied had rested their cases, and the PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses, not to mention other various motions and incidents already disposed of by the Sandiganbayan, with special attention to the numerous postponements granted the PCGG for presentation of its evidence which prevented an earlier termination of the proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the Sandiganbayan. - Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it. - The length of time the PCGG allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion to dismiss only at the homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as proper time. Such tarried maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel by laches - Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. - With its undenied belated action, 7 years in the making at that, it is only proper to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed as the Sipalay and Allied petitions lack of cause of action. Proper time cannot mean nor sanction an unexplained and unreasonable length of time such as 7 years. The leniency extended by the Rules (Rule 9, Section 2, Rules of Court) and by jurisprudence in allowing a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action filed after the answer or at any stage of the proceedings cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches - or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time which, in this case, was one of the PCGGs follies. Indeed, in matters of timeliness, indecent waste is just as reprehensible as indecent haste. - Another equally forceful reason warranting the denial of the PCGGs motion to dismiss is that this case falls under two recognized exceptions to the general rule of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the Sandiganbayans brief but lucid disquisition on one exception merits this Courts approval.

QUASHA V SEC & MANILA POLO CLUB 320 SCRA 478 TEEHANKEE; May 31, 1978
FACTS -Petitioner filed complaints with the SEC against the filing of Manila Polo Clubs (MPC) Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-Laws converting it into a proprietary club, alleging that such amendments would enable the members to appropriate the clubs property and use it as their contribution to the new club, essentially negating the accrued contributions of past and present members (including his) money, time, effort and foresight for a paltry proprietary membership fee (plus they allegedly had not been adopted by the required two-thirds vote). -SEC denied such injunctive relief for lack of merit hence this petition with prayer for a restraining order enjoining MPC from selling proprietary shares (the latter later issued by the Court). ISSUE/S 1. WON petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing with the court 2. WON resolution of the issues w/o a full blown hearing on the merits deprived petitioner of due process HELD 1. NO. In view of the limited time, and considering the issuance of the order denying injunctive relief only at the height of the Christmas holidays, petitioner properly filed directly with the Court without going through the prescribed procedure of filing before the SEC en banc within the 30-day reglementary period since such recourse would not be a plain, speed and adequate remedy. 2. YES. - The issues set forth, such as the necessary two-thirds vote and the legality of the value of the proprietary shares warrants the full-blown trial sought hence the case should be remanded to the SEC for such trial and determination on merits. -As for the TRO, it shall be lifted subject to the condition advanced by the SEC that should the amendments be later annulled, all payments made pursuant to it would be refunded to the members.

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The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to petitioners case. This rule, which is based on sound public policy and practical considerations, is not inflexible. It is subject to many exceptions, to wit: (i) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (iv) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice. x x x there was no absolute necessity of appealing respondent PCGGs resolution to the Office of the President, as purportedly required by Section 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations, inasmuch as respondent PCGG seemed to have exhibited indifference towards petitioners pleas for the lifting of the sequestration and search and seizure orders. Official inaction or unreasonable delay, as heretofore intimated, is one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, under the circumstance, petitioners may not be faulted for seeking relief directly from the courts. - The other exception is the first in the enumeration, i.e., where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine, consisting in the PCGGs being guilty of estoppel by laches which has just been discussed in great length. In answer therefore to the first key issue, this Court rules in the affirmative. The denial of the PCGGs motion to dismiss was in order.

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authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, (b) trucks were not used in the commission of the crime ISSUES 1. WON, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an action for replevin may prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines 2. WON the DENR Sec and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government (second contention of respondents) HELD 1. NO Ratio. (GENERAL RULE) Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. (EXCEPTION) It is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. Reasoning. The controversy was pending before the DENR Secretary when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the MFR. By appealing to him, the respondents acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of law. Obiter (on contention of respondents). ON DUE PROCESS: Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an

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opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation, but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. ON ARGUMENT THAT THE TRUCKS SHOULD NOT BE CONFISCATED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT USED IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME: the truck was indeed used in the commission of a crime not theft but violation of EO 277. -a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. 2. YES Ratio. Section 681 and 68-A2 of PD 70, as amended by EO 277. The Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. Disposition. Petition is GRANTED

PAAT V CA (DE GUZMAN) 266 SCRA 167 TORRES, January 10, 1997
FACTS -The truck of private respondent de Guzman was seized by DENR personnel because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Layugan (Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer) issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave de Guzman 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. De Guzman failed to submit the required explanation. Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained Petitioner Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. -De Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration of the Regional Executive Directors order denied. -De Guzman filed a letter to DENR Sec, wherein it was stated that in case the letter for reconsideration would be denied, the letter should be considered an appeal to the Secretary. However, pending the decision of the DENR Sec, De Guzman filed a suit for replevin with RTC. Petitioners filed MD (De Guzman had no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies) -RTC: MD denied MFR denied filed petition for certiorari with CA -CA: affirmed RTC decision Petitioner:. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies Respondent:. Doctrine does not apply because (1) due process was violated (not given a chance to be heard); (2) seizure and forfeiture was unlawful because (a) DENR Sec and his representatives had no

LOPEZ V CITY OF MANILA 303 SCRA 448 QUISUMBING; February 19, 1999
FACTS - Manila Ordinance No. 7894 (An Ordinance Prescribed as the Revised Schedule of Fair Market Values of Real Properties of the City of Manila) was enacted. With its implementation, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increased by 580%. With respect to the improvement on his property, the tax increased by 250%. - Backstory: Sec 219 of RA 7160 or the Local Govt Code of 1991 requires that: The provincial, city or municipal assessor shall undertake a general revision of real property assessments within two (2) years after the effectivity of this Code and every three (3) years thereafter. This revision was not yet enforced in the City of Manila. Until 1995, the basis for collection of real estate taxes was the old, year-1979, real estate market values.
1 Section 68: The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. 2 SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.

