Sharon Meroni One West Surrey Lane Info@DefendtheVote.com 847-382-1100 December 16, 2011 Langdon D.

Neal, Chairman Richard A. Cowen, Secretary/Commissioner Marisel A. Hernandez, Commissioner Lance Gough, Executive Director Chicago Board of Elections: 69 W. Washington Street, Suites 600/800 Chicago, IL 62708 Chicago Board of Commissioners, and Executive Director: Defend the Vote is an Illinois not-for-profit, non-partisan organization with the mission to empower citizens to protect elections. An important aspect of our activity involves evaluation of security protocols in place to protect the integrity of the vote. In April 2011, along with Champion News, we conducted a vulnerability assessment and security audit of the Chicago Board of Elections Election Day security procedures. Our findings document serious flaws in the election system. We evaluated 239 polling places on 11 security measures which were taken out of the 2011 Illinois (and Chicago) Election Judge Training Guide. 215 (91%) precincts failed in one or more measures. 139 (59%) precincts were documented with unsealed ballot boxes. Our report summarizing this audit was peer reviewed and published in Argonne National Laboratorys October 2011 edition of the prestigious Journal of Physical Security.. The peer-review team consisted of experts in physical security and some with election security expertise. Dr. Roger Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, is head of the Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Argonne National Laboratory and Editor of the Journal. Dr. Johnston found that the security protocols in place were wholly inadequate and essentially 100% ineffective in promoting a tamper resistant voting environment. Both the Illinois State Board of Elections and the Chicago Board of Elections have received copies of this report. Mayor Emanuel and the Chicago City Council have a copy. The Illinois Legislature is also being informed. In each case Defend the Vote is seeking to personally discuss security lapses in Illinois election systems. Copies of the report can be downloaded from this link. This report includes a section on Additional Vulnerabilities outlining additional security issues found in Chicagos elections practices. What is the Chicago Board of Elections planning to do about it?

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In a separate study, Defend the Vote has identified serious irregularities in staffing of early voting sites in Chicago. Along with the Chicago GOP, we uncovered the use of non-citizens operating polling sites and involved with decisions involving US citizens right to vote. Incredibly, I-9 forms for 75% of the early voting employees that staff sites in Chicago are not filled out correctly. Defend the Vote will present this evidence to you and we are seeking your responses. Since the forms were acquired from your office, I assume you have a copy of the I-9s on file. We have an upcoming election. This practice must be remedied. Defend the Vote visited with officials from the Chicago Board of Elections. Please follow up and inform us on progress in addressing these deficiencies: 1) The I-9 forms at the Chicago Board of Elections are non-compliant with Federal law. Please respond with the remedy. 2) The use of non-citizens to run early voting sites and making decisions involving US Citizens in the polling place is unacceptable. What is your response? 3) The use of employees to run early voting is unacceptable. While it may be legal and sometimes necessary in smaller voting jurisdictions, in a voting population such as Chicagos, balloting should involve the use of election judges, all with equal power in the oversight of the election process. We ask for a response to our request to end this practice and switch to the use of election judges. In 2012, in addition to Election Day polling place procedures, Defend the Vote will be looking at security procedures surrounding early and absentee voting, the military vote, and nursing home voting. We want to pave the way to working cooperatively with you on these important projects. Immediately, we are looking to assess security surrounding the military vote. How is delivered, recorded and tallied? Secondly we are looking at early voting security procedures. In this study we will sample 10% of all early voting sites in each election jurisdiction. In consideration of the upcoming election, please assist us in answering our questions quickly. 4) While some of these answers require FOIA, (sent separately) we are also looking to speak with the individual in charge of election security at the Chicago Board of Elections. Who is that person? 5) Defend the Vote seeks to speak about our findings at the next Chicago Board of Elections meeting. We believe 30 minutes will be adequate to present our findings plus 15 minutes for discussion. Pending scheduling concerns, we will invite a security expert to address issues related to the system currently in place. We look forward to hearing from all of you! Regards,

Sharon Meroni Executive Director

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