Lindstrom 1 Nathan W.

Lindstrom Professor Trullinger World History 2, Circa 1600 Present February 28, 2010

History and Origins of British Sea Power

Across the span of human history few developments have had as far-reaching an impact as the development of the navy as a tool of warfare. Among the navies of the world, none have the rich history and long legacy of the British. And while the more colorful aspects of its history are well known, the origins of English sea power are remembered by few people. If historians were forced to choose a single event which signaled Britains ascent to global naval supremacy, that event would almost certainly be Drakes defeat of the Spanish armada in 1588 (Morgan). While very well-known within the annals of naval history, this event hardly stands alone in the rise of English maritime supremacy. Rather, the epochs of Henry VII and Henry VIII did the most to contribute to such, and it is these two individuals that are the main focus of this essay. Englands rationale for building maritime strength was based on three interrelated considerations: geography, geopolitics, and economics. Being an island, completely separated from continental Europe, it became quickly evident that England would either have to take to the sea or become a commercially insular nation. By the time of Henry VII it was also clear that the English Channel was the route of Europes then most important trade circuit: that between Flanders and Spain, including also traffic from Genoa and Venice to Bruges and then to Antwerp

Lindstrom 2 (Modelski and Thompson). In addition to these economic and geographic factors, the most important factor was the geopolitical factor, or as historians Modelski and Thompson state:

the strongest thread of continuity in the annals of British naval history is the strategic imperative of preventing maritime invasions from first the Danes and later the French, Spanish and Germans.

These factors provide the primary rationale behind the increases in English maritime strength throughout the 15th century and beyond. In the time period directly prior to the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, war at sea was a minor affair, with naval tactics showing little novelty or imagination. Usually it was beyond the capability of 14th century commanders to stage a naval engagement (Morgan). The primary function of a maritime vessel during this time period was to safely transport cargo or troops to a predetermined destination. In almost every case, ships travelling long distances would carry a fairly large contingent of troops. Most were heavily armed, but not designed for offensive or defensive naval operations; rather, they were limited to attempting to protect their cargos from piracy. A typical sea battle might consist of one ship ramming another, and then while entangled boarding and attacking the other vessel. This boarding would occur while both sides were busy decimating the other by arrow fire coming from bowmen placed in the high castles of each ship. The battle of Sluys in 1340 and the battle of Cercy in 1346 both exemplify this primitive mode of naval combat (McKee). What is most important for the purpose of historical contrast is not so much how these early battles were fought, but what the strategies and organizational techniques used in maritime

Lindstrom 3 combat by the English were during this period. As far as strategy is concerned, there seemed to be no coherent approach written or understood concerning maritime combat. Again, the primary goal was to get a ships cargo from point A to point B intact and, occasionally if the opportunity arose, pirating a weaker vessels cargo. Beyond these extremely broad guidelines there seems to have been no grand strategy put forth by the English. As a result, the organizational The method of

techniques used by the English during this time left much to be desired.

formulating a maritime combat force usually consisted of the reigning monarch mobilizing private merchant vessels. This method is explained in detail by Modelski and Thompson:

English kings had long maintained small collections of ships for various purposes but they very quickly developed a reliance on mobilizing privately-owned vessels in periods of crisis. An exchange relationship between the Crown and the towns on the English Channel Coast had been established even prior to the Norman Conquest. In return for some amount of autonomy and trading privileges, the towns were expected to supply fifty-seven ships with crews for fifteen days per year.

Another important factor pertaining to maritime organization was the amount of financial resources which were available. As was mentioned above, each English king did possess his own small contingent of ships, but it must be remembered that these ships were sole property of the king. They did not belong to the nation and therefore were frequently bought and sold in an arbitrary fashion. An excellent example of this was King Henry V: he had incurred so much personal debt during his lifetime that the lions share of his ships was sold immediately

Lindstrom 4 following his death (Cowburn). Even the English monarchs who were not burdened by debt did not have the huge financial surplus needed to fund a new state-of-the-art naval fleet. The reason that naval organization and strategy were not cultivated up to this point is because an English national navy did not exist. However, beginning with King Henry VII all this began to change. Henry VII and particularly his son, Henry VIII, were not only responsible for founding the English Navy, but they were instrumental in developing revolutionary weapons systems, strategies, and methods of organizing navies and naval operations. No other English monarchs did as much to further the development of weapons, strategies and organization as did these two kings. Henry VII had two primary goals which he sought to accomplish regarding maritime endeavors. The first goal was to create a naval fleet which was not dependent on mustering private merchant vessels, but was instead owned and operated by the state. The second goal was to build ships which were specifically designed and equipped to do battle at sea. By battle at sea Henry VII did not necessarily mean conventional battle, as was earlier exemplified by the battles of Cercy and Sluys, but a new and novel type of warfare in which the vessels themselves, rather than the troops on board, were the primary combatants. Henry VII undertook several bold, and for the time, revolutionary actions in order to achieve his visionary goals. There are three achievements which were particularly significant during Henry VIIs reign with regards to increasing English maritime power: the first was his practice of subsidizing the construction of vessels larger than needed for commercial purposes. Two examples of this were the battleships Regent and Sovereign, both built for him between 1486 and 1488 (McKee). One thing which made these two ships unique is that they were sailing ships which possessed four masts, instead of the usual two. Traditionally the oar galley had been the ship of choice for

