Court File Number: F/M/1/11 F/M/22/11

IN THE COURT OF QUEENS BENCH OF NEW BRUNSWICK TRIAL DIVISION JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FREDERICTON BETWEEN: ANDRE MURRAY Applicant, -andTHE NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION Respondent, _____________________________________________________________________ The Applicants Pre-Hearing Brief Rules of Court, Rule 38.06.1 For joint Hearing regarding Court File Number: F/M/1/11 and F/M/22/11 Filed by the Self Represented Applicant Andr Murray _____________________________________________________________________

Andr Murray The Applicant 31 Marshall Street, Fredericton, New Brunswick, E3A 4J8 Telephone Number: E-mail address:

andremurraynow@ gmail.com

Stewart McKelvey Barristers, Solicitors and Trademark Agents Suite 600 Frederick Square 77 Westmorland Street P.O. Box 730 Fredericton NB E3B 5B4 Direct Dial: 506.443.0125 Main Tel: 506.458.1970 Fax: 506.444.8974 Email: dlamont@smss.com Debora M. Lamont Solicitor for Respondent

The New Brunswick Police Commission / 435 King Street, Suite 202 / 435, Fredericton NB E3B 1E5 Tel.(506) 453-2632 Fax.(506) 457-3542

Debora M. Lamont

PART 1 INDEX
The Plaintiffs Pre-Hearing Brief {(1) Unless ordered otherwise, each party to an application shall prepare a pre-hearing brief containing}

PAGE A. PART I INDEX ____________________________________ii

B. PART II STATEMENT OF FACTS ___________________ 1

{(a) a succinct outline of the facts the party intends to establish,}

C. PART III - ISSUES ____________________________________ 6

{(b) a concise statement of the issues to be dealt with by the court,}

1. Questions for the Court to answer ________________________6

{(c) a concise statement of the principles of law on which the party relies and citation of relevant statutory provisions and leading authorities, and}

2. Introduction__________________________________________6 3.MAXIMS ____________________________________________8 4.Fraud _______________________________________________10 5.Fraudulent Representation _______________________________23 6.Granting Disclosure ____________________________________25 7.Security of property____________________________________37 8.Interpretation of Statutes________________________________53 9.Interpretation ________________________________________60 10.Closing_____________________________________________62 11.Should the Respondent pay costs of the within Motion?______65

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12.Cost Orders in favor of self-represented litigants____________65

D. PART VI ORDERS SOUGHT _______________________ 70

{(d) a concise statement of the relief sought by the party.}

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B. PART II STATEMENT OF FACTS {(a) a succinct outline of the facts the party intends to establish,} 1. Wednesday May 7, 2008, approximately 6 pm Andr Murray while leaving his residence and traveling by bicycle into the center of Fredericton City, the APPLICANT was intercepted by a single Police patrol car followed by a group of Police patrol cars; the occupants of which, members of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE proceeded to assault and arrest the APPLICANT.

2. The Preposterous position of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE regarding the May 7, 2008 incident obliged the APPLICANT to reasonably on September 27, 2010, apply pursuant to Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 for correspondence and other documents which may reveal other possible motivations for the outrageous behavior of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE as did occur May 7, 2008.

3. APPLICANT as above mentioned, having filed complaints with both New Brunswick Police Commission (File: 2110 C- 09- 09), and the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE regarding the above mentioned incident Wednesday May 7, 2008, involving inter alia the arrest, of APPLICANT, reasonably any subsequent investigations and results/conclusions determined thereof, must be made available for perusal by the APPLICANT and according to RTIPPA.

4. December 9, 2010, the APPLICANT did receive a reply correspondence from the NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION, which stated

NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION in spite of RTIPPA is declining to allow the APPLICANT full access to documents, currently in their possession, furthermore, this denial of access applies to specific material - an Appendix C which consists of the investigation report prepared by the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE and the copy provided to NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION. Please note NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION is prepared to provide only partial disclosure of the investigation report (2 pages of 48 pages).

5. NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION in spite of RTIPPA has confirmed both verbally and by written correspondence a refusal to allow the APPLICANT full access to documents in their possession, which are specific to this matter (in particular 48 pages) of Appendix C

6. January 13, 2011 NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION did make partially available the documents as requested by the APPLICANT of NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION File : 2110 C- 09- 09 further, designated NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION File: 2010 RTIPPA- 02.

7. Andr Murray (APPLICANT in this matter) subsequently reviewed the NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION File: (File: 2110 C- 09- 09 ) 2010 RTIPPA- 02, the subject investigation report summary and conclusion revealed that the cause of APPLICANTS Assault, Battery and Arrest was as a result of a obscured/hidden person having provided a report the following is an exact excerpt: Investigative Summary blacked out .., a blacked out has provided a statement that he

observed a male closely matching the description of a suspect in some type of crime, as a result he contacted the police station, and Cst. Debbie Stafford attended the area and attempted to stop and identify the individual.

8. March 5. 2009, daylight hours; APPLICANT having just finished shoveling the driveway to residential dwelling was again assaulted and arrested by the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE at 29 -31 Marshall Street, in the City of Fredericton. The FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE were directed by telephone transmission to APPLICANT and allegedly falsely informed that APPLICANT was someone else, who FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE allegedly have warrants for the arrest of that individual.

9. March 5. 2009, APPLICANT , although never resisted, again experienced assault and battery resulting in physical injury at the hands of members of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE. As a result of the injuries, the Applicant have been unable to work (full capacity) since the March 5. 2009 assault and battery. Please note the APPLICANT was required by medical doctor to wear an arm brace and attend physiotherapy, which continues to this day because subject injuries which are not yet healed. the APPLICANT is still suffering from the injuries inflicted upon the APPLICANT by the March 5. 2009 arrest.

10. Late 2009, APPLICANT did file a complaint with the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE, regarding the March 5. 2009 Assault, involving Battery and Arrest. NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION File: (File:

9000 C- 09- 61 ) 2010 RTIPPA- 01 regarding the March 5. 2009 Assault, involving Battery and Arrest. The documents which NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION have released into the APPLICANTS possession revealed that the Police regarding the March 5. 2009 Assault, involving Battery and Arrest. were being directed and or guided by telephone communication with the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE dispatcher (as it does appear) to the APPLICANT moreover, although the Applicant had removed all of his winter clothing all accessories including hats scarves and gloves in a effort to maintain a lower body temperature, to complete the laborious task of shoveling out the snow from his driveway on a warm sunny day. Therefore it could not possibly be true that a distinctly identifiable man of the Applicants shape, size complexion and color of hair could possibly be mistaken for anyone else other than who he actually is.

11. APPLICANT has been subject to an apparent plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal (object yet known) a unreasonable nonstop harassment program against the APPLICANT in this matter, since year 2005 became a Tenant at 29 Marshall Street in the City of Fredericton. False witness statements against the APPLICANT therefore employing the unsuspecting local FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE with unfounded allegations which have lead to the APPLICANT in this case becoming the victim of violence at the hands of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE.

12. APPLICANT Andre Murray since year 2005 becoming a Residential Tenant at his Marshall Street residence in the City of Fredericton has

experienced unrelenting harassment by two neighbors in particular, living in single family houses on each side of his residence.

13. since year 2005 became a Residential Leasehold Tenant at his Marshall Street residence in the City of Fredericton has been visited by the local FREDERICTON CITY POLICE FORCE; Please Note that the APPLICANT is making this statement with carful attention not to exaggerate the facts of the matter as in the first year 2005 it would be safe to say the members of the FREDERICTON CITY POLICE FORCE visited the residence at least twice a week, sometimes twice a day with annoying allegations that the APPLICANT may have while walking in his yard, further allegedly may have inadvertently and mysteriously offended a neighbor although without actually having spoken to anyone nor had the APPLICANT observed anyone.

14. The foregoing must have been recorded by the FREDERICTON CITY POLICE FORCE Dispatch, (as it is their professional practice) this subject harassment program against the APPLICANT must have been chronologically documented and existing within the files of the FREDERICTON CITY POLICE FORCE Department headquarters.

C. PART III - ISSUES {(b) a concise statement of the issues to be dealt with by the court,} 1. Questions for the Court to answer Should the Honorable Court Order the New Brunswick Police Commission to disclose both requested Appendix C as provided by

and found within the Fredericton City Police Force Reports to the Applicant? Should the Honorable Court Order the Fredericton City Police Force to disclose the full requested Police Reports? Should the Honorable Court Order the investigation by the Fredericton Police into the abuse and malicious manipulation of the Fredericton Police Force services regarding the volume and substance of the telephone reports and complaints containing erroneous and provocative allegations against Andr Murray (Applicant In this matter) order disclosure of same investigation to the Applicant.

{(c) a concise statement of the principles of law on which the party relies and citation of relevant statutory provisions and leading authorities, and}

2. Introduction

15. It is the APPLICANTS contention that in pursuance of RTIPPA the head of a public body should disclose requested records that contain information of the identity of a malicious Police informant telephone caller, because there exists circumstances in the present case which are the exception to the rule which normally dictate that the RTIPPA is to be used to protect the identity of third party. To use the RTIPPA to protect the identity of a third party who is the source of a malicious Police informant telephone calls bearing false witness which reasonably could be considered and has evidently resulted in a disservice to justice causing violations of (in this case) the APPLICANTS civil liberties including a very real possibility of a fatal danger to the APPLICANT.

16. The NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION has identified a party by only as a THIRD PARTY and subject of this application .

Misapprehension exists here, non-disclosure is clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in this matter requiring disclosure for the purposes of the safety or protection of the APPLICANT. Section 22(5) of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R10.6 provides the following example of where the head of a public body shall disclose a record in the case of where the private interest of the third party in non-disclosure is clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in disclosure for the purposes of public health or safety or protection of the environment as follows: 22(5) Subject to section 34 and any other exception provided for in this Act, the head of a public body shall disclose a record that contains information described in subsection (1) or (2) if, in the opinion of the head, the private interest of the third party in non-disclosure is clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in disclosure for the purposes of public health or safety or protection of the environment. 17. When someone misuses and abuses the system especially crime prevention services and public services to engage in a systematic vicarious assault on an innocent these malicious people should in effect be relinquishing the intended protection of the RTIPPA.

18. We should all expect a reasonable protection of our privacy, bet when our actions become unreasonable, and in this case to be direct malicious, then those maliciousindividuals should not be protected by law designed to protect the privacy of reasonable people acting forthright.

3. MAXIMS 19. Because Maxims are principles and authorities, universally admitted, as being just, further, that it be consonant to reason and part of the general

customs or common law of the land; and are of the same strength as acts of parliament, please note APPLICANT will use the relevant Maxims throughout following arguments as they may apply in this particular case.

