Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:p This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows: On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his commonlaw wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6) Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8). Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened

appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied). Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987). He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987). Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied). The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987). The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987). Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134). Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision. In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55) 1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III). Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III) was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990). It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]: 1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . . . . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied). In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that: (t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served. The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals

(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957). Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action." The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction. The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it. First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168). It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]). In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows: First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied) The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62). The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else. Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication. 2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed. Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus: Fiscal Formoso: You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl? WITNESS: Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240) The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced. 3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10). Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, selfserving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and

convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]). Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93). Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment. WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows: Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am. Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo. CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon. ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi. CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m. ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita). CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko. ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko. ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa. CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa. CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako. CHUCHI Eh, di sana ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako. CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako. ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamaganak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko. ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon. CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union. ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na. CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob. ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako. CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith: INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized

by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person. Contrary to law. Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988. MARIANO M. CUNETA Asst. City Fiscal Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a personother than a participant to the communication. 4 From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989. On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10 We disagree. First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus: xxx xxx xxx Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear". Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside? Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor. Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings? Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties. Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor? Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it

is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded. Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders. Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded. Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand. Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair. xxx xxx xxx (Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964) Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly. Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between one person and another person not between a speaker and a public. xxx xxx xxx (Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964) xxx xxx xxx The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:

"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed."14 Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable. WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line. The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner. In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5). That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5). When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. (a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office; (b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School; (c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club; (d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School; (e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;

(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School; (g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media; (h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48). Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12). Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court. On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200. In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides: Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone

or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. We rule for the petitioner. We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion. There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's. Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results. The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device. Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party or end. The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120). In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled: Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. xxx xxx xxx Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the

generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181). Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138): Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred. In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule: American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184). In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater

importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation. xxx xxx xxx Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce. Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation. Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government. Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices. (Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964). xxx xxx xxx Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much. Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in court. (Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629). It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila G.R. No. L-68635 March 12, 1987 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE in G.R. NO. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this COURT, (mcorporated herein by reference), in feigned ignorance of the Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of, and must act through, at least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part: Please forgive us for taking the Liberty of addressing you this letter which we do hope you will read very carefully. It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635 entitled Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. by an untenable minute-resolution although an extended one, dated 14 May 1986 which we consider as an just resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member. xxx xxx xxx We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with such hurry/ promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethic. xxx xxx xxx Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes finish to our case before the Supreme Court (... THIS IS FINAL.) There is nothing final in this world We assure you that this case is far from finished by a long shot For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where the members of the Court can no longer deny our action with minute resolutions that are

not only unjust but are knowingly and deuberat only promulgated. The people deserve to know how the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in the task of decision making by affixing their respective signed on judgments that they render on petitions that they themselves give due course. Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of these three minute- resolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others, none of the division members are above the law. In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why we are requesting you to inform us your participation in the promulgation of these resolutions in question. Even we who are poor are also capable of playing fair even to those who take advantage of our poverty by sheer power and influence. We shall then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied). The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap, Chairman of the First Division in this wise: As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we received indicate, did not even have the elementary courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an extended one, which he should have done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After he is the law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez counsel for respondents, now the distinguished Solicitor General ... indicative that even at this stage of the proceeding in point of time, the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez as counsel for respondents, even as he is already the Solicitor General. For not withdrawing from the case formally Atty. Ordonez has manifested his unmitigated arrogance that he does not respect the Canons of Professional Ethics, to the actuation of his law partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court, an act that further aggravates the growing wrinkles in the domain of judicial statesmanship, impressed as it is, with very serious and dangerous implications. (9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez already became the Solicitor General. With such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez in the law firm Salonga, Ordonez Yap, Padian became the Chairman of the Division. xxx xxx xxx (11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some members of the Division were still busy putting their respective offices in order and had possibly have no Idea about the Maravilla case.

Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division members that Maravilla petition is without merit and since the members the new ones knew nothing about the case, readily agreed to the dismissal of the petition by a minute. resolution an extended one. After all, this was the case of the Solicitor General. If this is what happened, then we are sorry to say that you were deliberately "had" After ala the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an extended one, does not bear the signatures of the Division members. The members should have signed the resolution, after ala the Supreme Court had given the petition due course, indicating whether they concur, dissent or otherwise abstain from voting. The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state: We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since you were with the original First Division under the chairmanship of then Justice Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will bring this case before another forum to hold responsible the members of the Division who participated in the dismissal of the case by the unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for intended objective that your conscience you are aware.
xxx xxx xxx

We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation in the promulgation of the minute-resolutions in question Please do not take this matter rightly for we know justice in the end will prevail. For if we do not hear from you within a week, we will consider your silence as your admission that you supported the dismissal of the petition. In this way, we shall then be guided accordingly. The moment we take action in the plans we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice. xxx xxx xxx Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that will no doubt cause nationwide attention, and there should be anyone that will cause me harm personally, may we request you to show this letter to the authorities concerned so that they will know where to look, when it becomes necessary. (Emphasis supplied) The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of 22 October 1986, were "Noted," and referred en consulta to the Court en banc. On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and history of the case, found no reason to take any further action, and referred the case back to the First Division 11 as set forth in the latter's resolution of October 27, 1986. " In this Resolution, the First Division traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice Yap assumed his position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First Division, and that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited himself from further participation in the case; and that Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division only on

14 July 1986, after the compulsory retirement of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the First Division (incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus: The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an "unjust decision" or that it has been "railroaded". This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. YAP, J., took no part. On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which follow: It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we never dreamed that you would rush, as you did rush for assistance en consults with the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part of it all is the fact that the Court en banc had to promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986 which to us when considered in its entirety, is just as untenable as the First Division extended and unsigned minuteresolution of 14 May 1986. Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under 1) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. 2) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. 3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. That was we asked. The other matters contained in our letter were intended merely to give you the highlights of our case. This is what we wanted to know to properly guide us when we finally bring our case to the other forum of justice. Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the First Division referred our letters to the Honorable Court en banc en consults it was all your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate its unsigned extended minute-resolution that unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of the newly reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time, convicted themselves as guilty of distorting facts involved in our petition? This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why. xxx xxx xxx This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other forum of justice where we will soon bring this case beyond the reach of the newly reorganized Supreme Court We are prepared to expose many more of this kind of judicial performance readily constituting truvesty of justice Ponder upon this well because it is our very firm conviction that the people deserve to know how the distinguished members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in duties in this most sensitive area of decision making.

Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc consults) or not, the situation remains the same. At the proper time, as we said, we will bring this case before another forum of justice where the members of the First Division, in fact the Honorable Court en banc may no longer deny our action by mere untenable and unjust minute resolutions. Better believe it that we intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who took part in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of those who promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial integrity from its very inception on 14 May 1986. xxx xxx xxx Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva Maravilla Ilustre against the distinguished members of the First Division, in fact against the entire membership of the newly organized Supreme Court (because of its en banc unsigned extended minute-resolution that iswithout judicial integrity, dated 28 October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this fight. Other lawyers, not just by their mere sympathy for me personally and my case, but by their firm conviction that judicial statesmanship must be maintained at nines in the highest tribunal of justice in the land, that they have offered their free legal services when the legal confrontation begins. xxx xxx xxx Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the most fantastic, most unbelievable picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. It states ...When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez was private respondent's counsel. The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow this statement hook, line and sinker For Justice Yap we say. Tell that to the marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to the conscience of Justice Yap. Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure, but we are learning a few as we promulgated our case within legitimate that we state here that both resolutions that promulgated by the Court en banc of 28 October 1986 and that promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October 1986, are nothing but a desperate attempt when both are considered in their respective entirety, to maneuver without success, some semblance of justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May 1986 extended and unsigned minute-resolution that is bereft of judicial integrity. xxx xxx xxx Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable Court en banc think for one minute that because of their respective 4-page minute but extended resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of merit deliberately unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial integrity, that we win now give up the fight, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe it when we say we are prepared to carry the fight before another forum of justice. When we do, we shall call for a press conference with TV and radio coverage, so that we can present to the

entire nation our quest for justice against the steam-roller of power and influence and, at the same time, to call the attention of the people to the manner in which the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform their respective individual and collective functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of decision making. Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to wit: Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under a) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. b) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No. c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied). True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's aforecited Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some Members of this Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith," when their Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this Court. Additionally, Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciously charged with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986." All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as the tribunal of last resort, 1) upholding the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor General Ordonez to unduly influence the members of the First Division. The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference) was allegedly filed "in my quest for justice, something that has been closed to me by the Supreme Court forever" and specifically charged: CHARGE NO. ONE
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) "persuading, inducing, influencing the members of the newly organized First Division ... into promulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, knowingly with deliberate intent with such unusual hurry promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court base on insignificant issues and deliberately evading/prevaricating the more important substantial ones raised in my petition, in violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, ... ; and

(2) Under the same Section 3, sub-letter (e) of the same Republic Act ... for causing me and the other heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using their power and influence as Solicitor-General and Associate Justice, respectively. ...

CHARGE NO. TWO Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Serafin Cuevas, members of the then FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate Court 1) For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in the exercise of their functions through manifest and evident bad faith in CA-G.R. No. SP13680, entitled "Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v. Hon. Antonia Corpus Macandog, et al." in violation of article 204 of the revised Penal Code,2) For causing me and the other heirs such undue injury' by deliberately, knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 ... in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Section 3 (e) thereof. CHARGE NO THREE Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of 14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro Yap, ... 1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust extended MINUTE RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986 dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635, ... with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez now the distinguished Solicitor General the 'illegal owners' of the vast estates of my aunt Digna Maravilla ...; 2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, ... for deliberately causing us heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by depriving us of our rights over my aunt's vast estates because of their manifest and evident bad faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, deliberately intended to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez, now the Solicitor General the "illegal owners" of my aunt Digna Maravilla's estates when under the law, these Ordonez clients are not entitled to own these vast properties whether under testate or intestate succession or mixed succession (Emphasis supplied). Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished this Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the other respondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in this Court. On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioner's Complaint and decreed in the dispositive portion of his Resolution (herein incorporated by reference) that:

WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to dismiss the complaint against Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will continue evaluating the complaint against Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente Mendoza, Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez and the private respondents. The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page: Copy Furnished: DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA Counsel for the Complainant 919 Prudencio Street Sampaloc, Manila In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it required: (1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, with in ten (10) days from notice, why she should not be held in contempt for her aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. (pp. 383-384, Rollo). (1) In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustre prays that the contempt proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in character and were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there (being) a constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of communications;" (3) if her statements in those letters were really contemptuous, the Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary proceedings" against her, and not having done so, the Court has "forfeited" that right and is now "estopped" from doing so; this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filed the complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity, taken not in the spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the Tanodbayan "in my honest behalf that I lost my case before the Supreme Court not because of lack of merit or of its own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their services in the prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this case "was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel Dean Wenceslao Laureta, " who prevailed upon her to call off the press conference

