NATO ENLARGEMENT AND T H E B A L T I C ST A T ES: W H A T C A N T H E G R E A T P OW E RS D O?

Stephen J. B lan k

November 18, 1997

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T he views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the A rmy, the Department of Defense, or the U .S. Government. T his report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: D irector, Strategic Studies I nstitute, U .S. A rmy W ar College, 122 F orbes A ve, C arlisle, P A 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, D S N 242-4133, F A X (717) 245-3820, or via the I nternet at rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil

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F O R E WO R D

N A T O's enlargement has brought it to the borders of the B altic states who covet membership in N A T O. However, admitting them into N A T O is one of the most difficult problems for the A lliance because of Russia's unconditional opposition to such action and because of N A T O's own internal divisions on this issue. Nonetheless, a new regime or system of security for the entire B altic region must now be on the U .S. and E uropean agenda. T he key players in such a process are Russia, Germany, and the U nited States. T heir actions will determine the limits of the possible in constructing B altic security for the foreseeable fu t u re. I n t h is st u dy, D r. S tep hen B l a n k presents a detailed and extensive analysis of these three governments' views on B altic and E uropean security. T heir views on regional security are materially shaped by and influence their larger views on their mutual relations and policy towards E urope. T heir views also demonstrate the complexity of the issues involved in constructing B altic, not to m e n t ion E u rope a n , secu r i t y . B u t beca use N A T O enlargement is the most serious foreign policy and defense issue before Congress now, such an analysis can illuminate much of what is happening in the N A T O enlargement process and why it has ta ken its current shape. T herefore the Strategic Studies I nstitute presents this monograph in order to contribute to this emerging great debate over N A T O's enlargement.

R I C H A R D H . W I T H E RSP O O N Colonel, U .S. A rmy D irector, Strategic Studies I nstitute

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B I O G R A P H I C A L SK E T C H O F TH E AUTHOR

S T E P H E N J. B L A N K is the Douglas M acA rthur Professor of Research at the U .S. A rmy W ar College and has been an A ssoci a t e P rofessor of R ussi a n/Sov i e t A ff a i rs a t t h e S t r a t egic S t u d ies I nst i t u t e si nce 1989. P r ior to t h is appointment, D r. B lan k was Associate Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and E ducation of A ir U niversity at M axwell A ir Force B ase. D r. B lan k's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian history from the U niversity of C hicago. H e has published numerous articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign policies, notably in the T hird World, and is the author of T he Sorcerer as Apprentice: Sta l in 's Commissa r i at of N ation a l ities, 19171924 (Westport, C T: G reenwood Publishing G roup, 1994).

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SU M M A RY

As N A T O enlarges and approaches the borders of the B altic states, it faces one of the most difficult and complex security challenges in contemporary E urope. W hile the B altic states crave membership in N A T O, Russia deems t h a t o u t co m e a s u n a cce p t a b l e , t h r e a t e n s t o b r e a k cooperation with the West in such an event, and N A T O allies themselves remain divided over the wisdom of B altic membership. T he apparent irreconcilability of N A T O's and Russia's positions, and the B altic states' insistence upon consideration for their security interests, oblige both E ast a n d W est to col l abor a te on dev isi ng a wor k able a n d acceptable security system for the region that respects both Russian and B altic, not to mention Western, interests. O therwise, this region might become the flashpoint of a political conflict that could eventually degenerate into a military one. N A T O must simultaneously deter Russia and reassure it and the B altic states that their security will be enhanced. T he key players in this process are Russia, Germany, and the U nited States. T hey have the means to shape the future pa r ameters of a ny B altic secu rity system a nd a re t he principal players in E urope as well. A nd it is their policies that will define the limits of what can be done in the B altic, as well as in much of E urope, since B altic security is inseparable from that of E urope as a whole. O r, in other words, E uropean security is indivisible, and B altic security is part of it. H owever, a n a lysis of R ussi a n pol icy t h rough 1997 suggests that Russia remains fundamentally incapable of playing a constructive role in this process. Russian policies for E u rope a re i ncoheren t a nd a t t ached to models of E uropean security that have little or no relevance to other states or that actually alarm them. Russia still disdains the sm a ll st a tes, t h i n k i ng t hem to be of no consequence, proposes i nfeasible a nd object ion able schemes of pa nv

E uropean collective security that do not bind it but would bind N A T O, and at the same time pursues unilateralist spheres of i nfl uence policies i n t he Com mon weal t h of I ndependent States (C IS). Russian policy is also fran k ly and ope n l y r e v ision ist , de m a n d i n g bor de r r e v isions a n d refusing to sign formal border treaties to recognize the post1 9 8 9 c h a n ges i n C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r op e . I t s spokesmen ma ke demands for an exceptional position in E urope or for unwor k able security systems that do little to a d v a n ce f a i t h i n R u ss i a 's co h e r e n ce o r good w i l l . F ur thermore, its policy statements reveal a continuing addiction to old-fashioned doctrines of zero-sum games, of viewing everything in terms of cor relations of antagonistic military forces, and of desires for exclusive rights over small states. T hese obst acles to R ussi a n success i n E u rope a re prominent in Russia's B altic policies. Russia continues to ma ke threats against the B altic states of economic war, of cr i m i n a l subversion from w i t hou t, a nd of refusi ng to recognize borders, while attempting to gain a veto over N A T O's activities. Because Russia cannot carry out these threats, it only further antagonizes the B altic states, ma kes them more intractable in their own anti-Russian policies at home and abroad, and only worsens the regional situation. W hereas 4-5 years ago Russia might have been able to achieve a genuine neutralization of the region, today that is impossible. Now many of N A T O's members are involved in trying to secure the region. U ntil such time as Russia can devise coherent and responsible policies for E urope, it will continue to lose ground there and be seen as a threat more than as part of the solution. However, it is precisely due to its military-political capability to be a threat that Germany has attempted to conduct a policy where, on the one hand, it wants to expand (or so it says) the E uropean U nion ( E U) and N A T O to the E ast bu t w i l l ot her w ise do not h i ng t h a t a n t agon i zes President Boris Yeltsin and Russia. As a result, Germany has steadily back tracked since 1993 on B altic admission into N A T O and proposed terms for Russia's integration into vi

N A T O's policy processthe new N A T O-Russia Councilthat remar k ably prefigured the final agreement on the Council in M ay 1997. U nfortunately, those terms went far beyond giving Russia a voice but not a veto and certainly made it clear that Germany will not accept B altic membership in N A T O anytime soon. I ndeed, German Foreign M inistry officials spea k ing in Moscow openly alluded to the need not to do anything that wounds Russian sensitivities, explicitly giving Russia a veto on future expansion. T hus, it is unli kely that Germany will shoulder the responsibilities of helping to underpin a security regime that is viable for the B altic. If anything, all the evidence suggests that Germany is trying to force the Nordic states, mainly F inland and Sweden, and the U nited States to bear this burden while it basically gets a free ride. Accordingly, it falls to W ashington to ta ke the lead here, as it h as done in t he gener al process of enla rgemen t. W ashington has done so. I t has crafted new political and institutional formulas for N A T O within the Par tnership for Peace (PfP) program that will enhance the scope of B altic and other states' political and military participation in the alliance's activities. I t is devising programs li ke shared air defense and the U .S.-B altic charter to allay their security concerns while seek ing to integrate Moscow through the Council. Y e t h e r e, too, A me r ica n pol icy seems to r u n i n to difficulties. E vidently, as cited below, many U .S. officials have come to view A rticle 5 of the W ashington T reaty as having outlived its usefulness and as merely a part of the political superstructure needed for reassurance rather than as an operative, vital part of the A lliance. W ashington has told Sweden, for example, that it looks towards a collective security system in which all the states of E urope can participate through the PfP program. T he language of this program's founding documents is very close to that of A rticle 4 of the W ashington T reaty that calls only for consultations in the event of a threat to security. T hus membership in the PfP program only gives states the right of consultation in the event of a threat to their security, it does not give them vii

the security guarantee commonly held to derive from A rticle 5. E ven though the U nited States is the only state that is rea lly t r yi ng to lead t he for m a t ion of a region a l a nd con t i nen t a l system, i ts approach a t tempts to adv a nce N A T O's enla rgemen t while m ain t aining t h a t a clea rly increasingly an ti-A merican and revisionist R ussia is a democratic partner for W ashington. T his lack of realism bet r a ys a subst a n t i a l conf usion i n pol icy t h a t is not wa r r a n ted by R ussia's t r uculen t post u re or G er ma ny's interest in having others do for it what it will not do for itself, namely play a more active role in areas li ke the B altic. W hile the innovations proposed by the U nited States to N A T O and the PfP program are sound and will enhance B altic security, it is not clear that they will go far enough to overcome regional tensions, unless the E U and E urope are a lso brough t i n to t he pict u re so t h a t a t r ue region a l stabilization can occur. L i kewise, we need to recognize that, however much E urope has changed since 1949, the pledge of collective defense to treaty members under A rticle 5 is still relevant, and that it is not at all clear if Russia truly has reconciled itself to the status quo. As President C linton recently wrote to Senator K ay B ailey H utchinson (R-Texas), we still need to guard against the possibility of a regression i n R ussi a n pol i t ics t h a t wou l d t h r e a t e n t h e accomplishments of the last decade. A mong those achievements is the independence of the B altic states.

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NATO ENLARGEMENT AND T H E B A L T I C ST A T ES: W H A T C A N T H E G R E A T P OW E RS D O?

I nt rod uction. N A T O's enlargement will transform E uropean security. B ut the B altic states are not among N A T O's first new members because their defense organizations do not yet meet N A T O's standards, and they have problems with their Russian minorities and with Russia. 1 Moreover, N A T O members' reluctance to admit the B altic states will probably con tinue, leaving t he lat ter ou tside of any functioning E uropean security structure. 2 Admitting these states to N A T O and/or the E uropean U nion ( E U) presents E uropean gov e r n m e n ts a n d secu r i t y or g a n i z a t ions w i t h m a n y difficult challenges, among them deterring Russian threats. H . P l a t e r-Z ybe rg, a B r i t ish m i l i t a r y a n a l yst , w r i t es, Moscow will have no difficulty ensuring that the area is not sufficiently stable to join any security structures in the future. 3 If he is right, at least some of the B altic states' entry into N A T O, and maybe the E U , might be postponed indefinitely. M any pundits and diplomats also contend that these states are indefensible against Russian threats, an argument the B altic states vehemently deny. 4 T hus, these st a tes' fu t u re st a t us h as become a m ajor quest ion i n E uropean security. Russia unconditionally opposes their entry into N A T O, calling it unacceptable. 5 Russia's 1993 military doctrine also explicitly states that an alliance's expansion to states on its borders, e.g., the B altic states, threatens vital Russian interests. Logically this means that Russia still seeks a veto over N A T O and Central and E astern E uropean security policies even if it cannot obtain that goal. 6 I n the wa ke of the recent N A T O-Russia Founding Act of M ay 1997, Foreign M inister Yevgeny Prima kov said that the issue of the B altic states and N A T O was a condition for future E ast-West cooperation. 7 T hus N A T O enlargement to the B altic states 1

could trigger a strong Russian reaction there, even if it is only r hetorical, economic, a nd political a t first. B u t a military riposte could follow later and feature still more political, and maybe military, pressure against the B altic states and N A T O. 8 Moscow will, in either case, probably aim to p r ese r v e a n d/or p e r p e t u a t e t h e cu r r e n t r egion a l insecurity and prevent N A T O's enlargement to the B altic. T his regional security dilemma confirms that the main problem with N A T O's enlargement is that it complicates t he t ask of bu i ldi ng secu r i t y i n a nd a rou nd R ussi a. 9 Nonetheless, N A T O is committed to enlargement and must accept its obligations. W hile those obligations do not mean automatic defense of the B altic states if they are attacked (as would be the case for members), it does mean that N A T O cannot abstain from a substantive participation in the establishment of a regional security system for the B altic region. N A T O cannot simply wash it hands of those areas in E urope that are only included in the Partnership for Peace and ignore regional security issues either in the B al k ans or in the B altic. T herefore a mong t hose obliga tions t h a t N A T O h as incurred due to its enlargement is the challenge of building a du r able fr a mewor k for region al secu rity. O t her wise, N A T O's enlargement could aggravate, not reduce, B altic tensions. N A T O and/or all the littoral states, including Russia, might then adopt more confrontational postures. T he B altic states, being outside any E uropean security syst e m a n d t h e r e be i ng no W est e r n conse nsus ov e r upholding their secu rity and independence, might face strong Russian pressure to rejoin its sphere of influence. Such pressures could trigger a E uropean, not merely B altic, crisis. T herefore, to prevent such possibilities, we must consider how to enhance B altic security. Paradoxically, excluding the B altic states from E urope's sec u r i t y s t r u c t u r es m a g n i f i es t h e B a l t i c l i t t o r a l 's importance for E urope. Because Russia has made the B altic s t a t es' e xcl u sio n f r om N A T O a co n d i t io n of f u t u r e cooperation with the West, it is now more urgent for E urope and the U nited States to find at least an interim solution for 2

regional security dilemmas. I n particular, the key great powersRussia, Germany, and the U nited Stateswho most directly shape the region's security framewor k must ta ke the lead to assure mutual cooperation. Russia's importance is clear from the map. A merican preponderance is equally obvious. A nd bot h t he B al tic st a tes a nd neu t r als li ke F inland and Sweden accept that German policy greatly influences regional trends and is essential to any regional or E uropean balance. 10 As in the past, E uropean security organizations must deter and reassure Russia while enhancing the security of the littoral states. 11 T hese organizations must also jointly sh a re i n a ny B al tic secu r i ty pla n so t h a t no st a te or organization obtains a free ride. F ree riding occurs when one or more states, or organizations, k nowing or believing that some other state or organization can or will formulate solutions for major issues li ke B altic security, effectively abstains from serious participation in the solution. I nstead that state/s or organization/s then lets other states act alone, gaining a free ride at their expense. If free riding per v ades a n en t i re a lli a nce as i n t he 1930s, secu r i t y guarantees are devalued and could even become worthless. 12 Accordingly, to stabilize the B altic region, states cannot keep look ing, as they are now tempted to do, for others to ensure regional security. F ree riding undermines B altic integration in E urope by dissolving the cohesion of the new N A T O-led security system. I t also fosters renationalized and unilateral security policies. Germany could incline further to ma ke a bilateral deal with Russia over Central and E astern E urope. As it is, B altic cohesion, too, is already eroding. L ithuania poses, not as a B altic state, but as a C en t r a l E u ropea n one t h a t see ks u n i l a ter a l en t r y to E u rope a n orga n i z a t ions, w h i le forsa k i ng L a t v i a a n d E stonia. E stonia follows suit regarding its future entry into the E U and supports admitting at least one B altic state into N A T O so that others might later gain a hearing. 13 F ree riding and allied divisions regarding the B altic could create new and unforeseen regional problems and 3

clearly are due to the E U's and N A T O's hesitations over B altic issues. 14 Region al cooper a tion, w hich is al ready wea kened due to N A T O and the E U's reluctance to expand, will further decrease where free riding and renationalized agendas prevail. 15 Russia could then be tempted to extend an unwelcome protectorate over the B altic states. To prevent such outcomes and protect the B altic states, N A T O must continue to provide security, deter Russia, reassu re, a nd lead t he non- N A T O l i t tor a l st a tes a nd E u rope's other secu rity organizations, the E U and the O rga n iz a t ion for Secu r i t y a nd Cooper a t ion i n E u rope (O S C E), toward regional as well as E uropean militarypoli t ical i n tegr a t ion. F ail u re to do so will h ave gr ave consequences. E x-Swedish Prime M inister C arl B ildt wrote that Russia's B altic policy is a litmus test of its E uropean and security policies. 16 Vol ker Ruhe, Germany's M inister of Defense, wrote that the B altic states are the practical testing ground for meeting the challenges of reshaping N A T O's missions, territorial scope, the relations between the U nited States and its E uropean allies, the hoped for partnership with Russia, and, in general, for building the E urope we want to see. 17 German Foreign M inister K laus K in kel also stressed these states' importance for future E uropean security. 18 T hus failure to attend to B altic issues could jeopardize N A T O enlargement and E uropean security. K arl K aiser, of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, worried that the U .S. Senate may ma ke meaningful security for states not adm i t ted i n t he fi rst rou nd, li k e t he B a l t ic st a tes, a precondition for r a tifying enla rgemen t. D u tch a n alysts A lfred V an Staden and Gert de Nooy call the B altic E urope's most con tested a rea w here fail u re to reconcile B al t ic, Western, and Russian interests could reignite E ast-West confrontation. 19 T he 1991 Soviet coups in the B altic and Moscow led Central and E ast E urope to press for N A T O membership, so renewed pressure in the B altic could have equally grave consequences for the region, E urope, and Russia. 20 Not surprisingly, much E uropean diplomacy now revolves around the issues raised by N A T O enlargement 4

a n d B a l t ic excl usion f rom i t . O n t h e on e h a n d t h is diplom a t ic act i v i t y ack now ledges t he i n di v isibi l i t y of E uropean security, but, on the other, it also reveals the reluctance to accept the full implications of that fact. 21 Conditions for Baltic Secu r ity. A l t hough t he B al tic region is one of R ussia's vi t al interests, these states must not be abandoned to Russia's sphere of i nfl uence. Con t r a r y to R ussi a n policy, vi t a l interests and spheres of influence are not synonymous. A n equit able a nd lasting solu tion must involve a nd u nite Russia, the other littoral states, the E U , and N A T O in a common process. D isunity among these actors would erode a B a l t ic system, p recl u di ng effect i ve act ions tow a r ds regional security. Russia and the B altic states must also shun provocative actions. If they both eschew such actions, any state opting out of the system will then incur the costs of seek ing to destabilize E uropean security. E ven though Russia could have had B altic neutrality or F inlandization earlier, it is now impossible. 22 Today the B altic states and Russia must not become a source of trouble or conflict to each other. T he B altic states should not choose or be forced to become hostile front-line states against either Russia or N A T O. 23 T hat could lead to large, permanent, peace-time deployments in or around those states and either N A T O's and/or Russia's military buildup. 24 We must balance N A T O recognition of Russia's legitimate interests with an equal resolve to preserve and strengthen B altic security. A ny threat to the B altic states or acceptance of their diminished security also endangers the other littoral states and thus E urope. T herefore N A T O and Russia have substan tial responsibilities. F ailu re to fulfill t hem will cause perpetual regional tension, not stability. R ussia. H owever, the expectation that Russia will act as a responsible actor in a regional security regime is the most unli kely outcome and problematical factor in the B altic and 5