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- Mrs. Laderas, the newly appointed City Assessor of Manila, began the process of general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real properties. This was submitted to the City Council. The Council then conducted public hearings as required by law. - As a consequence, petitioner filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the ordinance with preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO). - At around the same time, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect, reducing by 50% the assessment levels (depending on the use of property, e.g., residential, commercial) for the computation of tax due. It also provides that the amendment shall take effect retroactively to Jan 1, 1996. As a result, it reduced the tax increase of petitioners residential land to 155%, while the tax increase for residential improvement was 82%. - Despite this, the controversy proceeded. The reason relied upon by the City of Manila for the dismissal of the petition was for failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. - RTC directed the issuance of a writ of injunction. Respondent filed MFR on the denial of its motion to dismiss. It also underscored the happening of a supervening event, i.e., the enactment and approval of the City Mayor of Manila Ordinance No. 7905. - RTC then granted MD. Lopez filed MFR, but was denied. Petitioners Contentions - When the trial court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case, the question of whether he needs to resort to the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes moot and academic. - The question of the constitutionality of the city ordinance may be raised on appeal, either to the Secretary of Justice or the RTC, both having concurrent jurisdiction over the case (BP 129). - At the time he instituted this complaint, it was premature to resort to the remedies provided by R.A. 7160 because he has not received the formal notice of assessment yet. ISSUE WON petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies HELD YES Ratio As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. This should be done not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. - There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal, (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small;

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(6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is private land; and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding. * These exceptions are not present in the present case. What could have been done? With regard to questions on the legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of R.A. 7160. Taxpayer may bring an appeal before the Secretary of Justice questioning legality of the city ordinance (Sec 187); owner of real property who is not satisfied with the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals (Sec 226); should the taxpayer question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he must first pay the amount due, then he must request the annotation of the phrase paid under protest and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals (Sec 252). ** The crux of petitioners cause of action is the determination of whether or not the tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. This issue is essentially a question of fact and thereby, precludes this Court from reviewing the same. The ordinance is likewise, a social legislation intended to soften the impact of the tremendous increase in the value of the real properties subject to tax. ** The supervening circumstance of enactment of Manila Ordinance No. 7905 has rendered the petition, moot and academic, for failure of the petitioner to amend his cause of action.

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be counted in computing the period of preventive suspension, and that his re-assumption of office as Administrator of PCA shall require prior notice of reinstatement as may be issued by the Governing Board. -Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the hearing of the administrative charges against him; the implementation of Resolution No. 046-89; and the Board and persons acting in its behalf in making an action/decision on the charges against petitioner pending hearing on the merits of his petition. -The trial court issued a status quo order enjoining the Board and all persons acting in its behalf from "implementing its Resolution No. 04689 extending petitioner's preventive suspension." -The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the PCA Governing Board from implementing its Resolution No. 046-89. -Petitioner filed a motion praying for the creation of a new investigating committee and that, pending resolution, the Investigation Committee be prevented from conducting further proceedings. -On 14 July 1989, the trial court issued an order denying the same but allowing the reception of evidence on whether a temporary restraining order shall issue. -On 26 July 1989, the trial court issued an order enjoining the Investigation Committee from further conducting investigation "within a period of twenty (20) days from receipt (of the order) and until (after) respondents (would have been) heard" -On 21 August 1989, the Grageda Investigation Committee submitted to the Board its resolution finding petitioner guilty as charged and so recommended the penalty of forced resignation. -On 25 August 1989, the Board passed Resolution No. 070-89, adopting and approving the Committee's recommendation and imposing, effective 31 August 1989, the penalty of forced resignation on petitioner. -On 28 August 1989, petitioner filed a supplemental petition with the trial court praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the Board from implementing Resolution No. 070-89 . -On 11 September 1989, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order stopping respondent Board from implementing its resolution of 21 August 1989 for a period of twenty (20) days from receipt thereof until the question of whether or not the issue of petitioner's alleged deprivation of due process would have been resolved. -On 25 September 1989, the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the PCA Governing Board from enforcing its Resolution No. 070-89. -The Board moved for a reconsideration of the order, as well as the writ of preliminary injunction of Oct 2 1989, which the trial court denied -Respondents elevated the aforesaid orders to the SC, which referred the case to the CA -CA granted the petition and set aside the orders of the TC granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondent Garcia -Petitioners MFR was denied, hence, this petition ISSUE WON the CA erred in declaring that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders

GARCIA V CA (PCA BOARD & GRATEDA) G.R. No. 100579 VITUG; June 6, 2001 FACTS -On 18 October 1988, the PCA Governing Board (Board) passed Resolution No. 109-88, creating an "Investigation Committee" which would look into the complaint made by one Antonio Pua against petitioner, then administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority, for supposed irregularities committed by him. -On 28 February 1989, the Investigation Committee submitted its finding that there was a prima facie case against Garcia, and recommended that formal charges be filed against him, and that he be placed under preventive suspension -On 01 March 1989, the PCA, through its then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed an administrative complaint against herein petitioner Leandro P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 -The Board placed petitioner under preventive suspension -On 20 April 1989, the Investigation Committee scheduled hearings on the administrative case. Petitioner was duly notified of these settings. -Neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared during the hearings. -On 30 May 1989, the Board issued Resolution No. 046-89, saying that consistent with Presidential Decree No. 807, the period of delay in the disposition of the case resulting from the petitions/requests for extension of time, postponement/cancellation of the scheduled hearings and related requests filed by the counsel of Garcia, shall not

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HELD NO -The records would show that petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with TC even while the administrative investigation was yet ongoing. Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial court was premature and precipitate. From the decision of the PCA Board, once rendered, an administrative remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission would still be available to him. -Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special competence. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts. -This Court has also said in a number of cases that: "When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) courts." -Petitioner's invocation that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be EXCEPTED by the fact that irreparable damage would ensue upon his overdue suspension and illegal ouster from office cannot be countenanced because in the case at bar, petitioner effectively, if not deliberately, delayed the resolution of the administrative case against him due to his repeated requests for extension of time to file answer and his inexcusable refusal to attend the scheduled hearings thereon despite due notice. -The observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy which should not be ignored. The doctrine insures an orderly procedure and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course. Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate and impermissible

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from the Municipal Engineer that the lots were classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. - The deed of one lot in the name of Apex was cancelled and a new one in the name of the RP was registered. Later, it was transferred to a farmer who allegedly occupied the land. So apex filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the compulsory acquisition proceedings over its landholdings be declared void. ISSUES 1. WON Apex violated the principle of exhaustion of remedies 2. WON Apex was deprived of due process HELD 1. NO. - The Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction. - Records show that the PARO did not take immediate action on respondent's Protest filed on January 12, 1998. It was only on February 15, 1999, or after more than one year, that it forwarded the same to petitioner DAR. Since then, what petitioner has done was to require respondent every now and then to submit copies of supporting documents which were already attached to its Protest. In the meantime, respondent found that the PARO had caused the cancellation of its title and that a new one was issued to an alleged farmer-beneficiary. - In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that the aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondent's lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition. 2. YES. - The CARL requires 2 notices: (1) notice of coverage and letter of invitation and (2) notice of acquisition. - The 2-notice requirement was not complied with. Disposition CA decision affirmed with modification.