20. APPLICANT comprehends; the following are the definitions of "maxims". Found at (http://ecclesia.org/truth/maxims.html)

21. APPLICANT will include and utilize Maxims, that, which, therefore may strengthen the following arguments such as the APPLICANT intends, for that reason, to present/offer to this most Honorable Court.

22. A. Maxim definitions: A. Maxim (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1856): 1. An established principle or proposition. A principle of law universally admitted, as being just and consonant with reason. 2. Maxims in law are somewhat like axioms in geometry. 1 Bl. Com. 68. They are principles and authorities, and part of the general customs or common law of the land; and are of the same strength as acts of parliament, when the judges have determined what is a maxim; which belongs to the judges and not the jury. Terms do Ley; Doct. & Stud. Dial. 1, c. 8. Maxims of the law are holden for law, and all other cases that may be applied to them shall be taken for granted. 1 Inst. 11. 67; 4 Rep. See 1 Com. c. 68; Plowd. 27, b. 3. The application of the maxim to the case before the court, is generally the only difficulty. The true method of making the application is to ascertain how the maxim arose, and to consider whether the case to which it is applied is of the same character, or whether it is an exception to an apparently general rule. 4. The alterations of any of the maxims of the common law are dangerous. 2 Inst. 210.

B. Maxim (William C. Anderson's A Dictionary of Law, (1893), page 666): 1. So calledbecause it's value is the highest and its authority the most reliable, and because it is accepted by all persons at the very highest. 2. The principles and axioms of law, which are general propositions flowing from abstracted reason, and not accommodated to times or men, are wisely deposited in the breasts of the judges to be applied to such facts as come properly before them. 3. When a principle has been so long practiced and so universally acknowledged as to become a maxim, it is obligatory as part of the law. C. Maxim of Law (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, (1933), page 1171): An established principle of proposition. A principle of law universally admitted as being a correct statement of the law, or as agreeable to reason. Coke defines a maxim to be "a conclusion of reason" Coke on Littleton, 11a. He says in another place, "A maxim is a proposition to be of all men confessed and granted without proof, argument, or discourse." Coke on Littleton. 67a. D. Maxim (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition): Maxims are but attempted general statements of rules of law and are law only to the extent of application in adjudicated cases." Maxim - Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. In default of the law, the maxim rules.

23. APPLICANT supports the English dictum that a man's home is his refuge as was established in common law by the lawyer and politician Sir Edward Coke in The Institutes of the Laws of England, as early as 1628 further, that this is a fundamentally important concept, that the Courts should uphold: "For a man's house is his castle, et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium [and each man's home is his safest refuge].

The Common laws of the Realm should by no means be delayed for the law is the surest sanctuary, that a man should take, and the strongest fortress to protect the weakest of all, lex et tutissima cassis. The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose. "

24. Further to the above principal established 1628 by lawyer and politician Sir Edward Coke; a principal the Applicant comprehends, is as a free society, we must have liberties grounded on self evident truths of the importance of the sanctity, security and privacy of the individuals home. The APPLICANT wishes to bring to the Courts attention the seriousness of the unwarranted violation of someones home, invasion of privacy and as the above mentioned Sir Edward Cokes, Semayne's Case, reflects and embodies sanctity principals, referred to as, a Mans Home is his Castle.

4. Fraud Maxim The laws serve the vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2327 25. The APPLICANT asserts that facts as will be presented, and the preponderance of probability will lead to the conclusion that the unnamed informant caller(s) and source of the fraudulent information provided to the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE, are acting maliciously, fraudulently and misusing the public resources for their own disingenuous ends.

26. The APPLICANT would like to note the following Maxims regarding the nature of the fraud:

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The legal maxims: Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant ( Fraud and justice never dwell together) & Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent ( Fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man). & Let no one be relieved or gain an advantage by his own fraud. 27. The substance of above provided maxims, have been reiterated in decisions of COURTS OF LAW and it has been further observed that it is in the inherent powers of the COURTS OF LAW to reject the protection of individuals who are guilty of fraud or misrepresentation. In the broadest sense, a fraud is an intentional deception made for personal gain or to damage another individual.

28. legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com provides the following definition: Fraud as follows: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fraud Fraud n. the intentional use of deceit, a trick or some dishonest means to deprive another of his/her/its money, property or a legal right. Also Fraud A false representation of a matter of factwhether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosedthat deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to her or his legal injury. Fraud is commonly understood as dishonesty calculated for advantage. A person who is dishonest may be called a fraud. In the U.S. legal system, fraud is a specific offense with certain features.

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Fraud is most common in the buying or selling of property, including real estate, Personal Property, and intangible property, such as stocks, bonds, and copyrights. State and federal statutes criminalize fraud, but not all cases rise to the level of criminality. Prosecutors have discretion in determining which cases to pursue. Victims may also seek redress in civil court. Fraud must be proved by showing that the Applicant's actions involved five separate elements: (1) a false statement of a material fact,(2) knowledge on the part of the Applicant that the statement is untrue, (3) intent on the part of the Applicant to deceive the alleged victim, (4) justifiable reliance by the alleged victim on the statement, and (5) injury to the alleged victim as a result. These elements contain nuances that are not all easily proved. First, not all false statements are fraudulent. To be fraudulent, a false statement must relate to a material fact. It should also substantially affect a person's decision to enter into a contract or pursue a certain course of action. A false statement of fact that does not bear on the disputed transaction will not be considered fraudulent. Second, the Applicant must know that the statement is untrue. A statement of fact that is simply mistaken is not fraudulent. To be fraudulent, a false statement must be made with intent to deceive the victim. This is perhaps the easiest element to prove, once falsity and materiality are proved, because most material false statements are designed to mislead. Third, the false statement must be made with the intent to deprive the victim of some legal right. Fourth, the victim's reliance on the false statement must be reasonable. Reliance on a patently absurd false statement generally will not give rise to fraud; however, people who are especially gullible, superstitious, or ignorant or who are illiterate may recover damages for fraud if the Applicant knew and took advantage of their condition. Finally, the false statement must cause the victim some injury that leaves her or him in a worse position than she or he was in before the fraud.

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A statement of belief is not a statement of fact and thus is not fraudulent. Puffing, or the expression of a glowing opinion by a seller, is likewise not fraudulent. For example, a car dealer may represent that a particular vehicle is "the finest in the lot." Although the statement may not be true, it is not a statement of fact, and a reasonable buyer would not be justified in relying on it. The relationship between parties can make a difference in determining whether a statement is fraudulent. A misleading statement is more likely to be fraudulent when one party has superior knowledge in a transaction, and knows that the other is relying on that knowledge, than when the two parties possess equal knowledge. For example, if the seller of a car with a bad engine tells the buyer the car is in excellent running condition, a court is more likely to find fraud if the seller is an auto mechanic as opposed to a sales trainee. Misleading statements are most likely to be fraudulent where one party exploits a position of trust and confidence, or a fiduciary relationship. Fiduciary relationships include those between attorneys and clients, physicians and patients, stockbrokers and clients, and the officers and partners of a corporation and its stockholders. A statement need not be affirmative to be fraudulent. When a person has a duty to speak, silence may be treated as a false statement. This can arise if a party who has knowledge of a fact fails to disclose it to another party who is justified in assuming its nonexistence. For example, if a real estate agent fails to disclose that a home is built on a toxic waste dump, the omission may be regarded as a fraudulent statement. Even if the agent does not know of the dump, the omission may be considered fraudulent. This is constructive fraud, and it is usually inferred when a party is a fiduciary and has a duty to know of, and disclose, particular facts. Fraud is an independent criminal offense, but it also appears in different contexts as the means used to gain a legal advantage or accomplish a specific crime. For example, it is fraud for a person to make a false statement on a license application in order to engage in the regulated activity. A person who did so would not be convicted of fraud. Rather, fraud would simply describe the method used to break the law or regulation requiring the license.

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Fraud resembles theft in that both involve some form of illegal taking, but the two should not be confused. Fraud requires an additional element of False Pretenses created to induce a victim to turn over property, services, or money. Theft, by contrast, requires only the unauthorized taking of another's property with the intent to permanently deprive the other of the property. Because fraud involves more planning than does theft, it is punished more severely.

29. Fraud as offered above herewithin and below may be established by showing that the perpetrators actions involved five separate elements: (1) a false statement of a material fact, (2) knowledge on the part of the source that the statement is untrue, (3) intent on the part of the source to deceive the alleged victim, (4) justifiable reliance by the alleged victim on the statement, and (5) injury to the alleged victim as a result.

30. The APPLICANT is not attempting to prove Fraud, per se, but wishes to alert the attention of the Court to the relevant portions of an argument regarding the fraudulent misrepresentations of the unknown informant caller(s) and the implications of same, namely that because the unknown informant caller(s) are acting fraudulently they should not in the usual manner be protected by this Court. To be fraudulent, a false statement must relate to a material fact, in this case unknown informant caller(s) fraudulently informing the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE of facts which the unknown informant caller(s) must have known to be false. In criminal law, a fraud is an intentional deception made for personal gain or to damage another individual A false statement of fact that does not bear on the intentional deception will not be considered fraudulent, in this matter, the intentional deception was to cause the FREDERICTON POLICE

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FORCE to act against the Applicant on many occasions under the false information that the APPLICANT was an individual with warrants for his arrest, or some other equally false claims.

31. Second, the individual Source of the information must know that the statement is untrue. A statement of fact that is simply mistaken is not fraudulent. In the present case, this was not simply one mistaken statement of fact, since the year 2005 the deceptions are unrelenting and were of a substance requiring a sufficient consciousness of mind to orchestrate the copious barrage unrelenting fraudulent misrepresentations of the unknown informant caller(s). This is perhaps the easiest element to prove, once falsity and materiality are proved because most material false statements are designed to mislead, such as in this case, the false information to the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE was crafted to mislead the Fredericton Police into a course of action which would have been to the detriment of the APPLICANTS legal rights and standing, and at the same time the induced course of action would have been to the benefit of the unknown informant caller(s) (otherwise why would this continue this course of action).

32. Third, the false statement, in a incident of fraud, must be made with the intent to deprive the victim of some legal right, in this case the Applicant would have been deprived of the Applicants legal rights guaranteed by The English Magna Carta, expressed in The United States constitution and guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights, which stated clearly the relationship between life, liberty, and property; arguably there is no

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property more sacred than a mans home. The violation of ones home constitutes a serious affront to human dignity.