Lindstrom 5 naval warfare and sailing ships were used for commercial activities. The sheer magnitude of these ships, i.e., having four masts, made them a novelty. The second significant maritime development of Henry VII's reign was a direct result of his first development: in order to maintain his new ships and modify his older ships it was necessary to build a dry dock large enough to accommodate them. This dock was built in Portsmouth, taking two years to complete, beginning in 1495 (Modelski and Thompson). It was the first dry dock ever built in England (McKee). The final and most important legacy of Henry VIIs reign was that the ships which Henry had built were permanent kings ships and were, in fact, intended to be the nucleus of a larger fleet (Cowburn). Henry VII left his son both an appreciation and knowledge of naval affairs and something much more tangible: seven sturdy warships (Morgan). Henry VIIIs achievements in increasing English sea power were numerous and enduring. So many were his contributions to naval knowledge that a review of them would easily constitute an essay in its own right, and are in fact the subject of more than a few history books. Sufficient for our purposes, however, are the following elements: first, the founding and rapid expansion of the English Navy; second, the revolutionizing of naval weaponry and strategy; and third, the formulation of an organizational infrastructure (Jokinen). In discussing why Henry VIII decided to found a permanent national navy and stimulate its proliferation, two precipitants are dominant. The highly charged geopolitical climate which existed through most, if not all, of Henry VIIIs reign was a constant incentive for naval expansion. Unending threats from France, Scotland, and occasionally Spain and other European countries were enough to make even the most stable personality xenophobic. And while naval expansion could easily be perceived as a geopolitical necessity, without financial resources and capital an English navy was little more than a fantasy. Henry VIII was able to turn his vision

Lindstrom 6 into reality (Rankin). His father had provided him with a core to work from, i.e., seven warships and a dry dock. Later in his reign he would also be able to tap a financial wellspring which came in the form of confiscated monastery properties (Modelski and Thompson). By combining a strong vision with a highly visible threat and adding the availability of financial resources, Henry VIII was able to multiply his original fleet to thirty-one ships in the first five years of his reign (Cowburn). By the time of the French naval raid on Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight in 1545 Henry possessed a navy which exceeded one hundred ships (Guy). To nautical historians the revolutionary changes in the ships and weapons which Henry VIII put in place are perhaps the most significant of all his feats. Henry VIIIs most important innovation was the introduction of proper ordnance unto ships (Cowburn). Until this point in history ships had been unable to carry heavy artillery such as cannon without the risk of sinking. But through the invention of waterproof gunports and a fundamental redesign of the large sailing vessels the concept of a floating gun platform was brought to reality (McKee). In contrast to the oar galleys which could only fire forward, the new warships of Henry VIII could fire from both flank and rear. In addition to the ability to fire in almost any direction, the larger weapons placed on these ships could also be used to effectively bombard castle walls and other types of landbased fortifications, softening resistance to amphibious assault (McKee). The ships Mary Rose and Great Harry are the best known prototypes of this new Henrican battleship. Henry VIIIs innovations were not limited to weapons and ships; he also created new methods of land and naval communications as well as methods of coastal fortification (Loades). More than any other ruler before or after him, Henry VIII converted naval warfare from an incidental, haphazardlyplanned event to a carefully-orchestrated military tactic.

Lindstrom 7 The ultimate test for Henry VIII and his navy came in the 1545 French naval raid. While many lives were lost in the attack, and his flagship, Mary Rose, was sunk, the English Navy at barely half the size of the attacking French force was able to repel the invasion (McKee). Thanks to his foresight in developing superior naval technology and tactics, Henry VIII repelled the French invasion attempt and forced a treaty in 1546 which strongly favored the English (Southworth). What makes Henry VIIIs maritime innovations so historically significant is that many of them were used for centuries after his death. He and his father had set a new course for the conduct of naval warfare. No longer were the oar galleys the warship of choice; the great ship with sails and broadside cannon quickly rendered all lesser vessels obsolete in battle (Southworth). Most important was the infrastructure and organizational foundation which Henry VIII and his father had built: the English Navy was now an enduring institution which belonged to the English nation, and not merely a possession of the monarch. A permanent organization was set up to supervise the building, maintenance, and supplying of ships. This organization evolved into the Navy Board which was instrumental in maintaining Englands long-term control of the seas (Southworth). Even present-day naval technology and battle tactics owe much to Kings Henry VII and VIII. They were truly revolutionary actors on the stage of naval history.

Lindstrom 8 Works Cited Barker, Richard. "Shipshape for Discoveries and Return." Mariner's Mirror (1992): 433-447. Cowburn, Philip. The Warship in History. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965. * Guy, John. Tudor England. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988. Jokinen, A. Henry VIII (14911547). 2004. <http://www.luminarium.org/renlit/tudor.htm>. Loades, David. The Tudor Navy: An Administrative, Political and Military History. Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1992. McKee, Alexander. King Henry VIII's Mary Rose. New York: Stein and Day, 1973. Modelski, George and William R. Thompson. Seapower in Global Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988. * Morgan, Kenneth O. The Oxford History of Britain. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988. Rankin, Mark. Imagining Henry VIII: Cultural Memory and the Tudor King, 1535-1625. PhD Dissertation. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1987. Southworth, John Van Duyn. The Age of Sails. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1968. The Mary Rose Trust. The Mary Rose Museum. February 2010 <http://www.maryrose.org>.

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