IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL ACTION NO.

1:12-cv-217

CHARLES E. CHERRY, JOSEPH L. PRYOR and ) ROBERT REYES, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) ) THE CITY OF GREENSBORO, ) ) Defendant. ) __________________________________________)

COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMAND

The Plaintiffs, Charles E. Cherry, Joseph L. Pryor and Robert Reyes, complaining of Defendant, allege and say: NATURE OF CASE 1. This is an action under Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to correct unlawful employment practices involving discrimination on the basis of race and national origin, and to provide appropriate relief to Plaintiffs and other employees who were or may continue to be adversely affected by these practices. The Plaintiffs are a Captain and two police officers formerly employed by the Defendant City of Greensboros Police Department (GPD) who were targeted for unwanted transfers, received other unjustified disciplinary actions, and ultimately were terminated from employment because of their race and national origin. 2. Plaintiffs Cherry and Pryor filed charges of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging a hostile work environment and were

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among thirty-nine officers who filed a lawsuit that is still pending, Alexander v. City of Greensboro, Middle District of North Carolina, Case No. 1:09-cv-934. Plaintiff Reyes also filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that the GPD was taking unjustified disciplinary actions against him, including suspension without pay and reprimands, because of his national origin and in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity, namely reporting the use of excessive force by a white officer against a black handcuffed prisoner and filing grievances about the GPDs discriminatory treatment of him. In retaliation for their complaints and because of their race and national origin, the GPD discharged all three officers on pre-textual grounds. Their careers shattered and their professional reputations called into question, former Captain Charles Cherry, Officer Pryor and Officer Reyes have been unable to serve the public in the role of police officer as a result of the discriminatory actions of the GPD. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, and

1343; 42 U.S.C. 1981a, 1983 and 1988; and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5. 4. This Court has authority to issue declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 2201 and 2202. 5. Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28

U.S.C. 1391(b). Defendant City of Greensboro is located in this judicial district and the employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within this judicial district. PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Charles E. Cherry is an African-American citizen and resident of

Guilford County, North Carolina. Captain Cherry was hired by the GPD on August 2, 1987 as a police officer and had been promoted to the rank of Captain by the time of the events complained 2

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of herein. He filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that the GPD discriminated against him on the basis of race and retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity on or about February 15, 2011, (EEOC Charge No. 435-2011-00277). On December 7, 2011 the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights (right-to-sue letter) for this charge, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 7. Plaintiff Joseph L. Pryor is an African-American citizen and resident of Guilford

County, North Carolina. He was hired by the GPD on January 16, 2003 as a police officer. He timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that the GPD discriminated against him on the basis of race and retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity on or about February 15, 2011, (EEOC Charge No. 435-2011-00278). On December 6, 2011 the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for this charge, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 8. Plaintiff Robert Reyes is a Hispanic citizen and resident of Guilford County,

North Carolina, whose ancestors national origin is Puerto Rican. He was hired by the GPD on August 18, 2008 as a police officer. He timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that the GPD discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin and in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity when the GPD took unjustified disciplinary action against him. This first charge was filed on or about February 15, 2011 (EEOC Charge No. 435-2011-00279). On December 20, 2011 the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for this charge, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. Officer Reyes was terminated from the GPD on May 2, 2011. He timely filed a second charge of discrimination against the GPD on or about May 13, 2011. (EEOC Charge No. 435-2011-00532). On December 20, 2011 the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for this charge, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.

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9.

Defendant City of Greensboro is a municipal corporation located in Guilford

County, North Carolina, established pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-1, et seq., and exercising all the powers and authorities permitted by the laws of the State of North Carolina. In the exercise of its statutory powers, the Defendant has established and operates the Greensboro Police Department (GPD) as a department of the City. 10. Defendant City of Greensboro has continuously employed at least fifteen (15)

people and more than five hundred (500) people in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year at all times relevant to this action and has continuously been the plaintiffs employer until their terminations, within the meaning and definition of 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), (g) and (h), and a person within the meaning and definition of 42 U.S.C. 1983. 11. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant City of Greensboro acted through

its managers and policymakers, including its Chief of Police and City Manager, and the acts, decisions, edicts, and practices of these persons represent the official policies of Defendant City of Greensboro. Throughout this complaint, all references to GPD are references to the Police Department operated by Defendant City of Greensboro. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 12. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, as specified in

paragraphs 6-8 above, all Plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC alleging violations of Title VII by the Defendant. All Plaintiffs received right-to-sue letters from the

EEOC with regard to those charges ninety (90) days or less before the institution of this lawsuit. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

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13.

