The Australian Journal of Anthropology (2012) 23, 84100

doi:10.1111/j.1757-6547.2012.00166.x

Defensive or offensive dining? Halal dining practices among Malay Muslim Singaporeans and their effects on integration
Gabriele Marranci1,2
1

National University of Singapore; 2Cardiff University

Anthropologists and sociologists have, in recent years, paid attention to different aspects of halal food production and consumption. However, very few studies have focussed on the impact that halal food, its certication and halal dining practice have on socialisation, particularly for Muslims living in multicultural societies in Southeast Asia. Nasir and Pereiras study (2008) is one of these exceptions. They studied the attitudes of Singaporean Malay Muslims towards halal food as well as the strategies they adopt when forced to share nonhalal dining environments. These authors have described such strategies as defensive dining and have argued that, through them, Muslims in Singapore are able to fully partake in the multicultural life of the city state as well as integrate within the mainstream, mainly Chinese, society. This article discusses how my observations and eldwork raise some questions about such overtly positive conclusions. Indeed, I suggest that to understand the impact that such dining strategies may have on the integration of Singaporean Malay Muslims, we should not only observe the Malay Muslims viewpoint but also consider the impact such practices have on non-Muslims, in particular the Chinese majority, as well as the role that stereotypes have in Singapore.

INTRODUCTION Recently, an increasing number of studies have focussed on the expanding halal food industry in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries (Ahmed 2008; Bonne et al. 2007).1 These studies mainly explore the religious concept of halal food (Riaz & Chaudry 2004), its production, distribution and relevance for Muslim migrants in non-Muslim places (Fischer 2008, 2009), the protests against halal slaughtering practice (Smith 2007) and, more rarely, the consumption of halal food (James 2004). However, very few studies (Fischer 2009; Nasir et al. 2010) have paid attention to the impact that the industrialisation and branding process of halal food, with its increasingly standardised certication, has had on socialisation processes, particularly in multicultural and cosmopolitan sociopolitical environments. In this article, I shall address this topic within the context of Singapore, a state in which multiculturalism and multireligious harmony is essential to the very existence of the city state. As we shall see, two recent studies have highlighted the centrality of halal certied food to the local Malay Muslim communitys religious identity and their
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expression of personal piety (Nasir & Pereira 2008; Nasir et al. 2010; see also Tong & Turner 2008). Nasir and Pereira, for instance, have suggested that Malay Muslims in Singapore adopt what they dene as defensive dining to maintain their halal practices within nonhalal contexts. Nasir et al. (2010) argues that Malay Muslims in Singapore, by practising defensive dining, are able to partake fully in Singaporean multicultural social life. Nonetheless, as I shall explain, my observations and eldwork raise some questions about such overtly positive conclusions. I contend that the certication of halal food, although aimed at facilitating the integration of Muslims in Singapore within mainstream society, affects socialisation in some cases. Indeed, while Nasir and Pereira (2008) have focussed on Singaporean Malay Muslims views, this article adds an important variable: the viewpoints of non-Muslims. As this study aims to understand the impact of halal dining strategies on integration in a multicultural space such as Singapore, we need to pay attention to the existing dynamics as well as the different interpretations, effect and activation of stereotypes existing among the different communities. SINGAPORE MULTICULTURALISM AND RELIGIOUS HARMONY Paradoxically, the Singaporean secular government manages, through specic legislation, various aspects of religious life and ethnic relationships (Case 2002; Nasir et al. 2010; Chua 2003, 2007a).2 In Singapore, Muslims are a minority, accounting in 2010 for about fourteen per cent of the overall population (see also Tan, C. 2008; Tan, K. 2008; Nasir et al. 2010). They are overwhelmingly ethnically Malay and are consequently recognised in the Singaporean constitution, which acknowledges the Malays as the indigenous population. Other citizens, the majority of the population, are either of Chinese3 or Indian4 origin. The rest are classied as Others.5 The so-called Maria Hertogh Riots in 1950 and the Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots in 1964 remain, up until today, a painful reminder to all Singaporeans of the risks of religious and ethnic conict within the city state. Such historical memory has shaped the understanding of multiculturalism in Singapore (Aljunied 2010). The government has linked the survival of the city state to the level of tolerance achieved among its ethnic components. Yet Singaporean scholars, such as Chua (2003), have suggested that Singapores vision of multiculturalism6 translates into a powerful instrument of social control because it helps to maintain a major political administrative and everyday obsession that casts a long repressive restraint on the politicisation of difference, including class differences (Chua 2007b: 925). Indeed, to guarantee equality to the different ethnic and religious communities without advantaging the Chinese Buddhist majority, the Singaporean State advocates meritocracy as a guiding principle (Tan, C. 2008; Tan, K. 2008) while simultaneously guaranteeing the preservation of different cultural traditions. In fact, specic policies preserve cultural and religious social identities and avoid the assimilation of the minorities within the overwhelming Chinese majority. However, such processes inevitably institutionalise ethnicity, real or imagined as it may be.
