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The Second FronT

1943-1944

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk

Romaniuk, Scott Nicholas THe second fronT, 1943-1944 Copyright 2010 Scott Nicholas Romaniuk All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the author and publisher. Published by: Scott Nicholas Romaniuk ISBN 978-1-897544-04-4

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AcknowledgemenTS
No aspect of the history of Allied operations during the Second World War in Europe is more controversial than the Normandy landings. Even prior to the cessation of the greatest conflagration in the history of human warfare, a passionate debate was unleashed about the timing and execution of the second front, which continues to reverberate today. Historians and scholars alike have since applied an intensely flickering intellectual candle to the debate. This tempest of historicity inspired me to produce a succinct but powerful account of the Allies invasion of Europe, which emphasizes the logistical perspective from both the Allied and German points of view. The events of the Second World War do not defy explanation in conventional military terms. High casualty rates were an inevitable concomitant to the resistance of Nazism and the defence of the Third Reich in every sense. Many of the Allies peripheral operations during their approach to the invasion were harbingers of darker things to come. Remaining actively malign was part of a systematic, though disquieting, lead-up to 6 June 1944. The beleaguered remnants of the Allied forces left the continent four years earlier, and returned to a war of unexampled ferocity. Though many historians deny the Allies inability to strike at the heart of Hitlers empire at will, readers will be struck by the parallels to be drawn between the planning of D-Day and the broader events within the European theatre of war. This work could not have been completed without the assistance of a great many people who have been a pillar of support throughout the entire process. First among those who deserve my gratitude is Dr. Daniel Byers, whose steady guidance over the years has helped this work become a reality. I thank him for his time and patience. He has spent innumerable hours editing, guiding, advising, encouraging, and motivating,

for which I am greatly appreciative. I am particularly grateful to Drs. Scot Robertson and Per Rudling for the guidance they gave me in navigating my way through the literature of warfare and history of the Second World War in Europe. They extended to me their interminable knowledge and dedication to the critical review of my research and writing. I am also indebted to the archivists and personnel in the various institutions where the research for this book was carried-out. Many thanks to the University of Alberta and to McGill University, the State of Baden-Wrttemberg, the Library for Contemporary History in Stuttgart, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, and the German Federal Military Archive in Freiburg. I am certainly grateful to have studied alongside a supportive group of peers during my studies at home and abroad. I wish to express my appreciation to Dale Youngman of PageMaster Publication Services Inc., my friends, and to my family for their encouragement during my studies. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk 2009

Foreword
As a former professor of Scotts, I am happy to write a foreword in support of his present book. Scott is one of those people who are a joy to teach - he was always a very keen student, especially when it came to studying any topic related to war, military affairs, or international relations. His passion for his subject is obvious in the pages that follow, which have grown out of a number of years of work that draws together his various interests. The beginning student in particular should find this book to be a useful introduction to the various issues that influenced Allied decisionmaking regarding the June 6, 1944 invasion of Normandy. Scott observes events from the perspective of German as well as Allied strategists, and provides a thorough overview of the many specific factors that shaped the actual preparations for D-Day on both sides. He also pays attention not just to the traditional concerns of western historians, but the implications of Germanys ongoing war with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe for military planners. The result is a study that intricately sets the D-Day invasion into its larger context, and should be a useful addition to the libraries of readers interested in learning more about the background to one of the greatest military events in history. Daniel Byers, Ph.D. Assistant Professor of History, Laurentian University at Georgian College B.A. Program, Barrie, Ontario, Canada 2009

PreFAce
Operation Overlord was the Allies master stroke against the parapets of Festung Europa. What the Allies began planning in late 1941, initially projecting to relieve pressure on the Red Army, sought to re-establish their military presence in Europe for the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany. Crossing the English Channel therefore became the precursor for Allied victory in Western Europe. Conceptualization of this mission was not simple at any rate and its planners faced what seemed to be illimitable obstacles at nearly every turn. While addressing the fact that many elements were vital for the induction of D-Day, it is necessary to make clear that the frontier of this books analysis is controlled by the degree to which such elements relate overall to the grand picture of Allied strategy and deliberation over the campaign. This may seem obvious, but in certain cases, obscure branches of the war have been observed and recounted for the purpose of increased topic profundity, but again, this has been done through careful restriction. Limiting my study to select cases of the war has created what may be perceived as naturally occurring gaps in my investigation and subsequent polemic account. My aim was to focus predominantly on two aspects of military operations: those of logistics and strategy. I agree with scholars that imperial notions resonated in the planning of and preoperations strategy of Overlord, but hold that peripheral action undertaken by the Allies was pivotal for the orchestration of such delicate affairs as those dealt with in the following chapters. There is always something to be gained through the decline of rather banal reasons or superficial pretexts why certain decisions were made throughout history and the Second World War delivers no exception. Italy proved to be quite a significant point of contention during Allied deliberation and collaboration in this military business. On the one hand, amassing joint-ops expertise was be-