with TV and radio coverage; that she is not a "disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has challenged the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containing distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly, in that (a) there is no res judicata, (b) the Court of Appeals in its decision declared that the judgment of the trial Court had long attained finality, so that it can no longer be set aside, (c) her 11 opponents," clients of Atty. Ordonez, are not entitled to own her aunt's "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate succession or mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this Court's Resolution that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the statement in the en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a pre-judgment over a case over which this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter body, she has "established not only probable cause but has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices concerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53 page Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan is made an integral part of her Answer. (2) In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is not respondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she has consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the course of the prosecution of her case, fike Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just learned from other sources that respondent llustre was planning to bring her case to the Tanodbayan with the assistance of other lawyers who offered her their legal services; (2) it was he who dissuaded her from calling her intended press conference and from circulating copies of her complaint "not only in the performance of duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president of Manila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a professional lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as the highest tribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little bit of credit for what he did" instead of taking this disciplinary proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not a "disgruntled litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not prepare respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, I appearances to the contrary notwithstanding," that these letters were "never, at any time, considered as constituting contempt of court" in the resolutions of this Court, otherwise, "it would have taken immediate disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court has lost its right to consider the statements in the letters as constituting contempt and it is now "estopped" from proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so, this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and character that underlie its present action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of judicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the Supreme Court is supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there was no disregard intended to the Resolution of the Honorable Court, as the tribunal of last resort, relative to its upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals;" he is just doing "his duty as an officer of the court to put the records in this regard in their proper light;" particularly (a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained its finality long ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, otherwise, this Court would not have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for review, (c) the observation in the First Division's extended Resolution of 14 July 1986 that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel "defies every vestige of human understanding," that Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited himself from participating in the case is not borne out by the record of this case. Justice Yap had "never voluntarily entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have done so when respondent Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's partner, Atty. Ordonez, continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for private respondents even as he was the Solicitor General; (b) finally, "appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not colted acts unworthy of his profession. The truth of the matter is, he should at least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts taken by him to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable Court.

We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court dissipate in the face of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every vestige of human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed, they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words." (Mathew 6:7). Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consults and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The Chief Justice had promptly announced his Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "the Supreme Court will take appropriate steps on the matter upon its resumption of sessions on the first working day of the year. " There is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, nor with the com plaint filed before the Tanodbayan. In the Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the main petition, he stressed: 10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five members. Strangely enough, about one month later, the Honorable Court promulgated its extended resolution with such promptitude in the entire history of the Supreme Court, unequaled in a manner of speaking, ... In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta (p. 311, Rollo), the same phrases were incanted: the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was promulgated (par. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given due course is concerned ... (Emphasis given) Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored by respondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices whom respondents have charged. Thus: We consider the three minute resolutions ... railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics" ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 2). xxx xxx xxx

with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court (Ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 5). The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2). Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty. Laureta stated: counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of Court Corazon Served the following: (1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division? (2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation? (3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of the petition to be promulgated by resolution and who did not, if any? (4) Who prepared the Resolution? (p.312, Rollo). Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the second letters dated November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under the supposed signatures of respondent Ilustre, thus: Evidently you misunderstood our point of in our first letter. It is a very simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under 1) The l4 May l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No 2) The 9 July l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No 3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied) ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p. 1; to Justice Cruz, p. 1) Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and "powerful influence" by Atty. Ordonez and Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken references"; "untenable minute resolution although extend. "unjust minute resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed and re-echoed in the individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the Complaint and the Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta. The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the Court that copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he was following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan. Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer had control of the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal E

times should be reminded him that '(a) lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client pursuits in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.' " (In Re: Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the members of the First Division of this Court, by baselessly charging them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith," because of his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had been rejected as without merit by the Court's First Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold captions falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place them in a bad light at the height of the Christmas season. We come now to the specific accusations of respondents. They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of May 14,1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly and deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez (now the Solicitor General) the "illegal owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla (Digna's eldest brother) undue injury by depriving them of their rights over the estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez) of having 11 persuade(ed), inducted(ed) and influence(ed) the members of the newly organized First Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended minute Resolution of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), which Resolution, (the "Division Resolution, " for short) is herewith attached as Annex "A ". Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in this Court. It cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the Court en banc, this is the third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy involving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The first was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971], where this Court ruled: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to law. ... As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached as Annex " B ", and hereinafter referred to as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a party in that case, upon remand of the case to the probate Court, she and other children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions for Intervention. Respondent Ilustre's participation in the state involved, therefore, harks back to that first case. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No. 05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, et al." in a Decision penned by Justice Venicio E scolin (hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was categorically ruled that there was no point to allowing intervention on the part of respondent Ilustre, et al., "for failure to show any right or interest in the estate in question. " Thus:

(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petition for mandamus, seek this Court's resolution on the petitioners' motion for intervention in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings and memoranda, the parties have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners may be allowed to intervene; and the same may as well be determined in the present case, if only 'to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266). A resolution of this issue should render moot and academic the question anent the disqualification of respondent Judge. We agree with private respondents that petitioners' motions for intervention are devoid of merit, for failure on their part to show any right or interest in the estate in question. There is no dispute that the last will and testament of the late Digna Maravilla had already been admitted to probate in a final judgment which the Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla as xxx xxx xxx The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession. Having no forced or compulsory heirs, except her husband, the testatrix had the absolute freedom to institute the latter as her sole, universal heir, and such freedom is recognized by Article 842 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs. There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear to have no interest in the estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving the settlement thereof. xxx xxx xxx The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155 on November 9, 1977 and has become final. That was the second case involving the estate filed before this Court. Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc Resolution "that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts" is obviously erroneous and intended to mislead. The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become final, also finally foreclosed any claim that respondent Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with her, may have had on the estate of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears repeating:

The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession. ... To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February 29, 1979, respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint for partition of Digna Maravilla's estate and for damages against the heirs of Digna Maravilla's husband, who had then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404), before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X, presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaring defendants therein (private respondents in the petition under review) in default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in this case to go back to their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustre and Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog Decision"). In addition, the judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, et al., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent Laureta. A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties (private respondents in the petition under review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Court's declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and that the dismissal of the complaint be ordered. On January 21, 1982, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, questions of fact being involved. In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division)', 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the Busran Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied certiorari stating in one breath that "the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at p. 13), and in another "for all we know, the judgment below had already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was that petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of Certiorari, which is not a substitute therefor. On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private respondents in the petition under review), in that appealed case AC-GR SP No. 13680), the same Court of Appeals (Fourth Special Cases Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the "Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the BusRan Decision" and entered another one: 1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29 April 1980 and its decision dated 11 August 1981; and 2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. X-404 and ordering the Hon. respondent Court not to take further action therein. Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for Review filed on October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought before this Court involving the same estate. Review was denied in an extended Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following reasons: The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds. (1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The Answer was only one day late besides the fact that when so filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the Trial Court.

