A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition by Robert O.

Keohane; Joseph S. Nye Review by: Kal J. Holsti International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring, 1978), pp. 513-530 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706275 . Accessed: 18/01/2012 11:38
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A new internationalpolitics? Diplomacy in complex interdependence

Kal J. Holsti

Robert0. KeohaneandJoseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence:WorldPolitics in Transition, Boston and Toronto:Little, Brown and Company, 1977, 273 pp.

One of the prominentcliches of contemporary diplomaticrhetoricis that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent.This view reveals a certain Western myopia about who affects whom by what means in internationalrelations, but it does contain enough truthin certain contexts to merit serious analysis. While it is ludicrousto thinkthat shortof massive civil war or externalaggression, Paraguayor Benin can have an important impact on industrial societies, it is obvious that significantevents and technological innovationsin some of the most powerful states do have serious consequences in other areas of the world. Interdependenceis a prominentcharacteristicof the relations between the industrialcountries, and be-

Editor's Note. To avoid any conflicts of interest, this essay was solicited, reviewed, and edited by the Chairmanof the Board of Editors. The Editordid not read the essay until after it had been set in type. Kal J. Holsti is a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver.

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OPEC members). Depentween them and some developing countries (particularly dence, however, remainsthe reality for a majorityof the new states, but that fact is seldom acknowledged in the speeches of Western politicians. The leaders of the industrialpowers generally use the condition of interdependenceto lecture to the rest of the world thatonly "responsible" foreignpolicy behaviorand "international cooperation" can resolve global issues. They stoutly maintain-with good reason-that confrontations,cartels, and autarkicpolicies can only lead to a worsening of the world's difficulties. Yet, it is hardto see how these forms of behaviorby small, vulnerable states could really have much impact elsewhere. The policies requiredfor global cooperationare essential for the majorpowers and many other states as well, but in some cases they might be a luxurythat highly dependentstates cannot afford. If there is growing interdependence,it is neitheruniversalnor symmetrical. Until more equitable relations between developed and developing states are achieved, we cannot expect the latter to jump enthusiasticallyon the international cooperation bandwagon, particularlyin those issues-areas (e.g., pollution) where they are not major contributorsto the problem. This essay will explore the relationshipbetween analyses of dependency and interdependence,and assess the Keohane-Nye volume as a contributionto these competing views of contemporary relations. international Formulatorsof dependency theory' have an unabashedlyeconomic view of politics. The distributionof economic goods in the world is distinctly international inequitable, and doomed to remain in that pattern. The present world economic order grew out of the world-wide expansion of capitalism, via colonialism; the centers of production expropriated surplus capital from the peripheries and constructed the economics of the latter in such a manner as to preclude selfcontained, indigenous development. The present internationaleconomic order of free trade perpetuatesbasic structurescreated centuries ago, and results in the exploitationof the poor by the rich. Dependencytheory, at least as developed by its "grand designers" such as Frank and Galtung2seeks to explain how exchange relationshipsbetween center and peripheryresult in inequitabledistributionof re-

'There are many versions of dependency theory. Various writers emphasize different facets of the problem, and use different arenas for investigation. It is not the purpose of this essay to present a comprehensivereview of the vast literatureon the subject. For a critical analysis of many of the main propositionsin this body of literature,see Benjamin Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (New York: Basic Books, 1973). For refinements and attemptsto operationalizesome of the key concepts in the dependencyliterature,see Tom Travis, "Toward a ComparativeStudy of Imperialism,"paperpresented to the 16th AnnualMeeting of the International Studies Association, Washington,D.C., February1975, and James Kurthand Steven Rosen, eds., TestingEconomic Theoriesof Imperialism(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974). 2I select these two authorsprimarilybecause of the comprehensivecharacterof their analysis. While Frank's theses apply primarilyto the Latin Americanexperience, it is clear that he is writing about all relationsis also universalin its application. ThirdWorldcountries. Galtung's model of center-periphery or See AndreGunderFrank,LatinAmerica: Underdevelopment Revolution (New York:MonthlyReview Theory of Imperialism,"Journal of Peace Press, 1969), esp. Chapter1. JohanGaltung, "A Structural Research No. 2 (1971): 81-117.