33. Fourth, justifiable reliance by the alleged victim (FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE) on the fraudulent statement as is in this case the victim's reliance on the false information, must be reasonable (which is apparent because the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE acted on same) .

34. Finally, the false statements provided by the malicious informants evidently made victims of FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE and the APPLICANT causing injury leaving all concerned and or interacting during these false arrests, inter alia in a worse position than they were before the malicious informants instigated said events .

35. The Maxim Let no one be relieved or gain an advantage by his own fraud. Is relevant to this hearing because, the informant(s), having repeatedly provided false information (whatever their motivation)to FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE, by their (the informant) actions and the actions of their willing agents (FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE) created a condition, where, the Applicant: a) b) c) d) e) Despite having no warrants for the Applicant, Despite having not been a criminal, Despite having no criminal record, Despite having not being engaged in criminal activity, Despite having not being under investigation by the Fredericton Police, f) The applicant has had his residence searched twice without warrants, by the Fredericton Police, g) The applicant has at his residence been, Assaulted, Battered, Arrested, injured and Detained three separate times,

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h) The applicant has been subject to 6 years of unnecessary Police Harassment involving many incidents coming and going to the area of residence, i) The Applicant cannot enjoy the Applicants residence, without interference, j) The applicant is in fear for his life and or personal safety, k) The Fredericton Police Force will not cooperate with the Applicant. which reveals that the agenda of the unnamed informant(s) appears to be succeeding consequentially without the intervention of the Courts, Applicant will continue to be Assaulted, Battered, Arrested, injured, Detained and have his residence searched without COURT ORDERED WARRANTS, illegally by the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE. 36. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), Page 4062 and 4063 provides the following definition of REPRESENTATION as follows: REPRESENTATION representation,n.1. A presentation of fact either by words or by conduct made to induce someone to act, esp. to enter into a contract; esp., the manifestation to another that a fact, including a state of mind, exists <the buyer relied on the seller's representation that the roof did not leak>. Cf. MISREPRESENTATION. [Cases: Fraud 9.] Representation ... may introduce terms into a contract and affect performance: or it may induce a contract and so affect the intention of one of the parties, and the formation of the contract.... At common law, ... if a representation did not afterwards become a substantive part of the contract, its untruth (save in certain excepted cases and apart always from fraud) was immaterial. But if it did, it might be one of two things: (1) it might be regarded by the parties as a vital term going to the root of the contract (when it is usually called a condition); and in this case its untruth entitles the injured party to repudiate the whole contract; or (2) it might be a term in the nature only of an independent subsidiary promise (when it is usually called a warranty), which is indeed a part of the contract, but does not go to the root of it; in this case its untruth only gives rise to an action ex contractu for damages, and does not

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entitle the injured party to repudiate the whole contract. William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 218, 222 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919). affirmative representation. A representation asserting the existence of certain facts pertaining to a given subject matter. false representation. See MISREPRESENTATION. material representation. A representation to which a reasonable person would attach importance in deciding his or her course of action in a transaction. Material representation is a necessary element of an action for fraud. [Cases: Contracts 94(2); Fraud 18. C.J.S. Contracts 156, 166.] promissory representation. A representation about what one will do in the future; esp., a representation made by an insured about what will happen during the time of coverage, stated as a matter of expectation and amounting to an enforceable promise. [Cases: Insurance 3035. C.J.S. Insurance 537, 546551, 629, 634, 639, 694, 704, 759.]

37. The informant(s) have done what is according to Blacks Law Dictionary representation which is a presentation of fact (in this case that the APPLICANT is someone who he is not) either by words or by conduct assertion (repeatedly providing false fraudulent information to the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE) to induce someone (MEMBERS OF FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE) to act to injure Andr Murray (APPLICANT) .

38. The informant(s) have provided what is according to Blacks Law Dictionary above as material representation which is a representation to which a reasonable person may attach importance while deciding their (FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE) course of action such as to behave in

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such a exaggerated manner so as to allow for Assault, Batter, Arrest, in the course of an intended arrest of the APPLICANT which to date has incidentally included unlawful detainment of APPLICANT Andr Murray while having endured violent false arrest furthermore, FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE have conducted WARRENTLESS search procedure the APPLICANTS residence.

39. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) , Page 3169 and page 3170 provides the following definition of MISREPRESENTATION as follows: MISREPRESENTATION misrepresentation,n. 1. The act of making a false or misleading assertion about something, usu. with the intent to deceive. The word denotes not just written or spoken words but also any other conduct that amounts to a false assertion. [Cases: Fraud 9.] 2. The assertion so made; an assertion that does not accord with the facts. Also termed false representation; (redundantly) false misrepresentation. Cf. REPRESENTATION(1). misrepresent,vb. A misrepresentation, being a false assertion of fact, commonly takes the form of spoken or written words. Whether a statement is false depends on the meaning of the words in all the circumstances, including what may fairly be inferred from them. An assertion may also be inferred from conduct other than words. Concealment or even nondisclosure may have the effect of a misrepresentation .... [A]n assertion need not be fraudulent to be a misrepresentation. Thus a statement intended to be truthful may be a misrepresentation because of ignorance or carelessness, as when the word not is inadvertently omitted or when inaccurate language is used. But a misrepresentation that is not fraudulent has no consequences ... unless it is material. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 159 cmt. a (1979). fraudulent misrepresentation. A false statement that is known to be false or is made recklessly without knowing or caring whether it is true or false and that is intended to induce a party to detrimentally rely on it. Also termed fraudulent representation; deceit. [Cases: Fraud 8.] A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his

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assertion to induce a party to manifest his assent and the maker (a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts, or (b) does not have the confidence that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 162(1) (1979). material misrepresentation. 1.Contracts. A false statement that is likely to induce a reasonable person to assent or that the maker knows is likely to induce the recipient to assent. [Cases: Contracts 94. C.J.S. Contracts 136, 139140, 156, 158160, 170171, 173174.] 2.Torts. A false statement to which a reasonable person would attach importance in deciding how to act in the transaction in question or to which the maker knows or has reason to know that the recipient attaches some importance. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 538 (1979). [Cases: Fraud 18.] The materiality of a misrepresentation is determined from the viewpoint of the maker, while the justification of reliance is determined from the viewpoint of the recipient.... The requirement of materiality may be met in either of two ways. First, a misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent. Second, it is material if the maker knows that for some special reason it is likely to induce the particular recipient to manifest his assent. There may be personal considerations that the recipient regards as important even though they would not be expected to affect others in his situation, and if the maker is aware of this the misrepresentation may be material even though it would not be expected to induce a reasonable person to make the proposed contract. One who preys upon another's known diosyncrasies cannot complain if the contract is held voidable when he succeeds in what he is endeavoring to accomplish.... Although a nonfraudulent misrepresentation that is not material does not make the contract voidable under the rules stated in this Chapter, the recipient may have a claim to relief under other rules, such as those relating to breach of warranty. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 162 cmt. c (1979). misrepresentation of source. See PASSING OFF.

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negligent misrepresentation. A careless or inadvertent false statement in circumstances where care should have been taken. [Cases: Fraud 13(3).] 40. There is evidence that certain informant(s) acted under a knowing misrepresentation of the truth and or concealment of a material fact regarding certain fraudulent information rendered to FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE to further induce the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE to act to the detriment of the Applicant by feigning that the APPLICANT was and or is someone whom he was not.

41. The informant(s) have done what is according to Blacks Law Dictionary misrepresentation which is the act of making a false or misleading assertion about something as in this case false allegations directed against the reputation of the APPLICANT The word misrepresentation denotes not just written or spoken words but also any other conduct that amounts to a false assertion.

42. R. v. Mavroudis, 2009 ONCJ 430 (CanLII), Justice P.N. Bourque stated regarding Fraud, Conspiracy and Impersonation, at paragraph 16, 17, 32, 33, 34 and 40 As follows: http://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2009/2009oncj430/2009oncj430.html LAW [16] In the previous sentencing I set out what I felt was the appropriate legal framework for a sentencing for a significant fraud conviction:

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[17] In R. v. Savard 1996 CanLII 5703 (QC C.A.), 1996 CanLII 5703 (QC C.A.), (1996), 109 C.C.C. (3d) 471 (Que.C.A.) at 474, the court set out a useful framework respecting sentencing in a fraud case: These facts can be summarized as follows: (1) the nature and extent of the loss, (2) the degree of premeditation found, notably, in the planning and application of a system of fraud, (3) the accuseds actions after the commission of the offence, (4) the accused[s] previous convictions, (5) the personal benefits generated by the commission of the offences, (6) the authority and trust existing in the relationship between the accused and the victim, as well as (7) the motivation underlying the commission of the offences. [32] LAW Consipracy 465(1)(c) (c) every one who conspires with any one to commit an indictable offence not provided for in paragraph (a) or (b) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the same punishment as that to which an accused who is guilty of that offence would, on conviction be liable. Obstructing Justice 139(2) (2) Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

5. Fraudulent Representation 43. In Wellesley Lake Trophy Lodge v. BLD Silviculture et al, 2005 BCSC 379 (CanLII), The Honourable Mr. Justice Blair stated the following

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regarding ALLEGED FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS and BALANCE OF PROOF at paragraph 20 and paragraph 31 as follows: [20] The parties concur that the elements comprising the tort of deceit or fraudulent representation are:
1. there must be a false representation of fact; 2. the representation must be made with knowledge of its

falsity, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true, or recklessly; 3. it must be made with the intention that it should be acted on by the defendant, or by a class of persons which includes the defendant, in the manner which resulted in damage to him; 4. it must be proved that the defendant has acted upon the false statement; and 5. that the defendant has sustained damage by so doing. BALANCE OF PROOF [31] The defendants must meet a higher degree of probability given that their claim is based on allegations of fraud by Mr. Miller. In Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co., 1982 CanLII 13 (S.C.C.), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 164, Chief Justice Laskin for the Court stated at p. 170: There is necessarily a matter of judgment involved in weighing evidence that goes to the burden of proof, and a trial judge is justified in scrutinizing evidence with greater care if there are serious allegations to be established by the proof that is offered. I put the matter in the words used by Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater, supra ([1950] 2 All E.R. 458) at p. 459, as follows:

It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but there

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may be degrees of proof within that standard. Many great judges have said that, in proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be clear. So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a higher degree of probability than that which it would require if considering whether negligence were established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature, but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion. [emphasis added]

44. Maxim - Perspicua vera non sunt probanda. Plain truths need not be proved. Co. Litt. 16. 45. At this point the APPLICANT has alleged and hopefully established that FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS have occurred and the BALANCE OF PROOF regarding preponderance of probability favors that it is more likely that subject malicious informants are intending to further provide fraudulent misrepresentation, to induce the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE to further act against the APPLICANT, than it is to believe the subject malicious informant(s) have been innocently mistaken, literally one hundred times over the course of five years.

