Inquiry, 47, 2041

Political Itineraries and Anarchic Cosmopolitanism in the Thought of Hannah Arendt

Annabel Herzog
University of Haifa

In this paper, I argue that Arendts understanding of freedom should be examined independently of the search for good political institutions because it is related to freedom of movement and has a transnational meaning. Although she does not say it explicitly, Arendt establishes a correlation between political identities and territorial moves: She analyzes regimes in relation to their treatment of lands and borders, that is, specic geographic movements. I call this correlation a political itinerary. My aim is to show genealogically that her elaboration on the regimes of ancient, modern, and dark times is supported by such a correlation. I read Arendt in light of the current clash between an amorphous global political identity (and new international order) and the renewal of nationalisms. I show that, for Arendt, the world is divided by necessary frontiers territorial borders and identity frames and that the political consists precisely of the effort to transgress them. Arendt never proposed a restoration of authority but, on the contrary, a worldwide anarchic (that is, based on no predetermined rule) politics of de-localization and re-localization; in her terms, a politics of free movement of founded identities, a cosmopolitanism, which, nevertheless, would have nothing to do with global sovereignty.

Arendt did not conceptualize a best regime nor did she systematically indicate the characteristics of good political institutions. She theorized freedom as the raison detre of politics,1 but, as widely noted in the literature, she left us with more questions than answers because her argumentation on the need for authority contradicts her concept of freedom. In my mind, Arendts understanding of freedom should be examined independently of the search for good local political institutions because it is related to freedom of movement and has a transnational meaning. I argue that Arendts conception of the political in general is linked to the notion of displacement and, hence, transcends the limits of localized structures. Although she does not say it explicitly, Arendt establishes a correlation between political projects meaning constitutions and identities and territorial moves: She analyzes regimes in relation to their treatment of lands and borders, that is, specic geographic movements. I shall call this correlation between political projects and territorial displacements a political itinerary. My aim in this paper is not to reveal a misunderstood political
DOI 10.1080/00201740310004396 # 2004 Taylor & Francis

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philosophy, but to show genealogically that Arendts elaboration on the regimes of ancient, modern, and dark times is supported by such a correlation. I read Arendt in light of the current clash between an amorphous global political identity (and new international order) and the renewal of nationalisms. I show that the world conceived by Arendt is divided by necessary frontiers territorial borders and identity frames and that, according to her, the political consists precisely of the effort to transgress them. In order to expose the notion of political itinerary in the work of Arendt, I disregard the dichotomy totalitarianism-free republic (or democracy) traditionally established by Arendts scholars, and I read her according to the conceptual triad, authority-imperialism-cosmopolitanism. I rst focus on her conceptualization of authoritarian regimes as repeated policies of return to one land and one founding rule. The authoritarian itinerary has been proven to limit freedom because of its centralization on a sanctied land and a oncein-history foundation whose values were considered as essential principles of behavior. However, modernity has taught us that the destruction of all foundations, that is, ideology, has more severe consequences than the absence of freedom. Therefore, in the second part of the paper, I discuss Arendts contention that imperialism, seen as the rst ideological policy, replaced the authoritarian itinerary in annihilating both the idea of foundation and that of a territorially delimited homeland. In the third part, I turn to Arendts proposed alternative to the imperialist itinerary. I argue that Arendt does not propose a restoration of authority but, paradoxically, a worldwide anarchic (that is, based on no predetermined rule)2 politics of de-localization and re-localization; in her terms, a politics of free movement of founded identities,3 a cosmopolitanism, which, nevertheless, would have nothing to do with global sovereignty.

I. Authoritarian Itineraries: Ontological Foundation

In We Refugees, in which Arendt describes the life condition of German Jews eeing Nazism, she writes: The desperate confusion of these Ulysseswanderers who, unlike their great prototype, dont know who they are is easily explained by their perfect mania for refusing to keep their identity.4 The difference between the refugees and Ulysses is that the former had no place to come back to because they forgot who they were. For Arendt, identity does not consist in a determined background that follows one everywhere like a shadow, but rather in a process of return, which is at the same time a territorial return and a return in memory. Ulysses remembers who he really is and, accordingly, agrees to reveal himself to others only when he hears the story of his own life out of himself, an object for all to see and to hear, told

22 Annabel Herzog by a bard at the court of the king of the Phaeacians.5 His memory of his journey or, as Arendt interprets it, his reconciliation with his own reality, is parallel to his concrete return to his island: one day after he hears and tells the story of his life Ulysses eventually reaches and re-conquers Ithaca, his home.6 Arendts reference to the journey of Ulysses in such a refugee context reveals the twofold meaning of the myth (twofold for our purpose, manifold in general), namely, its ontological and political levels; ontological rst because it is the story of the elaboration of identity as a dialectical process of alienation and re-appropriation, which ends up in a reinforced sameness. Unlike the refugees who whatever [they] do, whatever [they] pretend to be reveal nothing but [their] insane desire to be changed, not to be Jews, 7 Ulysses estranges himself from his family and his small land whose borders are clearly established, and crosses the seas to discover and confront otherness, with the constant aim to come back and reintegrate his own landscape and his own traditions. Enriched by his adventures, one might say that he becomes more himself than himself at the end of his journey. The meaning of his trip, its essence, is the return. Ulysses travels in order to come back; he leaves the known for the unknown for the sake of the known. This ontological myth is, in parallel, a political myth. King Ulysses chooses to leave his kingdom and participate in the Trojan War. He visits remote lands where he ghts and defeats various powers and comes back to re-conquer his Ithaca, coveted, like Penelope, by the suitors. The return of Ulysses is that of a victorious king and of his specic political order. By contrast, argues Arendt, the German-Jews eeing Germany never cared for political involvement.8 They had nothing to come back to because they had lost a political identity that never existed: remember that being a Jew does not give any legal status in this world.9 Identity is political. Its loss is a loss of belonging to, and acting in a specic community and a specic place. The similarity of ontology and politics as a search for reconciled identity or, put differently, the understanding of politics as a quest for unity and sameness, is as old as Western culture and is reected in traditional philosophy. Arendt dedicates The Life of the Mind to analyzing and criticizing this similarity and, like many of Heideggers students,10 she there claims to attempt to dismantle metaphysics, and philosophy with all its categories.11 When referring to traditional philosophy, or metaphysics, she turns to another Greek journey, Platos Allegory of the Cave. Political philosophy, she writes, began with the philosophers turning away from politics and then returning in order to impose his standards on human affairs.12 As Patrick J. Deneen recently argued, the Allegory of the Cave shares a great deal with the story of Ulysses: Odysseus offers for Plato the example of a protophilosopher, one who is cognizant of the attractions of life both inside and outside the cave and who, like Odysseus, chooses nally to return to mortal life inside the cave, if informed throughout by his journey above and by prudence once below.13