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hierarchy.These depenwards and advantages,and hence in perpetualinternational dent variables in their studies are mostly taken for granted, while their analyses concentrateprimarilyon explaining how that exchange of commodities for manufacturedgoods is inherentlyunequalbecause the productionof primarygoods results in few technological or labor spinoffs. The essential mechanism explaining internationalinequalityis thus operationof the Ricardianlaw of comparativeadvantage and internationalspecialization. Power or capabilities, bargainingskills, and idiosyncraticvariables are basically irrelevantin diplomacy between the weak and the strong;inequalityand hierarchyresult from the economic imperativesof the internationalcapitalistsystem, and are sustainedtoday by implicit and formal alliances bourgeoisie" in between manufacturers the industrialcountriesand the "comprador in the periphery areas; the latter have a strong interest in maintainingtrade and investmentlinks with the centereconomies, althoughthey occupy highly dependent economic roles. To both Frank and Galtung, genuine development is impossible so long as these alliances continue. Foreign aid programs,culturalexchanges, and occasional subversion or intervention by the metropolitan governments-what we call the internationalpolitics of industrialand developing countries-are designed to perpetuate the essential linkages between dominantand dependenteconomic actors. Dependency models of internationalrelations are dynamic in the sense that they seek to show how economic and internationalinstitutionalmechanisms perpetuate inequality over time. But they are static because they fail to measure system changes in the the dependentvariables. The descriptionsof the international are made at t1, but there is no predictionthat at t2 inequality might decline or the distributionof rewardsin any bilateralrelationshipmight shift in favor of the poor. Theoristsof dependencygenerally ignore the evidence, documentedfor example by Moran,3 in his study of the copper corporationsin Chile, that governments of developing countrieslearn how to maximize their bargainingadvantagesand eventually develop the intellectual, technical, and bureaucraticskills to manage their resources in such a way as to avoid exploitation. The theorists also ignore the examples provided by some countries which have successfully overcome neocolonial economic relationshipsto promote genuine indigenous development. The strategies range from isolation (Burma) to export-generated industrialization (Taiwan and South Korea), to the formation of producer cartels. Nationalism, regionalvariations,problemsposed by populationgrowth, and lack of resourcesare also irrelevantto the theories of dependency. Reacting to the conventional wisdom of the 1950s and 1960s that most of the "barriersto growth" were internal,dependency theorieshave gone to the otherextreme:only exogenous variablesexplain the "development of underdevelopment."Hence, if one wants to overcome perpetual exploitation and inequality, revolution aimed at destroying the economic links between the developing countries and the metropolitan centers is the appropriate

3TheodoreMoran, MultinationalCorporationsand the Politics of Dependence (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1974).

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strategy. Interdependencewith the Western industrial nations is only a fig leaf covering relationshipsthat are basically exploitative. inequality, exploitation, and hierarchyis located If the source of international goods, it follows that there cannot be in the exchange of primaryfor manufactured dependencybetween any pair of states which exchanges both primarycommodities items with each other. Yet, any Finn, Swiss, or Canadianwould and manufactured quickly point out that dependent relationshipscan exist even where the types of commodities being exchanged are roughly similar. Dependencycan referto a situation between any pair of states in which there are asymmetricalvulnerabilities.No elaborate theory is needed to identify vulnerabilityand the conditions which give inequalityis a good example of rise to it. MarshallSinger's4accountof international an analysis which explores dependency conceived as vulnerabilityratherthan exploitation. Unlike the dependency theorists who predict only perpetualhierarchy and exploitation, Singer's comparativedata demonstratefairly steady movement toward lesser vulnerability, if not greaterequality, between former colonial areas and the industrialworld. in What are the hallmarksof vulnerability,particularly the tradeand economic (2) dimensions?The most obvious are: (1) high exportproductconcentration; a high of ratioof exportsto GNP; (3) geographicconcentration exports;and (4) geographic concentrationin sources of supply. Under these conditions, price fluctuations, loss to of markets,or shutdownof supplies can bringeconomic catastrophe the vulnerable state. Most, but not all, countriesin the ThirdWorld sharethese conditions, but so do several countries which are a part of the "center." Moreover, if we regarddependencyas an empiricalquestion between pairs of model, we must examine the actualdistribution states ratherthan as a near-universal of rewards in bargainingrelationships and not foreclose this importantissue by goods is inherentlyunequal. arguingthat an exchange of primaryfor manufactured Bargainingskills, personalities,knowledge, world demand, andproductionpatterns are always relevant to outcomes, and should be the object of inquiry. As OPEC members have shown, it is certainlypossible for the rewardsin an exchange relationship to be dramaticallyreversed. Governmentsare concerned with these matters, not with the intellectual adequacy of this or that model. They are also concerned with the degrees of vulnerabilitythey face when they become involved in is bilateraland multilateralrelationships.Dependency-as-vulnerability a pervasive condition in internationalrelations but it is not distributedequally. Capacities to harm, to disrupt, and to coerce by economic means, are not distributedequally either. The diplomats who speak of global interdependenceignore these facts; dependencytheoristswrongly assume thatonly developing countriesare vulnerable; do and academic writerson interdependence not seem interestedin the implications of dependency, wherever it may be found. If dependency can be viewed as asymmetricalvulnerability,then presumably interdependenceimplies approximateequality of vulnerability, or mutual depen-

4WeakStates in a Worldof Powers (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

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dence. But is this how interdependencehas been conceived in the literature?The major preoccupationof scholars has not been to develop a theory of interdepenThe debatehas revolved dence, but ratherto describethe extent of interdependence. between the industrialcountries aroundthe questionwhetheror not interdependence has increasedduringthe twentiethcentury.5The argumentwas launchedby Deutsch and Eckstein,6and subsequentwork by Deutsch purportedto demonstratethat the ratio of intersocietal transactions to internal transactions had actually declined among EEC countries.7 Waltz8 argued the same point. Cooper,9 Morse,10 and Rosecranceand Stein,1 have presenteddata to emphasize the opposite point: interdependence has grown dramatically. Most recently, Rosecrance and his colhas actually followed a cyclical leagues12have demonstratedthat interdependence history since the late nineteenthcentury. This is not the place to discuss the relative merits of the various bodies of data and the measuringtechniquesused to establish The critical issue, afterall, is not the rateof transaction degrees of interdependence. in economic behavior between nations, but their consegrowth or the similarity quences. This questionhas been largely evaded: most authorsseem to imply that greater transactionlevels lead to greater impact and sensitivity, and presumably, to an increasedneed for policy coordination.Unlike the dependencytheorists, who outline the consequencesof economic exchange in terms of exploitationand hierarchy demonstrate little in the system, the works on interdependency-as-transaction concern for the effects of interdependenceon the structureof the international system, on the distributionof capabilities (hierarchy), or on the distributionof benefits from all the transactions. If the dependency theorists can be faulted for exchange (exploitation), much of the assuming a fixed outcome from international can on literature interdependence be criticizedfor ignoringthe questionof outcomes altogether.

