To: Professors Name From: Student ID Number Re: Manton; file no.

C467 Date: November 18, 2008 STATEMENT OF FACTS The District Attorney of Centerville, representing the State of Georgia, has been asked to analyze the States case against Stephen Manton. Mr. Manton is a criminal defense attorney who has been implicated in the death of Jose Gonzalez based on the shooting of Gonzalez by Arnold Black. The District Attorney wants to bring the highest murder charge possible. Mr. Mantons wife, Susan, who is also a criminal defense attorney, successfully defended Gonzalez when he was charged and acquitted of murder. Gonzalez, who was also a suspect in the murder of two other women, stalked Mrs. Manton for six months following his acquittal. Mrs. Manton made it known to the Centerville police that Gonzalez continually startled her. On two occasions, these authorities warned Gonzalez that they were aware of his behavior and were watching him. Mrs. Manton obtained a restraining order against Gonzalez because of his sarcastic and threatening comments and his awkward behavior towards her. When Gonzalez continued to harass his wife, Mr. Manton, unsatisfied with police efforts, contacted Black. Black, who was represented by Mr. Manton in past convictions of aggravated assault, attempted murder, and armed robbery, is accused of fatally shooting Gonzalez on October 3, 2008. Police discovered Gonzalezs body in a pool of blood and an audiotape. The tape contained statements by Black informing Gonzalez that he was sent by Mr. Manton to even the score and to put a stop to the harassing of Mrs. Manton and that was what he intended to do. In the tape, Gonzalez stated the Mantons needed to develop thicker skins and should

stop making a living off protecting criminals. Following this, a gunshot was heard. Following the discovery of Gonzalezs body, the tape, and Blacks fingerprint in Gonzalezs apartment, Black was arrested. He refused to answer any questions and contacted Mr. Manton. On October 4, 2008, Mr. Manton met with Black who is charged with murder based on evidence of the tape, his presence in the area, and his fingerprint at Gonzalezs residence. When questioned by police, Mr. Manton answered affirmatively that he had represented Black in the past, had spoken with him in the past two weeks, and was not regretful that Gonzalez was dead. When informed of the existence of the tape, Mr. Manton refused to answer any further questions and requested an attorney. The State of Georgia would like to convict Mr. Manton of the highest murder charge possible and take this opportunity to send a message to the public that citizens are not permitted to take justice into their own hands. QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Under Georgia criminal law, did Black commit felony-murder when he shot and killed Gonzalez at Gonzalezs residence? II. Under Georgia criminal law, was Mr. Manton a party to the commission of the felony-murder of Gonzalez when he sent Black to even the score and to put a stop to Gonzalezs harassing of Mrs. Manton? BRIEF ANSWERS I. Yes. Black committed felony-murder because, regardless of intent, Black caused the death of Gonzalez during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, aggravated assault. II. Yes. Mr. Manton is a party to the commission of the felony-murder because his conduct under the circumstances, his prior relationship and knowledge of Blacks capacities, and Blacks

statements as to Mr. Mantons involvement proves he advised and encouraged Black to kill Gonzalez. DISCUSSION The issue here is whether Mr. Manton is guilty as a party to Gonzalezs felony-murder. First, a person commits the offense of felony-murder when, in the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice. Ga. Code Ann. 16-5-1(c) (2007). In the prosecution of felony-murder, aggravated assault is an inherently dangerous underlying felony to support a conviction. Baker v. State, 225 S.E.2d 269, 270 (Ga. 1976). Second, if a person does not commit the act of felony-murder he can still be held criminally liable as a party to the crime. Ga. Code Ann. 16-2-20(a) (2007). A person is a party in the commission of the crime if he intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels or procures another in the commission of the crime. Id. 16-2-20(b)(4). Therefore, to find Mr. Manton guilty of felony-murder, the prosecution must prove Black caused the death of Gonzalez while in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. Also, the prosecution must prove Mr. Manton intentionally advised or encouraged Black in the commission of the felony-murder. Based on the applicable law, Mr. Manton is guilty as a party to felony-murder. I. Felony-murder. First, the prosecution must prove Black caused the death of Gonzalez. Death as a result of gunshot wounds is sufficient to prove the cause of death in a felony-murder prosecution. Rachel v. State, 274 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. 1981). In Rachel, an armed robbery took place and the defendant shot and killed the victim. Id. The court held it was sufficient to prove the cause of death due to the gunshot wounds. Id. at 477.

Similarly, both Rachel and Black caused the death of other people by shooting and killing them. The police found Gonzalez in a pool of blood, Blacks fingerprint inside Gonzalezs residence and an audiotape that included a conversation between Black and Gonzalez that ended with a gunshot. Therefore, the court will find Black caused the death of Gonzalez when he killed him with the gunshot. Second, the prosecution must prove Black caused the death of Gonzalez while in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. A person commits aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon which is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. 16-5-21(a)(2). Aggravated assault is an inherently dangerous underlying felony sufficient to support a conviction of felony-murder. Baker, 225 S.E.2d at 270. In Baker, the victim went to the defendants residence to collect an unpaid debt. Id. The defendant, unprovoked, fired a gunshot with the intent to frighten but in actuality struck and killed the victim. Id. Even if the defendant only meant to frighten him, the gunshot resulted in an aggravated assault and, therefore, was used in the prosecution of felony-murder. Id. The court affirmed the conviction of felony-murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated assault. Id. at 272. Like Baker, Black committed aggravated assault. Black initiated the contact and went to Gonzalezs home to stop Gonzalez from harassing Mrs. Manton. Then, Black, like Baker, fired a gunshot that actually resulted in the death of Gonzalez. While Blacks intentions were unclear, the audiotape indicates he had a conversation with Gonzalez and fired an unprovoked gunshot that was likely to cause serious bodily harm. Like Baker, for purposes of felony-murder, Blacks commission of aggravated assault was an inherently dangerous felony and sufficient in felonymurder prosecution. Thus, the court will find that Black caused the death of Gonzalez while in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony.

