Systems Research and Behavioral Science Syst. Res. 22,11^26 (2005) DOI:10.1002/sres.

551

&

Research Paper

Theory and Practice of Soft Systems Methodology: A Performative Contradiction?

Jac Christis*
Nijmegen School of Management, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Dissatised with the approach of systems engineering, Checkland set himself the task of seeing if system ideas could help tackle the messy problems of management. In the course of doing so, he developed a new, soft systems approach. It differs from the hard approach, rst, in the nature of its methodology and, second, in its use of the word system. Messy problems can best be handled by a soft systems methodology (SSM). And the word system is no longer applied to the world, but to the process of our dealings with the world: the word system does not refer to real systems in the world. The aim of this contribution is to show that the realism that is presupposed by and implicit in the practice of model application in SSM contradicts the philosophical theory of SSM, in which it is denied that we refer with our concepts and conceptual models to concept-independent things in the world. A central tool in achieving this aim is the Wittgensteinian distinction between language (how we speak) and discourse (what we say), between the meaning of the words we use and the truth of the statements we make. This tool enables us to avoid both the semantic objectivism of the metaphysical realist, according to whom the meaning of our words is determined by the things we refer to, and the ontological subjectivism of the constructivist, according to whom we do not think and speak about mind and concept-independent things in the world. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords systems; methodology; philosophy

INTRODUCTION In their practice, managers and organizational consultants are often confronted with situations
* Correspondence to: J. Christis, Nijmegen School of Management, PO Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: j.christis@nsm.kun.nl

in which there is no agreement on the nature of the problem at hand. According to Checkland, they are then confronted with so-called illdened or messy problems. In such a situation not a hard, but a soft systems approach is needed. Checkland uses two ways to distinguish between hard and soft system approaches. The rst refers to the nature of the problems that
Received 29 May 2002 Accepted 15 April 2003

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

RESEARCH PAPER have to be solved: well-dened versus illstructured, messy problems. Thinking about messy problems led Checkland to develop a new, soft systems methodology (SSM). The second way refers to the relation between language and the world, between concepts and the things we refer to with these concepts. In Checklands view, a concept like that of a system does not refer to systems in the world. Such concepts are devices that we use to investigate a world of which we only know that it is complex: Thus the use of the word system is no longer applied to the world, it is instead applied to the process of our dealing with the world. It is this shift in systemicity (or systemness) from the world to the process of inquiry into the world which is the crucial intellectual distinction between the two fundamental forms of systems thinking, hard and soft (Checkland, 1998, p. A10) In this contribution we rst present Checklands thinking about messy problems and about the role of concepts in our investigations of the world. In the next section, we critically examine the process of model building and application in SSM. We investigate the practice of the proposed methodology. In an immanent critique we confront what is presupposed in the use of models with what Checkland says we do when using models. In the nal section, we concentrate on Checklands subjectivist views on the nature of the relation between language and the world. We investigate the philosophical theory of the proposed methodology and criticize it in an explicit way. We will come to the overall conclusion that the realism that is presupposed in the practice of model use is denied in the philosophical theory of Checkland. Such a contradiction between what we do and what we say we do is called a performative contradiction and the aim of this paper is, rst, to show that Checkland is entangled in such a contradiction and, second, to show how the contradiction can be resolved by using the Wittgensteinian distinction between language and discourse.
Copyright 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Syst. Res. CHECKLAND ON MESSY PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTS Well-Dened and Messy Problems: The Development of SSM According to Checkland, systems engineering or the hard systems approach is only applicable in situations in which goals or needs are given: the whole of this approach is predicated on the fact that the need and hence the relevant need-meeting system, can be taken as given. Systems engineering looks at how to do it when what to do is already dened. This was found to be the Achilles heel of systems engineering, however, when it was applied . . . to ill-dened problem situations. (Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. 17) Ill-dened or messy problems are characterized by the fact that both the what and the how of problem solving are unclear. Because organizations, as open systems, have to reach many different goals, have to meet many different needs or have to solve many different problems simultaneously, messy problems will be the normal case. In such a situation many different but plausible denitions of system objectives (are) possible. In this situation systems engineering methodology falls down (Checkland, 1995 p. 50). SSM offers a methodology for an inquiring process in which different system models of the problem situation are used to structure a debate with people who have a concern for the problem situation. The launch of a new product, for example, will be seen differently by production managers, by sales managers, by planners, by union ofcials, by competitors, by customers, etc. So, it will be possible to build many models of a system to launch a new product, each embodying a different world view (Checkland, 1995, p. 50). All these different models are used to structure the debate about problems and solutions. If in the debate some form of accommodation between the interested parties will arise, action can be taken to improve the problem situation. SSM consists of a stream of cultural analysis and a logic-based stream of analysis. Furthermore, it
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Syst. Res. can be performed in two modes: in mode one as an external recipe and in mode two as an internalized model (Checkland, 1998, p. A36). In this contribution we concentrate on the role that system models play in the logic-based stream of analysis in both performance modes.