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6. Granting Disclosure 46. The law will not intend a wrong. - Legal Maxim, Bacon's Maxims (17, reg. 3)

47. Section 2 of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 provides as it relates to the Applicant as follows: Purposes of this Act 2 The purposes of this Act are (a) to allow any person a right of access to records in the custody or under the control of public bodies, subject to the limited and specific exceptions set out in this Act, (c) to allow individuals a right of access to records containing personal information about themselves in the custody or under the control of public bodies, subject to the limited and specific exceptions set out in this Act, 48. The three provided reasons by the New Brunswick Police Commission, for not disclosing the subject information are: 1. Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R10.6 If access prohibited under another Act and sunset provision 5(1) The head of a public body shall refuse to give access or disclose information to an applicant under this Act if the access or disclosure is prohibited or restricted by another Act of the Legislature. . 5(2) If a provision of this Act is inconsistent with or in conflict with a provision of another Act of the Legislature, the provision of this Act

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prevails unless the other Act of the Legislature expressly provides that it, or a provision of it, prevails despite this Act.

2. Police Act, S.N.B. 1977, c. P-9.2 Investigation report 28.2(2) Upon receipt of the documents listed under subsection (1), the chief of police shall (a) provide a copy of the documents to the Commission, or, if the Commission agrees, make the documents available for viewing during normal business hours, and (b) provide a summary of the investigators findings and conclusions to the police officer and the complainant 3. Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R10.6 Unreasonable invasion of third partys privacy 21(1) The head of a public body shall refuse to disclose personal information to an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third partys privacy. General duty of public bodies 43(1) A public body shall not use or disclose personal information except as authorized under this Division. 49. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at Page 3967 provides the following definition of REASONABLE REASONABLE

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reasonable,adj.1. Fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances < reasonable pay>. 2.According to reason <your argument is reasonable but not convincing>.

50. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at Page 47793967 provides the following definition of UNREASONABLE UNREASONABLE unreasonable,adj.1. Not guided by reason; irrational or capricious. 2. Not supported by a valid exception to the warrant requirement <unreasonable search and seizure>. 51. In Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 Justice IACOBUCCI J. provided the following insight into the Principles of Statutory Interpretation from paragraph 26 though to and including paragraph 30 as follows: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2002/2002scc42/2002scc42.html

(1)

Principles of Statutory Interpretation

26 In Elmer Driedgers definitive formulation, found at p. 87 of his Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983): Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. Driedgers modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred approach to statutory interpretation across a wide range of interpretive settings: see, for example, Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 20 (S.C.C.), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, at p. 578, per Estey J.; Qubec (Communaut urbaine) v. Corp. Notre_Dame de Bon_Secours, 1994 CanLII 58 (S.C.C.), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3, at p. 17; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (S.C.C.), [1998] 1

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S.C.R. 27, at para. 21; R. v. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (S.C.C.), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 25; R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, 2000 SCC 65, at para. 26; R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 (CanLII), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 33, per McLachlin C.J.; Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3, at para. 27. I note as well that, in the federal legislative context, this Courts preferred approach is buttressed by s. 12 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I_21, which provides that every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. 27 The preferred approach recognizes the important role that context must inevitably play when a court construes the written words of a statute: as Professor John Willis incisively noted in his seminal article Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell (1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 6, words, like people, take their colour from their surroundings. This being the case, where the provision under consideration is found in an Act that is itself a component of a larger statutory scheme, the surroundings that colour the words and the scheme of the Act are more expansive. In such an instance, the application of Driedgers principle gives rise to what was described in R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 (CanLII), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, 2001 SCC 56, at para. 52, as the principle of interpretation that presumes a harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes dealing with the same subject matter. (See also Stoddard v. Watson, 1993 CanLII 59 (S.C.C.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1069, at p. 1079; Pointe_Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court), 1997 CanLII 390 (S.C.C.), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, at para. 61, per Lamer C.J.) 28 Other principles of interpretation such as the strict construction of penal statutes and the Charter values presumption only receive application where there is ambiguity as to the meaning of a provision. (On strict construction, see: Marcotte v. Deputy Attorney General for Canada, 1974 CanLII 1 (S.C.C.), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 108, at p. 115, per Dickson J. (as he then was); R. v. Goulis (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 55 (C.A.), at pp. 59_60; R. v. Hasselwander, 1993 CanLII 90 (S.C.C.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 398, at p. 413; R. v. Russell, 2001 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 804, 2001 SCC 53, at para. 46. I shall discuss the Charter values principle later in these reasons.)

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29 What, then, in law is an ambiguity? To answer, an ambiguity must be real (Marcotte, supra, at p. 115). The words of the provision must be reasonably capable of more than one meaning (Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang, [1966] A.C. 182 (H.L.), at p. 222, per Lord Reid). By necessity, however, one must consider the entire context of a provision before one can determine if it is reasonably capable of multiple interpretations. In this regard, Major J.s statement in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1999 CanLII 680 (S.C.C.), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743, at para. 14, is apposite: It is only when genuine ambiguity arises between two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute, that the courts need to resort to external interpretive aids (emphasis added), to which I would add, including other principles of interpretation. 30 For this reason, ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact that several courts __ or, for that matter, several doctrinal writers __ have come to differing conclusions on the interpretation of a given provision. Just as it would be improper for one to engage in a preliminary tallying of the number of decisions supporting competing interpretations and then apply that which receives the higher score, it is not appropriate to take as ones starting point the premise that differing interpretations reveal an ambiguity. It is necessary, in every case, for the court charged with interpreting a provision to undertake the contextual and purposive approach set out by Driedger, and thereafter to determine if the words are ambiguous enough to induce two people to spend good money in backing two opposing views as to their meaning (Willis, supra, at pp. 4_5).

52. The stated purposes of this Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 is to (a) to allow any person a right of access to records in the custody or under the control of public bodies, subject to the limited and specific exceptions set out in this Act, and (c) to allow individuals a right of access to records containing personal information

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about themselves in the custody or under the control of public bodies, subject to the limited and specific exceptions set out in this Act.

53. As stated in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002, supra by Justice IACOBUCCI J Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

54. Interpretation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-13, section 17, is reproduced bellow, as follows: 17 Every Act and regulation and every provision thereof shall be deemed remedial, and shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of the object of the Act, regulation or provision. 55. Should the Honorable COURT ORDER the New Brunswick POLICE COMMISSION to grant the APPLICANT right of access to records containing personal information about the APPLICANT that which may be in the custody or under the control of New Brunswick POLICE COMMISSION, said ORDER would be congruent with the stated purpose of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Interpretation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-13.

56. Section 5 (1) and section 5(2) of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6, quoted by the New Brunswick POLICE COMMISSION, provides the following:

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If access prohibited under another Act and sunset provision 5(1) The head of a public body shall refuse to give access or disclose information to an applicant under this Act if the access or disclosure is prohibited or restricted by another Act of the Legislature. 5(2) If a provision of this Act is inconsistent with or in conflict with a provision of another Act of the Legislature, the provision of this Act prevails unless the other Act of the Legislature expressly provides that it, or a provision of it, prevails despite this Act. 57. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at Page 3828 provides the following definition of PROHIBIT as follow: PROHIBIT prohibit,vb.1. To forbid by law. 2. To prevent or hinder.

58. The relative section of the Police Act, S.N.B. 1977, c. P-9.2, does not in fact prohibit, prevent or hinder the POLICE COMMISSION from disclosure of the subject Police Report. The relative section of the Police Act, S.N.B. 1977, c. P-9.2 is provided as follows: Investigation report 28.2(2) Upon receipt of the documents listed under subsection (1), the chief of police shall (a) provide a copy of the documents to the Commission, or, if the Commission agrees, make the documents available for viewing during normal business hours, and (b) provide a summary of the investigators findings and conclusions to the police officer and the complainant 59. The key term used here is to provide. The chief of police shall (a) provide a copy of the documents to the Commission, or, if the Commission

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agrees, make the documents available for viewing during normal business hours, and (b) provide a summary of the investigators findings and conclusions to the police officer and the complainant

60. merriam_webster.com reveals the following definition for provide at the subsequent URL: http://www.merriam_webster.com/dictionary/provide provide transitive verb 1archaic : to prepare in advance 2a : to supply or make available (something wanted or needed) <provided new uniforms for the band>; also : afford <curtains provide privacy> b : to make something available to <provide the children with free balloons> 61. The Police Act, S.N.B. 1977, c. P-9.2Section 28.2(2) does not preclude providing a copy of the Investigative Report to the Applicant.

62. APPLICANT argues that the head of a public body could refuse to give access or disclose information to an APPLICANT under this Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act if the access or disclosure is prohibited or restricted by another Act of the Legislature (namely the Police Act), which it is not. Consequently APPLICANT argues that the head of a public body should not refuse to give access or disclose information to APPLICANT under this Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and has no reason to refuse.

63. Section 84 of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 provides that the Burden of proof (section 84(1) in

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any proceeding under this Act, is relegated to head of the public body to prove , as must be done in this matter, that the APPLICANT has no right of access to the record or part of the record. Since the APPLICANT has provided that Section 28.2(2) does not preclude providing a copy of the Investigative Report to the APPLICANT , there is no need for the head of the public body to prove the position of access refusal or nondisclosure of information to the APPLICANT therefore unnecessary to prove regarding Section 28.2(2) of the Police Act, S.N.B. 1977, c. P-9.2. or Section 5 (1) and section 5(2) of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6

64. Section 84 of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 provides the following: Burden of proof 84(1) In any proceeding under this Act, the burden is on the head of the public body to prove that the applicant has no right of access to the record or part of the record. 84(2) Despite subsection (1), if the proceeding under this Act concerns a decision to disclose or to refuse to disclose, in whole or in part, a record containing personal information about a third party, the burden is on the applicant to prove that disclosure of the information would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third partys privacy. 84(3) Despite subsection (1), if the proceeding under this Act concerns a decision to disclose or to refuse to disclose, in whole or in part, a record containing information that is not personal information about a third party, the burden is on the third party to prove that the applicant has no right of access to the record or part of the record. 65. Since the third and remaining section of RTIPPA quoted by the new Brunswick POLICE COMMISSION proceeding under RTIPPA involves a

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decision to disclose or to refuse to disclose, in whole or in part, a record containing personal information about a third party, the burden of the third and remaining section of the RTIPPA is on the APPLICANT to prove that disclosure of the information would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third partys privacy.