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Therefore, the so-called Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others (CMIO) socialpolitical administrative identities (they are marked on ID cards) mark the individual Singaporean from birth until death. Developed from the legacy of the British colonial period, the bureaucratisation of race, which is inherited through the paternal line, has been reengineered to serve the hard multiculturalism model under which Singapore ourished after its dramatic split with Malaysia in 1965 (Vasu 2008). For instance, on Racial Harmony Day (21 July) students in Singaporean schools are encouraged to dress, present food and dance according to the community identier recorded on their ID card (which may or may not represent their own identity). The CMIO, to which Daniel Goh refers as a racial grid of state multiculturalism (Goh et al. 2009: 217), is so embedded in the socialpolitical structure of Singapore that ethnicity also marks some aspects of social welfare. Each recognised ethnic religious group has its own self-help organisation: the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC), Mendaki for the Malays and the Singapore Indian Development Agency (SINDA). Notwithstanding the socialpolitical stability that multiracialism contributes to the security and economic growth of the nation, such a rigid structure inevitably produces social side effects. As Vasu has emphasised, although the CMIO division aimed to achieve racial harmony, such a strong emphasis on race as social identity nonetheless facilitates the perpetuation of racial stereotypes, because creating a category requires that it be lled with content (Vasu 2008: 29). Goh et al. also observed, when comparing the Singaporean bureaucracy of race with the similar bureaucracy in Malaysia, that in Singapore the racial grid achieves ever deeper inscriptions on the lived reality of the citizens, producing cultural contradictions as racial governmentality meets hybridising globalisation. (Goh et al. 2009: 215). Therefore, as we shall see, stereotypes about race and religion, although often not openly declared, are widespread. The stereotypes affecting the Malay community can be traced to colonial times. Therefore, some of them are rooted in biological bias (Kopnina 2004). Malays may be representedand not just in popular parlanceas endowed with traits of complacency, indolence, apathy, infused with a love of leisure and an absence of motivation and discipline (Rahim 1998: 49). Such stereotypes facilitate the simplistic idea that Malays are predisposed towards drug addiction, criminality, teenage pregnancy and family dysfunction and are consequently unable to perform as well as other racial groups, particularly when compared to the majority Chinese. Since the foundation of modern Singapore, political leaders have questioned, more than once, Malay Muslims loyalty to the country and have questioned their integration within mainstream society. For at least the rst decade after the foundation of the Singaporean Armed Forces, Malay Muslims could not serve in the army, despite Singapore adopting a conscript army in which every young man had to serve at least 2 years after nishing high school (Chua 2003). Today, although Malay Muslims serve in the national army, some of them complain that high rank military positions remain difcult to access. Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of
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Singapore from 1950 to 1990 and Minster Mentor until 2011, justied such discrimination as the result of an inevitable dilemma: It would be very tricky business for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to put a Malay ofcer who was very religious and who had family ties in Malaysia, in charge of a machine-gun unit.7 Recently, Lee Kuan Yew observed in his book Hard Truths that, in Singapore, all religions other than Islam were able to integrate and that Muslims socially do not cause any trouble, but they are distinct and separate.8 Lee Kuan Yew has also invited Muslims to be less strict; his comment referred in particular to the Malay communitys observance of halal practices, such as the avoidance of pork, alcohol and the fear of nonhalal food contamination. The statements surprised and displeased many among the Malay Muslim population and community leaders.9 The aftermath of 9 11 and the failed terrorist plot in Singapore (Vasu 2008) has increased the number of non-Muslims, particularly within the majority Chinese community, who question the loyalty and integration of the Malay Muslim minority. While in the past the loyalty question had focussed on the ethnic identity of the Singaporean Malays and their links with Malaysia, today it focuses more on their identity as Muslims. As Ismail and Shaw have observed, currently, Singapore Malay-Muslims face unprecedented challenges in dealing with the global impact of the interpretation, perception, manipulation and reaction towards their faith. Concurrently, the community could not be