RESEARCH PAPER The Purpose of our Investigation To avoid misunderstandings about the content and nature of this critical examination of SSM we will delineate the topic and problem that is addressed, the tools and methods that are used and the solution that is offered. The topic of this contribution is the reality or objectivity of the things we think and speak about and the constructivist thesis that: there is no objective reality which can be discovered by researchers and replicated by others, in contrast to the assumptions of positivist science. (Walsham, cited in Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 22) So, the topic is not the interpretivist thesis that social things require interpretive understanding instead of causal explanation. The interpretive approach is based on a real, ontological distinction between physical and social things and restricts the correctness of the positivist or empiricist approach to physical things on the assumption that physical regularities (as against social regularities) are entirely unaffected by our having theories about [them] (Checkland and Holwell, 1998 p. 19): the hypotheses which natural scientists test concern the natural regularities of the universe, and all the evidence is that these are invariant . . . When we turn to human affairs, however, and to social phenomena, it is far from obvious that the same experimental hypothesis-testing approach applies . . . The methods of natural science, extremely productive in enabling external observers to discover the regularities of the natural universe, are exceptionally difcult to apply to human affairs. (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 19) To treat the topic of interpretivism properly would necessitate a discussion of what we mean by causes, causal laws and causal explanations, of the differences between empiricist and realist notions of causality and of the realist combination of interpretive understanding and causal explanation in the social sciences, as in Webers sociology (see Kalberg, 1994) or Bhaskars (1979) critical naturalism.
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Concepts and their Referents: The Concept of a System Thinking about messy problems resulted not only in the development of a new methodology, but it motivated Checkland also to rethink the nature of the concept of a system and its relation to the world. According to Checkland, hard system theory makes the mistake of thinking that systems are real things in the world instead of concepts or devices that we use to investigate a world that remains unknown: This may seem a pedantic point, but it is an error which has dogged systems thinking and causes much confusion in the systems literature. Choosing to think about the world as if it were a system can be helpful. But this is a very different stance from arguing that the world is a system, a position which pretends to knowledge no human being can have. (Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. 22) According to Checkland it is a canard [to think] that human activity systems exist in the real world, rather than as devices to explore it (Checkland, 1995, p. 53). We could say that, philosophically spoken, the hard approach is a realist and the soft approach an anti-realist, subjectivist or constructivist one. Basically, subjectivists (or anti-realists) hold that the world we observe and know is a world that is constituted, created or constructed by the concepts we use in our observations of and statements about the world. They conclude either that empirical truth is language dependent, or that truth can be dispensed with: according to Checkland empirical model validation plays no role in SSM (Checkland, 1995, p. 54). Realists say that we think and speak about mind and concept-independent things in the world. The truth of what we say is determined by the way things are in the world.
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RESEARCH PAPER The problem addressed is whether it makes sense to abandon the notion of the real world and empirical model validation, while continuing to compare models with the world to generate knowledge about that world in order to solve real-world problems (Tsouvalis and Checkland, 1996). The problem is also whether it makes sense to say that there are no systems in the world while at the same time maintaining that you can organize the process of inquiry into the world as a learning system (Checkland and Holwell, 1998). The cause of the problem is diagnosed as the inability to distinguish between language and discourse, between the meaning of the words we use and the truth of the empirical statements we make about things in the world. Without this distinction philosophers are inclined to say that, by constructing the concepts we use in empirical statements, which indeed we do, we construct the things we refer to in such statements: Language as a medium does not simply reect the world out there but constitutes it in the social process of interaction (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 48). In this way, philosophers are inclined to treat concepts as lters or veils between us and the world as it really is and of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever instead of as tools or instruments that enable us to speak about language-independent things in the world. Our most important tool, then, will be the Wittgensteinian distinction between language and discourse, between how we speak and what we say, between the (meaning of the) concepts we use and the (truth of the) empirical statements we make. This distinction enables us to conduct a grammatical or conceptual investigation of the concepts used by Checkland and to compare the results with the actual practice of SSM. So, our method will be an immanent critique of SSM (in the section on the practice of model building and application) in which we confront what Checkland says we do when we use models with what we actually do and with what is presupposed in the use of such models. And our method will be an explicit critique of Checklands philosophy (in the section on the subjectivist theory of Checkland). We will show where he transgresses the bounds of sense when he speaks
Copyright 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Syst. Res. about the relation between language and the world. Our solution will be a form of realism that avoids the semantic objectivism of the metaphysical realist and the ontological subjectivism of the constructivist. In the discussion between realists and anti-realists, it is important to distinguish between realism about the things we think and speak about and realism about the meaning of the words we use in our statements about things in the world, as in the realism of Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein does not deny that we, for the most part, talk about language-independent things; he denies only that the latter constitute the meanings of our words, and hence that there are semantic connections between language and world. Empirical propositions refer to language-independent items and are veried or falsied by the way things are. (Glock, 1996, p. 275) According to Wittgenstein, a language or conceptual scheme does not state or describe anything and so does not mirror or represent the world: a language cannot be true or false. But we use a language to make statements about language-independent things in the world. These statements are true or false according to how things are in the world. Using this distinction between language (how we speak) and discourse (what we say), between the meaning of our words and the truth of the statements we make, we can say that Wittgenstein is an antirealist with regard to language and meaning and a realist with regard to discourse and truth, that is, with regard to the things we think and speak about. In this way, Wittgenstein avoids both linguistic realism (language mirrors the essential structure of the world) and linguistic idealism (we construct the world with the language we use). It is important to note that our critique is aimed not at what we do when we use models in SSM but at what Checkland says we do when we use models. Checkland sometimes complains that discussions of SSM are: often awed by the apparent inability of many commentators to understand the shift of the
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Syst. Res. notion of systemicity in SSM: from assuming that the world contains systems to assuming that the process of inquiry into the world can, with care, be organized as a learning system. (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 157) In this contribution, we understand and agree with the motive for and kernel of truth of this shift: the language and concept dependence of what we can say about things in the world. But we deny the sense of this shift and show that such a shift cannot be inferred from the concept dependence of what we can say: our language or the concepts we use determine what we can say, but the truth of our statements, of what we actually say is determined by the way things are in the world.

