Rethinking Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations: Condemned to Nuclear Confrontation? Author(s): Mario E.

Carranza Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 6 (Jun., 1996), pp. 561-573 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645791 . Accessed: 25/03/2012 09:10
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RETHINKING INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEARRELATIONS

Condemned NuclearConfrontation? to E. Mario Carranza
On August 1994,speaking a rally thePakistani23, at in heldpartof Kashmir, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said: "I can confirm Pakistan possessestheatomicbomb,"addingthatan Indianattack on Pakistan couldtrigger nuclear "a holocaust bothcountries as possessatomic bombs."'Although Sharif'sstatement quickly was deniedbyhimself the and Pakistani government, incident the highlighted dangersof the present the Indo-Pakistani nuclearimpasse.Can India and Pakistan remain undeclared nuclearpowersindefinitely? Does the new international strategic environment makeIndianand Pakistani proliferation decisionsinevitable, on the or does contrary, it createthepossibility a peaceful of and enduring resolution of theirdispute?Can an Indo-Pakistani nucleararms controlregimebe decoupledfrom issue of Kashmir? the thesequestions imporis Answering tantto designa soundnonproliferation toward SouthAsia. strategy BothIndiaandPakistan believedto havethecapability produce are to and deliver nuclear notice.2According a recent to weaponson short report, they are in theprocessof miniaturizing nuclearwarheads makethemfit their to
Mario E. Carranzais a PoliticalScientistspecializingin nuclear in proliferation regional and is and security SouthAsia and LatinAmerica.Thisarticle a revised versionof a paperpresented thepanel,"RecentResearchin Nationalism, at updated Foreign Policy,and PublicOpinion," 23rdAnnual on of Conference SouthAsia, University Wisconsin1994. The author grateful Lloyd I. Rudolph, is to MarvinG. Weinbaum, Madison,November and SteveJackson helpful for comments an earlier on draft. ? 1996 by The Regents theUniversity California of of 1. See "Pakistani Rebuked A-BombRemark," Is 25 on New York Times, August1994,p. A7. 2. It is estimated by theend of 1995 Indiahad 425 kg of weaponsgradeplutonium that free fromnon-proliferation controls, enoughfor85 nuclearweapons.See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, WilliamWalker,World and Inventory Plutonium Highly of and EnrichedUranium 1992 (Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press,1993),pp. 160-61. On theother hand,Pakistanis believed havesufficient to highly enriched uranium produce to between and 25 nuclear 15 weapons"in a relatively short timeframe." LeonardS. Spector See and MarkG. McDonough,

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in If trends continue, theabsenceof a intotheir ballistic missiles.3 current regime,the next Indomeaningful bilateralor regionalnon-proliferation level,withdevastating efPakistani crisismaywell escalateto thenuclear the of populations, considering proximity bothcounfects bothcountries' on border. tries'majorcitiesto thecommon system brought This essay arguesthatthe changesin the international compelIndiaand Pakistan aboutby theend of theCold War willeventually and in the direction a nuclearsettlement thattheycan achieveprogress of resolution the of even without comprehensive a towarddenuclearization The first considers Kashmir The articleconsists three of sections. dispute. the bothcountries' and to incentives disincentives "go nuclear"after Cold wisdomon the IndoWar. The second sectiondiscussesthe conventional a and arguesthat recompetition theKashmir and dispute Pakistani nuclear The the regime can be decoupledfrom latter. gional nucleararmscontrol of the and finalsectionputsall thepieces together, considers implications the breaking link betweenKashmirand the nuclearissue for U.S. nonSouthAsia. proliferation policytoward

with when motivations Countries makethedecision "go nuclear" to converge The outweigh disincentives. end of theCold War capabilities, incentives and In the has affected secondequation. some cases (e.g., SouthAfrica), rethe thuschanging balthe security have disappeared, gionalthreats national to the to ance between incentives disincentives leadinga country forgo and and nuclearweaponoption.In thecase of SouthAsia, theregionalsourcesof and but changesin thetransregional global insecurity remain, thedramatic for since environments theendof theCold Wararemorepropitious strategic thanin the of a peacefuland enduring rivalry resolution theIndo-Pakistani past. SouthAsia. themselves from Both theU.S. and Russia have disengaged are and coopU.S.-Russian, Sino-U.S.relations predominantly Sino-Russian, to so erative, the "big three"are not likelyto riskrenewedconfrontation can playoff their former SouthAsian allies and thelatter no longer protect and one superpower the American Russianstrategic distancing against other. for statesto seek outside from regionmakeit moredifficult thesmaller the to New DelhioftheCold Warargument depriving support against India,thus
NuclearProliferation: Guide in Maps and Charts,1995 A withEvan S. Medeiros, Tracking for Peace, 1995), p. 97. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment International 3. LeonardSpector, personal communication.