expected to be immune to the impact of global events with increasing demonisation of their religion and with it everything they hold sacred (Ismail & Shaw 2006: 49). Although not openly acknowledged, Lee Kuan Yews view on Singaporean Muslims has found considerable support. For example, from behind the presumed anonymity of Internet forums and blogs, some have clearly agreed with Mr Lee Kuan Yew and have provided examples of their own negative experiences of trying to share food or dining occasions with Singaporean Malays.10 I had occasion, myself, to observe similar complaints and arguments during conversations among and interviews with the patrons of various hawker centres, whose views were often inuenced by stereotypes and a lack of knowledge of Islamic requirements. However, I also noticed that a majority of those who shared similar views to those expressed by Lee Kuan Yew had formed them through their experiences of interacting with Malays during dinner occasions, home parties, work meetings or sharing tables in food courts. In these cases, defensive dining appeared to lack the desired outcome. In a certain sense, it had backred. HALAL FOOD AND HALAL STRATEGIES IN SINGAPORE As Mintz and Du Bois (2002) have discussed, ethnographers and anthropologists have shown interest in food and human behaviour related to it since the nineteenth century, as can be observed from works such as Mallerys Manners and Meals (1888) or Smiths Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (1889), or the detailed account of Boass Kwakiutl salmon recipes (Boas 1921). Other, more recent studies, such those offered by Levi-Strauss (1965) and Douglas (1966), have observed that
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the theoretical and symbolic analysis of social constructs and human behaviour may be derived from observing the consumption and manipulation, among other aspects, of food. Other contemporary studies have provided analysis of food as an expression of ethnic, racial or national identity as well as individual and group interactions (Caplan 1997: 131). Yet it is interesting to note that no study, as far as I know, has focussed on the impact that the certication of it may have on a particular community, while, as we have seen earlier, very few, and often unpublished (e.g. McKinley 2003; in the case of Malaysia), studies specically deal with the impact that halal food practices among Muslims may have on socialisation. None, other than Nasir and Pereira (2008) and Nasir et al. (2010) have discussed Singapore, where Muslims are a native minority. With approximately 6000 eating establishments in 2009 and an industry employing some 86,800 workers,11 food in Singapore is not only a lucrative business, but also a symbol of its multicultural lifestyle. Certainly, some of the most visible and traditional aspects of food in Singapore are the hawker centres (Ohtsuka & Marumo 2008; Lai 2009a) which, with their coffee shops and communal tables, have become important multicultural spaces. The majority (eighty-ve per cent) of people in Singapore live in public housing estates (known as HDB estates because they were built by the Housing and Development Board). One of the main characteristics of HDB estates is their communal spaces and their very accessible food courts. Dining out, rather than cooking at home, is a very common practice among the local population because of the low cost of the food provided (Lai 2009b). Among the 6000 food establishments, 2600 hold a Halal Certicate from Maglis Ugama Islam Singapura (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore).12 I shall not describe in detail what halal food consists of (for an extensive discussion see Riaz & Chaudry 2004), or the rules behind halal certication in Singapore, because they have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (Nasir et al. 2010) and are furthermore clearly explained on the MUIS website.13 For our present discussion, we need only remember that Muslims are required to avoid pork and alcohol in all forms and derivations and eat only meat that has been ritually slaughtered. The majority of Muslims will also carefully avoid cross-contamination with nonhalal food, for instance, during preparation. In Southeast Asia, most Malay Muslims follow the Shai tradition and place a strong emphasis on purity and the avoidance of contamination as part of their piety. In an environment such as Singapore, where pork is widely used in several traditional Chinese dishes and drinking beer is a part of everyday social life among the majority Chinese population, halal food and halal practices acquire not only a religious but also a strong ethnic signicance for the Malay minority. Food is not only nutrition but also socialisation into commensality (Beardsworth & Keil 1997; Mintz & Du Bois 2002) and in Singapore this is especially true. Hence, observing and studying the dynamics14 of halal dining among Malay Muslims is relevant for understanding the effects that it might have on socialisation within the mainstream society.