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The Allegory of the Cave, like the story of Ulysses, unies ontological and political processes. On the one hand, the philosopher comes back enriched by the contemplation of the essence of Being, that is, of true and perfect unity; on the other hand, he comes back as a philosopher-king.14 Arendt argues that it is Platos originality to have thought of sameness and truth in terms of standards applicable to the behavior of other people and that he tried to modify the theory of ideas so that it would become useful for a theory of politics, and so that it would become the basis for ruling the public sphere.15 This wish to rule, she adds, comes from Platos fear of the mob that killed Socrates. Recall that the mob in the cave claims to know the truth and does not recognize the philosopher as the truth-teller, as the suitors aspired to Ithaca and Penelope and did not recognize their king. The ontological political identity exemplied in these myths consists, therefore, in a double process of return: return to preexisting rules whose value is discovered and strengthened during the estrangement abroad, and return to a specic and limited territory: Ulysses comes back to Ithaca and the philosopher comes back to the cave. Arendt insists on this normative and geographic return, which appears to inform the authoritarian order, and which I call the authoritarian itinerary, as distinct from authoritarian institutions. Arendt argues that authority as theorized by Plato was, in practice, a Roman creation, the particularity of the Romans being that they were bound to the specic locality of this one city [Rome] [They] were really rooted in the soil, and the word patria derives its full meaning from Roman history. Moreover, Roman-conquered lands were subsumed ontologically, as it were, under the laws of the homeland and they were nothing but Roman hinterland.16 In this context, authority meant a constant return both to the land of Rome and to the values of ancestors considered sacred and immutable.17 As emphasized by Honig,18 Arendts analysis of authority is ambivalent, not to say, contradictory. On the one hand, she contends that authority helps to prevent deterioration of the political realm.19 On the other hand, she criticizes authority in that it may lead to an attraction to the tyrannical, both in philosophy and in practice,20 because authority always implies obedience and a hierarchy.21 The compelling nature of the rules, even if they represent the standards of reason, risks degeneration into coercion.22 At the same time, therefore, authority is a necessary condition for political life and authority hinders freedom and the human capacity to begin something new. Pirro asks: Why does Arendt afrm the necessity of limiting the very thing [freedom] that she values the most? And he rightly answers: Political authority, as it is manifested in customs, manners, traditions, and positive laws, serves to stabilize human affairs by providing a framework within which initiativetaking in politics can take place.23 In other words, authority is useful for political life to the extent that it provides a framework but it endangers or

24 Annabel Herzog limits freedom to the extent that this framework subsumes newness under given standards. Accordingly, it is my thesis that, for Arendt, what is needed for good political life is not authority per se, which may degenerate into tyranny, but a framework or, more precisely, a framework that will allow or even provoke newness. Such a framework, independent of authority but included in some forms of authority, is called by Arendt a political foundation. A foundation is the actual event that realizes the link between sameness and newness and on which a community constitutes its specic identity, be it that of a nation-state or of any other form of public community of acting men and women. It is an event in which the world had become esh, that is an absolute that had appeared in historical time as a mundane reality, and it is the necessary starting point of all actions.24 The founded political identity may be more or less related to previous structures: A modern revolutionary foundation tries to cut all bonds with former regimes, whereas some antique foundations, like that of Rome, voluntarily maintain a link with ancient customs or traditions.25 In any case, for Arendt, following Aristotle, a political foundation never consists in a passage from a state of nature to a political state: It institutes a particular political tradition, or constitution, replacing another particular political tradition. Indeed, it consists partly in a return to sameness: It establishes the political but it is, at the same time, already based on a political situation. Then the foundation of a political community constitutes its identity because, or when, its actual occurrence is remembered. Ancient foundations, for instance, were kept in memory in the form of legends through which people assumed responsibility for the past and on which they built their political will.26 In her analysis of foundations, Arendt recalls a third Greek journey, that of Theseus, the legendary founder of Athens.27 She recalls it briey, but her laconism should not prevent us from remembering the whole myth. Like Ulysses, or the philosopher of the Cave, Theseus comes back home but he comes back to a home where he has never been before: His homeland is not his land of birth and youth. His trip, from Troezen to Athens, is a quest for identity, for he is willing to meet Aegeus, his father. In Athens, however, he does not perpetuate his familys regime but establishes a new regime, democracy. He accomplishes his glorious deeds and defeats his cousins, the fty sons of Pallas, not to re-conquer a lost kingdom, but to found a new political order. In the three Greek myths recalled, that of Ulysses, that of the Cave (developed in the whole theory of The Republic), and that of Theseus, the hero comes back reconciled with himself, represses some kind of rebellion, and strengthens his political power. However, only in the case of Theseus is this power radically new, that is, free;28 indeed, it is a regime of freedom. (For Arendt the authoritarian regime of the philosopher-king described in The Republic has nothing new because it is based on the

