The Role of the Electoral College in Presidential Elections By Jed Feeny SOC 427 November 16, 2011

Feeny 1

The Role of the Electoral College in Presidential Elections The purpose of this paper is to thoroughly explore the Electoral College voting system in the United States. The paper will first examine the Electoral College from a historical perspective and supply the reader with background information on the institutions formation. Next, the paper will introduce the different opinions of the institution and explain the arguments from both sides. This paper will also include proposed changes to the current system, as well as alternative electoral processes. I will also review the Electoral Colleges role in the controversial presidential election of 2000. It is critical to understand the complexities of the Electoral College method and how it is used to decide the next president of the United States. People should also understand how this system differs from alternative processes, particularly the direct popular vote. The U.S. uses a method of selecting its next president and vice-president called the Electoral College. This method relies on a small number of electors chosen specifically for this purpose rather than using a direct election through by popular vote (Cain et al. 2007). The term Electoral College is never used in the Constitution, but it entered unofficial usage in the early 1800s. According to Cain et al. (2007), the term was first written in federal statutory law in 1845. The roots of this method of election can be traced back to Roman Republic, where qualified male adults were divided into groups called Centuries. Each Century was entitled to cast one vote regarding proposals set before them by the Roman Senate (Cain et al. 2007). During the Holy Roman Empire, a similar system used representatives of German states who were entitled to select the next Emperor (Cain et al. 2007). According to Cain et al. (2007), the manner in which the president was to be selected did not receive much attention during the ratification of the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton

Feeny 2

acknowledged that it was ideal for people to be involved in the selection process. However, the founding fathers were afraid of foreign influence and corruption so they decided to establish a group of electors whose sole purpose was to make the final selection for president. Grofman and Feld (2005) note that the Electoral College was originally designed to allow a select group of citizens to meet in isolation in order to deliberate and make informed choices. These intellectuals would be chosen by the people to form an intermediate body of electors that would protect the public from tumult and disorder (Cain et al. 2007: 22). Cain et al. (2007) recognize that this system was chosen because of the situation the founders were in. The newly independent country consisted of thirteen states of varying population sizes and geographical boundaries. There were a total of four million people distributed across thousands of miles who were barely connected by transportation and communication. The Constitutional Convention considered various proposals, including the direct popular vote, selection by State legislatures, and selection by Congress. However, these methods were all rejected in favor of the Electoral College system. This method has remained basically the same since its conception. One notable change was the 12th Amendment of 1804 that required each Elector to cast one vote for the president and another vote for vice-president. In the original design, Electors casted two votes for president, with the runner up becoming the vice-president (Cain et al. 2007). According to Cain et al. (2007), electors are usually selected at each political partys state convention. They are usually chosen as a token of gratitude for long standing service and loyalty to the party. For each state, the number of electors equals their number of senators plus representatives of the U.S. Congress (Cain et al. 2007: 23). As a result of this rule, each state as

Feeny 3

well as the District of Columbia, is guaranteed to have at least three electoral votes. Electors are bound by their pledges and by state law to follow the wishes of the people (Cain et al. 2007). Around the presidential election, it is not unusual to hear calls of reform for the Electoral College system. It has been criticized as a failure of our governmental system. There have been over 700 proposals introduced into Congress to reform or eliminate the Electoral College (Cain et al. 2007). Critics believe that the Electoral College ignores the wishes of the people by employing the unit rule or winner-take-all awarding system of electoral votes for each state (Cain et al. 2007: 23). The winner-take-all format is used in all states except for Nebraska and Maine (Grofman and Feld 2005). These states differ from the unit rule by having two selectors chosen by the statewide vote with the remainder selected by popular vote within Congressional districts (Cain et al. 2007). According to Grofman and Feld (2005), there are two frequent proposals to the current system. The first proposal is to the replace the Electoral College system with direct popular election. The second is suggestion is to reallocate Electoral College seats to the level of House districts and have a two seat bonus for the state winner (Grofman and Feld 2005). The latter proposal has already been implemented in Nebraska and Maine. Critics quickly point to two key problems with the Electoral College. The first is that this system fails to meet the one person, one vote standard because the seats of smaller states are overweighted (Cain et al. 2007). Critics would prefer the president to be elected on the basis of an equally weighted popular vote (Smith 2008). Critics of the Electoral College believe that electing the president on the basis of a direct popular vote is inherently good. Smith (2008) continues by saying that a government that is not elected by popular vote will lack legitimacy and this will result in political crisis. The selection through a national popular vote is more likely to lead to good government and produce better policy results (Smith 2008). The second