RESEARCH PAPER were thought of as failing. The basic structure is shown in gure 1.4 [Figure 2], and there are a number of examples of such models later in this book. (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 16) As Checkland and Holwell note, this basic, formal structure remains the same in all conceptual models. To give content to such a formal model, you have to dene the goals of the human activity system at hand. These goals enable you to formulate the activities and the norms with which these activities are monitored and controlled. Because goals are desired or preferred states, they imply a set of values or a worldview (Weltanschauung). Goals and values are stated in so-called root denitions of the system. When we have dened the system, we can develop a conceptual model in which the activities are dened that a system has to perform to reach the goal as stated in the root denition. Thus, conceptual models (CM) are based, in form, on a control loop model (CLM) and, in content, on a root denition (RD). These three elements together form the model-building phase or stage of SSM. In the application stage, these CMs are compared with reality and used for a structured exploration of and debate about the problem situation. When compared with reality, the debate is rst of all on empirical or descriptive matters. A CM consists of a named set of activities and their connections, that dene what a system should do to be the system it is. With the help of this model the presence or absence of these activities, and these connections between them, could be seriously investigated (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 161). Questions asked and answered are Does this activity exist? How is it done? Who by? (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 161), but also: Are norms of efcacy, efciency and effectiveness formulated and used, in what way, by whom, and are these norms reached? Because these are straightforward empirical questions, we call this stage, in which models are used to explore or investigate reality, the empirical stage. So, in the conceptual stage a general control loop model and root denitions are used as input for the development of conceptual models that
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THE PROCESS OF MODEL BUILDING: A REALIST PRACTICE The Logic-Based Stream of Analysis: The Use of Models As said before, we will concentrate in this contribution on the use of models in the logicbased stream of analysis in both the rst and second, experienced or internalized mode. Conceptual models of human activity systems occupy centre stage in the logic-based stream of analysis. Humans involved in real-world problem situations are trying to take purposeful action. A human activity system is dened as (the idea of) a set of activities linked together so that the whole set, as an entity, could pursue a purpose (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 13). To be a conceptual model of, for example, a library, the conceptual model has to have form and content. The form is that of a simple control loop model with negative feedback: in order to be able to learn, the system has to monitor and control its set of primary activities: the models of human activity systems used in SSM consist of a structured set of activities constituting an operational sub-system within a boundary, together with a monitoring and control sub-system which could in principle modify the operation or their structure if they
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Syst. Res.

Figure 1.

Conceptual and empirical models in the soft systems methodology

are used in the empirical stage, among other things, to establish the presence and absence of and connections between the activities named in the conceptual model. The result of this investigation, of this comparison between conceptual model and reality, is an empirical representation or description of what the system actually does, framed in the concepts of the conceptual model. We will call such an empirical representation or description an empirical model of what the system actually does (see Figure 1). Root denitions, the control loop model and the conceptual models all belong to the nonempirical, conceptual phase of the process of inquiry. They form the language or conceptual scheme in which the empirical investigation is carried out. To show what we mean by the nonempirical nature of concepts and conceptual models we take a closer look, rst, at the control loop model and then at root denitions and conceptual models. Next, we look at the empirical stage, in which an account of the problem situation is given. We call such an account an empirical representation or empirical model of

the problem situation. Finally, we clarify the problem of the objectivity and completeness of empirical models by comparing them with maps of a territory.

The Control Loop Model: The General Form or Basic Structure of Conceptual Models Conceptual models are based on root denitions and a general control loop model or a model of a system with negative feedback. In this control loop model a system is dened by Checkland as a transformation that is monitored and controlled with the help of norms of efcacy (does the transformation work?), efciency (with a minimum of resources?) and effectivity (does the transformation meet the longer term aim as formulated in the worldview?). Both the crude models of mode 1 as the sensemaking models of mode 2 have this general form or basic structure (compare models 6.1 and 6.2 in Checkland and Howell, 1998). Their difference is not in form but in content: mode 2 models are

Figure 2. The control loop model (see Checkland and Howell, 1998, p. 15, gure 1.4) Copyright 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 22,11^26 (2005)

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Syst. Res. rich in content, which is measured by the number and nature of the activities named in the model. Note that, although rich in content, the models remain simple in form. That form could be made complex by introducing conceptual distinctions and renements within the general control loop model, as for example in the viable system model of Stafford Beer (1979) or in the modern sociotechnical model of Ulbo de Sitter (1993). After having established the use of a general CLM in both mode 1 and mode 2 of SSM, we will now investigate the nature of this model: is it an empirical model that can be validated by the way things are in the world? Our answer is, that a general CLM (whether in its simple or complex form) does not describe a system with negative feedback, but denes what such a system is: a transformation that is monitored and controlled with the help of norms. The basics of the model are explained in Ashby (1956) and rened in different ways in the sociotechnical models and the viable system model. Of course, we call it a model of a system with negative feedback, but if we ask of which concrete system? we can only answer of all concrete systems with negative feedback. This is not an empirical discovery, reached by inductive generalization over all concrete systems. Such an induction would presuppose that we know what a system with negative feedback is. Without this conceptual model we could not classify things in the world as systems with negative feedback. And with this conceptual knowledge we can look and see what systems can be properly classied as systems with negative feedback and we can design such systems in the world. We can, for example, design an inquiring process as a learning system. Thus, a control loop model of a system is not a description of a concrete system or of all systems. Instead, we dene with the model what a system with negative feedback is, what will count as an example or instance of a system with negative feedback. When we use such a conceptual model in the investigation of the world, the result will be an empirical description or descriptive model, framed in the concepts of the conceptual model. From now on, we will call a descriptive model an empirical model and a dening model a
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RESEARCH PAPER conceptual model. Formulated in Wittgensteinian terms, a conceptual model in the form of a control loop model is not an empirical representation, but a norm of representation.