The Second Front

yond value for what was to follow, especially in multi-national concerted action. On the other hand, it consumed a large portion of the Allies timetable and delivered very little territory into Allied hands in lieu of their struggle and the commitment of force arguably went far beyond the return. The availability of essential men and matriel to continue any offensive inland unabated was the pivotal component that dictated against the Allies capacity to invade prior to 1944 and was uppermost in Allied minds from the very beginning but as a harbinger of Allied inability it has often been rejected by historians. In examining and measuring the risks and rewards of the Allies undertaking the Second Front in 1944, I attempt to reveal with the best possible line of reasoning the peril of an Allied invasion in 1943. I provide a history not merely of a logistical perspective on planning the Second Front but of the many intricate dimensions that influenced Allied planning during the Second World War as a whole. That is, beyond the impediment presented by a shortage of manpower, the overall currents of the war in Europe and the politico-military relationships were actors that dictated the success of Overlord. Waging strategic war was not a new concept by the time World War II slammed the Continent, but orchestrating coalition warfare in a way that embroiled all three major elements of the military in a symbiotic relationship was certainly unfamiliar territory for all participants in the conflict - especially in an era when military technology had developed beyond its ability to be tested in true battle. The Allied forces were not unaware of the imbalance of power that existed in the early years of the war, and certainly they remained aware of their weaknesses up until the cessation of hostilities. In every way, operating in parity was the core of conditions for the formulation of Allied strategy. All of the previously mentioned details present a complex package that requires close examination. Accordingly, detailed

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quantitative and qualitative assessments have been made on respective resource availability for the Western Allies and Germany during both 1943 and 1944 while taking into account the evolution of the Allied and German armies over the course of the war. A focus has also been made on the prevailing factors that governed the timing and location of this foray, which military scholars and historians continue to debate today. History, it has been observed, possesses truth that remains hidden amid ultimate parable and foreseeable ambiguity. Given that persistent study within this discipline routinely turns out more uncertainty than clarity and maybe even truth, it remains perhaps one of the most onerous fields of work in which one could engage. It is my sincere hope that this book reflects my respect for history as a discipline and of it, meritorious authors and historians past and present. A great number of colleagues, friends, professors as well as casual acquaintances have played a role, both large and small, in the final form of my work and it is for this single reason that wish to extend my gratitude to all of them, for the content of this book is the product of a combined effort. Emerging from an article that I had begun writing during my undergraduate career as a student of history, I had begun my planning and research for this book while embracing my studies in Germany. I continued its composition during the remainder of my degree in Canada, while simultaneously attempting to pursue many other interests within as well as external to academia. Originally I conceived the idea of the original article as appropriate homage to the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day and to those who fought so adamantly whether with guns or tools, at the front or in the factories, on either side of Europe against the ideological apparatus of Nazi Germany. The momentous occasion seemed to be the perfect time to re-examine the largest coalition operation that has ever been undertaken in military history; although the United States, United

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Kingdom and Canada comprised its principle participants and while the primary Allied formations that saw combat in Normandy came from these three countries, they were certainly not alone. In the eyes of German and Allied soldiers alike, the campaign in Normandy, like those of Italy and Africa, were represented by the determination and spirit of the collective forces involved. It is through this magnificent historical representation of a united front that I feel it not only appropriate but absolutely necessary to recognize that Free French, Polish, Belgians, Czechoslovakians, Greeks, Dutch and Norwegians also participated in the many battles of Normandy. The sheer scale of operational, logistical and strategic planning that was invested into the preliminary planning while concurrently maintaining the fight against the Axis powers in multiple theatres of war in Europe intrigued me above all else. D-Day was no simple operation. Likewise it was no single operation. Overlord was part of a broad strategy, relying on the successful conclusion of preliminary campaigns that brought courageous young men from the crescent bays of Morocco, through the canyons of the Apennine spine and all the way to the fretted coasts of France. Setting aside the items that were vitally important to the success of an amphibious invasion of France, across some rather portentous waters of Europe, and while feeding the insatiable appetite of military fronts the world over, was an issue that lingered in mind throughout my research and as I articulated my assertions in the following pages. It may seem peculiar that while my family is of Ukrainian background, I grew up learning German and French; only as of late, have I unearthed the time and energy to tackle Ukrainian and Russian. The history of World War II, like the study of modern languages, has been a mainstay in my life, and I expect that it will continue as such for the remainder of it. I have devoted most of my adolescent years to the reading, studying, examining and