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Notwithstanding the interesting topic of the impact halal practices may have on integration, little research has been conducted, the most recent exception being part of The Social Distance Project.15 This project aimed to understand how Muslims in Singapore embody acts of piety within public life and the impact that those acts may have on integration within a mainly non-Muslim society. As part of this project, Nasir and Pereira led a research team who focussed on the halal practices among Malay Muslims. Nasir and Pereira published the results in an article titled Defensive dining: Notes on the public dining experiences in Singapore (Nasir and Pereira 2008, the article has also been republished with few changes in Nasir et al. 2010: 5669). The researchers interviewed thirty tertiary-educated, middle-class Muslims who described themselves as pious. They were equally divided between the genders. To this, as a kind of control sample, they added ten working-class pious Muslims. Each respondent answered open-ended questions for an average of ninety minutes (Nasir et al. 2010: 55). The authors explained that they focussed on middle-class Malay Muslims because they felt that the education attainment of the middle-class person would allow him or her to be more reective and articulate about his or her attitudes and ideas on various issues (ibid.) but they also emphasised that they did not nd any relevant difference in views between the middle-class and the working-class Muslims. During the interviews, they found that all respondents displayed a strong halal consciousness, preferring to abstain from eating if they held even the slightest doubt about the halal status or certication of a particular food. They also indicated a preference for Muslim cooks and kitchen staff and many, out of a fear of contamination, demonstrated a desire to avoid sitting too close to people who were not eating halal food. The study highlighted the Malay Muslims overall preference for halal environments. When this was not possible, Nasir and Pereiras respondents employed avoidance strategies, such as refraining from touching tables that had been cleaned with a wet cloth which may have been in contact with nonhalal products. Some of their respondents described the smell of pork as contaminating and there was a general support for separated halal spaces. Yet most of the respondents emphasised that, thanks to the above precaution, they felt comfortable to eat in environments that were not fully halal (as the majority in Singapore indeed are) as long as certied halal food was available. Nasir and Pereira have described these strategies as defensive dining:
while (Malay Muslims) tried to remain true to the teachings of their religion, they were also pragmatic to accept that they could achieve their religious expectations with regards to public dining if they took a few additional safeguards (...) Thus, it can be concluded that their personal preference for a total halal environment is a wish for conveniencewhere they need not be on high defensive alert all the timerather than exclusivity. (Nasir & Pereira 2008: 72)

In other words, the research concluded that Malay Muslims in Singapore would not exclude themselves from the mainstream because of their piety and dietary
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requirements. Rather, the halal certication contributes to the integration process because it facilitates the adoption of defensive dining. Furthermore, as Nasir and Pereira have observed, non-Muslims are free to patronise halal environments and eat halal food. There are many similarities between the conclusions of the above study and my own results. Yet there exist also some fundamental differences. It is likely that the different methodologies and approaches employed may be the most signicant reason for such discrepancies. Nasir and Pereiras study developed from single, short interviews with a small sample of Malay Muslims, who were selected mainly for their self-dened religiosity. My research, instead, is based on 2 years of eldwork conducted between 2009 and 2011, which consisted of interviews, casual conversations and observations of the dining strategies of my informants during invitations to non-Muslim homes and events. Furthermore, in this study, I did not focus solely on the Malay Muslim minority but rather I also observed the reactions and perceptions of the non-Muslim majority, particularly those of Chinese ethnicity. Indeed, it is my contention that we need to observe the dynamics involving halal practice and habitus to fully understand the impact on integration. IDENTITY, PURITY AND GREEN LOGOS
Why do that? I mean, Mark (my son) can go and play at his Malay friends home, but his friend cannot come to play at my home, even though my son would like to share the Playstation with him. The reason, you see, is his mother. She is worried about food. I told her that I know about halal food and I will be careful, but it seems there is nothing I can do. I felt very bad about it. It is as if they told us that we are dirty.

Adeline16 is a Chinese Christian mother and her son is 8 years old. The Malay mother of her sons friend has prevented her son from visiting Adelines home. The reason is fear of contamination. Despite the fact that Adeline has made an effort to inform herself about halal food and procedures, the Malay mother still feels that Adeline cannot be trusted. She argues that Mark can play at her home, because halal food is ne for non-Muslims. This is only one of several examples with very similar dynamics. There is a particular concern among many Malay mothers that their children may be exposed to nonhalal food or that their food may be otherwise contaminated, mainly by pork residues on objects or utensils. Many of these Malay parents, in my study, came from the working class, yet similar opinions may be found among some educated professionals, as Nasir and Pereira (2008) have argued. Other examples of dining strategies which I have witnessed include bringing ones own food to parties and dinners despite efforts to provide halal or nonpork and alcohol-free products by the host; abstaining from food altogether; refusing, even in the case of the same gender,17 to shake hands for fear of contamination;