(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default, certiorari may be resorted to when a party has been illegally declared in 4 default Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos 63 SCRA 300-301 [19751), or where it is necessary to restore order to proceedings in the Court below (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463 [19751). (3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No. X-404 declaring that the Testatrix's collateral relatives have a rightful claim to her estate to the exclusion of the husband who was designated her sole and universal heir, nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment and overturns the pronouncements of both the Appellate Court and this Court on the case. There being former judgments on the issues which have become final rendered by Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, the said judgments having been rendered on the merits, and there being between the prior and subsequent action Identity of parties, subject matter and substantial Identity of cause of action, it is clear that the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is barred by the principle of res adjudicata, and whatever transpired therein are nun and void ab initio and without any legal effect. To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when a right or fact has been judicially determined, the judgment of the Court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]). ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Court's judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 13080 is hereby affirmed. SO ORDERED. Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course Order and denied review in an extended Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision. They allege that said Resolution was "railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded, induced and influenced" by Solicitor General Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap. Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution" The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of seven Justices, which initially gave it due course because the resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally rendered by the then Court of Appeals, and in order to have more time for further study. Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can be considered as the date when this case was submitted for resolution. The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the February, 1986 political upheaval The last incident in the case was a motion for the early release of decision filed by petitioner on November 19, 1985.

When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of the First Division was reduced to five (5) Justices. Taking account of the motion of petitioner for early release of decision, the new First Division, then chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the will but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings resolved, on May 14, 1986 to dismiss the petition through an extended resolution which at the same time recalled the due course order. The new Division of 5 acted unanimously. The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their petition which has been subjected to such recall. They have lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the I entire history" of the Supreme Court. As to the participation of Justice Yap in the ease, the "Banc Resolution" stated: Justice Yap clarified that he was an official mission to Switzerland for the Presidential Conunission on Good Government after his appointment to the Supreme Court an April 11, 1986 and did not assume his position in the Supreme Court his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez was private respondent's counsel. On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was taken up by the First Division on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos still the Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing that his former partner, Atty. Ordonez, had submitted the pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and Justice Edgardo L. Paras was designated under Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in the Division in his place. The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9, 1986. Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14, 1986. On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 1986, entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28, 1986. Justice Yap again took no part in the deliberation of the case. But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been "unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez. They reacted by saying "ten it to the marines" (Letters of November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact. With so many cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers during deliberative sessions very often escape attention, concentration being centered on the issues to be resolved. Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordonez as counsel" for their opponents in the case. In the same " Banc Resolution," it was clarified: A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez as his name still appears on the cover page of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the Supreme Court still recognizes him as counsel for respondents (at p. 4)

The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty. Ordonez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed before the Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez." No withdrawal of appearance having been presented by Atty. Ordonez in the main petition, his name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned continue to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this Court. In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May 14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration with finality, and September 3, 1986 denying leave to file a second motion for reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division Resolution, explained: The aforesaid resolutions were by no means 'railroaded.' The pleadings filed by the parties, as in any other case, were included in the Agenda of the First Division as soon as feasible. The Division acts promptly on all Agenda items, and the minutes of its deliberations are released as soon as possible after Agenda day. xxx xxx xxx The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an 'unjust decision;' or that it has been "railroaded." This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. (at p. 4) Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In their own words "the ordered probate of the 1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is conclusive only as to the genuineness and due execution of said will but not upon the validity of testamentary provision, particularly with the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universal heir of Digna Maravilla." On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the Busran Decision" AC-GR SP No. 13680), aptly held: The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run counter to the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 admitting the will of Digna Maravilla to probate because the latter refers to the extrinsic validity of the will while the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot agree with this observation because it is quite clear from the questioned decision that the will was in effect declared not to have been freely and voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna Maravilla but was the result of the evil and fraudulent machinations of her husband, Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said will The declaration that private respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an indication that the Hon. respondent Court has nullified the will. Private respondents are not compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being named legatees or devisees in the will, they could only lay claim to the estate of Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the New Civil Code, to wit: Art. 1003. If there are no descendants ascendants, illegitimate children or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed

to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.' However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complain d of by private respondents referred only to the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper for them to have instituted a separate action in a court other than that in which the probate proceeding was pending. xxx xxx xxx It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court or in any other court by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the plaintiffs in the estate determined The very purpose of the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until they are settled and determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such as the present one can be maintained. Considering that the "Escolin Decision, " as affirmed by this Court on November 9, 1977 in G.R. No. L-46155, had become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptly observed: 3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12 August 1981 (referring to the "Macandog Decision") unsettles and reviews issues which had long been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme Court and the then Court of Appeals. But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No. L-50814, refer the case to the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue of whether the remedy of petitioners' in that case was appeal and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had not become final. If appeal, its finality would be the consequence. The "Javellana Resolution," which -reversed the Busran Decision," held that certiorari was proper when a party has been illegally declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog Decision" had not attained finality. Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberately evaded divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the judgment of the Trial Court (in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as in fact the Court of Appeals had held that the "judgment of assail had long become final," and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband could not be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on indestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not inherit wife's vast estate on the ground of utter unworthiness. The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again obvious. It was not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the judgment of assail (referring to the 'Macandog Decision') had long become final." That was in the BurRan Decision," which was precisely reversed by the " Javellana Resolution." As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife, the "Javellana Resolution" pointedly observed:

