Technovation 23 (2003) 917928 www.elsevier.

com/locate/technovation

Implementing Lean in aerospacechallenging the assumptions and understanding the challenges

V. Crute, Y. Ward, S. Brown , A. Graves
University of Bath, Centre for Technology and Innovation, School of Management Group (CENTAIM), Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK

Abstract Lean manufacturing appears to hold considerable promise for addressing a range of simultaneous, competitive demands including high levels of process and product quality, low cost and reductions in lead times. These requirements have been recognised within the aerospace sector and efforts are now well established to implement Lean practices. Lean manufacturing was initiated within the automotive sector. However, since the publication of the inuential book, The Machine That Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990) there has been a range of documented cases of Lean implementation in a variety of sectors. Despite this evidence, the perception remains that Lean manufacturing is to some degree, an automotive idea and difcult to transfer to other sectors especially when there are major differences between them. In this paper we discuss the key drivers for Lean in aerospace and examine the assumption that cross-sector transfer may be difcult. A Lean implementation case comparison examines how difculties that arise may have more to do with individual plant context and management than with sector specic factors. 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Lean; Aerospace, manufacturing strategy

1. Introduction Manufacturing has undergone radical and fundamental changes over the past decade. The relatively static nature of market conditions within the mass production era have now been replaced by market requirements that are profoundly different to mass production. The terms used to describe the current era include: Mass Customization (Pine et al., 1993)reecting the need for volume combined with recognition of customers (or consumers) wishes. Flexible Specialization (Piore and Sabel, 1984) related to the manufacturing strategy of rms (especially within small rms) to focus on parts of the value-adding process and to collaborate within networks in order to produce whole products. Lean Production (Womack et al., 1990)developed from the massively successful Toyota Production System, focusing on the removal of all forms of waste from a system (some of which are difcult to see).

Agile (Kidd, 1994) emphasising the need for an organisation to be able to switch frequently from one market-driven objective to another Strategic (Hill, 1995; Brown, 1996) in which the need for the operations to be framed in a strategy is brought to the fore. Whatever term is employed, the paradigm for the current era is, as mass production was a hundred years ago, a major innovation process that makes the system it replaces, largely redundant. Time-to-market and product customization are now high on the strategic agenda (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Hart and Berger, 1993; Pine et al., 1993; Sasaki, 1991). Perhaps the most popular term to describe the current era is that of Lean production. This developed from the book, The Machine That Changed the World, in which the authors examined the Toyota Production System and provided data on Lean and non-Lean plants within the automotive industry (Womack et al., 1990). Lean production describes the Japanese-style manufacturing process pioneered by Toyota, which uses a range of techniques including just-in-time inventory systems, continuous improvement, and quality circles (Krafcik, 1988). Lean is concerned not only with the rms

Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-1225-323-841. E-mail address: s.e.brown@bath.ac.uk (S. Brown).

0166-4972/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0166-4972(03)00081-6

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internal manufacturing capabilities, but is also heavily dependent upon supplier involvement within the supply network (Levy, 1997; Oliver et al., 1996). The essential characteristics of Lean production include the following factors: Integrated production, with low inventories throughout, using Just-in Time management; Emphasis on prevention, rather than detection in quality; Production is pulled in response to customers, rather than pushed to suit machine loading or other in-house ideas of scheduling; Work is organized in teams, using multi-skilled workforce problem solving to eliminate all non added value (Dankbaar, 1997); Close vertical relationships, integrating the complete supply chain from raw material to customer. The claims of the authors of The Machine That Changed the World were both bold and clear. Ultimately, it is claimed, Lean practices will spread to all manufacturing: ....the adoption of Lean production, as it inevitably spreads beyond the auto industry, will change everything in almost every industrychoices for consumers, the nature of work, the fortune of companies, and, ultimately, the fate of nations (Womack et al., 1990:p. 12) and ...we believe, Lean production will supplant both mass production and the remaining outposts of craft production in all areas of industrial endeavor to become the standard global production system of the twenty-rst century (Womack et al., 1990, p. 278). Undoubtedly, as Womack et al. (1990) predicted, Lean practices have crossed from the automotive sector into other industries. However, the Lean paradigm is not without its critiques. For example, Delbridge (1998) is very critical of supposed benets of team working and empowerment promised by the adoption of Lean practices and argues that these are based on myth. These views have some support in the aerospace sector, as the following quote illustrates: Lockheeds version of Lean manufacturing isnt with employee empowerment, says Terry Smith, a business representative with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (LAM) at the Ft. Worth plant. Their version of Lean manufacturing is more top down where they say, We want you to do it this way so we can gure out how to do it