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ancestral ruling mode of the private space, and it does not allow much more freedom than life in the cave.) Theseus journey paradoxically links a return and the beginning of absolute newness: Theseus comes back to act; he comes back for the future. Consisting of both a return and the beginning of something contingent, his foundation becomes, in itself, a framework that will allow further freedom to develop. Put differently, Theseus foundation establishes the possibility of other foundations. The recourse to the myth of the founder of Athens allows us to better understand the relationship between authority and foundations. By contradistinction with the multi-founding journey of Theseus, who, after pacifying Athens, went on sailing up to Crete to challenge the tyranny of Minos over Athens inhabitants, and then traveled to the land of the Amazons etc., in other words, introduced newness at each stage of his leadership, the return home that characterizes the authoritarian itinerary exemplied by Rome is based on the centrality of Rome and the memory of a once-in-history founding of the city and of the values of its rst and only founders. Arendt stresses that this eternal foundation of Rome prevents the possibility of renewing itself and by this, differs from the Greek understanding of foundations, paradigmatically represented by Theseus. She assumes that
[t]he polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its location; its the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. Wherever you go, you will be a polis: these famous words became not merely the watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space between the participants which can nd its proper location almost anytime and anywhere.29

For the Greeks, the political meant an endless founding process in lands considered both as homelands and as new lands. The lands were necessary for foundations and, hence, for political commitment. However, Arendt says that in their refusal to sanctify these lands, the Greeks expressed a critical attitude, perceptible also in their approach to political functions manifested in democratic practices and in the way they treated cultural sources. She writes, [T]he great Greek authors became authorities in the hands of the Romans, not of the Greeks. The way Plato and others before and after him treated Homer, the educator of all Hellas, was inconceivable in Rome30 She emphasizes that [t]he Roman feeling of continuity was unknown in Greece because [i]n contradistinction to the Romans, the Greeks were convinced that the changeability, occurring in the realm of mortals in so far as they were mortals, could not be altered because it was ultimately based on the fact that, the young, who at the same time were new ones, were constantly invading the stability of the status quo.31 We have to conclude, therefore, that it is because they lacked criticism, that is, free renewals of foundations on non-sanctied lands, that authoritarian regimes degenerated into coercion and

26 Annabel Herzog violence.32 Indeed, Arendt claims that the difculty to maintain an authoritarian regime comes with the difculty to keep a territory sacred and eternal, as shown in Machiavelli,33 and that this difculty leads to terror. We can now see that the problem of authority for Arendt comes from the closure of its unique return, its unique foundation, or its limitation in time and space. More often than not these regimes eventually maintain their unique tradition through dictatorship.

II. Imperialist Itineraries: Regressive Progression

As shown, for Arendt, Theseus founding gesture and, in general, the early Greek invading the stability of the status quo oppose the authoritarian itinerary understood as a return to a sanctied once-in-history foundation. However, these two ancient models have to be considered retrospectively, in light of the new dangers of dark times. In modernity, an unknown category of regimes arose, which destroyed the bases of authority without establishing newness and freedom because these regimes were, strictly speaking, nonfounded policies. In Arendts terms, they were ideological expansions. Arendt calls the modern form of power that imposes an identity without the foundation of a body politic, that is, without the possible creation of something new,34 imperialism. As I will show in the last part of this paper, she proposes an original alternative to ideological expansions based on free and renewed foundations (hence, on Theseus model). In order to understand her alternative, I shall now highlight the features of the imperialist itinerary. As broadly emphasized in the literature, Arendts focus on imperialism was genealogical and the object analyzed genealogically was modern world alienation.35 By alienation Arendt meant depolitization. Politics disappeared in dark times because private practices and devices were gradually transformed into rules and principles for the conduct of public affairs.36 Referring to these words, many of Arendts readers understand her notion of depolitization as based on the opposition between public and private spaces established in The Human Condition. As a result, depolitization is interpreted as an undue outgrowing of the social, that never private nor public hybrid realm,37 followed by destruction of the public sphere. This understanding is legitimate in any attempt to associate Arendt with participatory democracy theory.38 However, I focus here on another theme of Arendts theory, namely, the continuity of time. In her thought, the erosion of a clear separation between public and private spaces comes with the emergence of a gap between past and future. In dark times there seems to be no willed continuity in time and hence, humanly speaking, neither past or future, only sempiternal change of the world and the biological cycle of living creatures in it.39 As recalled above, for Arendt, the political means not only free plural and public

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actions, but also such actions based on the remembrance of a common past. What is destroyed in dark times is not merely the ability to act in the public space, but the ability to link newness and a preexisting political identity consisting of common historical memories,40 that is, between acting and belonging to a founded community. In my opinion, Arendts entire theory depends on this link, a link that establishes the elements it links: When the link disappears, both political initiative and political identity are neutralized. Arendt contends that imperialism was involved in the destruction of this link and, therefore, of the two components of all bodies politic, acting and belonging, because it consists in expansion instead of action, and in ideology instead of foundation. In focusing on expansion and ideology, Arendt tries to distinguish imperialism from other forms of territorial conquest, for instance, Roman conquest, which she never criticizes, or the colonization of America, about which she is remarkably silent, as if colonization were legitimated by the eventual constitution of a body politic. In other words, contrary to our current views on conquest, the problem of imperialism, for Arendt, is not that it negates the independence and cultures of entire populations but that it destroys all possible political life in conquered territories. In the same vein, in 1947, she wrote to Jaspers: What has been done in Palestine itself is extraordinary: not merely colonization but a serious attempt at a new social order.41 A new order consists in action, which develops stabilizing forces which stand in the way of constant transformation and expansion.42 The stabilizing forces are the foundations of a common life, that is, a common law (a tradition), whereas expansion does not care for the implementation of law or justice because it is an economic process based on unlimited production and accumulation of capital. Contrary to the ancient conquerors, European imperialists never attempted to govern conquered lands but dominated them for economic purposes through bureaucratic reports and decrees.43 Conquered lands became economic properties of European countries, never new homelands. The principle and tool of such bureaucratic rule was power left to itself, that is, power whose end is not to serve and control political action but to increase indenitely. Unlimited investment and trade combined with unlimited power meant unlimited territorial conquest. Such a journey was a realization of what Arendt calls the progressive view of the 19th century, that is, a perversion of the 18th century belief in emancipation, and which not only did not want the liberty and autonomy of man, but was ready to sacrice everything and everybody to supposedly superhuman laws of history.44 For Arendt, therefore, imperialist progression had nothing to do with Kants conception of universal history as a regular progression among freely willed actions.45 Like Benjamin, and quoting his ninth Thesis on the philosophy of history and the denunciation of the pile of ruins created by progress, that is, the linear