Feeny 4

commonly cited problem is that the loser of the popular vote can still win the Electoral College majority and become president (Grofman and Feld 2005). A side effect of this symptom it that presidential candidates shift their attention to the battleground states where elections are potentially competitive. Nearly two-thirds of the population is relegated to being mere spectators while candidates focus on the most competitive states (Richie 2007). These battleground states are disproportionately white and are dramatically shrinking in number (Richie 2007). Grofman and Feld (2005) argue that this leaves much of the country unaware of the election and lowers the overall incentive for voter turnout. According to Richie (2007), in 2004 fifty-one percent of voters under thirty turned out to vote in battleground states, while only thirty-eight percent of voters under thirty bothered to vote in the rest of the country. Goux and Hopkins (2008) argue that the Electoral College encourages candidates to focus their resources in the few states considered winnable by either party. The focus on battleground states may increase the attention to their issues, while ignoring the problems of voters in other parts of the country. According to Richie (2007), almost all small states are ignored in todays presidential campaigns because they carry far fewer electoral votes. In 2004, only New Hampshire was competitive (Richie 2007). In fact, most small states did not have a single major-party candidate visit during 2004. There is also greater incentive to commit electoral fraud in the battleground, or swing states because the election can be determined by just these few outcomes (Grofman and Feld 2005). Richie (2007) contends that the Electoral College contributes to a two-tier class structure that disregards second class citizens as irrelevant and gives disproportionate attention to the needs of a fortunate few who live in the dwindling number of battleground states. Entire states, including California, Texas, and New York, received little attention from candidates during the

Feeny 5

general election campaign (Goux and Hopkins 2008). In 2004, George W. Bushs chief strategist admitted that the campaign had not polled outside of the eighteen most competitive states in more than two years (Richie 2007). John Kerrys campaign used a similar tactic. As a result, the needs and opinions of those who lived in spectator states were ignored unless they happened to coincide with those of first-class Americans (Richie 2007: 39). By the final six weeks of 2004, both major campaigns focused almost entirely on just five states (Richie 2007). Goux and Hopkins (2008) found that most significant difference between the population of battleground states and those of the rest of the nation is race. Battle ground states have a lower proportion of racial minorities. African Americans make up a significant portion of the population of southern states and there are large Latino communities in California, Texas, and New York (Goux and Hopkins 2008). Ignoring these spectator states hurts the needs of African Americans and Latinos because their problems receive less attention and their needs are unaddressed. Advocates of the Electoral College suggest that although it no longer serves the purposes intended by the founding fathers, it is now utilized to fulfill other useful roles. Advocates believe that the system contributes to the cohesiveness of the country because it requires a geographic distribution of support (Cain et al. 2007). In response to the systems failure to satisfy the one person, one vote requirement, defenders often say that It makes no sense to object to the Electoral College unless you are also willing to reject the bicameral congress, since it is the state representation in the U.S. Senate that creates the small state bias in the Electoral College (Grofman and Feld 2005: 2). The Electoral College requires the successful candidate to win several simultaneous elections among a variety of constituents. The system appears to add political stability by emphasizing the depth of political support for the winner (Smith 2008).

Feeny 6

Smith (2008) raises the point that the Constitution does not always follow the principle of weighing every vote equally. For example, in the U.S. Senate both large and small states have equal representation. The House of Representatives also has this feature to a lesser degree (Smith 2008). Also, because districts are apportioned based on population disregarding the eligibility to vote, districts with large numbers of immigrants and children gain greater representation (Smith 2008). It can also be said that within each state, all votes are weighed equally. People could also view the presidential election as fifty one state and district elections (Smith 2008). Each persons vote is weighed equally to that of his or her neighbors. The votes of one community are weighted equally with those cast in neighboring communities (Smith 2008). According to Grofman and Feld (2005), academics who are educated in game theory believe that small state bias is greatly overstated. Noted mathematician John Banzhaf believes that voters in large states, not small states, have more power because large states have a greater chance of being pivotal (Smith 2008). With this theory in mind, some scholars have suggested that we need to give more weight to the smaller states (Grofman and Feld 2005). According to Grofman and Feld (2005), there are two common responses by advocates of the current system to the possibility of a candidate winning the Electoral College despite having fewer popular votes than his or her opponents. The first claim is that this outcome is extremely rare and will continue to be rare. Only twice, 1876 and 2000, has the Electoral College result changed because of state disputes (Smith 2008). The second claim is that even when there is such an occurrence, it is not something to get very upset about. Grofman and Feld (2005) make an analogy to the World Series, where the winner was the team to win four of seven games, not the team who scored the most runs. Benjamin Harrison won the Electoral College in 1888 without winning the popular vote. There was no controversy over the outcome of this election,