E u ropea n equ a t ion. As Mon i k a Woh lfeld of t he W est E uropean U nion's (W E U) I nstitute for Security Studies writes,
So far, Russia has not been able to ma ke a clear impact on the evolving E uropean security structure. . . . Deprived of the bipolar relationship with the U nited States, Moscow appears unableif not downright unwillingto par ticipate on an equal footing with other E uropeans in the establishment of a new networ k of security institutions, and Russia's participation in the Contact G roup and then I F O R is considered by Moscow to be a meager substitute for a more effective instrument with which to wield its influence over E uropean events. 25

M uch of this failure stems from Russian elites' inability or refusal to accept E uropean realities. T hey still insist that Russia is a super or great power that must have global equality with the U nited States and an exceptional place at the presidium table of E uropean security. 26 Russia seeks st a t us i n E u rope, not r esponsi b i l i t y , a n d r ef uses to participate except on its own terms. 27 H aving signed the Founding Act, Russia still is trying to use its new position to block Poland's and other states' entry into N A T O and push for the O S C E to become the coordinator of N A T O. Such actions reflect Russia's continuing opposition to anything that smacks of N A T O's leadership in E urope. 28 As Sergei Rogov, head of the U S A-C anada I nstitute and a highly regarded advisor to the government, recently wrote,
T he Russian F ederation is unwilling to consent to bear the geopolitical burden of the defeat of the Soviet U nion in the cold war or to be reconciled with an unequal position in the new E uropean order. 29

T hus Moscow has already served notice of its intention to act as a T rojan horse inside N A T O. T his revisionist and unrealistic stance diminishes Russia's neighbors' security and aims to preserve that insecurity as a lasting condition of Russian power. Russia still acts as if none of its neighbors can be secure for it to be secure. 30 Russia continues to pursue objectives and policies in E urope that its power does not merit, that are unsustainable, and which ultimately

endanger its own security. T hese policies are reintegrating t he C I S, crea t i ng a n excl usive R ussi a n sphere t here, demanding a veto over N A T O's and Central and E astern E u rope's act i v i t y , a n d b a r r i ng C e n t r a l a n d E ast e r n E urope's military modernization. 31 Russia seeks equality with the U nited States, its own unchallenged sphere in the C I S, a nd t he demili t a r iza t ion of C en t r al a nd E aster n E urope so that the great powers alone could once again revise their status. Russia has reverted to old thin k ing about world politics a nd E u rope, such as cor rel a t ions of forces, especi a l ly military forces, zero-sum games, and worst case threat scenarios. Not surprisingly, Russian elites believe that for R u ss i a t o b e R u ss i a i t m u s t h a v e e xcl u s i v e a n d uncontested dominance over the C IS and an accompanying sphere of influence over the B altic states. A ny Western influence in the C IS and B altic immediately threatens Russian vital interests even as Russia demands a veto and voice in Western activities. Yeltsin's former senior foreign policy advisor, D mi t r i Ryu r i kov, obser ved t h a t i t w as strange, unjust (or unfair) and wrong for N A T O not to grant Russia such a veto and that refusal to give Russia this right actually deprives it of the possibility of ta k ing part in settling E uropean security problems. 32 I n other words, without an empire and that veto, Russia is nothing in E urope, and everyone threatens it. B ut while the West must not intervene in its sphere of influence, Russia must have security rights or privileges unequal to every other state, i.e., a veto over N A T O and its policies. 33 To be sure, Russia has well-founded fears of exclusion from the B altic during wartime or a crisis. I n many wars, closure of the B altic inflicted grievous military-economic damage on Russia. Today, when Russians view long-range naval and air based stri ke systems as the main military threat and Russia's B altic position is the worst peacetime position since Peter the G reat, these are not idle fears. Since N A T O's sea and air launched cruise missile routes directly traverse the B altic states, the importance to Moscow of air,

missile, naval defense, early warning systems, and B altic counter-amphibious operations becomes clear. Nonetheless, Russia's B altic policies aggravate regional a n d E u rope a n t e nsions. N A T O is sign i f ica n t l y demilitarizing and poses no threat to Russia. Moscow, at a minim u m, w a n ts t he B al tic st a tes, w hich i t considers S a isonsta aten (states for a season), to be perennially on N A T O's doorstep but barred from N A T O. 34 Yet this outcome would not moderate Russian opposition to N A T O or its enlargement. Russian objectives are much greater as the struggle over N A T O's military policy underscores. Russia prefers to demilitarize Central E urope, preserve it as a buffer outside any viable E uropean security system pending the revival of Russian power and hegemony, and neutralize N A T O as an effective security provider. Russian officials insist that N A T O must confine itself to regional peace operations under either U . N . and/or O S C E auspices, giving Russia a veto over its activities. A nd the new Founding Act with N A T O unfortunately goes a long way toward realizing those objectives and restricting the West's ability to influence developments in the C IS. W hile no state or party has a veto over the other side's internal operations in the N A T O-Russia Council, in matters brought to the Council, in the absence of consensus, no action can be ta ken. T herefore out of area operations in the C IS are ruled out a priori. Spheres of influence peace ope r a t ions r em a i n t h e or de r of t h e d a y. A s R ussi a n commentators note, the preceding negotiations confirmed t h a t E u rope will not let R ussi a be est r a nged even if W ashington wanted to do so. T hey are certainly right about Germany and probably now about F rance as well. Nor is W ashington liable to do so since Russia is the key country to E urope and the C IS and its democratic partner. No crisis or question that arises where Russia has an interest will escape discussion in the Council, nor is the West li kely to press tow a rds a u nil a ter al concl usion, a nd a Wester n consensus will be hard to obtain. T herefore they argue that Russia has obtained a de facto veto in the Council and more flexibility in the C IS . 35 T hus Russia's C IS, B altic, and 8

E uropean policies are openly and unabashedly coercive and dangerous.

Russia's policies for E urope and the near abroad rule out its participation in a truly cooperative, B altic, and E uropean security regime. Russia's main foreign and defense policy goal, reintegrating the C IS under Russian auspices, necessarily entails a high degree of strategic overextension, internal instability in Russia, and perennial tension throughout the post-Soviet space including the B altic states.36

Moreover, these policies are inherently revisionist with regard to E urope and the C IS.
T he very concept of Russia as propounded by Boris Yeltsin and his circle since 1990 has always been deeply problematic because of the de j u re equation which exists between the Russian state and the Russian Soviet F ederated Socialist Republic (RS F SR). T here has never been a Russian state in history within the borders of the RS F SR, and those borders are, with reason, seen as artificial not only by proponents of the greater Russia, but, as the C hechen war shows, by the proponents of a smaller one. T he obvious but overlooked point, therefore, is that in the former Soviet space Russia is not a status quo power but a revisionist one. T he argument in Russia is how to revise the post-1991 status quo, not whether to revise it. 37

I ndeed, one reason for Russia's pro-Western policies in 1991-93 was to win Western support for hegemony over the C IS. 38 N A T O's enlargement starts a process that forecloses t h a t i m pe r i a l op t ion i n t h e C I S. T h e r efor e R ussi a n revisionism is not mere rhetoric, as some Western analysts maintain, but aims squarely at the E uropean status quo. 39 I n September 1996, Prima kov told the O S C E that,
Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of the two blocs no longer exists, but the H elsin k i agreements are not being fully applied. After the end of the Cold W ar, certain countries in E uropethe Soviet U nion, C zechoslova k ia, and Y ugoslaviahave disintegrated. A number of new states were formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e H e l s i n k i a g r e e m e n t s. U n d e r t h e

circumstances, there is a need for the establishment of a new system of security. 40

As Russia also demands guarantees of its integrity against secessionist threats while the M inistry of Defense insists on retaining the old Soviet borders, Prima kov confirmed what A lexei A rba tov ca lled t he duplici t y of R ussi a n border pol icy. 41 C lea r l y, dem a n di ng rev isions of neighbor i ng st a t es' bor de rs t h r e a t e ns t h e m a n d t h e st a t us q uo . P rima kov also revealed Moscow's a r roga n t a nd foolish belief that small states, li ke the B altic states, have nothing to add to E urope's security dialogue nor do they merit security equal to Russia's. 42 Moscow's preferred system for its neighborhood dates back to 1994, if not earlier. 43 Foreign M inistry officials and prominent analysts outlined a concept calling for a Russianled C IS to be an equal pillar with N A T O in E uropean security under the O S C E's supervision. Russia's veto in the O S C E would safeguard its sphere of influence and restrain N A T O's freedom of action. C hernomyrdin reiterated this call for an ostensibly collective security system in E urope at the OS C E's December 1996 L isbon conference. 44 Moscow has also proposed a bilateral joint guarantee of Central E urope with the U nited States and/or N A T O, or a five power conference with the U nited States, G reat B ritain, F rance, and Germany to form a great power E uropean security director ate and exclude the small states which Russia considers of little consequence and has basically shunned si nce 1989. 45 L a tel y Y el tsi n offered t he B a l t ic st a tes guarantees, only to then warn L atvian President G intis U lmanis that, unless Riga treats its Russians as Moscow wants, relations will worsen. I n other words, Moscow wants its own private d roit de rega r d over B altic citizenship policies on top of the powers vested in the O S C E and the C ou nci l of E u rope. M e a n w h i le, R ussi a st i l l v iole n t l y opposes the B altic states' entry into N A T O and demands r ect i f ica t ion of t h e i r n a t ion a l i t y pol ici es. 4 6 R ussi a n guarantees have little value or chance of being accepted under such conditions.

10

Since unilateral or joint guarantees are not a fruitful road for Russia, Moscow's most li kely option is the new N A T O-Russia Founding Act. H ere Russia seeks a veto power over N A T O's actions, a voice in N A T O, and the power to set conditions for N A T O's enlargement, conventional and n ucl e a r d e p loy m e n t s, o r ot h e r s u bseq u e n t m i l i t a r y operations through participation in N A T O. O nce inside N A T O, Moscow could obstruct any future enlargement, even of those states chosen in M adrid. 47 N A T O would then ideally become a mere E uropean peacekeeping organization oper a t i ng u nder t he O S C E 's pu r view. 48 R ussi a wou ld remain E urope's largest military power, the only one that can act unilaterally and still have its sphere of influence. A n d t h r o u g h t h e p a r a l l e l n e go t i a t i o n s o n a n e w Conventional Forces in E urope T reaty (C F E), it hopes to formalize Central E urope's demilitarization since a purely R ussi a n i m pe r i a l p rogr a m ca n not e n h a nce r egion a l , E uropean, or Russia's security but a major international treaty can do so. Russia's B altic policy comports with Moscow's larger program. Nor is this policy, or the perceptions upon which it rests, confined to the lunatic fringe that views the B altic states only as giant criminal enterprises and intelligence launch pads aimed at Russia. 49 O n F ebruary 11, 1997, the gov e r n m e n t , a t Y e l tsi n's i nst r uct ions, issu ed a n e w statement of its B altic policies. T his statement supposedly a i med to p romote m u t u a l fr iendsh ip a nd a model of rel a t ions based on econom ic i n tegr a t ion a nd bil a ter a l coope r a t ion (not r egion a l coope r a t ion w h ich R ussi a opposes), indivisibility and security of the countries, and respect for human and ethnic minorities' rights. 50 H owever, Russia has strange ideas about achieving these goals. F irst of all, B altic states' membership in N A T O would have a lasting and serious negative effect on relationships with Russia.
Conversely, the preservation of their non-bloc status (and this does not necessarily mean neutralityauthor) would be able to create a basis for bilateral and unilateral steps, and quite

11

concrete ones, capable of dispelli ng t he apprehension for security which is still lingering in the B altic states.51

Second, protecting Russian minorities' rights in the B altic remains a long-term policy goal. Russia spelled out the conditions for citizenship that it insists E stonia's and L atvia's Russian minorities must receive, seek ing to dictate t hose cou n t r i es' f u n d a m e n t a l ci t i ze nsh i p l egisl a t ion . F urthermore, progress on treaties delimiting the RussoB altic borders will not occur unless those states follow Russia's recommendations on the broader issues of RussoB al t ic rel a t ionsh ips. As N A T O a nd t he E U h ave told candidates that they must resolve border issues, Russia is a t tempt i ng to bl ack m a il t hose st a tes wi t h per m a nen t exclusion from N A T O and possibly the E U (Russia has claimed to support B altic entry into the E U an example of the contradictions in its B altic and E uropean policies, given this statement) unless they sur render vital aspects of their sovereignty regarding legislation and foreign policy. 52 T h i r d, M oscow com p l a i ns t h a t econom ic t i es a r e undeveloped because the B altic states use Russian goods against Russian interests. I t also argues that state and customs controls must be strengthened. Yeltsin specifically issued here a call to create favorable transport conditions to K aliningrad, i.e., opening a cor ridor through L ithuania. Moscow has already demanded one through Poland and been rebuffed. T his new demand aims to ensure a military route to K aliningrad that would separate Poland as a N A T O member from the B altic states. 53 Moscow also demands increased cultural cooperation to overcome B altic fears of its cultural imperialism. B ut this agreement can create a basis for future cultural-political agitation within those states where Russia could then intervene from outside in their politics. 54 F inally, Moscow demands an end to B altic-based criminal threats against R u ssi a . S i nce R u ssi a n cr i m i n a ls h a v e co n f esse d to fomenting ethnic animosities inside the B altic states, and B altic governments believe Moscow directs such operations, they wholly reject this arrogant and hypocritical demand. 55

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After the H elsin k i Summit with President C linton in M arch 1997, Yeltsin and Prima kov tal ked about a new approach to the B altic and giving them guarantees. B ut later statements by Prima kov to the E U's commissioners and the demand for guarantees concerning minorities as a precondition to border treaties signal Moscow's evident intention to use the issue of Russian minorities abroad to excl ude t he B al tic st a tes from a ny E u ropea n secu r i ty organization, not to ameliorate their condition, something which Russia has not tried to do since 1992. T hese gambits represent a probable futile effort at coercive diplomacy, i.e., forcing the B altic states to turn to Moscow for security guarantees, thus fulfilling Russia's policy objectives. 56 T rying to intimidate the B altic states is long-standing. I n D ecember 1996, V alery Loshchinin, D irector of t he Second E uropean Department of the M inistry of F oreign Affairs, said that Russian diplomacy's strategic task in the B altic is to overcome the negative heritage of the past (which included efforts to use the Russian troops there to force changes in policy towards Russians 57 or to keep the B a l t ic st a tes ou t of t he Cou ncil of E u rope) a nd for m medi u m-ter m good neighbor rel a t ions wi t h t he B a l t ic states. W hile L ithuania and Russia have good relations, relations with L atvia and E stonia are complicated because of their massive gross infringement on human rights of t h e R ussi a n-spe a k i ng pop u l a t ion . 5 8 R ussi a , h e sa i d, proceeds from Y el tsi n's i nst r uct ions to use t r ade a nd economic policy to undo these alleged violations (few of which are perceived by outside observers or even in the Foreign M inistry's own journal, I nter n ation a l Affa i rs). 59 Russia has arrogated to itself the right to intervene in these states' domestic policies. 60 Russian policy's economic aim is to eliminate or reduce to the minimum parasitic mediation of the B altic states in Russia's foreign trade. Since 40 percen t of E ston i a a n d L a t v i a's bu dget reven ues a re allegedly ensured at the expense of the transit of Russian goods, Loshchinin urged an enhanced economic position for Russia in the B altic states' energy, ban k ing, shipping, industries, and trade. 61