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SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC v NTC 408 SCRA 678 YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003
FACTS - The NTC issued a memorandum circular regarding the billing of telecoms services, including the sale of sim cards. - Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. - Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was granted by the trial court. - RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the circular. - NTC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies. - RTC denied NTCs motion. NTC filed a special civil action certiorari and prohibition with the CA. CA granted the petition and annunled and set aside the decision of the lower court. ISSUES WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case HELD YES. - In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. - Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. - Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential

DAR v APEX INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CORP. 401 SCRA 283 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; April 10, 2003
FACTS - Apex owns parcels of land in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The Agrarian Reform Office in Dasmarinas initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings pursuant to RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). Apex claims the lots are residential. Apex presented certification

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decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

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- However, under the laws above-mentioned, the powers granted to the DENR thru the Pollution Adjudication Board did not expressly exclude the Courts which under the law are empowered to try both questions of facts and law to determine whether pollution which maybe nuisance per se or by accidents (sic) exist or likely to exist. Under the Constitution, the courts are imbued the inherent power of general jurisdiction to resolve these issues. While it maybe (sic) true that petitioners might have first to seek relief thru the DENRs Pollution Adjudication Board a resort to the remedy provided under the Pollution Adjudication Board is rendered useless and ineffective in the light of the urgency that the said pollution be restrained outright in lieu of the impending risk described in the petition. It will be noted that the DENR did not have the power either in Executive Order 192, Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984 to issue a writ of injunction. The argument therefore for the exhaustion of administrative remedy and lack of jurisdiction does not warrant the dismissal of this petition against Bacnotan Cement Corporation. - Respondents motions for reconsideration were likewise denied by the trial court in an order dated May 13, 1997. Respondent BCC then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking to reverse and set aside the orders dated December 6, 1996 and May 13, 1997 as well as to lift the writ of preliminary injunction dated December 11, 1996. - On April 6, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, granting BCCs petition. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on February 24, 1999. ISSUE WON the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court. HELD NO. - The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground. - The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with. - As we explained in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, the thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same

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correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. - While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in certain instances, such as: (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. - the case does not fall under any of the exceptional circumstances. - Petitioners claim that their action before the trial court, without going to the DENR first, is justified because they are in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of respondents cement repacking plant and the DENR does not have the power to grant them the relief they are praying for. - RA 3931, An Act Creating the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission, was passed on June 18, 1964 to maintain reasonable standards of purity for the waters and air of the country with their utilization for domestic, agricultural, industrial and other legitimate purposes. It created the NPCC which had the power, to issue, renew, or deny permits, for the prevention and abatement of pollution. - In 1976, Presidential Decree No. 984 was enacted to strengthen the NPCC giving it, among others, the following: Sec. 6. Powers and Functions xxx (e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing. (f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. (g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the

ESTRADA ET AL V. CA (BACNOTAN CEMENT CORPORATION) 442 SCRA 117 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; NOV 11, 2004
FACTS Estrada, Canilang and Lim, as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed on July 31, 1996, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Khong Hun as President of WFPI, Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and Serrano as Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). - The complaint alleges that: WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into an illegal lease contract, which in turn became the basis of a sub-lease in favor of BCC; the sub-lease between WFPI and BCC is a violation of the first lease because the cement plant, which BCC intended to operate in Wawandue, Subic, Zambales, is not related to the fish port business of WFPI; and BCCs cement plant is a nuisance because it will cause pollution, endanger the health, life and limb of the residents and deprive them of the full use and enjoyment of their properties. The plaintiffs prayed that an order be issued: to restrain and prohibit BCC from opening, commissioning, or otherwise operating its cement plant; and to require the defendants to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiffs P205,000.00 by way of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. - Defendants WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC filed separate motions to dismiss, both alleging that the complaint states no cause of action. BCC, in its motion, added that: the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court; that the complaint was premature; and that the RTC has no jurisdiction on the matter. Respondent Serrano of the DENR also filed a motion to dismiss stating that there was no cause of action insofar as he is concerned since there was nothing in the complaint that shows any dereliction of duty on his part. - On December 6, 1996, Judge Ubiadas of RTC Olongapo City, Branch 72, issued an order denying respondents motions to dismiss and granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Pertinent portions of the order read as follows: - The powers vested by law under Executive Order 192, Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984 are regulatory merely and for the purpose of determining whether pollution exists.

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installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof xxx (j) serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. - P.D. No. 984 also empowered the commission to issue ex parte orders directing the discontinuance or temporary suspension or cessation of operation of an establishment or person generating sewage or wastes without the necessity of prior public hearing whenever it finds a prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceed the allowable standards set by the commission. - In 1987, Executive Order No. 192 was passed, reorganizing the DENR. It transferred the power of the NPCC to the Environmental Management Bureau and created the PAB, under the Office of the Secretary, which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases under R.A. No. 3931 and P.D. No. 984. - In Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals, the PAB is the very agency of the government with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. We also recognized its power to issue, ex parte, cease and desist orders. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.

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student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom.) - Khristine's pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who defended their positions as compliance with PCST's policy. She filed complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. - PCST filed a MD on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED). - In her response to MD, Khristine argued that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for damages arising from respondents' breach of the laws on human relations. - RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action w/o explaining the ground. RTC citing said that Sec 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vested in the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy. ISSUES 1. WON doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable 2. WON the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action HELD: 1. NO. Factoran Jr. v. CA: "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x." - Khristine isnt asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. - Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. (Miriam College Foundation v. CA) - United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems: Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. - The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. 2. YES, breach of contract and liability for tort. - Every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal. A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming

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the facts that are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. Reciprocity of the School-Student Contract - Alcuaz v. PSBA: the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the student as a contract, in which "a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester." Two years later, in Non v. Dames II, the Court modified the "termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete it. Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in nature. - The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations. - The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception -- upon enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of payment. - Magtibay v. Garcia, Licup v. University of San Carlos and Ateneo de Manila University v. Garcia: barring any violation of the rules on the part of the students, an institution of higher learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. - In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students' taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees. - The school-student contract "is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions." Sec. 5 (1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such declaration accessible to all. "Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." Sec. 9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982: "Section 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights: xxx xxx xxx

REGINO v. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, GAMUROT & BALADAD 443 SCRA 56 PANGANIBAN; November 18, 2004
FACTS - Khristine Regino was a 1st yr computer science student at PCST. Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Gamurot and Baladad, as teachers. - In Feb 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. - Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. Consequently, her respondent teachers disallowed her from taking the tests. (Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not Khristine and another

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(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations." Liability for Tort - Khristine anchors her complaint for tort on Art. 19, 21, 26 of the NC C (she alleged that PCST "inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon her the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;" as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. - Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. - PSBA vs. CA: "x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: 'x x x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.' "Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x." Academic Freedom (PCSTs defense which SC didnt buy ) - Academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. - Garcia v. the Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology: freedom of an academic institution thus: "to decide for itself aims and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint." - Tangonan v. Pao: once a school has, in the name of academic freedom, set its standards, these should be meticulously observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain students. After accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other than those made known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the school year.

