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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.

- Tax Refund
G.R. No. 184823 October 6, 2010 Del Castillo, J.

Doctrine: - The CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents within which to grant or deny the claim for refund/credit of input vat. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. - A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process. - As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. - The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund under Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.

Facts: Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondents claim for refund/credit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period 2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an administrative claim, and violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

Held:

1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondents administrative claim was timely filed.

2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature. Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit], within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales. The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT. The premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs SAMANIEGO.


G.R. No. 175573 | September 11, 2008 FACTS: Respondent Samaniego was the City Treasurer of Ligao City, Albay. On separate dates, the Commission on Audit (COA) filed two administrative complaints against Samaniego, for dishonesty and grave misconduct. In these administrative complaints, the COA alleged that respondent incurred shortages in his accountabilities for two separate periods. Respondent received letters of demand requiring him to explain his side and settle his accountabilities. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found respondent liable for grave misconduct because he failed to explain his side and settle his accountabilities. Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 with a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the CA, respondent assailed the joint decision of the Office of the Ombudsman insofar as it found him liable in one of the admin cases filed. His prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Since it was not impleaded as a respondent, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall the writ of preliminary injunction. The motions were denied. The Office of the Ombudsman now claims that the CA erred in denying its right to intervene, considering that its joint decision was the subject of the appeal. It also asserts that the writ of preliminary injunction should be recalled. ISSUE: Whether writ of injunction was necessary to stay the execution of the order of the Ombudsman?

HELD: NO. Under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - xxx where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals xxx An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. xxx. A literal reading of this rule shows that the mere filing of an appeal does not prevent the decision of the Ombudsman from becoming executory. However, we clarified this rule in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja: [O]nly orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. The penalty meted out to respondent was suspension for one year without pay. He filed an appeal of the Ombudsman's joint decision on time. In his appeal, he included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to stay the execution of the decision against him. Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, we hold that the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the joint decision against him. Respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the execution of the decision against him) was therefore a superfluity. DECISION SHELL PHIILS. V. EFREN JALOS ABAD, J.:

This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum contractor, whose pipeline operation has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas, inflicting loss of earnings among fishermen.

The Facts and the Case

On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two

years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. This entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline from Shell s production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. The pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea. On May 19, 2003, respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 other individuals (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for damages[1] against Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Jalos, et al claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shell s natural gas pipeline. Jalos, et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the pipeline. As a result, their average net income per month fell from a high of P4,848.00 to only P573.00. They said that the pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to] stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea. They now have to stay longer and farther out at sea to catch fish, as the pipeline s operation has driven the fish population out of coastal waters.[2] Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint. It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action, as it is a pollution case under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control Law. Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related damages.[3] Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the State s consent. Shell said that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves. Moreover, said Shell, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not specify any actionable wrong or particular act or omission on Shell s part that could have caused the alleged injury to Jalos, et al. The complaint likewise failed to comply with requirements of a valid class suit, verification and certification against forum shopping, and the requisites for a suit brought by pauper litigants.[4] On March 24, 2004 the RTC dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the action was actually pollution-related, although denominated as one for damages. The complaint should thus be brought first before the PAB, the government agency vested with jurisdiction over pollution-related cases.[5] Jalos, et al assailed the RTC s order through a petition for certiorari[6] before the Court of Appeals (CA). In due course, the latter court reversed such order and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the action. It said that Shell was not being sued for committing pollution, but for constructing and operating a natural gas pipeline that caused fish decline and considerable reduction in the fishermen s income. The claim for damages was thus based on a quasi-delict over which the regular courts have jurisdiction The CA also rejected Shell s assertion that the suit was actually against the State. It observed that the government was not even impleaded as party defendant. It gave short shrift to Shell s insistence that, under the service contract, the government was solidarily liable with Shell for damages caused to third persons. Besides, the State should be deemed to have given its consent to be sued when it entered into the contract with Shell.

The CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong. Jalos, et al invoked their right to fish the sea and earn a living, which Shell had the correlative obligation to respect. Failure to observe such obligation resulted in a violation of the fishermen s rights and thus gave rise to a cause of action for damages.[7] Finally, the CA held that Jalos, et al substantially complied with the technical requirements for filing the action. But since they failed to prove the requisites of a class suit, only those who have verified the complaint should be deemed party plaintiffs.[8] Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA s decision but the same was denied.[9] Hence, it filed this petition for review under Rule 45.

The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the PAB; Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against Shell; and Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state immunity.