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F rom a government notorious for its own corruption, these are brazen accusations, as is the ever recur ring threat of sanctions, but they fit with Russia's coercive C IS and E uropean policies and precisely forecast the F ebruary 1997 statement. I ndeed, Russian leaders regularly charge the B altic and C IS states with mistreating local Russians and demand that the B altic states, U k raine, K aza kstan, etc., revise their domestic legislation, sur render ter ritory to R ussia, or gr a n t R ussia ns du al citizenship r igh ts a nd preferences li k e t hose of ex t r a-ter r i tor i a li t y, t he 19t h century's most visible sign of colonial rule. 62 Yet these policies are utterly irresponsible. As Russia is economically and militarily prostrate, such confrontational and hegemonic policies will inevitably trigger imperialism, ethnopolitical conflict, and even possibly protracted war, where Russia risks collapse. A lready by 1992, Russian gener a ls repor tedly rea lized t hei r B a l t ic posi t ion w as u n ten able, a nd t he a r my's cu r ren t condition r ules ou t invasion for a long time. 63 Yet while N A T O has no intention of invading or threatening Russia and its members are cu t t i ng t hei r defense spendi ng, R ussi a's a r m y open l y rehearses and discusses invasion scenarios directed at the B altic states, against quite incredible threat assessments. O r Russian spokesmen threaten to attack or target them with nuclear and conventional weapons. 64 T hough this k ind of posturing seems illogical, this has been the pattern for some time and reflects the ir responsibility of many of Russia's past policies in E urope. T h is neo-i mper i a l a n d coerci ve pol icy is rooted i n Russian domestic politics. Yeltsin's 1995 decree calling rei n tegr a t ion of t he C I S as a si ngle u n ified poli t ica leco n o m ic-m i l i t a r y sp ace a m a jo r s t a t e t a s k fo r a l l ministries, explicitly stated that one reason for this policy is to counter growing separatist trends within Russia itself. 65 P r i m a k o v f r e q u e n t l y r e i t e r a t es t h i s po i n t a n d i t s accompa nyi ng r a t ion ale, st a t i ng t h a t, despi te R ussi a's economic and military wea k ness, it must now pursue a great power policy based on its potential. Foreign policy must create the most favorable conditions for accomplishing 14

critical in ter n al policies such as safegu a rding R ussia's integrity and access to international organizations and mar kets. T hat great power policy is also the best policy for solving R ussia's cu r ren t a nd fu t u re problems, a nd for regaining its deserved status as one pole of the multipolar world against U .S. unipolar hegemony. 66 Consequently foreign policy should divert people from the difficult domestic situation by pursuing an imperial solution based on Russia's potential, not a sober evaluation of r e a l i t y . T h i s p r og r a m e n t a i l s R u ss i a 's s t r a t eg ic overextension as it poses as E urasia's gendarme with a free hand to quell unrest in its sanctioned sphere of influence. R u ssi a n fo rces m u s t t h e n be p e r p e t u a l l y s t a t ion e d throughout Russia's periphery in a vain effort to police it and impose Russia's authority there. 67 T his policy's ultimate logic means war. A nd, despite Russia's present wea k ness, it represents a pr i m a facie reason for Russia's neighbors to apply to N A T O. If this is Russia's program when prostrate, what will Moscow do if it recovers without countervailing forces to impede this grand design? C ritics of N A T O enlargement who ask where is the threat overlook this dimension of the issue. T hey fail to realize what N A T O Secretary General Javier Solana aptly stated, that potential new members seek membership for the same reason as did the old members. 68 N amely, they sought political guarantees and E uropean integration that included Germany. 69 Yet w hile t hey t h rea ten t he B al tic st a tes, R ussia n leaders loudly protest the growing threat from N A T O's enlargement. A dmiral F eli ks G romov, Commander in C hief of the N avy, wrote that the increased defense cooperation among B altic, N A T O, and Nordic states and pressures to demilitarize the K aliningrad M ilitary D istrict would leave t h a t dist r ict defe nseless, t h r e a te n R ussi a's m a r i t i me interests in the B altic Sea, and render it vulnerable to block ade. N A T O's en l a rgemen t t h rea tens K a l i n i ngr ad province which is cut off from Russia proper, vital Russian maritime interests, and E uropean stability. 70 T hus G romov wrote: 15

I t is naive to say that the approach of the [N A T O] bloc's armed forces tow a rd t he R ussi a n border will i ncrease a n ybody's security. Q uite the contrary, such an action will undermine any attempts to strengthen stability on the E uropean continent. T he ultimate aim of such consolidation of the above mentioned countries is clearly the limitation of Russia's influence in the region, t he secu r i ng of u n il a ter al poli t ical, economic, a nd military advantages and, as a result, crowding Russia out from the community of B altic states, limiting to the maximum its access to the B altic Sea, and possibly also revising the H elsin k i accords on the inviolability of the E uropean borders. 71

I ndeed, in Russian military writing on the B altic one finds a visible current of despair. A dmiral Yegorov, C I N C of the B altic F leet, observes that this fleet historically has been R ussi a's m ai n factor of st abili ty i n t he W ester n maritime direction. Today, Russia's vital interests in the B altic Sea are growing, but the economic-political-military situation is deteriorating. T he B altic F leet must play a political and deter rent role, but it is undergoing the same crisis as the rest of the N avy and cannot perform its function unless other, ground forces are placed under its direction. 72 Western analyses agree on this area's rising strategic p rofi le. Sweden's Sup reme Com m a nder, G ener a l O we W i k torin, stated:
More than 60 percent of Russia's strategic nuclear capacity, compared to 25 percent a couple of years ago, will now be deployed in the north. T he strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula brings, in its turn, a concentration of ground, sea, and air units to the area. H ence Scandinavia and Sweden will remain in the strategic limelight for a long time to come. I n this context, it is also appropriate to recognize that Sweden still constitutes a major [littoral state on] the B altic Sea. T he B altic for ms now , as i t h as for m a n y ce n t u r i es, a n econom ic intersection-zone. Sweden and Germany are the dominating powers around the B altic, neighboring Poland, the three fragile B altic states, Russia and the K aliningrad Oblast. T he B altic is Russia's gateway to the West and has, as such, increased in strategic importance. 73

Russian deployments confirm this assessment. T he Kola naval complex will become the northern and sole naval 16

nuclear bastion of the Russian fleet. L arge modernized air and naval forces will be deployed there to lend this fleet combat stability. Russias total forces in the B altic equal those of 1989 despite the end of the Cold W ar and the massive decline of Soviet armed forces. T he decision to m a i n t a i n t h ese d e p l o y m e n t s d es p i t e t h ose e v e n t s underscores the area's increased strategic significance for Moscow as it is now a front-line area. M any forces in K aliningrad are forward-deployed; and the C F E treaty's provisions for deploymen t i n t he fron t-li ne L en i ngr ad M ilitary D istrict were eased to allow more Russian forces t here. 74 E ver yone accepts t he B a l t ic's r isi ng st r a tegic centrality. Still, Russia's way of expressing its concerns misreads E uropean realities. Russia's leadership uniformly views N A T O as strictly an anti-Russian military alliance, ignores N A T O's substantial demilitarization, still sees E uropean security in terms of rival blocs pursuing zero-sum and antagonistic goals, willfully distorts N A T O's position on nuclear missiles, and greatly overrates Russia's power and position in E urope. Russian elites also have recourse to a diverse inventory of threats against the B altic states and E urope. 75 Russian elites often rattle their nuclear sabers, threatening to retarget the B altic and E uropean states if N A T O expands. 76 However, Russia's endless harangues of the B altic states for mistreating local Russians, constant threats of invasion, demands for revised borders, economic pressure, boycotts a nd sa nct ions, pl us depict ions of t he B a l t ic st a tes as essentially criminal enterprises, do not advance Moscow's or local Russians' interests. 77 T hese actions only increase distrust of local Russians, especially as local Russian groups are probably funded from Moscow. T hese threats fan B altic nationalism, intensify regional tensions and B altic states' fear of Russia, increase their governments' pressure to join N A T O, and alarm the West concerning Russian aims. Yet since these tactics constantly fail, they encourage a B altic belief t h a t Moscow is bluffing or ca n not ca r ry ou t its threats. 78 Nor do they lead the B altic states to abandon their 17

(perhaps misplaced) belief that ultimately the West will rescue them. Russia's futile policies only heighten regional tension, hindering the quest for regional solutions. T h us t hese policies diminish R ussia's secu rity, a nd would ma ke sense only if Moscow had determined that its interests required a high degree of controlled tension in t he B altic region. B u t such tension is wholly cou n terproductive to a Russia which needs peace above all. Russia's addiction to old thin k ing leads Moscow to ma ke threats and demands that cannot be carried out unless it risks its own stability along with that of the B altic states and E urope. Since Moscow cannot or will not distinguish among the threats it faces to create a national security program based on a h ier a rch y of rea l t h rea ts, i ts spok esmen i n vok e multiple, omnidirectional threats. I n fact, one of the most stri k ing tendencies of cur rent Russian security policy is the divorce between political and military realities. V ladimir Ivanov, of the I nstitute of World Economy and I nternational Relations and the U S A-C anada I nstitute, wrote that the 1993 defense doctrine showed that foreign policy cannot unquestionably be considered a factor that sets the context and requirements for the military policy of Russia. M ilitary policy and a doctrine of national interests based on it have moved to the forefront of Russian policy. 79 I nterests, goals, and real capabilities are disconnected in Russian policy. Moscow pursues unachievable goals while possessing a quasi-Soviet mindset of empire, universal threats to Russia, and cold war bipolarity. T his mindset is a recipe for disaster. R u ssi a's i nca p aci t y o r e v e n con sciou s r ef u s a l to recognize N A T O's changes since 1990 and current politicalm i l i t a r y c h a r a c t e r p e r p e t u a t e s o b so l e t e b l oc- l i k e approaches to E u ropea n secu r i t y. Con versa t ions w i t h Russian analysts often suggest that they would prefer a strict division of responsibilities or spheres of influence in E urope with the B altic on their side. T hey also harbor the notion that Russia alone, or as leader of the C IS, must have security equal to N A T O's but greater than every Central E uropean state's security. T hat is, Russia wants unequal 18

secu r i t y for i tself a t ever yone else's expense. 80 T hese discussions also reveal an unwillingness or refusal to come to grips with E uropean or international reality, a failing that has mar red Russian policy and is so perceived abroad. 81 Accordingly, R ussia will keep pressu ring t he B altic states to reestablish or invoke its hegemony. Certainly Moscow construed the refusal to ta ke these states into N A T O as a Russian victory and a base from which to proceed towards a redivided E urope. 8 2 Yet Moscow also k nows that it cannot conduct military adventurism in the B altic states that would provoke a protracted local, if not general E uropean, war. Moscow's foreseeable pressures on the B altic states are largely rhetorical, diplomatic, political, and economic to probe the limits of the possible and expand Russia's sphere of action. B ut if Russia recovers and N A T O and E uropean integration stagnates, we can expect more pressure on the region. Western concessions will trigger new dem a nds, not reconcili a t ion. Con versely, N A T O's resolution will more li kely force Russia to accept the status quo and the new reality. T hat conclusion will also positively benefit Russia's democratization because one factor that drives Russian p r ess u r e i s t h e a sce n d a n cy of t h e n a t io n a l i s t a n d Realpoliti k lobbies that will always raise the B altic issue, even when there are no grounds for doing so, to play to neoimperial lobbies and sentiment, and stifle reform. Both exForeign M inister Kozyrev and Zbigniew B rzezinsk i see that the opposition to N A T O represents the Nomen k latura's last ditch stand for domestic power by playing the xenophobic and imperial cards. 83 T his is happening now where the government, led by Yeltsin and Prima kov, repeatedly beats the drum of B altic oppression of Russians and possible threats to Russia if N A T O expands there. 84 M any elites also raise possible military threats to the B altic in this context. D ue to this failure to grasp reality, Moscow continues to pursue a unilateral hegemony in an area that cries for multilateral solutions. N A T O's enlargement shows us that the result of Russian policies is Moscow's steady loss of influence in E urope. Moscow's current capabilities cannot 19

be used to shape a Central and E astern E uropean security system. T hey remain essentially negative factors that can only disrupt, obstruct, or sabotage such framewor ks. T hus, Polish officials believe, on the basis of their conversations in Moscow, that Russia intends to interpret the Founding Act unilaterally and selectively, i.e., contrary to the spirit of the entire enterprise. 85 T he absence of viable Russian ideas for E uropean security underscores this failure to offer E urope a constructive policy. F oreign states can only view Russia's policies negatively. Russia, as presently constituted and governed, cannot conduct a measured E uropean policy proportionate to the real opportunities and threats in E urope and the B altic. Similarly, Russia's reck less nuclear and military threats, premeditated violation of treaties that it signed, e.g., the O S C E code of conduct in 1994 and the C hemical Weapons Convention, and its reversion to old thin k ing, offer E urope lit tle hope. R ussia today can not exercise enough selfde t e r r e nce or se l f-con t rol to r e assu r e i ts n e igh bors concerning its intentions and aims. T herefore, to stabilize the B altic, the West, including the littoral states, must constantly provide the deterrence and reassurance that Russia has rashly spurned. For this region to achieve true security, the West, broadly conceived, must ta ke up Russia's former system-shaping role in the B altic. T hus Russia's constant stream of threats, which cannot materialize, breeds precisely t he results it most fea rs. Moscow, still without realizing it, has obliged Sweden, F inland, Denmar k, Germany, Poland, and most of all the U nited States, to be fully occupied for a long time with ensuring ( de facto, if not de ju re) B altic stability. A ll these states are now jointly and collectively involved in providing soft security to the B altic. T hese programs, if not equal to military guarantees, represent a great change from 1990 and a major loss for Russia. Russia's bluster has precluded the B altic's neutralization. T he B altic states are now and will be an object of the West's lasting and detailed interest, Moscow's worst fear. B y creating constant tension, Moscow

20

h as foreclosed B al t ic neu t r ali ty or F i nl a ndiza t ion a nd undermined its own best interests. Yet, on the other hand, Western interests are not the same thing as a Western consensus. T he absence of a W ester n consensus on region a l issues cou ld crea te a security vacuum where many states seek a free ride on the U .S.' back, or the U nited States tries to pass the buck to its E uropean allies. We could then end up with a chain of buckpassing and free riding on other states where ultimately no state ta kes responsibility for protecting and stabilizing the area. 86 T hen the B altic states' worst fears, their involuntary pl acemen t w i t h i n a R ussi a n sp he r e of i nfl uence a n d vulnerability to Russia, might then ta ke place. Ger man y. G er m a n y's r isi ng power, geogr aph y, a nd h istor ica l connection to the B altic give it a large and growing role in shaping the region's future. 87 T herefore German power must be firmly anchored in E uropean security institutions w h ich const r a i n, ch a n nel, bu t a lso legi t i mize G er m a n policies. O nly U .S. power, manifested in N A T O, ma kes German power acceptable to E urope in security issues, just as t he E U 's i n ter n a t ion a l i n tegr a t ion m a k es G er m a n economic power acceptable across E urope. T his relationship must continue, for if N A T O does not expand, its, the U .S.' and the E U's power cannot then be deployed across E astern E urope, excluding the area from any security arrangement. Germany then might have to repeat its history of bilateral ar rangements with Russia despite other E uropean states' preferences. Were this k ind of relationship to ensue, Russia, due to its size and power, migh t come, in time, to be t he dominan t C en t r al and E astern E uropean military power in return for German economic hegemony. T he rest of E urope and the U nited States might then unite against German hegemony as before. To avert these antagonisms, k nown to historians as t he n igh t m a re of coali t ions, Bon n offici ally suppor ts N A T O and E U expansion so that its economic power will be