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refusing to drink from glasses at the homes of non-Muslims or requiring plastic disposable utensils. All these strategies may be classied within what Nasir and Pereira (2008) have dened as defensive dining. This practice is not only common in Singapore, where Malay Muslims are a minority, but also in neighbouring Malaysia, where Muslims are the majority and the Chinese or Indian population the minority. For instance, McKinley (2003) has analysed the frequent decision of Malay Muslims in Malaysia to reject non-Malay Muslims social invitations as part of a power struggle in which non-Muslims are forced into an unequal host-guest relationship and where non-Muslims will be always guests (limited powers) rather than hosts. Although I can agree that there are some similarities between Malaysia and Singapore with regard to halal dinner practice and defensive dining strategies, I have to note that in Singapore the Muslims are a minority and, as we have seen, the racial grid of state multiculturalism (Goh et al. 2009: 217) is deeply different. Hence, I suggest that we need to understand the Singaporean case as part of a dynamic based on relationships instead of a singularity of cultural struggle and power. Therefore, I also interviewed some university students about their experiences of attending high school. Some schools, like Rafes Girls School, while comprised mostly of an ethnically Chinese student body, have a fair representation of minority students from both the Malay and Indian communities. Again, Malay students adopted similar strategies to the ones discussed earlier. One of the Chinese respondents emphasised that despite the school promoting mutual understanding among students of different faiths, including having teachers explain the religious requirements of Malay Muslims to non-Muslim students, sometimes the Chinese and Indian students felt frustrated by such requirements or perceived them to be illogical or sectarian. Grace reported an anecdote from her high school days:
We were on a school trip and we had to do everything by ourselves, like washing our clothes and cooking our food. We were mixedChinese, Malay and Indians. I recall how frustrated we felt when the Malay students insisted that we had to buy new forks and spoons which had to be used only by them. Some pointed out that the utensils could have been washed carefully, but the Malay students insisted that washing does not clean the contamination of non-halal food. Yet Indians have requirements too, but they never really complain and they seemed more accommodating to us. Also, because of their special diet, often the Malay girls used to eat together in a group isolated from the others; this was not really welcomed by the other members of the group. We felt that there was no need to eat separately, but we tolerated it. These kinds of things make you wonder how they can be part of any group other than their own. (Grace, 24, university student, Chinese)

In the context of food courts, some Malay Muslims may adopt other strategies, such as opting to order food from halal stalls as take-away if the food court is not an exclusively halal environment, sitting on the other side of the table if eating with a group of non-Muslims and directly or indirectly trying to convince the non-Muslim members of the group to select halal food. Certainly not all Malay Muslims

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adopt all, or even some of these defensive dining strategies, and there are certainly levels of exibilityhowever, in Singapore, they are employed by a relevant number. Although I tend to agree with Nasir and Pereiras observation (Nasir & Pereira 2008) that both working class and more highly educated Malay Muslims adopt defensive dining, I have noticed that those with a higher income and educational background try actively to avoid non-Muslims misreading their defensive dining as a criticism of non-Muslims or, even worse, as a racist act: I do my best to avoid that my Chinese colleagues can think that I dislike them when my intention is only to respect my religion and protect myself from sins (Muhammad, 32 years old, engineer). Do Malay Muslims from different economic and educational backgrounds understand the threat of pollution and contamination from nonhalal environments differently? An in-depth answer to such a question would require extensive quantitative and quanlitative research. Notwithstanding, my 2 years of interviews and observations during dining interactions tend to conrm a certain discrepancy in attitudes between Muslims of different backgrounds. On the one hand, less educated Malay Muslims ascribe the risk of contamination to the non-Muslims themselves, in particular to the Chinese majority. In this case, it is the Chinese person, with his or her non-Muslim behaviour, who is considered to be the cause of contamination. When I asked why the person and not just the food was contaminating, I was reminded that people are made of what they eat. On the other hand, secular18 educated Malay Muslims seem, as we have seen earlier, to mainly address the religious obligation and to be careful that others perceive the rejection as exclusively aimed towards food. The impurity in this case is metaphysical, i.e. because of the Islamic context of ones life, rather the ontological, i.e. because of the impurity of a particular group. To explain the discrepancy between the two attitudes, we have to look not only at education but also at the different experience that middle-class and working-class Malay Muslims have of multiculturalism in Singapore. The majority of low and medium income families live in HDB housing, where people are forced19 to share multiethnic spaces. Although at rst glance, the racial relationship may appear smooth, a certain level of tension is undeniable and is often expressed through racial comments and jokes. This tension is particularly visible among youth and young children where, as Lai has observed, ethnic expletives and derogative language are frequently used. Common ethnic swear words used by Malay youths on Chinese youths are Cina kui (Chinese devil), syaitan (Satan), Cina babi (Chinese pig), babi syaitan (Satanic pig) (Lai 2009b: 8). For the purposes of this article, we may notice how pig and syaitan (devil) have been linked and how this may reinforce the relationship between pork and the threat to ones own spirituality. The perception that dietary differences may transform an ethnic or religious group into an overall polluting threat is not new (Douglas 1966). We can even trace theological debates within traditional schools of Islam on the very same subject (see the case of the Maliki school, Safran 2003). We need