5A good review of the debate is in Richard Rosecrance, A. Alexandroff, W. Koehler, J. Kroll, S. International Organization Vol. 31 (Summer Lacquer, and J. Stocker, "Whither Interdependence?" in that are not 1977): 425-72. There are, of course, many other studies of interdependence the literature or germaneto this debate. Many of them offer definitions of interdependence advice on how to "manage" it. The present review does not evaluate these contributions,partly because of space limitations, and also because most of them do not assess the consequences of interdependence. and 6KarlW. Deutsch and AlexanderEckstein, "National Industrialization the Declining Share of the Economic Sector, 1890-1959," WorldPolitics Vol. 13 (January1961): 267-99. International France, Germanyand the 7KarlW. Deutsch, Lewis Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and RichardL. Merritt, WesternAlliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and WorldPolitics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), Chapter 13. 8KennethN. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence,"in CharlesP. Kindelberger,ed., The InternationalCorporation:A Symposium(Cambridge,Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 205-26. 9RichardN. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 10EdwardL. Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes," International Organization, Vol. 25 (Summer 1971): 373-97. Myth or Reality?" WorldPolitics Vol. 26 Rosecranceand ArthurStein, "Interdependence: "1Richard (October 1973): 1-27. et 12Rosecrance al., "Whither Interdependence?"

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Studies by Waltz, Morse, Haas, Scott, and the volume underreview have dealt in different ways with this shortcoming.Waltz' well-known essay, "The Myth of National Interdependence"is really a foray into the question of vulnerabilityand dependency. He argues that large industrialpowers are neitherdependentnor vulnerable and introducesthe importantnotion that a hallmarkof dependency is the high cost of establishing alternativemarketsand sources of supply ("The low cost of disentanglementis a measure of low dependence").'3 Dependence-and presumably interdependence- is more than just sensitivity to transactions;what matpatternsare seriouslydisturbed.Outcomesin bargaining ters is when the transaction hierarwill reflect degrees of vulnerability.Waltz thus implies that an international chy of vulnerabilityperpetuatesa hierarchyof diplomatic influence. He also emphasizes the rhetoricalaspects of the common usage of interdependenceand adds that "the word 'interdependence' subtly obscures the inequalities of national capabilities,pleasinglypoints to a reciprocaldependency, and stronglysuggests that Here Waltz is more realisticthanthose who all states areplaying the same game."'"4 believe thatthe consequencesof increasedtransactionsare more or less equal to all parties. Haas is among the first to relate increased interdependenceboth to consequences in the system and to certainpolicy options of state actors.'5Rejecting the conventional wisdom that increased interdependencecreates more stability and a can greaterlikelihood for peace, he argues that greaterinterconnectedness predict conflict nor cooperation.It does predict system change, however. As probneither lems become more complex, strategies designed to cope with them will appear increasingly inadequate;yet desires to deal with them will involve increasedintervention by states and internationalorganizations in each other's affairs. Haas suggests that "the kinds of systems change associated with rising interdependence weaker actors againststrong states as the do imply a tendencytowardstrengthening web of relationshipsincreases perceived sensitivities, vulnerabilitiesand opportuof nity costs for the stronger"(p. 860). The remainder Haas' analysis focuses on the conditionsunderwhich state actorsmay be willing to establishregimes and particular forms of organizationalproblem-solving. But he is concerned with the consequences of interdependenceas well as its origins. And in contrastto dependency theorists who would predict increased hierarchyfrom greaterinterdependencebetween center and periphery,Haas forecasts the opposite. Andrew Scott's recent essay on interdependencealso concentrateson consequences ratherthanquantities.'6His analysis explicitly employs a systems perspecconsequences tive; he is concernedprimarilywith the problemof the unanticipated

3Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence,"p. 212. '4Ibid., p. 220. B. 15Ernst Haas, "Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence,and the Constructionof International Regimes," InternationalOrganization Vol. 29 (Summer 1975): 827-76. Interaction,"InternationalStudies QuarterlyVol. 21 16Andrew M. Scott, "The Logic of International (September 1977): 429-60.