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FLORES v SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN NG PAMPANGA, GOV LAPID, MUNICIPAL COUNCILORS GR NO. 159022 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; Feb 23, 2000
FACTS - An administrative complaint for dishonesty and gross misconduct against Mayor Flores was filed w/ Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga. Complainants were the councilors. - Case was about acquisition of communication equipment w/o resolution or ordinance by Sangguniang Bayan. Kai Electronics won in bidding. While bidding was still being conducted, Kai delivered the equipment. It was overpriced. - Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to Lapid that Flores be preventively suspended. - Without seeking reconsideration of that recommendation, Flores wrote to Lapid, requesting him to veto the same - And without waiting for Lapids action, Flores filed with CA petition for certiorari. CA denied petition because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Also, CA found no grave abuse of discretion. Flores MFR was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE WON Flores failed to exhaust administrative remedies HELD YES - After receiving order of preventive suspension, Flores should have filed MFR to give Sangguniang Panlalawigan opportunity to correct itself if necessary. This MFR is a condition sine qua non before filing petition for certiorari under Rule 65. - Petitioner must not only show that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the questioned Order, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. - he should have waited for Lapids action since it is Lapid, as Governor, who is empowered to suspend him, according to Local Government Code. - The rationale rests upon presumption that the administrative body, if given chance to correct its mistake / error, may amend its decision. It will also prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

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- Petitioner claims the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. - The balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report, no release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds. Petitioner contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional. ISSUE 1. WON petition should be dismissed because of procedural defects 2. WON DBM is justified in withholding the funds HELD 1. NO - The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. As petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification from the DBM Secretary prior to filing the present action, its failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule. - As for the rule on hierarchy of courts, it is not absolute. A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Petitioner justifies its direct filing of the petition with this Court as the matter involves the concept of fiscal autonomy granted to [it] as well as other constitutional bodies, a legal question not heretofore determined and which only the Honorable Supreme Court can decide with authority and finality. 2. NO - Province of Batangas v. Romulo, on automatic release in Sec 6, Article X of the Constitution: Websters Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton. Further, the word automatically is defined as in an automatic manner: without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. - By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.

CSC V DBM G.R. No. 158791 CARPIO-MORALES; July 22, 2005

FACTS - CSC seeks to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

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- On respondents justification for withholding funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. The alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. Even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution. - To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. The agencies vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall. - While the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA. - Guiding principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy: After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject to availability of funds. This phrase subject to availability of funds does not contradict the present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. - petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected. Article IX (A), Section 5 does not contain the similar provision in Art VIII, Section 3, which says, Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year. The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.

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car loads of cotton seed made from various points in Louisiana east of Alexandria, in that state, to Abilene, Texas, the carrier had exacted, over the protest of Abilene, the payment of an unjust and unreasonable rate, which exceeded, in the aggregate, by the sum sued for, a just and reasonable charge. Moreover, the rate exacted was discriminatory, constituted an undue preference, and amounted to charging more for a shorter than for a longer haul. - Texas & Pac argued that the shipments were interstate, and were, therefore, covered by the act of Congress to regulate commerce. As the rate was the one fixed in the rate sheets which the company had established, filed, published, and posted, as required by that act, the state court was without jurisdiction to entertain the cause, and, even if it had jurisdiction, it could not, without disregarding the act to regulate commerce, grant relief upon the basis that the established rate was unreasonable, when it had not been found to be so by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). - The trial court ruled for Texas & Pac saying that it complied with the interstate commerce law and the rates, though excessive, were posted in the depots for the inspection of the public and were approved by the ICC. The Court of Civil Appeals adopted the findings of fact but reversed judgment saying that a shipper may be granted relief under common law despite the fact that the excessive rates are in accordance with law. ISSUES WON a shipper may maintain an action at law against a common carrier to recover damages because of the exaction of an unreasonable rate although the rate was in accordance with the act to regulate commerce and was the duty of the carrier to enforce HELD 1. NO. Ratio A shipper seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the established rate must, under the act to regulate commerce, primarily invoke redress through the ICC, which body alone is vested with power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule, because the rates fixed therein are unreasonable. Reasoning The act to regulate commerce was intended to afford an effective means for redressing the wrongs resulting from unjust discrimination and undue preference. The means by which these purposes were to be accomplished was the placing upon all carriers the positive duty to establish schedules of reasonable rates which should have a uniform application to all, and which should not be departed from so long as the established schedule remained unaltered in the manner provided by law. - If it be that the standard of rates fixed in the mode provided by the statute could be treated on the complaint of a shipper by a court and jury as unreasonable, without reference to prior action by the ICC, finding the established rate to be unreasonable, and ordering the carrier to desist, a shipper might obtain relief and thus such shipper would receive a preference or discrimination not enjoyed by those against whom the schedule of rates was continued to be enforced. If, without previous action by the ICC, power might be exerted by courts and juries to determine the reasonableness of an established rate, it

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would follow that, unless all courts reached an identical conclusion, a uniform standard of rates in the future would be impossible, as the standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions reached by the various courts. The recognition of such a right is wholly inconsistent with the administrative power conferred upon the ICC and its duty under the statute of seeing to it that the statutory requirement as to uniformity and equality of rates is observed.

PHIL. GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS INC v RELOVA GR No. L-52819 FERNANDO; OCT. 2, 1980
FACTS - Petitioner filed with the Board of Telecommunications an application for authority to establish a branch or station in Cebu City "for the purpose of rendering international telecommunications services from Cebu City to any point outside the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. The SolGen and private respondents opposed such application. The Board of Communications rendered a decision, recognizing the right of petitioners under its legislative franchise to establish branches or stations anywhere in the Philippines, subject to its prior approval. A joint motion for reconsideration came from private respondents, followed as could be expected by an opposition from petitioner. In a reply to such opposition, private respondents put in issue the jurisdiction of the Board of Communications, now the National Telecommunications Commission, to act on such application. Such motion is still pending. Private respondents filed before respondent Judge an action for declaratory judgment to ascertain the scope and coverage of the legislative franchise of petitioner, it was ratified to Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge. - There was a motion to dismiss by petitioner on the ground that the question raised in such suit pertained to the National Telecommunications Commission, the body with primary jurisdiction. Respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion to dismiss as in his opinion the ground relied is not indubitable. Hence this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. ISSUES WON the petition for declaratory relief lies. HELD YES. - A suit for declaratory relief lies and, therefore, the petition must be dismissed. There was such a limitation concerning the ingress and egress of its messages or signals only thru a "sole gateway" (Manila) or only thru any point or single location in the Philippines. Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise a legal question arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy as to whether or not the legislative franchise could be so interpreted as to enable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A

C. PRIMARY JURISDICTION ON PRELIMINARY RESORT TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v ABILENE COTTON OIL 204 US 426 WHITE; February 25, 1907
FACTS - The Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (Abilene) sued Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. (Texas & Pac) to recover $1,951.83 alleging that on shipments of

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jurisdictional question thus arises and calls for an answer. - The conclusion reached is reinforced by the nature of the assailed order of respondent Judge. It was merely a denial of a motion to dismiss the suit for declaratory relief for the reason that the ground relied upon "is not indubitable." There is thus the appearance and the reality of an unseemly haste in which the matter was brought to this Court considering that the well-known doctrine that certiorari to be available as set forth in Panaligan vs. Adolfo, requires a showing of "a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions." DISPOSITION petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The restraining order issued is set aside.