and Incentives Disincentives to "Go Nuclear"

MARIO CARRANZA563 E.

a predominance theregionand creating golden over legitimize military its neighbors. opportunity Indiato mendfenceswithits smaller for for improve the 1990s,India's arguments rein As Sino-Indian relations becomeless convincnuclear armscontrol regime jectingan Indo-Pakistani confidence-building border ing. India and China signed four significant in September the 1993andChinasupports SouthAsianAssociaagreements relations continue imto tionfor (SAARC). Ifbilateral RegionalCooperation of assurances members a prospective to prove,China's negativesecurity becomecredibleforIndia, zone in SouthAsia might nuclearweapon-free Tibet and suspends if nuclearweaponsfrom particularly China withdraws for settlement thus the military to Pakistan, increasing prospects a definite aid regime South in of theSino-Indian dispute a nuclear and armscontrol border security reAsia. As Chinabecomesmoreengagedin a global cooperative Regime)it willhaveto Control gime(e.g., ifitjoins theMissileTechnology technology Pakistan.In to imposelimitson the sale of advancedmilitary aggressive policies foreign policybehavior (adopting spiteof its ambivalent moreinterits China is arguably whilediplomatically engaging neighbors), expansionist its miracle" thanin pursuing estedin consolidating "economic unsolved, areas.Although Taiwanissue remains the goals in its surrounding ASEAN countries overthe Chinahas agreed begina dialoguewith to several the islandsin theSouthChinaSea, and is negotiating reducdisputed Spratly in areas tionof military forces and confidence-building measures its border and Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan.As with the Russian Federation, confiof Chinabecomesa fulldialoguepartner ASEAN, itcouldsignsimilar with Asian neighbors.4 dence-building agreements its Southeast In thebroader Japan, Russia,China,and theU.S. agreedto Asianpicture, issues withthe in security dialogueon military participate a multilateral Forum of (ARF) took ASEAN states. The first meeting theASEAN Regional securin 1994andmaypave thewayfora cooperative place inBangkok July in Asia. The October1994 U.S.-North ityregime East Asia and Southeast of in Korean"AgreedFramework" well result thedenuclearization the may and towardregionalnon-proliferation deKorean Peninsula.As progress Asia Asia (theSoutheast and is nuclearization made in Northeast Southeast on Zone treaty signedin Bangkok December15, was Nuclear-Weapon-Free conflict of for 1995),international pressures thesettlement theIndo-Pakistani if will increase, banning particularly Arabsand Israelisreachan agreement in weaponsof mass destruction theMiddleEast.
of 4. China's application become a fulldialoguepartner ASEAN, approvedby senior to at by to on ASEAN officials April10, 1996,is subject fullapproval ASEAN leaders an informal Far Economic See in due summit to be heldin Jakarta December. "RegionalBriefing," Eastern 25 Review, April1996,p. 13.

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These changeshelp explainwhydespitetheKashmir conflict, other and unresolved bilateral disputes, neither IndianorPakistan declared has nuclear weaponstatus cope withsecurity to threats and/or deal witheach other. to Moreover, bothcountries' indebtedness their and dependence international on financial institutions theWest (particularly U.S.) moreleverageto give the obtain concessions IndiaandPakistan thenuclear from on issue,evenifthere are stillobstacles aboutChinesenuclear (suchas India'sconcern weapons)to a establish permanent non-proliferation regimein South Asia. Duringthe Cold War in theearly1980s,incentives clearly outweighed disincentives for bothcountries "go nuclear." "Indian threat" Pakistan's was to The paramount security concern; although Pakistan notpursue nuclear did a weaponcapabilityuntil after beingdefeated Indiain theDecember1971 war. For India, by the primary motivation was the conventional nuclearmilitary and threat posed by Chinaafter 1962 Sino-India the war,coupledwiththe"latent nuclearthreat" posed by Pakistan sincetheearly1980s. the Although thesemotivations existafter Cold War,thefearof trigstill a on gering full-fledged nuclear weaponprogram theother side has becomea for to with their nusignificant disincentive Indiaand Pakistan proceedfully in Proliferation incentives clear weaponsprograms. disincentives outweigh thecase of India and canceleach other in thecase of Pakistan. off international Because of the greater weight international of norms, conin in on decisionmaking India and Pakistan have increased straints nuclear theearly1990s.Forthefirst timein decadesbothcountries havecutdefense under from creditor After Cold War,a more spending, pressure nations. the IAEA andUnited Nations Councilmaythreaten assertive Security economic, with and sanctions political, evenmilitary against potential proliferators, the of NationsSpeof after precedent theUnited the possibility enforcing them, for countries deto cial Commission Iraq. This is a deterrent threshold on velop openlynuclearweapons,as shown by NorthKorea's decision to the negotiate scalingdown of its nuclearweaponoptionin exchangefor and nuclear Western diplomatic recognition, investments, trade, technology. to withtheWest,but Indiaand Pakistan in a stronger are position negotiate toward nonWar trend Koreancase is partof a globalpost-Cold theNorth and initiatives agreements. proliferation is On the otherhand,international status/prestigeno longerthe kindof normsare incentiveit was duringthe Cold War; as non-proliferation an the thatmay followfrom strengthened, negative consequences adopting or nuclearweaponscancel off,and nuclearposture deploying ambiguous the even in the case of regional could outweigh status/prestige incentive, withglobal status such hegemons pretensions, as India or Brazil. The new international situation slowlyconstraining nuclear is the diplomacy both of IndiaandPakistan, them moresensitive outside to for making pressures mili-