cheaper and with less peopleManufacturing News. (April 10, 2000 p. 3) Despite some criticism with Lean, the Aerospace sector has recognised the opportunity to eliminate huge amounts of waste within its value streams and the Lean revolution within the industry is clearly underway, as the following indicates: The aerospace industry is in the grip of a revolution. Its name is Lean and its guiding principle is the elimination of waste from the production cycle. The revolution is moving out of the prototyping shops and on to the assembly lines, with dramatic resultsand none too soon. The automotive industry has been Lean for years. In aerospace, avionics and engine manufacturers embraced Lean thinking long before the airframe makers. Now airframers are moving fast to catch up. Their motivation is the promise of faster development, better quality and lower cost Flight International. (Sept, 1999) This is endorsed by Cook (1999) when he states: Lean aircraft designers consider that a new right rst time culture in aerospace manufacturing will do for aircraft what it did for the car industry a decade ago. Under the new regime, panels and components damaged in operation can be quickly replaced at the front line without special customization in much the same way that car parts are ordered up and tted in the commercial world. Employees involved in all aspects of Euroghter productionfrom the design stage through to logistic supportare grouped in integrated product teams (IPTs). Each IPT is responsible for its own budget and accountable for its particular section of the aircraft (Cook, 1999). The adoption of Lean practices are evident in the US and UK. In the US, Lockheed Martins Aeronautics Sector declared 1999 as the year of Lean and is rigorously applying Lean techniques to the F-16 and F-22 ghter programmes and the C-130J military transport aircraft. In the UK, BAE Systems military aircraft plants have been heavily involved in employing Lean practices within their businesses in recent years. The Samlesbury site became the companys agship manufacturing site, believing that Lean manufacturing was central to controlling costs on the Euroghter programme. However, BAE Systems perceives that the aerospace industry is 1015 years behind the automotive sector in implementing Lean ideas (Flight International, Aug Sept, 1998). Lean ideas are now being transferred throughout the UK aerospace industry, with major initiatives also underway in many manufacturing rms including Airbus

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UK, Rolls-Royce plc, Smiths Aerospace, and TRW Aeronautical Systems among others. Lean improvement efforts are also being supported in both the USA and UK by national research programmes exemplied in the US Lean Aerospace Initiative at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the UK Lean Aerospace Initiative, a consortium consisting of the Universities of Warwick, Bath, Nottingham and Craneld. Thus far we have provided a brief introduction of the adoption Lean practices within the aerospace sector. In the following sections of this paper we examine the key drivers for Lean implementation in the Aerospace industry and we then proceed to challenge some of the preconceptions of Lean implementation. Lastly, we present our primary data and identify the challenges faced by individual companies through case study comparison.

2. Key drivers for Lean in aerospace In this section we explore the key drivers behind Lean practices within the automotive sector and we then compare these with aerospace. The reason for doing so is that Lean manufacturing originated in the automotive sector and the pursuit of Lean is still common within it. The automobile industry is still the worlds largest manufacturing business. Motor vehicle production at the beginning of the new millennium was around 55 million units. However, there are a number of major concerns for auto rms and there are vast differences between competitors in terms of their size, capabilities and nancial performance. In 2000 only a quarter of the worlds 40 carmakers were protable. Competition has become far more intense due to increased globalization efforts coupled with saturated capacity in several major geographic areas. Perhaps the key issue for the industry is over-capacity: in total, the industry can produce 20 million more cars and trucks a year than it sells. Put bluntly, every car plant in North America could close, but there would still be over capacity. As a result of this, a possible scenario is that by the year 2010, 40 carmakers will have been reduced to a total of the Big Six: by 2010, the thinking goes, each major auto market will be left with two large, home-based companies GM and Ford in the US, Daimler-Chrysler and Volkswagen in Europe, and Toyota and Honda in Japan. Players such as Nissan or Volvo may keep their brand names, but someone else will be running the show (Business Week, Jan 25, 1999). These contextual, industry factors have enormous impact on Lean production for two reasons. First, in very cost-conscious conditions in which much of the auto industry operates, protability is very dependent upon competitors being able to drive down costs by eliminat-