66. Because any active member of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE, who contributed to the Report as required by this request would be acting professionally and should not be considered private.

67. RTIPPA provides that the head of a public body shall disclose a record that contains information if, in the opinion of the head, the private interest of the third party in non-disclosure is clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in disclosure for the purposes of public health or safety or protection of the environment.

68. The APPLICANT is part of the Public and this is most certainly in the interest of the health of the APPLICANT to have the head of a public body disclose a record that which contains information that the APPLICANT may thereby take reasonable steps to protect himself from these unrelenting harmful and malicious attacks.

69. An investigation into the volume of FALSE WITNESS REPORT calls made to the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE, regarding the APPLICANT (in this matter)_which will demonstrate blatant anomaly further confirm abuse of the resources of the FREDERICTON POLICE

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FORCE into malicious dangerous endeavors therefore targeting the APPLICANT.

70. Section 22(5) of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 provides the following example of where the head of a public body shall disclose a record in the case of where the private interest of the third party in non-disclosure is clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in disclosure for the purposes of public health or safety or protection of the environment as follows: 22(5) Subject to section 34 and any other exception provided for in this Act, the head of a public body shall disclose a record that contains information described in subsection (1) or (2) if, in the opinion of the head, the private interest of the third party in non-disclosure is clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in disclosure for the purposes of public health or safety or protection of the environment. 71. As stated above: Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at Page 3967 provides the definition of REASONABLE which is Fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstancesor According to reason It is reasonable that this HONORABLE COURT ORDER the head of the New Brunswick POLICE COMMISSION to provide subject information as requested so that the Applicant may take reasonable Legal steps to be safe against this constant Police harassment and inevitable next latest assault which 6 years of history reasonably indicate will occur, unless the HONORABLE COURT ORDER is ISSUED . 72. As stated above Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), the definition of UNREASONABLE Not guided by reason; irrational or capricious. or Not supported by a valid exception to the warrant requirement It is unreasonable that the Applicant (in this matter) be subject to continuous

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harassment and endangerment, when all that is required to prevent this is to have a COURT ORDER requiring that the head of the New Brunswick POLICE COMMISSION to provide the requested information to the Applicant.

73. If the Applicant were to request a FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE investigation into the matter, the privacy protections protocols of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE would again prohibit the Applicant from knowing the Source of all these harassing Police calls.

74. Invasion of a third partys privacy, is reasonable, when the third party is abusively manipulating privacy laws in order that their hideous actions may remain hidden, that they may further continue with immunity to make false and misleading malicious phone calls to the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE dispatcher thereby manipulating members of said Police with crafty schemes and or cunning designs for the accomplishment of a sinister end, designed to harass and endanger the (in this matter) Applicants well being . It is only just that this Court order the head of the public body to grant the request in whole or in part, in this case POLICE COMMISSION to comply and surrender relevant material as is requested by the APPLICANT. .Enough is enough, it is time the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE stop being manipulated in the ways as found listed herewithin above and below, moreover, perhaps to allow circumstances to remain as circumstances currently are, it stands to reason that eventually sooner or later the Applicant may be forced to experience as so called mishap accident because of misapprehension by members of FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE, which said altercations could

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eventually end the life of the Applicant. The Applicant in all sincerity currently lives in constant fear of being accosted by members of FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE .

75. This Honorable Court in pursuance with RTIPPA Section 66(1) has the authority to order the head of the public body to grant the request in whole or in part, and the applicant request this Court to do just that.

7. Security of property

Maxim - Argumentum ab auctoritate fortissimum est in lege - An argument drawn from authority is the strongest in law. 76. The following is found within giga-usa.com, at the following URL: http://www.giga-usa.com/quotes/authors/william_blackstone_a001.htm SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE English jurist (1723 -1780) So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. The public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual's private rights.

77. The Chief Justice of New Brunswick, The Honourable J. Ernest Drapeau expressed the function of the court in the following from the New Brunswick Courts Web site at the following address: http://www.gnb.ca/cour/index-e.asp

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A message from the Chief Justice of New Brunswick Free and democratic societies are founded on the supremacy of law, and an independent judiciary is essential to ensure its unbiased application. Courts play an essential role within Canadas constitutional framework. They constitute the judicial branch of government, a component that the Constitution of our country compels the legislative and executive branches to preserve and protect. New Brunswick courts are called upon, on a daily basis, to judge and apply the appropriate law to disputes and provide a peaceful and professional mechanism for their resolution." 78. The HONORABLE COURT applies appropriate LAW to preserve and protect free and democratic societies. To accomplish this task, the HONORABLE COURT have opportunity to protect and promote dignity and worth of the human people and the position of the family in a society of free men and free institutions, by choosing to promote and enforce the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and insure the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law.

79. The following copy of the Canadian Bill of Rights is found at the following URL: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-1960-c-44/32178/sc-1960-c44.html Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44

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Canadian Bill of Rights 1960, c. 44 C-12.3 [Assented to August 10th, 1960] An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Preamble The Parliament of Canada, affirming that the Canadian Nation is founded upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy of God, the dignity and worth of the human person and the position of the family in a society of free men and free institutions; Affirming also that men and institutions remain free only when freedom is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law; And being desirous of enshrining these principles and the human rights and fundamental freedoms derived from them, in a Bill of Rights which shall reflect the respect of Parliament for its constitutional authority and which shall ensure the protection of these rights and freedoms in Canada:

Therefore Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: PART I BILL OF RIGHTS Recognition and declaration of rights and freedoms 1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination

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by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, (a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law; (b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law;

80. The right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law is what is meant to be enforced by a just COURT of LAW, which must reasonably recognize that only when the people of Canada (to be more specific), a man is secure, may they enjoy property. The Applicant has a right not to be deprived of his property rights, security of the person, freedom of movement, and entitlement to privacy except by due process of law.

81. Furthermore the MAGNA CARTA and the U.S. CONSTITUTION reflect this same view, the following quote is from the following URL: http://home.clara.net/heureka/lincolnshire/magna-carta.htm The great principles of freedom and the rights of man are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence. __ Sir Winston Churchill, address to the Americans, 1946

The original Magna Carta, drawn up in 1215, was to influence the US Constitution and the UN Charter.

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Although drawn up in 1215 between King John and the English Barons, the Magna Carta was surprisingly modern in the rights it bestowed. Magna Carta (Latin for "Great Charter", literally "Great Paper") was drawn up in 1215 to limit the power of English Monarchs, especially King John, from absolute rule. ...........................

One of the most important clauses that was to have the long lasting effect was Article 39: No free man shall be arrested, or imprisoned, or deprived of his property, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor shall we go against him or send against him, unless by legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. This meant the King must judge individuals according to the law, and not according to his own will. Equally important was Article 40: To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice. The importance of these two clauses, the right to be judged by one's peers, is felt in all English speaking countries today. ................................ The influence of Magna Carta can be seen in the US Bill of Rights, which enumerates various rights of the people and restrictions on government power: No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ........................

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The American Bar Association acknowledged the importance of Magna Carta and the debt American law and constitutionalism had to Magna Carta when in 1957 they erected a monument at Runnymede. 82. Furthermore, a more direct quoted excerpt of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution found at the following URL (http://www.constitution.org/billofr_.htm ) which states as follows: Article the seventh [Amendment V] No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

83. The following excerpt of the Magna Carta, section 39 is found here: http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm 39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

84. The following informative definition, for the word disseize, is found at the following URL: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/disseised disseize disseize also disseise (ds_sz) tr.v. disseized also disseised, disseizing also disseising, disseizes also disseises Law

42

To dispossess unlawfully of real property; oust. [Middle English disseisen, from Anglo_Norman disseisir, variant of Old French dessaisir : des_, dis_ + saisir, to seize; see seize.] Usage samples from TheFreeLibrary.com The right can be traced back to 1215 from the Magna Carta: "No freeman shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any other way destroyed, nor will we proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. Untruthful jurors in the federal courts: have we become comfortably ... by Press, Joshua S. / St. Thomas Law Review When tenant in fee simple, fee tail, or for term of life, was put out, and disseised of his lands or tenements, rents, find the like; he might sue out a writ of assize In Focus : Considering King Henry II by The Star (Amman, Jordan) a judgment, it not infrequently disseised itself of jurisdiction. Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice by Bjorklund, Andrea K. / American Journal of International Law 85. The following definition of the word DISSEISE is found at Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at Page 1425, as follows: disseise (dis-seez), vb. To wrongfully deprive (a person) of the freehold possession of property. Also spelled disseize.

86. The English MAGNA CARTA, The United States CONSTITUTION and the Canadian CHARTER OF RIGHTS stated clearly the relationship between life, liberty, and property; arguably there is no property more sacred than a mans home. The violation of ones home constitutes a serious affront to human dignity.

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The Applicant deposes that the actions of the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE have thus far evidentially, acted contrary to the seriousness represented by Violation of the Sanctity of a Person's Home. The Right to information and protection of Privacy Act should be read and broadly construed, with the Applicants purposed notion of maintaining in mind, the dignity and integrity of the individual. For the benefit of the Court coming to a fair and balanced decision, all these previously referred to documents enshrine the most important principal of law, expressed in the following maxim: The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Broom's Legal Maxims(max. 1-10), also Bacon's Maxims (reg. 12) 87. In Somwar v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd., 2006 CanLII 202 (ON S.C.) SUPERIOR COURT JUSTICE STINSON J. addressed the right to privacy in Canada and how is it protected from paragraph 23 through to an including paragraph 30 as follows: [23] I turn to this aspect of the rule 21.01(1)(b) test in light of arguable uncertainty of the existence of the tort of invasion of privacy in Ontario. In seeking an answer to this question (apart from the jurisprudence discussed above) it is useful to address a more fundamental one: is there a right to privacy in Canada and how is it protected? In Hunter v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (S.C.C.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the existence of such a right. Dickson J. (as he then was) held that the purpose of the right against unreasonable search or seizure contained in s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was the protection of the privacy of the individual. In effect, s. 8 is the constitutional embodiment of the right to be let alone by other people.