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fu lly accepted. A n u ndefi ned si t u a t ion i n t he E ast is anathema to Bonn which has repeatedly said that it will not be N A T O's eastern frontier. 88 E ither N A T O gives it security, or it has to ma ke a deal with Moscow for security. N A T O's a nd E U 's en l a rgemen t deter m i ne w het her unification augments rather than lessens and complicates G er many's secu rity. T his explains R u he's and K in kel's statements on the importance of the B altic states and region. T his logic also explains Germany's support for E U negotiations and agreements with the B altic and other C e n t r a l E u rope a n st a t es tow a r ds t h e i r e v e n t u a l incorporation into the E U . T heir E U membership would stabilize those states and create a tremendous outlet for German exports and investments. U ltimately, the E U's expansion will also give Germany an ever greater voice in the E U's future activities. 89 However, an equally compelling logic or danger, namely a r ev ision ist a n d dissa t isfied R ussi a, e n d a nge rs t h is approach. Just as Germany wants guarantees against all security problems from the E ast, Bonn also believes that Russia is the key to E ast E uropean and E uropean security. Nothing can or should be underta ken to unsettle Yeltsin's government. W ithout admitting it, Germany concedes to Russia a veto power on N A T O's further enlargement and is probably greatly relieved that Russia does not oppose B altic incorporation into the E U . German policy here continues the Ostpoliti k tradition that gave Moscow a veto on the extent and pace of Central and E astern E urope's internal and external transformation and led Bonn into some very unsavory policies vis-- v is E ast Germany and Communist Poland. 90 Consequently, whereas Germany formerly embraced a parallel strategy to bring Central E urope into N A T O and the E U at roughly the same time, the discovery of the region's diversity, of its high economic costs and burdens, of R ussi a's stou t opposi t ion to N A T O e n l a rge me n t a n d possibly E U's enlargement, divided and then paralyzed German policy. T his paralysis has led Bonn to abdicate its l e a d e r s h i p r o l e a n d s l o w t h e p r ocess of E u r op e a n 22

i n tegr a t ion. N ot su rpr isi ngly, ot her E U members li k e F rance and I taly also developed second thoughts even about E U expansion or B altic compliance with E uropean norms on minority policy. I nstead, it was U .S. pressure to enlarge N A T O and the E U that kept the momentum for enlargement going. 91 M uch of German hesitation sprang from Russian pressure, but it also was due to the fact that Prime M inister H elmut Kohl and K in kel worry much more about Russian reactions than does Ruhe, and they control the policy. T hus the B altic states cannot ta ke German advocacy for granted, even in the E U . A nd it is clear to most, if not all, observers that even if N A T O does expand eastward by 1999, E U will not follow suit at least until 2002 or 2003. 92 T he E U's capacity and will to expand remain dependent on N A T O's pressure for its expansion, as was seen in its mid1997 decision to begin accession tal ks with five new states: Pol a n d, H u nga r y , t h e C zech R ep u bl ic, E ston i a , a n d Slovenia. W ithout N A T O's decision to ta ke in three new members and U .S. pressure to expand the E U and not leave the B altics wholly in the cold, that decision would not have happened. If the E U and/or N A T O should nevertheless falter in their current enlargement plans, Central and E astern E uropean economic and security agendas could then become renationalized. T hat would mean a (probably t a c i t ) R u sso- G e r m a n b a r g a i n o v e r t h e a r e a t h a t substantially transforms the regional security picture. I n deed, t h is b a rga i n w i l l p rob a bl y occu r t h rough N A T O's charter, with Russia giving Moscow substantial oppor t u n i t ies for i nfl uenci ng or obst r uct i ng N A T O i n Central and E astern E urope, or a bilateral Russo-German agreemen t if t h a t alter n a tive fails. A ny fu t u re R ussoG e r m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n gs w o u l d n o t b e a M o l o t o v Ribben t rop agreemen t for w a r a nd for new ter r i tor ial aggrandizement along agreed spheres of influence, but would more li kely resemble the Russo-Prussian compacts of the 18th and 19th centuries. T hose accords mar ked out m u t u al spheres of in terest w here ter r i tor ies were not necessarily occupied but came under either state's tutelage. 23

I n deed, t h e F ou n d i ng A ct , u n de r G e r m a n p rodd i ng, proposes the following scheme to Russia: a new C F E treaty wi t h m uch lower ceili ngs i n t rea t y-li mi ted equ ipmen t (T L E), no conventional or nuclear forces on N A T O's new members' territory, formalized consultation in the N A T ORussian Joint Council on questions of E uropean security, a pledge to consult the Council should any of its members detect a threat to security, restraints on foreign and U .S. troops being stationed in Central E urope, and a promise t h a t N A T O wou ld not use force ou t of a rea i n peace operations without U . N . or O S C E approval, where Moscow has a veto, and cooperation towards joint operations on a case by case basis under the authority of the Security Council or the O S C E and where Combined Joint T ask F orces (C J T F ) are used, early joint participation in them. T here also were reports of a tacit moratorium on the next round of enlargement until at least 2005. 93 Most of these concessions to Russia's point of view were first suggested by Russia in 1995, only to be ta ken up by Germany and then contained in the Founding Act. 94 C learly this agreement casts a large shadow over Central and E ast E uropean security. O n the one hand N A T O is enlarging to the E ast and supposedly getting new missions which ma ke it a k ind of international peacekeeper or peacema ker. O n the other hand, E uropean states not in N A T O have to look elsewhere for self-defense. F rench sources wonder if the Joint Council is to ta ke precedence over the North A merican Council or serve as an appeals court for decisions rendered i n t h e N A C . A s F or m e r Secr e t a r y of S t a t e W a r r e n C hristopher and former Secretary of Defense W illiam Perry have recently written,
T he alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's rea li t y: t he da nger to t he secu r i t y of i ts members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory... . T he security concerns of most countries of E astern E urope and the former Soviet U nion will be addressed outside the context of N A T O membership. 95

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G iven this expansion of the missions to be ascribed to N A T O, it is hardly surprising that critics of the Founding Act a lso ch a rge t h a t i t sign a ls N A T O's f u n d a men t a l transformation from an alliance for the collective defense of its members to a collective or cooperative security system. 96 As international relations theory well recognizes, this is the easiest security system in the world to brea k. 97 T his h a rdly seems the way to advance small E uropean states' security or moder a te a nd deter R ussia n adven t u rism. Yet t his ou tcome clea rly coincides wit h bot h G er ma n a nd U .S. preferences as stated below. A nd, if this system does brea k down and no longer legitimizes German power throughout E urope, open spheres of influence and bloc politics become the only possible alternatives. If anything, N A T O and E U expansion represent the least contentious, if not wholly satisfactory, formula for E urope. T he other alternative would be no security system east of Germany. Obviously we cannot wholly surmount E urope's Cold W ar division into rival and greatly differen t i a ted m ili t a r y-poli t ica l-econom ic-cu l t u r a l blocs i n a single step. 98 B ut any new division outside of the E U and N A T O only creates security vacuums, spheres of influence, blocs, and a wea ker U .S. ability or will to lead in E urope. F or the B altic states, then, Germany's policy failure came as something of a betrayal though they cannot and will not say so openly. I n 1992, partly because Russian troops were still in Germany, Germany and its l aender (federal governments) were eager to participate in B altic multilateral ventures aiming at economic and political security. T hese ventures also involved and showed good faith to Moscow. Officials stated that integration projects inhibited potential regional nationalist outbrea ks and eased fears a bo u t G e r m a n n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e y u n d e r s t ood t h a t integrating German power in a larger project was the only way to ma ke it palatable. 99 B ut by early 1994, Ruhe tal ked about involving Nordic states in E uropean security, thereby reducing Bonn's burden. W hile he stressed that the West must help Russia ma ke correct decisions, Russia had to ma ke them. 100 25

K in kel, already in 1993, saw the B altic as a hinge to Russia that could draw it into cooperation and integration. R egion a l econom ic success wou l d m i t iga t e M oscow's hegemonic tendencies. A lthough policyma kers understood and sympathized with the B altic states' plight, they rejected ideas of barricading the region against Russia. B altic economic success, helped by Germany, would attract a revivi ng R ussi a i n to cooper a t ive rel a t ionsh ips, easi ng Bonn's burden of helping to structure regional relationships. Bonn expected only peaceful scenarios. O nce F inland and Sweden joined the E U , it would focus on free trade agreements with the B altic states and common security p rog r a ms. S i nce R ussi a d i d not t h e n op pose B a l t ic membership in the E U , that would help cement peaceful ties between them and Russia and be the main instrument for E u rope a n secu r i t y. Bon n a lso a dvoca t ed meldi ng Russian and N A T O peace operations and forces that did not infringe on N A T O's A rticle 5 and lin ked E urope, Russia, and the U nited States. 101 As C laus Genrich reported,
According to German ideas, Russia should be able to discern f rom a p rom isi ng developmen t of t he B a l t ic st a tes, t h a t cooperation is apt to be more effective than hegemony and del i m i t a t ion. Bon n h as fu l l u n derst a n di ng for t he B a l ts' security concerns. However, Germany is seek ing to awa ken B altic consciousness of the fact that they cannot obtain security against Russia. German B altic policy might describe how the mode of thought emphasizing influence and power categories could be replaced by cooperation and reciprocal lin ks. Russians would then realize that a prosperous B altic region might well act as the propelling force for the development of their own count ry. . . . Bon n's diplom acy aims in t al ks wit h R ussia n pa r t ners to preclude any suspicion that, by promoting B altic interests, Germany intends to isolate Russia. T he Bonn people say that it is one of the duties of an advocate to counsel his client. I t is therefore appropriate to persuade the B alts to discard the idea t h a t t h e y n eed to t h row u p for t i f ica t ions aga i nst t h e i r neighbors. I nitia tives towa rd t he st abiliza tion of rela tions between the B altic countries and Russia represent the only

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promising method for outsiders to give a mar ket economic impetus to Russian border regions. T he gradual equalization of l i v i ng st a n d a r ds on bot h si des of t h e bor de r is t h e i n d i sp e n s a b l e p r e r e q u i s i t e fo r a p e r m a n e n t l y u se f u l relationship.102

W hile Russia has not yet learned this lesson, the B alts' consciousness has been raised, or their arms twisted. Yet this logic and the premise that Russia is the most important state to E uropean security has driven German policy and paralyzed Germany's overall E uropean policy. A ny view assuming that Russia must be placated before E urope can be secure inevitably gives Moscow a veto over E uropean stabilization and encourages its obstructionist tactics. 103 T hat policy delays Central and E astern E urope's stabilization, too easily tempts Russian elites to keep playing at empire, and hinders E uropean integration. German relations to the B altic demonstrate this process. B y 1994 K in kel urged Russian troops to leave the B altic (which they did that summer), and both Russia and the B altic states to ma ke mutual overtures concerning the R u ss i a n m i n o r i t i es. H e a l so a d voc a t e d f u t u r e f u l l membership for the B altic states in the E U and an overall security strategy based on cooperation where the B altic states and region were mediators and role models between E ast and West, but not N A T O members. 1 0 4 H e rejected all tal k of special Russian relationships in the C IS, but has yet to outline an active strategy against it. 105 B altic elites soon gr asped his policy. W hereas many E stonians, in 1991, viewed Germany as a country that could neutralize Russian pressure against E stonia, by 1994 nobody believed that G e r m a n y wou ld r isk i ts p a r t ne rsh ip w i t h R ussi a for E stonia's sa ke. 106 B y 1995 Ruhe advised L atvia not to seek security only along the Poland-Germany axis, but also to seek integration with E urope by cooperating with the Nordic countries. 107 A lthough he insisted that Russia must also compromise with the West, he indicated that Germany had, more than any other country, sought to integrate Russia and had made concessions (implicitly unilateral ones) to its viewpoint. H e 27

told the B altics there must be no gray areas in E urope. Germany sought security arrangements that included them a nd R ussi a. M ea n w h ile t he B a l t ic st a tes shou ld k eep pursuing E U membership. I n other words, they should not rely so much on N A T O, but on E U and Scandinavia, policies that Germany supported. 108 I n deed, i n m i d-1995 t h e B a l t ic st a t es sign ed t h e E uropean agreements with the E U , ostensibly putting them on the road to the E U . K in kel echoed Ruhe's remar ks and publicly stated that the changes needed to qualify for the E U will modernize and strengthen the B altic states and m a k e t hei r refor ms i r reversible. Moreover, t he B a l t ic security architecture will not be at their expense nor should the region be a gray area in E urope. Regional security demands cooperative structures. 109 W hile Germany also took part in B altic PfP and naval exercises and helped train the B altic B attalion (B altbat) and L atvian officers; K in kel apparently told L ithuania and L atvia in A ugust 1995 that B altic entry into N A T O was not on the agenda and could only be considered after Poland entered. B y 1996, German policy bent further toward Moscow. Kohl openly opposed anything that might annoy Russia. H e attacked W ashington for raising the issue in an election year (as if democratic debate should be banned). T his would t hen reverber a te i n Moscow, p resu m abl y to Y el tsi n's detriment. H e emphasized E U's (i.e., Germany's) trade with Russia as a factor leading to its integration and implicitly as a factor wor k ing against the B altics. 110 A t the annual Wehr k unde conference, Kohl repeated the need to cooperate with Russia, urging a special N A T O-Russia accord that could become the core of E urope's security architecture. 111 B y M ay 1996, K in kel's public opposition to B altic entry into N A T O due to the Russian factor became clear, but he also now believed these states would not enter into the E U anytime soon, because each leading member had its own special protege. W hen Germany would mention Poland, H u nga r y , or t h e C z ech R ep u b l ic, F r a nce wou l d ci t e Romania. 112 K in kel's argument here overlooked the equally strong domestic opposition among E U member states to any 28

expansion that would reduce the subsidies that key sectors of t h e i r i n d ust r i es ge t f rom t h e E U , or force ot h e r unwelcome reforms upon them. T hese obstacles have held E U enlargement hostage to domestic lobbies. German policy further crystallized during 1996. E stonia reported that Germany seemed hobbled by domestic and foreign policy factors, i.e., Russia, but that Kohl was well disposed towards the B altic states' security agenda. Still, t hei r si t u a t ion w as not t h rea ten i ng enough to crea te German support for their entry into N A T O, especially given the Foreign M inistry's coolness towards the idea. Ruhe had to tell them that they would not get in before 2000. A nd since N A T O expansion will not occur before 1999, this now means that they will not get into N A T O or probably the E U until 2002 or 2003.113 N o r i s N A T O l i k e l y t o t a k e t h e m i f t h r e a t s do materialize. A n alliance afraid to ta ke new members lest they be threatened will not defend them when the threat appears. T hus the B altic states are now resigned to German opposition to their rapid entry into N A T O. B ut they are visibly impatient and even angry because they feel that without Germany they lack a strong partner. As Sweden and F inland are in no hur ry to join N A T O, the B altic states lack friends at court to press their cause while Russian hostility remains high and constant. 114 A lthough in 1996 K in kel claimed to see all three states as a single strategic unit, he still opposed their entry into N A T O. N A T O enlargement should not create division lines or gray zones. B ut he did support their future entry into the E U. 115 Ruhe now cited the B altic states' importance, but emphasized the need for a charter with Russia, soft security s u c h a s i n t e r - m i l i t a r y coo p e r a t i o n of a b i l a t e r a l , multilateral, or P F P nature, and the B altic Council where all the littoral states participate. H e urged a cooperative E u ropea n system i ncl u di ng R ussi a, bu t a lso st ressed balancing that with strong T ransatlantic cooperation. H e emphasized that the B altic PfP should be given a stronger regional focus where Sweden and F inland would lead in coordinating a k ind of B altic bloc or security community. 116 29

B ut Sweden and F inland reject this solution, precisely because they and the B altic states then confront Russia directly while Germany remains aloof and enjoys a free ride. If F inland and Sweden led in forming a B altic or Nordic bloc that could be seen as a counter to Russia, that would violate the cardinal point of both states' policy: never to confront Russia directly alone and if either or both state/s must do so, they must have ironclad guarantees from real allies. I n such a B altic bloc, Bonn gains because others confront Russia on its behalf and provide a semblance of regional security, while it bears no major responsibility for g u a r a n t ee i n g F i n l a n d a n d S w ede n a g a i nst R ussi a n retaliation. As K arl L ammers, F oreign Policy Spokesmen of t he r u li ng C h r ist i a n D emocr a t ic U n ion fact ion i n t he B undestag, recently said,
T he question is what role the B altic states can play both for Russia and the E U . T hey can be a bridge to E urope for Russia. T his would have to be made clear through trilateral cooperation. As long as N A T O does not guarantee the B altic states' security directly, it could be the task of the E U and the two nonaligned cou n t r ies, Sweden a nd F i n l a nd, to h ave a secu r i ty policy i n f l u e nce on t h a t r egion . I n t egr a t ed E u rope a n m i l i t a r y structures could be developed, modeled on the E urocorps, in which the B altic states could participate in a suitable way.117