ing all forms of waste. Second, in the light of the continuing shakeout and reduction of players within the automobile industry it would appear that to be a potential partner for a merger a rm must be able to demonstrate that it has Lean/world-class capabilities. Thus, the ability to demonstrate Lean capabilities may become a mere order-qualier (Hill, 1995) in order to compete at all within the automobile industry. However, without such capabilities it is likely that a car producer will have to exit the automobile industry. But what are the contextual factors that have caused Lean production to become an issue within aerospace? We suggest three factors are relevant here. First, the end of the Cold War prompted drastic reductions in defence procurement budgets resulting in reduced military markets. The defence industry could no longer justify the cost-plus mentality that characterised the Cold War era and faced the challenge of seeking new markets (AW& ST, Feb, 1992; Interavia, Sept 1999). Second, passenger demand fell suddenly following the Gulf War, forcing airlines to cancel or postpone civil aircraft orders. This followed a period where civil aircraft orders had been running at unprecedented high levels. The inability of the industry to respond to unexpected changes in demand was reected by long lead times (AW&ST, Aug, 1999). Third, in common with other industries globalization has become a central feature. The rise of globalization has clearly necessitated a complete rethink for some rms in terms of how they can organize and recongure themselves. Many markets now contain a number of global players. When Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the US aircraft makers, completed their $13.3 billion merger in 1997, Philip Condit, the combined groups CEO said that one of the main reasons behind the merger was: We are moving, I think, inexorably towards a global economy. (Source: Financial Times, 1997, Sep 19). These events signalled radical changes for the global aerospace industry. There was now over-capacity in the market and prots were declining (Cosentino, 1999). As a result of these factors a number of major players within aerospace are pursuing Lean practices. For example, Boeing is facing up to some of these challenges as it implements urgent operational improvement strategies to: 1. Achieve greater quality on rst pass throughout Boeingthe goal is 90% improvement in manufacturing quality 2. Organize corporate-wide work teams that are fully accountable for their work product and that all have the metrics they need to measure their performance 3. Create a culture that encourages employees to propose better ways of meeting performance goals

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4. Move up the value chain i.e. focus on core competencies 5. Reduce the companys cost structure substantially 6. Globalize to a greater degree (AW&ST, Aug, 2000).

3. Transferring Lean to aerospacechallenging some preconceptions The applicability of Lean practices to sectors other than automotive has been questioned (James-Moore and Gibbon, 1997). Clearly, Lean had its roots within the automotive industry and the contrast between this high volume setting and the low volume environment of the aerospace industry is enormous. Jina et al. (1997) provide insights into some of the sector differences between automotive and aerospace companies although they do not mention how this impacts upon the manufacturing transformation process and this is where the literature on manufacturing strategy becomes important. From a manufacturing point of view, Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) and Hill (1995) provide templates that show profound differences between high volume (line production) processes, common to automobiles, and low volume (project based) processes that pervade aerospace. According to Hill, the differences between these two manufacturing environments extend beyond production transformation characteristics to competitive priorities. To use the Hill (1995) terminology, there are major differences between order-winning and order-qualifying criteria when contrasting high and low volume settings. The transfer of practices across different sectors can present difculties. This potential problem is not peculiar to Lean practices; other modern paradigms, which we mentioned earlier including Mass Customisation (Pine, 1993) and Agility (Kidd, 1994) pose sector-specic problems of transfer across industry sectors. These sector-specic requirements cannot be ignored and glossed over in the pursuit of a particular paradigm. However, differences such as volume levels may not necessarily present an obstacle to the implementation of Lean in aerospace because numerous successful examples of the application of Lean have been drawn from a variety of industrial sectors (Womack and Jones, 1996; Henderson and Largo, 1999; Jenson et al., 1996). Indeed, Womack and Jones (1996) provide a detailed account of the introduction of Lean principles within Pratt & Whitney, one of the worlds leading aero-engine manufacturers. The aerospace sector may even be at an advantage over automotive in terms of applying Lean principles. The lower volumes mean that the aerospace sector (at prime and upper tier levels particularly) is closer to the Lean ideal of single piece ow than the automotive sector. Another possible concern is that aerospace is ten years behind the automotive sector with regard to the implementation of Lean practices and, although this may