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pondering of the many discreet and indiscreet facets of the Second World War in Europe as well as the Pacific, yet my natural inclination was always to approach the general conflict from the Allied point of view. Believing that no more value should be afforded to the Allied position than should be proffered to Germany and her allies, and since war is never one-dimensional, my approach to this subject has thus not been influenced by anything more than this single enlargement. Without the co-operation within the United Nations, Overlord would certainly not have been possible. This contention will always be genuine and sound in my mind. Nevertheless, it is my estimation that without the sacrifices made by innumerable men and women of diverse ethnic origin in the Soviet Union, our Western efforts would have been utterly fruitless. Soviet strength and fortitude against the military might of Nazi Germany reflected on the Allies; upon my own volition, I extend my gratitude to the men and women of the former Soviet Republics for their indestructible courage and for their pivotal role in our shared victory and esteemed freedom. This book attempts to set out the record of the Allied planning of D-Day by providing both description and explanation of events that form the basis of a second front in North-West Europe. Although no single book could provide absolute coverage and explanation of any chapter of history, my hope is that this view of the second front will describe the military and political encounters that profoundly sculpted Overlord, and produce some new perspectives of its formative events and the conditions that dictated its execution and early success. While this book attempts to cover the major facets of this extensive military movement, it does not present a complete history of the Allied Second Front by any stretch. Originally intending to provide a supplementary resource to ongoing dialogue, as well as diverse studies centering on this particular historical event, the

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various sections of this book have ultimately escaped my initial intention for their self-containment. I have thus set Overlord and its expedients soundly within the broader strategic framework of the war in Europe and slightly further abroad. This framework, however, defines no clear boundary on its own. Deciding where to limit my analysis was difficult, since countless elements were indicative of either Allied success or failure, it would be nearly impossible to fit them all into a single book. The dominant problem in tackling this specific topic, as is the case with many in the history of the Second World War, is the sheer scope of literature that has since become available. Given this seemingly boundless abyss of accessible literature, I found it tricky and at times quite awkward to ascertain which issues ultimately affected the planning of the Allied second front in unique ways. My central argument has been carefully referenced with a diverse mixture of events from the outset of the war in Europe. With circumspect, I chose to include terms that are and were of impending importance to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as well as those eminent elements that plagued the echelons of OKW and the war effort until what Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel termed the longest day. This book is divided into three parts, the first offering an account of German military power and Allied strategic resource availability through an examination of the military transition that had taken place in Europe early in the war, the second providing an analysis of steps that attempted to foretell the probability of success for an invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe while following the most significant changes in the combatants strategic posture. The final chapters of this book serve as a countdown, following through advanced phases of D-Day preparation and address a number of basic but critical variables prior to the Allies storming the beaches of Normandy. Through nearly every step of my research and writing, my

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intention was never to compile a text book per se, but rather a work that would find its appeal in the hearts of those who have a passion for the field of history, and those who wish to pursue military history in academia or of their own leisurely accord. At the same time however, my belief is that this book is suitable for professors at the University level teaching courses or directing seminars on twentieth Century warfare, World War II or War and Society in the Modern World. Having appreciably based my research on original documentation, I spent many unsociable hours poring over German military archives, war diaries and what seemed to me at the time to be illimitable correspondence in English, French, German and Dutch. But a large portion of my investigation involved secondary works as well and provided many hours of sheer enjoyment, entertainment and fulfillment. Above all, I wanted to revisit this event sixty years past and explain the delicate nature of conception and progression, not with a contumacious attitude or with negative repose, but simply to reflect and exhibit not only my interpretations but such events as seen through the eyes of senior commanders on the timing of this grandiose military undertaking for what it simply was: a spectacular feat

conTenTS
Introduction Embattled Europe Allusion of Victory A Calculated Strategy Trial and Error Epochal Campaigns Distant Shores Girding the Initiative Strategic Overtures Countdown to Victory Along the Channel A Paralyzing Ordeal Hitlers Vainglorious Citadel Triumphant Tide Appendices Comment on Sources Chronology Diagrams Principle Persons Glossary Maps Index 212 214 228 229 235 241 242 149 158 163 183 87 102 122 19 49 62 1

Winston Churchill
6 June 1944

What a plan! This vast operation is undoubtedly the most complicated and difficult that has ever taken place.