The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate, pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required member of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten years later, the Hon. respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by declaring that Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely execute the probated last will and testament, unifying the institution of Herminio Maravilla as her sole and universal heir, and ordering the return of the properties of Digna Maravilla to the trunk of origin. The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and "Javellana Resolution" commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim that those judgments were accepted "hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it was that the First Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled the due course Order, which it had previously issued to give it "more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986). Contrary to respondents' claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case. But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case to the Tanodbayan charging the members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an "unjust extended minute Resolution" with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code 3 and for deliberately causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-heirs because of the 11 unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. 4 Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." " It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case ofArnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317) Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of

the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's judicial power is by no means a "display of arrogance" as per respondents' puerile contention, but a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz. that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes vs. Chuoco 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 134), our Constitution "as a definition of the powers of government"placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and 'when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments . . . but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them.' " As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinal principle he would grossly impair and violate is that of the independence of the judiciary, which the members of the bar are called upon to defend and preserve. The independence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335). Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons 34 Phil 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Parades, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1) The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or

decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287) To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes. Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this Court en banc, particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments (Montecillo vs. Gica 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this Court, and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts. Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his chent's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a lawyer is an

instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." (Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970]; Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975[). In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that "disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are suit generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actions as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in the light of the demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and undermining public confidence in the honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a time when the Court is exerting every effort to regain public confidence in our courts after the trauma and debacle undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall impose upon him an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some future and opportune time, that he shag have once again regained the fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562) ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt, and is hereby fined in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle of punishment; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-69377 July 20, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEXANDER ALBOFERA and ROMEO LAWI-AN, accused-appellants. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Mandatory review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case No. 184.* which convicted accused Alexander Albofera and Romeo Lawi-an of Murder, inflicted on them the capital punishment, and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P35,000.00, "by way of moral as well as actual damages." There is no direct evidence linking both accused to the crime charged, their alleged participation therein having been found by the Trial Court to have been proved by circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution as follows: Sometime in June or July 1980, at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the place of the accused Romeo Lawi-an, a long time acquaintance, when accused Alexander Albofera, whom Esma also knew for years and likewise a resident of the same place, called him and informed him they would ran after somebody. Esma acceded (tsn, October 20, 1982, pp. 38-42). Together, Albofera and Esma proceeded at once to the house of accused Lawi-an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was around making a list of people engaged in "caingin" (tsn, October 20, 1982, p. 43). Whereupon, Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the road (tsn, October 20, 1982, p. 44). Albofera at once put his arm on the shoulder of Carancio and asked him to go with them to the upper portion because they will do something there. Carancio was taken to the house of accused Lawi-an where several persons were already gathered, among whom were accused Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began questioning Carancio about his purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he was there to inspect the "caingin" as a forester Albofera resented this, telling Carancio that his acts hurt the poor people who were making a plain and simple living. Carancio answered that he was only complying with the orders of the government. Albofera then asked Carancio should he be set free not to come back anymore. Carancio, however, replied that he would still come back and bring his nephew who is an army man. Thereupon, Albofera intimated to Carancio that he is a member of the NPA and that the NPA's were against the forestry personnel. Thereafter, the persons gathered decided to kin Carancio. Right then and there, Albofera tied Carancio's hands at the back. Carancio pleaded for mercy. Unheeding, Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an, alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan decided to bring, and they indeed brought, Carancio to the forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an's house. Esma did not join the group but remained in the house of Lawi-an (tsn, October 20, 1982, pp. 44-51). Not long after, the group returned to Lawi-an's house, but without Carancio. Albofera's hands, as wen as alias Jun's hands were bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera announced that they had already finished the killing. He also warned everyone, particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to any person or the military, otherwise he (Albofera) would hold him accountable. After that, E smaller went home (tsn, October 20, 1982, pp. 52-54). Meanwhile, at about the same time Efren Sisneros and his wife were weeding their farm in Barangay Buenavista, Bansalan, which is adjacent to Bagong Silang, Managa, also in Bansalan, when the son of accused Lawi-an, who is his compadre, arrived and informed him that his father (the accused) wanted him (Sisneros) in his house. So, Sisneros went with Lawi-an's son (tsn, September 16, 1982, pp. 3-7, 11). On reaching the front yard of the Lawians, Sisneros saw the ac cused Lawi-an at the window. A lot of people were likewise in the house, and he recognized Boy Lawi-an and a certain Jun Menez among others. Sisneros called for accused Lawi-an. The latter went down and they talked downstairs. Accused Lawian explained that he had Sisneros fetched, because the people inside the house were discussing on what to do with somebody a Bureau of Forestry employee-later on Identified as Teodoro Carancio who was also inside the house at the time, and that they

were inclined to kill that person who, according to Lawi-an, was a hindrance to the farmers, because he (the forester) had caused Lawi-an's uncle and brother-in-law to be put in jail and fined for cutting trees in the forest. Shocked, Sisneros could only say "do not do that because killing a person is great sin toward God." Thereafter, accused Lawi-an went upstairs. Sisneros who was left downstairs went home (tsn, September 16, 1982, pp. 11-16, 21). The following day, at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Sisneros was at his farm when accused Lawi-an and Jun Menez passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two, accused Lawi-an told him that the forester was already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise he would be killed (tsn, September 16, 1982, pp. 1620.) The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in not reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981, Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a CHDF member in Bansalan. Margarito then accompanied him to the municipal hall to see the Chief of Police, P/Sgt. Arnulfo Gohol. Sisneros related the killing to Sgt. Gohol. That forester must have already been reported missing, for Sgt. Gohol told Sisneros that the slain forester was Teodoro Carancio. Sisneros asked that his Identity be kept secret in the meantime pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. Sgt. Gohol acceded (tsn. September 16, 1982, pp. 19-20, 21-22). The police authorities arrested accused Albofera on July 2, 1981. ... xxx xxx xxx

Accused Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on July 4, 1981 (pp. 12, 15, Record). Also in July, 1981, the two accused, shortly after their arrest, led the police authorities to the place in Bagong Silang where they buried the slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near the forest where the trees were not quite big besides a coffee plantation (tsn, January 6, 1983, pp, 84-87). And on the very spot pointed to by the two accused, the authorities dug and recovered the cadaver, together with the clothings, namely: a maroon sweater, a semigreen trousers and fatigue briefs worn by the victim, still intact. After placing these in a sack, the group left at about 6:00 o'clock p.m. and returned to the municipal building at around 10:00 p.m. (tsn, January 6, 1983, pp. 87-89, 94-101). xxx xxx xxx1

On July 2, 1981, Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the "arrest" of the victim, Carancio, a Forest Guard in the National Park, because he was "a very strict employee of the government who arrested several kaingeros already in the National Park and Romeo Lawi-an being one of his victims before, got mad of his actuations prompting the latter to report said person to the NPA for possible punishments;" and that the group "sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing." Albofera further declared: Q. 21- Was said Carancio killed by the group? A. Yes, sir, Carancio was stabbed to death by alias John, Romeo Lawi-an, alias "Dolly" Fred, Albert and myself in succession.