provide opportunities for learning, the time lag is an important issue. However, we should also bear in mind that the transfer of Lean practices has not been fully disseminated even within the automobile industry, although the initial efforts began some ten years prior to the aerospace sector. For example, Kochan et al. (1999) showed that although Lean production systems do seem to be diffusing throughout the world, there is much variation not only across countries and rms, but within rms as well. In addition, four types of Lean plants were identied and these are shown in Table 1. In addition, the automotive sector may be accused of shopoor myopia, having concentrated on creating Lean nal assembly plants and supply chains over the past ten years. The automotive sector is only now coming to grips with applying Lean in the extended enterprise (Womack and Jones, 1996), in particular by looking at ways to reduce waste throughout the distribution process and provide the nal customer with their true requirements. This has become evident in the 3-Day Car ambition within the industry (Holweg and Pil, 2001). However, rather than catching up with such developments in the automotive sector, the aerospace sector already builds to order, only producing aircraft that are required by their commercial and military customers. The aerospace sector is adopting Lean practices with a Lean Enterprise mind-set, particularly as 80% of cost is built-in at the design stage. Therefore, the concern over the perceived ten-year gap may not be as much of a disadvantage as it rst appears. While the aerospace sector may have some advantages in implementing Lean, the challenges of implementation are real and prove dif cult for many rms. As Karlsson and Ahlstrom (1996) point out, traditional ways of thinking and practices are difcult to shed and we can thus expect such a radical change to be fraught with difculties.

4. Primary researchunderstanding the challenges: a case comparison of Lean implementation 4.1. Methodology We now turn our attention to our primary research. Our research combined both primary and secondary data. Secondary material was updated on a regular basis in order to continually monitor developments on Lean processes. In addition, we gained ongoing primary data from longitudinal case studies of two plants within the same rm. In-depth case studies can potentially provide a source of rich data and can also serve as an interesting point of comparison between the differences of behaviour between plants or divisions within a single rm. Fig. 1 provides a ow diagram of how we combined primary and secondary research throughout the project.

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Table 1 Types of Lean automotive plant (adapted from Kochan et al., 1997) Plant types Stable and Lean Rapid move to Lean Sticking-with-tradition Characteristics Japanese-owned plants, both in Japan and abroad that were early adopters of Lean production and continue to use this approach with great success. Those plants in Europe and other regions that are relatively new to the industry and have been quick to adopt parts of Lean production systems, although not the entire system. The US-owned plants in North America that have been slow to adopt Lean production and, in many cases, have reverted to traditional mass production. Also, they have made only modest progress on quality and productivity. Plants that have production systems that incorporate aspects of both Lean and mass production systems.

Hybrid

Fig. 1.

A schematic diagram of the research for the longitudinal case studies.

Our primary research combined qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative research began with semiformal interviews with management staff at both sites. We wanted to explore if capabilities of Lean implementation were rm-specic oras in the case here where more than one plant existsplant-specic. Having examined the parameters in the literature that indicated Lean criteria, we examined a range of operational capabilities as well as strategic drivers behind the pursuit of Lean practices within the two plants. Judgemental sampling (Saunders et al., 1997) was used to identify some of the factors that may enable or hinder Lean implementation within the case comparisons of Lean implementation. The two sites were chosen because both were pursuing Lean practices as a result of pressures from their customers within the industry. Both plants (which henceforth we shall refer to as Site A and Site B) belonged to the same company and both are second/third tier component suppliers within the aerospace industry supply chain. From the outset of our research it was clear that industry pressures (as we discussed earlier) to reduce costs and improve quality provided the stimulus for implementing Lean practices at both sites. Quantitative information on performance improvement was collected, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the key managers and shop-oor employees and this data was supplemented with documentary evidence. We sought to examine possible reasons for the differences in the rate

of Lean implementation and to see if key lessons for Lean implementation could be found. 4.2. Findings 4.2.1. Key drivers and results of Lean implementation We found that despite the similarities, with both sites having achieved signicant results, the time-scales for progress differed considerably between the two sites. At Site A, Lean changes were implemented and effective within six months. By contrast, at Site B Lean changes were still being put in place after 18 months of effort. Site A was experiencing a large increase in orders for spare components requiring the site to approximately double their output. Senior managers in the company acknowledged that existing resources, equipment and systems would not be sufcient to meet future demands and, therefore, a change strategy had to be implemented. It was decided that Lean techniques would be piloted in one department, which was under-performing and that the strategy would be that Lean practices would then permeate from here to the whole site over time. Improvement targets were very specic and linked to Lean indicators, including lead-time reduction, increase in stock turns and the introduction of pull systems. The department was involved in machining, sub-assembly, assembly and testing processes. Substantial results were achieved within six months as shown in Table 2.

