Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Roger Federeralism DA
DA Shell
Roger Federeralism DA....................................................................................................................................1
Federalism 1NC................................................................................................................................................2
Federalism 1NC................................................................................................................................................3
Federalism high now.........................................................................................................................................4
Federalism high now.........................................................................................................................................5
Coastal area federalism high now.....................................................................................................................6
New federalism high now.................................................................................................................................7
California maintaining federalism....................................................................................................................8
A2: Clean air act/fuel economy standards........................................................................................................9
Now is the key time........................................................................................................................................10
Federalism low now........................................................................................................................................11
Federalism low now........................................................................................................................................12
Federalism low now........................................................................................................................................13
Links...............................................................................................................................................................14
Links...............................................................................................................................................................15
Wind power link.............................................................................................................................................16
RPS link..........................................................................................................................................................17
Spillover..........................................................................................................................................................18
No link............................................................................................................................................................19
Model yes........................................................................................................................................................20
Model no.........................................................................................................................................................21
Federalism good – conflict.............................................................................................................................22
Federalism good – conflict.............................................................................................................................23
Federalism good – tyranny.............................................................................................................................24
A2: Race to the bottom...................................................................................................................................25
Federalism bad – conflict................................................................................................................................26
Federalism bad - conflict................................................................................................................................27
Federalism bad - tyranny................................................................................................................................28
Liberty impact.................................................................................................................................................29
Iraq federalism good – links...........................................................................................................................30
Iraq Federalism good – links..........................................................................................................................31
Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................32
Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................33
Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................34
Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................35
Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................36
Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................37
Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................38
Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................39
Iraq federalism bad – links.............................................................................................................................40
Iraq federalism bad – solvency.......................................................................................................................41
Iraq federalism bad – solvency.......................................................................................................................42
Iraq federalism bad – solvency.......................................................................................................................43
Indonesia federalism now...............................................................................................................................44
Indonesia federalism good - terrorism............................................................................................................45
Indonesia federalism good - hegemony..........................................................................................................46
Indonesia federalism bad................................................................................................................................47
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UMKC SDI 2008 – roflzomg Federalism/Lopez extensions
Federalism 1NC
A. Uniqueness: A. Unique internal link – federalism is on the brink, but state rights
are winning because of leadership over energy
Raymond C, Scheppach, Executive director of the NGA, Stateline.org, “Will the 2008 election improve
state-federal relations?” July 9, 2008
we are at a major turning point in the role of the states
While it is always risky to look into the crystal ball, I sense that
in our intergovernmental system. Essentially, the long-term trend of increased centralization of authority
in Washington, D.C., may slow dramatically or even be reversed. Two reasons will drive this change.
First, the next administration and Congress will have to focus more on international issues, ranging from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, to terrorism, to Iran and North Korea and to global economic issues such as the price of oil and other commodities and
the value of the dollar?all in an increasingly fragile international financial system. In short, the next administration and
Congress will face huge international challenges that could dominate the agenda. Second, on many of
the domestic issues such as health care, energy and climate change, states and governors have been
providing national leadership over the last decade.
B. Links: Preemption on climate change policy destroys federalism – now is the key
time.
Raymond A. Biering, JD Loyola Law School, and Brian S. Biering, University of Oregon School of
Law, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, 2008 lexis
As California and other states continue to develop and implement climate change programs, the inherent
tension in our nation's particular form of federalism will necessitate compromise and coordination
between the federal and state jurisdictions. At the heart of the issue of federalism is the argument over the perceived
political advantages and disadvantages inherent in decentralized environmental decision making, as compared to centralized
environmental decision making. The bases for the arguments for decentralized environmental decision making include the states'
right to determine environmental protection measures based upon a balance between environmental protection and economic
development; the potential for a greater range of environmental choices based upon local circumstances; the inherent differences
between states in their natural and impacted environments and potential efficiencies resulting from the unique circumstances
applicable to certain environmental measures; and the view that states are more nimble and can provide technological and
regulatory innovation more flexibly than the federal government. 141 The bases for the arguments regarding centralized
environmental decision making include concerns that states may adopt less stringent standards; inconsistent state actions may result
in interstate and possibly even foreign policy impacts; centralized environmental decision making may be more efficient in terms of
both research and development of regulatory standards and their effect on nationwide or multi-national industries; and, specific to
climate change, its global [*66] consequences cannot be effectively addressed at the state and local level. 142 Beyond the policy
choices inherent to federalism in the context of climate change initiatives, state and regional-level approaches to regulating
greenhouse gases will likely raise broader constitutional concerns. The federal government has yet to comprehensively
occupy the field of climate change initiatives, except arguably with regard to vehicular fuels under CAA
section 202 143 and yet-to-be developed EPA regulations after Massachusetts. Thus, states are free to continue
implementing their own regulatory climate change initiatives, including some that may ultimately be
inconsistent with the efforts of the federal government and other states, until the federal government
effectively occupies that field. As previously mentioned, California's Clean Air Act provides that even local and regional air
authorities "may establish additional, stricter standards than those set forth by law or by the state board for nonvehicular sources."