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decisions and actions for the system, and the system's of national(andinternational) capacityto regulateor control those consequences. Given the vastly increasedflow of transactions,what are some of the problemsthat arise?Among others, Scott lists the following as particularlyimportant: 1. Undirectedand partiallydirectedprocesses produce surprisesand inadvertent consequences; 2. Inadvertentconsequences are becoming more common and more important; 3. As the international system becomes more elaborate,the numberof system and structural requisites increases; 4. Internationalproblems will become broader in scope and more closely linked; 5. As the numberof requisites and problems increases, the internationalsystem will become increasingly fragile and the costs of keeping the system operatingwill escalate sharply. Scott also suggests that actors in the system will find it increasinglydifficult to control events and pursuetheir interestseffectively. Althoughhe does not elaborate on the forecast, he suggests thatthe majorpowers may be particularly vulnerableto impotence as they try to deal with a "continuing flow of system-generatedcrises" (p. 458). Like Haas, then, Scott also suggests decreasing hierarchyin the international system as far as ability to influence other actors or solve international problems are concerned. While Haas' and Scott's analyses are speculative ratherthan data-based,they have taken an importantstep in directingour attentionaway from description of transactionflows. To map transactionsis an importantdescriptive relationstheory, it is important enterprise,but from the perspectiveof international to know as well how changes in patternsof interaction,whetherlinear or cyclical, affect other processes and structuresin the internationalsystem. is Morse17 among the first to focus attentionexplicitly on the consequences of interdependenceto policy making. If the fact of interdependencehas been wellestablished, what difference does it make to how governmentsconducttheir mutual affairs? Does interdependencein one issue-area spill over into bargainingin other issues-areas?Does the fact of interdependencecreate any imperativesfor specific types of diplomaticeconomic policy? Morse does not supply answers to all these questions, but his analysis clearly shifts attentionto a varietyof dependentvariables at the national and systems levels. Indeed, to Morse, interdependenceis really an interveningvariablebetwen basic socio-economic trendsanddiplomaticbargaining. Its sources are found in increased sensitivity to industrial societies to external phenomena,exacerbatedby technologicalchanges, and in the efforts on the partof governments to lower barriersto internationalexchanges. Taken together, these

Economic 17Edward L. Morse, "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence,and the Politics of International Relations," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1972), pp. 123-50.

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factors have increased mutually contingent behavior, or interdependence.In turn, has interdependence increased (1) the incompatibilityof governments'foreign policy objectives, and (2) the frequency of internationalcrises between industrial states; it has decreased (1) governmentallatitude of choice in both domestic and foreign policies, (2) government control over transnationalactivities, and (3) the number of instrumentalities(e.g., tax and fiscal policies) available to cope with empiricallythat all these domestic economic problems. Morse does not demonstrate variables are linked in the ways specified, nor does he explore the question of the relationship between distribution of capabilities or vulnerabilities to bargaining outcomes. In two brief case studies, however, he shows how governmentsin inrelationshipscan manipulatecrises to maximize their national advanterdependent situation is not tage. How this diverges from diplomacy in a non-interdependent entirely clear, but Morse is on the verge of saying that interdependencecreates a politics and bargaining. new type of international Thereis a levels-of-analysis problemin this work, however. Like Scott, Morse in implies that there has been an increase of interdependence the system which has given rise to certain systemic consequences such as an increased numberof diplomatic crises between industrialstates. But we do not know how variationsin interdependencebetweenspecificpairs of states affect bargainingbetween those particuof equally lar states. Like the dependencytheorists, attribution certaincharacteristics throughoutthe system precludes statements about particularsituations. We may legitimately make claims for the prevalence of dependency or interdependenceas modal characteristicsof the internationalsystem, but we must not commit the ecological fallacy and argue that those characteristicsdeterminethe natureof relations between any given pair of states. Thus, while Morse is awareof distributional problems, he does not really explore them, and cannot explore them unless he establishes empirically that interdependence exists in any bargaining group. also concentrates dependent on KeohaneandNye's Power and Interdependence variables, that is, on the consequences of interdependence.It is not concernedwith measuring transaction flows, nor does it assume as do dependency theorists, researchers, and many traditionalinternationalreladependency-as-vulnerability tions scholars that disparities in economic capabilities or vulnerabilitynecessarily lead to inequitable bargaining outcomes, much less to permanent international hierarchy. Outcomes are an empirical problem: the question is, how does interdependence affect bargainingstyles and distributionof rewards? Following Morse, Keohane and Nye are concerned also with demonstrating that interdependenceis more than a quality or condition that can be measuredby involves a new type of international looking at transactionflows. Interdependence politics that cannotbe understoodor describedby using the concepts and categories of traditionalinternationalrelations analysis. The realistparadigm,where only nation-statesare actors, and where outcomes of internationalconflicts are predicted from the relative power position of those states (or, as dependency theorists would have it, from the economic power of states), does not help us understandproblems as complex as the law of the sea relations, or internationalmonetaryaffairs. negotiations, Canadian-American