Root Denitions: The Nature of the System or the Goal that Should be Reached To give content to the formal model we need to know the nature of the system we are going to model. In SSM this is done with the help of root denitions of the system at hand. So, the second input of a conceptual model of a system is the root denition of the system. In fact, the process of inquiry starts with such root denitions. Root denitions of systems can be formulated with the PQR model: a system to do P, by Q, in order to achieve R. To do P refers to the transformation. By Q species the activities that are needed to do P, that is, to transform an input into an output. In order to achieve R refers to the worldview that makes the transformation meaningful: the higher-order goal or longer-term aim of the transformation. An example would be a denition of a library as a system to transform a local population into a better-informed population, by lending books, in order to enable better decision making by the local population on the topics at hand. A more extensive alternative are CATWOE denitions in which customers, actors, the transformation, the world view (the longer-term goals), the owners and the environmental constraints are dened. Different root denitions represent different perspectives on or ways of looking at the system. The central element of both the PQR and the CATWOE model is the denition of the transformation. Such a denition is not a description: to say that a public library transforms a local population into an informed population (Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. 34) is not an empirical description of a library. It is a denition of what a library is, of what a library should do, to be a library. Of course, we can dene a library and its goals in different ways (to inform, to educate, to entertain) and a system like a library can and will normally have multiple goals. And Checkland is right in maintaining that
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RESEARCH PAPER denitions, being prescriptive, cannot be empirically validated: you cannot choose between different denitions of a library by looking at what libraries actually do. It is the other way around: by dening what a library should do, it becomes meaningful to investigate what it actually does. But Checkland seems to suggests that all system denitions are possible. However, to dene a library as a system that transforms books into dog-eared books (Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. 34) is to show that you do not understand what a library is, although, of course, books get dog-eared in a library. Libraries have many outputs or effects on their environment. These outputs or effects can be manifest or latent, acknowledged or unacknowledged and intended or unintended. By imposing a value scheme on causes and effects, desirable outputs or effects become goals and undesirable outputs or effects become problems (Luhmann, 1974). In that sense, dog-eared books can belong, not to the goals, but to the problems of libraries, that is, to the acknowledged but unintended and undesirable side effects of lending books in order to inform, educate and/or entertain a local population. So, root denitions, being prescriptive norms of representation, cannot be empirically validated. They belong to the conceptual, non-empirical stage of the investigation. Although denitions cannot be true or false as descriptions can be, and although different denitions are possible, we can exclude some proposed denitions by using the distinction between sense and nonsense.

Syst. Res. description of purposeful human activity conceived as a transformation process, always embodies a particular world view. It is an account of what the system is, while a conceptual model is an account of what the system must do in order to be the system named in the denition. (Checkland and Tsouvalis, 1997, p. 158) As we saw before, a root denition as an account of what the system is is not an empirical description of its actual goals, but a description of the goals it should have: it denes what the system should be in terms of its goals. In the same way, the conceptual models, based on root denitions, are not descriptive, empirical models: they dont describe what the system actually does, but dene what the system must do in terms of a negative feedback model. So, just as with root denitions and the control loop model, conceptual models function as norms of representation. It is obvious that different root denitions will result in different conceptual models because they embody different perspectives on the problem situation. In addition, the same root denition can result in different conceptual models, because the same root denition can be conceptually elaborated in different ways. In that sense, root denitions do not determine but structure or guide the development of conceptual models: different, but not all conceptual models are possible. The construction of conceptual models is a crucial and difcult part of SSM: to construct a conceptual model, you have to understand what it means to inform, educate and/or entertain people by lending books. Thus, conceptual models are conceptually constrained, both by their root denitions and by the use of a negative feedback model. Up until now we were preoccupied with the conceptual, non-empirical, model-building stage of SSM. We have seen that concepts and conceptual models are norms of representation that dont describe anything and so cannot be true or false. They are the instruments or tools of our languages that we use in empirical statements about things in the world. In that sense questions of meaning antecede questions of (reference and of) empirical truth. Raising the
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Conceptual Models of a System: Naming the Activities that Should be Performed A root denition and the control loop model form the input of a conceptual model of the system. The conceptual model itself is the result of an answer to the question what the system must do in order to be the system as dened in the root denition: The purpose of the conceptual model (CM) is notionally to accomplish what has been dened in the root denition. A root denition, being a
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Syst. Res. question of the status of models in SSM, Checkland says: Clearly they are not would-be descriptions of the world, and hence cannot be tested by checking how well they represent the world, since this is something they do not purport to do. (Checkland, 1995, p. 52) As far as conceptual models are concerned, Checkland is perfectly right, but this is true of all conceptual models. But these models are used to explore and give an account of real-world problem situations by comparing them with reality. To this stage we now turn.