144 Depending on how the federal government ultimately responds to climate change after Massachusetts,
future comprehensive regulatory approaches addressing climate change may turn on questions of federal
supremacy. The Supremacy Clause under the United States Constitution essentially invalidates state laws that "interfere with, or
are contrary to" federal law. 145 Federal law can supersede state law through: (1) express preemption, i.e., where Congress
preempts state law in express terms; 146 (2) nullification of a state law to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law; 147
and (3) implied preemption, i.e., where the federal regulatory scheme "is [*67] sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the
inference that Congress "left no room' for supplementary state regulation." 148 At this juncture, Congress has not expressly
preempted state action regarding climate change initiatives, except, perhaps, in the context of limited areas like vehicular fuels.
Further, in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation addressing climate change, the states' initiatives, both regulatory and
voluntary, are not yet conflicting with federal law. Finally, until the federal government acts definitively and
comprehensively, implied preemption will be limited to those areas where Congress has actually left no
room for supplementary state regulation.
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Federalism 1NC
C. Impact: Federalism preserves peace, preventing ethnic conflicts.
Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983,
Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December,
1995 lexis
Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and
Switzerland. It is a big part of the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque
country or a Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem. American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint
historical anachronism. American-style federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly
planned by the Framers, partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare,
it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic
majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the
situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There
is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the
federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb more completely the attention
of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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State policies and federalism are high now – thanks to flexibility efforts against the
Federal Government.
John Dinan, Publius, “The state of American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the
national policy process and continued state policy innovation” June 22, 2008 lexis
By any measure, state governments were at the forefront of domestic policy-making in 2007 and early
2008. Not only were state officials more successful than in any prior year of the Bush presidency in securing relief
from burdensome federal directives regarding the National Guard, homeland security, education, and welfare policy, but they
were also as active as ever in adopting policy innovations in areas such as illegal immigration, health
care, and environmental protection. To be sure, state influence in the national policy process was not so strong as to bring
an end to other contested requirements in the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
program (TANF), and REAL ID Act or to fend off new federal directives in other areas. Nor were state officials free of federal
constraints as they targeted illegal immigration, expanded health care coverage, and addressed climate change, given that state acts
generated federal lawsuits and agency rulings preempting state authority in each of these areas. Nevertheless, states were more
influential than in recent years in gaining flexibility in implementing federal legislation, and they
continued to be the main innovators in policy areas where the public was especially desirous of
governmental action.
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Recent trends have not been in favor of Federalism despite significant state action
on climate change.
Barry Rabe, ASAP, Oxford University Press, Publius, "Environmental policy and the Bush era" June 22,
2007 lexis
One might assume from such a development that the decentralization mantra so pervasive in environmental policy in the late 1980s
and throughout the 1990s had reached a new level during the current decade. In some respects, such as climate change
policy development and implementation, the American system of environmental federalism is more state-driven
than ever before. However, it would be a mistake to assume that this trend holds across various
environmental policy areas or that some structured or cooperative set of intergovernmental negotiations
have guided these transitions. Despite considerable initial expectation that the Bush administration would build seriously
on recent decentralization experiments, the third-quarter mark of his Presidency was passed with a very different record,
including a number of significant efforts to expand federal--and executive branch--authority. In turn,
federal-state conflict over environmental policy may well have reached its highest level in at least two
decades.
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Federalism has been under severe stress for the last decade – the direction of
federalism in the future will be determined by the NEXT administration and
congress, not the plan.