MARIO CARRANZA565 E.

although India is still tary restraint regional and armscontrol. example, For it considered joining an NPT hold-out, 1991-92 forthefirst in time seriously theTreaty, under significant pressure. U.S. regime The possibility a regional of non-proliferation in SouthAsia is conIndia's) conciliatory nuclear difirmed Pakistan's by (and to a lesserextent, in it plomacy the announced 1993 that had "capped," vis-a-vis U.S. Pakistan expressing strong support and "frozen" nuclear its program; Indiacontinues forglobal denuclearization a of efforts (including cut offin theproduction is fissile material) a non-discriminatory on basis.5 As progress madetoward of theelimination nuclear weapons thegloballevel,Indiais in theuncomat to fortable position claiming of that onlya globalapproach nonproliferation makessense whilerejecting non-proliferation proposals Pakistan'sregional the whichincreasingly appearas necessary bolster globalprocess.6 to The indefinite extension the Non-Proliferation of Treaty(NPT) in May on test 1995 andtheongoing negotiations a comprehensive ban (CTB) treaty in 1996putadditional on and international pressures India,Pakistan, Israelto nuclear and eventually signbothtrearefrain from declaring weaponstatus commitments. Pakistan'sofficial ties,or adoptequivalent non-proliferation it after policyhas alwaysbeenthat wouldsigntheNPT shortly Indiasignsit. bold non-proliferation proposals werecostDuring Cold War,Pakistan's the knewthatIndia wouldrejectthem. freebecausePakistan This is no longer version anyof of necessarily case. Now,Indiacan acceptsomemodified the it thePakistani NPT, e.g., if the proposals; could even signa reinvigorated at fivedeclared nuclear weaponstates signa CTB treaty the51stU.N. Genin Pakistan playthe can 1996.7On theother eralAssembly September hand, and to same game andjoin theNPT first isolateIndiapolitically diplomatically.

disarmament" of Despite the new international atmosphere "competitive arsenalsby nuclear treaties (U.S.-Russian [START I and II] to reducetheir
1993,pp. 19-20. For India,see Quarter no. see 5. ForPakistan, PPNN Newsbrief, 24. Fourth no. in Clinton, PPNN Newsbrief, Rao Prime Minister and President between thejointstatement 1994,p. 18. 26, 2nd Quarter offers (1) signtheNuclearNonto: include proposals non-proliferation regional 6. Pakistan's if safeguards full-scope under facilities if Treaty India does; (2) place its nuclear Proliferation nuclear installations; of inspections eachother's of a Indiaalso does so; (3) create regime mutual zone,and (5) a five-nation weapons-free of the (4) negotiate establishment a SouthAsia nuclear States,Russia,China,Inof consisting theUnited conference nonproliferation nuclear regional proposal). (theSharif dia, and Pakistan right withto its it it 7. Indiacouldjoin theNPT making clearthat wouldexercise sovereign period agendain a certain on X is drawunder Article ifthere no progress theglobaldisarmament of time(e.g., fiveyears).