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plaintiffs, having unjustifiably refused to inform the latter of the nature and accuse of accusation upon which the charges were initiated, having inexcusably violated elemental due process, and having erroneously applied the law. - The contention of the school teachers that the DECS officials are being sued solely in their private capacity certainly is not borne out by their above allegations and prayers. The root of the cases filed below deals, in fact, on the performance of official functions by the DECS officials. Whether the actions they have taken were proper or improper, or whether they have acted in good faith or bad faith, cannot, pending a full hearing that would aptly afford all parties an opportunity to ventilate their respective contentions, be yet determined. Until then, it must be presumed that official duties have been regularly performed. - Theres also no reversible error in the denial of a the defendants motion to dismiss the complaints. The various complaints filed by the public school teachers allege bad faith on the part of the DECS officials. It cannot be pretended this early that the same could be impossible of proof. On the assumption that the plaintiffs are able to establish their allegations of bad faith, a judgment for damages can be warranted. Public officials are certainly not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from the acts done in bad faith; in these and similar cases, the public officials may not be said to have acted within the scope of their official authority, and no longer are they protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. - The court cases and the administrative matters are closely interrelated, if not, indeed, interlinked. While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding, in the interest of good order, it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. We see, in these petitions before us, no cogent reason to deviate from the rule.

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Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the 2 coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. - Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Velasco before RTC Makati, Branch 150, alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the MOA was finalized and approved by the BED; that MMIC discontinued work thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the adjacent coal blocks; and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI's loan obligation as provided in the MOA. IEI also prayed that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating contract from MMIC to petitioner, with a written confirmation that said contract is valid and effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract from an exploration agreement to a development/production or exploitation contract in IEI's favor. - In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the MOA, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating contract in favor of IEI; ordered the reversion of the 2 coal blocks covered by the coal operating contract; ordered BED to issue its written affirmation of the coal operating contract and to expeditiously cause the conversion thereof from exploration to development in favor of IEI; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application for a coal operating contract; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application for 3 more coal blocks; and ordered the payment of damages and rehabilitation expenses. - In reversing the TC, the CA held that the rendition of the summary judgment was not proper since there were genuine issues in controversy between the parties, and more importantly, that the TC had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. ISSUE/S WON the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks. HELD NO. Ratio It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such

VIDAD v RTC OF NEGROS ORIENTAL 227 SCRA 271 VITUG; October 18, 1993
FACTS - A group of public school teachers held a strike from their classes, to demand the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget. They also assailed alleged corruption in the DECS. - DECS Regional Director issued a return-to-work order, with a warning that if the striking school teachers didnt resume their classes within 24 hours, administrative charges would be filed. The order wasnt heeded, so administrative complaints against the teachers were filed. Constituted to look into the cases was an investigation panel composed of 3 DECS lawyers, Baclaso, Montes and Capuyan. - A group of school teachers administratively charged filed with the RTC a complaint fo injunction, prohibition and damages, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, against the aforenamed DECS officials. The TRO prohibiting the defendants from continuin with the administrative investigation was granted by the court. - the defendants filed their answer and a motion to dismiss. The school teachers moved to strike out the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General and to accordingly declare the defendants in default. Both motions were denied by the court. - both parties filed with this Court their respective petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. The teachers petition was docketed as GR No 98084, and that of the DECS officials as GR No 98922. Both these cases were consolidated in this Courts resolution. ISSUES WON the lower courts denial of both parties motions was improper HELD NO Reasoning The various complaints against the DECS officials have prescinded from the administrative actions taken, and contemplated to be yet taken, against public school teachers, the plaintiffs in the cases pending with the court a quo. The said complaints charge the defendants, all government officials, with having illegally withheld their salaries, having wrongfully filed administrative charges against the

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. V CA (MARINDUQUE MINING) 184 SCRA 426 MELENCIO-HERRERA; April 18, 1990
FACTS - Petitioner IEI was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the exploration of 3 addl. coal blocks which, together with the original 2 blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area." - IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-demand balance the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC. Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a

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case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view". Reasoning While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED. For the BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board (abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked with the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program for the exploration, exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's coal resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all activities relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or through service contracts such exploitation and development, all in the interest of an effective and coordinated development of extracted resources. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served. Disposition the Court Resolved to DENY the petition.

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Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). Respondents, sister local companies, engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing Sunshine Biscuits. -respondents found out that Conrad and Co had been importing, selling and distributing biscuits and cookies, and other food items bearing this trademark in the Philippines. Although CONRAD had never before been engaged in the importation, sale and distribution of products similar to those of plaintiffs, CONRAD was suddenly designated exclusive importer and dealer of the products of "Sunshine Biscuits, Inc." (apparently, an international trademark for Sunshine Biscuits was already in existence) for sale in the Philippine market. -a case for "Injunction with Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction" against Conrad was filed. Conrad opposed this stating the court has no jurisdiction due to a pending case before the BPTTT filed by Sunshine America against herein respondents for the cancellation of trademark. -trial court ruled for Conrad and dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. CA reversed stating that the cause of action in the injunction case and in the cancellation case were different. CA ordered the continuation of the case before the RTC. ISSUE: WON trial court has jurisdiction over the injunction case pending a cancellation of patent case before the BPTTT. HELD: NO. Conrad contends that: -the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be made to apply in this case considering that the BPTTT had already acquired jurisdiction over the suit brought by defendant's principal against the plaintiffs involving the right of plaintiffs to use said trademark. No doubt the BPTTT is better situated, considering its experience and special knowledge to determine the matters of fact involved. -"Petitions for Cancellation" of Fitrite's Certificate of Registration with BPTTT cast a cloud of doubt on private respondents' claim of ownership and exclusive right to the use of the trademark "Sunshine." Considering that this matter is at issue before the BPTTT, which has primary jurisdiction over the case, petitioner argues, an injunctive relief from any court would be precipitate and improper. However, the SC affirmed CA in saying that : The issue involved in the action a quo is not whether the "SUNSHINE" trademark in question is registerable or cancelable since the trademark has already been registered in both the Supplemental and Principal Registers of BPTTT in the name of FITRITE; actually, the issue involved in the action a quo is whether CONRAD's acts of importing, selling and distributing biscuits, cookies and other food items bearing said registered "SUNSHINE" trademark in the Philippines without the consent of its registrant (FITRITE) constitute infringement thereof in contemplation of Sec. 22 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended. -But, even assuming which is not the case that the issue involved here is technical in nature requiring specialized skills and knowledge, still Industrialized Enterprises does not authorize the outright dismissal of a case originally cognizable in the courts; what it says is where primary jurisdiction comes into play in a case "the judicial process is