Raymond C. Scheppach, Ph.D., executive director of the National Governors Association, Stateline.org,
“Will the 2008 election improve state-federal relations?” July 9, 2008 lexis
Here's a crucial question for the presumed presidential nominees - Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama - and all
the candidates for the next Congress. Are you happy with the status quo in federal-state relations? States have long served as
laboratories for creating and testing policies and programs that drive positive change nationally. Yet for more than a decade,
the federal-state relationship has been under stress. Looking forward, the nation faces many challenges,
and states can play a key role in providing leadership. However, whether governors and states provide separate,
independent leadership or leadership within a stronger federal-state partnership will depend on which
brand of federalism the next administration and Congress adopt.
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Links
Restricting state flexibility crushes federalism.
OMB Watch, "States Losing Ability to Protect Public Due to Federal Preemptions" June 13, 2006
Federal law and regulation is able to solve national problems through national solutions that impact and benefit all members of
society. At the same time, states have long been pioneers in advancing groundbreaking social policies.
Allowing states the flexibility to meet particular local needs while requiring a basic level of public
protection for all citizens has long been an important issue for the balance of power between federal and
state governments. The answer has long been "floors, not ceilings"--turning to the federal government for the base level of
protection, and allowing the states to offer their citizens more stringent safeguards. Without any sufficient showing of a
compelling need for national uniformity, these acts of Congress and the White House turn the
federal/state balance around, suppressing states’ abilities to provide services and protections that go above
and beyond federal laws and regulations.
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Links
Current federal environmental programs leave a role for the states – the plan
reverses this, destroying federalism
Robert B. McKinstry, Philadelphia lawyer, John C. Dernbach, Law Prof @ Widener, and Thomas D.
Peterson, Exec. Dir. Center for Climate Strategies, 11-19-2007, “Federal Climate Change Legislation,”
Widener Law, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031552#PaperDownload
Most major federal environmental laws preserve a significant role for state and sometimes local
government. They create overarching federal goals and minimum standards and provide for
implementation by states, often leaving the design of implementation mechanisms to the states.
Preservation of a significant state role in federal programs reflects political reality in the United States.
Constitutional limitations on federal power have been reinforced by long political tradition of local
decision-making epitomized by the New England town meeting and concern that centralizing power
would undermine political freedoms. There are also concrete advantages to giving state and local
government a significant role in implementation of environmental policies. These are evident from
consideration of the progress of climate change initiatives in the United States to date. As noted by Justice
Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), states
have greater flexibility that allows them to innovate with less severe consequences and provide models
for future federal legislation. State and local government programs can allow bottom-up decision-making
with greater stakeholder involvement. This allows the development of more precisely focused targets and
strategies that are tailored to local conditions and are more likely to succeed.
The federalism balance over alternative energy has decisively shifted to the states –
it’s a key part of decentralizing government
Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Harvard, Fall 2003, “Nothing But Net,” 14 Duke Envt’l. L. & Pol’y F. 1, ln
With state governments at the barricades of federalism, an energy revolution has been launched. Perhaps
usurping federal law, thirty-eight states recently mounted a statutory and regulatory charge to establish
"net metering," a regulatory innovation to implement decentralized renewable power. This innovation
fundamentally shifts the regulatory balance as well as the energy mix in America. Net metering
profoundly reshapes the energy landscape, providing the most significant boost of any policy tool at any
level of government - both qualitatively and quantitatively - to decentralize and "green" American energy
sources. While only twelve states have passed statutory initiatives to implement renewable energy system
benefit charges and eight have elected to implement renewable portfolio standards, n1 thirty-six states to
date have implemented net metering. n2 Net metering enables consumers with small generating facilities,
for example solar panels, fuel cells, or wind turbine systems, to offset their electric bills with any excess
[*2] power produced at their facility, running the retail utility meter backwards when the renewable
energy generator funnels power to the grid. Net billing, or net metering, is the cornerstone of state energy
policies encouraging private investment in renewable energy sources. n3
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RPS link
RPS is the classic case of federalism.
The Electricity Daily, "Pew Scopes Spread of RPS" June 19, 2006 lexis
The report, "1Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards," was
authored by Barry Rabe, a University of Michigan professor. Rabe characterized the growth of state-level
RPS's as a "classic case in federalism," the Wall Street Journal reported. Rabe said, "These states have
had very little contact with federal officials. There's this disconnect," the Journal reported.
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Spillover
Each intrusion on federalism erodes the balance of power.