Issue and Indo-Pakistani The Kashmir Control NuclearArms

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two-thirds; possibility a comprehensive of nuclear ban in 1996 or 1997), test theprevalent interpretation theendoftheCold Warhas hadlittle no is that or impact theIndo-Pakistani on bilateral disputes a negligible and impact the on Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition.8 argument This hinges thecomplexity on (intra-state interstate) ethnic and of separatism conflict and along theIndoPakistani border theunyielding and nature theKashmir of conflict, withits ethnic, religious, nationalist, territorial, symbolic and aspects.The factthat Kashmir becomea symbol bothcountries' has of national identities would createdomestic constraints, making difficult compromise thepartof any on India or Pakistan. The origins and evolution theKashmir of disputeare well coveredin a of number works. Pakistan questions legality theaccessionof Kashmir the of of in to Indiaafter partition thesubcontinent 1947,accusing the Indiaof not implementing U.N. resolution a calling for a plebisciteto determine the Indiaclaimsthat accessionof Kashmir India to wishesof theKashmiris. the in 1947 was legal,and became"final and irrevocable" after Constituent the in of declared November 1956 that state"is and shall Assembly Kashmir the wisdom that is be an integral of theUnionof India."9 The conventional part to will "never" becauseit wouldbe tantamount Pakistan giveup on Kashmir abjuringits raison d'etre as the homelandof the Muslims.India would of "never"~ up either, give becauseit already controls two-thirds theterritory wouldchallenge India's secularist under and dispute, anyof thealternatives in elsewhere theInideologywhileleadingto other secessionist initiatives dian Union.10
in Relations," G. SeControl Indo-Pakistani and Rizvi,"Arms Gowher 8. See amongothers, gal, ed., ArmsControlin Asia (London: MacmillanPress, 1987), pp. 116-43; Raju G. C. eds., E. F. the "IndiaandtheNPT After Cold War,"inJoseph PilatandRobert Pendley, Thomas, for 1995: A New Beginning theNPT? (New York: PlenumPress,1995); Nazir Kamal, "The and in Future NuclearWeapons:Proliferation SouthAsia," in P. J.Garrity S. A. Maaranen, of (New York:PlenumPress,1992), pp. 181-98. World eds.,NuclearWeaponsin theChanging Review," in Raju India, and Kashmir:A Historical 9. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan, in The Rootsof Conflict SouthAsia, p. 101. on Thomas,ed., Perspectives Kashmir: of Minister Hindunationalist government Prime in 10. The election May 1996oftheminority giveup that Indiawill"never" wisdom the Vajpayeein Indiareinforced conventional AtalBihari will spending be military Mahajan, said that has minister, Pramod on Kashmir. newDefense The will be given"proper in Kashmir force Indian-held and India's 350,000-member increased that See F. Musliminsurgency. John Bums,"IndianLeadersTry to powers" deal withtheKashmiri Clash," New YorkTimes,18 May 1996, p. 3. PrimeMinister to Calm Fears of a Pakistani Janata Party (BJP),seemedto accepttheconstimember theBharatiya of a Vajpayee, moderate will be treated an "on that Indiancitizens all of whenhe declared principle secularism tutional class orcaste." region, on will and equal footing, there be no discrimination thebasisofreligion, 16 Times, May New PostofIndia'sPremier," York Head Chosenfor John Bums,"HinduParty F. 1996,p. A6.

MARIO CARRANZA567 E.

The Kashmir disputeis generally considered primary the motivation behindtheIndo-Pakistani nuclear competition. Since there no resolution is in sight theKashmir for problem, dominant the interpretation is thatit is "too late"to rollbackbothcountries' nuclear weapons programs. morepessiThe mistscholars claimthatIndo-Pakistani and open nuclearization be full will inevitable, that and discussions nuclear on armscontrol disarmament and in SouthAsia area wasteoftime can evenbe counterproductive, the and unless political rootsof theconflict eliminated. are Although is often it argued that Kashmir thenuclear and issue are inextricablylinked, linkages notalwaysclearly the are speltout.Some arguethat a crisisin Kashmir couldtriggerfourth a Indo-Pakistani that war might escalate 1 to thenuclear level.' Others claimthat decisionto assemble a and stockpile nuclear weaponsbyeither couldheighten side tensions, provoking crisisin a Kashmir thatmight to a conventional rise (and eventually nuclear)military confrontation. If Pakistan declaresnuclear weaponstatus order blackmail in to India on theKashmir issue,India will probably followsuit,testing secondnuclear a deviceorjust declaring it has nuclear that weapons. Bothincipient nuclear forceswold be vulnerable preemptive to attacks.Mutualfearsof counterforcestrikes wouldlead bothparties increase size and "survivability" to the of their follow nuclearforces. The nucleararmsrace thatwouldprobably wouldbe unfavorable Pakistan for becauseIndiawouldbe tempted engage to in aggression deterrence with conventional weaponsonce a "stable"nuclear was situation arises, the veryresultthatthe Pakistaninucleardeterrent the FromIndia's military-stragegic to designed avert.12 standpoint, linksbein situaissueareat besttenuous thepresent tween Kashmir the nuclear and tion of mutual nuclear ambiguity, althoughIndia's potentialnuclear miliof effect its conventional reinforces deterrent the superiority certainly tary advantage overPakistan. decidedto have a nuclear Yet, neither India norPakistan weaponoption to a in becauseoftheconflict Kashmir. India'sdecision pursue nuclear weapto and to ons optionhad nothing do withKashmir was basicallya response defeatin a India's humiliating China's first nuclear testin 1964,following Indiabeganreprocessing war Chinain 1962.Although border with plutonium warswith three in at Trombay 1966,and in spiteof having fought India,two
the before SenateCommittee Woolsey'stestimony James CIA 11. See, e.g.,former Director OfPrinting D.C.: U.S. Government February 1993 (Washington, 24, Affairs, on Governmental fice,1994). decision, from proliferation a for any 12. This seemsto outweigh possiblebenefits Pakistan whileoffering do to weaponsprogram, to Indiato slowdownitsnuclear except, perhaps, prompt and nuclear armscontrol disof step likewiseas a preliminary fortheestablishment a bilateral regime. armament