Adolf Hitler

3 November 1943

In the East, the vastness of space will permit a loss of territory without suffering a mortal blow to Germanys chance for survival. Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time.

Joseph Stalin
12 October 1942

[What place does the possibility of a second front occupy in the Soviet estimates of the current situation?] A most important place; one might say a place of first rateimportance.

Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel


June 1944

Well have only one chance to stop the enemy and thats while hes in the water. Everything we have must be on the coast the first 24 hours of the invasion will be decisive. For the Allies as well as Germany, it will be the longest day.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower


6 June 1944

People of Western Europe: A landing was made this morning on the coast of France by troops of the Allied Expeditionary Force. This landing is part of the concerted United Nations plan for the liberation of Europe, made in conjunction with our great Russian allies I call upon all who love freedom to stand with us. Keep your faith staunch. Our arms are resolute. Together we shall achieve victory.

InTroducTIon
Sure, we want to go home. We want this war over with. The quickest way to get it over with is to go get the bastards who started it. The quicker they are whipped, the quicker we can go home. - General George S. Patton

ll at ease on the eve of Operation Overlord, General Dwight D. Eisenhower knew that the Allies were about to subject their armies, perhaps to an untenable situation in Normandy. Tension among Allied leaders ran at a high pitch in the weeks before thousands of men set sail for the coast opposite England. During a tense moment, Eisenhower stated probably no one who does not have to bear the specific and direct responsibility of making the final decision as to what to do can understand the intensity of these burdens.1 What Eisenhower and the Allies knew was nearly equal in force to that which they knew nothing about and could do deceptively little to influence. Obvious were the many thousands of hours of effort that had been devoted to the creation of fortified Europe; but less overt was the notion of how events would actually unfold come H-Hour, and if Operation Bowsprit would herald the eventual cancellation of Operation Overlord. One such component, never acting entirely as friend or foe, was the weather. For this was an element that no amount of planning, preparation or prediction could affect in any degree of realism. Within sixty years of the Allied assault into Basse Normandy, strategic development of the Overlord plan continues attracting
1 Robert H. Ferrell, The eisenhower diaries, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), 119 and 120.

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a great deal of military historians attention. Strategy shadowed by the Allies is criticized in a multiplicity of ways. Chief among these include the Allies committing to an engagement with the Wehrmacht in North-West Europe too late, an artificial deferral of obligations to the Soviet Union, prolongation of the war in Europe through the abandonment of a short-road policy for the defeat of Germany, and an effort to leverage the Allies politico-military posture in the post-war world. The aforesaid form the crux of many such diatribe. Predominantly, this discourse centers on the most acute question: would a combined Allied invasion of North-West Europe in 1943 have been a military success or would it have been a premature affair, devoid of necessary offensive strength that would have ultimately materialized as a strategic failure? On 6 March, JCS moved to accept the argument put forward by Eisenhower, making clear that they were in agreement with his overall opinion, If the war is to be won in Europe, land forces must be developed and trained which are capable of landing on the continent and advancing under the support of an overwhelming air force.2 From this point, Stephen Ambrose added, The United States now had a strategic solution to the problem of victory in World War II but what the Allies had, in realistic terms, was a strategic thought, a simple idea supported by little more than liquid courage and confidence to which substance was lent by the United States dormant industrial rump of the decade previous.3 The British had accepted both organization and thought on strategy with little reservation. With the first stepping stone laid, the Americans sought to convince the British of abandoning their general plan of simply
2 3 Robert H. Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), 119 and 120. Stephen E. Ambrose, The supreme commander: The War Years of General dwight d. eisenhower, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.), 34 and 35.