James Lack, Senator NY, 7-11-1995, Serial No. J-104-31, p. 11
Every year Congress considers bills, federal agencies consider rules, and international agencies consider
cases that would supplant state statutory or common law. Adverse decisions may result not only in
nullifying state laws and court decisions, but also in narrowing the range of issues that legislatures may
address. The threat is the steady, incremental, year-by-year erosion of the jurisdiction of state legislatures.
Single big federalism decisions are key – they send an important signal that shapes
politics.
Stephen G. Calabresi, professor of law @ Northwestern, Mar. 2001, The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 574 Annals 24
When the Supreme Court decides a big federalism case like Lopez, it does a lot more than simply resolve
the immediate case and issue at hand. In some fundamental sense, it sets up a symbol for the American
people of the importance that is attached to a constitutional value or norm. Symbolism is terribly
important in constitutions and in constitutional case law. Symbols help citizens organize their beliefs,
reinforce core values, and provide a rallying point for those who believe in them, thus reducing the costs
of organization. When powerful symbols issue from the Supreme Court of the United States, those
symbols help to set the national agenda, and they affect the flow of our politics. Lopez, for example,
caused devolution and federalism concerns to become more prominent in Congress than they otherwise
might have been. This may well have played into the last Congress’s decision to devolve part of the
federal welfare entitlement to the states.
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No link
States are asking for federal action.
Katherine Mangu-Ward, Reason associate editor, Reason Magazine, "Arnold Among the Lilliputians"
April 22, 2008
One of Schwarzenegger's applause lines: "We don't wait for Washington, because I've always said
Washington is asleep at the wheel." This newfound pride in federalism has its definite limits. For every
states' rights rah rah, there was a wistful plea for more federal regulation on carbon production. Even
states' rights revisionist Gov. Sebelius said she hoped that "the roles will be reversed in the next
administration." A proposed cap and trade plan, Gov. Jon Corzine said, is something he'd "love to see
globally, love to see nationally, but unfortunately narrowed to regional efforts."
The feds can regulate greenhouse emissions because of the commerce clause – the
plan doesn’t hurt federalism
Robert K. Huffman, lawyer, and Jonathan M. Weisgall, VP at MidAmerican Holdings,Winter 2008,
“Climate Change and the States,” Sustainable Development Journal,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2008/winter08.pdf?rd=1
The United States’ system of federalism allows the federal and state governments to share power in
certain areas, while each maintains exclusive areas where the other may not regulate. The power of the federal
government is constrained by the Constitution and does not include general police powers, which are reserved to the states.46 State
governments, however, may not regulate certain aspects of interstate and foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and other areas of
reserved federal power. When states take actions to regulate greenhouse gases, it raises questions about the
extent of state authority to regulate the economy and the environment. Linking emissions trading programs or
enacting auto emissions regulations brings states to the far end of their regulatory authority, given the transborder nature of emission
trading and carbon dioxide emissions generally. This section explores the constitutional issues that can potentially arise from state
actions to reduce GHG emissions. Commerce Clause The Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3, gives the federal
government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States[.]”47 The Supreme
Court has long considered the Commerce Clause to be “an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting
federal statute.”48 This concept is known as the Dormant Commerce Clause—wherein the Constitution acts as a prohibition on
certain types of state actions that affect interstate commerce, invalidating the state law by negative implication.49 Although the
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has gained widespread acceptance, at least two current Supreme Court justices (Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas) reject it altogether. Regardless of these two justices, it is highly unlikely that a majority of the
Court would reject the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Were the doctrine to be rejected by the Court, state
actions would never be invalidated for conflicting with unexercised congressional power under the Commerce Clause, but would be
subject to invalidation only for express or implied preemption by federal law.
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Model yes
U.S. federalism is modeled worldwide.
Chilbi Mallat, University of London Doctoral Candidate, Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law, Winter 2003 lexis
Laurence Tribe, in Constitutional Choices, summarized what he calls the underlying political ideas of the American system into a
list of six categories: representative republicanism, federalism, separation of powers, equality before the law, individual autonomy
and procedural fairness. America has shared many of these traits with other democracies for a long time, but two constitutional
features stand out on a world level as typically American -- federalism and the Supreme Court. The
American people deserve credit for both inventions which brought new dimensions to democracy and the rule of
law for the rest of the planet. Perhaps America does not know it, but the world has been a consistently better
place wherever her two home-grown intellectual products have found anchor.