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was notseriof them (1947-48 and 1965) overtheKashmir issue,Pakistan weaponscapabilities until after ouslyinterested matching in India's nuclear the 1974 Indiannucleartest.In fact,withthepassingof time(particularly weaponscapability theearly1980s), it in after Pakistan acquireda nuclear issue vitiated Indo-Pakistani relawas moreoften case thatthenuclear the to than other the wayaround. Similarly tions, including Kashmir the dispute, of the dangerous independent dynamic the nucleararmsrace betweenthe betweenthe two superpowers duringthe Cold War, nuclearcompetition independent from politicalconflict the SouthAsian rivalsbecamerelatively between them. situation mutual of nuclear ambiguity Some scholars claimthat current the to or "latent" stability SouthAsia, sinceit creates de a nuclearization brings bothcountries.'3 facto conventional nuclear and situation between deterrence Others that"theIndia-Pakistan nuclear and conventional disagree, claiming or "neither state balancesarefundamentally and unstable asymmetrical," that misweaponsand ballistic is really prepared, technically, absorb[nuclear to It considered siles] and maintain present levels of stability."'14 is generally in is thatthetransitional deterrence ThirdWorldscenarios phase to nuclear characterized significant deterrence becauseof thelackof reliinstability, by able command, and systems strong temptations control, communications and to strike in anticipation preemption a crisis.Unlesstheseproblems first in of of are overcome, production deployment nuclear the and weaponsby India A of theand/or Pakistan couldbe very destabilizing. basic tenet deterrence if be of which hardly believed the can threats, oryis thecredibility deterrence basement" notsupposed exist.If anything, are to uncertainty "bombs-in-the inis out threats a permanent aboutan adversary's to ability carry deterrent attackon it. Uncertainty not enhance does centiveto launcha preemptive that both is to verification deterrence unlessthere an effective regime ensure In theabsence sideswill notactually assembleand deploynuclear weapons. or the of of sucha regime, present situation "nonweaponized" "existential" the Indiaand Pakistan does notprovide kindof stability deterrence between the the that characterized U.S.-Soviet relationship during Cold War and may toward comprehensive a hindering progress give a false sense of security, to settlement the Indo-Pakistani of disputes. Hence, it is urgent createa in armscontrol nuclear strong regime SouthAsia.
in Deterrence SouthAsia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani "Nuclear 13. See, e.g.,DevinT. Hagerty, "Reflecpp. 1995/96), 79-114; Raju G. C. Thomas, Security, (Winter 20:3 International Crisis," on pp. Problem," Raju Thomas,ed., Perspectives Kashmir, 28-29; in .tionson the Kashmir Press,1995), pp. 184-85. D.C.: WilsonCenter Ambition (Washington, Reiss,Bridled Mitchell (BoulPredicament World Security Ayoob,TheThird Mohammed 14. The first quoteis from StephenP. Cohen, "A Note on 1995), p. 151; the second,from der, Colo.: LynneRienner, in 9:1 Stability SouthAsia," Swordsand Ploughshares, (Fall 1994),p. 3.