Q. 22- Do you mean to say that you have participated in stabbing Carancio to death? A. I was the last to thrust said bolo but I know that said victim was already dead when I did it. Accused for their part, maintain: That in or about the middle of 1980, both the accused-appellants ALEXANDER ALBOFERA and ROMEO LAWI-AN, who were farmer-residents at that time of Sitio Balutakay, Barangay Mansaga, a remote settlement in the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, were fetched from their farm houses by four (4) persons, known to be NPA elements operating in their locality and Identified with their aliases "Fred", "Dolly", "John", and "Albert". Both accused together with Efren Sisneros and Rodrigo Esma were brought by the said four (4) NPA's to a secluded forested area in order to witness the execution of a man, whom the prosecution later claimed to be one Teodoro Carancio, an employee of the Bureau of Forest Development. Thereafter, both the accused, Efren Sisneros and Rodrigo Esma were ordered by these armed NPA to bury the remains of the victim. Afterwards, they were warned, with threat to their lives, not to reveal or report to the government authorities. 2 In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused Alexander Albofera, while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter testified on October 20, 1982, which was translated into English by the Trial Court interpreter and reads as follows: 10-5-82 Dear Odeng, Ding first of all how are you are in good health. As to me if you will also ask me I am here suffering from hardship, so that Ding, help me that I can get out in this difficult condition because your affidavit is the one that has weight. Ding, you go with Mining to my lawyer so that I can study your reason because I will ride if what is your affidavit. If you will not appear before the lawyer it will mean that you will pushed us. Ding, you know about this incident and that I do not want this to happen but you were the one persisting in fact I asked you and you acceded so that that happened. But now you are going to put us down will you not pity the uncle of your wife and furthermore you were not threatened by me we have agreed about this thing now you will free yourself. Ding you must bear in mind that you are a part of this if that will happen to me I will include you so that we will be together in jail anyway your affidavit is there that you are one of those who apprehended the forestry and Noy Roming will testify that no one threatened us and also according to him that he will declare that the two of us apprehended so that the three of us win be convicted. Ding why is it that we are not going to understand one another so that we will not be hard-up we have still a way that will be taught by my lawyer in which we have nothing to fear each one of us. Anyway you can still be a witness of the other side my lawyer wants to know only your reason so that he can study this in order that I ran prepare and ride on it so that you will not be included and I can also get out from this case because if you will not make any arrangement our reasons will contradict with each other even though we have exculpated you we will instead be together here if how many years will be my sentence yours will also be the same because I will include you anyway you were present in the incident nobody force us nobody can witness that you were force by me because that is not the truth. And Ding, I have not squeal because it's difficult the other side no jail its's better for the government because we will just be imprisoned you are the one who win know how to understand we win help one another in order that no hazard of both of us anyway you will not be imprisoned of this you will only help me in order that I can get out here. This is our agreement, is it not.

I hope you will remember our being together before we are very close but now because we have a misunderstanding but our complainant you do not even know him will they look back at you after this. Your mercy (Sgd.) Alex Albofera. 3 Rodrigo Esma's Affidavit referred to in the letter taken on July 21, 1981, mentioned accused "Albofera and "alias Jun" "as having killid the victim. After trial, the lower Court found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both accused for the crime charged, and sentenced them to death in its Decision of October 5, 1984, now before us. The accused raise the following errors: I That the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur gravely erred in finding both accused guilty of murder, as charged in the information, and ordaining a sentence of death, instead of dismissing the charge anchor absolving them as the entire proceedings on the case in the Municipal Court of Bansalan up to rendition of judgment in the CFI of Davao del Sur are void ab initio and a nullity for being tainted with serious illegalities and jurisdictional infirmities as from the inception of appellant's illegal arrest, tortures, and detention without bait their fundamental constitutional and human rights were blatantly violated, brazenly trampled upon and utterly reduced to naught. II That the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur gravely erred-in failing to consider at all the prosecution's evidence on record, which reasonably raises doubt upon the conclusiveness of the bases as to the supposed victim's (1) Identity; (2) his alleged fact of death as stated in the certificate of death [Exh. D]; (3) the place of death and, the approximate or credible date of death; and-consequently, in not finding that on the basis of the above-factual hiatus, the evidence has failed to establish the guilt of both accused beyond that quantum of reasonable doubt as zealously mandated by the constitution. III That the Court a quo erred in holding that evidence adduced against accused-appellants conceded to be merely circumstantial in character and confirmed as such in the appealed decision, has attained such degree of proof and weight of moral persuasion as to leave no vestige of reasonable doubt on the guilt of both accused. IV That the Court a quo erred in appreciating as competent evidence the letter written by accused Alexander Albofera to Rodrigo Esma (Exh. B), the admissibility thereof being specifically excluded under Sec. 4, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution.