The Court s Rulings First. Although the complaint of Jalos, et al does not use the word pollution in describing the cause of the alleged fish decline in the Mindoro Sea, it is unmistakable based on their allegations that Shell s pipeline produced some kind of poison or emission that drove the fish away from the coastal areas. While the complaint did not specifically attribute to Shell any specific act of pollution, it alleged that the pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to] stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea. [10] This constitutes pollution as defined by law. Section 2(a) of P.D. 984 defines pollution as any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of any water x x x as will or is likely to create or render such water x x x harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate purposes. It is clear from this definition that the stress to marine life claimed by Jalos, et al is caused by some kind of pollution emanating from Shell s natural gas pipeline. The pipeline, they said, greatly affected or altered the natural habitat of fish and affected the coastal waters natural function as fishing grounds. Inevitably, in resolving Jalos, et al s claim for damages, the proper tribunal must determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters properties and negatively affected its life sustaining function. The power and expertise needed to determine such issue lies with the PAB. Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control Commission provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D. 984.[11] These empowered the PAB to [d]etermine the

location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects of water pollution.[12] Among its functions is to [s]erve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. In this regard, the PAB has the power to conduct hearings,[13] impose penalties for violation of P.D. 984,[14] and issue writs of execution to enforce its orders and decisions.[15] The PAB s final decisions may be reviewed by the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[16] Jalos, et al had, therefore, an administrative recourse before filing their complaint with the regular courts.[17] The laws creating the PAB and vesting it with powers are wise. The definition of the term pollution itself connotes the need for specialized knowledge and skills, technical and scientific, in determining the presence, the cause, and the effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not within the competence of ordinary courts.[18] Consequently, resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters. To this extent, the failure of Jalos, et al to allege in their complaint that they had first taken resort to PAB before going to court means that they failed to state a cause of action that the RTC could act on. This warranted the dismissal of their action.[19] Second. Still, Shell points out that the complaint also states no cause of action because it failed to specify any actionable wrong or particular act or omission on Shell s part. The Court cannot agree. As mentioned above, the complaint said that the natural gas pipeline s construction and operation greatly affected the marine environment, drove away the fish, and resulted in reduced income for Jalos, et al. True, the complaint did not contain some scientific explanation regarding how the construction and operation of the pipeline disturbed the waters and drove away the fish from their usual habitat as the fishermen claimed. But lack of particulars is not a ground for dismissing the complaint. A cause of action is the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff.[20] Its elements consist of: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiff s right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.[21] To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, however, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.[22] Here, all the elements of a cause of action are present. First, Jalos, et al undoubtedly had the right to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources which is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution.[23] Second, Shell had the correlative duty to refrain from acts or omissions that could impair Jalos, et al s use and enjoyment of the bounties of the seas. Lastly, Shell s construction and operation of the pipeline, which is an act of physical intrusion into the marine environment, is said to have disrupted and impaired the natural habitat of fish and resulted in considerable reduction of fish catch and income for Jalos, et al. Thus, the construction and operation of the pipeline may, in itself, be a wrongful act that could be the basis of Jalos, et al s cause of action. The rules do not require that the complaint establish in detail the causal link between the construction and operation of the pipeline, on the one hand, and the fish decline and loss of income, on the other hand, it being sufficient that the complaint states the ultimate facts on which it bases its claim for relief. The test for determining the sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether the complaint alleges facts which, if true, would justify the relief demanded.[24] In this case, a valid judgment for damages can be made in favor of Jalos, et al, if the construction and operation of the pipeline indeed caused fish decline and eventually led to the fishermen s loss of income, as alleged in the complaint.

Third. Shell claims that it cannot be sued without the State s consent under the doctrine of state immunity from suit. But, to begin with, Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country s natural gas reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State s full control and supervision,[25] it does not follow that Shell has become the State s agent within the meaning of the law. An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.[26] The essence of an agency is the agent s ability to represent his principal and bring about business relations between the latter and third persons.[27] An agent s ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical acts that would create, modify or extinguish relations between his principal and third persons.[28] It is this power to affect the principal s contractual relations with third persons that differentiates the agent from a service contractor. Shell s main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to [p]erform all petroleum operations and provide all necessary technology and finance as well as other connected services[29] to the Philippine government. As defined under the contract, petroleum operation means the searching for and obtaining Petroleum within the Philippines , including the transportation, storage, handling and sale of petroleum whether for export or domestic consumption.[30] Shell s primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State. Consequently, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services, technology and financing[31] for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. It is not immune from suit and may be sued for claims even without the State s consent. Notably, the Philippine government itself recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project. This is evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38. Article II, paragraph 8, Annex B of Service Contract 38[32] states that legal expenses, including judgments obtained against the Parties or any of them on account of the Petroleum Operations , can be recovered by Shell as part of operating expenses to be deducted from gross proceeds. Article II, paragraph 9B of the same document allows a similar recovery for [a]ll actual expenditures incurred and paid by CONTRACTOR [Shell] in settlement of any and all losses, claims, damages, judgments, and any other expenses not covered by insurance, including legal services. This signifies that the State itself acknowledged the suability of Shell. Since payment of claims and damages pursuant to a judgment against Shell can be deducted from gross proceeds, the State will not be required to perform any additional affirmative act to satisfy such a judgment. In sum, while the complaint in this case sufficiently alleges a cause of action, the same must be filed with the PAB, which is the government agency tasked to adjudicate pollution-related cases. Shell is not an agent of the State and may thus be sued before that body for any damages caused by its operations. The parties may appeal the PAB s decision to the CA. But pending prior determination by the PAB, courts cannot take cognizance of the complaint. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 82404 dated November 20, 2006. Respondent Efren Jalos, et al s complaint for damages against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. in Civil Case P-1818-03 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro is ordered DISMISSED without prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or PAB.