RESEARCH PAPER The reection and debate is structured by a number of systemic models. These are conceived as holistic ideal types of certain aspects of the problem situation rather than as accounts of it. It is taken as given that no objective and complete account of a problem situation can be provided. (von Bulow, cited in Checkland, 1995, p. 51) We will rst look at the question of empirical model validation. Next, we investigate the meaning and possibility of an objective and complete account of a problem situation. An account of a problem situation is not a conceptual model but the result of the use of such a model in the comparison or empirical stage of the inquiring process. What does such a result consist in? Such a result can be fourfold (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, pp. 161162). Because the conceptual model names a set of activities that the system should perform to be the system it is and a set of norms that a system should reach to be the system it is, the rst result consists in answers to questions about primary activities (Does this activity exist? How is it done? Who by? How is it judged? (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 161), about their connections, about monitoring and control (are activities monitored and controlled?) and about norms (are norms of efcacy, efciency and effectiveness formulated? Are these norms reached?). These are straightforward empirical questions with answers that have to be empirically checked. So, the rst result is an empirical account of what the system actually does and the norms it actually reaches, framed in the concepts of the conceptual model. This account can then be used, second, to consider possible groupings of similar activities, third, to dene attitudes and skills needed for the performance of these activities and, fourth, to dene the information systems that are needed. Obviously, these further uses depend on the nature and truth of the rst result: the presence or absence of these activities, and these connections between them (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 160): false statements about these activities and their interconnections, will negatively inuence statements about possible groupings, required attitudes and skills and needed information systems.
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The Comparison Stage: The Question of Empirical Representation and Validation Concepts and conceptual models dont describe anything and so cannot be empirically validated. They are used to make empirical descriptions, representations or models of things in the world. In a hard approach like system dynamics the concepts of positive and negative feedback, rates and levels are used to make empirical models of systems in the world. If these models do not represent the system correctly they will lead to wrong policy prescriptions. Therefore, these models have to be empirically validated. According to Checkland empirical model validation plays no role in SSM: In a hard approach models must be shown adequately to represent a part of the world; in a soft approach models have only to be internally valid, that is to say internally defensible against a set of principles which dene a particular kind of intellectual construct, a particular kind of epistemological device. (Checkland, 1995, p. 54) But the result of the comparison stage is an account of the problem situation. If such an account is not true or objective and complete, false policy recommendations will be made. Checkland not only seems to suggest that no such empirical validation plays a role in SSM, he also holds the opinion that no objective and complete account is possible:
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RESEARCH PAPER To describe the presence, absence and interconnections of activities and at the same time denying the role of empirical model validation in SSM is an example of a performative contradiction: in what you say (empirical model validation plays no role in SSM), you deny what you actually do (describing the presence and absence of activities and so on). An account of the presence or absence of activities and their connections is, of course, an empirical description or representation of what the system actually does that can be true or false. We call such a representation an empirical, descriptive model. Of course, the use of different root denitions and conceptual models enables us describe different things. Does it follow that no complete, all perspectives and aspects encompassing account of a problem situation is possible? Well, that depends on what we mean by objective and complete. To answer this question, we compare empirical models with maps of a territory.

Syst. Res. they tell us is impossible to do is a nonsense thing, an unintelligible thing. (Putnam 1995, p. 40). Making a problem diagnosis is often called mapping the problem. So, let us compare the result of such a diagnosis (an empirical model or description of the problem situation at hand) with a map of a territory. To make a map, we need a grammar that denes the meaning of the signs that we use and a method of projection. The map itself is an empirical representation of the territory. As we know, we can make different maps of the same territory: road maps, vegetation maps, population maps and so on. All these maps are maps from a different perspective and so show us different aspects of or things in the same territory. Does it make sense to ask for a map without a perspective? No, for in that case we wouldnt have a criterion that tells us what about the territory is important for us. We can look at the territory as long as we want, but it will not tell us what is so important about it. What is important depends on us: going on a holiday, we need a road map, not a population map. So, there is no such thing as a map without a perspective. To represent the territory as it is and without using a perspective would amount to a duplication or mirror of the territory. But a map is not a duplication or mirror of its territory: A map is schematic, selective, conventional, condensed, and uniform. And these characteristics are virtues rather than defects. The map not only summarizes, claries, and systemizes, it often discloses facts we could hardly learn immediately from our explorations. (Goodman, 1972, p. 15) Does it make sense to ask for an all-perspectives encompassing, complete super map? No, for a territory has an indeterminate or indenite number of aspects that could all be used to formulate a perspective from which we can draw up a map. So, again, there is no such thing as an all-perspectives encompassing map: an indeterminate or indenite map is no map at all. So, to ask for an objective and complete map, meaning by that a map without a perspective or
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Empirical Models and Maps We can reformulate the objectivity problem in subjectobject terms: if a subject uses one perspective, only some aspects of the object become visible and, if the subject uses another perspective, other aspects of the object will become visible. This is something we all know. If we now dene subjective as a view from a perspective, then objective means a view without a perspective (Nagels view from nowhere or Williams absolute view) or an all-perspectives encompassing super view. Before accepting such a denition, we should ask ourselves whether such a contrast, dened in this way, makes sense. For, it could be possible that what we are asked to do (to give an objective and complete account) is not something we cannot do because we lack certain capacities, but because it is a nonsense thing: In fact, one might say that it is characteristic of Wittgenstein to try to show us that when philosophers say that we cant do something, say something is impossible, typically the thing
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Syst. Res. an all-aspects encompassing map, is to ask for a nonsense thing: it shows that the asker does not understand what the word map means. But can we, then, ask for objective and complete road maps, vegetation maps and so on? Not if we compare them with (constructivist) stories that create their own objects and so have no storyindependent reality to check for objectivity and completeness. But (realist) map makers are neither empiricist mirror makers nor constructivist storytellers: they dont confuse map and territory. This enables them, rst, to distinguish between changes in their maps (better descriptions) and changes in the territory (as when new things emerge). It enables them, second, to check whether their maps are correct and complete. Map makers combine epistemological relativism (different maps of the same territory are possible) with ontological realism (we distinguish between map and territory) and so avoid the judgmental relativism of the constructivist storytellers (Bhaskar). That is why their form of realism looks so much like the realism of Wittgenstein: it is a form of realism that is presupposed in what we do, say and think, for example, when we make or use maps. And that is why their transcendental arguments (in their Strawsonian form) look so much like Wittgensteins grammatical arguments.