28 Annabel Herzog march of imperialist conquerors,46 Arendt establishes a correspondence between the territorial and deterministic senses of progression. However, imperialism does not consist only in progression but in a regressive way of dening political identity. At the beginning of the imperialist adventure, identity was still nationalist because what then seemed relevant in expansion were the economic and security interests of the homeland.47 Soon, the seduction of power left to itself became so strong that the administrators of conquered territories resented the restraining power of the nation-state. These functionaries of violence proved to be indifferent to political considerations on the submitted lands and alienated from their native body politic. The consequence of such alienation, argues Arendt, was a regressive nihilism that eventually destroyed the structures of the nation-state itself, the last known form of the authoritarian itinerary: The concept of unlimited expansion makes the foundation of new political bodies wellnigh impossible. In fact, its logical consequence is the destruction of all living communities, those of the conquered peoples as well as of the people at home.48 The imperialist disintegration of patriotic beliefs did not mean the end of the search for a shared identity, but rather that the establishment of a common ideology had replaced the reference to a common foundation. Here, according to Arendt, appears the originality of the imperialist itinerary and, in my opinion, the originality of her analysis. Arendts conceptualization of ideology is to be found only in the last part of The Origins,49 but, as I understand it, the whole book reads like a genealogy of ideology seen as the main characteristic of depolitization. As Bernstein emphasizes, AntiSemitism was already a form of political ideology,50 and imperialism crystallizes ideology as concrete policy. For Arendt, ideology is the logic of an idea not related to something that is but to the development of the idea itself. Accordingly, ideological thinking becomes independent of all experience from which it cannot learn anything new even if it is a question of something that has just come to pass. Hence ideological thinking becomes emancipated from the reality that we perceive with our ve senses, and insists on a truer reality concealed behind all perceptible things. Emancipating itself from experience through certain methods of demonstration that replace the remembrance of real events, ideology pretends to explain the entirety of history through the logical development of its single idea. Racism, for example, explains the whole of history as a natural ght of races.51 As a result, imperialist administrations became ideological from the moment they stopped looking back to the nation and concentrated on race theories, that is, when they tried to give themselves a pure identity based on pre-political natural origins:52 The organic doctrine of a history for which every race is a separate, complete whole was invented by men who needed ideological denitions of national unity as a substitute for political nationhood.53

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Echoing her claim that extermination camps were laboratories of totalitarianism, Arendt argues that the case of the Boers should be observed as a laboratory of all European imperialist policies. Believing in (but not founding) an identity made of faith in the divine chosenness of the Whites, hence trying to escape all laws, that is, all limitations upon their land possessions, the Boers voluntarily abandoned these lands and entered the interior wilderness of the country they had transformed themselves into a tribe and had lost the Europeans feeling for a territory, a patria of his own54 (note that the use of the word patria clearly refers to the authoritarian itinerary). Like all race organizations they had lost all roots. According to Arendt, the focus on the purity of the race leads to regression to a horde existence without territorial boundaries, and, hence, no more based on conquest but on the horrible reality of wandering like beasts. Arendt notes the similarity of the horde-like life of the Boers and the tribalism of continental (German, Russian, etc.) imperialism. Tribalism, she explains, rejects the framing effect of territorial borders and, as such, it destroys all political commitment. It articulates metaphysical rootlessness with the territorial uprootedness of the nationalities it rst seized.55 The imperialist itinerary described by Arendt articulates symbolic and territorial progression and regression. In erasing borders, imperialists did not enlarge the territories of their sovereignty but rather destroyed the idea of territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the invention of a so-called superiority of the white race overrides all theories of human origins that have a political, hence territorial, outcome. In boundless lands ruled by violence, there is nowhere to fall back upon,56 only an abstract ideology based on no common experience no founding event, no memories, no shared actions, and no specic place to frame these actions. The outcome of imperialist policy is a regressive world, where armed hordes ght for supremacy and survival. Arendt insists on a direct consequence of the imperialist itinerary, which, as such, should be distinguished from totalitarianism (which, radicalizing the regressive features of imperialism, is an unprecedented form of absolute depolitization).57 In annihilating territorial boundaries, imperialism necessarily engenders the existence of stateless people and refugees. Certainly due to her own status during and after the war, Arendt focuses solely, I have to admit, on European refugees. It is somewhat disturbing that the consistent parallel that she establishes between the different forms of imperialism suddenly ends when she turns to the victims of imperialism, and refers only to European stateless peoples.58 Her silence on non-European refugees is partly explained by her claim that the unique reaction aimed at protecting stateless people against racist ideology was also a European ideology, namely, the abstract slogans of human rights. The notion of human rights was as unfounded, she says, as the idea of race struggle: Since the Rights of Man were proclaimed to be inalienable, irreducible to and undeducible from

30 Annabel Herzog other rights or laws, no authority was invoked for their establishment. [I]t turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.59 Arendt argues that the condition of stateless people did not consist in a lack of the rights formulated in the declarations of the 18th century, but was manifested rst and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions signicant and actions effective. Here again, against liberal views Arendt emphasizes not the lack of rights of stateless people, but their total exclusion; the fact that they had nowhere to be even as repressed people. They belonged to nowhere whereas, in ancient times, even slaves still belonged to some sort of human community.60 As such, stateless people appear as the rst signs of a possible regression from civilization,61 parallel to the horde-like regression of imperialists. The regression of the conquerors and that of their victims characterizes a depoliticized world.