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suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. -an action for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy of injunction and relief for damages, is explicitly and unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK V. CA G.R. No. 132767 Mendoza:January 18, 2000

FACTS: - Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao. The lands were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. - The petition was filed on January 26, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which on February 23, 1995, dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. - On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. It was held that jurisdiction over land valuation cases is lodged in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. - In pursuance thereof, it is clear that the right of a landowner who disagrees with the valuation fixed by the DAR to file a petition for the judicial fixing of just compensation before special agrarian courts must be exercised within the period provided in Rule XIII, Section 11.1 - In this case, appellant neither gives information regarding the date of its receipt of the questioned Order of the DAR Provincial Adjudicator, nor disputes the conclusion made by the trial court - Petitioner filed MFR, but its motion was likewise denied. ISSUE: WON the petition for judicial fixing of just compensation be filed within the period provided in Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure HELD: YES Reasoning Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided from the decision of the DAR adjudicator. - On the other hand, respondents argue that actions for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the appropriate courts within 15

CONRAD AND CO v CA (Fitrite and Victoria Biscuit) 246 SCRA 691 VITUG; July 18, 1995
FACTS: -FITRITE INC and VICTORIA biscuit co (respondents) are owners of the trademark SUNSHINE granted by the Bureau of Patents,

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days from receipt of the decision of the DAR adjudicator, otherwise such decision becomes final and executory, pursuant R.A. No. 6657. - The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657 provides: Sec. 50 Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Sec. 57 Special Jurisdiction The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. - Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the preliminary determination of the value of lands placed under land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by notifying the landowner of the government's intention to acquire his land and the valuation of the same as determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days from receipt of notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. In the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held by the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, for the purpose of determining the compensation for the land. The landowner, the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then required to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides the case within 30 days after it is submitted for decision. If the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial Court. - To implement R.A. No. 6657, Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides: Land Valuation Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within15 days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

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Jesusa Samson in the City of Cebu. The taxpayers protested and the Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the assessments. Ursal took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his valuation, but said Court refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and that the assessor had no personality to bring the matter before it under section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, which reads as follows: "SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. - Any person, association or corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling." ISSUE WON the city assessor has personality to resort to the CTA HELD NO - The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but the overruling indicted no material damage upon him or his office. The Court of Tax Appeals was not created to decide conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies. - The appellant invites attention to the fact that the Court of Tax Appeals is the successor of the former Central Board of Tax Appeals created by Commonwealth Act No. 530 and of the Board of Tax Appeals established by Executive Order No. 401-A, and that said Commonwealth Act No. 530 (section 2) explicitly authorized the city assessor to appeal to the Central Board of Tax Appeals. Here is precisely another argument against his position: as Republic Act No. 1125 failed to reenact such express permission, it is deemed withheld. - Oversight could not have been the cause of such withholding, since there were proper grounds: (a) discipline and command responsibility in the executive branches; and (b) instead of being another superior administrative agency as was the former Board of Tax Appeals the Court of Tax Appeals as created by Republic Act No. 1125 is a part of the judicial system presumably to act only on protests of private persons adversely affected by the tax, custom, or assessment.

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petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that, as a tax payer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are ". . . deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of law . . ."; that they have filed the instant petition "on their own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound and general interest." It is actually the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election. Issues 1. WON peitioners may file the instant petition 2.WON SC has jurisdiction over the COMELEC 3. WON the said provision applies to the Interim National Assembly Held 1. No. - As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under the constitutional provision abovecited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. What the case at bar seeks is one that entails expenditure of public funds which may be illegal because it would be spent for a purpose - that of calling a special election - which, as will be shown, has no authority either in the Constitution or a statute. - the alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fillup the existing vacancies in the Batasan Pambansa, standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens. Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. 2. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: "Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof." - There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is not alleged that the COMELEC was asked by petitioners to perform its alleged duty under

ACTING COLLECTOR v CTA (Rean) LOZADA (IGOT) v COMELEC 120 SCRA 337 De Castro ; 1983 January 27
FACTS - Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while

D. STANDING TO CHALLENGE URSAL V CTA 101 PHIL 209 BENGZON; April 26, 1957
FACTS - Ursal is the City Assessor of Cebu. In the exercise of his powers, he assessed for taxation certain real properties of Consuelo Noel and

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the Constitution to call a special election, and that COMELEC has issued an order or resolution denying such petition. - Even from the standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total absence of a showing that COMELEC has unlawfully neglected the performance of a ministerial duty, or has refused on being demanded, to discharge such a duty; and as demonstrated above, it is not shown, nor can it ever be shown, that petitioners have a clear right to the holding of a special election which is equally the clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC to respect, mandamus will not lie. 5 The writ will not issue in doubtful cases. - It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the Batasan Pambansa may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from said body, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not interim Batasan Pambansa. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now Batasan Pambansa, not to the Interim Batasan Pambansa, as will presently be shown. 3. No. - The Interim National Assembly was to be composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well as the then incumbent President and Vice-President, and the members of the Senate and House of Representatives of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. With such number of representatives representing each congressional district, or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt absolutely no need for filing vacancies occurring in the Interim National Assembly, considering the uncertainty of the duration of its existence. What was in the mind of the Constitutional Convention in providing for special elections to fill up vacancies is the regular National Assembly, because a province or representative district would have only one representative in the said National Assembly. Even as presently constituted where the representation in the Interim Batasan Pambansa is regional and sectoral, the need to fill up vacancies in the Body is neither imperative nor urgent. No district or province would ever be left without representation at all, as to necessitate the filling up of vacancies in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. There would always be adequate representation for every province which only forms part of a certain region, specially considering that the Body is only transitory in character. The unmistakable intent of the Constitutional Convention as adverted to is even more positively revealed by the fact that the provision of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the New Constitution is in the main body of the said Constitution, not in the transitory provisions in which all matters relating to the Interim Batasan Pambansa are found. No provision outside of Article VIII on the "Transitory Provisions" has reference or relevance to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. Also under the original provision of the Constitution (Section 1, Article XVII -

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Transitory Provisions), the Interim National Assembly had only one single occasion on which to call for an election, and that is for the election of members of the regular National Assembly. The Constitution could not have at that time contemplated to fill up vacancies in the Interim National Assembly the composition of which, as already demonstrated, would not raise any imperious necessity of having to call special elections for that purpose, because the duration of its existence was neither known or pre-determined. It could be for a period so brief that the time prescriptions mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution cannot be applicable. The foregoing observations make it clear that the aforementioned provision for calling special elections to fill up vacancies apply only to the regular Batasan Pambansa. This is evident from the language thereof which speaks of a "vacancy in the Batasan Pambansa," which means the regular Batasan Pambansa as the same words "Batasan Pambansa" found in all the many other sections of Article VIII, undoubtedly refer to the regular Batasan, not the interim one. A word or phrase used in one part of a Constitution is to receive the same interpretation when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears, from the context or otherwise, that a different meaning should be applied.