RESEARCH PAPER problem identications and improvement proposals (later on we introduce further perspectives, like the one of a dean, for whom this bachelor course is a means to reduce access to the master). This exercise functions as a very useful evaluation of our course: note that in this contribution we do not criticize the practice of SSM! We only confront what we do in SSM with what Checkland says we do. So, imagine what would happen if we said to our students: Your description of the course and identication of its problems is not objective and complete, for it is a description only from the perspective of students. Their answer will be: If you mean by subjective and incomplete that these are our problems and not the problems of the teachers of the course (or of the dean of the faculty and so on), you are trivially right. But if you mean that the list of our problems as students is not complete and objective, then you are wrong. Either you tell us what problems we missed and which of our statements are false (which, if you are right, will make our account both more objective and complete) or you have to accept it as an objective and complete account. Of course, we dont say such things to our students. Instead, we discuss the accounts from both the student and teacher perspective in order to improve them in objectivity and completeness and then try to design improvements of the course in which both perspectives are accommodated. Note that such an accommodation becomes more difcult or less culturally feasible when we add the perspective of the dean. SSM also contains a cultural stream of analysis, but Checkland remains relatively silent on how an accommodation of interests can be reached in different situations.

Conclusion By way of conclusion, we can apply this comparison between maps and models to the development of a CATWOE denition and conceptual model of a bachelor course in system theory and the application of such a model to describe what is actually done in the course and to identify problems and propose courses of action to improve the course (we actually use this as a student exercise in our course). Because the course has an indeterminate number of aspects that could all be used to describe the course and identify its problems, students rst have to choose a perspective. In the exercise, students have to develop and apply models from the perspective of both students and teachers. This will result in different CATWOE denitions, conceptual models, descriptions of activities,
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THE SUBJECTIVIST THEORY OF CHECKLAND: CONCEPTS AND REFERENTS Checkland on Language and the World The distinction between language and discourse enables Wittgenstein to be a realist about the things we think and speak about and an
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RESEARCH PAPER anti-realist about the meaning of the words we use to refer to these things. Wittgenstein is neither a constructivist, who denies that we think and speak about mind and languageindependent things in the world, nor a semantic or metaphysical realist, according to whom the meaning of our words is determined by the things we refer to. According to the semantic realist, it is the business of our language to reect, mirror, represent or describe accurately the things we refer to with these concepts. Checkland belongs to the anti-realist, subjectivist or constructivist camp, for he is of the opinion that we create the perceived world with our concepts and ideas. But he also thinks that the perceived world yields or creates the concepts that we use to create the perceived world. So, he seems to be at the same time a semantic realist: What is being argued is that we perceive the world through the lter ofor using the framework ofthe ideas internal to us; but that the source of many (most?) of those ideas is the perceived world outside. Thus the world is continuously interpreted using ideas whose source is ultimately the perceived world itself, in a process of mutual creation like that shown in [Figure 3]. (Checkland and Scholes, 1990, pp. 2021) Checklands position is just the opposite of Wittgensteins position: while Wittgenstein is a realist with respect to the things we think and speak about, Checkland is a constructivist (our concepts create the perceived world) and while Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to the meaning of our concepts, Checkland is a seman-

Syst. Res. tic realist (the perceived world yields our concepts). Moreover, Checkland accuses the realist of confusing concept and object. The realist thinks that he uses concepts like apple, feedback loop or system, to refer to real apples, feedback loops and systems in the world. According to Checkland, this is a position which pretends to knowledge no human being can have (Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. 22). The fundamental difference between hard and soft systems theory is not so much marked by the distinction between well-dened and messy, illstructured problem situations. Instead: the crucial difference is between on the one hand an approach which assumes the world to be a complex of systems, some of which may be malfunctioning, and on the other an approach which makes no assumption about the nature of the world, beyond assuming it to be complex, but assumes that the process of enquiry can be organized as a system of learning. (Checkland, 1995, p. 53) In this way, Checkland sets up the constructivist contrast between appearance and reality, between the world as we know it (the perceived world) and the world as it really is and of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever.

Constructivism or Linguistic Idealism: Do Concepts Create the World? Lets take, now, thesis one: concepts create the perceived world (that is: the things we perceive). This thesis has a kernel of truth: without the concept apple, feedback loop and system, we

Figure 3.