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[24] The importance of privacy as a value worthy of constitutional protection was emphasized in another Supreme Court decision, R. v. Dyment, 1988 CanLII 10 (S.C.C.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.). In that case La Forest J. described three zones or realms of privacy, which included rights involving territorial or spatial aspects, rights related to the person, and rights that arise in the information context. With respect to privacy in relation to information, La Forest J. wrote (at para. 22): This too is based on the notion of the dignity and integrity of the individual. As the Task Force [Privacy and Computers, the Report of the Task Force established by the Department of Communications/Department of Justice (1972)] put it (p.13): This notion of privacy derives from the assumption that all information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit. In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound where the reasonable expectations of the individual that the information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected . [25] There has also been judicial recognition of a constitutional right to privacy in the civil context, as Robyn M. Ryan Bell noted in her article, Tort of Invasion of Privacy Has its Time Finally Come? in Todd Archibald & Michael Cochrane, Annual Review of Civil Litigation (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 225. Among other decisions, Bell cited Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario 1995 CanLII 7116 (ON S.C.), (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 388 (Gen. Div.), aff'd 1996 CanLII 1139 (ON C.A.), (1996), 31 O.R. (3d) 798 (C.A.), a case involving a Charter challenge to mandatory reporting of medical information. In that case Wilson J. concluded that there is a right to privacy in the civil law context; after balancing the privacy rights of individuals and the state objective of promoting public health for the safety of all, however, she found no breach of either s. 7 or s. 8 of the Charter.

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[26] In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 1995 CanLII 59 (S.C.C.), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.), Cory J. discussed the approach that should be followed when a common law rule is alleged to be inconsistent with the Charter. Writing for the majority, he stated (at para. 92): Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the courts making those incremental changes, which were necessary in order to make the law comply with current societal values. The Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape our democratic society and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts to make such incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary to have it comply with the values enunciated in the Charter. [27] Although the Charter does not apply to disputes between private individuals, I agree with the views expressed by Bell, in her article, supra, at p. 229: The introduction of the Charter has impacted upon the development of the tort of invasion of privacy in two ways. First, the values underlying the Charter include respect for an individuals dignity and autonomy, values which are, in turn, closely tied to respect for and protection of an individuals privacy. Second, the Supreme Court has made it clear in cases as M. (A.) v. Ryan, 1997 CanLII 403 (S.C.C.), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, that the common law must develop in accordance with Charter values. [28] Provinces such as British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan have created a statutory tort of invasion of privacy. See John D.R. Craig, Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: the Common-Law Tort Awakens (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 355, footnote 2. In Quebec, s. 5 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, which provides that every person has a right to respect for his private life, is directly enforceable between citizens. In Ontario, however, there is no statutory remedy for unreasonable intrusion into an individuals private affairs.

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[29] With advancements in technology, personal data of an individual can now be collected, accessed (properly and improperly), and disseminated more easily than ever before. There is a resulting increased concern in our society about the risk of unauthorized access to an individuals personal information. The traditional torts such as nuisance, trespass, and harassment may not provide adequate protection against infringement of an individuals privacy interests. Protection of those privacy interests by providing a common law remedy for their violation would be consistent with Charter values and an "incremental revision" and logical extension of the existing jurisprudence. [30] Such a development in the common law has been viewed as appropriate by many legal commentators: see, for example, the articles by Bell, and Craig, supra. Bell wrote (at p. 235): The emerging social realities of twenty-first century life in Canada include the use of technology that increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, cellular phones that can be used to take photographs, and the seemingly ever-increasing desire by the public at large for media stories, to name but a few examples. A broad embracement of a common law tort of invasion of privacy would reflect an updating of the common law to reflect these emerging social realities. 88. Furthermore, in R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, Justice La Forest J. stated, regarding the right to privacy and its relationship to human dignity at the following paragraphs 15 through to and including paragraph 23 as follows: 15. From the earliest stage of Charter interpretation, this Court has made it clear that the rights it guarantees must be interpreted generously, and not in a narrow or legalistic fashion; see R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (S.C.C.), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 344. The function of the Charter, in the words of the present Chief Justice, then Dickson J., in Hunter v. Southam

47

Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (S.C.C.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 155 "is to provide ... for the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties". It is a purposive document and must be so construed. That case dealt specifically with s. 8. It underlined that a major, though not necessarily the only, purpose of the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 is the protection of the privacy of the individual; see especially pp. 159-60. And that right, like other Charter rights, must be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner so as to secure the citizen's right to a reasonable expectation of privacy against governmental encroachments. Its spirit must not be constrained by narrow legalistic classifications based on notions of property and the like which served to protect this fundamental human value in earlier times. 16. Indeed, it may be confusing means with ends to view these inherited rights as essentially aimed at the protection of property. The lives of people in earlier times centred around the home and the significant obstacles built by the law against governmental intrusions on property were clearly seen by Coke to be for its occupant's "defence" and "repose"; see Semayne's Case (1604), 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 77 E.R. 194, at p. 91 b and p. 195 respectively. Though rationalized in terms of property in the great case of Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 E.R. 807, the effect of the common law right against unreasonable searches and seizures was the protection of individual privacy. Viewed in this light, it should not be cause for surprise that a constitutionally enshrined right against unreasonable search and seizure should be construed in terms of that underlying purpose unrestrained now by the technical tools originally devised for securing that purpose. However that may be, this Court in Hunter v. Southam Inc. clearly held, in Dickson J.'s words, that the purpose of s. 8 "is ... to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy" (supra, p. 160) and that it should be interpreted broadly to achieve that end, uninhibited by the historical accoutrements that gave it birth. He put it this way, at p. 158: In my view the interests protected by s. 8 are of a wider ambit than those enunciated in Entick v. Carrington.

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Section 8 is an entrenched constitutional provision. It is not therefore vulnerable to encroachment by legislative enactments in the same way as common law protections. There is, further, nothing in the language of the section to restrict it to the protection of property or to associate it with the law of trespass. It guarantees a broad and general right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure. It should also be noted that s. 8 does not merely prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. As Pratte J.A. observed in Minister of National Revenue v. Kruger Inc., [1984] 2 F.C. 535 (C.A.), at p. 548, it goes further and guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 17. The foregoing approach is altogether fitting for a constitutional document enshrined at the time when, Westin tells us, society has come to realize that privacy is at the heart of liberty in a modern state; see Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1970), pp. 349-50. Grounded in man's physical and moral autonomy, privacy is essential for the well-being of the individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy of constitutional protection, but it also has profound significance for the public order. The restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of the citizen go to the essence of a democratic state. Claims to privacy must, of course, be balanced against other societal needs, and in particular law enforcement, and that is what s. 8 is intended to achieve. As Dickson J. put it in Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, at pp. 159-60: The guarantee of security from unreasonable search and seizure only protects a reasonable expectation. This limitation on the right guaranteed by s. 8, whether it is expressed negatively as freedom from "unreasonable" search and seizure, or positively as an entitlement to a "reasonable" expectation of

18.

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privacy, indicates that an assessment must be made as to whether in a particular situation the public's interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government's interest in intruding on the individual's privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement. 19. The first challenge, then, is to find some means of identifying those situations where we should be most alert to privacy considerations. Those who have reflected on the matter have spoken of zones or realms of privacy; see, for example, Privacy and Computers, the Report of the Task Force established by the Department of Communi- cations/Department of Justice (1972), especially at pp. 12-14. The report classifies these claims to privacy as those involving territorial or spatial aspects, those related to the person, and those that arise in the information context. All three, it seems to me, are directly implicated in the present case. As noted previously, territorial claims were originally legally and conceptually tied to property, which meant that legal claims to privacy in this sense were largely confined to the home. But as Westin, supra, at p. 363, has observed, "[t]o protect privacy only in the home ... is to shelter what has become, in modern society, only a small part of the individual's daily environmental need for privacy". Hunter v. Southam Inc. ruptured the shackles that confined these claims to property. Dickson J., at p. 159, rightly adopted the view originally put forward by Stewart J. in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), at p. 351, that what is protected is people, not places. This is not to say that some places, because of the nature of the social interactions that occur there, should not prompt us to be especially alert to the need to protect individual privacy. This Court has recently dealt with privacy of the person in R. v. Pohoretsky, 1987 CanLII 62 (S.C.C.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945. The case bears some resemblance to the present one, but there the doctor had taken the blood sample from a patient, who

20.

21.

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was in an incoherent and delirious state, at the request of a police officer. In holding this action to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure, my colleague Lamer J. underlined the seriousness of a violation of the sanctity of a person's body. It constitutes a serious affront to human dignity. As the Task Force on Privacy and Computers, supra, put it, at p. 13: ... this sense of privacy transcends the physical and is aimed essentially at protecting the dignity of the human person. Our persons are protected not so much against the physical search (the law gives physical protection in other ways) as against the indignity of the search, its invasion of the person in a moral sense. 22. Finally, there is privacy in relation to information. This too is based on the notion of the dignity and integrity of the individual. As the Task Force put it (p. 13): "This notion of privacy derives from the assumption that all information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit." In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound where the reasonable expectations of the individual that the information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected. Governments at all levels have in recent years recognized this and have devised rules and regulations to restrict the uses of information collected by them to those for which it was obtained; see, for example, the Privacy Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111. One further general point must be made, and that is that if the privacy of the individual is to be protected, we cannot afford to wait to vindicate it only after it has been violated. This is inherent in the notion of being secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Invasions of privacy must be prevented, and where privacy is outweighed by other societal claims, there must be clear rules setting forth the conditions in which it can be

23.

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violated. This is especially true of law enforcement, which involves the freedom of the subject. Here again, Dickson J. made this clear in Hunter v. Southam Inc. After repeating that the purpose of s. 8 of the Charter was to protect individuals against unjustified state intrusion, he continued at p. 160: That purpose requires a means of preventing unjustified searches before they happen, not simply of determining, after the fact, whether they ought to have occurred in the first place. This, in my view, can only be accomplished by a system of prior authorization, not one of subsequent validation. [Emphasis in original.] He was there speaking of searches, but as I will endeavour to show, the statement applies equally to seizures. 89. The welfare of the people is the supreme law, therefore the right to privacy and private property, and again there is arguably no property more sacred than a mans home, further, is defended when the courts apply the values underlying the above referenced Canadian Bill of Rights to include respect for an individuals dignity and autonomy, values which are, in turn, closely tied to respect for and protection of an individuals Residential Property. Also, Bell, in her article, supra, stated the Supreme Court has made it clear in cases as M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, that the common law must develop in accordance with Charter values.

90. As SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE stated, supra The public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual's private rights.

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91. Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the courts making those incremental changes, which were necessary in order to make the law comply with current societal values. And from the earliest stage of Charter interpretation, the Courts has made it clear that the rights it guarantees must be interpreted generously, and not in a narrow or legalistic fashion.

92. One further general point must be made, and that is, if the individual's private property rights, dignity and integrity of the individual, is to be protected, we cannot afford to wait to vindicate it only after it has been violated. This is inherent in the notion of being secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Invasions and intrusion of a mans home must be prevented, and where security of property is outweighed by other societal claims, there must be clear rules setting forth the conditions in which it can be violated.