Feeny 7

nor were there questions of the presidents legitimacy (Smith 2008). Smith (2008) also points out that a candidate can theoretically win a simple plurality of the vote with less than fifty percent in his or her favor. This method does not necessarily support the notion that the majority must rule. Smith (2008) then questions if supporters of the direct popular vote would support a candidate as legitimate with only twelve percent of the vote. The Electoral College at least assures a minimal level of popular support. The lowest popular vote percentage by an Electoral College winner was Abraham Lincoln, won 39.9 percent of the popular vote in 1860 (Smith 2008). Advocates of the Electoral College do not refute the claims that candidates focus their attention on a handful of potentially competitive states. However, under a different system candidates would like focus their campaigns on the largest media markets (Grofman and Feld 2005). Smith (200) argues that no voter is prevented from voting simply by where candidates campaign. He contends that battleground states frequently change. For instance, California was a closely contested state for many decades before solidifying itself as Democrat within the last twenty years (Smith 2008). Florida was considered a safe Republic seat until 1996. Many states that had been presidential locks now show increased competition. In fact, several states that have traditionally gone towards one party during presidential elections, but have governors of a different party (Smith 2008). Empirical evidence from Goux and Hopkins (2008) suggest that the strategic targeting of voters in specific regions would continue even if the Electoral College was abolished. The advocates of the Electoral College believe that the incentive to commit electoral fraud would not be significantly less under a different system (Grofman and Feld 2005). They argue that under a direct popular vote election, a close race could result in simultaneous lawsuits in several different states. The votes sought may not affect the outcome of individual states, but

Feeny 8

could potentially change the results of the popular vote. For these reasons, Grofman and Feld (2005) point out that recounts under a direct election would be more troubling because the outcomes of any state could be called into question. The Electoral College isolates election disputes to particular states and avoids the chaos of a nationwide recount (Smith 2008). Fraud is more likely to occur in close states and would generally be limited to a few specific areas. This allows election observers and law enforcement officials to concentrate their resources on the states most likely have competitive elections. In a direct popular vote, fraud would benefit a candidate regardless of what state it occurred in (Smith 2008). This would require officials and federal resources to be distributed across the entire country and would make it harder to detect fraud. The final argument by advocates of the Electoral College is that the process maintains the two-party system and contributes to the political stability of the nation (Cain et al. 2007). The winner-take-all feature reinforces the two-party system because the popular vote share by third party candidates is less likely to translate to Electoral College votes (Grofman and Feld 2005). Grofman and Feld (2005) support this argument by indicating that the U.S. is the only country in the world with a true two-party system at the national level. They believe that this is due in large part to the Electoral College. Smith (2008) contends that much of the outcry over the results of the 2000 presidential election was limited to pundits and politicians. He believes that the American public was ready to accept a president elected without a plurality of the popular vote. A poll taken in November of 2000 by the New York Times/ CBS News showed that a plurality of respondents agree with the statement that a popular vote winner would have a more legitimate claim to the presidency than the Electoral College winner (Smith 2008: 201). However, the same poll showed that a

Feeny 9

plurality believed that the Electoral College winner, George Bush, should be president (Smith 2008). This suggests that voters could find legitimacy in winning the election under a system where the rules were reasonably fair, even though they would prefer another system if given the choice. The general public did not agree with calls to eliminate the Electoral College. Gallup surveys showed that support for the system reached an all-time high in the months after the 2000 election (Smith 2008). The closeness of the 2000 presidential election and dispute over the winner forced the nation to wait weeks before a final outcome was decided. According to Cain et al. (2007), many people wanted corrections that would avoid this situation in the future. The public was most concerned about the accuracy of election results and probability of a mistake. The use of a direct popular vote has been suggested to solve these problems. However, Cain et al. (2007) contends that the Electoral College reduces risk by a greater amount than the direct popular vote in close elections. It is more valuable to diversify as the election becomes more competitive and riskiness increases. The Electoral College system is more valuable than the direct popular vote in the case of competitive elections (Cain et al. 2007). Cain et al. (2007) attempt to apply the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and the principle of diversification to the Electoral College. Investors who apply the MPT seek to optimize their portfolio investments by reducing risk in the form of standard deviations. Diversification is the basic idea of not putting all your eggs in one basket (Cain et al. 2007: 24). Dividing the investment between several assets reduces the risk as compared to investing in a single asset. If all the votes are counted and then voted together, the direct national popular vote can be viewed as one asset with a full value of 538 votes for a correctly decided election and zero for an incorrectly decided election. An impartial spectator whose only concern is the validity of the