Germany clearly wants to push the burden of dealing with Russia in the B altic onto Sweden and F inland for whom not confronting Russia directly is a basic precept of policy. T hat Germany supports such an alternative only reflects the extent of German buckpassing and free riding while it tries to expand its security at the expense of its B altic and Nordic partners. F rom the foregoing, it is clear that all the concessions made by N A T O to Russia since 1994 display Germany's desire to have its ca ke and eat it too. B y late 1996, German offici a ls were compet i ng a mong t hemsel ves to dev ise concessions t hey could give R ussia. K in kel lobbied for putting Russia in a stronger position vis--vis N A T O in tal ks on security policy cooperation. H is ministry asserted

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t h a t R ussi a wou l d accep t N A T O e x p a nsion beca use Moscow's protests were mainly for domestic consumption. To show Russia that N A T O expansion would not produce g r a y z o n e s o r n e w d i v i s i o n s , h e o f f e r e d R u ss i a n participation in a joint N A T O-Russia consultative security committee of 17, or S-17. 118 N A T O and R ussia would con d uct i nst i t u t ion a l i zed consu l t a t ions on issu es of d isa r m a m e n t a n d non-p rol i fe r a t ion of a r ms of m ass dest r uct ion, peace k eepi ng measu res, a nd a ll issues of mutual interest. I t should be noted that this foretold the language of the F ounding Act which creates the N A T ORussian Council and a whole structure of bilateral contacts throughout the N A T O organization with free rein to discuss all issues of mutual interest. 119 I n tune with his beliefs stated above, he argued that these concessions are needed for Russian domestic politics. More committees on this S-17 pattern would be formed at all levels of N A T O's military hierarchy, placing Russia throughout N A T O, where it could effectively influence N A T O decisionma k ing or threaten to use its veto in the Joint Council. Bon n also suppor ts join t crisis-managemen t in t he E uro-A tlantic security space, i.e., Russian involvement in the Combined Joint T ask Force arrangement, presumably replicating S F O R in Bosnia where Russia accepted N A T O's command. (B ut Moscow would be loath to do so elsewhere in E urope). 120 T his would mean Russian liaison staffs at the W E U , as well as at B russels and S A C L A N T's Norfol k, V A, headquarters, which is to be the center for future crisis operations. 121 A nd it is the basis for the N A T O-Russian mechanism that was agreed to at the H elsin k i summit and the Founding Act. T han ks to this agreement, Russia gains a formalized voice and right of participation in many, if not all of N A T O's deliberations. Russian spokesmen from Yeltsin down insisted that the H elsin k i summit and the Founding Act gave them a veto over N A T O's activities outside of its current remit, i.e., anything east of Germany and especially the C IS, without which the whole enterprise is meaningless. Si nce N A T O de n ies t h is u n de rst a n di ng t h a t M oscow continues to reiterate, the sources of future tension are already apparent. 122 31

F i n a l l y , R u h e p roposed t h a t no N A T O t roops be stationed on the territory of new N A T O members and that ot her concessions should also be m ade as R ussi a h as dem a nded. 123 T h is suggest ion pa r a l leled t h a t of K a r l L ammers, a high ran k ing member of the ruling C hristian D e mocr a t ic p a r t y's P a r l i a m e n t a r y f act ion , t h a t on l y E uropean troops be stationed in a N A T O Polish force, whose si ze wou ld be de t e r m i ned by agr eeme n ts on a r ms limitations. Since L ammers believed the threat to Russia is U .S. forces, he implied that N A T O (i.e., Germany) and Russia would jointly decide the practical extent of regional security. I t is necessary to seek an expansion that would be acceptable to Russia. 124 I t would be interesting to see what would happen in a real crisis, since few if any member states want to spend money for modernizing N A T O's forces. 125 B y January 1997, German sources hinted at a deal formally to exclude the B altic states from membership for 510 ye a rs i n r e t u r n for R ussi a n accep t a nce of N A T O expansion. K in kel again hinted at possible E U membership for E stonia alone (t he st rongest B altic economy), even though this undermines his previous concept of those states' strategic unity and fosters a further erosion of regional solidarity. 126 A nd since the Founding Act, matters have become still clearer. I n June 1997, Junior Foreign M inister H elmut Schaefer, spea k ing in Moscow, publicly called for a halt to N A T O expansion after the first round lest a hurt and wounded Russia be further antagonized. H e observed that Russian officials' strong opposition to N A T O's enlargement had been u nexpected and frigh tening. T herefore, he con tin ued, After the first round, we should thin k about a security system for the whole of E urope before more harm is done. . . . I warn all those in Germany who, out of jingoism, want to ta ke all sorts of countries into the alliance. 127 For his part, K in kel now says that the B altic states objectively find themselves in a certain risk situation. Accor di ngl y, E u ro-A t l a n t ic secu r i t y st r uct u res shou ld devise ways of drawing them closer without their acquiring a special status through bilateral agreements (i.e., special 32

agreements with the U nited States to circumvent their exclusion from N A T O) that might impede their futu re admission. W hile N A T O should unequivocally restate (as it did in Rome in 1991) that its security is inseparably bound u p w i t h t h a t of a l l E u rope, a n d i ts su ppor t for a l l democratic E uropean states, including the B altic states, they still should not come closer to N A T O membership. 128 E ven though German businessmen now warn about the danger of a B altic gray zone, and there are those who support guarantees for the B altic states, this is not to happen anytime soon. 129 Consequently, he offered a 12point program even in 1996 along the lines stated here which fits with the recognition of Russian interests as embodied in the Founding Act and the tr a nsform ation of N A T O into a col lective secu r ity system wh ich nonetheless reta i ns its a utonomy . I ndeed, K in kel continues to maintain that Germany regards itself as the advocate of bringing the reformed new states closer to T ransatlantic and E uropean institutions. 130 Repor tedly t he B al t ic st a tes, w ho h ad li t t le choice anyway, were happy to see Germany's and N A T O's concern for their welfare, but were clearly interested in getting N A T O to commit itself as much as possible to a second round where they might enter N A T O. W hile this is the implied U .S. position, it cannot be said for sure if this is Germany's position, given Schaefer's outburst and K in kel's ambiguity a n d a mbi v a lence. 131 A n d beca use t he N A T O-R ussi a n Council will surely have to confront this issue, we can expect more contentiousness over the B altic and a disunited N A T O as well. B ut logical consistency does not seem to matter in a German policy composed equally of fear, appeasement of Russia, drift, and ambivalence about E uropean security. I n deed, obse r v e rs i n B on n r epor t t h e gov e r n m e n t's uneasiness over the prospect of a public debate over its policy and N A T O's enlargement, something that Germany desper ately needs. 132

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Ger man Policy, the E U an d N A T O: T he C hallenge for the U n ited States. C learly Germany, E urope's strongest state and potential advocate for t he B altic states, has defaulted on t hem. A lthough it seeks an expanded PfP for the B altic to blur the distinction between membership and nonmembership in N A T O, the all-important guarantee, signifying that E urope will resist threats to these states' independence, integrity, or sovereignty, is lack ing. A nd Bonn will choose Moscow over the B altic states. German policy evidently cannot t r a nscend geogr aphy, its ingr ained h abit of look ing to Moscow as well as to Paris and W ashington, and the notion that E astern E urope is a liability or source of danger, not an op po r t u n i t y . I t s pol ici es a lso se e m t o be b a se d o n fundamental misconceptions. Russia's opposition to N A T O is not purely for domestic consumption. As Prima kov has said, Russia opposes N A T O e n l a r ge m e n t i n p r i n ci p l e , i r r esp ect i v e of w h a t e v e r arguments are made for it. 133 N A T O's enlargement unites Russia's elites in a competition where each faction seeks to outdo each other in its opposition to N A T O, while the public basically remains apathetic. Nor can economic cooperation, concessions, and soft security alter Moscow's policy toward the B altic. Q uite the contrary, Moscow only interprets these as a green light for further pressure regionally and in E u rope as a w hole. I ndeed, Moscow h as steadily a nd successfully raised the ante once it grasped N A T O's inner hesitations and divisions. Nor does R ussian policy rely so much on economic b l a n d ish m e n ts. G e r m a n y see ms to h a v e ov e r loo k ed Russia's policy as described above and the fact that under Western pressure B altic policy has shifted, if grudgingly, while Moscow's stance has become tougher as it senses Western irresolution and confusion, exactly the opposite of what it predicted. G iving Russia a veto over N A T O's future enlargement or activities inside the C IS or the B altic, or the B a l k a n s d o e s n o t e n d M osco w 's r e v i s i o n i s m a n d unilateralism.

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Russia's insistence on a free hand in integrating the C IS creates a line of demarcation, as in the C aucasus. H ere Moscow does what it accuses N A T O of doing as it returns to T ur key's border. F urthermore, while it many not be fashionable to admit this, Russia, not N A T O, started drawing the lines by its own n eo- i m p e r i a l a c t i o n s i n t h e C I S a n d i n c r e a s i n g l y antidemocratic policies, both beginning in 1993. Russia's t h rea ts to U k r ainia n a nd B altic sovereign ty, dema nds concerning borders and the Russian d i aspor a , imperial policies in T ranscaucasia and Central Asia, its support for coups in A zerbaijan, its coercive use of military force to compromise the integrity of Georgia and its sovereignty, and to force A rmenia and Georgia to give it permanent bases did in advance what it claims N A T O would do by moving E ast. Russia did all this on the boundary of a N A T O member, T ur key . 134 Germany cannot create cooperative security regimes wit hou t gr ay zones a nd lines of division while R ussia successfully insists on such lines for itself, a neo-colonialist hegemony over the C IS, and a E urope where some states enjoy secu rity guar antees but others do not. I n effect, Germany urges others ta ke the lead in the B altic and ta ke risks that it will not assume for itself even within N A T O and the E U . I t refrains from ta k ing an active position even inside these organizations where its power is strong, but bounded, apparently seek ing the benefits of buckpassing, f r ee r idi ng, a n d consor t i ng w i t h eve r yone. I ts pol icy represents a vain effort to reconcile Russia's veto on N A T O, a strong transatlantic connection, and equal security for all or even part of Central and E astern E urope. F u r t h e r mo r e , t h e r e l i a nce o n t h e E U is u t t e r l y unfounded. If N A T O will not act, neither will the E U . B russels resents N A T O and W ashington's pressure that it fulfill its supposed historic responsibility of integrating E astern E urope, while N A T O shir ks this task but claims it is act i ng u nder U .S. leadersh ip to move i n to C en t r a l E urope. T he E U will not be rushed by some U .S. timetable, offici a l or not . N ei t h e r w i l l i t e asi l y a me n d i ts ow n 35

procedures of minute observations of candidates' every a t t r ibu te before act i ng. T he E U will m a k e object ive judgments," not political ones. Nor will the E U be rushed into ma k ing a decision that might jeopardize it, or the B altic states, even if E stonia is now a candidate for future E U membership. 135 A deeper examination of the E U's record and its futile quest for a E uropean Security and Defense Identity ( E S D I) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (C F SP) shows G er m a ny's fa u l ty judgmen t. J acques D elors, t he E U 's former Secretary-General and architect of the M aastricht T reaty, wrote in his memoirs that he never believed E urope could obtain the C F SP. 136 T he E U's leading members lack the will, the resources, the commitment, or the unity of approach to craft and enforce a coherent Central E uropean policy. As H ans van den B roek, the E U Commissioner for ex ter n a l rel a t ions w i t h C en t r a l a n d E aster n E u rope, recen t ly sa id, Sh api ng t he fu t u re of E u rope is more important than preparing the accession of new members to the E U . 137 I t is quixotic to rely on the E U to bail out N A T O and ma ke it bear the burden of the B altic. T hat just means that N A T O passes the buck to the E U in search of a free ride. A nd even if the E U does admit those states, that would not happen for at least 5-6 years. A nyone familiar with the E U's inability to agree on foreign and defense policy cannot be optimistic. Just as F rance, Germany, and G reat B ritain seem i ncap able of agreemen t on foreign a n d defense policies, Bonn cannot ma ke the political decisions it should be ma k ing. W hile Bonn's acceptance of Russia's d roit de rega r d (right of supervision) of E astern and Central E urope is appeasement, it is appeasement to secure selfish but hidden German interests suppose dly in E urope's name. I t also is appeasement in the hope of a future hegemony through E uropean security agencies and an accord with Russia over Central E urope. 138 A pparently Germany, as Schaefer suggested above, will also reject any future B altic m e m be rsh i p i n N A T O to a p pe ase R ussi a . 1 3 9 F r ase r C ameron of the E uropean Commission concluded that, 36

Sitting on the fence may at times be uncomfortable, but it is the prefer red German position. T hus Germany is in favor of widening and deepening the E U ; of enlarging to the east and to t he sou t h; of e n l a rgi ng N A T O a n d see k i ng a st r a t egic p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h R u ssi a ; of s t r e n g t h e n i n g W E U a n d N A T Obut not increasing its defense budget.140

Conclusions for N A T O an d the U n ited States. C lea r ly, if t he U n i ted St a tes does not lead i n t he for ma tion of a B altic (a nd E u ropea n) secu rity system, nobody else will. I nstead, other states will ma ke deals without us, against our interests, and E urope's overall security. A lthough Poland, F inland, Denmar k, and Sweden have made important contributions towards soft security in the B altic, they cannot assume the unilateral or even joint burden of directly confronting Russia in the B altic without N A T O's firm support. T his, too, may be buckpassing, but at least it derives from history and real power realities. T hese states need great power commitments to transcend their present levels of activity. I n the B altic, W ashington must balance against Moscow's imperial tendencies and Bonn's inclination to appease them. I ndeed, W ashington has already underta ken numerous regional initiatives dating back to helping Russia withdraw its troops from the B altic in 1994. I t has led the way to an integrated regional air traffic control system, the basis for ex tendi ng N A T O's a i r defense system east w a rd. T h is system goes beyond proposals for subregion al secu rity guarantees or associations, where the Nordic countries ta ke the lead. A nd there also are specific agreements with major West E uropean states in areas li ke air defense, specifically identification of friend or foe (I F F ). 141 U .S. pol icy a l r e a dy t r a nsce n ds p u r el y r egion a l or subregion al sol u t ions to region al issues a nd is deeply i n volved w i t h B a l t ic secu r i t y progr a ms. F or i nst a nce, P r esi de n t C l i n ton's d iscussions w i t h S w ed ish P r i m e M inister Goeran Persson, in A ugust 1996, revealed much abou t bot h st a tes' policies a nd led C lin ton to suppor t Sweden's five-point B altic policy. 142 E ven earlier, Swedish 37

Foreign M inister Lena H jelm-W allen reiterated Swedish support for B altic membership in the E U because only thus will their voices be heard. W hile Sweden cannot guarantee t h e i r secu r i t y i n N A T O , i t s u p po r t s t h e i r r i g h t t o membership if enlargement does not occur at the expense of those states who are not admitted or do not wish to be admitted to N A T O. T hese states, li ke Sweden, must gain chances for more cooperation with N A T O. 143 Sweden also believes that B altic membership in the E U will promote regional cooperation with Russia, and help the B altic states conduct generous minority policies. 144 T his line of reasoning differs from Bonn's past policy which does not seem to tie B altic membership in the E U to better treatment of Russian mi nor i t ies, bu t appa ren t ly r a t her reverses t h a t order. Swedish officials hinted they might use their veto power in the E U to this end because they fear a nightmare scenario where everyone else ta kes a free ride and F inland and Sweden must face the burdens and risks. I n this scenario N A T O exp a n ds i n C en t r a l E u rope, R ussi a n p ressu re against the B altics grows, the U nited States cuts back its E uropean role, and E U enlargement only encompasses Central E urope and ties up that organization. 145 T he risks in B altic admission to the E U are that the E U then must give some sort of guarantee, if only a soft security one, to the B altic states. E verything shows that it is unwilling to admit them or give them a real commitment. T he B altic states, Sweden, and F inland would be left in the lurch. 146 T h e r efor e, P e rsson's f i v e-poi n t p l a n e n v ision ed a broader regional program. Sweden will:

I ncrease existing bilateral cooperation in economics, and in environmental and energy policy with the B altic states. E xpand regional cooperation within the framewor k of the B altic Sea Council. Support E U enlargement to include the B altic states. President C linton announced his support for this as well. 38

E xpand the PfP role in the B altic and convey B altic states' desire to join N A T O. Since W ashington ruled t h is desi r e ou t , i t w as h a pp y to su ppor t t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p i n E U a n d t o p r e ss u r e t h e E U accordingly. Stress direct dialogue with Russia. 147