V That the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur gravely erred in admitting and considering as competent evidence the illegally extracted extra-judicial confession of accused Alexander Albofera (Exh. C) in violation of, and contrary to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Philippine Constitution of 1973 and the Supreme Court's judicial precedents in point. VI That the Trial Court gravely erred (1) in sustaining the prosecution's theory that both accused-appellants were responsible and culpable for the killing of the alleged victim; (2) in according credence to the testimonies of prosecution's witnesses Efren Sisneros and Rodrigo K. Esma; (3) in failing to sustain the defense theory; and (4) in convicting and sentencing both accused-appellants. VII Furthermore, the lower court gravely incurred the following patent reversible errors: (1) in finding aggravating and qualifying circumstances in the alleged commission of murder, and (2) in not absolving the two accused-appellants, and awarding damages. 4 Succintly stated, the essential issues posed are: 1) Whether or not "serious illegalities and jurisdictional infirmities," in fact, attended the proceedings below and "constitutional and human rights of the accused brazenly trampled upon." 2) Whether or not the extrjudicial confession of accused Alexander Albofera, and his letter to Rodrigo Esma are admissible in evidence; 3) Whether or not the Identity of the victim and the fact of his death were duly proved; 4) Whether or not the circumstantial evidence adduced is sufficient to warrant conviction; and 5) Whether or not qualifying and aggravating circumstances were duly proved. On Irregularities alleged: The charge of illegalities and infirmities is absolutely without basis. There was nothing illegal in the accused's detention without bail. They were charged with and held for the crime of murder, a capital offense and, therefore, were not entitled to bail where the evidence of guilt was strong. That was for the Trial Court to evaluate. The preliminary investigation was far from being "hasty and farcical." If the second stage thereof was not held it was because the accused had waived the same and prayed for the transmittal of the case to the then Court of First Instance for trial on the merits; it was not because they were deprived of the right. Much less has due process been denied the accused. They were duly informed of the charge against them and they were given fun opportunity to interpose and prove their defense. On the Admissibility of the Extra-Judicial Confession of Accused A Alexander Albofera: The preliminary questions addressed to said accused when his Sworn Statement was taken read:

P R E L I M I N A R Y: Mr. Albofera, I am reminding you that you are now under investigation in connection with the commission of an offense, but before I will proceed in it, I would like to inform you that under the Constitution of the Philippines it is so provided that you have the right to remain silent, the right to counsel of your own choice to be present with you while being investigated, the right to self-incrimination and the right to due process, do you understand this: Answer Yes sir, I do. I would like to inform you further, that the manner in which this investigation will be conducted in English, but however, the contents of the same will be interpreted to you in dialect you fully understand and speak, and if you choose to answer one of the question or questions propounded to you, your answer will be reduced into writing and the same will be used in evidence against you or to your favor in any court of justice in the country, do you understand what I am explaining to you? Answer Yes. sir, I understand it because you explained it to me clearly. Do you need then the assistance of counsel to assist you while investigated? Answer I think I do not need any yet this time because I know what I am going to declare here it being the truth of the matter, sir. Since you do not (have) any lawyer yet, are you willing to proceed with this investigation and submit yourself freely into it? Answer I wish that this investigation will be continued because lawyer is not necessary yet. Are you willing to swear and sign this statement of yours freely to justify that your submission into the said investigation is free and voluntary? Answer Yes sir, I will sign it if only to prove that all what I have stated are true and to the best of my knowledge and ability. (Sgd.) Alex Albofera (Exhibits "C", "C-1"). Judicial precedents5 have laid down the rule that the foregoing form of questioning, does not satisfy the Constitutional requirement that an accused be apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. It is, at best, ceremonial and perfunctory, with the answers being mere formalisms put into the mouth of the affiant. What is contemplated is the transmission of meaningful information, comprehended by the person under investigation, not a mere recitation of the Constitutional mandates. More, the extra-judicial confession was extracted without the assistance of counsel contrary to the rulings of this Court in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, No. L-61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, affirmed in People vs. Galit, No. L-51770, March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465, People vs. Burgos, L-68955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1, that "no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in

the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf." While Albofera seemingly waived his right to counsel, which he is allowed to do, aside from the fact that we are not convinced that the waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, the waiver was not valid because it was made without the assistance of counsel.6 That principle is now enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly requires that the waiver be in writing and in the presence of counsel.7 For failure to meet such exacting standards, the extrajudicial confession of accused Albofera must be stricken out and held inadmissible in evidence against him.8 On the admissibility of Albofera's Letter. Accused Albofera contends that his letter to prosecution witness, Rodrigo Esma (Exhibit "B"), is inadmissible in evidence against him under the exclusionary provisions of Section 4, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution), which provides: Sec. 4 (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the Court, or when public safety and order require otherwise. 2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The submission is untenable. The foregoing provision implements another Constitutional provision on the security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and Identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability. On the Identity of the Victim and the Fact of Death: Accused argue that corpus delicti had not been established as the body of the victim, Teodoro Carancio, was not Identified, nor the fact, place and approximate date of his death established. The term corpus delicti stands for the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed.9The evidence adduced in this case sufficiently proved the commission of the crime. In fact, the accused themselves pointed to the grave where the body of a person, allegedly slain in their presence, had been dumped and which, when dug, produced human remains, which turned out to be those of the victim. The skeletal remains of the victim were Identified by his brother, Benjamin Carancio, through the victim's front teeth whose "base seemed rusty" and which bore resemblance to his own, as well as through the victim's clothes, fatigue briefs, maroon sweater and trousers, which Benjamin recognized.10 Prosecution witness Esma also Identified the victim from a photograph which was presented to him.11