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Table 2 Lean performance improvements at Site A Site A Lead time Stock turns Production capacity per mth. Pull systems Single piece ow Scrap and rework Starting point (Time = 0) 8 weeks 2.3 450 None 40/50 part batches 3,500 per week Target (0 plus 6 mths) 4 weeks 10 800 In place Reduce batch size Reduce Achieved (0 plus 6 mths) 5 weeks 5.3 800 Sub-assembly 5 part batches 750 per week

At Site B the drive to implement Lean practices was motivated by perceived success at Site A and more modest demands for a 20% increase in production. The area identied for Lean improvements was involved in assembly processes only with machining and testing taking place in other parts of the organisation. Improvement goals included increasing output of delivery kits and improving labour efciency. Further targets for improvement were more generic includingto use a range of management quotes gained from interviewsestablishing customer-focused areas and establishing continuous improvement practices within the site. Few performance measures were available within the target area for the start of the improvement efforts although metrics were available for the whole assembly section of which the target area formed one part. No plans were put in place to set formal targets and measure the achievement of the more generic goals. Production and productivity targets were achieved and some progress was made in establishing customer-focused areas. While continuous improvement practices were adopted within the area, there were some reservations concerning the degree to which such practices had become embedded and would be sustained. An overview of Site B is provided in Table 3. As Tables 2 and 3 indicate, there were improvements at each site, although the results were achieved in different timescales and we now highlight key differences between sites. 4.2.2. Factors affecting the rate of Lean implementation Interviews with managers and staff engaged in implementing Lean practices highlighted a broad range
Table 3 Lean performance improvements at Site B Site B Delivery kit production capacity Labour efciency Establish customer focused areas Establish continuous improvement practices Starting point (Time = 0)

of factors, which were considered to be signicant in inuencing the rate of change. The key strategic factors that we examined included: Change strategies Effects of company culture Product focus Senior management commitment and consistency of focus Time and space for performance improvement. The key distinctions are summarised in Table 4. In the following sections some of the factors inuencing the rate of improvement at each site are explored in more depth. 4.2.2.1. Change strategytargeted and holistic It has been argued that implementing Lean philosophy and techniques requires adoption of the entire system in a holistic manner, rather than applying techniques in a piecemeal fashion. However, many companies have engaged in cherry picking of the Lean techniques observed in Toyota. As Rother (1998) points out: lacking the overriding goal, the techniques become our goal and we ended up cherry picking (p. 489). This approach can prove problematic as Womack and Jones (1996) highlight. As they suggest, many managers and change agents: have drowned in techniques as they tried to implement isolated bits of Lean system without

Target

Achieved (0 plus 18 mths)

100 units 20% increase 120 units Actual Data not released 20% improvement 20% improvement reported No formal measurement in place No formal targets or measures set Estimated 15% of target areas established No formal measurement in place No formal targets or measures set Continuous improvement practices adopted

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Table 4 Summary of the key factors inuencing rate of Lean improvements Site A Rate of Lean implementation Signicant results within 6 mths Site B Signicant results following 18 mths of implementation efforts Piecemeal approach Generic targets Performance measures developed at later stage in implementation Informal dissemination of Lean concepts Central site High visibility/blame culture Bureaucratic Changes targeted on a functional area (assembly) Processes shared by several products Less process ownership Highly dependent on other areas Conicting management initiatives/people management philosophies Changes to Lean champions responsibilities

Change strategy

Holistic approach Specic Lean targets Performance measures developed at outset of implementation Formal Lean training provided Satellite site Autonomy/willingness to experiment

Site culture

Product focus

Changes targeted on product value stream Processes mainly dedicated to particular Product family Greater process ownership Limited dependency on other areas High degree of support Consistent messages

Senior management commitment and consistency

Time and space for performance improvement Increases in customer orders created a pull for changes Creation of additional time and space for changes Drowning in orders Limited time and space available for changes

understanding the whole (Womack and Jones, 1996, p. 10). In our research, Site A took a more targeted and holistic approach to implementation than Site B. As noted earlier, several complementary targets were established, including reducing lead times, using pull systems and moving further towards the principle of single piece ow. Performance measures were developed to assess progress towards the objectives set. By contrast, Site B took a less targeted approach and failed to identify performance measures to assess improvements. This may have resulted in a lack of clear focus. This is a problem that has been highlighted within UK Lean Aerospace Initiative research, where it was found that some aerospace companies have identied the benets of clear targets and measurements including: Enhanced Visibilitymeasures enable performance to be visualised by highlighting the facts. Measures show improvement trends and can therefore be used to foster continuous improvement. Change of mindsetmeasures give people an aim and

have the potential to change attitudes. When employees see how they are contributing to the company they begin to think differently and are empowered to make changes. Clearer focusif measures are seen as important, people will try to improve. A clear and easy to understand measurement system can provide a clear, customer-oriented focus (Ward and Graves, 2001). Such benets seem to have been gained at Site A, leading to rapid changes in practices and performance improvement. Additionally, value-adding and non-valueadding activities were systematically identied across each process in the products value stream and string diagrams were used to record product movement across the entire value stream. This approach gave participants in the improvement activities at Site A, a more coherent picture of what was to be achieved. In contrast, Site B took a less targeted, more piecemeal approach. Although there were targets for increasing both production and labour efciency, the targets were less challenging than at Site A and there were few measures to assess progress for the more generic goals. Progress towards Lean manufacturing was also hesitant and less holistic. Recognising