Introduction

closing the ring on Germany, and to adopt the strategy that General George C. Marshall was putting together instead. With comparatively much weight behind the new idea, would the course of the war deviate far from the vagueness of the British route? Why was the British plan so formless, the ensuing raids having been undertaken in relatively small terms and in a seemingly haphazard manner, or better yet, why was the American plan so large and so focused on pushing straight into Europe? The origins of this are closely tied to American political foresight. The forceful nature of the U.S. plan was indicative of American post-war interests and establishment of authority that escaped the nation after the First World War. The direct push against nazism would showcase American splendour, a remarkable exploit in the face of world events. Since the cessation of hostilities in Europe 8 May 1945, the primary realization on this specific facet of military history is that D-Day was certainly not a sure thing. Even before the invasion, it was not prescribed any degree of guaranteed success. Hours prior to droves of invasion fleets setting sail from southern England, fears echoed in the minds of those who planned the invasion. The risk was understood by no one person better than General Dwight D. Eisenhower. During the night of 5 June 1944, Eisenhower wrote out the text of the press release that he hoped he would never have to deliver. The note read:
Our landings have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.4

Military historians have approached this topic with differ4 Dr. David Stafford, What if D-Day had Failed? BBC News < http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3732417.stm>

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ing sentiment and the Second Front thus remains a point of military controversy. In his account of the Second World War, Basil Liddell Hart endorses the notion that any endeavour by the British Chiefs of Staff to cross the Channel in 1943 would have ended in disaster in which their estimation will hardly by questioned in historical retrospect.5 Generals and historians have devoted little attention to the many diverse dimensions of preparation that the Allies undertook to prime their armies for the coming invasion of France, leaving many to believe that D-Day represents a specific point in history. Indeed, the joint venture was a precise point in time in which Allied forces attempted to punch a gap in German defences of the Atlantic Wall; yet D-Day as an intricate component of the war could not have existed without years of historical framework. For this reason, it is impossible to discuss the success or failure of D-Day without expanding ones basis of analysis from days, to months to even years leading-up to H-Hour. When in the middle of March, the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, D.C., deliberated over a study that needed to be made on specific landing measures, a concrete pillar to that very history was driven deep into the ground. It was not the only pillar to be laid and it was also not the earliest. Who were the principle persons laying these pillars, building the foundation and comingup with strategic formulation? In the beginning, the plan was being laid-out by arm-chair generals. In normandy to the Baltic, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery wrote inconsequentially on the matter insomuch that his focus of several pages measures rather significantly in comparison to generals, commanders and numerous officers of the Normandy campaign who did not remark on the subject of pre-invasion preparation and strategy at all. His position is thus,
5 John Grigg, 1943: The Victory that never Was, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980), 121.

Introduction

rather distant from the battle-front. His thinking and conceptual need was also rather disconnected. Surprisingly, to an extraordinary degree, this issue has not been deeply scrutinized as other aspects as the Second World War have. Even as many notable historians and authors have invariably established unique opinions on this issue within the historical field, only recently have studies of Allied strategy and army preparation figured markedly in the field. David French, author of Invading europe: The British Army and its Preparations for the normandy campaign, 1942-44 observes that many historians are breaking new ground in analyzing the measures taken by the Allies to prepare their forces for Overlord. Canadian historian J. A. English has recently made a microstudy on the Canadian units that were prescribed to Normandy. Carlo Deste and Roy Conyers Nesbit, who have also adopted a greater circumference of interpretation of American, British and Canadian military traction toward a realistic plan for the invasion of Europe, also depict essential, but often over-looked dimensions of this matter. Contemplating the intensity of the battles of Normandy, Stephen E. Ambrose posthumously fuels the growth of information and insight of Overlord: drawing on the personal account of more than 1,400 ordinary German, British, French, Canadian and American soldiers from it in d-day, June 6, 1944: The climactic Battle of World War II, he grasps the hidden nature of this trial by battle; while John Keegan invariably remains one of the foremost authorities on the history or warfare in general. Producing books that include battle-by-battle coverage of conflict, Keegan has contributed significantly to the historiography in modern warfare and themes in World War II and Operation Overlord is certainly no exception. On one side of Europe and the Atlantic Ocean, the attitude toward the Second Front was amiable but the other side of Europe