MARIO CARRANZA569 E.

be the Can Indo-Pakistani nuclear armscontrol decoupledfrom Kashmir threewars (two over Kashmir) problem? India and Pakistanhave fought cauldron a realmenis sincebecoming independent 1947andtheKashmir in were ace to regional peace and security becauseeven if India and Pakistan able to come up with diplomatic over issue,the a settlement thesovereignty outsidethe control of activities Kashmiri of militant groups,significantly of bothgovernments, would stillthreaten implementation any bilateral the agreement. constraints nuclear on decision Yet,becauseoftheincreasing international of making mentioned above,theendoftheCold Waropensup thepossibility nuclear relations from Kashmir the issue.In spite decoupling Indo-Pakistani of itsmilitary-strategic relative security gainswould predicament, Pakistan's be greater thoseof Indiaifa mutual nuclear inspections regime estabis than program. India in turn lished,because India has a moreadvancednuclear joins a nuwouldincrease relative its security gainswithChinaif thelatter in SouthAsia and theprocessof partial clearweapon-free disnuclear zone By the armament theglobal level continues. strengthening disincentives at the for to the and weakening incentives IndiaandPakistan "go nuclear," end of theCold War also weakened linkages the between Kashmir and thenuclearissue.IndiaandPakistan should of takeadvantage thesituation negoto nuclear arms controlregime,with an effective tiate a comprehensive progress toward resoa verification system, evenintheabsenceofimmediate settlement evenpave theway may lution theKashmir of dispute. nuclear A I that forserious negotiations Kashmir. am notsuggesting thepredicament on or oftheKashmir be by community, peopleshould forgotten theinternational itself indefinitely. lack of proYet, that crisisin Kashmir the shouldprolong for not on should be an obstacle gressin Indo-Pakistani negotiations Kashmir issue.Even iftheKashmir making gainsin a separate dialogueon thenuclear war from conventional a is dispute completely solved,theriskof escalation conto theuse of nuclear weaponswill stillexistas longas bothcountries in of domestic eachother interferencetheir tinue politics (e.g.,Pakiaccusing stan accusing India of meddlingin Sindh; India accusing Pakistanof overtheSiachenGlacierin Kashmir in interference Punjab)and thedispute would nuclear armscontrol A unsolved. fully regime remains implemented seta evenwithout comprehensive eliminate danger nuclear the of escalation, of tlement theseconflicts. issue has and the conflict the nuclear the Breaking linkbetween Kashmir South to for War strategy denuclearize important implications a post-Cold solution in toward political a Asia. Paradoxically, spiteofthelackofprogress with to theIndo-Pakistani difference thepeace process conflict significant (a in theMiddleEast) theprospects nuclear for armscontrol look more promisare interactions in ingin SouthAsia than theMiddleEast. Regionalstrategic

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a in monopoly creates moredangerous regions. Israel'snuclear differentboth are in situations alwaysunstasituation theMiddleEastbecausesemi-nuclear in the and confrontation. contrast, South By ble, carrying riskof escalation detente between1972-79, "tacit Asia besidestheperiodof Indo-Pakistani efforts the 1980s can be seen as in of bargaining" a number bilateral and The SAARC founded security regime. laying basis foran Indo-Pakistani the cooperative diplocontinuing in 1985, is the best proofof Indo-Pakistani have signedan IsBoth countries dispute. macy,in spiteof the Kashmir accordnotto attack and Delhi "hotline" agreement a formal lamabad-New inmeasures Further confidence-building one another's nuclear installations. not talks clude weeklymilitary-to-military and agreements to violateeach exercises. Bothrivals of and other's airspace on advancenotification military to process agreeing place one or by couldstrengthen confidence-building the in underIAEA safeguards, two additional nuclearfacilities each country for nuclear regime. whilebeginning discussions a mutual inspections in measures (CBMs) couldresult these confidence-building To what extent or a self-managed bilateral regionalsecurity regimeis an open question. Buildingon CBMs will notbe possibleuntilbothIndia and Pakistancan or diplomacy. Indiauses the"regional of nuclear supersede dualism their the regional non-proliferaPakistan's as for global"dilemma a pretext nottaking stillbelievesthat India will rejectits protioninitiatives seriously. Pakistan its the becauseIndia continues old posals as it did during Cold War,partly as negotiaof Cold War strategy isolating muchas possibleIndo-Pakistani in its for indicates support a tionsfrom Pakistan, turn, powerintrusions. great to that India,butcontinues pursue regime includes regional non-proliferation isto the instead trying separate nuclear of its nuclear policies.Even worse, has done exactlythe opposite, sue fromKashmir, Bhuttogovernment the escalateto the overKashmir might conflict stirring fearsthata military up milifrom purely a a level. Although is probably soundstrategy this nuclear that it bad considering as of this tary-strategic perspective, is very diplomacy on issue. Indiato holdserious negotiations either it writing has notcompelled to UntilPakistan thatit is in its bestinterest breakthelinkberecognizes to tweenKashmir and nuclear policyit will be verydifficult denuclearize (such as a CTB or a fissile SouthAsia, even by usingglobal arrangements On to Indiato seriousnegotiations. theother hand,if material cutoff) attract Pakistani the every proposal India stopsplaying Cold Wargameof rejecting its to will be forced reconsider nuclear fornucleararmscontrol, Pakistan cost-free. once it realizesit is no longer diplomacy,