III. Cosmopolitan Itineraries: Displaced Foundations

By imperialism Arendt meant the strictly European colonial imperialism whose end came with the liquidation of British rule in India.62 However, imperialism consists in the crystallization of two general processes of modernity, the loss of tradition and the loss of action, which still shape our attempts to overcome the boundaries of the world, claims Arendt, even when the outcomes of such attempts are not successfully imperialist:63 the word expansion has disappeared from our political vocabulary, which now uses the words extension or, critically, overextension to cover a very similar meaning.64 The recent revival of nationalism in Europe may seem, at rst glance, to refute Arendts analysis, although it appears quickly that these struggles for independence are not exempt from imperialist ideologies. In the following lines, I sketch Arendts attempt to respond to imperialism leading to depolitization without coming back to authority leading to despotism. Arendt denes the political as an interrelation of actions and foundations. Foundations are specic actions on which identities are built. New actions emerge from these identities but also transform and transcend them. Arendt calls identities, which connect people in a particular way, in-betweens: Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, which varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent.65 In-betweens are objective realities because they are founded on actions that are real events, and they are thereafter transformed by other real events. Based on such an in-between, a regime is not ideological, but it would

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be not authoritarian only if it were repeatedly transcended by actions, that is, if the values of the foundation were not to eventually become a standard for behavior and a justication for violence. Accordingly, a founded nonauthoritarian regime would consist of pure freedom and would produce pure freedom. Put differently, freedom needs foundations that will not restrain it. In Honigs words, the problem is to establish foundations without appealing to gods, a foundationalist ground, or an absolute or, as Keenan puts it, to establish a lasting support for freedom.66 This may seem quite abstract, or maybe even trivial. This could mean that a free political community should constantly renew its foundation through democratic activities. However, it is striking that Arendt never denes such democratic practices or the institutions that would assure them. Canovan recalls that Arendt had planned to write a systematic book on political institutions but it never materialized. 67 She stresses elsewhere that Arendt was much less interested than most of her predecessors in the details of institutions, and much more interested in free discussion.68 Unlike most political philosophers or political writers such as Montesquieu or Tocqueville, whom she often recalls, Arendt does not provide us with any normative analysis of political structures. My conclusion is that, for her, to nd lasting support for freedom does not mean to establish lasting institutions. Arendt cares only for the lasting of the possibility to call something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known.69 She argues even more radically that Where men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual will with which I force myself, or the general will of an organized group. If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.70 In other words, lasting support for freedom cannot be identical to lasting institutions of sovereignty because sovereignty is identical to rule and, hence, constrains freedom. Arendt recalls that, for the Greeks of Theseus times and subsequently, Freedom as a social phenomenon was understood as a form of political organization in which the citizens lived together under the condition of norule. This notion of no-rule was expressed by the word isonomy. The polis was supposed to be an isonomy, not a democracy.71 As I see it, when Arendt speaks of lasting freedom, she always refers to such a freedom as norule or as participation in public affairs72 not determined by an a ''rwen or a kratein. As a result, I cannot agree with Honig who argues that Arendt searched for a practice of authority for modernity, although Honig interestingly concludes that such practice turns out to be, paradoxically enough, a practice of deauthorization.73 The augmentation and amendment of authoritarian constitutions74 would necessarily be centered on an absolute legal and territorial ground, that is, on an a ''rwen. Sure enough,

32 Annabel Herzog Arendt makes it consistently clear that founded authoritarianism is better than unfounded modern imperialism, and she emphasizes the advantages of authority in light of the catastrophes of dark times. However, it seems to me that she would prefer to avoid all practices based on immutable a ''rwen. Freedom is pure anarchy, which is emphasized in a too-often forgotten expression of Arendt (in her essay on Broch): the political realm -- that is, the inherently anarchic conglomeration of human beings75 This sentence suggests that freedom, experienced in spontaneity,76 constitutes its own foundation and that we are looking for a way to assure the continuation of such auto-foundation. The act of foundation is a real event, albeit a real event exclusively made of freedom. A non-authoritarian and non-imperialist political life should, therefore, consist of renewed foundations and of freedom as no-rule. Arendt did not describe the structures of such life because, per denitio, a no-rules life has no predetermined structures. We would not be surprised to discover that political freedom has no territorial predetermination either, but a global meaning. Action is part of the human condition, which is to say that in dening action, Arendt not only depicts the political functioning of societies but also processes that express and inuence our being in the world.77 Our actions in the public realm transcend this realm and we are thrown into the world by our actions. Paradoxically, when the specic and limited public sphere appears, it is immediately dissolved into the world: [T]he term public signies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it78 In the context of this elastic notion of the public sphere, as Curtis puts it,79 freedom as no-rule is freedom in the world as freedom of movement: Freedom of movement is [] the indispensable condition for action, and it is in action that men primarily experience freedom in the world.80 The emphasis on global freedom is developed in Arendts analysis of Jaspers attitude in Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?81 Arendt writes: One could easily prove that Jaspers whole philosophical work was conceived with intent toward world citizenship , and she stresses the resemblance between the cosmopolitanism of Kant and that of Jaspers, the only successor Kant has ever had.82 The similarity between Kants right to visit as opposed to conquest,83 and Jaspers world citizenship reacting to imperialism and totalitarianism seems glaringly obvious. However, Arendt immediately adds that to be a citizen of the world does not consist in belonging to a world government.84 In her last book, Democracy and the Foreigner, Honig notes that political theorists, principally nationalist ones, too often identify cosmopolitanism with world government. She advocates a democratic cosmopolitanism seeking not to govern but rather to widen the resources, energies, and accountability of an emerging civil society that contests or supports state actions in matter of transnational and local