Feeny 10

process wants the correct candidate to win the election. If this occurs the return to the impartial spectator/investor is the 538 electoral votes (Cain et al. 2007: 24). If each state votes separately, the Electoral College can be viewed as a portfolio of individual assets. The assets are the values of the election in each state and the District of Columbia. If the election is correctly decided in each state, then it has value equal to its Electoral College votes. If the election is incorrectly decided, the state has a value of zero. Since these elections are conducted separately, the impartial spectator acting as an investor is concerned about each separate outcome (Cain et al. 2007). Grofman and Feld (2005) provide a general optimization strategy for the Electoral College process. First it is important to recognize when a state is firmly in ones control, or in the opponents control. At this point it makes no sense to invest further resources into that state. Secondly, more competitive states should have more resources invested in an effort to persuade undecided voters. These battleground states should be the focus of most of the candidates attention and investment. Thirdly, in states where the outcomes are not certain, candidates should invest proportionately more where their chances are better. The key to the Electoral College system is to consider a states competitiveness. This requires an understanding that a states pivotal power is based on a probabilistic weighted voting game (Grofman and Feld 2005). Once states have been secured by a candidate, they are no longer considered in play. At this point, pundits should look at the reduced weighted voting game and treat the Electoral College votes from the already decided states as given. For example, on the day after the 2004 presidential election, three states remained too close to call. These states were New Mexico (five votes), Iowa (7 votes), and Ohio (20 votes). Bush had totaled 254 Electoral College votes and Kerry had 252. The outcomes of Iowa and New Mexico were irrelevant at this point because

Feeny 11

only Ohio held enough Electoral College votes to declare a candidate the winner. In this situation, game theorists would refer to Iowa and New Mexico as dummies because the total of their Electoral College votes would still be insufficient to shift a candidate into the winners circle. Therefore, it would make sense for a candidate to focus all their resources on Ohio given its pivotal power in this situation (Grofman and Feld 2005). The case against the Electoral College system is far from clear. Many believe that we should exercise caution in trading a system with known strengths and weakness for one whose pros and cons are yet to be determined (Grofman and Feld 2005). Literature on the Electoral College varies significantly in opinion, with a lack of consensus on even the basic topics of discussion. For instance, it is debatable whether the Electoral College gives greater power to citizens in smaller states or larger states. Representatives of smaller states see themselves as benefitting from the two senator seat bonus, while representatives of larger states see themselves benefitting from the voting as a unit rule. Goux and Hopkins (2008) conclude that the flaws caused by the Electoral College are somewhat overstated by detractors. They also have reason to believe that the direct popular vote will rarely provide different outcomes from those resulting from the Electoral College system (Goux and Hopkins 2008). Grofman and Feld (2005) also explain that if one looks at a long enough time period, most states have experienced a shift from being solidly Democrat to being solidly Republican at the presidential level. Also, virtually every state has been competitive at some point in history. The calls to change the electoral system usually fade immediately after the presidential election, with the prevailing side reluctant to abandon their winning formula (Grofman and Feld 2005: 13).

Feeny 12

Bibliography Cain, Chris, Peter M. Basciano, and Ellen Cain. 2007. The electoral college: diversification and the election process. Constitutional Political Economy. 18(1): 21-34. Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://www.springerlink.com/content/h33274v0721m6415/fulltext.pdf. Goux, Darshan J. and David A. Hopkins. The Empirical Implications of Electoral College Reform. American Politics Research. 36(6): 857-879. Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://apr.sagepub.com/content/36/6/857.full.pdf+html. Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. 2005. Thinking about the Political Impacts of the Electoral College. Public Choice 123(1-2): 1-18. Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://www.springerlink.com/content/v1048130n36480x0/fulltext.pdf. Richie, Robert. 2007. A Binding Agreement: Reforming the Electoral College with Interstate Compacts. National Civic Review. 96(1): 38-46. Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ncr.166/pdf. Smith, Bradley A. 2008. Vanity of Vanities: National Popular Vote and the Electoral College. Election Law Journal. 7(3): 196-217. Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/elj.2008.7305.

Feeny 13