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to consider that the perception of halal environments as protection against the inuences of seemingly polluted and threatening surroundings are, in the case of Malay Muslim Singaporeans living in HDB estates, cognate with their status as a minority. Although acknowledged as the native population in the Singaporean constitution, Malay Muslims remain, for historical and socialpolitical reasons, economically behind and affected by social problems when compared to the Chinese majority.20 In these cases, halal food represents something more than a religious obligation. It is transformed into an act of identity, a marker which allows not only a fully controlled space, but also an emotional one. Indeed, while the state has provided regulations and limitations21 on other religious matters such as the tudung (Islamic scarf), halal food remains the only sphere in which the Malay Muslims are fully in control and the stateas well as other ethnic groupsare required to accommodate the minoritys requests. During my research, I also noticed that some Chinese Singaporean respondents compared and contrasted the two main minorities, Malays and Indians, emphasising how they perceived the latter as more accommodating than the former. It is through these types of simplistic comparisons that stereotypes about the Malay Muslim community are reinforced. The current world debate on Islam also has an impact, despite the fact that the Singaporean government (which controls all the national mass media) is extremely careful to moderate the style in which news is presented to the public, particularly when it concerns Islam (Lee 2010). Therefore, the impact of stereotypes and bias on the Malay Muslim minority should be taken into consideration when evaluating the effect that defensive dining may have on overall integrative dynamics. Indeed, it is important to emphasise here that integration is not a general and mono-directional process. People integrate not just into an overall social fabric but also into the ordinary context of everyday life, something which consists of a quite limited number of actors and places. Nobody despite the terms common usageintegrates into a state or even into a relatively small city, such as Singapore. Rather, people integrate within correlational contexts that are marked by the dynamics of interactions (or lack of them). As we have seen, Nasir and Pereira (2008) have missed such dynamics and have instead focussed only on the Malay Muslims views. DEFENSIVE OR OFFENSIVE DINING? TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN Nasir and Pereira (2008) have concluded that the defensive dining strategies that many Malay Muslims adopt in Singapore have actually facilitated their integration within a mainly non-Muslim society. I do not dispute that the centralised MUIS halal certication and other similar strategies may facilitate, from the viewpoint of some Malay Muslims, their participation in activities organised in nonhalal environments. Nonetheless, I argue that the authors have overlooked the other side of the coin: defensive dining strategies foster and reinforce existing stereotypes among the non-Muslim population, particularly among the Chinese majority. Integration is a
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dual process and individual actions, or nonactions, of a group are not enough by themselves to achieve such a social state. My research suggests that some non-Muslim Singaporeans may misunderstand the practice of defensive dining as antisocial at best or, at worst, offensive. The supposed advantages of adopting such a strategy would, in the latter case, backre. One of the main reasons for these results may stem from the fact that a considerable number of Singaporeans harbour stereotypes about the various racial and religious communities. Indeed, although the Singaporean government, as we have seen earlier, places a strong emphasis on racial and religious harmony, many Singaporeans perceive stereotypes to be innocent characteristics of ethnic religious groups. An interesting aspect of my research is that several of my respondents highlighted that religious harmony refers to the religion itself and not to the members of the religion or ethnic group: we are not allowed to make fun of others religion, I mean, even jokes are not tolerated so easily in Singapore. You cannot say that Islam is the religion of the devil or Christianity a stupid religion and so on. But of course, nobody will say anything if one of us says thatjust to give you an exampleMalays are lazy or Chinese Singaporeans are greedy, or that Muslims are too strict (Joseph, 22 years, university student, Chinese Singaporean). In Singapore, people use ethnic and religious categories as maps to orient themselves within their inevitable multicultural social interactions. Although stereotypes have often been understood as cultural tools, recent studies in both psychology and neuroscience have suggested universal dynamics that may explain, in our case, their existence within a society like Singapore, which has made a strong and conscious effort, in the name of state multiculturalism, to eradicate them. Indeed, Macrae et al. (1994): 37 have suggested that stereotypes serve to simplify perception, judgement and action. As energy saving devices, they spare perceivers the ordeal of responding to an almost incomprehensibly complex social world. In such conditions, the more or less conscious cognitive mapping of social interactions as belonging to either an in-group or out-group is facilitated. Research (e.g. Ellemers et al. 2002) has suggested that the mere process of categorising people into groups elicits intergroup biases and if for any reason one group (or part of such group) perceives the out-group as a possible source of threat, any pre-existing bias would be reinforced (Branscombe et al. 1999). Some scholars, such as Devine (1989) (see also Dovidio et al. 