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interests85 In my mind, Arendts work enriches this discussion and contributes to the elaboration of a new kind of cosmopolitanism independent of the idea of rule, although, as I suggested above, Arendts thinking is fundamentally more anarchic than institutionally democratic. Arendt points out that No matter what form a world government with centralized power over the whole globe might assume, the very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the monopoly of all means of violenceis not only a forbidding nightmare of tyranny, it would be the end of all political life as we know it.86 In a lecture on Kant she similarly claims that Kant knew quite well that a world government would be the worst tyranny imaginable.87 As unique sovereignty single rule over the earth world government can be nothing else but the outcome of an extended ontological conquest eventually maintained through violence, thereby to constitute a strengthened authoritarian power whose enlarged sovereignty makes freedom impossible.88 As a result, Jaspers idea of world citizenship necessarily entails a rejection of all possible forms of sovereignty, national and transnational, and would lead not to a global power but to a federated world based on mutual understanding:
[J]ust as the prerequisite for world government in Jasperss opinion is the renunciation of sovereignty for the sake of a world-wide federated political structure, so the prerequisite for this mutual understanding would be the renunciation, not of ones own tradition and national past, but of the binding authority and universal validity which tradition and past have always claimed. The shell of traditional authority is forced open and the great contents of the past are freely and playfully placed in communication with each other89

It appears to me here that Arendt uses her reading of Jaspers to reformulate her own conception of the difference between a framework and the attempts of this framework to rule. According to her, Jaspers rejection of sovereignty is not the rejection of distinct traditions and past, but of their binding authority as a claim of universal validity. We need traditions against ideology, but traditions that appear freely in our times, thereby to be renewed and replayed in the here and now. World citizenship means a communication between diverse traditions, that is, free passages between memories of distinct national pasts. Cosmopolitan communication should be materialized through a world federation. Such a federation would reproduce Arendts description of a federation of councils on a larger scale and thus realize the relation between foundations, identities, and freedom. Arendt indeed wrote:
[C]ouncils or soviets had sprung everywhere, completely independent of one another. The formation of a council in each of these disparate groups turned a more or less accidental proximity into a political institution. The most striking aspect of these spontaneous developments is that it took these independent and highly disparate organs no more than a few weeks, in the case of Russia, or a few days, in the case of Hungary, to begin a process of co-ordination and integration through the formation of higher councils from which nally the delegates to an assembly representing the

34 Annabel Herzog
whole country could be chosen. As in the case of the early covenants, cosociations, and confederations in the colonial history of North America, we see how the federal principle arises out of the elementary conditions of action itself. The common object was the foundation of a new body politic90

Richard J. Bernstein refers to Arendts understanding of the councils system as a viable political alternative to the failures of the nineteenth-century nation-state (and national sovereignty) and to the all too real successes of twentieth-century totalitarianism.91 Although I would replace the term totalitarianism with imperialism (because Arendt saw totalitarianism as a specic crystallization of general imperialist processes that destroyed freedom and tradition), Arendt denitely considered federalism to be a good solution to the risks of both authority and imperialist disappearance of authority. That is why, in her mind, a Jewish homeland, distinct from a sovereign Jewish state and imperialist Jewish expansion, could be realized only as a confederation of Arabs and Jews. Moreover, as Crick notes, her fervor for councils recalls Proudhons utopia, hence classical anarchism and the rejection of a centralized states rules.92 However, no matter how appealing Arendts enthusiasm and hopes, they only partly match her general argument. Of course, a federation of councils is built on spontaneous actions and connections between identities but Arendt herself emphasizes that at the end of this process (and quite quickly in fact), a unied representation of the global body politic is established and freedom becomes institutionalized. In other words, general rules are determined. This would not be a problem if we were only considering the spontaneous freedom of the founding act. However, because freedom and newness are identical, freedom should be able to renew itself. Arendt contends quite emphatically that in federalism the central power [does] not deprive the constituent bodies of their original power to constitute.93 But this view is true only up to a certain point. If we focus on her own examples of the Soviet Union, Hungary, and the United States, we reach the unequivocal conclusion that all post-foundation changes in constitutions were made under the authority of these same constitutions, regardless of the clear differences between them. Once the body politic is founded, and even if freely founded, there can be no more free actions. As Bernstein notes, public freedom existed only for the revolutionary founders.94 Arendt is aware of this fact and she pursues her description of federalism by the surprising statement: Freedom, whenever it existed as a tangible reality, has always been spatially limited.95 It seems, therefore, that the outcome of freedom as no-rule consists ultimately in a kind of authoritarian return. If we follow Arendts own analysis of federalism, we have to conclude, against her, that a federation and, a fortiori, a world federation, will necessarily, in one way or another, become sovereignty. Let us bear in mind that Arendts purpose was not to dene institutions that,

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de facto, eventually constitute a sovereignty limited by territorial borders (even if, as she claims, many sovereignties are less tyrannical than one world sovereignty), but to conceptualize action as freedom. We should, therefore, set aside for a moment the risk of sovereignty and focus on the meaning of such a freedom. As Villa shows, for Arendt, actions are expressions of the free uniqueness of the agent, independent not only of rules but also of personal motives.96 Actions are inspired by principles such as glory or honor, which appear during performed acts, neither before nor after,97 and are accomplished even if there is nothing to be attained.98 However, a further distinction should be made. Subjective actions are depersonalized because they do not realize personal motives, and undetermined because they are not subsumed under specic rules. Still, they are founded. They are free if and only if they are connected to a common past. Actions are depersonalized and undetermined but, precisely through the principles that they express, they continue a tradition, and thereby constitute individual developments of an inbetween. Put differently, actions express individually a plurality of agents related by the in-between. But how can individual action manifest and renew a plurality? Actions, says Arendt, consist of expressed opinions,99 and an opinion itself consists in taking into account other opinions, or other standpoints:
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where I actually am not100

As we know, Arendt explains that the capacity to form opinions by taking into account the diverse opinions of a plurality is similar to the enlarged mentality based on imagination conceptualized by Kant in his Critique of Judgment. In her lectures on Kant she writes:
Critical thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection it makes the others present and thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of Kants world citizen. To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains ones imagination to go visiting. (Compare the right to visit in Perpetual Peace).101

Critical is to be understood here in its etymological sense of judgment. Arendt planned to argue in the third part of The Life of the Mind that political judgment is a judgment without a rule; hence, she considered Kants judgment of taste a model for political judgment. Put differently, critical thinking or a judgment without a rule is, strictly speaking, anarchic. To form an opinion is anarchic because it is determined by no standard at all. However, it is elaborated during a visiting process, which is founded on