President C linton supported this program and was pleased that Sweden was adopting a regional leadership role. 148 W ashington also supported establishing a regional PfP headquarters in Sweden for peacekeeping operations. H owever, these discussions also revealed distu rbing facts about the U .S. position on the more general E uropean secu r i t y issues. Swedish jou r n a lists a lso lea r ned t h a t W ashington wants the PfP program to resemble N A T O as much as possible and N A T O to appear increasingly as a collect ive secu r i t y orga n iz a t ion. 149 I n t h a t case, t hese officials argued, A rticle 5 of the W ashington T reaty, calling for collective self-defense, will be seen as a last resort. Since PfP and N A T O both call for consultations under A rticle 4, if consultation wor ks, we will never have to use A rticle 5. 150 T he effort to renounce or depreciate A rticle 5 was shouted from a megaphone. Sweden heard U .S. concerns that the E U does not w a n t to exp a n d a n d h as l i t t le secu r i t y relevance, while the I F O R in Bosnia was already a regional peacekeeping force. 151 O ne Swedish diplomat said that a senior U .S. official told him that N A T O was a force for cooperation for collective security rather than collective defense. A rticle 5 was an asset more for the credibility for the political superstructure than something that it actually could be necessary to use. 152 I n the U .S. view, PfP forces will ultimately resemble N A T O's forces and gain assignments to do peace operations, h u m a n i t a r i a n i n te r ven t ion, a n d confl ict m a n agemen t w i t h i n t he fr a mewor k of t he W E U 's 1992 Petersberg Agreement. Sweden could participate in those operations a nd cooper a te wi t h N A T O w hile ret ai ni ng i ts cu r ren t defense profile. 153 W ashington also supports building up an

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E S D I only within N A T O. 154 Sweden and F inland could then be models of civilian control and decisionma k ing for future members' armed forces and cooperate with N A T O through the PfP. T heir nonalignment calms Russia and shows the B a l t ics t h a t N A T O is not t h e on l y roa d to secu r i t y. W ash i ngton aspi res to recip roca l membersh ip for a l l members of the E U and N A T O where an E S D I is in N A T O, not a moribund W E U . 155 T hese statements of U .S. policy fully conform to U .S. efforts to depict N A T O enlargement as a major step in the transformation of N A T O and, more broadly, of E uropean s e c u r i t y i n t o a coo p e r a t i v e o r co l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y arrangement rather than a purely mutual security alliance for collective defense as it has been until now. Certainly they comport with the statement by C hristopher and Per ry above. N A T O's enla rgemen t is also t he cor nerstone of E uropean democratization, and the enlargement of mar ket democratic states is a fundamental element of a national security program of democratic enlargement. 156 W hile t he new members may crave the guarantee of A rticle 5 of the W ashington T reaty, W ashington evidently believes that in t he new E u rope, A r ticle 5 will not be needed because collective security will reign within N A T O and cooperative secu r i t y t h rou g hou t E u rop e. A s S ecr e t a r y of S t a t e M adeleine A lbright has stated, enlargement ma kes it more li kely that A merican forces will not have to be used in E urope. T his was the point made by H enry K issinger in his critique of the Founding Act and the H elsin k i summit, but what he failed to grasp is that this appears to be the conscious intention the allies, specifically Germany and the U nited States. 157 K in kel openly spea ks of the N A T O area and E urope as one of collective security, and the U nited S t a tes, from P residen t C l i n ton on dow n, sel ls N A T O enlargement, not as a military-defensive alliance but as a project for the enlargement of democracy and integration, and almost a trade policy. 158 F or example, a State Department paper presented in A pril 1997 to the I I I A nnual Convention of the Association for the Study of N ationalities, an academic organization 40

devoted to studying ethnic issues in Central and E astern E urope, stated,

T he countries of our region [Central E urope] can become modernized only through integration; thus our N A T O agenda is based essentially not on geopolitical considerations but on the desire to get integrated. . . B y enlarging N A T O, we want to prevent wars, not to win them. 159

Secretary of State A lbright duly invokes a productive p a r a dox t h a t a l l ege d l y op e r a t es h e r e. N A T O is a n instrument of preventive diplomacy in that the further it advances, the less risk there is that it will be needed. 160 T herefore, N A T O members ca n all demilit a rize safely. T hreat scenarios involving N A T O members will not arise. T he classical concept of collective security where all parties are presumed in advance to share a common belief on the origin, nature of, and appropriate response to crises and a gg r ess i o n i s pos t u l a t e d a s a f a i t a cco m p l i . T h u s consultation under A rticle 4 will suffice when some crisis happens. T he hard cases are finessed away through a response made up in equal parts of hope, wishful thin k ing, a neo-W i lson i a n ideology, a nd t he u nproven bel ief t h a t Russia is a democratic partner of the U nited States who accepts a new U .S.-led alliance system in E urope. Obviously Russian realities do not conform to this belief system. Russia's revisionism is incompatible with the U .S. vision of a neo-W ilsonian collective security. W hat happens then to the hard security issue, i.e., collective defense? W ho ensures that the B alts or anyone else are not left in a Russian sphere or limbo? W ho helps defend against attack or subversion? A nd what happens if they are threatened? T he implicit premise is that in the event of a threat everyone will consult under A rticle 4 and/or the Partnership for Peace protocols and agree on a response. B ut if they do not agree, what then? If consultation under A rticle 4 does not wor k, or, more li kely, ends up with inter-allied divisions as in Bosnia, then allied action, whether it occurs under A rticle 5 or some other article of N A T O's key documents becomes irrelevant. A llied discord would preven t action u nder a ny a r ticle,

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A rticles 4 or 5, or the PfP accords gaining nothing for the B altics or anyone else who feels threatened. Moreover, authoritative Russian commentators k now fully well that the allies will not wish to provoke a political confrontation, let alone a major crisis, with Russia over the B altics. T hus they believe that Russia will have a de facto veto in the new Council, even if nobody there wanted to plead Russia's case. However, Germany and F rance will not let the U nited States act unilaterally too often, and, if they do, the Council will then brea k down into a stalemate once Russia vetoes anything against its interests. I ndeed, Russians are already complaining that its first meeting showed that N A T O really intends to disregard Russia and its interests. 161 Russia's upcoming emplacement in N A T O, its determination to use the new agreements in a unilateral manner, the vacillations of our allies, many of whom are apparently ready to plead R ussi a's case, a nd N A T O's pa lpable unwillingness to confront hard military questions such as p a y i n g fo r d e f e n se m od e r n i z a t i o n , m a k e t h ese a l l t roublesome issues t h a t we a re st i l l not confron t i ng. Russia's presence in N A T O via the Council only enhances i ts i ncen t i ves a nd oppor t u n i t ies to i nci te a nd fomen t divisions among members. Moscow will not find it hard to obstruct a coherent N A T O reply to its efforts to expand its sphere of i nfl uence beca use W ester n hesi t a t ions h a ve already left peace operations and other security operations in the C IS to an organization where Moscow has a veto. W a s h i n g t o n h a s co n c u r r e n t l y so u g h t s u bs t i t u t e sol u t ions to t he secu r i ty problem t h rough i n nova t ions applying both to the B altic and to the larger PfP program. T hus it created a B altic Action Plan in A ugust-September 1996. T his plan has three key elements: assisting the B altic states to join E uropean security institutions, encouraging i m p r ov e d r e l a t io n s be t w ee n t h e m a n d R u ssi a , a n d expanding U .S. relations with them to include cooperation charters with each state detailing cooperation in security, political issues, and economics. 162 I t also entails support for the regional air defense system and the B altic battalion made up of soldiers a nd officers from all t h ree B altic 42

states. 163 W ashington believes that such cooperation under the PfP and A rticle 4 eliminates the need for stronger guarantees that provoke Russia. W ashington also asserts that this cooperation also deters Russia from threatening the B altic states lest N A T O's reaction ma kes it lose the benefits it would gain from improved Russo-B altic and E ast-West relations. Meanwhile, W ashington hopes for future changes in the situation even though the plan, which it hopes will be ratified in a forthcoming B altic charter, does not provide security guarantees. T hus it will not rule out fu t u re B a l t ic membersh ip i n N A T O m uch to R ussi a's dismay. T he B altic states have reacted with restraint to the B altic Action Plan. E stonia is even opposed to a charter with N A T O lest it establish a special N A T O-E stonian relationship outside membership that would delay E stonia's entry in to N A T O . 164 Still, this and other initiatives, li ke the regional air defense plan for Central and E astern E urope, imperfect as they are, are still material advances toward integration and preventive security. W hile nobody will give guarantees, integration through soft security, which might ultimately reduce regional tension, is clearly occurring. U .S. policy also follows along the paths outlined in the conversations with Sweden. I n July 1997 N A T O chose its fi rst members for accession. N A T O u nderst a nds t h a t Russia will seek to tie up N A T O, lin k enlargement to the C F E treaty, and seek a veto over enlargement. T hus N A T O decided that Polish, C zech, and H ungarian security, not to mention B altic security, will not be contingent on Russian security ar rangements that are inimical to their interests and to security in Central E urope. T he conclusion of the Founding Act casts doubt on its decision not to tie new membership to any separate deal with Russia. B ut now, only time and N A T O's resolve will tell. A t the O S C E and N A T O December 1996 meetings in L isbon and B russels, W ashington offered specific B altic initiatives. W hile the original PfP program listed 22 areas of cooperationpeace and humanitarian operations, democrat iza t ion of civil-mili t a r y rel a t ions, cr isis m a n agemen t, 43

i n t e rop e r a b i l i t y , a n d log is t ics as p ropose d b y t h e n Secretary of Defense Perry, the new, expanded PfP involves partner states in planning and executing actual military operations, disaster relief, peacema k ing, and delivery of humanitarian aid. 165 T he meetings' communiques listed the specifics of t h is expa nded progr a m to i ncl ude grea ter political and military cooperation among the partners and, as W ashington told Stock holm, drew the partners ever closer to actual membership in practice. 166 T his approach has two fundamental advantages. F irst, it solidifies and advances N A T O's capability to function as a true security organization and an instrument for effective collective action based on the members' consensus. Second, this program advances beyond N A T O's 1991 Copenhagen meeting, when N A T O first expressly stated its direct and m a t e r i a l conce r n for C e n t r a l a n d E ast e r n E u rope a n security. Today, the more N A T O interacts with regional governments, the more they come to depend on it and the mor e obl iged i t shou l d fee l tow a r ds t h e m . I f N A T O con t i n ues to believe i n i ts en l a rgemen t a nd t h a t t h is creeping integration is desirable and inevitable, then this line of action is the best way to steer the process. N A T O then would not suddenly face demands for membership when a major th reat arises. 167 I n that case, a N A T O that had declined in peacetime to defend Central E urope and that had passed the buck would face demands for action in a time of crisis, or even war. T hat would probably split N A T O and prevent it from acting under either A rticle 4 or A rticle 5. B y controlling the process, the U nited States and N A T O can devise a program that eliminates many of the new states' fears and concerns while integrating them as closely as possible in a semi-A rticle 5" relationship on a PanE uropean basis. T hat phrase denotes a relationship based on the PfP language which is close to A rticle 4 of the W ashington T reaty, but adds a political dimension to the PfP. B y adding the members input and a political structure to the PfP, we would realize some of the goals that the C linton administration presented to Swedish representatives in 1996. 168 44

N A T Os present consensus probably will not permit further steps, but this is already a considerable amount. Still, to secure the B altic region and E urope, W ashington must keep driving the E uropean consensus. If it shir ks its duty, others will follow suit, triggering an epidemic of freeriding and N A T O's practical dissolution. T his control over the admission process must be exercised throughout all its phases lest new and/or old members turn selfish about other regional states' membership and bal k at defending them, at a time when Russia's policy becomes still more aggressive and attempts to frighten N A T O. T he rejected candidates should not have to thin k that Russia is their only choice. 169 I nstead, the program that came together at the end of 1996 offers the right blend of control, transparency, and U .S. steering of the operation to prevent E urope's door from closing prematurely. I t preserves partners' equality within PfP, extends their responsibilities and learning curve while preparing them for entry, and holds the door open for Russia should it accept the project. 170 However, it does so at a price. N amely it substantially alters the nature of the N A T O alliance away from its traditional restriction to a collective defense pact towards a new relationship in line with ideas of cooperative and collective security. B ut it is those very ideas that seem to exercise the most influence on U .S. policy. T he Need for Conti n u i ng U.S. Leadersh ip. Still, problems remain. I t may grate on E uropean, and especially F rench, ears to hear this, but it remains true that an E S D I or C F SP is no closer to fruition today than before, and notions of the W E U as a E uropean pillar remain stillborn. W ithout U .S. suppor t or N A T O's acquiescence, other agencies, li ke the W E U , let alone Combined Joint T ask F orces ( C J T F s), ca n not pe r for m m a jor secu r i t y t asks. 171 O nly t he U nited St ates can devise a du r able multilateral B altic security regime. If we keep proclaiming ou r leadersh ip i n E u rope, t hen we m ust displ ay t h a t leadership in action. T he O S C E's abilities pertain only to conflict prevention and mediation where both sides are willing to negotiate. 45

A lthough Russia often proclaims its desire for the O S C E to lead E uropean security, Moscow defies it with impunity. 172 T he O S C E's successes in the B altic stem from these states' susceptibility to Western pressure more than the O S C E's own institutional legitimacy. T his inclination to the West induces the B altic states to heed its advice on minority policy, since they k now that otherwise they will not obtain entry to the West or security from Russia. 173 Because the O S C E clearly cannot respond to B altic secu r i t y ch a l lenges bu t t he E U a nd N A T O ca n, i t is senseless to deny the B altic states both E U and N A T O membership when appeasing Russia only brings increased demands and truculence. T his does not mean necessarily admitting the B altic states into N A T O. B ut it does mean much more clarity and a tough-minded policy that is not based on wishful thin k ing regarding Russia. T h us we a re eviden tly laboring u nder sever al misconceptions as we defend and advance N A T O's enlargement. F irst, while we seek Russia as a strategic partner on nuclear issues, its openly expressed goals and policies are inimical to E uropean peace and stability and to the role of pa r t ner. 174 Russian policy openly demands an exclusive sphere of influence in the C IS and attempts to prevent Central and E ast E urope from achieving true military security and equality to it in E urope. Such demands are clearly unacceptable to those states and should be equally unacceptable to N A T O, which cannot renounce its freedom to act to defend its members. If official Russian statements on E uropean security were published and explained, they would create more public support for N A T O's enlargement. S uch p u bl ica t ion wou l d cr e a t e gr e a t e r a w a r e n ess of Russia's goals as stated above. Certainly Russian public statements indicate that Moscow's delegation and officials believe that the Founding Act and H elsin k i summit gave them a veto over N A T O and no reason to change their B altic policies. I ndeed, Yeltsin offered new unilateral guarantees of B altic security, but not of borders or an end to threats against the B altic states. T herefore, these guarantees were rejected. 175 46