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1987 Constitution that recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. As well as the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of mans inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation in natural law. ISSUE WON the petitioners have standing HELD YES. The civil case is a class suit Reasoning The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the RoC. - Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

OPOSA V FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 DAVIDE JR; JULY 30, 1993
FACTS - In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their parents) and the Philippine Ecological Network (PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by the new secretary, Angel Alcala. The complaint was instituted to be a taxpayers class suit as it alleges that all citizens of the Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of the countrys virgin tropical rainforests. The suit also alleges that this suit represents people who are sharing the same sentiment towards the preservation of our natural resources (since not all of them could go before the court). Furthermore, this was also asserted to be representative of the current generation and generation that are yet to be born. - The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), its agents, representatives, and those acting on its behalf to, 1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and 2. to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, and renewing or approving new timber license agreements. . - The petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of cause of action, of being political question, and of causing the impairment of contracts. The petitioners filed for certiorari hence this case. They contend that there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code (the right to a sound environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls for the creation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to safeguard the peoples right to a healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section 16, Article II of the

JOYA v PCGG (Jonas) KILOSBAYAN v GUINGONA, JR 232 SCRA 110 DAVIDE, JR; May 5, 1994
FACTS - Petitioner KILOSBAYAN is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners (except Webb, Taada, Joker Arroyo, who are suing as members of Congress and taxpayers) are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. - Pursuant to the charter of PCSO which grants it authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system to increasee its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. - The Berjaya Group Berhad from Malaysia engaged in successful lottery operations became interested to offer its services to PCSO. As

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an initial step Berjaya Group organized with some Filipino investors a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) which was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. - Considering the citizenship requirement, the Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of its original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. - Oct. 21, 1993: the Office of the President announced that it had given PGMC the go-signal to operate the online lottery system. - Nov. 4, 1993: KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Pres. FVR strongly opposing the setting-up of the online lottery on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Petitioners Claim - PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the lottery system in collaboration or association with the PGMC in violation of Sec 1(B) of RA 1169 which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic. Respondents Comments - PGMC asserts that it is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, and as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a ci0ioeratir of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise in collaboration, association or joint venture with PGMC. - The issue on morality of lottery franchise granted to PCSO is political, not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum. - The petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or the real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the relief sought. - PCSO as a corporate entity is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives. ISSUE 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing3 2. WON Contract of Lease entered into by PCSO and PGMC is valid. HELD 1. YES Ratio In line with the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actons before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Reasoning A partys standing before the SC is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.

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- The rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. - Even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. - The instant petition is of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the mention cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. 2. NO Sec 1 RA 1169 Sec. 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office xxx shall have the authority: A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors. B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph A. - The language of the section is clear that the PCSO cannot exercise its privilege to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries etc. in collaboration, association or joint venture with any party. - By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Sec 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. - The intention of the parties is the soul of the instrument. The arrangement between the parties would leave to the PGMC the technical, operations and management aspects of the online lottery system while the PCSO would primarily provide the franchise. DISPOSITION The Contract of Lease violates the exception of Sec 1(B) of the PCSO charter, and is invalid for being contrary to law. SEPARATE OPINIONS CRUZ, Concurring; Concerning the doctrine of locus standi, Cruz cannot agree that out of the millions of Filipinos affected by the proposed lottery, not a single solitary citizen can question the agreement. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right to call the firemen. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading even if he lives in the other block. FELICIANO, Concurring; It is not enough for the Court simply to invoke public interest or even paramount considerations of national interest, and to say that the specific requirements of such public interest can only be ascertained

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on a case to case basis. Such an approach is not intellectually satisfying. And such an answer appears to come too close to saying that locus standi exists whenever at least a majority of the Members of the SC participating in a case feel that an appropriate case for judicial intervention has arisen. - The funds or assets involved in the case are important. The funds are clearly public in nature. The funds to be generated by the lottery are to be raised from the population at large, and are designed to benefit the general public. The dissenters insist that because the funds will not have been generated by the exercise of the taxing power of government, the present petition cannot be regarded as a taxpayers suit and must be disregarded. It is known that the principal sources of funding for government operations today include not just taxes and customs duties, but also revenues derived from activities of PAGCOR. PADILLA, Separate Opinion; The case falls within the De Guia doctrine (the Court may brush aside procedure if the case is of paramount interest). When the contract of lease in question seeks to establish and operate a nationwide gambling network with substantial if not controlling foreign participation, then the issue is of paramount national interest and importance as to justify and warrant a relaxation of the above-mentioned procedural rule on locus standi. MELO, Dissenting; - Petitioners have no legal standing as taxpayers and members of Congress. - No public fund raised by taxation is involved in this case. It is even doubtful if the rentals which the PCSO will pay to the lessor for its operation of the lottery system may be regarded as public fund. The PCSO is not a revenue-collecting arm of the government. The money it will raise shall remain with the corporation. It is public only insofar as PCSO is a government-owned/ controlled entity. - The contract does not involve the disbursement of public funds but of strictly corporate money. PUNO, Dissenting; - Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. - Not one of the petitioners is a party to the Contract of Lease executed between PCSO and PGMC. None of the petitioners participated in the bidding, and hence they are not losing bidders. They are complete strangers to the contract. - Petitioners have no standing as taxpayers because the case does not involve any expenditure of public money on the part of the PCSO. - Puno suggests that the doctrine of De Guia be reviewed. It treated the rule on locus standi as a mere procedural rule. It is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Sec 1 Art VIII of the Constitution which mandates courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. By downgrading the requirement on locus standi as a procedural rule which can be discarded in the name of public interest, is in effect an amendment the Constitution by judicial fiat.

There must be an actual case or controversy; the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible time; the decision of the constitutionality must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

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VITUG, Separate Opinion; Petitioners assert that the lottery violates morals. However, what evils should be corrected as pernicious to the body politic, and how correction should be done, is a matter primarily addressed to the discretion of the legislative department, not of the courts. KAPUNAN, Dissenting; The petitioners have no personal stake in the case. The constitutional requirement for an actual case and controversy limits this Courts power of review to precisely those suits between adversary litigants with real interests at stake thus preventing it from making all sorts of hypothetical pronouncement on abstract, contingent and amorphous issues. The Court will therefore not pass upon the validity of an act of government or a statute passed by a legislative body without a requisite showing of injury. A personal stake is essential, which absence renders our pronouncements gratuitous and certainly violative of the constitutional requirement for actual cases and controversies.

