MEMORANDUM OF LAW To: Atty. Charmaine Joy Filarmeo From: Atty.

Genevieve Penetrante Date: February 23, 2012 RE: Memorandum of Law

Questions Presented I. WHAT ARE IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES? II. WILL DISCREPANCIES IN THE SALN RESULT TO BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST? III. IF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST RESULTS TO IMPEACHMENT OF CJ CORONA? IV. WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS? Answers I. The grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust. II. Not every offense, not every omission is an impeachable offense. In other words, even a crime that has been committed is not impeachable offense. III. It depends on the credibility in the presentation of evidence. IV. There is no specific or precise degree of proof required in an impeachment case.

Facts

The action for impeachment is brought against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona in accordance with the provision of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, on the grounds of: (a) Betrayal of Public Trust; (b) Culpable Violation of the Constitution; and (c) Graft and Corruption. I. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WHICH CONTINUED TO HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE AND UP TO THE PRESENT. II. RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDERSEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. III. RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT [A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT. IV. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN IT BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARROGUTIERREZ.

V. RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA AND IN DECIDING IN FAVOR OF GERRY-MANDERING IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE. VI. Respondent Betrayed the Public Trust By Arrogating Unto Himself, And To A Committee He Created, The Authority And Jurisdiction To Improperly Investigate An Alleged Erring Member Of The Supreme Court For The Purpose Of Exculpating Him. Such Authority And Jurisdiction Is Properly Reposed By The Constitution In the House of Representatives via Impeachment. VII. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURTS OWN TRO. VIII. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.

Discussion I. As provided in the article of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas on Philippine Daily Inquirer dated February 6, 2012 it states that: Our 1987 Constitution provides the impeachable offenses. It enumerates the grounds for impeachment as culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other

high crimes or betrayal of public trust. The word other is significant. Under the eiusdem generis rule, when the law makes an enumeration of specific objects and follows it with other unspecified objects, those unspecified objects must be of the same nature as those specified. Thus for graft and corruption and betrayal of public trust to be grounds for impeachment, their concrete manner of commitment must be of the same severity as treason and bribery, offenses that strike at the very heart of the life of the nation. Grounds for impeachment are found in the US constitution, in our 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions. But there are differences in the enumerated grounds. The enumerated grounds for impeachment common to all of the above constitutions are treason, bribery, high crimes. Only the 1973 and 1987 constitutions mention graft and corruption. Betrayal of public trust is found only in the 1987 Constitution. II. The only ground for impeachment added by the 1987 Constitution is betrayal of public trust. The person responsible for the insertion of this provision said that it includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc., to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute. More generally, another commissioner said that it could cover any violation of the oath of office. However, the committee responsible for the article on Accountability of Public Officers accepted the narrower view that betrayal of public trust implied deliberate intent, perhaps even a certain degree of perversity, for it is not easy to imagine that individuals of the category of these [impeachable] officials would go so far as to defy knowingly what the Constitution commands. But, again, what it all comes down to is that since betrayal of public trust is enumerated as among an exclusive class of offenses, it must also be seen as having the same gravity as the other offenses in the class. In other words, not every violation

of public trust is an impeachable offense. Not every offense, not every omission is an impeachable offense. In other words, even a crime that has been committed is not impeachable offense. Give us evidence that could reach the level of impeachable offense. It should not be just any offense. It must be a higher bar because we are removing a chief justice,Senator-Judge Joker Arroyo said. III. It depends on the credibility in the presentation of evidence. Accordingly, in the recent article of Jelly F. Musico on Philippine Daily Inquirer dated February 2, 2012 it provides for the arguments of both parties. The prosecution said such dishonesty constitutes betrayal of public trust, an impeachable offense under the Constitution.However, retired Supreme Court Justice Serafin Cuevas, the lead defense counsel, said Coronas apparent failure to declare some of his properties, if for the sake of argument he did fail do to so as the prosecution had alleged, the act does not warrant dismissal from office. It calls merely for corrective action under certain provisions of the SALN Law, and some in cases that the Civil Service Commission had promulgated, he added. Salvador asked if any inaccuracy in Coronas SALN should be seen as an impeachable offense or merely violative of some administrative procedure. Under Article 2 of the verified impeachment complaint, Corona committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayal of public trust when he failed to disclose to the public his SALN as required under the Constitution. Article 3 accuses Corona of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayed public trust for lack of integrity, impartiality and propriety. Corona is facing eight articles of impeachment. Betrayal of public trust was added as among the grounds for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution, particularly Section 2 of the XI, Accountability of Public Officers.

IV. In Romulo B. Macalintal's article on Philippine Daily Inquirer dated February 8, 2012 : The defense argued that it must be proof beyond reasonable doubt since an impeachment case is akin to a criminal action; the prosecution, on the other hand, claim preponderance of or more than just a substantial evidence would be enough, because an impeachment case is an administrative case. There is no specific or precise degree of proof required in an impeachment case. Thus, a senator-judge can decide on the basis of the product of his own mind, to Senate President Juan Ponce Enriles repartee to a query raised by the prosecution. This means that the decision or the vote of a senator-judge, as well as the appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties, is left to each senators own sense of judgment. He is not bound by any standard or degree of proof in arriving at a decision. He is not even required to make his decision or opinion in writing. He may or may not explain his vote on judgment day. He will only be asked to rise and choose his answer: Guilty or Not Guilty. Whatever vote a senator-judge renders, the same is final and unappealable. It is not subject to any review by the Supreme Court or any court or agency. Conclusion As a summary, the grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust. Not every offense, not every omission is an impeachable offense. It depends on the credibility in the presentation of evidence. There is no specific or precise degree of proof required in an impeachment case. This means that the decision or the vote of a senator-judge, as well as the appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties, is left to each senators own sense of judgment.

Submitted Penetrante

by:

Genevieve

D.