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Model no
U.S. federalism isn’t modeled abroad
Newsweek, January 31, 2006 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6857387/site/newsweek/
American Democracy: Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal
innovations—free elections, judicial review, checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the
19th and 20th centuries, countries around the world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan
after World War II. Today? When nations write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look
to the American model. When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a
polite hearing, and were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a
European-style parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in
American democracy. It's very prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he
says. "Europeans would not want to follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American
campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates and photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American
planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo opted for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution,
South Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate
for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African democracies look to South Africa as
their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently heads the international relations
department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the Americans." The new democracies are
looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns about racial and
social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'."
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Devolution caused ethnic conflicts that federalism could not solve in Yugoslovia.
Carol Salnik Leff, professor of political science, World Politics, June 1999
By the period of multiple transitions in 1990, therefore, the center no longer held the cards to coordinate a
policy of state maintenance. It was forced to rely on the constitutional courts for adjudication of
republican sovereignty initiatives and helpless to enforce court decisions, which republics systematically
flouted. The center had lost control of the agenda of constitutional revision. Instead those battles were
increasingly fought directly between and among the republics, within the federal presidency, and
bilaterally, as the framework of federal coordination broke down. It was the refusal of Milosevic of Serbia
to negotiate a more confederal model as much as the resistance of the deadlocked federal government that
set the stage for the Croatian and Slovenian exodus from the state in June 1991. Once again, the republics
seized the initiative from the center in determining the course of negotiations, although in this case the
outcome was a bargaining stalemate among the republics and violently contested secession.
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Liberty impact
Every violation of liberty must be rejected.
Sylvester Petro, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, Toledo Law Review, 1974 lexis
It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of
one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That
road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhensyn. Ask Milovan
Dijilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering any society aiming to maximize
spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be empathically identified and resisted with
an undying spirit.
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Now is the key time for Iraq federalism to take hold – it appears federalism is
coming now.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Fox News, "Burdensome Weight of Unity Could Force Iraq Break-Up"
September 20, 2006
the Iraqi constitution, passed in October 2005, which calls for a federalist model of government but
He pointed to
left open for debate the details on how it would work and how autonomous the regional governments would be. That
debate is clearly hot. Parliamentary factions representing the Sunnis — who are a minority in Iraq and stand to lose in a break-
up because their land in the west has none of the oil resources of the Shiite south — joined secular representatives and those loyal to
radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in threatening to walk out if the parliament took up the most recent proposal to codify the
separate states. "Federalism is a preliminary step to dividing and separating Iraq," said Adnan al-Dulaimi, head of
the Iraqi Accordance Front, the largest Sunni bloc in the parliament. "I call on Iraqis to confront this draft." But Michael Rubin, a
Middle East expert at the American Enterprise Institute who served as a consultant for the U.S.-led transitional government after the
2003 invasion of Iraq, said a federalist system with powerful regional forces may be inevitable.
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All ethnic parties support federalism as the only way to solve tensions.
Dawn Brancati, Center for the Study of Deomcratic Politics, Princeton, The Washington Quarterly, “Can
Federalism Stabilize Iraq” 2004
Federalism seems to be the system of choice for more than just the Kurds. In fact, all Iraqi leaders that
opposed the regime before it collapsed have expressed their support for federalism in Iraq. The Iraqi
opposition first voiced its support for federalism in December 2002 at the London conference of opposition leaders that included
Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi‘as. The members of the conference agreed that “[n]o future state of Iraq will be
democratic if it is not federal at the same time in structure.”6 Federalism, they claim, is a necessary form
of democracy because federalism protects the will of the minority against the will of the majority.
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Iraq will not solve Middle East democracy, terrorism, or the peace process.
David L. Mack, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Arabia Link, 2004
Some of the cheerleaders of last year’s war, a war that in a very real sense is not over, badly oversold
what we were going to accomplish. The success which I believe is still possible in Iraq will make that
country a much better place for Iraqis and a much safer place for Iraq’s neighbors, but it is unlikely to
lead to a wave of democracy throughout the region. It will not by itself bring us much closer to an Arab-
Israeli settlement, it will not end terrorism and it will only help reduce global energy dependence on other
Arab suppliers. We need to start looking for a good exit strategy based on achievable goals within a
relatively short time frame.
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