The Second Front

rested a future adversary of the Western Alliance. Marked with histories of hostility and even bloodshed with the West, Soviet Russia was less amiable at nearly every step of developmental planning. Conventional opinion within the Soviet Union has always followed Communist Party doctrine as a design for enhancing anti-Western pose, defending the contemptuous view that the motive of the British and Americans was to facilitate blood-letting of Soviet military strength within the Russo-German theatre of war. That the Allies lethargically prepared for an invasion whilst truly conserving their military and economic resources to establish post-war dominance within Europe by way of filling the subsequent power vacancy that at the time was expected after the defeat of Nazi Germany is a standpoint that mainstream opinion within the U.S.S.R. had typically assumed. In russia at War, Alexander Werth recalls the general sentiments of the typical Soviet citizen as he observed during his 1942 visits to Karelia:
[Churchill was] ...an old enemy of the Soviet Union [and the] Soviets considered themselves lucky at the very least that Churchill did not choose to side with Hitler.6

The majority of Soviets doubted whether there would be a Second Front for a very long time, or at all, as long as Churchill was in power.7 This cold sentiment remained and hampered relations between the two camps. Werth alleges that both Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt were eager to avoid the creation of a large front in North-West Europe while George F. Kennan contends in russia and the West under Lenin and stalin that Roosevelt possessed an eagerness for the Second Front based on the desire to placate Stalin, reconciling him to the deferment of discussing the issues of territory in
6 7 Alexander Werth, russia at War 1941-1945, (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1964), 368. Ibid.

Introduction

Eastern Europe until the time when the final peace conference would provide an opportunity for further engagement.8 The most significant attitude was brewing in the East. The West, viewed as sitting idly by dispassionately while the Soviet Union absorbed almost the entire impact of the German war machine, was incapable of practicable military performance on a scale large enough to curb these sorts of feelings. They were convincing the East through inaction that they were looking to the post-war world and simply sought an upper-hand in post-war territorial negotiations and the political carving of Europe after German capitulation.9 That the Western Allies were simply interested in the deterioration of Soviet military power is a rather curious line of argument to espouse, particularly since the need for a multi-front war was fully recognized by the Allied powers. Roosevelt understood how the process of two-front war could and would reduce German military strength to a point where the outcome would be simple and obvious. So too was the basic concept and military arithmetic appreciated by Marshall, Eisenhower and Churchill in this very nature. To posit that many politicians in the Soviet Union were becoming increasingly disapprovative of the West for the consistent lethargy and inertia of their armies since the German invasion of the Soviet Union would be an accurate conjecture. Indeed, many months passed as German molestation of the Soviet Union had taken place. Yet even during the grim summer of 1940, Britain understood the importance of expanding the war as much as possible despite the generality of the British strategy of basically tightening the ring around Germany, there were necessary steps to follow and simultaneous expansion was just another mechanism.
8 9 George F. Kennan, russia and the West under Lenin and stalin, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 358. Ibid.

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Building sympathy by way of the other side of the coin is a uphill battle indeed, since ultimately casualty rates for the Soviet Union soared in comparison to the deaths experienced in the West. When dozens of deaths during the London Blitz were received with shock, what sort of impact Soviet casualty rates would have on the general public of Britain is an interesting notion to countenance. Failure to mount a front in full force outside of the Mediterranean Theatre was not acceptable to the highest levels of strategic command within the Allied camp according to Stephen E. Ambrose in d-day: The climactic Battle of World War II.10 The fact that the United States and Great Britain could have remained militarily inert while the Soviet Union defeated the German Army in 1943 and 1944 is a sentiment that he sharply opposed given that failure to ultimately mount another front would have been viewed by the U.S.S.R. as a blatant double-cross.11 Ambrose explains that a betrayal of the Soviet Union through the failure to launch a second front might lead to a separate Nazi-Soviet treaty, or even the possibility of Red Army liberation and post-war occupation of Western Europe.12 Since the Allies were still able to think in like terms to that of the paranoid mind of Stalin, plans were set in motion in the event that this had occurred. Ideals affixed with Churchills opposition to an early invasion of the continent deliver a definitive statement on Allied plans to seek alternative routes to re-enter Nazi occupied Europe. Wiliam R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister evoke in The Twentiethcentury World that two considerations ultimately brought the

10 11 12

Stephen E. Ambrose, d-day: The climactic Battle of World War II, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 40. Ibid. Ibid., 368.