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had already made this The authors' earlier work on transnationalrelations18 point-perhaps too strongly, because the transnationalrelations "approach" provided no criteria to distinguish the important from the routine in international politics. As long as any actors use resources to influence the behavior of other actors, across nationalboundaries,they become a legitimate subject of inquiry. It may be interestingto explore how provincial and state bureaucrats Canadaand in the United States influence each other (transgovernmental relations)'9 but it is difficult to arguethatcomparedto detente, SALT, or the MiddleEast problem, such researchis of equal theoreticalor practicalimportance.As a guide to research,then, the authors' previous contributionextended the boundariesof the field almost to infinity. While the realist paradigmcontains many shortcomings,at least it has the virtue of directing attention to what is truly importantin internationalpolitics, namely the actors, policies, trends, and issues that are potentially or actually the source of war and peace. The purpose of Power and Interdependence, however, is not to replace the realist paradigm, but rather to demonstratethat it, along with other models of international processes, is insufficient for describing and explaining the politics of relationships characterized "complex interdependence."The authorspresentthis by concept as an ideal type. Its hallmarks are (1) multiple channels of diplomatic interaction, by all types of actors, (2) absence of hierarchy on issues (that is, securityissues do not dominatethe global or bilateralagenda, and many issues arise from domestic sources), and (3) irrelevance of military force in determiningthe outcomes of bargainingand conflicts. The political processes found in a condition of complex interdependencealso differ significantly from those of traditionaldiplomacy. There is, they suggest, an absence of linkage between issue-areas when bargainingtakes place, agendas are frequently determinedby domestic pressure groups and other non-state actors (e.g., MNCs), and internationalorganizations often play an importantand independentrole in bargaining, at least on areas of global concern. The realist (and other) models do not help us understandthese processes adequately.A criticalquestion, "why do international regimes persist or change?" is not even raised in the traditionalliterature,they contend. (It could be argued, however, that balanceof power theories are eminently concernedwith the problem of change in the internationalorder.) And a standardclaim of the realists and dependency theorists that bargainingoutcomes can be predictedfrom the relative power position of nationalactors, is patentlyfalse when we look at many contemporary internationalrelationships. Keohane and Nye consistentlyoutline their methods and develop their findings

Relationsand WorldPolitics (Cambridge, S. 18Joseph Nye andRobertO. Keohane, eds., Transnational Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1972). Relations Between J. 19Kal Holsti and Thomas A. Levy, "Bilateral Institutionsand Transgovernmental Canadaand the United States," InternationalOrganization Vol. 28 (Autumn 1974): 283-309.

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clearly. Their approachis to describe first the various regimes in the oceans and relaand Australian-American monetary issue-areas, and in Canadian-American tions, and subsequentlyto measure to what extent the relationshipsin those cases ideal of conform to the three essential characteristics the complex interdependence type. Next, they explain regime change or persistence, or the outcomes of conflicts, using four differentmodels: (1) the economic process model (economic growthand technological innovationcreate demandsfor regime change), (2) the overall power structuremodel (changes in relative military strength determine bargaining outmodel (change and outcomes can comes and regime change), (3) the issue-structure be predictedfrom the relative strengthof the actors within each issue area), and (4) organizationmodel (change and outcomes derive from "organizathe international tionally dependent variables," such as voting power, ability to form coalitions, control of elite networks, and the like). The authorsstart with the simplest model (overall structure),and add complexity from other models until a satisfactoryexplanation of regime change or bargainingoutcomes is achieved. For example, the overall structuremodel would have predictedthe United States to play a majorrole in constructingthe internationalmonetaryregimes of the 1920s, but it was Great Britain, a declining militarypower, which neverthelessset the rules of the monetary game in that decade. Similarly, because the United States has remainedmilitarily the most powerful countryin the world, the overall structuremodel could not have predictedor explained the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and the declining ability of the United States to determine the rules of a new monetary regime. Satisfactoryexplanations of regime change can be derived by combining elements of the othermodels, however. A majortask of the book is to illustratehow this can be done. Keohane and Nye are generally very judicious in assessing the utility of the four models, when applied to the four cases, and in a few instances confess that regime change or persistence cannot be explained sufficiently using any combination of the models. And where facts fit only imperfectly with the predictions, no organizaexaggeratedclaims of satisfactoryexplanationsof their own international tion model are put forward. The two case studies of bilateralrelationshipsare supportedwith impressive evidence. The Australian-American relationship,examined back to 1920, contains few of the characteristicsof complex interdependence;hence, the outcomes of conflicts are largely dependentupon the relative power position of the two statesjust as the overall power structuremodel would predict. In the Canadian-American of case, also studiedback to the 1920s, the characteristics complex interdependence become increasingly evident; and as they develop, outcomes of conflict tend to favor Canadamore frequently-a finding obviously at odds with the overall power organizastructuremodel, but reasonablyconsistent with the authors'international relations demonstratehow multiple channels of tion model. Canadian-American relations, non-linkage of issues, ecoaccess, non-state actors, transgovernmental nomic vulnerability and other features of complex interdependencecombine to produce a relationship where traditionalpower factors and military capacity are almost totally irrelevant.