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin 1983), have argued that there exists a certain cognitive automatism for bias and stereotyping towards out-groups, although recent studies (Livingston & Brewer 2002) have shown some limitations to such automatism. Social neuroscientic studies, based on fMRI methodology (Cunningham et al. 2004; Phelps et al. 2000; Wheeler & Fiske 2005), have implicated the amygdalaa region of the brain implicated in visceral states and disgust that operates at an automatic and unconscious levelin the automatism of bias and stereotypes. Such cognitive and neuroscientic studies reveal an interesting aspect of stereotyping and out-group bias that is very relevant to Singapore, which has strict legislation protecting religious harmony and severely limits actions (or
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even the expression of opinions) that may displease one of the main religious communities.22 In their studies, Wyer et al. (1998) found that under conditions in which deploying stereotypes and bias may provoke strong social disapproval or, as in the case of Singapore, where they are legislatively discouraged, people may try to suppress them. However, the study revealed a strong rebound effect. In other words, people tend to experience an increase in stereotype use following attempts to suppress such usage (see also Zhang & Hunt 2008). This rebound effect may help to explain the widespread diffusion of stereotypes about members of the various religions and ethnic groups existing in Singapore, particularly Malay Muslims. Indeed, as many of my respondents reported during interviews and conversations, because of the fear induced by the Singaporean legislation designed to protect religious harmony, great care is taken by a majority of Singaporeans to avoid stereotypes or negative representations of religions. Yet I can plausibly suggest that such efforts may, in some cases, result in a strong rebound effect so that religious stereotypes, as we have seen, affect community members instead of their religions. It is within these dynamics that we have to understand the impact that the halal logo and the defensive dining strategies have on both Muslims and non-Muslims. Clearly, the halal practices are inscribed within a commodication and commercialisation that go far beyond the spiritual personal domain to become, as we have seen, a social (often fossilised) norm. Therefore, in Nasir and Pereira (2008) also Nasir et al. 2010) reading of Muslim dining strategies, we can observe a lack of understanding of the relationship between eating etiquette within the wider social practice of Singapore, stereotypes and piety, which prevents the authors from seeing how those defensive practices may become offensive. CONCLUSIONS Although there are some studies focussing on halal food (see in particular Fischer 2008, 2009), in-depth studies on related halal practices and Muslim strategies are almost nonexistent, with the exception of the work of Nasir and Pereira concerning Malay Muslims in Singapore (Nasir & Pereira 2008; see also the re-worked version in Nasir et al. 2010). Singapore is a vibrant multicultural and multifaith society, yet inter-religious and ethnic tension exists. In this article, I have discussed some of these tensions and the ways in which they are also affected by the socialpolitical structure of Singapore and its often unique legislation. Nasir and Pereira (2008) and Nasir et al. (2010) have shown the centrality of halal food and halal practice to the local Muslim community. Their research has focussed exclusively on the perceptions and views of middle class, educated, Malay Muslims. They concluded that Malay Muslims in Singapore are enabled to partake fully in the multicultural life of Singapore, despite their strict adherence to halal dietary and environmental requirements by adopting defensive dining strategies. In other words, the authors have presented defensive dining as a positive integration strategy.
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However, when Malay Muslims halal practices are read within everyday contexts and interactions with the non-Muslim majority, particularly the Singaporean Chinese population, defensive dining strategies can be seen as less effective and, in some cases, clearly divisive. As we have discussed, MUIS has certainly attempted, through the centralised certication of halal food, to provide a protected meta-space in which Singaporean Malay Muslims can feel reassured and free to interact with non-Muslims without concerns about nonhalal food contaminationfear which surely would prevent, in many instances, sharing dining spaces and activities. Yet MUIS can only provide the instruments and the system; how people then use them, together with the meaning that they may ascribe to them, is beyond the Muslim organisations control. Furthermore, when one pays attention to how the non-Muslim majority read the Malay Muslims defensive dining practices, Nasir and Pereira (2008) (also Nasir et al. 2010) conclusions appear overly positive and, in many instances, distant from the reality. Stereotyping is particularly prevalent within Singaporean society (Lai 2009a,b) and some recent studies have shown, as we have discussed, that the conscious effort to suppress bias and prejudice against out-groups may, in reality, facilitate the development of other unconscious and automatic stereotypes. Hence, existing stereotypes and