36 Annabel Herzog specic identities: in visiting I both stay in myself and I try the standpoint of other people. Visiting, therefore, does not consist in an enormously enlarged empathy,102 nor in abandoning my own identity. My opinion is related to all kinds of people and groups that I consider although they have nothing in common with me. Lisa Disch sums up this conception most accurately when she concludes, Visiting is contrary to parochialism, which means simply to stay at home, contrary to accidental tourism, which means to ensure that you will have all the comforts of home even as you travel, and contrary to assimilationism, which means forcibly to make yourself at home in a place that is not your home by appropriating its customs. Both the tourist and assimilationist erase plurality.103 What we should notice in this attitude is, rst, that it is both individualist and plural. Although visiting is political par excellence, it does not reect a general policy but an individual behavior. However, this behavior takes into account the whole community, and more: it is open to all sides. Second, it is not accidental that in depicting critical political thinking manifested in actions, Arendt uses the metaphor of spatial displacement and recalls Kants right of travelers. The visiting behavior establishes a link between political activity, namely, forming opinions expressed in actions, and traveling in the world, even if only in imagination. Nevertheless, Arendt contends immediately that Kants position was that of a world-spectator and not that of an actor because To be a citizen means among other things to have responsibilities, obligations, and rights, all of which make sense only if they are territorially limited.104 As I see it therefore, to be political and not purely philosophical in the manner of Kant, the visiting process or cosmopolitan itinerary of the actor has to be dialectical. On the one hand, the foundation of identities inevitably provokes the need to maintain these identities; hence, the emergence of institutions and borders. Arendt recalls that all foundations need a limited place to develop and produce an in-between. On the other hand, these limits should be constantly criticized; hence, crossed and delocalized by taking into account other standpoints. At the same time, identities should be strengthened and transgressed by worldwide movements. Identities should be transformed by these transgressions, incorporating what they learned during their visit, thereby changing the world and not immobilizing it nostalgically; still, they refer to a delimited common past. A citizen would be that person who, without rejecting his/her dened identity, would be able to contest and de-localize its frame. He/she would not share a common identity with all human beings but, in forming his/her own opinions, in acting, he/she would take into account as many other specic identities as possible. Arendts dialectical but anarchic cosmopolitanism reveals the difference between sharing an identity and taking into account identities. Sharing is limited symbolically and territorially and reduces plurality to sameness,

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whereas taking into account crosses all borders and, hence, is inherently plural. Un-ruled but founded (I hesitate to say rooted, as roots cannot move whereas Arendts foundations have the ability to be displaced), this process is both anti-authoritarian and anti-imperialist. It sketches an anarchic political itinerary consisting in undetermined worldwide movements founded on specic identities and territories. Based neither on subsumption nor on destruction of borders but on transgression of necessary limits, this original cosmopolitanism does not include conquest of any kind. Visiting consists in a continual confrontation between opinions and between identities; hence, between territorial commitments, which may lead to disagreement but not to war because war aims precisely at avoiding such confrontation in subsuming or destroying. Contrary to Curtis, who suggests that Arendts actors excel at being together with others by being neither for nor against them,105 and, hence, describes quite a static and indifferent togetherness, I think that Arendt depicts moving actors crossing one anothers path and rethinking their own itinerary according to that of neighbors and foreigners. Arendt shows us that the delimitation and determination of lands and identities are not the goal of political existence but only a part of it; a part of a process that should de-localize no less than localize. Borders are necessary and have no intrinsic value. As such, they should be criticized and reevaluated but, at the same time, they should never be forgotten or rejected. Arendt does not propose a new model of political regime but a new kind of political itinerary resisting constraint and consolidating belongings. This moving position is neither the most convenient nor the most stable. Like Theseus who unied Attica but then offered civil rights to foreigners, and who welcomed Oedipus although he was an outcast (see Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus), a free citizen should both reinforce and transform his/her identity by examining other standpoints. The risk of a hardening of identities and borders always exists: Theseus was nally accused of being himself a foreigner, had to renounce his leadership, and was replaced by a king. However, in times that experience the ideological absence of foundations and, accordingly, the desperate wanderings of refugees, anarchic cosmopolitanism could be the political itinerary that articulates freedom as no-rule and concrete, remembered, identities.

NOTES 1 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 146. 2 I will use the word anarchic in its etymological sense; never in its common connotation. 3 See Kimberley Curtis, Our Sense of the Real. Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 70. 4 Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, edited by Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove Press, 1978), p. 64. 5 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 45.

38 Annabel Herzog
6 Odyssey, Book XIII. 7 Arendt, Jew as Pariah, p. 63. 8 Arendt, Jew as Pariah, pp. 55, 62, 113; Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace and Company: 1993), p. 17. 9 Arendt, Jew as Pariah, p. 65. 10 For instance Emmanuel Levinas writes, The ideal of Socratic truth thus rests on the essential self-sufciency of the same, its identication in ipseity, its egoism Ontology as rst philosophy is a philosophy of power. It issues in the State. Totality and Innity. An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pp. 44, 46. 11 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, one-volume edition (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace and Company, 19771978), p. 212 (Thinking). See also Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 1245. See Michael Denneny, The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah Arendt on Judgment, in Melvyn A. Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), p. 248. 12 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 1718. 13 Patrick J. Deneen, The Odyssey of Political Philosophy. The Politics of Departure and Return (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers, 2000), p. 17. 14 Otherwise he would be killed 15 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 112, 113; Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), p. 226. 16 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 1201. 17 However, authoritarian values are not necessarily transcendent: Platos recourse to transcendental truth differs from the Roman use of laws. See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 187, 199. 18 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 1993), p. 96. 19 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 119. 20 Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger at Eighty, in Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 303. See also Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 139. See Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 16065. 21 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 923. 22 Hence Arendt tried to dene the task of the thinker independently of the wish to rule, if only by the standard of truth, the political realm that she sees as the domain of free and contingent actions. See Lisa J. Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994); Dana R. Villa, Socratic Citizenship (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 24698. 23 Robert C. Pirro, Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Tragedy (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001), pp. 53, 66. 24 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 160. See Honig, Political Theory, pp. 96109. 25 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 210. 26 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), p. 208. 27 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 281. 28 On Arendts triple identication of action, newness and freedom, which stands at the basis of her whole thought, see for instance What is Authority? and What is Freedom? in Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 91171 and Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 235. I consider this point basically known by all readers. 29 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 198. 30 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 124. 31 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 28. 32 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 13241. 33 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 1389; Arendt, On Revolution, p. 39. 34 Arendt, The Origins, pp. 135, 138.