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It is importantin evaluating this study to recall what the authorsare, and are not, doing. Keohane and Nye do not claim that this volume presents a general theory of international politics, or even a formal theory of the politics of complex interdependence. Since they examine their subject primarily from a systems perspective, the role of domestic politics and personalities is not covered thoroughly.These variables, of course, would be essential componentsof a formal theory. Nor is the book intendedto replace other views of, or approachesto, international politics but ratherto demonstratethat in certain types of relationshipsthe relatively parsimonious overall structureand economic process models (and by implicationthe dependencymodel) fail at the levels of description,explanation,and prediction. This is not to argue, then, that the more complex and novel models introduced in the book would be useful for studying, for example, Sino-Soviet relations. But they are necessary tools for understandingother types of relationships, particularlythose which contain the characteristicsof complex interdependence. The book does not identify all those relationshipsin the world where complex interdependence prevails. This is a theoreticalbook, not a foray into measurement. Emphasis is on the relationship between complex interdependenceand regime change, not on the causes of interdependenceor vulnerability. Although observations on these mattersare offered, they are not developed systematically. Yet, the is authorsare convinced that interdependence increasing. But they do not admit-as some have-that the "high politics" of security are being replaced by economic, resource, andecological problems. Whatis happening,of course, is thatthe international agenda is becoming increasinglylengthy; the additionof each new item does not mean that the others are being resolved, nor that welfare-orientedproblems are displacing security problems. There is nothing wrong with looking at the world that throughMorgenthau-colored glasses so long as we understand it is intellectually fruitful to do so only for certain types of relationships. As long as we have the rivalries of the great powers, to say nothing of the activities of the Libyas, Ethiopias, Somalias, and others, we are a long way from achieving complex interdependenceuniversally. The authorspropose, nevertheless, that the conditions for furtherdevelopment are of complex interdependence propitious. The hierarchicorderingof states in the system, where hegemons like Great Britain establish and maintain international regimes unilaterally,is rapidlydeclining. (The presentinabilityof the United States to controlthe outcomes in a variety of global and bilateralrelationshipsis evidence of this proposition.) This importantpredictionabout the long-rangestructural consequences of complex interdependencecontradicts Scott's analysis of increased system instability, the forecasts of dependency theorists, and the predictions of realists who emphasize the mammothgap in military capabilities between the nuclear powers and other states. The latter groups visualize the world in terms of ever-increasingstatus and power distances; Keohane and Nye offer a much more egalitarianassessment. In a system where power and influence are becoming more equitably distrib-

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uted, new types of leadership (unilateral "example-setting," or collective problem-solving) have to be employed. These types of leadershipnot only result from complex interdependence, but contribute to its development as well. The authors,in their normativechapter, applaudsuch developments,thoughthey do not suggest any inevitabilityto them. Clearly, attemptsto re-institutehegemonic leadership styles, or individual government initiatives that set off conflict spirals, remain strong possibilities. Note, for example, the unilateral actions to establish 200-mile economic zones. Power and Interdependenceis a closely reasonedpiece of scholarship.It may relationstheory well prove to be one of the most significantwritingsin international of the past two decades. It does contain, however, a few difficulties that should be confrontedin futureresearch.The authorscorrectlyemphasize thatin a conditionof complex interdependence,intemationalconflict does not disappear.It is the irrelevance of military force that helps distinguish conflict behavior in complex interdependencerelationshipsfrom others. This may be correct in the sense that threats of militaryaction are not made while bargaining,let us say, on monetaryissues. But what if there is a roughequivalent to militaryforce thatis used to threatenor inflict punishments?For example, isn't a unilateralthreatdrasticallyto devalue currency conflict? Are not trade an equivalent to a threatto use militaryforce in a territorial a wars equivalentto certainforms of militarycoercion?Is it possible to approximate when such "wars" are going on, or threaten condition of complex interdependence The authorsmight consider reformulatingthis one to break out at any moment?20 of complex interdependence-the minor role of military force-and characteristic substitutefor it a broadercategory, such as the absence of grossly harmfulthreats. Such a category would be difficult to operationalize, but its use would at least indicate that a genuinely new type of international relationship has not been achieved so long as any extremely harmfulactions are threatenedor taken by any system. members of an interdependent Interdependencemight indeed give rise to new types of internationalpolitics and leadershippatterns, but Keohane and Nye could have speculated more on the problem of costs it creates for small states. Increased interdependencebetween unequal partners, for example, may lead to the greater loss of domestic policymaking capacity among the weak, so that incentives for disintegratingfrom the system begin to emerge. Witness Canada's recent attempts to reduce American penetrationof the society and economy, and to build counterweightswith Japanand Europe. Complex interdependencemight be a desirable condition to achieve for

20UsingKeohane and Nye's criteria, the Iceland-Britaindyad would not approximatecomplex interdependence because force was threatenedand used-albeit carefully-during the "Cod War." Yet, in 1971, the United States imposed a 10 percent surchargeon all imports which, combined with devaluations, harmedthe economic interests of America's major trading partners.While such punitive action of was not technicallythe same as a display of militarypower, it certainlyhad few of the characteristics a "new diplomacy." According to the authors' formulations, the American action would be consistent with a condition of complex interdependence.