personal bias, sometimes based on personal experiences, may easily create situations in which a Malay Muslim can perceive his or her defensive dining as a compromise which allows participation in multicultural spaces, while a Chinese Christian may interpret it as a rather offensive antisocial practice. It is clear, from observations and interviews, that many Muslims in Singapore unquestioningly follow certain halal practices as dened by unwritten (and unofcial) practices and halal logos, instead of applying acquired Islamic knowledge available on the subject. Younger generations in particular are becoming so used to the green halal logo, and to some local practices (as described by Nasir and Pereiras defensive dining), that they are not able, for instance, to implement strategies used by Muslims living in western countries which are still within the realm of Islamic orthodoxy.23 In other words, their capacity to discern what may or may not be halal has decreased to the extent that, in some cases, the only reliable means of discerning what is halal is the halal logo on products or the halal certicate at food stalls and restaurants. This lack of knowledge magnies the fear of contamination and creates confusion regarding where the limits of halal permissibility lie. Hence, as we have seen, there are cases in which some Malay Muslim mothers refuse to let their children play at the homes of their non-Muslim friends. Integration, as I have discussed, is not a mono-directional process. Furthermore, people do not integrate within abstract ideas, but rather in everyday contexts. As we have seen, food and dining have a particular signicance within socialisation processes in Singapore. Singaporean Malay Muslims have adopted strategies which allow them to interact with the mainly non-Muslim environment. In many circumstances, these strategies are effective. However, cases of defensive dining and the use of halal logos as the only safe option among the many availablethat to Muslims
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of other communities would be considered Islamically permissiblehave, in some cases, backred. Some non-Muslim individuals who have interacted with Muslims adopting the above strategies did not see those defensive dining practices as such, but rather, because of automatic stereotyping, as a form of distancing, a form of rejection and a lack of integration; or, as Lee Kuan Yew himself argued, too strict. Different perceptions and interpretations of the same practice do not facilitate integration and communication. Surely, more understanding would be possible if the non-Muslim majority were fully aware of the reasons behind such defensive dining practices. Yet, at the same time, a full and widespread awareness and knowledge of Islamic halal requirements among the general Singaporean Malay Muslim community might increase exibility in choices of food and premises beyond the commercially driven halal logos. Please send correspondence to Gabriele Marranci: g.marranci@gmail.com NOTES
1 2 See also Othman et al. 2009; Nasir & Pereira 2008. See, for instance, The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, The formation of the Muslim council of Singapore (MUIS), or the 2002 New Malay Identity project (Tan, C. 2008; Tan, K. 2008) Ethnic Chinese comprise seventy-seven per cent of the population and are largely Buddhists, followed by Taoists and Christians. Indians are seven per cent of the population and are largely Hindu, followed by Muslims and a minority of Christians. Statistical data is derived from Department of Statistics, Singapore: http://www.singstat. gov.sg/stats/themes/people/demo.html The Singaporean government ofcially uses the term multiracial society. Straits Times, 8 February 2001; see also Chua 2003. Cited in the Straits Times, 26 January 2011. See, for instance, the AMP (Association Muslim Professionals): http://www.amp.org.sg/ main.asp. See, for instance, Lee Kuan Yew urges Muslims to be less strict, forum thread at Sams Alfresco Heaven: Celebrating Singapores Golden Period, http://tinyurl.com/4ze8vw9. For further statistical data see Economic Surveys Series, Department of Statistics, Singapore: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/biz/fnb.pdf. Maglis Ugama Islam Singapura (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore): http:// www.muis.gov.sg/cms/services/hal.aspx?id=1714. http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/services/hal.aspx?id=458. As I have mentioned above, some of the conceptualisations of halal and halal ritualisation are specic to the region rather than shared by all Muslims. Conducted by Asia Research Institute, Religion Cluster, principal investigators Turner and Pereira. All names have been changed to respect anonymity. A great number of Muslims prefer not to shake hands with the opposite gender.
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18 19 20 21 22 23

In Singapore the education system acknowledges, although through strict regulation, religious schools or madrasahs. For further information see Mokhtar (2010). By specic legislation. For more information see Sin (2002); Soh and Yuen (2011). Singapore emphasises meritocracy (Moore 2000). Races are often compared to measure their economic and social development. For instance, schoolgirls cannot wear the tudung, or head-covering, at national secular schools (Kam-Yee 2003). See, for instance, the case of the prominent Christian Evangelical Pastor Rony Tan (Goh 2010: 32). E.g. some products, because of their ingredients are halal by default even if the halal logo is not present. Another example is the idea, sometimes expressed by both Nasir and Pereira (2008) respondents and mine, that ones halal food can be contaminated by the smell of pork or by tiny particles of the non-halal food of nearby diners; while no such cases are mentioned in traditional orthodox Islamic teachings. Indeed, it may be concluded that many of the defensive strategies adopted by some of my respondents do not nd conrmation in ordinary Islamic orthodox halal practices.

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