CARBONEL V. CSC
NACHURA, J. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated November 24, 2008 and Resolution[2] dated April 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101599. Petitioner Clarita J. Carbonel was an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Makati City. She was formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Documents by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO IV). The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as affirmed by the CA, established the following facts: On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost the original copy of her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as certificate of rating).[3][4] Because of these discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation. Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification slip. The Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioner s personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement[5] before Atty. Rosalinda S.M. Gepigon, admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she accepted the proposal of a certain Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS Career Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating. This prompted her to secure another copy from the CSCRO IV Hence, the formal charge against petitioner Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her Answer,[6] traversed the charges against her. She explained that after filling up the application form for the civil service examination, she asked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother. Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite her failure to take the test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the certificate of rating but to check the veracity of the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of counsel. After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25, 2002 Decision No. 020079[7] finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed on her. Petitioner s motion for reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November 14, 2003.[8]

Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed[9] the same for having been filed almost three years from receipt of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioner s explanation that she failed to timely appeal the case because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the other members of the law firm, petitioner s counsel of record, could have timely appealed the decision.[10] Petitioner s motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 072049[11] dated November 5, 2007. Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November 24, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the decisions and resolutions of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioner s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on April 29, 2009. Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds I SERIOUS ERROR OF FACT AND LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 24, 2008 BECAUSE PETITIONER S FINDING OF GUILT WAS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON HER UNSWORN STATEMENT THAT SHE ADMITTED THE OFFENSES CHARGED AND WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COUNSEL. II THE CONCLUSION AND FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION THAT PETITIONER S APPEAL WAS LOST THRU HER OWN FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE WAS PREMISED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS. III THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.[12] The petition is without merit. It is undisputed that petitioner appealed the CSCRO IV s decision almost three years from receipt thereof. Undoubtedly, the appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period when the decision had long become final and executory. As held in Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission,[13] citing Talento v. Escalada, Jr.[14] The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and beyond the power of the Court s review. Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final and executory, it becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest. Such decision or order can no loner be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have been. This notwithstanding, on petition before the CA, the appellate court reviewed the case and disposed of it on the merits, not on pure technicality To accentuate the abject poverty of petitioner s arguments, we discuss hereunder the issues she raised. Petitioner faults the CSC s finding because it was based solely on her uncounselled admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated because she was not afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken.

It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioner s uncounselled statements and, partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document.[15] However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation.[16] Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.[17] While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.[18] The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.[19] As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal.[20] We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CSC and the CA. The written admission of petitioner is replete with details that could have been known only to her.[21] Besides, petitioner s written statement was not the only basis of her dismissal from the service. Records show that the CSCRO IV s conclusion was reached after consideration of all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the parties during the formal investigation. Now, on petitioner s liability and penalty It has been established that petitioner accepted Navarro s proposal for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS Career Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating that prompted her to secure another copy from the CSCRO IV. The CSCRO IV noticed that petitioner s personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on the same application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. Clearly, petitioner falsely represented that she took the civil service examination when in fact someone else took the examination for her. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1991, provides: An act which includes the procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination, has been categorized as a grave offense of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.[22 It must be stressed that dishonesty is a serious offense, which reflects on the person s character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue, and integrity. Its immense debilitating effect on the government service cannot be overemphasized.[23] If a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his

right to continue in office. The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression, and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.[24] Under the Civil Service Rules, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal which carries the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits (except leave credits), and disqualification from reemployment in the government service.[25] In Civil Service Commission v. Dasco,[26] Bartolata v. Julaton,[27] and Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,[28] we found the respondents-employees therein guilty of dishonesty when they misrepresented that they took the Civil Service Examination when in fact someone else took the examination for them. Because of such dishonesty, the employees were dismissed from government service. We find no reason to deviate from these previous rulings. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 24, 2008 and Resolution dated April 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101599 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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