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that in such a systemjoint gains some, but it has not been adequatelydemonstrated necessarilyincrease as comparedto more traditionaldiplomaticrelationships.And, as Haas points out, if one unit "blows up," destructiveescalationin interdependent systems is more probablethan in relationshipsof lower interconnectedness.21 It is debatablewhether Keohane and Nye have done full justice to the realist view of internationalpolitics. For example, they argue that this model predicts outcomesof conflict or regime change solely on the basis of militarycapacity. But if there is any one problemthat has bedevilled the realists, it is how to combine the various "sources of power" to come up with a valid world power ranking. The classical texts emphasizethat population,territory,economic level, and technology are just as importantas military strength. Moreover, Keohane and Nye claim that the realist (overall structure)model is also inadequatebecause it fails to explain regime change and bargainingoutcomes in economic and social areas. But, in my opinion, the realists, unlike dependency theorists, would never claim that militarypower is directly relevantto issues other than security. They are interestedprimarilyin the classical issues of war, peace, and organization the balanceof power, leaving othermattersto experts on international or law. And while they might not be interestedin regime change in the oceansexcept where such changes impinge on security interests-they are vitally concerned with changes in the internationalpolitical system, the causes of those changes, and their predictedresults. The subtitle of this volume, WorldPolitics in Transition, in which the transitionis implied to be a result of growing interdependence, is thus misleading. Worldpolitics has always been in transition,which is not to deny the authors' major point that new types of relationshipsdo exist and that to them. But in attempting apply new models are needed to describeand understand old approachesor models to areas for which they were never intended, they are setting up straw men. Finally, by defining interdependencein terms of behavioralattributesin bargaining and playing down the question of vulnerabilities, the authors may have Multiplechandifficulty identifyingpairs of states which really are interdependent. nels of diplomaticinteraction,absence of hierarchyor linkage on issues, and irrelevance of military force are probably characteristicof the relations between Japan and Bhutan, Canadaand the Bahamas, and India and Finland. But are these states Withoutsome specified thresholdsof impactor vulnerability, really interdependent? cannot exist, even or at least some minimumflow of transactions,interdependence if the otherthree conditions are met. In short, Keohane and Nye may have outlined some necessary conditions for interdependence,but they are not sufficient conditions. None of these comments points to any critical flaw in Power and Interdependence. On the contrary,the book is a measured,but very importantstep in pointing -the way to more satisfactory analyses of a complex world. As with the authors' previous work, it should stimulateresearchand provide guidelines for exploration

21"IsThere a Hole in the Whole?. . . " p. 857.

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of the political aspectsof global economic and social issues. While perhapscomplicated for the beginning undergraduate,it will command a leading place in the readinglists of advancedstudents. Aside from the substantivemeritsof the book, it is also a model of the blending of theory with empirical work. But what of dependency?In their preface, Keohane and Nye dismiss the body to of literature dependencytheoryas irrelevant theirconcernwith regime change. on But their analysis has some implicationsfor the relationsbetween the industrialand developing countries. For one thing, the dependency theorists, like Keohane and Nye, emphasize the importance of non-state actors and transnationalrelations. Wherethey could disagreeis on the connectionbetween such actors and diplomatic activity. To Frankand others, for example, diplomatswork to preserveand develop a basic world economic superstructure; Keohane and Nye would reject such a deterministicstance. On the question of bargaining outcomes, their analysis would partially support-at least by implication-the predictionsof dependencytheorists. Where complex interdependence does not exist-as is presumablythe case in the relations between most LDCs and the industrialcountries-power and coercion appearmore frequentlyandoutcomes of conflict do reflect capabilitydifferentials.If this was the case between the United States and Australia,then it shouldbe trueeven more so in America's relationswith Thailand, GreatBritain's connection with Sri Lanka, and France's diplomacy toward Chad or Niger. Keohane and Nye would not agree, however, thatthe outcomes necessarilyconstituteexploitation. Yet, where the three are conditionsof complex interdependence present-and these might very well exist in the relations between some industrialcountries and a few developing nationsthen it follows that bargainingoutcomes between them, as in the Canada-United States case, would be roughlyequal-a propositionthatdependencytheoristswould never accept. But all of this is by way of speculation. The fact remains that writers on and interdependence dependencytheoristshave had very little to say to each other. Whatever similarities appear in their work is more fortuitous than the result of academic interchange.The lack of dialogue can be attributedboth to the different intellectualmotivationsin their work and to fundamental differences on conceptual problems. Dependency theory developed initially in Latin America among economists and sociologists who were frustratedby the lack of international equality and the continuedproblemsfaced in organizingsuccessful developmentstrategies.Many of the analyses owe a greaterdebt to Marxismthanto traditional international relations theory. Their driving force has been moral concern and their approachhas emphasized theory on a grand scale ratherthan empirical work.22In contrast, writers have been motivatedby intellectualcuriosity, predominatelya on interdependence
22Thisis not to imply that all of the literaturegrouped under the dependency category is devoid of empirical work. Some of the writing takes off from the careful investigations of Latin American that economists who soughtto demonstrate primarycommodityproducerswere sufferingfrom worsening termsof trade. Raul Prebisch'swork for ECLA is particularly thorough.AndreGunderFrank'stheoreti-

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desire to describeand measureratherthanto explain. Most have played down policy implications of their analyses. The call for cooperation and policy coordination appearsrepeatedlyin the literature,but only a few have explorednationalautonomy and other strategies as a possible solution to the problems posed by interdependence. The subjectof inquiryalso differs. Writerson dependency-even dependencyas-vulnerability23-are concerned solely with the relations between the world's center and its peripheries. Without really asking the question why, writers on interdependencehave confined their studies to the relations between industrial states. Although Keohane and Nye point to the possibility of coalition-makingby organization,as well as the power of the weak in developing states in international such issue-areasas the Law of the Sea, the other issue-areasand bilateralrelations they explore lie predominatelyin the domains of the industrialstates. Are these as writersimplying, then, thatinterdependence a conditionexists only between such states?Or has the easy availabilityof tradeand investmentdata between the industrial states determinedthe focus of inquiry? We can summarizeschematically some of the major substantivedifferences relationsdiscussed in this essay: (1) between five of the approachesto international vulnerabilityanalysis, (3) transactionanalysis, (4) realism, dependencytheory, (2) and (5) complex interdependence. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it does help us evaluatethe possibilities of, or barriersto, intellectual consolidation. It appearsthat on substantiveissues impedimentsto building bridges between the various there are few insurmountable approaches.The realistparadigm,for example, does not precludeconsiderationsof non-state actors in diplomacy, nor is there any particularreason why those interested in measuring changes in internationaltransactions should confine their investigations to the relations between industrial states. Dependency theorists should certainly acknowledge that not all issues can be reducedto economics and for that some foreign policy actions are undertaken militarysecuritypurposes. And Keohane and Nye might be urged to explore the advantagesof more autonomous policies for states enmeshed in systems of complex interdependence.Using the list, readersmay wish to speculate on other areas where collaborationmight be undertaken. The major problems preventingsynthesis appearto be epistemologicalrather than substantive.While dependencytheory may tell us something about the lot of the average developing country in an internationaleconomy that does contain