U.S. non-proliferation SouthAsia havefailedso farto elimipoliciestoward adThe in of proliferation thesubcontinent. Clinton natethedanger nuclear

Conclusion

MARIOE. CARRANZA571

ministration seemsto haveabandoned original its strategy rolling of backthe nuclear weaponprograms Indiaand Pakistan one of merely of for "capping" them, themajority non-proliferation and of scholars seemto agreewiththis approach.According SandyGordon, to "thismaywell nowbe theonlyviable way forward."15 theprecedents Argentina, Yet, of Brazil,and SouthAfricashowthat "rollback" thenuclear a of weapons programs SouthAsia is in stillachievable. The Indo-Pakistani fallssomewhere between case in South Africa'sturn-around (aftermanufacturing nuclear six devices) and theArgentine-Brazilian coursereversal before actually manufacturing nuclear any weapons.The Indo-Pakistani is similar thelatter that case to in according to most reports SouthAsianrivals the havenotactually assembled stockpiled or nuclearweapons; and yet theyhave gone farther ahead thantheirLatin American counterparts toward weaponization, dangerously crossing psya chologicalthreshold declaring thattheycan producenuclearweapons by "whenever required."16 I have arguedthatIndia's and Pakistan'snuclear weaponsprograms can stillbe rolledbackandthat resolution theIndo-Pakistani a of nuclear competition does notdependon theresolution theimpasseover Kashmir. of The end of theCold War opens up a real possibility theestablishment a for of regional nuclear armscontrol disarmament and regime SouthAsia: a forin mal verification regimepatterned the Argentina-Brazil-IAEA on trilateral but agreement, withmorestringent the inspection requirements, following of experience theIAEA in SouthAfrica. WhywouldIndiaandPakistan the acceptsucha regime? Although end of theCold War does notautomatically to compelIndia and Pakistan give up theirnuclearweaponsoption, affects it their their behavior weakening by if nuclear will incentives there Disincentives definitely propensity. outweigh is realprogress toward disarmament economic and conditions globalnuclear continue in the choicesin SouthAsia. In a world which constraining strategic increasing significance economic of traditional strength challenges geopolitiA of SouthAsia's Nuclear WeaponsPrograms: Window Oppor15. SandyGordon, "Capping of strategy that is it tunity?" AsianSurvey, July 1994,p. 664. The bigshortcoming the"capping" envisaged would legitimaterial cutoff, whichas presently is closelyrelated a globalfissile to (India,Pakistan, and of states mize thenuclear weaponsprograms thede factonuclear-weapon nuclearmaterial Undera cut-off convention, previIsrael) thusundermining NPT regime. the See to powers wouldnotbe subject IAEA safeguards. Frans ouslyproduced threshold by nuclear 19:3 International Security, et in of Berkhout al., "A Cutoff theProduction FissileMaterial," (Winter 1994/95), 197-98. pp. Hindunationalist governthat 16. IndianPrime Minister Vajpayee'sdeclaration his minority to openly Indiaa Janata Party's longstanding promise declare ment wouldstick theBharatiya by arms control regime in of a nuclear nuclear weaponsstate showstheurgency achieving verifiable See F. SouthAsia, evenbefore comprehensive a resolution theKashmir of dispute. John Burns, p. "HinduParty Head ChosenforPostof India's Premier," A6.