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on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were actually involved. -Also, the voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one (7-6); majority was a tenuous one not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the membership of the Court, (Justices Cruz and Bidin have retired; and Justices Francisco and Mendoza are newly appointed). -The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply. This may be a sequel to the first case, but it is certainly not its continuation. The parties are the same but the cases are not. -The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is also inapplicable because the issue is one of law, and the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated. Hence the determination in the prior case that petitioners had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit. -Strictly speaking, petitioners legal standing is not even an issue in this case since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the ROC. In short: questions of constitutionality otherwise legal standing real party in interest

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(4) under Sec1(A) of R.A. 1169, the PCSO has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it itself holds or conducts such lottery; and (5) the ELA in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity. SEPARATE OPINIONS PADILLA, J., concurring: -It is the duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by the President, (unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a Member's personal conviction that gambling should be totally prohibited by law. -The rule on locus standi, being merely a procedural rule, should be relaxed, as when the issue is of paramount national interest and importance. The core issue in the present case is the same as the issue in the first lotto case, i.e., the validity of a changed agreement between PCSO and PGMC. Thus, it is my view that the principle of locus standi should not stand in the way of a review by this Court of the validity of such changed agreement. VITUG, J., concurring: -reiterates his separate opinion in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona. -The matter of the legal standing of petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract appears, both under substantive law and the rules of procedure, to still be an insuperable issue. Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 1987 Consti has not been intended to unduly mutate, let alone to disregard, the long established rules on locus standi. Neither has it been meant to do away with the principle of separation of powers. FELICIANO, J., dissenting: -reiterates his concurring opinion in the first Kilosbayan case: All the factors which pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case, still exist and demand, with equal weight and insistence, such recognition in the present or second Kilosbayan case. REGALADO, J., dissenting: -In the first lotto case, the Court excepted petitioners from the traditional locus standi proscription because the issues raised on the indiscriminate operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system are of paramount public interest and of a category higher than those involved in former cases wherein the application of that rule was sustained. The court acted correctly; creating exceptions to doctrines and even rejecting the same in the interest of justice are not unusual. -Withal, the relaxation or the locus standi doctrine in the first lotto case is impugned and lamented in the second one now at bar. In the first lotto case, the minority therein rested its position entirely on procedural grounds, that is, by merely challenging the legal standing of petitioners but without any comment on the merits of the contract in question. Since the case at bar is in truth a reprise of the first, I had expected that this case would now be decided purely on the merits of the putative expanded lease agreement but the Court's judgment turn again on technical procedural grounds, by hiding within the shroud of the locus standi mystique!

KILOSBAYAN, INC., V MORATO 246 SCRA 540 MENDOZA; July 17, 1995
FACTS -In Kilosbayan, Inc v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994), SC invalidated the Contract of Lease between the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO. The parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement resulting in an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a certain amount of rentals. -Petitioners filed this suit seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case. They allege that said ELA is violative of PCSOs charter, of the SC decision in the first case, of the Law on Public Bidding (EO 301 & 298), of COA Circular No. 85-55-A, and of Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. -Respondents filed comments questioning the petitioners' standing to bring this suit. ISSUE WON petitioners have legal standing to bring this suit <For the discussion on the substantive issues (validity of the ELA, interpretation of Sec. 1 of RA 1169, requirement of public bidding), please see the original.> HELD NO. - Kilosbayan, Inc., its trustees and the petitioner-senators, not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings

-This cannot be treated as taxpayers suit since there is no allegation that public funds are being misspent. -Art. II, Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution are not self executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of contract law. -In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it, or who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally excluded from it. -These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. . . . The phrase 'present substantial interest' more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him." Disposition Petition dismissed. (1) petitioners have neither standing to bring this suit nor substantial interest to make them real parties in interest (Rule 3, Sec 2); (2) a determination of petitioners' right to bring this suit is not precluded or barred by the decision in the prior case between the parties; (3) the ELA of January 25, 1995 is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of the PCSO;

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-Majority opinion says: petitioners are not parties to the contract not real parties in interest no cause of action no right of action they cannot maintain the present petition. -Minority says: Standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has the capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. -The matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain this action whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case. The principles of "law of the case'' and res judicata are applicable. DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: NOTE: he is ponente of first Kilosbayan case and author of the exception to paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. -disturbed by the sudden reversal of SC rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona and believes such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. -In first Kilosbyan, SC sustained the locus standi of the petitioners, citing transcendental importance / paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions of pesos its is expected to raise. -The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or GOCCs allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. -Under the principle of either the law of the case or res judicata, the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the application or interpretation of the exception clause in par. B, Sec. 1 of R.A.1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or interpretation has been laid to rest under the doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code. -The legal question of locus standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same in this case and in every subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the conduct or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration, association, or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity. For one thing, the question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and the same issue of law. For another, these cases involve the same and not substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line lottery system. -It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on real party in interest was never put in issue in the previous case. It was the

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clear understanding of the Members of the Court that in the light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced therein, only locus standi deserved consideration. -Friedenthal; et al., whose book is cited in the majority opinion in its discussion of the rule on real party in interest and the doctrine of locus standi, admit that there is a difference between the two, and that the former is not strictly applicable in public law cases, thus: It is important to note, however, that standing, because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed toward ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. xxx In the realm of public law, the real party in interest rule is not applicable. -The attempt to use the real-party-in-interest rule is to resurrect the abandoned restrictive application of locus standi. Such attempt directly or indirectly restricts the exercise of the judicial authority of this Court in an original action to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Only a very limited few may qualify, under the real-party-in-interest rule, to bring actions to question acts or contracts tainted with such vice. -Locus standi is not such an absolute rule that it cannot admit of exceptions under certain conditions or circumstances like those attending this transaction.

Dean Carlota
- The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the rate of return of the proposed increase in rates. - LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase - Then Secretary of DOTC issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. - Respondent Secretary of the DOTC Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption of rules and procedures to implement abovequoted Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down deregulation and other liberalization policies for the transport sector. - LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating guidelines for implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587. - PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. - KMU filed a petition with LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. ISSUE WON KMU has the standing to sue. HELD YES. - The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power. - Lamb v. Phipps: judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf. - Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. - KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. - Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency

KMU V GARCIA, JR 239 SCRA 386 KAPUNAN; December 23, 1994

FACTS - Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. - Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos suggesting that the implementation of the proposed fare range scheme be further studied and evaluated. - Respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-theboard increase of P0.085 per kilometer for all types of provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of 15% over and below the proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimummaximum fare range applying only to ordinary, first class and premium class buses and P0.50 minimum per kilometer fare for aircon buses, was sought. - PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of 0.065 centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. The decrease was due to the drop in the expected price of diesel.

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