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that shopoor staff spent a large proportion of their time locating or waiting for inventory in order to progress production, initial improvement efforts focused on bringing the inventory needed for production into the area. This approach was unsuccessful resulting in excessive inventory levels and a lack of ownership of inventory due to insufcient preparation of the team members. This action was reversed at a later stage with a maximum amount of one days allocation of inventory being kept on the line. This more tentative or piecemeal approach may have been adopted because of resistance among personnel to the new ideas. As one interviewee noted, staff tended to: do the bits they understood and liked but were more reluctant to do the bits they where they were uncomfortable. An example of this was a reluctance to move to standardised tooling rather than own toolboxes. The perception was that shopoor employees tended to pick up on one thing rather than seeing the whole picture (from one of the interviewees). At Site A training was provided for employees whereas Site B relied on a more informal approach of discussions with employees at meetings rather than formal training and presentations. The use of more focused training may have helped Site A employees to understand better the key principles of waste elimination and ow of value, and more importantly, to explain why the change to Lean manufacturing was necessary at this time for their business success and survival. 4.2.2.2. Effects of company culture A number of cultural factors were also highlighted in terms of inuencing the rate of change across the two sites. It was recognized that the two sites differed considerably in their history and culture. Site A had its roots in a small company, which had been taken over by a larger aerospace supplier. However, while the site had become medium-sized, the managers and staff reported that they still had a mindset of small company attitudes where they would pursue what needed to be done rather than waiting for direction from the centre. Over the years, as a satellite site they had been, in the words of one interviewee, left to get on with it, as long as the numbers came out right. This degree of autonomy was considered to be highly benecial in making changes. Personnel at Site B, in contrast, were more visible to scrutiny by senior managers. This visibility and the perception of being in a blame culture were some of the factors considered to have a negative inuence on their ability and desire to take risks in implementing

Lean ideas. Historically, this site had been involved in the military sector, which required a lot of formal reporting. Consequently, the organisation had become highly bureaucratic with procedures to cover every eventuality (quoted from an interviewee). It was described as being top heavy with a management structure and support systems to support large-scale and complex work. This organisational structure and culture made it difcult to break away from the existing ways of doing things. 4.2.2.3. Product focus The improvement sites also differed in terms of product focus and process ownership. Site A was structured around a particular product family with limited variation. The Lean changes at this site focused on a large part of this product value stream (Rother, 1998), which, essentially, had mainly dedicated rather than shared processes. As a result, there was greater control of resources when making changes and the improvement team was less dependent on others within the organisation to get things done. Site B, on the other hand, was still somewhat functionally oriented with less ownership and control of processes. The improvements were targeted on a functional area, part of the assembly area for a range of products. As a result of several processes, including machining and testing being carried out in different locations, making changes at this site required convincing many people from other departments that the changes were right prior to implementation. Consultation of this sort would naturally slow the improvement process. The people involved were also a subset of the larger group of people working on assembly. This might also have had an impact on the rate of change since the majority of employees in the assembly area were continuing to follow more traditional practices. 4.2.2.4. Senior management commitment and consistency of focus A lack of senior management commitment has often been cited by as one of the key reasons why change efforts fail (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). However, it is not necessarily clear how such a lack of support is manifested. The experience of the sites in this investigation highlight some of the ways in which senior managers can demonstrate a lack of consistency in their approach to implementing Lean improvements. While Site A reported a high degree of support and a consistent message to proceed with the Lean improvements, the messages coming to Site B employees were less clear. A number of examples of conicting messages were reported: While the Lean strategy of cellular manufacturing was being implemented, a machine tool strategy, which encouraged process sharing, was also underway. The machine tool strategy was experienced as undoing the