A second misconception flows from the first one about Russia as a partner. Moscow's policies indicate a continuing need for a robust interpretation of A rticles 4 and 5 which guarantee, first, consultation, and then if a member is attacked, collective defense. T hus, despite the concessions that Russia has won from N A T O, it remains unpersuaded of the benefits of N A T O or possibly even the E U's enlargement or of the virtues of the status quo. Russia will continue to threaten the C IS, and beyond that, E astern E urope, if it is n o t c h ec k e d . M osco w se e m s d e t e r m i n e d t o c r e a t e permanent tension in the B altic or vis--vis Pola nd to prevent a more stable situation or such membership from a rising. 176 T here are other misconceptions as well. A ll the soft security innovations are useful and beneficial, but Russia has refused to participate fully in the PfP and deliberately seeks to obstruct N A T O. A nd although PfP is close to the A rticle 4 of the W ashington T reaty, it does not give PfP members, li k e t he B a l t ic st a tes, t he r igh t to act iv a te consultation mechanisms. I nstead, it states that under cer t a i n condi t ions N A T O w i l l consu l t a mong t he PfP members or purely among alliance members. Nor does the B altic states' association agreement with the W E U give them that right there, either. 177 Yet while we contend that N A T O 's m a i n p u r pose is d e mocr a t ic e x t e n sion a n d enlargement, not the collective defense that ma kes the former possible, Russia and most of Central and E astern E urope still thin k in other, older terms, notwithstanding their rhetoric. W hile democratization is a truly historic and enduring benefit of N A T O, N A T O's purpose remains, first and foremost, collective defense which provides the basis for democr a tic in tegr a tion. P u t ting democr a tic in tegr a tion first confuses N A T O's benefits with its purpose and, by obscuring its purpose, ma kes its possible to wea ken N A T O's cohesion while Russian policy continues to justify the need for collective defense albeit at lower force and spending levels. W e shou ld not refr a i n from m a k i ng N A T O's case. F ailure to state the real and sound reasons for N A T O's 47

enlargement engenders suspicion and cynicism at home. T hen, far too many observers cannot discern a rational reason for enlarging N A T O, creating suspicions that we have something to hide. As a result, we have inadvertently undermined the priceless assets of the competence and resolution of U .S. foreign policy. T h us we shou ld forsa k e t he idea t h a t A r t icle 5 is moribund or should be and that N A T O is essentially for purposes of collective security. M uch of today's writing on collective security either misunderstands the concept or twists it into strange shapes to minimize or conceal its objectionable features and promote the author's agenda. 178 T here is good reason for such academic strategies for they seek to mask the crippling wea k nesses that invalidate the concept as a viable basis for E uropean security. N A T O's first purpose is collective defense, not the validation of a concept t h a t w as a nd rem ai ns i n heren t ly defect ive i n practice. A nother misconception is that somehow we can farm out our leadership role to Germany as a mediator and to the E U as a security provider. N either of these entities can lead E urope or be persuaded to do what W ashington or N A T O will not do for themselves or their allies. Such efforts only breed resentment, misunderstanding, security failures, and help renationalize German security policy. Such efforts also represent our own attempts at buckpassing and free riding. A nd if we engage in those pastimes, who can blame others for doing so? T h e r e is no f u n d a m e n t a l obst acle, sa ve t h e E U 's timorousness, to implementing a program outlining what Central and E astern E urope must do to gain membership and committing itself and those states to follow it. A nd if E uropean governments truly believe their rhetoric about the E U as a security provider they would rush to implement it for the entire region, not just the B altic. T he disinclination to do either of these things means that N A T O, specifically W ash i ngton, m ust push t he E U r a t her h a rd lest t he divisibility of E uropean security harden. We cannot lead by

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subcontracting foreign and defense policy to a divided and disunited E urope. E U membership for the B altic states seems particularly useful if Russia intends, as suggested above, to launch a campaign of economic warfare and internal subversion in the B altic states. B altic efforts to meet the E U's entry requiremen ts would cer t ainly st rengt hen t hem against such efforts, but if those requirements remain invisible or a r e const a n t l y ex p a n ded, t h e r e w i l l on l y be e n d l ess equivocation. T hey will rightly lose heart then as the E U will have clearly shown it does not want them. T hus the U nited States must again lead. Some of the aforementioned initiatives increase B altic states' ability to play in N A T O and learn how it wor ks. Russia should be urged to participate more fully in the PfP program in order to test its bon a fides . W hile N A T O can certainly afford to be magnanimous and extend partnership with Russia, that magnanimity cannot come to mean a pretext for a new division of E urope into rival spheres of influence. Conclu di ng P roposals for F utu re U.S. Policy. Since nobody else can lead in the B altic or E urope, f a i l u r e to l e a d w i l l e r od e a l l i e d co h esio n , i ncr e a se buckpassing and free riding, and create worse divisions in E u r op e t h a n wo u l d N A T O e x p a n sio n . A cco r d i n g l y , W ashington ought to ta ke the following steps, realizing that all previous expansions of N A T O have created lines, as well as conditions for further expansions that have superseded those lines. 179 Because N A T O is both an institution for collective defense and an evolving civic community whose doors are perennially open to all who qualify, we must continue to ma ke it clear that those doors will remain open and decisively rebuff speculation and Russian pressure that there only be one expansion. 180 T his means inviting Russia to join E urope, but the invitation, as stated above, should not be an open-ended one. Russia should not be allowed to obtain an unequal security or status compared to other states. N A T O cannot 49

grant special rights to Russia in the C IS or Central E urope or the right, omnipresent in German proposals, to paralyze N A T O. Nor can it give Russia a veto over Central E urope's defense. G ranting Russia such terms and/or a veto drives a sta ke through the hopes for E uropean security. I nstead U .S. policy should foster the spread of integrative processes through public pressure on the E U to move forward and eastward and on prospective N A T O members to meet N A T O's standards as set forth in the 1995 N A T O E n l a r ge m e n t S t u d y . 1 8 1 U . S . po l i cy a p p e a r e d t o b e contradictory on this point. O n the one hand, A mbassador to N A T O R ob e r t H u n t e r d e n i e d t h a t N A T O a n d E U membership are parallel processes. O n the other hand, we are pressuring the E U to accelerate its membership process for the B altic and other E ast E uropean states. Rober t Simmons, deputy head of the Office of E uropean Security a n d Pol icy a t t h e S t a t e D ep a r t m e n t , tol d S w ede n's delegation in A ugust 1996 that the new N A T O will back the E S D I that the E U is pushing for and,
T he logic of the processes in both the E U and within N A T O indicates that ultimately they will mean reciprocal membership of both the E U and N A T O. I t seems logical that an adjusted N A T O , w hich h as a rela tionship wi t h t he E U , should be attractive to all members of the E U .182

F inally, in M ay 1997, U nder Secretary of State Strobe T albott stated that we support E U's deepening in the West and broadening to the E ast and view N A T O's enlargement as creating an environment that is conducive to the E U's enlargement as well. T he two processes are parallel and should both support a deeper transatlantic community. 183 Sadly, it is unli kely that, even with A merican pressure, the E U will bail N A T O out in the E ast. W hile this pressure is necessary, it must be upgraded, for to hope or pretend that the E U will bail out N A T O is merely another form of buckpassing on the hard cases. Nor will the E U act unless A mer ica galva nizes i t t h rough N A T O . P roposals for a C F SP, E S D I, or to ma ke the W E U the center of E uropean defense activity are meaningless where E uropean countries

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will not spend the resources or harmonize their foreign and defense policies. T he entire discussion of E uropean security would gain from candor regarding the W E U's and the E U's unreadiness for foreign and defense policy coordination as shown most recently in A lbania's crisis. 184 F urthermore, there are many reasons why the postSoviet states must have a tangible economic and defense prospect of security before them. Moscow's past record of economic warfare against the B altic states and U k raine should suffice as an example of that need. T he real and apparently quite imminent danger here is that we may believe that we really have completed our mission and rely on guaranteed consultations for PfP members and the Joint Council with Russia alone and not on the alliance's inherent capabilities. 185 We would then have failed to deter as well as to reassure all the B altic players. T his would be a fatal error. Russia's policy in the C IS and the B altic overtly threatens their integrity and sovereignty and then the security of the first tier of Central E uropean states beyond their borders. T his is not a fashionable view or one that people are h u r r y i ng to m a k e p ubl ic. N eve r t heless, t he ev ide nce presented here, official statements of Russian leaders and much of Russia's elite discussion, reflects that conclusion. I ndeed, Russian diplomats' words and actions regarding the B altic constitute a fran k espousal of coercive diplomacy. Yet, since the wherewithal for such strategies is utterly lack ing, the pursuit of such a strategy, ostensibly on behalf of Russians in the C IS and the B altic states, could trigger a major crisis of the Russian state. If Russia crashes while trying to pursue a policy of imperial overstretch, that would have far-reaching and profoundly dangerous results, both politically and geographically all across E urope. As Roman Szporlu k of H arvard U niversity wrote, the demand to pursue a policy based on saving the 25 million or so Russian d i aspor a sacrifices the interests of the 125 million Russians in Russia proper to an adventurist policy. 186 A nd the essence of that k ind of policy is that Moscow cannot calibrate ends and means or k now where to stop.

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T hus we cannot do without A rticle 5 and should stop sa y i n g t h a t w e a r e a p p roach i n g a t i m e w h e n i t is superfluous or unnecessary. W hile it is right to blur the boundaries between membership and PfP, it is wrong to give others the impression that N A T O can be divided, or that it will passively stand by in cases of aggression or t h r e a ts to secu r i t y i n E u rope. T h a t w i l l on l y i n v i t e a gg r ess i v e p r ob es, c r i s i s i f N A T O r e a c t s s t r o n g l y , disillusionment when N A T O does not respond effectively, and, inevitably, erosion of alliance cohesion. A ny hint that N A T O will not respond to Russian probes will rapidly tempt Germany to ma ke its own deal with Russia regarding Central and E astern E urope. Moreover, sensitive R ussia n observers k now t h a t a profound connection exists between the extent of Russia's stabilization and democratization and the fervor for N A T O expansion. 187 To the extent that the former fails, the latter grows as has been the case since 1993. A Russia that thin ks and acts along the lines of K in kel's analysis or of the W ilsonian impulse in U .S. foreign policy might become a fit partner for us in E urope. B ut that is not and will not be Yeltsin's Russia. I nstead Russia's demands are at odds with both E uropean security and its own domestic tranquility. T hey can only be met by N A T O's firm but measured riposte, a riposte that, as the more intelligent Russian analysts k now, will once and for all terminate the erotic lure of empire in Russia's E uropean policies and help consolidate true democracy at home. W hen and if that happens and to the extent that it does, we can then move onto the next stage of a p roject w h ich cou l d w e l l becom e secu r i t y f rom V ancouver to V ladivostok. B ut if we ignore the B altic and accept the idea that the divisibility of E uropean security must be implemented in its most rigid and enduring form, and that the E ast-West divide of the last 5 centuries must also be perpetuated for the long term, neither small states, Russia nor the West will enjoy much security. H ence statements about A rticle 5 being superfluous are very unfortunate, for they betray a

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misunderstanding of N A T O and of the reality of E uropean politics today. O nce Russia opted for its hegemonic sphere of influence in the C IS and for an unaccountable government that is not bound by democratic laws or anchors, it divided E urope, if not along Cold W ar lines, then along new geopolitical lines. N A T O's enlargement, if anything, overcomes many of the lines of division in E urope, going back to the Renaissance and also creates the least possible threatening conditions for overcoming more of those lines in the future. T his does not mean that we must now expand N A T O to the B altic states. B ut it does mean that we cannot simply leave them in the lurch. We now have the power and bear the burden of dev isi ng a r egi m e for t h a t r egion w h ich r e t a i ns t h e possibility of its full integration into E urope. T he E U should move east, PfP and N A T O should both grow, and Russia should be deter red from further unprofitable and dangerous adventures. I n other words, we still must provide both reassurance and deterrence. Nobody else can or will. We may complain about this burden and this opportunity, but we can no longer shir k them. E N D N O T ES
1. Rita F . Peters, T he B altic Search for Security, Perspectives, Vol. V I I, No. 2, November-December 1996, pp. 4-5, T he Monitor , September 20, 1996. 2. T hus Slovenia's Prime M inister Janesz D rnovsek reports that, T he A mericans emphasize that N A T O expansion will be a continuous process that will occur over a number of rounds. T he E uropeans are more skeptical about future N A T O expansion and believe that it would be good if as many countries as possible are accepted now, L jubljana, Delo, in Slovenian, M ay 26, 1997, F oreign B roa dcast I nfor m ation Service, E aster n E u rope (henceforth F B I S- E E U)-97-150, M ay 30, 1997; Ronald D ietrich Asmus, N A T O E nlargement and B altic Security, Bo H uldt and U lri k a Johannessen, eds., 1st A n n u a l Stock hol m Conference on B a ltic Sea Secu r ity a nd Cooper ation, Stock holm: Swedish I nstitute of I nternational Affairs, Conference Papers No. 20, 1997, pp. 11-12. 3. H . Plater-Zyberg, N A T O E nlargement: Benefits, Costs, and Consequences, Conflict St udies Resea rch C en t re, Royal M ili t a r y Academy Sandhurst, C amberley, Surrey, E ngland, 1996, p. 8; London,

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T he D a i ly Telegr aph, in E nglish, July 19, 1996, F oreign B roa dcast I nform ation Service, Western E urope, (henceforth F B I S-W E U )-96-140, July 19, 1996, p. 1; T homas L. F riedman, T he B ig B ang, New York T imes, November 27, 1996, p. A25.
4. Asmus; F riedman; Rene N yberg, T he B altic Countries and the Northwest of Russia: A E uropean C hallenge, E uropea n Secur ity, Vol. I I I, No. 3, A utumn, 1994, p. 537; V ygaudas Usack as, N A T O's Role in B altic Security: A L ithuanian V iew, in H uldt and Johannessen, pp. 7879. 5. Moscow, Izvestiya , in Russian, July 6, 1996, F oreign B roa dcast I nform ation Service, Centr a l E ur asi a, (henceforth F B I S-S O V)-96-131, J uly 8, 1996, pp. 17-18; Secret Yeltsin-C lin ton Cor respondence, C ur rent D igest of the Post-Soviet P ress, (henceforth C D PP), X L V I I I, No. 27, July 31, 1996, p. 20; M ichael R. Gordon, Russia Accepts E astward G rowth of N A T O, but O nly I nch by I nch, New York T imes, M arch 5, 1997, pp. A1, 8. More recently, Yeltsin and Prima kov have both stated that any effort to admit former Soviet republics to N A T O would cause Russia to revise its relationships with N A T O and its members. 6. B asic P rovisions of t he M ili t a r y Doct r i ne of t he R ussi a n F ederation, Rossiyskie Vesti, November 18, 1993, in Russian, F B I SS O V -93-222-S, November 19, 1993. 7. Moscow, Novoe V remya, in Russian, No. 15, A pril 20, 1997, F B I SS O V -97-084, A pril 20, 1997. 8. T he Mon itor , J a n u a ry 10, 1997; T allin n, E T A , in E nglish, November 26, 1996, F B I S-S O V -96-230, November 29, 1996. 9. Robert Legvold, T he Russian Q uestion', V ladimir B aranovsk y, ed., R ussi a a nd E urope: T he E merging Secur ity Agend a, O xford; O xford U niversity P ress for t he Stock holm I n ter n ation al Peace Resea rch I nstitute (SI PR I), 1997, p. 67. 10. Jaa ko B lomberg, F inland's E volving Security Policy, N A T O Review , Vol. X L I, No. 1, F ebruary, 1993, pp. 12-15; V ilnius, E lta , i n E nglish, January 6, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-004, January 8, 1997. 11. M ich ael H ow a rd, Reassu r a nce a nd D eter rence: W ester n Defense in the 1980's, F oreign Affa i rs, Vol. L X I, No. 2, W inter, 1982/83, pp. 309-324. 12. F or a discussion of the term free riding or buck-passing and its harmful consequences for security, see T homas J. C hristensen and Jack Snyder, C hain G angs and Passed B ucks; Predicting A lliance Patterns in M ultipolarity, I nter n ation a l O rga n ization, Vol. X L I V, No. 2, 1990,

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pp. 138-168; and B arry Posen, T he Sources of M i l ita ry Doctr ine: F r a nce, B r ita in, a nd Germ a ny Between the Wor ld Wa rs, I thaca, N Y: Cor nell U niversity Press, 1986, pp. 12-127, 156-157. 13. V ilnius, E lta , in E nglish, F ebr u a ry 4, 1997, and Moscow, I nterfax, in E nglish, F ebruary 4, 1997, both in F B I S-S O V-97-025, F ebruary 7, 1997; W arsaw, Szta nd a r , in Polish, October 24, 1996, F B I SS O V-96-211 , October 24, 1996. 14. See C arl B ildt's remar ks in Stock holm T T, (Pohjoism a iset U utiset D atabase Version), in Swedish, M arch 21, 1997, F B I S-W E U-97080 , M arch 21, 1997. 15. Posen, Snyder and C hristensen highlight the erosion of mutual cooperation under such circumstances. 16. C arl B ildt, T he B altic L itmus Test, F oreign Affa i rs, Vol. L X X I I I, No. 5, September-October, 1994, pp. 72-73. 17. Vol ker Ruhe, N A T O Positions for G rowth, Defense News, October 21-27, 1996, p. 33. 18. T allinn, B N S , in E nglish, A ugust 29, 1996, F B I S-S O V-96-170, A ugust 30, 1996, pp. 52-54. 19. A lfred V an Staden and Gert De Nooy, T he E uropean Security Space: A n A nalysis of Possible A r rangements, Commitments, and I nstruments, and K arl K aiser, E xpanding the E uropean Security Space, both in G uido Lenzi and L aurence M artin, eds., T he E u ropea n Secu r ity Space, Working P apers by the E u ropea n Str ategy G roups a nd the I nstitute for Secur ity Studies of Western E uropea n U nion, Paris: I nstitute for Security Studies, Western E uropean U nion, 1996, pp. 3, 22. 20. Stuart C roft, Competing V isions of E uropean Security and the I nevitability of N A T O E nlargement, paper presented to the annual convention of the I nternational Studies Association, Toronto, M arch 1822, 1997, p. 16. 21. T he Founding Act of M ay 27, 1997 between Russia and N A T O openly declares both sides' commitment to the indivisibility of E uropean security. F ound ing Act on M utu a l Rel ations, Cooper ation a nd Secu r ity Between N A T O a nd the R ussi a n F eder ation, P a r is, M ay 27, 1997, N A T O I nternet. 22. Stephen B lan k, R ussi a a n d the B a ltic: Is T here a T h reat to E u ropea n Secu r ity?, C arlisle B arracks, P A: Strategic Studies I nstitute, 1993, pp. 16-19, raised just such an option.