8. Interpretation of Statutes 93. In Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 Justice IACOBUCCI J. supra, provided the following insight into the Principles of Statutory Interpretation:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. provides that every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.

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words, like people, take their colour from their surroundings. This being the case, where the provision under consideration is found in an Act that is itself a component of a larger statutory scheme, the surroundings that colour the words and the scheme of the Act are more expansive.., as the principle of interpretation that presumes a harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes dealing with the same subject matter. Other principles of interpretation such as the strict construction of penal statutes and the Charter values presumption only receive application where there is ambiguity as to the meaning of a provision.

What, then, in law is an ambiguity? It is only when genuine ambiguity arises between two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute, that the courts need to resort to external interpretive aids (emphasis added), to which I would add, including other principles of interpretation. 94. For comparison, let us review The New Brunswick Interpretation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-13 which states: 17 Every Act and regulation and every provision thereof shall be deemed remedial, and shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of the object of the Act, regulation or provision. 95. We find a very helpful explanations of Interpretations of Statutes, in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, by Justice Iacobucci J. which can be found at the following URL: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1998/1998canlii837/1998canlii837.ht ml

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Interpretation of Statutes, Paragraph 2 of the header of the decision: At the heart of this conflict is an issue of statutory interpretation. Although the plain language of ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA suggests that termination pay and severance pay are payable only when the employer terminates the employment, statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. Moreover, s. 10 of Ontarios Interpretation Act provides that every Act shall be deemed to be remedial and directs that every Act shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit. 96. Paragraph 4 of the header of the Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, decision, supra: The use of legislative history as a tool for determining the intention of the legislature is an entirely appropriate exercise. Section 2(3) of the Employment Standards Amendment Act, 1981 exempted from severance pay obligations employers who became bankrupt and lost control of their assets between the coming into force of the amendment and its receipt of royal assent. Section 2(3) necessarily implies that the severance pay obligation does in fact extend to bankrupt employers. If this were not the case, no readily apparent purpose would be served by this transitional provision. Further, since the ESA is benefits-conferring legislation, it ought to be interpreted in a broad and generous manner. Any doubt arising from difficulties of language should be resolved in favour of the claimant. 97. At paragraph 20 to paragraph 27 of the Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, decision, supra: 20 At the heart of this conflict is an issue of statutory interpretation. Consistent with the findings of the COURT OF APPEAL, the plain meaning of the words of the provisions here in question appears to restrict the obligation to pay termination and severance pay to those employers who have actively terminated the

55

employment of their employees. At first blush, bankruptcy does not fit comfortably into this interpretation. However, with respect, I believe this analysis is incomplete. 21 Although much has been written about the interpretation of legislation (see, e.g., Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (1997); Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) (hereinafter Construction of Statutes); PierreAndr Ct, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)), Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. At p. 87 he states: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. Recent cases which have cited the above passage with approval include: R. v. Hydro-Qubec, 1997 CanLII 318 (S.C.C.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213**; Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp., 1997 CanLII 377 (S.C.C.), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411; Verdun v. TorontoDominion Bank, 1996 CanLII 186 (S.C.C.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550; Friesen v. Canada, 1995 CanLII 62 (S.C.C.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103. 22 I also rely upon s. 10 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 219, which provides that every Act shall be deemed to be remedial and directs that every Act shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit. 23 Although the Court of Appeal looked to the plain meaning of the specific provisions in question in the present case, with respect, I believe that the court did not pay sufficient attention to the scheme of the ESA, its object or the intention of the legislature; nor was the context of the words in issue appropriately recognized. I now turn to a discussion of these issues.

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24 In Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., 1992 CanLII 102 (S.C.C.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986, at p. 1002, the majority of this Court recognized the importance that our society accords to employment and the fundamental role that it has assumed in the life of the individual. The manner in which employment can be terminated was said to be equally important (see also Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., 1997 CanLII 332 (S.C.C.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701). It was in this context that the majority in Machtinger described, at p. 1003, the object of the ESA as being the protection of . . . the interests of employees by requiring employers to comply with certain minimum standards, including minimum periods of notice of termination. Accordingly, the majority concluded, at p. 1003, that, . . . an interpretation of the Act which encourages employers to comply with the minimum requirements of the Act, and so extends its protections to as many employees as possible, is to be favoured over one that does not. 25 The objects of the termination and severance pay provisions themselves are also broadly premised upon the need to protect employees. Section 40 of the ESA requires employers to give their employees reasonable notice of termination based upon length of service. One of the primary purposes of this notice period is to provide employees with an opportunity to take preparatory measures and seek alternative employment. It follows that s. 40(7)(a), which provides for termination pay in lieu of notice when an employer has failed to give the required statutory notice, is intended to cushion employees against the adverse effects of economic dislocation likely to follow from the absence of an opportunity to search for alternative employment. (Innis Christie, Geoffrey England and Brent Cotter, Employment Law in Canada (2nd ed. 1993), at pp. 572-81.) 26 Similarly, s. 40a, which provides for severance pay, acts to compensate long-serving employees for their years of service and investment in the employers business and for the special losses they suffer when their employment terminates. In R. v. TNT Canada Inc. 1996 CanLII 847 (ON C.A.), (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 546, Robins J.A. quoted with approval at pp. 556-57 from the words of D. D. Carter in the course of an employment standards determination in Re Telegram Publishing Co. v. Zwelling (1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 1 (Ont.), at p. 19, wherein he described the role of severance pay as follows:

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27 In my opinion, the consequences or effects which result from the Court of Appeal's interpretation of ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA are incompatible with both the object of the Act and with the object of the termination and severance pay provisions themselves. It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to Ct, supra, an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra, at p. 88). 98. The New Brunswick Interpretation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-13 states at paragraph 17 as follows: 17 Every Act and regulation and every provision thereof shall be deemed remedial, and shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of the object of the Act, regulation or provision. 99. As similarly stated above in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., supra, the Applicant wishes to bring the Honorable presiding JUSTICE OF THE PEACE attention, to recognize, the importance that our society accords to security of the home and the fundamental role that it has assumed in the life of the individual.

100.

It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the

legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to Ct, supra, an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other

58

provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 37880). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile.

101.

The intention of Parliament can be comprehended to enshrine the Law

with capacity and mandate for protection of the deeply cherished community value of the sanctity of the home. This well known, well recognized, established principle of Right of the sanctity of the home, devised for the protection of individual security, applies to all homes of a man or woman and is the factor that makes Residential Tenancies so unique, in reflecting these very principals. A man while maintaining the Peace must be able to venture onto his yard or his drive way, as the case may be, without fear of being accosted by Police.

102.

The Applicant will refer to and rely on the well established principle of

statutory interpretation, that: the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. an interpretation may be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment a label of absurdity may be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile.

103.

The Applicant argues that a label of absurdity may be attached to

interpretations of the Right to information and protection of Privacy Act,

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that, which may defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile.

9. Interpretation 104. Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004), defines Justice as The fair

and proper administration of laws. The fair and proper administration of Justice in the Courts of New Brunswick, naturally require procedural application of the Rules of Court, further, with the intention of arriving at a determination of every proceeding on its merits.

105.

Rule 1.02, of the New Brunswick Rules of Court is reproduced as

follows: CITATION, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION 1.02 Application These rules apply to all proceedings in the Court of Queens Bench and the Court of Appeal unless some other procedure is provided under an Act. 106. A determination should be in keeping with the general direction

contained in Rule 1.03(2) to secure the just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of every proceeding on its merits, Rule 1.03 (2), of the New Brunswick Rules of Court is reproduced as follows: CITATION, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION 1.03 Interpretation 1.03 (2) These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of every proceeding on its merits.

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107.

Reference: In LeBlanc v. Bastarache, 2005 NBQB 142 (CanLII)

RIDEOUT, J. stated regarding applying Rule Rules 1.03(2); 2.02; 3.02(1) and (2) (Please see at paragraph 11 to 19) at the following address: http://www.canlii.org/en/nb/nbqb/doc/2005/2005nbqb142/2005nbqb142.ht ml 108. As found provided above, in LeBlanc v. Bastarache, supra, the

Honorable Court must consider: what is necessary to see that justice is done? The answer may be, if the refusal to grant the Applicants request of a COURT ORDER for disclosure of the relevant documents would evidentially do an obvious and substantial injustice to the Applicant, while to permit it is not going to cause any substantial injustice to the third party or prejudice the third party, the requested COURT ORDER for disclosure of the relevant documents may be granted.

109.

The rule which emerges from these cases unequivocally recognizes that

the Court's main concern must be to see that justice is done and to make certain that the requested Order for disclosure of the relevant documents does not prejudice or work any injustice to either of the parties Reference: In East Texas Distributing Inc. v. Video Solutions (Atlantic) Ltd., 2003 NBQB 268 (CanLII) Justice RIORDON, J. stated the following regarding Rule 1.03, Rule 2.02,. and Rule 1.03(2): (Please see at paragraph 25 28) at the following address: http://www.canlii.org/en/nb/nbqb/doc/2003/2003nbqb268/2003nbqb26 8.html 110. The Applicant has noted a similarity to the above provided case, in East

Texas Distributing Inc. v. Video Solutions, supra, it would be unfair to not grant the subject requested COURT ORDER as requested by the

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APPICANT for a COURT ORDER that directs the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE and or the POLICE COMMISSION to disclosure any relevant documents currently in their possession that may assist in relief for the Applicant from the evidentially dangerous state of affairs as they now stand.

111.

The Applicant contends that as provided above, in East Texas

Distributing Inc. v. Video Solutions, supra, this is a situation where this Honorable Court must and should apply Rule 1.03 and Rule 2.02. Furthermore, as above Rule 1.03(2) says: These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, and I emphasize just, determination of every proceeding on its merits. It also goes on to say least expensive and most expeditious determination.. As in the case before this Court, where the Applicant finds himself challenged by apparent limitations as prescribed by the RTIPPA, which, can only be remedied by the granting of a COURT ORDER for disclosure of the relevant documents, so that this matter may be heard on its merits and properly investigated.