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work in developing Lean practices. As one manager noted, Getting the process down from 14 operations to 2 became the point. Little account was taken of the wider picture across the value stream including whether you could get the raw material to machines or use the part as soon as it was nished. This had the effect of reversing work done to promote cellular manufacturing and to give people a product focus. The machine tool strategy, which involved major nancial investment, was described as stealing the show and overshadowing the more modest efforts to implement Lean practices. A further management initiative involved devolving responsibility for customer contact to a wider circle of specied managers. While this was welcomed by staff at Site B as a step forward, there were problems with the way in which this initiative was implemented. The allocation of customer responsibility did not align neatly with product responsibility, which resulted in the manager at Site B not having responsibility for his own customers. This initiative was consequently seen as a further distraction from the Lean strategy. Finally, conicting messages were given through the imposition of several changes to the Lean champions role. This issue will be elaborated on in the next section, which raises the issue of timing for the Lean initiative. There certainly appear to been inconsistencies in the approach taken by managers on Site B. One member of staff described the situation as three or four people going in several directions at once, following their own perceptions of what is required at the time. Consistency in management messages is emphasized as an important element in effective implementation of changes in organisations (Kotter, 1995; Senge, 1999). 4.2.2.5. Timing and space for performance improvement Site A faced a large increase in orders for spare components and this was an important factor in focusing Lean implementation efforts. In this case there was a clear customer pull for the improvements made. This approach may be more effective in creating rapid change than introducing and pushing changes through the system even though they may not be needed until a later stage (Crute and Graves, 2001). Competitive pressures were clearly felt at Site A. As one respondent commented the customer wanted a large reduction in cost by end of 2000. Weve got to support him, otherwise hell take his business elsewhere. There are lots of people out there who would like our businessweve got to improve our quality, improve our throughput and reduce our inventory. This awareness of competitive pressures was also felt to be helpful in focusing improvement efforts. Site B similarly experienced general pressures to

reduce costs and improve quality, and demands for an increase in production. However, there were additional factors in the timing of the Lean implementation efforts, which were less conducive to achieving rapid and focused change. The business was in the process of acquiring another company and senior managers were removed from a team created to oversee the introduction of Lean manufacturing to what was described as an acquisition implementation team. The manager of the target area for Lean changes was also asked to contribute heavily to the acquisition team, thus reducing the time available to champion the Lean implementation. Loss of senior management input to the Lean manufacturing initiative would, likewise, have presented a message that the acquisition was more important for the company than improving performance on the shopoor. High production demands also made it difcult to commit resources and time on the shopoor to improvement activities. A manager at Site B described the plants as drowning in orders where team members were wrapped up in re-ghting with little time to do anything else. It was perceived to be difcult to make changes without adversely affecting delivery to the customer. Consequently, the team at Site B opted for trying to do a little at a time with Lean implementation. Site A, by contrast, adopted a strategy of making time through the use of weekends to create signicant changes. This problem has been noted in other cases of Lean implementation where companies have remained in a were getting ready for Lean transformation line of thinking and delayed too long in making changes (Rother, 1998). As some Lean practitioners have suggested to manage change, you sometimes have to just do it and then deal with the consequences (Koenigsaecker, 1998). Finally, interviewees at Site B commented on the difculty of making changes when physical space was limited. It may be signicant that at Site A, one of the rst tasks undertaken involved tracking product movements around the factory and a consequent redesigning of the factory layout which created extra oor space.

5. Conclusions and future research From our research it would appear that the problems of implementing Lean within aerospace are not, necessarily, more difcult than that of implementing Lean within high volume sectors, including automobiles. The challenges are different but not more difcult. We offer key conclusions from our ndings and tentative lessons for other companies can be drawn from the experience of the two sites. First, Lean capabilities are not merely rm-specic but are, instead, plant specic. There were differences

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in the rate of progress made and differences in the approach taken to Lean implementation. Second, it cannot be assumed that the characteristics of the best performing site within a rm that has multiple plants will, necessarily, be transferred to other plants within the same company. Techniques, including benchmarking between sites may help but there needs to be Lean Champions between sites if Lean practices are to be disseminated among plants within the same rm. Third, in order for Lean to be implemented, plantspecic manufacturing strategies have to be in place that are comprehensive and holistic in scope and content. Results may also be achieved more readily when improvement activities focus on all or a large part of an identied product value stream rather than on a functional area which produces a range of products. Similarly, faster results seem to be possible when process ownership has been established rather than several products sharing production processes. Plant-specic strategies have to include internal targets as well as the development of supplier relationships with external partners. The strategic approach taken to Lean implementation would seem to have a signicant impact on the rate of performance improvement (Crute and Graves, 2001). Within the case studies presented, a targeted and holistic approach to Lean implementation delivered faster results in Lean implementation. This approach involves creating a Lean system rather than simply applying single Lean techniques. Complementary objectives are set which support the elimination of waste and ow of value to the customer. Such objectives include identifying and eliminating non-value adding activities from your processes; reducing lead times; inventory reduction and establishing pull systems. Clear targets and performance measures would also seem to play a critical role in Lean implementation. Fourth, operations managers have to be willing to take on a more strategic role than has been the case in past manufacturing paradigms. This is a difcult issue because the emergence of Lean Production has emerged from the profound changes of manufacturing processes over time. However, as Brown (2000) found, the transition from craft through mass production to the current era of Lean often resulted in operations management being absent from the most senior levels of the rm as enterprises became larger and more organized around functions and although there has been increasing importance placed on operations personnel in terms of their contribution to the rms capabilities, including Lean production (Womack et al., 1990; Kenney and Florida, 1993) this has not included discussion about their involvement in terms of their position at strategic levels within the hierarchy of the rm. Our ndings indicate the need for operations managers to have a strategic and not merely tactical role if Lean implementation is to be