Introduction

British Prime Minister and the American President to oppose an early landing in North-West Europe.13 The first was borne in sensible concern: [1] insufficient availability of landing-craft of a variety of types required for the safe deliverance of Allied men and equipment, [2] U-Boat threat of the North Atlantic, which was likened to the trench warfare of the First World War only at sea; [3] fortified German divisions along the Channel coast.14 This multi-faceted perspective incorporates elements that are logistical, tactical and strategic in nature. They are broad, but the main elements that dictated the success of failure of Overlord. With these in mind, they attempt to consider the broader picture, elucidating to the need of avoiding the divisions of variables in the deliberation of the busting back into Europe. Keylor and Bannister, commenting on the spectre of British defeat at Gallipoli in 1915, diversify their perspective, and for this reason, Churchill remained conscientious of the like fate of a premature, under-manned invasions carried-out by ill-equipped soldiers in lieu of the fact that Churchill was blamed for the Gallipoli failure in 1915 while acting as first lord of the Admiralty.15 Funds and supplies will be critical for the success of any military operation regardless of the scale and the period of time involved. In todays military world and in tomorrows as much as the case has been in the distant past, victory cannot be bought. Victory is for the most part, a wishful nostalgia that constantly demands determination, dedication and endurance, while parading as something rather easily attainable at times, is deceptively elusive. This is the very thought that ran through Eisenhowers mind when he visited the War Department in early 1942. Invasion was only the first step in a series of balancing acts to support and con13 14 15 William R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister, The Twentieth-century World: An International History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 157. Ibid. Ibid.

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stantly supply the combat units of the Allied invasion force, as it would eventually push its way inland from once it had established itself in the lodgement area. Roosevelt made a sensible decision in response to the problem presented to him over which theatre to commit the next several years of force build-up to. The scales were tipped in favour of Operation Bolero as oppose to the traffic of American forces to Australia. Admiral King had none-the-less fought for the U.S. Navy to receive the attention of the President and the forces that he could supply it with saying, important as the mounting of [Operation] Bolero may be, the Pacific problem is no less so, and is certainly the more urgent it must be faced now. Generals and commanding staff were bound to the decision of their President and Prime Minister, but both were bound to the will of a far greater power, that of the general citizenry of the United States and of Great Britain. Here, though, was an indication that choices were made in part by the general population living in the United States. Roosevelts position was a precarious one since the U.S. immediate enemy was made clear by a little over 200 planes in the first week of December. This was where America had entered the war, but to enter it in foot-dragging fashion would have been a difficult policy to pass-by and have approved by the American people. Therefore a decision needed be reached and quickly. Speed was given to the decision while attention was given to Europe but not the Pacific. The second consideration that saw Churchill and Roosevelt oppose an untimely landing in North-West Europe according to Keylor and Bannister rest in the Churchills conviction that the North African coast was a far more inviting alternative to an invasion of France. North Africas coastline, for the most part, was relatively lightly defended and would serve as a mechanism for a

Introduction

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subsequent invasion of the Italian mainland.16 Africas coast provided a variety of attractive opportunities for Allied exploitation but at the same time the theatre prescribed an over abundance of obstacles that no amount of conceptual planning could mitigate. Two predominant points of view should be adopted with respect to Allied movement in the Western Mediterranean. First, the invasion of North Africa served as a model for success since all went well for Allied planners; Operation Torch was a success story on a small scale that was thence applied to France, albeit much later in the war. Second, considering that experience accrued from military training and the experience bequeathed on an army through actual combat is finely demarcated, British and American forces participating in Torch would show that home-land training did not always accord with live combat; divisions that returned home from the Mediterranean theatre were composed of nothing less than battle-hardened veterans. Prior to the instigation of disagreement over the Allied Second Front, fighting during the Second World War progressed, death tolls soared as the war in the European theatre climaxed and the largest invasion in the history of warfare drew near. Eisenhower made clear the situation that Allied soldiers would face when they returned to the continent in a statement that preceded the amphibious landings:
You [Allied coalition forces] will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world. Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped, and battle-hardened. He [the German soldier] will fight savagely... The free men of the world are marching together to victory. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than
16 William R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister, The Twentieth-century World: An International History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 157.