cal statementshave been based on case histories of Chile and Brazil. It is interestingthat portions of dependencytheoryhave been subjectedto empiricaltesting primarilyby NorthAmericanscholars. See in Test of the Theory of Dependency," Comparative RobertR. Kaufmanet al., "A Preliminary particular Politics Vol. 7 (April 1975): 303-30, and LawrencyR. Alschuler, "Satellizationand Stagnationin Latin America," InternationalStudies QuarterlyVol. 20 (March 1976): 39-82, and the Kurth-Rosenvolume cited in fn. 1.
23Singer's

Weak States in a World of Powers concentrates on the relations between the major powers

and their former dependencies.

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Table 1 Similarities and differences on substantive issues in

Dependency Scope of Inquiry North-South (center-periphery) independent

Vulnerability mostly NorthSouth independent

Focus on independent or dependent variabks Types of essential actors Inquiryfocused on characteristicsof system, actors, or pairs of actors? Major instruments of bargaining

non-state system

state pairs of actors

economic coercion, backed by threatsof military force or subversion

economic coercion

What determinesbargaininglconflict outcomes? Results on system of bargainingand conflicts

economic exchange relationships

comparativedegree of vulnerabilityin dyads probablehierarchy

exploitation and systemic hierarchy

Policy implications; appropriateresponses to national or systemic characteristics

isolation/autarchy

diversify markets and sourcesof supply

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analyses of dependency and interdependence

Transactionalists Western industrial nations independent

Realists universal both

Complex Interdependence mostly Western industrialnations both

non-state (societies system

state all

state and non-state all

not analyzed

military and economic coercion; diplomacy

diplomacy;transnational & transgovernmentalalliances; exploitation of vulnerabilitiesin issue areas issue areavulnerability; non-state actor roles, etc. more equitablerewards than in noninterdependent systems; less hierarchy policy coordination with appropriate forms of leadership

not analyzed

military/economic power of imbalance/balance power

not analyzed

coordinatepolicies to maximizejoint gains

varied

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inequitable characteristics, its economic determinism, disregard for measuring changes in dependentvariables, and casual treatmentof empiricalmaterialscannot be reconciled easily with the canons of inquiry extant among non-Marxistsocial can scientists. The transactionalists be faulted for a generally atheoreticalconcern with measurementand for confining their inquiryto an unnecessarilynarrowgeographic domain. Dependency theorists no doubt would look with strong disfavor upon an academic exercise that studies externalities-quantifies transactions-but avoids examining the nature or consequences of those transactions. And realists viewpoint on the might quarrelwith the developersof the complex interdependence groundsthatthe latterhave become overly enamoredwith relativelytrivial items on the internationalagenda. However, are there any majorpayoffs to a synthesis of these approaches?Is bridge-buildinga worthwhileexercise? In my opinion, it is, because each of these approachesor bodies of literaturetells us something aboutthe truthof international relationships,but not all the truthaboutit. Each should help correctthe substantive and theoretical shortcomings of the other. Those who promote the rhetoric of spreadequally around interdependence,assumingthatit is a qualityor characteristic the globe, should be made aware of the vulnerabilities-and frustrations-of the as weak. Those who see interdependence an inexorabletrendbringingbenefits to all also has its costs. Policies of disintegration, that should understand interdependence autarky,and isolation are often responsesto too much dependenceor asymmetrical the integration.We shouldattemptto appreciate fearsandperceptionsthatgive rise to them. The weak and the vulnerablestates, many of which are inundatedby foreign advisors, buffeted by wild fluctuationsin commodity prices and currency values, and the object of vast flows of foreign culturalpenetration,should not be expected in to look upon interdependence the same light as those who have strongcapabilities and who are the actors in internationalrelations, not merely the objects. Depenecodency theorists, on the other hand, should recognize that not all international enterprises between industrial and nomic relations are zero-sum; collaborative developing countriescan bring importantadvantagesto the poor and enhance their possibilities for indigenouseconomic and culturaldevelopment. And if they would stop assuming that all countries must develop simultaneouslyalong a single path, their conclusions might not be so pessimistic. A debate between the proponentsof the various approachesto the study of types of relationshipsin internationallife is long overdue. Analyses of interdependence and dependencerepresentdifferentworld views; these are sharedin large part by government officials in the industrial and developing nations. If they are to engage in fruitfuldialogue, it would serve all of us well if they could learn, through the productsof scholars, to distinguish the facts and fantasies of each view.