The world interpreted by ideas whose source is the world itself Syst. Res. 22,11^26 (2005)

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Syst. Res. could not refer to apples, feedback loops and systems in the world and could not say things about them. Furthermore, with the use of different concepts we can observe different things in or aspects of the world and can say different things about them. But it is strange to say that concepts create their objects. The concepts apple, feedback loop and system do not create the apples, feedback loops and systems we perceive and talk about. Concepts like those of apple, feedback loop and system are created by us, but not the apples, feedback loops and systems we perceive or discover in the world. These are concept-independent things in the world, although there are of course no concept-independent statements about these things in the world. To be able to say things, to make a statement, we need a language (Wittgenstein), conceptual scheme (Strawson, Quine), vocabulary (Rorty) or lexicon (Kuhn). What we can say is determined by the language we use and there are things we can say in one, but not in another language, as every bilingual person knows. Thus, truth is not language dependent: what we can say depends on the language we use (how we speak). But the truth of the empirical statements we actually make (what we say) is determined by the way things are in the world. So, not truth, but effability is relativized to language, as Kuhn says after his lexical turn: A change in lexical structure . . . brings with it a correspondingly changed form of professional practice and a different professional world within which to conduct it . . . The point is not that laws true in one world may be false in another but that they may be ineffable, unavailable for conceptual or observational scrutiny. It is effability, not truth, that my view relativizes to worlds and practices. (Kuhn, 1993, p. 336; see also Glock, 1997) Note that to live in a different world means the same as to live differently in the same world. Interpreted in this way, Kuhn is neither a relativistic Kantian (as in Hoyningen-Huene, 1993), nor a nominalist (as in Hackin, 1993), but a critical realist (as in Niiniluoto, 1999, p. 224).
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RESEARCH PAPER So, when we use the conceptual models of SSM, sociotechnical system theory or the viable system model, we do not construct different worlds, but with the help of these models we observe different things in or aspects of the world. Even radical constructivists like Luhmann or Teubner dont think that concepts create their objects. Speaking about the systemic character of social things in the world, Patterson and Teubner say that: our decision about their systemicity is dependent upon observable self-organizing processes in the social world. Autopoietic systems are produced by self-organizing processes in the social world, not by scientic observers. We need careful empirical observation, therefore, in order to nd out which operations are recursively linking up to other operations in our eld so that in their concatenation they gain the autonomy of an autopoietic system (Paterson and Teubner, 1998, p. 460) Of course, without the concept of an autopoietic system, we could not observe and describe such systems. If concepts (like that of an autopoietic system) dont create their objects (like autopoietic systems), the crucial question becomes Where do they get their meaning from, do concepts conform to their objects, do they mirror or represent their object, as the semantic realist says?

Semantic or Linguistic Realism: Does the World Yield our Concepts? Now the central question is Where do these concepts come from, where do these words get their meaning from? Thesis two of Checkland states that the perceived world creates or yields these concepts. This thesis has again a kernel of truth: things like apples, feedback loops and autopoietic systems have similarities. These similarities can take the form of common properties, common functions or family resemblances. These real similarities enable us to categorize these things as apples, feedback loops or autopoietic systems: without these similarities, we could not
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RESEARCH PAPER apply our concepts or categories. But it is a strange thing to say that apples, feedback loops and autopoietic systems create the concepts of an apple, a feedback loop and an autopoietic system. And it is wrong to say, as the semantic realist does, that the meaning of our concepts is determined by the similarities between the objects we refer to with our concepts, that these similarities yield our concepts. The problem with this semantic realist thesis is not that there are no relations of similarity and difference between things. The problem is that there are too many of these relations. Things have an indeterminate number of properties that could all be used to dene a concept in terms of similarity and difference. From all these properties we have to select relevant ones which depend on our aims or values: The problem is that any two things are alike in some respect and different in others. So likeness alone is powerless to settle matters of categorization. In classifying dachshunds and Dobermanns together, horses and zebras apart, we distinguish important from unimportant similarities. That is, we make a value judgment. (Elgin, 1997, p. 177) Relevance is a highly practical, human and context-dependent affair. Things in the world do not tell us what similarities are relevant and what differences make a difference. That is up to us. So, we dont call some animals horses because they are horses (how could we know this?), but, from all the similarities and differences between these animals, we select important or relevant ones. This enables us to treat some animals as the same or equivalent, despite their differences and as different from other animals despite their similarities with them. In that sense, concepts dont mirror things in the world, but express and direct our interests (Wittgenstein, PI 570): concepts prescribe what they are concepts of, rather than objects prescribing the nature of their concepts (Hunter, 1990, p. 121): In an innitely varying world, the decision as to what level and kind of similarity/dissimilarity will count as equivalence is an arbitrary one: it depends among other things on how
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Syst. Res. many or how few categories will be most useful to us. The decision is dictated therefore by human considerations, not simply by the structure of things. From the innite number of possible groupings that are available, a linguistic community has chosen those that (for good reasons) it is interested in, and our language is structured accordingly. (Ellis, 1993, p. 95) Hunter (1990, p. 104), for example, imagines a community that distinguishes between benign animals and hostile beasts. Within this scheme, butteries and dogs are treated as the same and dogs and wolves as different. Although different from our scheme, there is nothing wrong about it: the differences between animals and beasts are real differences. The scheme expresses what this community thinks important; it expresses their forms of life. We can compare this with different biological classications. The scientic classications of the biologist, for example, can be based on intrinsic properties, on reproductive isolation and on evolutionary descent. These different classications will all differ from the specialist classications of, for example, the timber merchant, the herbalist or the gardener. And both the scientic and specialist classications will differ from the ordinary language classications we use when we are cooking: to classify garlic and onions as the same would have disastrous effects on our meals. This reects merely the immense variety of human interests and criteria of relevance. So, there are countless legitimate, empirically grounded ways of classifying things in the world. But if we discard the metaphysical thesis about the ultimate and essential structure of the world, the reality of those things is not in danger. You could call this form of realism promiscuous realism as Dupre does: The realism derives from the fact that there are many sameness relations that serve to distinguish classes of organisms in ways that are relevant to various concerns; the promiscuity derives from the fact that none of these relations is privileged. (Dupre, 1981, p. 82; see also Niiniluoto, 1999, p. 222)
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Syst. Res. To avoid anti-realist, subjectivist or constructivist conclusions, we only have to refrain from asking What are these things apart from our classicatory or conceptual schemes? Such a question suggests an unknowable world of things as they really are, beyond the world of the things of our different classicatory schemes. We should refrain from posing such a question, rst, because it is a nonsense question: there is no such thing as telling what something is without using concepts and classicatory schemes. To observe, perceive, describe, explain the world is either elliptical for observing things in or aspects of the world or nonsense. The world is not indescribable, but inexhaustible (Niiniluoto), it is an innite information load (Luhmann) or an ever yielding horizon (Husserl). There is no such thing as observing or describing the inexhaustible, the innite or the ever yielding just as there is no such thing as enumerating all cardinal numbers. We should refrain from it, second, because it helps us to avoid the kind of performative contradictions Checkland is involved in.