12

The Second Front full victory. Good luck, and let us all beseech the blessings of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking. - General Dwight D. Eisenhower17

On 6 June 1944 Normandy became the most important theatre of the Second World War. Overlord had become the Allies principle campaign and the soldiers of the Allied coalition against Nazi Germany fought vigorously in opening the long awaited Second Front in Europe.18 By the end of the day, a delicate toehold was established in Western France with 156,000 American, British and Canadian troops, as the forerunner to an army that eventually grew to roughly two million men. The few kilometres of beach that were seized on the first day represented the first step in the liberation of Paris and the eventual Allied crossing of the Rhine. This was achieved by way of a marvellously executed coalition operation amid littoral conditions that was the beginning of the end of German military dominance in Western Europe. As the end-game began, Axis leadership could only act to postpone what appeared to be an inevitable defeat. Operation Overlord and its expedients were the result of meticulous deliberation and collaboration between the chief nations of the Allies that were directly involved in Overlords execution: Great Britain and the United States. Through a successive series of German and Italian military defeats from the turn of 1943, the Allies had the opportunity to ascend as the dominant force in the European and peripheral theatres. Since Germanys colossal invasion of the Soviet Union 22 June 1941 the need of opening another front in Europe was stressed by Joseph Stalin in order to siphon German units away from the Eastern Front and
17 18 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 6 June 1944, embarkation speech on the morning of the D-Day order. Operation Roundup refers specifically to an Allied invasion of mainland Europe to take place at some point during 1943 where as Operation Neptune and Operation Overlord identify with the invasion of France projected for May-June 1944.

Introduction

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alleviate pressure that Hitlers campaign was placing on the Red Army. Soviet Russias alliance with the Western Allies may be characterized as a precarious partnership at best and having many implications on Churchill and Roosevelts decision to assume a direct strategy against Germany as well as their decision to re-enter Europe. Deluged by sudden war, tension resounded in the politicomilitary relations, fostering subsequent hostility and suspicion on both ends of the partnership. Extreme logistical and strategic limitations impeded the United States and Britains capacity to pursue a direct strategy against Germany in 1943. Achievement of victory seemed possible only through projecting a 1944 invasion of Western Europe. As a result, 1943 was utilized as a year for peripheral drills to aid the success of Overlord. Friction between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union heightened as a result of this adaptation and repeated postponements of the Second Front. Returning to Europe in 1943 presented the Allies with substantial risks in contrast to the date effected in 1944; in making an account of the risks and rewards of creating the Second Front it is essential to examine several main facets of the war in Europe. From the fall of France in June 1940, German military strength steadily grew. National Socialist muscle stood at the pinnacle of military achievement by the early stages of Barbarossa. Slowly, the German military position in the Soviet Union receded as the war in Eastern Europe unfolded and yet despite these unfolding events, Germany retained a capacity to wage a potent offensive war against both the Allies and the Soviets on two fronts until the late summer of 1943. A cross-analysis between 1943 and 1944 German military and strategic effectiveness depicts the degree to which Germany was capable of continuing the war on all fronts. It stresses how the possible application of military strength from one front to another

14

The Second Front

posed a real threat to an Allied landing in 1943, creating the confines for the Allied offensive-defensive trade-off. Establishment of Allied air and naval supremacy was another vital factor influencing the inception of a substantial lodgement ahead regardless of when it was to commence. Air-power potential was firmly proven at the very beginning of the war in Europe in 1939. Likewise, the necessity of naval supremacy for a successful amphibious manoeuvre was demonstrated beyond reservation soon after. The need for SHAEF to assert aerial and naval dominance in Europe and over the area directly concerning the point of invasion became a critical proviso in returning to the continent. Investigating Allied pre-ops in the European periphery preliminary offensives undertaken in late 1942 through 1943 and the beginning of 1944 illustrates how such moves acted as stepping stones that laid foundation for Overlords eventual laurel. In order to concentrate on the issue of the Second Front while directly relating to Allied strategic planning, this book defers the issue of partisan actions, including Balkan partisan forces in Yugoslavia led by Josep Broz-Tito, forces franais de LIntrieur [Maquis] activity as well as the impact of partisan forces operating behind German lines in the Soviet Union or elsewhere among the many countries under German administration in occupied Europe. Attending to all levels of conflict in the engagement of any historical domain, while avoiding arbitration between intra-national differences of attitude and perspective, is always a rather pernicious challenge for historians. Accepting the recognition of the complexity of nation-specific interpretations and paying particular attention to the various power relations that are involved in the broader spectrum of the conflict is critical. To this end, I am presenting a framework that allows one to focus on the topic with the hope of delineating matters that played

Introduction

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an integral role in the grandeur of orchestrating large-scale coalition warfare during the Second World War.

Map 1: Europe in 1939 Before the Storm

From concise Historical Atlas of World War 2 by Story, R (2005`) used by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

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