On the Circumstantial Evidence: Circumstantial evidence is admissible in the absence of an eyewitness to the commission of a crime, and it is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12 The circumstances testified to by prosecution witnesses meet the foregoing criteria. Even disregarding Albofera's extra-judicial confession, the combination of circumstances sufficiently point to his guilt. The presence of both accused at the scene of the incident is admitted by them. They also admit that they witnessed the execution of the victim, although they claim that they were merely compelled to do so. The foregoing version, however, is negated by Rodrigo Esma's testimony from which it is clear that it was Albofera, his long-time friend, who had fetched witness Esma and informed the latter that they would run after somebody. Together, they proceeded to the house of accused Lawi-an who informed Albofera that the victim was around making a list of "kaingeros." Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. Overtaking the latter, Albofera took him to Lawi-an's house where a group had already congregated and a discussion followed as to the victim's fate. Albofera resented the victim's determination to do his duty and the latter's statement that he was bringing an army man to help him. Sufficient motive was provided to do away with the victim. Albofera tied the victim's hands and, with Lawi-an and three others, took the victim to the forest. When the group returned not long after, the victim was no longer with them. Witness Esma noticed Albofera's and "alias Jun's" hands bloodied. After they had washed their hands, Albofera announced to everyone present at Lawi-an's house that the victim had been done away with and warned everyone not to reveal the incident to anyone including the military. Apparent from the foregoing narrated circumstances is the fact that it was Albofera who was "calling the shots;" that it was he who was the leader of the group and not "alias Jun" as he would want this Court to believe. Esma's testimony is worthy of credence. He was a friend of long standing of Albofera. There was no reason for him to attribute to Albofera the commission of such a serious crime as Murder, if such not the truth.
lawphi 1

Accused Lawi-an must be held equally culpable. That he was part of the criminal design from its initial stages until its culmination is revealed through the circumstances brought out by prosecution witness, Sisneros who testified that while he was weeding his farm, Lawi-an, his "compadre," sent his son to fetch him (Sisneros). With the son, they proceeded to Lawi-an's house where Sisneros saw many people. Lawi-an went down the house and explained to Sisneros that they were discussing what to do with the victim, and that they were inclined to kill him. Sisneros advised against it and went home. The following morning, Lawi-an passed by Sisneros farm and informed the latter that the victim had already been killed with the warning to Sisneros not to reveal the incident to anyone. Prosecution witness, Esma, further buttressed the fact of Lawi-an's participation in the criminal plot when he testified that it was Lawi-an who informed Albofera that the victim was around making a list of "kaingeros;" that it was on the strength of that information that Albofera coaxed Esma into joining him to search for the victim; that Lawi-an was with Albofera and three others who, starting from Lawian's house, took the victim to the forest and then returned thereafter without the victim, obviously because the latter had been done away with. While the degree of actual participation by Lawi-an in committing the offense is not described with accuracy, Lawi-an's conduct before and after the commission of the crime shows that he acted in

concert with his co-accused Albofera. He indubitably cooperated with the latter and three other persons in bringing about the death of the victim goaded by resentment against the latter for his strict enforcement of forestry laws, which led to the incarceration of Lawi-an's uncle and brother-inlaw and the imposition of fines against them. The circumstances proven sufficiently establish a community of purpose-a conspiracy among the perpetrators such that the crime committed in furtherance thereof must be held to be the act of all regardless of the extent and character of an accused's active participation.13 On the Attendance of Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: No reversible error was committed by the Trial Court in appreciating the presence of qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The killing of the victim was committed treacherously, his hands having been tied behind his back so that he was totally helpless and defenseless, and in no position to resist nor fight back. The accused employed means which tended directly to insure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victim might have made. Evident premeditation was likewise present as both accused and their co-conspirators had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and continuously followed it notwithstanding that they had ample time to reflect and allow their conscience to overcome their resolution to kill.14 The accused likewise took advantage of superior strength although this cannot be appreciated separately as it is deemed absorbed in treachery.15 The killing of the victim because of his strictness and the resentment against him as a forester constitutes the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank,16 and not because the victim was engaged in the discharge of his duties under Article 14 (5) of the Revised Penal Code as found by the Trial Court. With the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and two (2) generic aggravating circumstances with no mitigating circumstance to offset them, the crime committed is Murder and the death penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper. However, with the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and as mandated therein the death penalty imposed by the Trial Court should be reduced toreclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby affirmed with modification that the accused Alexander Albofera and Romeo Lawi-an are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Teodoro Carancio, in the amount of P30,000.00, and each to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent. The facts are as follows: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint. Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr.,

this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2 On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

.... 4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice. Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question. It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to

the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5 The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997 WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller. 1

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a "true Servant," thereby assailing the 30 September 1993 decision 2and December 1993 Resolution 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private respondent 4 and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 5 The facts are as follows:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum 6 from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum 7 to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. 8 In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he described as follows: . . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989 . . . .
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. 10

Forthwith, in her memorandum 11 dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, 12 and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. 13 In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. 14

In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum 16 notifying Catolico of her termination; thus: We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990 respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch, you actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the amount of P640.00 actually represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting Department. Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company. Accordingly, you are hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. 17 In his decision 18 of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days work." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows: 30 days Preventive Suspension P2,000.00 Backwages 26,858.50 1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21 Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15 TOTAL AWARD P35,401.86 Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services. In its decision 19 of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. 20 It concluded:

With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal. The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari, which is anchored on the following grounds: I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts. II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent. III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy. Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti, 21 the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's decision, as it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact; and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. It observed that Catolico was given "several opportunities" to explain her side of the check controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation "satisfy the requirements of just cause and due process." The OSG was also convinced that Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolico's admission of the existence of the check, as well as her "lame excuse" that it was a Christmas gift from YSP, constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners' argument that there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication in this case, 22 adding that petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest. In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC contends that petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we dismiss this petition. In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the

contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence. Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a check from YSP, she meant that she did not receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that there was apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion. Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS because, being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle "confidential information or sensitive properties." She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low. A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the instant petition must fail. Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. 23 Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 24 In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. 25 Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task. It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit: 26 4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the [company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00; 5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.

It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. 27 Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through the former's memorandum 28 of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru MBTC Check No. 222832," the said check was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners. Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 29 stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5 October 1989 30 priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order. Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders were silent as to Catolico's participation in the purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an "under the table deal" with YSP. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; 31 and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. 32 Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. 33 As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti 34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. 35 In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for

having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.