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cal definitions national of security severalregions in (e.g., MERCOSUR in LatinAmerica, ASEAN Free TradeArea in Southeast the Asia), India and Pakistan maydecideto followtheglobaltrend concentrate regional and on economiccooperation integration, and speeding theSAARC process(a up preferential tariff agreement, SAPTA, has alreadybeen signed).Domestic pressures a settlement theKashmir for of dispute mayslowlyincrease the as economiccosts of the India-Pakistan conflict become difficult sustain to under economic Even restructuring. in theabsenceofregional economic inteif gration, thetrend toward military spending in thesubcontinent suscuts is tainedand mutualconfidence building measures continue, self-managed a regionalsecurity regime could emergeby theyear2000, patterned the on ASEAN model.Morecooperative globalandtransregional strategic environments arguably isolatetheIndo-Pakistani mini-Cold War,inducing two the SouthAsian rivalsto negotiate establishment a nuclear of armscontrol the in regime thesubcontinent. I have shownthedangers relying "existential" "nonweaponized" of on or nucleardeterrence settlethe Indo-Pakistani to nuclearcompetition. Some analystshave suggestedthatIndia and Pakistanshould declare nuclear the of to weaponstatus enhance credibility deterrence.17 thetransition to Yet, with second-strike a securenuclear and forces, capability adequate command, with risk and the of wouldbe very control, communications systems unstable, preemptive strikes thepossibility accident, and of misunderstanding, or misperception. Putting Indianand Pakistani the geniesback intothebottle (rewithin globalframework, gionalnuclear armscontrol) a makesmoresense. nucleartest Although certain global measures, such as a comprehensive before end of thedecade,nuclear the disarmaban,could becomea reality mentnegotiations amongthefivedeclarednuclearweaponstateshave not disarmament treaties evenbegun, whereas U.S.-Russianuclear the (START I In the meantime, and Pakistan India and II) have a 15-yeartimeframe. in followthe threat thesubcontinent, talksto defuse nuclear should continue in a structure ingup theconfidence building already place with formal agreein armedconflict.'8 not ment to use nuclear weaponsfirst a future The real challengeis how to make boththe global and regionaldenuat clearization processesconverge some pointin thefuture committing by
17. See K. Subrahmanyam, Indo-PakNuclearRestraint "An Regime:Parts1 and 2," Ecoof nomicTimes(New Delhi), September and October1, 1992. The vulnerability incipient 30 in in of See smallnuclear forces mostregional situations beenmentioned a number studies. has e.g.,Joseph Nye,Jr., S. NuclearEthics(New York:Free Press,1986),p. 88. 18. Among setof proposals a sentby Indiato Pakistan earlyin 1994 to ease border tensions was the assurancethatin the eventof war, India would not use nuclearweaponsfirst. See Programme Promoting for NuclearNon-Proliferation, PPNN Newsbrief, 25, FirstQuarter no. 1994,p. 5.

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Chinato bothglobalmeasures CTB and negative (a security assurances) and seriousnegotiations establish nuclear to a weapon-free in SouthAsia.'9 zone Following Soviet-American the example, India and Pakistan could agreeon significant in their cuts ballistic and missilecapability even before ending their local Cold War (the 1987 INF Treaty between U.S. and theSoviet the Unionpreceded end of theCold War). the The future India-Pakistan of relations, including nuclear the issue,will be subjected increasing to international pressures greatly and influenced the by evolution an international of environment whichnuclear in weaponsare losing legitimacy a currency powerwhileissue linkageacrossglobal reas of gimesis morepronounced in thepast.Violators globalnorms the than of in security issueareamayincreasingly subjected pressure theeconomic be to in issue area,thusdiscouraging "threshold" countries from exercising nuthe clearweaponoption. A CTB treaty 1996or 1997 andbinding in on negative security assurances thepart the"bigfive" wouldcompelboth IndiaandPakistan revisetheir to of nucleardiplomacy. Progresstowarda global cooperative security regime underthethreat Western would isolateIndia and Pakistan even further, of In and/or collective sanctions. the politicaland economicreprisals security that meantime maycometo theconclusion signing CTB treaty a they (which in have longsupported) participating other and disarmathey globalnuclear is bestinterest. verifiable A ment mutual nuclear negotiations in their inspections regimecould be established this stage, takinginto accountthe at in as between India and Pakistan, a asymmetry nuclear-weapon capabilities first toward nuclear zone step a weapon-free in SouthAsia. Even iftheKashin mirconflict unresolved themedium such a regimewould remains term, with in eliminate threat a nuclear the of exchange thesubcontinent itsdevasfor of tating consequences millions peoplein SouthAsia.

on for did weaponstates notmakeconcessions a deadline theprovi19. Although nuclear the conference, did acceptthe they assurances the 1995 NPT extension at sion of negative security to in at locking a Chinesecommitment Test thus leastpartly 1996 Comprehensive Ban deadline, the government a NWFZ in SouthAsia. In August1995,theIndian agreedto explore feasibility no. 1995,p. to sucha zone. See PPNN Newsbrief, 31, 3rdQuarter of a U.S. proposal establish 19.