The Plaintiffs were law enforcement officers duly certified by the State of North

Carolina. Charles Cherry was first employed by GPD in August, 1987. He was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1999, Lieutenant in 2002, and Captain in 2007. Joseph Pryor was hired as a

police officer by GPD in January, 2003. Upon information and belief, at some point after 2003, after David Wray became Police Chief, GPDs Chief and Deputy Chief directed subordinate officers to gather pictures of black police officers out of uniform to be used as line-up books or other visual aids for the purpose of framing, embarrassing, and wrongfully investigating and charging black officers with crimes, offenses and violations of law and GPD policies. 14. Following the discovery of this practice in 2005, and after numerous unsuccessful

internal efforts by GPD to address the workplace culture of racial harassment and intimidation of black and Hispanic police officers that the practice spawned, Plaintiffs Cherry and Pryor, along with numerous other officers, filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC alleging a racially hostile work environment. 15. In September 2008 after the EEOC charges referenced in paragraph 14 above

were filed, in a Command staff meeting attended by Captain Cherry, Captain John Wolfe, a white male, made a statement to the effect that he did not trust any of the officers who filed the EEOC charges. Assistant Chief Dwight Crotts, also a white male, expressed his agreement with Captain Wolfe, saying he didnt trust them either. Captain Cherry protested these statements, arguing that such distrust was unfounded and asserting that officers had a right to complain about racial discrimination at the GPD. None of the Departmental leadership, including the Chief and the Assistant Chiefs present at the meeting, contested the statements by Captain Wolfe and others that persons who filed EEOC complaints are not to be trusted.

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16.

Beginning in 2009, several African-American officers including Plaintiffs Pryor

and Reyes came to Captain Cherry with concerns that they were being unfairly treated, and being treated differently from white officers, because of their race and national origin. Captain Cherry first attempted to assist them with resolving the complaints informally through conversations, emails and memos. Eventually he assisted the officers with filing grievances alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. 17. In January 2009, Plaintiff Joseph Pryor was alleged to have kicked a suspect after

engaging in a foot chase of the suspect along with two white officers. The suspect allegedly suffered serious injury. Officer Pryor was investigated criminally and administratively by GPD. Officer Pryor actually suffered a knee injury while chasing the suspect, which temporarily incapacitated him and made it physically impossible for him to kick the suspect. The white officers involved in the chase stated that Officer Pryor had never touched the suspect. However, the white officers did state that they delivered knee strikes and superscapula closed fist blows to the suspect. GPD never investigated the white officers striking of the suspect. 18. GPD initially ruled that the suspects allegations were not sustained which is a

finding of insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the allegations. Upon Officer Pryors request, Captain Cherry assisted Officer Pryor with filing a grievance, which was submitted in March of 2010. As a result of the grievance, the finding was changed to unfounded. 19. In October 2009, Officer Robert Reyes reported an incident he personally

witnessed involving a white police officer using excessive force with, and communicating a threat to, an African-American man that the white officer was arresting. In just a few weeks after making this report, Sergeant Barwick, a white male, ordered Officer Reyes to ride with Corporal Chapman, a white male, as a disciplinary measure. 6 Officer Reyes subsequently

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received a negative performance evaluation, and unwarranted disciplinary memos were placed in his file without his knowledge. Officer Reyes was told by Assistant Chief Dwight Crotts he

could not file a grievance regarding the resolution of the appeal of his evaluation. Captain Cherry advised Officer Reyes on how to pursue a grievance and at Officer Reyes request, Captain Cherry assisted Officer Reyes in preparing the written grievance. 20. On December 7, 2009, Plaintiffs Cherry and Pryor were among numerous

employees who filed suit against the Defendant styled as Alexander v. City of Greensboro, Middle District of North Carolina, Case No. 1:09-cv-934. 21. Upper level commanders and the Chief of Police learned that Captain Cherry was

assisting other officers with filing grievances concerning racially discriminatory treatment. 22. Shortly after Captain Cherry, and Officers Pryor, Reyes, and Banks submitted

written grievances alleging racial discrimination and retaliation by the GPD in March of 2010, Captain Cherry was required by GPD to use the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). Assistant Chief Dwight Crotts gave Captain Cherry a pre-textual reason for this requirement, namely that Captain Cherry had an alleged inappropriate exchange with Captain Cheek. In this incident, Captain Cheek, a white male, referred to Captain Cherry using a derogatory term. During all times relevant to this Complaint, Black and Hispanic officers commonly endured being called derogatory names by white GPD command staff and officers, including token Black and wetback. Assistant Chief Crotts informed Captain Cherry that if he did not seek assistance through EAP, he would be required to undergo a psychological evaluation. 23. Although he had done nothing inappropriate, Captain Cherry complied with the

requirement and obtained confidential counseling as permitted by the Defendants employee assistance policies and procedures. 7

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24.