10. Closing Maxim- nvitat culpam qui peccatum praeterit Translation: Pardon one offence and you encourage the commission of many 112. The Court should make a ruling, which reflects the view that when

anyone (as in this matter) misuses the mechanisms of peaceful society, such as benevolent Police Protection, instead manipulates police service for nefarious purposes, that their actions will not be tolerated further that they

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must forfeit protection of genuine privacy which must otherwise be afforded to all forthright individuals who as a consequence are contributing to peaceful society . The Applicant has been subject to an apparent plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal (object yet known) a unreasonable nonstop harassment program against the Applicant in this matter, since year 2005 shortly after the Applicant became a Residential Leasehold Tenant at 29-31 Marshall Street in the City of Fredericton. False witness statements uttered and directed against the applicant thereby manipulated the unsuspecting members of local FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE with unfounded allegations which have lead to the Applicant in this case becoming the victim of malicious false arrest involving violent altercations with members of FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE causing the Applicant Andr Murray not only serious physical harm but long term psychological lack of ease .

113.

The Court should not use the very laws of privacy protection issued

pursuant to RTIPPA to therefore designed to protect the public, to in the alternative, as in this case withhold information which evidentially has and will guarantee the harm to the public. By erroneously applying and the misuse of the concept of privacy protection certain disingenuous individuals are manipulating the system to cause harm to (in this case) the Applicant vicariously though manipulation of the Fredericton Police Force while ironically seeking protection and shelter from exposure for their grossly wicked or reprehensible acts of FALSE WITNESS causing bodily harm.

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114.

Section 2 of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act,

S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 provides Purposes of this Act as it relates the Applicant as follows: Purposes of this Act 2 The purposes of this Act are (a) to allow any person a right of access to records in the custody or under the control of public bodies, subject to the limited and specific exceptions set out in this Act, (c) to allow individuals a right of access to records containing personal information about themselves in the custody or under the control of public bodies, subject to the limited and specific exceptions set out in this Act,

115.

When persons misuse and or abuse the system of what is considered

public service crime prevention (Police) to instead engage on a systematic vicarious assault upon an innocent individual (Applicant) the (in this case) unnamed caller(s) should reasonably be relinquishing the benefits of association with or otherwise intended protection of what would under normal circumstances may be lawfully withheld information materials by RTIPPA. 116. Since a section of the RTIPPA as quoted by the NEW BRUNSWICK

POLICE COMMISSION, furthermore that proceeding under this Act, concerns a decision to disclose or to refuse to disclose, in whole or in part, a record containing personal information about a third party, the burden is on the applicant to prove that disclosure of the information would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third partys privacy. The Applicant asserts that the chronic repeat malicious conduct of the unnamed caller(s) amounts to a forfeiture of the usual protection of privacy granted by law and

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therefore revealing this information would not be an unreasonable invasion of the third partys privacy.

117.

RTIPPA provides a precedent that the head of a government mandated

public oversight body such as the POLICE COMMISSION shall disclose any record that which contains information if, in the opinion of the CEO, the private interest of the third party in non-disclosure is clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in disclosure for the purposes of public health or safety or protection of the environment.

118.

The Applicant is part of the Public and on behalf of the Applicant it is

most certainly in the best interest of the health of the Applicant to have the CEO of a government mandated public oversight body POLICE COMMISSION therefore disclose a record that contains the sufficient information, that the Applicant may reasonable take necessary steps to protect himself from harmful and malicious attacks. Without the intervention of the Presiding Justice having heard this matter Andr Murray will suffer the loss of quality if life by the continuous unwarranted harassment, (evidence provided by AFFIDAVIT) subsequent random physical assaults causing injury, invasion of privacy, home invasion and further damages, which to date have all occurred on a regular basis.

119.

If the presiding Justice on hearing this matter elects not to

intervene on victim Andr Murrays behalf (for that reason) cause a COURT ORDER to be issued to the FREDERICTON POLICE FORCE, and or the POLICE COMMISSION which would clearly

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demonstrate this irregularity and anomaly which is misappropriating the resources of the Fredericton Police Force into mean and dangerous endeavors targeting the Applicant, that would be disservice to the administration of Justice.

11. Should the Respondent pay costs of the within Motion? 120. Section 76 of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act,

S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 provides the following: Costs 76(1) If a matter is referred to a judge of The Court of Queens Bench of New Brunswick under subsection 65(1) or appealed to a judge of The Court of Queens Bench of New Brunswick under section 75, the judge shall award costs in favour of the person who referred or appealed the matter (a) where the person is successful, and (b) where the person is not successful, if the judge considers it to be in the public interest. 76(2) Despite subsection (1), a judge of The Court of Queens Bench of New Brunswick may award costs in favour of the public body if the judge considers that the matter for review or appeal is frivolous or vexatious or amounts to an abuse of the right to access.

12. Cost Orders in favour of self-represented litigants 121. If the Applicant is successful on REFERRAL, Rule 76(1) states the

judge shall award costs in favour of the person who referred the matter.

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122.

The Applicant asserts that this REFERRAL is not frivolous or vexatious

nor amounts to an abuse of the right to access, but in the contrary is necessary because the Applicant has no other means to achieve and or obtain the information necessary to protect the rights and safety of the Applicant, therefore this Court should not, pursuant to Rule 76(2) award costs in favor of the public body in any event or outcome of the Decision of this Court.

123.

It was the Refusal of THE NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION

to provide the requested records, which necessitated the Filing of this REFERRAL further that this Matter be further heard by this Honorable Court, consequentially the responsibility or fault lies with THE NEW BRUNSWICK POLICE COMMISSION who refused access Pursuant to RTIPPA therefore the Order of this Court for Costs should reflect this fact. The Applicant, reasonable has been forced to COURT FILE this REFERRAL out of the necessity for self preservation.

124.

Reference: McNichol v. Co-operators General Insurance Company,

2006 NBCA 54 (CanLII), Chief Justice J. ERNEST DRAPEAU, addresses cost orders in favor of self-represented Litigants. (Please see below, at paragraph 41 through to and including paragraph 45), at the following URL: http://www.canlii.org/en/nb/nbca/doc/2006/2006nbca54/2006nbca54.ht ml

125.

As stated by Chief Justice J. ERNEST DRAPEAU above in McNichol

v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2006 , supra, Rule 59.01, however, makes it clear that costs are in the discretion of the trial court

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who can determine by whom and to what extent costs shall be paid and that such costs can be fixed with or without reference to a tariff. In addition, there appears to be a modern trend regarding the granting of costs to unrepresented lay litigants.

126.

The Applicant argues that after due consideration, this Honorable Court

may conclude similarly to the Court above in McNichol v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2006, supra, that the case before this Honorable Court is one that calls for the exercise of the Courts discretion under Rule 59.01 in a manner favorable to the self-represented Applicant.

127.

Following the lead of the above quoted Court Decision, McNichol v.

Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2006, supra, this Honorable Court may find it appropriate to Order the Respondent to pay costs throughout, in addition to all reasonable disbursements. Reference: Fong, et al v. Chan, et al, 1999 CanLII 2052 (ON C.A.) Justice Robert J. Sharpe J.A stated as follows regarding the right of self-represented lay litigants to recover Costs. (Please see below, from paragraph 15 though to and including paragraph 27), at the following URL: http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1999/1999canlii2052/1999canlii2 052.html 128. As stated in Fong, et al v. Chan, et al, 1999, supra, Costs should only

be awarded to those lay litigants who can demonstrate that they devoted time and effort to do the work ordinarily done by a lawyer retained to conduct the litigation, and that as a result, they incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity such as is the case with the Applicant in this matter before this Court. It is abundantly clear that the Applicant in

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this matter has devoted copious time over these many months of his time and effort to present interesting and thought-provoking legal argument ordinarily done by a lawyer, which is evidenced in the quality and the voluminous material presented to the Court for consideration in this matter.

129.

The Applicant contends that it is now well established by the courts

that lay litigants may recover costs, including counsel fees, which is a clear trend of both the common law and the statutory law, to allow for recovery of costs by self-represented litigants.

130.

As stated above in Fong, et al v. Chan, et al, 1999, supra, as a matter of

principle, it seems difficult to justify a categorical rule denying recovery of costs by self-represented litigants.

131.

As stated above in above in Fong, et al v. Chan, et al, 1999, supra,

paragraph 22 modern cost rules are designed to foster three fundamental purposes: (1) to indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation; (2) to encourage settlements; and (3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants. All three purposes are fostered by allowing the trial judge discretion to award costs to self-represented litigants. 132. Self-represented lawyers are entitled to indemnity on the time is

money or opportunity cost rationale and it is difficult to see why the opportunity cost rationale should not be more generally applicable to selfrepresented litigants, such as the Applicant in this matter before this Honorable Court.

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133.

The self-represented litigants must possess skills for which they

customarily are remunerated on the regular work week basis, and if the law is prepared to compensate lawyers for loss of time when devoting their efforts to their own cause, the same entitlement should extend to selfrepresented lay litigants who are able to demonstrate the same loss.

134.

Costs may be awarded to those lay litigants who can demonstrate that

they devoted time and effort to do the work ordinarily done by a lawyer therefore, retained to conduct the litigation, further, that as a result, they incurred according to opportunity cost rationale costs by foregoing remunerative activity, additionally useful Costs are a useful tool of the Court to encourage settlements or to discourage or sanction inappropriate behavior.

135.

The trial judge may be particularly well-placed to assess the

appropriate allowance, if any, for a self- represented litigant, and accordingly, the trial judge may either fix the costs when making such an award or provide clear guidelines to the Assessment Officer as to the manner in which the costs are to be assessed.

136.

Having considered the here within above provided arguments for costs,

it was the Applicant who requested both Referral Hearings F/M/1/11 and F/M/22/11 be held concurrent because of the similarities of the content, this Honorable Court may find it appropriate to Order the Respondent to pay costs throughout, in addition to all reasonable disbursements.

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ALL OF THIS respectfully submitted this day of August 2011.

_________________________ Andr Murray - APPLICANT

D. PART VI ORDERS SOUGHT {(d) a concise statement of the relief sought by the party.} 137. Section 66 of the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act,

S.N.B. 2009, c. R-10.6 provides the following Decision of The Court of Queens Bench 66(1) If a matter is referred to a judge of The Court of Queens Bench of New Brunswick under subsection 65(1), the judge shall hold a hearing and, (a) where the matter is referred by an applicant, (i) if the head of a public body denied a request for information in whole or in part, may order the head of the public body to grant the request in whole or in part, and (c) may make any other order that is, in the opinion of the judge, necessary. 1. Order that the New Brunswick Police Commission to disclose both requested Appendix C as provided by and found within the Fredericton City Police Force Reports to the Applicant 2. Order that the Fredericton City Police Force to disclose the full requested Police Reports 3. Order that the investigation by the Fredericton Police into the abuse and malicious manipulation of the Fredericton Police Force services regarding the volume and substance of the telephone reports and complaints containing erroneous and provocative allegations against

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Andr Murray (Applicant In this matter) order disclosure of same investigation to the Applicant.

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