successful. Senior management have an important role to play in presenting a coherent vision for their business, clearly communicating business strategy and indicating how the Lean philosophy and practices t with the needs of the business. There also needs to be an awareness of the impact of the consistency of senior management messages. Questions need to be asked concerning whether the philosophies and initiatives being promoted are consistent, timely and necessary. Fifth, our ndings indicate that it is possible that Lean implementation can be achieved more rapidly in plants where the culture supports autonomous working and learning through experimentation. Where such a culture does not exist, senior managers will play a key role in creating a context where change is possible. This requires leadership and a consistent message of support. As one interviewee at Site A stated, you need to believe in people and let them try. If they mess it up, support them, and if they mess it up againsupport them again. Sixth, some aspects of improving performance such as changing factory layout require time and physical space to be available, if signicant results are to be achieved. Interviewees at the improvement sites suggested that consideration should be given to creating a temporary buffer of time through use of evenings or weekends, through committing extra resources to the area or through temporarily increasing stock to make space for improvement activities without affecting production demands. Finally, we recognise that a basic denition of any case study is that it is the intensive examination of a single instance of a phenomenon (Kervin, 1992, p. 53). By their very nature, case studies may be seen as having limitations is the transferability of the ndings to other settings. However, we hope that our research will encourage further exploration of the transfer of Lean practices within the aerospace sector including a larger range of case studies as well as multiple sites within the same company.

Acknowledgements Research for this paper was funded by the Society of British Aerospace Companies and an EPSRC grant, GR/M60491.

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Dr. Valerie Crute is a Research Fellow with the UK Lean Aerospace Initiative based at the University of Bath. She lectured for seven years in the Department of Communication at the University of Ulster, before specializing as a consultant in the management of organisational change. She joined the UK Lean Aerospace Initiative in 1998 following a career that combined academic research and working directly with managers in the private and public sector. Yvonne Ward is a Research Ofcer with the UK Lean Aerospace Initiative based at the University of Bath. Yvonne currently specialises in the area of Performance Measurement, Benchmarking and Cost Management for the Lean Enterprise. Yvonne has wide experience within the aviation and aerospace industry. Yvonne is a graduate of Dublin City University and holds a Masters degree from the University of Limerick. Professor Steve Brown leads the Operations Management Group and is Director of the Centre of Technology and Innovation Management (CENTAIM) at the University of Bath. He is a Visiting Professor to Baruch College, City University, New York and is also Visiting Professor at NIMBAS in Holland. He is listed in Whos Who in Europe. His management experience was gained in both Public and Private Sectors including large and SME organisations. He is actively involved in consulting in a range of organisations in manufacturing and service sectors. He has published numerous articles and his books include Manufacturing the FutureStrategic Resonance for Enlightened Manufacturing (2000) Financial Times Books; and Strategic Manufacturing for Competitive AdvantageTransforming Operations from Shop Floor to Strategy (1996) Prentice Hall. Hemel Hempstead. Professor Andrew Graves joined the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex in 1985 where he undertook research with MITs International Motor Vehicle Programme on R&D and technology issues and subsequently became European Director to the programme. In 1994 he moved to the University of Baths School of Management and now

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V. Crute et al. / Technovation 23 (2003) 917928 3 Day Car Programme International Motor Vehicle Programme (UK Directorate) He also directs the I.M.R.C. (Innovative Manufacturing Research Centre) within the School of Management at the University.

holds the Chair for Technology Management. He is director for research programmes into Lean Manufacturing and AGILE Production: UK Lean Aerospace Initiative Agile Construction Initiative