On May 14, 2010, Chief T.R. Bellamy stated in a command staff meeting, If

anyone thinks there is corruption in the GPD, they need to turn in their paperwork and get the hell out of here!! Captain Cherry was the only one who had written grievances or complaints alleging corruption. White commanders cheered and applauded the Chiefs statement. Approximately 30 minutes later Assistant Chief Crotts came to Captain Cherrys office and told him to stop helping officers write grievances and complaints. 25. On June 7, 2010, Captain Cherry was mandated to undergo a psychological

fitness for duty evaluation, even though he disclosed that he had utilized the EAP procedures. His gun and badge were taken and he was placed on administrative duty. The psychological recommendation memo gave as grounds for the evaluation that Captain Cherry had written seven grievances in three months and had made two complaints on another commander. The grievances Captain Cherry assisted officers to file alleged race discrimination, differential treatment of black and Hispanic officers and retaliation for engaging in protected activity. 26. On July 20, 2010 Captain Cherrys psychological evaluation was completed, no

disabilities were found, and he was cleared to return to duty by the Doctor performing his psychological evaluation. 27. On August 5, 2010 Captain Cherry was placed on administrative leave without

pay, charged with unfounded and petty rule violations. He was terminated by then-Interim Chief Dwight Crotts on August 30, 2010. He appealed his termination, which became final when upheld by the City Manager on October 28, 2010. 28. Other white officers, including other white Captains/Commanders and senior

officers employed by the GPD, have engaged in misconduct or violated departmental rules

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similar to or more serious than those Captain Cherry was alleged to have violated and were not disciplined, were not disciplined as severely, or were not terminated for that conduct. 29. The real reason for Captain Cherrys termination was because of his race and in

retaliation for his engaging in protected activities, including making complaints about racial discrimination and assisting other Officers with filing internal grievances regarding differential treatment based on their race and national origin. 30. On October 7, 2010, Officer Pryors termination, recommended by then-Interim

Chief Crotts, became final when his appeal was denied. Officer Pryor was terminated for a completely pre-textual reason, specifically that he allegedly lied about signing a piece of paper notifying him of an investigation relating to the incident in which a suspect accused Officer Pryor of injuring him. 31. Numerous white officers have been found responsible for significantly more

serious violations of departmental policy than Officer Pryor and have not been terminated. Many times complaints against white officers for misconduct or rule violations were not investigated. Officer Pryors termination was in fact motivated by racial discrimination and in retaliation for his having filed a grievance alleging that he was being treated differently because of his race. 32. As alleged above in paragraphs 19 and 22, Officer Reyes initially pursued a

grievance in March 2010 concerning the adverse disciplinary actions taken against him after he filed a report that a white officer used excessive force and communicated a threat to an AfricanAmerican suspect. In June 2010, GPD began an unfounded investigation of Officer Reyes for malicious gossip and untruthfulness. In August, 2010, Officer Reyes was given a polygraph test

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regarding these allegations and was suspended without pay. On August 30, 2010, then Interim Chief Crotts gave Officer Reyes a division level reprimand. 33. Officer Reyes was terminated on May 2, 2011, for insubordination for filing

appeals and complaints in September, October and November of 2010 over the division level reprimand he received without justification. This was an unfounded and pre-textual reason. Officer Reyes was terminated because of his Hispanic ethnicity, his national origin, and because he engaged in protected activity, complaining about an acts of racial discrimination by a white officer and then filing an EEOC complaint regarding GPDs treatment of him. 34. Similarly situated employees of the GPD who were not black or Hispanic were

not subjected to the unfounded disciplinary actions, adverse employment consequences and ultimately termination described herein. 35. The Plaintiffs race and national origin was a motivating factor for each of the

unlawful and retaliatory employment practices detailed above. 36. Each of the Plaintiffs was performing his job duties at a level that met or

exceeded the Defendants legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment actions described herein. 37. The Plaintiffs were engaged in activities protected by Title VII and were

discharged because of those activities. The Defendants stated reasons for terminating Plaintiffs are pre-textual and not the true reason these Officers were terminated. 38. The Plaintiffs sought administrative remedies for their terminations and

Defendant through its management instituted, approved and ratified the discriminatory acts described above.