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35 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 6. See Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (A Thousand Oaks and London: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 76; Bernard Crick, Crossing Borders. Political Essays (London, New York: Continuum, 2001), p. 155; and Richard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press: 1996), p. 124. 36 Arendt, The Origins, p. 138. 37 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 28, 35. 38 See Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), see chapter 6, pp. 20152. For a criticism of Arendt based on this interpretation of her work, see Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob. Hannah Arendts Concept of the Social (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998). 39 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 5. 40 Arendt, The Origins, p. 166. See Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 94. 41 Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence 19261969 (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1992), p. 98. If we follow Arendt, what has been done in the territories conquered by Israel in 1967 is closer to imperialism than to such serious attempt. 42 Arendt, The Origins, pp. 1378. 43 Arendt, The Origins, p. 186. 44 Arendt, The Origins, p. 143. 45 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 41. As Pagden writes, Kant was not in an obvious sense an imperialist. Indeed, in almost all obvious respects he was an anti-imperialist. His belief in the possibility of a universal cosmopolitan existence is explicitly not based on the conception of an expanding military culture, however supposedly benign its intent. Anthony Pagden, Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism, Constellations 7 (2000), pp. 322, at p. 18. 46 Arendt, The Origins, p. 143. 47 Arendt, The Origins, p. 132. 48 Arendt, The Origins, p. 137. 49 Arendt, The Origins, p. 46971. 50 Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, Ch. 2. 51 Arendt, The Origins, p. 159; see also p. 469. 52 See Joan Cocks, On Nationalism: Frantz Fanon, 19251961; Rosa Luxemburg, 1871 1919; and Hannah Arendt, 19061975, Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, edited by Bonnie Honig (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 236. 53 Arendt, The Origins, p. 166. 54 Arendt, The Origins, p. 196. 55 Arendt, The Origins, p. 236. 56 Arendt, The Origins, p. 189. 57 Let us recall that the rst chapter of Totalitarianism, which follows Arendts analysis of the situation of stateless peoples at the end of Imperialism, is called A classless society. In it Arendt shows that totalitarian control dealt with amorphous mobs made homogeneous. Needless to say, Arendt does not miss the division of society into classes but the existence of some kind of boundaries within the society related to the difference between opinions (I come back to this point in the last part of this paper.) She makes this clear when she claims that totalitarian movements organized masses and not classes or political parties. Arendt, The Origins, p. 308. In contrast to despotism, which is a degeneration of founded authority into violence, totalitarianism proved to be the total control of homeless hordes indoctrinated by ideology. This does not mean that totalitarianism is a consequence of imperialism, but that it may develop at the end of the imperialist journey when expansion and ideology have completely destroyed all political boundaries. Therefore, totalitarianism is absolutely a-political.

40 Annabel Herzog
58 On Arendts disregard for, or prejudices against, the fate of other continents, see Anne Norton, Heart of Darkness: Africa and African Americans in the Writings of Hannah Arendt, Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, pp. 24761. See also Benhabibs discussion on Nortons view: Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism, p. 85. 59 Arendt, The Origins, pp. 2912. 60 Arendt, The Origins, pp. 2967. 61 Arendt, The Origins, p. 300, my emphasis. 62 Arendt, The Origins, p. xxi. 63 See for instance Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), pp. 347. 64 Arendt, The Origins, p. xix. See also p. xx. 65 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 182. 66 Honig, Political Theory, p. 97; Alan Keenan, Promises, Promises. The Abyss of Freedom and the Loss of the Political in the Work of Hannah Arendt, Political Theory, 22 (1994), pp. 297322, at p. 298. 67 Margaret Canovan, Introduction to Arendt, The Human Condition, p. ix. 68 Canovan, Hannah Arendt, p. 203. 69 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 151. 70 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 165. 71 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 30. 72 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 32. See also Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 32. 73 Honig, Political Theory, pp. 96, 115. 74 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 202. 75 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 149. My emphasis. 76 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 166. 77 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 177, 247, Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 156; Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 5 etc. 78 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 52. 79 Curtis, Our Sense of the Real, p. 76. 80 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 9. 81 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, pp. 8194. 82 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 74. 83 Kant, Political Writings, p. 106. 84 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 84. 85 Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 13. See also p. 104. 86 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 81. 87 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 44. 88 Such a regime would be despotic, but not necessarily totalitarian. Indeed, it would not necessarily be established on ideology. 89 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 84. 90 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 267. 91 Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, p. 125. 92 Crick, Crossing Borders, p. 159. 93 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 267. 94 Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, p. 130. 95 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 275; see also Arendt, Lectures, p. 44. 96 Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror, pp. 139, 140. 97 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 152, 153. 98 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 147. 99 See Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy. Listening, Conict, and Citizenship (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 81. 100 Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 1412. See also Hannah Arendt, Understanding and Politics, Essays in Understanding 19301954 (New York, San Diego, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993), p. 323. 101 Arendt, Lectures, p. 43.

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102 Arendt, Lectures, p. 43; see Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 241; Hannah Arendt, A Reply (to Eric Voegelins review of The Origins of Totalitarianism), The Review of Politics, 15 (1953), pp. 7685, at p. 79. 103 Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, pp. 1589. 104 Arendt, Lectures, p. 44. 105 Curtis, Our Sense of the Real, p. 147. Received 27 April 2003 Annabel Herzog, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel. E-mail: aherzog@poli.haifa.ac.il