RESEARCH PAPER used this method in a constructive way when we showed the realism that is implicit in and the condition of the possibility of the practice of model building and application of SSM. And we used it in a critical way by looking at the philosopher in Checkland and his peculiar combination of anti-realism with regard to the things we speak about and realism with regard to the meaning of the words we speak with. In this way we showed the performative contradiction committed by Checkland: to do something in your practice and to deny the rationality of what you do in your theory of that practice. Our most important tool was the distinction between how we speak (our language or conceptual scheme) and the things we say (our assertions or statements made in this language or with this conceptual scheme). And our most important result was the refutation of semantic realism, the thesis that the meaning of our words is determined by the things we refer to with these words. We also showed that this refutation in no way endangers the reality or objectivity of the things we think and speak about: no constructivist conclusions follow from the refutation of semantic realism. REFERENCES
Ashby R. 1956. An Introduction to Cybernetics. Methuen: London. Beer S. 1979. The Heart of Enterprise. Wiley: Chichester. Bhaskar R. 1979. The Possibility of Naturalism. Harvester: Brighton. Checkland P. 1995. Model validation in soft systems practice. Systems Research 12(1): 4754. Checkland P. 1998. Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. Wiley: Chichester. Checkland P, Holwell S. 1998. Information, Systems and Information Systems. Wiley: Chichester. Checkland P, Scholes J. 1990. Soft Systems Methodology in Action. Wiley: Chichester. Checkland P, Tsouvalis C. 1997. Reecting on SSM: the link between root denitions and conceptual models. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 14(3): 153168. Christis J. 2003. Problems: objective facts or subjective constructions? (To appear.) Dupre J. 1981. Natural kinds and biological taxa. Philosophical Review 90: 6690. Elgin C. 1997. Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. Syst. Res. 22,11^26 (2005)

CONCLUSION The nature of our investigation of SSM was a conceptual or grammatical one. In a grammatical investigation we make explicit what is implicit in what we do, say and think. As such it resembles a transcendental argument as construed by Strawson and Bhaskar: Still, if it is the case that philosophy is, as I have claimed it can be, a conceptual science, then, like any science, it ought to be able to tell us something we did not already know: it ought to be able to surprise us. Philosophy does so when it (for the rst time) makes explicit what is already presupposed by the activities in which we engage; or when, to put it in another way, it shows the conditions of their possibility. (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 257) Although we wouldnt call philosophy a science and would point to the overlap between philosophy and science with regard to conceptual matters, the characterization is an apt one. We
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RESEARCH PAPER
Ellis J. 1993. Language, Thought and Logic. Northwestern University Press: Evanstone, IL. Glock H. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Blackwell: Oxford. Glock H. 1997. Truth without people? Philosophy 72: 85104. Goodman N. 1972. Problems and Projects. Hackett: Indianapolis, IN. Hackin I. 1993. Working in a new world: taxonomic solutions. In World Changes, Horwich P. (ed.) MIT Press: Cambridge, MA; 275310. Hoyningen-Huene P. 1993. Reconstructing Scientic Revolutions. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. Hunter J. 1990. Wittgenstein on Words as Instruments. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh. Kalberg S. 1994. Max Webers Comparative Historical Sociology. Polity Press: Cambridge, UK.

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Kenny A. 1994. The Wittgenstein Reader. Blackwell: Oxford. Kuhn T. 1993. Afterwords. In World Changes, Horwich P (ed.). MIT Press: Cambridge, MA; 311343. Luhmann N. 1974. Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalitaet. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt. Niiniluoto I. 1999. Critical Scientic Realism. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Paterson J, Teubner G. 1998. Changing Maps: empirical legal autopoiesis. Social and Legal Studies 7(4): 451487. Putnam H. 1995. Pragmatism. Blackwell: Oxford. Sitter UL de. 1993. A socio-technical perspective. In The Paradigm that Changed the Workplace, Eijnatten F van (ed.). Van Gorcum: Assen; 158185. Tsouvalis C, Checkland P. 1996. Reecting on SSM: the dividing line between real world and systems thinking world. Systems Research 13(1): 3545.

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