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39.

The Defendants treatment of Plaintiffs was intended to discredit them publicly,

ruin their careers and reputations, and prevent them from asserting their federally protected rights to equal employment opportunities because of their race and national origin, and because they complained about, assisted in filing grievances over, and filed EEOC charges concerning race and national origin discrimination occurring in the GPD. 40. The Plaintiffs did in fact suffer harm to their careers and reputations, and they

each were deprived of equal employment opportunities because of the unlawful acts of the Defendants. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Title VII Claim for Race and National Origin Discrimination and Retaliation 41. 42. Plaintiffs rely herein upon all of the paragraphs of this Complaint. The GPD has committed acts, engaged in practices and implemented policies

which discriminated against the Plaintiffs because of their race and national origin, and retaliated against plaintiffs because of their opposition to and complaints of race and national origin discrimination, in violation of federal law including Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a. 43. As a result of Defendants violation of plaintiffs civil rights, each plaintiff has

suffered damages, including loss of income and benefits, loss of employment; mental anguish and emotional distress; embarrassment and humiliation; loss of quality and enjoyment of life; loss of reputation; and other damages to be proven at trial. 44. The Plaintiffs are each suffering continuing harm by being deprived of their

positions of employment with Defendant.

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45.

Plaintiffs are entitled to reinstatement, back pay and other equitable relief as

necessary to remedy the effects of Defendants discriminatory actions, and to protect Plaintiffs and other employees of the GPD from future violations of their rights. 46. Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief and to recover compensatory damages

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981a and 2000e-5.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 42 U.S.C. 1983 Violation Equal Protection 47. 48. Plaintiffs rely herein upon all of the paragraphs of this Complaint. Defendants actions described in this Complaint violate Plaintiffs right to equal

protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 49. As a proximate result of defendants violations of plaintiffs Constitutional rights,

each Plaintiff has suffered damages, including loss of income and benefits, loss of employment; mental anguish and emotional distress; embarrassment and humiliation; loss of quality and enjoyment of life; loss of reputation; and other damages to be proven at trial. 50. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their compensatory damages pursuant to 42

U.S.C. 1981a. 51. Plaintiffs are entitled to reinstatement, back pay and other equitable relief as

necessary to remedy the effects of Defendants discriminatory actions, and to protect Plaintiffs and other employees of the GPD from future violations of their rights.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs ask that the Court: 1. Issue a declaratory judgment that the acts, practices and policies of Defendant violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Constitution of the United States; 2. Issue an injunction requiring the immediate reinstatement of all Plaintiffs to their former positions, with salary increases, benefits and seniority, retroactive to the date each Plaintiff was terminated; 3. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant, its officers, agents, employees and all those acting in concert with the Defendant and at its direction, from continuing to engage in the unlawful and discriminatory acts, practices and policies complained of herein; 4. Order the Defendant to take remedial steps to ensure a non-discriminatory workplace for all its employees and officials, including but not limited to adopting appropriate policies and providing adequate training to all employees and officials responsible for making determinations regarding complaints of discrimination; 5. Order the Defendant to make each plaintiff whole for the loss he suffered as a result of the discriminatory conduct as alleged in this Complaint; 6. Award compensatory damages to each plaintiff to fully compensate each plaintiff for the pain and suffering caused by the Defendants discriminatory conduct as alleged in this Complaint, pursuant to and within the statutory limitations of Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a; 13

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7. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all amounts awarded in this action at the contract rate; 8. Award Plaintiffs their costs, disbursements and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in bringing this action as provided by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. 1988; and 9. Grant such additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury with respect to all issues raised herein.

Dated this 2nd day of March, 2012. /s/ Anita S. Earls____________________ Anita S. Earls (State Bar # 15597) Attorney for Plaintiff Southern Coalition for Social Justice 1415 Highway 54, Suite 101 Durham, NC 27707 Telephone: 919-323-3380 ext. 115 Fax: 919-323-3942 E-mail: anita@southerncoalition.org

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