II. Party to the commission of the crime. The prosecution must prove that Mr. Manton intentionally advised and encouraged Black in the commission of the crime. A person may be charged with and convicted of the crime, if he intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels or procures another in the commission the crime. Gambrel v. State, 391 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ga. 1990) (citing 16-20-2(b)(4)). Common criminal intent with the actor is necessary and may be inferred by ones presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. Garcia v. State, 658 S.E.2d 904, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). In Gambrel, for example, the defendant, who was not present during the crime, was convicted after the court found that she advised and encouraged another to kill her husband. Gambrel, 391 S.E.2d at 408. The defendant, using her companionship with the perpetrator, threatened to end their intimate relationship if he didnt kill her abusive husband. Id. Following the murder, the perpetrator testified as to the defendants involvement and had a taped conversation with the defendant discussing her involvement. Id. Before and after the crime, the killer and the defendant remained in contact with one another. Id. Also, witnesses testified that they overheard statements by the defendant indicating a lack of care to see her husband alive. Id. Based on these facts, the court found the defendant intentionally advised and encouraged another in the malice murder. Id. at 409. Like Gambrel, Mr. Manton intentionally advised and encouraged Black in the murder of Gonzalez notwithstanding his absence during the crime. Before the crime, Mr. Manton, exhibited his companionship with the actor by contacting Black when police efforts were unsuccessful in preventing Gonzalez from harassing his wife. Likewise, Mr. Manton advised Black of the situation between Mrs. Manton and Gonzalez and used their prior relationship

history to encourage Black. Like Gambrel, Mr. Manton knew Black would commit the act to even the score between them. Next, Blacks statement to Gonzalez that he was sent by Mr. Manton to stop the hassling [of] his old lady whatever it takes and that was what he intended to do confirms Mr. Manton encouraged Black to commit the act. Like Gambrel, Mr. Manton maintained contact with Black after Blacks arrest. Later, when questioned regarding his involvement, Mr. Manton, like Gambrel, openly stated that he was not disappointed by the death of Gonzalez. Finally, when Mr. Manton was informed of the tape, he further illustrated a common criminal intent when he declined further questions. Therefore, based on these facts, the court will find Mr. Manton intentionally advised and encouraged Black in the commission of the crime. Mr. Manton may argue his involvement was simply approval of the actions of Black. Mere approval, however, is not sufficient to convict one of being a party to a crime. Garcia, 658 S.E.2d at 907 (citing Hill, 642 S.E.2d at 66). While Georgia courts have continually examined this defense, it is rarely successful. In any event, Mr. Mantons actions went beyond approval of the act. His companionship and contact with Black before and after the incident, along with Blacks statement that Mr. Manton sent him to Gonzalezs residence to stop the harassing of Mrs. Manton demonstrated a common criminal intent and consisted of actions beyond mere approval. Also, Mr. Mantons dissatisfaction with police efforts in protecting Mrs. Manton, his unsympathetic conduct when discussing the death of Gonzalez and his refusal to answer any further questions following his knowledge of the audiotape further indicated a common criminal intent. Therefore, Mr. Manton will be unsuccessful in this defense. As a policy consideration, Mr. Manton should not be allowed to distribute justice as he sees fit. Even if one is reasonably justified in the eyes of the public, social costs are created

when vigilantes undermine the constancy and authority of the criminal justice system. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, then there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Here, Gonzalez did nothing illegal and was aware of the polices presence. However, Mr. Manton, a seasoned criminal attorney, took the law into his own hands by advising and encouraging Black to put a stop to Gonzalezs actions. To allow Mr. Manton to engage in such vigilantism would emasculate the criminal justice system, inhibit societal growth, and foster a civilization of vigilante justice. Therefore, in an effort to further the confidence and goals of public order and impartiality, courts should not allow such vigilantism as exhibited by Mr. Manton in the community. CONCLUSION Based on Blacks fingerprints at the crime scene, his presence in the area, and the tape recordings of his conversations with Gonzalez at the scene of the crime, the court will find Black committed felony-murder when he shot and caused the death of Gonzalez while committing an inherently dangerous felony, aggravated assault. Additionally, the court will find Mr. Manton intentionally advised and encouraged Black in the commission of the crime based on his prior relationship with Black, his contacting of Black before and after the commission of the crime, Blacks statements of being sent by Mr. Manton, and Mr. Mantons conduct following the commission of the crime. Therefore, Mr. Manton should be found guilty as a party to felonymurder because he intentionally advised and encouraged Black in the felony-murder of Gonzalez.