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23. As Jacques F reymond of the U niversity of Geneva observed, small states should not become a source of trouble to other states. Jacques F reymond, H ow the Small Count ries C an Cont ribute to Peace, A ugust Schou and A rne O lav B rundtland, eds., Sm a l l States i n I nter n ation a l Rel ations, 17th Nobel Symposium, Oslo, 1971, N ew Yor k: John W iley & Sons, 1971, pp. 178-179. 24. Copenhagen, I nform ation , in D anish, September 27, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-190, October 1, 1996. 25. Moni k a Wohlfeld, A Su rvey of St r a tegic I n terests of t he Countries of the E uropean Security Space, in Lenzi and M artin, eds., p. 12. 26. D mitry T renin, T ransformation of Russian F oreign Policy: N A T O E xpansion C an H ave N egative Consequences for the West, Nezavisimaya G azeta , F ebruary 5, 1997. 27. Legvold, p. 69. 28. W arsaw, Polskie R a dio F irst Progr a m Network, in Polish, June 4, 1997, F oreign B roa dcast I nfor m a tion Service, M i l it a ry A ffa i rs ( henceforth F B I S-U M A)-97-155, June 4, 1997; W arsaw, Rzeczpospol ita, in Polish, June 5, 1997, F B I S-E E U-97-157 , June 6, 1997; Moscow, I T A R-T A SS , in E nglish, June 5, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-156, June 5, 1997; Moscow, I T A R-T A SS , in E nglish, June 6, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-157, June 6, 1997; F lorence L a N azione, in I talian, June 8, 1997, F B I S-W E U97-159, June 8, 1997. 29. Moscow, Nezavisim aya G azeta, in Russian, September 28, 1996, F B I S-S O V-96-211-S , September 28, 1996. 30. Woj te k L a men tow icz, R ussi a a n d E ast-C en t r a l E u rope: Strategic O ptions, and Y uri D avydov, Russian Security and E astCentral E urope, in B aranovsk y, pp. 355-385. 31. D a v y dov , L a m e n tow icz , A n d r e i Z a gors k y , R ussi a a n d E u ropea n I nst i t u t ions, a n d V l a di m i r B a r a novsk y, Concl usion: Assessing Russia's I nteraction W ith E urope, all in B aranovsk y, pp. 364-365, 379-382, 525-527, 539-540, and 545-555, respectively. 32. F oreign B roa dcast I nfor m a tion Service, O bserv a tions a n d A n a lysis, (hencefor th F B I S- F M N)- F ebruary 12, 1997, Solana C IS T rip I r ks Officials; Paul Goble, Strange, U njust, and W rong, R a dio F ree E u rope / R a dio L iberty, (henceforth R F E / R L) F ebr uary 13, 1997. 33. Ibid .

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34. M ilitary A lliances, C D PP , Vol. X L V I I I, No. 43, November 20, 1996, p. 21; and the article by Russia's leading defense correspondent, Pavel F elgengauer, Moscow, Segodnya , in Russian, October 18, 1996, F B I S-S O V-96-214-S, November 6, 1996. 35. Russia, N A T O Agree on Act F ormalizing Relations, C D P P , Vol. X L I X, No. 20, June 18, 1997, where a F oreign M inistry official said We got everything we wanted. H enry K issinger, H elsin k i F iasco, Washington Post, M arch 30, 1997, p. C7; H enry K issinger, T he D ilution of N A T O, Washington Post, June 8, 1997, p. C9; F riedbert Pfluger, N A T O's B ad B a rgain, N ew Yor k T i mes, M ay 16, 1997, p. A 33; F ounding Act; Moscow, R I A , in E nglish, M ay 17, 1997, F B I S-U M A-97137, M ay 17, 1997, Rogov on Founding Act's Benefits, Problems, Joh nson 's R ussi a L ist, djoh nson@cdi.org, M a y 28-29, 1997, from L iter aturn aya G azeta, M ay 28, 1997, Moscow, Itogi , in Russian, M ay 27, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-109, M ay 27, 1997. 36. As Sergei Rogov, D irector of the U S A-C anada I nstitute (IS K A N) pointed out, today's Russia has a proportionally greater military burden than did the Soviet U nion, lecture to the Foreign Policy Research I nstitute, Philadelphia, P A, January 22, 1997. 37. James Sherr, Russia and U k raine, Semi n a r on R ussi a a nd the N I S , A n k ara, T ur key: M inistry of Foreign Affairs Center for Strategic Research, 1996, S A M Papers No. 1, M inutes of a conference at A ntalya, M arch 29-31, 1996, p. 45. 38. James Sherr, Russian G reat Power Ideology: Sources and I mplications, Conflict St udies Resea rch C en t re, R M A Sandh u rst, C amberley, Surrey, July 1996, pp. 2-3. 39. Stephen Sestanovich, G iving Russia I ts D ue, T he N ation a l I nterest , No. 36, Summer, 1994, pp. 3-13, is the most overt exponent of the argument that Russian policy is, in fact, one of stability, not of revisionism, and han kering after hegemony in the C IS. See also Goble; F B I S- F M N , F ebruary 12, 1997; Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Will the U nion Be Reborn?: T he F uture of the Post-Soviet Region, John H enri ksen, trans., Strengthening Democratic I nstitutions Project, John F . K ennedy School of Government, H arvard U niversity, C ambridge, M A, 1997, which contains a fran k aspiration of revisionism to restore a union (not a Soviet U nion) and lays out a strategy for doing so. 40. A ddress by Y.M. Prima kov to the O S C E Permanent Council, V ienna, September 20, 1996, p. 2. T ranscript made available by the E mbassy of the Russian F ederation to the U nited States. 41. Moscow, M i rovaya E konomik a i Mezhdun a rodnye O tnoshen iya, in R ussian, July-September, 1994, F oreign B roa dcast I nfor m ation

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Service, Centr a l E ur asi a, F B I S Report (hencefor th F B I S-U S R)-94-129, November 29, 1994, p. 48.
42. V ladimir B aranovsk y, Russian Foreign Policy Priorities and E uropean M ultilateral I nstitutions, T he I nter n ation a l Spectator, Vol. X X X, No. 1, January-M arch 1995, pp. 33-50; Moscow, Izvestiya i n Russian, June 19, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-169, June 19, 1997. 43. A ll T his Is O urs, T he E conomist, November 26, 1994, p. 60, Statement by the Prime M inister of the Russian F ederation V.S. C hernomyrdin A t the Meeting of the H eads of State or Government of the O S C E Participating States, L isbon, December 2, 1996. 44. C an Russia E ver Be Secured?, T he E conomist, December 7, 1996, pp. 45-46. 45. Ibid . 46. T his was repeated by the Russian A mbassador to L atvia as well, Moscow, R I A , in E nglish, June 11, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-162, June 12, 1997, for still more recent attacks on the B altic states, see Stock holm, D agens N yheter, in Swedish, July 12, 1997, F B I S-W E U -97-224, A ugust 12, 1997; R a dio F ree E urope / R a dio L iberty Newsline, A ugust 26, 1997. 47. K issinger; Pfluger, p. A33; F ounding Act. 48. F B I S-S O V , June 5 and June 6, 1997; F ounding Act. 49. G raeme H erd with E ne Rongelep and A nton Suri kov, C r isis for E ston i a? R ussi a, E ston i a, a n d a Post-C hechen Col d W a r, London Defence Studies, No. 29, Centre for Defence Studies, London, 1995, pp. 38-44. 50. Moscow, I T A R-T A S S; in E nglish, F ebr u a ry 11, 1997; T he M o n i t o r, F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 9 7; P a u l G ob l e , A n a l y s i s F r o m W ashingtonPutting Pressure O n B altics, R F E / R L , F ebruary 14, 1997. 51. I T A R-T A SS , F ebruary 11, 1997. 52. Ibi d .; G r aeme H erd, L et ter on B a l t ic Secu r i t y Policies, Security D i a logue, Vol. X X V I I I, No. 2, June, 1997, pp. 251-253; Goble, Putting Pressure on B altics. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid .

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55. Ibid . 56. H erd, pp. 251-253; Moscow, N T V , in Russian, M ay 7, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-127, M ay 7, 1997; Poznan, WP R O S T , in Polish, M ay 11, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-133, M ay 13, 1997; Moscow, I T A R-T A S S , i n E nglish, M ay 5, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-125, M ay 5, 1997; Copenhagen, Ber l i ngske T i den de, in D anish, A pril 16, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-086, A pril 16, 1997. 57. Moscow, I T A R-T A SS Wor ld Service, December 10, 1996; B lan k, R ussi a a nd the B a ltic, pp. 1-9. 58. I T A R-T A SS World Service, December 10, 1996. 59. Ibi d .; V alentin A lexandrov, A M ission Abroad - To L atvia, I nter n ation a l Affa i rs, (Moscow), M ay 1992, p. 60; A ndreas O plat k a of the Neue Z u rcher Zeitung reports that Western diplomats describe Russians in the B altic who, than ks to Moscow's propaganda, perceive themselves to be repressed and the victims of discrimination, as losing touch with reality. A ndreas O plat k a, E stonians, Russians, and the B urden of H istory, Swiss Review of Wor ld Affa i rs, September 1996, p. 9. 60. I T A R-T A SS Wor ld Service, December 10, 1996; I T A R-T A S S, F ebruary 11, 1997; Goble, Putting Pressure on B altics. 61. I T A R-T A SS World Service, December 10, 1996. 62. Moscow, Kommersa nt-D a i ly in Russian, July 29, 1994, F B I SS O V-94-147, A ugust 1, 1994, p. 1; Moscow, Rossiyskiye Vesti in Russian, A ugust 16, 1994, F B I S-S O V-94-159, A ugust 17, 1994, pp. 12-13; T he Monitor , June 9, 1995, M arch 15, 1996, and January 10, 1997. 63. A natol L ieven, B altic Iceberg Dead A head: N A T O Beware, T he Wor ld Tod ay, July 1996, p. 176. 64. Moscow, Nezavisim aya G azeta, in Russian, M ay 17, 1995, F B I SS O V-95-095, M ay 17, 1995, pp. 6-7; M ilitary A lliances, C D PP , Vol. X L V I I, No. 25, July 19, 1995, p. 31; Moscow, I T A R-T A SS , in E nglish, June 28, 1996, F B I S-S O V-96-126, June 28, 1996, p. 18. 65. Moscow, Rossiysk aya G azeta, in Russian, September 23, 1995, F B I S-S O V-95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22. 66. T renin; Moscow, T rud , in Russian, June 25, 1996, F B I S-S O V96-124, June 26, 1996, pp. 18-19.

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67. See the two articles by Sherman G arnett, Russia's I llusory A mbitions, F oreign Affa i rs, Vol. L X X V I, No 2, M arch-A pril 1997, pp. 61-76; and Russia and I ts Borderlands: A Geography of V iolence, P a r a meters, Vol. X X V I I I, No. 2, Spring 1997, pp. 4-21. 68. Speech by M r. Javier Solana, Secretary General of N A T O at the Royal I nstitute of I nternational Relations, B russels, January 14, 1997, N A T O I nternet, p. 4. 69. Melvyn P. L effler, A P reponder a nce of Power: N ation a l Secur ity, T he T r um a n A dmi n istr ation, a nd the Col d Wa r, Stanford, C A: Stanford U niversity Press, 1992, pp. 280-282, 345-346. 70. A dmiral F . N . G romov, Znachenie K aliningradskogo Osobogo R a ion a dli a O boronosposobnost i Rossiiskoi F eder a tsii, Voen n aya Mysl ', No. 5, September-October 1995, p. 13. 71. Ibid . 72. K aliningrad, K a liningr a dsk aya Pr avd a , in Russian, October 19, 1996, F B I S-S O V-96-211, October 31, 1996. 73. Q uoted in C aptain Jorgen E ricsson, Royal Swedish N avy, Swedish Security Policy at a C rossroads, N ava l Wa r Col lege Review, Vol. X L I X, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 75. 74. R ich a rd A . B i t zi nger, T he N ordic/B a l t ic Region: A N ew Strategic Significance? Defense A n a lysis, Vol. X I I, No. 3, 1996, pp. 371375. 75. O n January 22, 1997 the Russian government released a letter from generals and admirals urging the retargeting of E uropean capitals with nuclear weapons should N A T O expand. See also Paul A. Goble, T he Russian Response to N A T O E xpansion, R a dio F ree E urope / R a dio L iberty, October 2, 1996. T hese are only a few of the many efforts to brandish such threats. 76. A t the recent D avos conferencein F ebruary, 1997Russian spok esmen t h rea tened t h a t N A T O en l a rgemen t m igh t ca use a n upsurge of E uropean terrorism by disaffected elements, not just Russians. Obviously this was a clear threat to use intelligence assets to foment terrorism. T he Monitor, F ebruary 4-5, 1997. 77. H erd, Rongelep, and Suri kov, pp. 38-44. 7 8 . L o w e l l B a r r i n g t o n , T h e D o m es t i c a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l Consequences of C itizenship in the Soviet Successor States, E uropeAsi a Stu d ies, Vol. X L V I I, No. 5, 1995, pp. 752-755.

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7 9 . V l a d i m i r I . I v a n ov , R u ss i a 's N e w M i l i t a r y D oc t r i n e: I mplications for Asia, M ichael D. Bellows ed., Asi a in the 21st Century: E volving Str ategic P r ior ities, W ashington, D C: I nstitute for N ational Security Studies, N ational Defense U niversity, p. 223. 80. T his was revealed at the Russian Presentations to the X V B ien n i a l Conference of E u ropea n Secu r i t y I nst i t u t ions, Moscow, January 24-26, 1996, and is visible in the Conference Report of John Bor awsk i for t he Conference E u ropea n Secu rity A fter t he G rea t Debate, Moscow, Hotel B altchug K empinsk i, January 24-25, 1997, that was organized by the F riedrich E bert Stiftung and the Moscow Public Science Foundation. 81. Ibid .; T renin; Oplat k a, p. 9. 82. As can be seen by Bonn's increasing number of concessions to Russia which give every sign of being formalized into a pack age of concessions to Moscow, Moscow's screaming and yelling has effect. A nd as Secretary Perry indicated, the B altic states' problems with Russia debar them from N A T O, reasoning that gives Moscow every reason to keep up the pressure as in its recent B altic policy statement. I T A RT A S S, F ebruary 11, 1997; Steven E rlanger, A lbright F lies Toward Vexing Issues, New Yor k T i mes, F ebruary 16, 1997, p. A12. 83. A ndrei V. Kozyrev, N A T O Is Not O ur E nemy, Newsweek, F ebruary 10, 1997, p. 31; Zbigniew B rzezinsk i, G lobal V iewpoint: U ltimately, B igger N A T O W ill Be of Benefit to Russia, H a r r isburg P atriot-News, F ebruary 9, 1997, p. B9; I dem ., N A T O and Russia, Stephen C ambone, ed., N A T O 's Role in E uropea n Security, W ashington, D C: Center for Strategic and I nternational Studies, 1995, pp. 44-48. 84. For example, Prima kov's statements on January 9 and F ebruary 7, 1997, that the government should not bal k at imposing sanctions on E stonia for mistreating its Russians and his refusal to sign a border treaty with T allinn or Riga until this alleged mistreatment stops, T he Monitor , January 10, and F ebruary 8, 1997; for others, see Stephen J. B lan k, T he B altic St ates A nd R ussia: T he St r ategic and E t h nic Con tex ts, paper p resen ted to t he I I A n n u a l Con ven t ion of t he Association for the Study of N ationalities, Columbia U niversity, N ew Yor k, N Y, A pril 28, 1996. 85. Wohlfeld, p. 12; F B I S- E E U , June 6, 1997, and the two articles by John Borawsk i, T he N A T O E nlargement: W hat Does Russia W ant, E u ropea n Secu r ity, Vol. V, No. 3, A utumn 1996, pp. 381-395; and N A T O E nlargement and Russia, Perspectives (A n k ara), Vol. I, No. 2, July-A ugust, 1996, pp. 118-131. 86. C hristensen, and Snyder, 138-168; Posen, pp. 12-127, 156-157.

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87. Jacqui Moorhouse, Central and E astern E urope: Accession to the E uropean U nion, A ussenpol itik, E nglish E dition, No. 4, 1996, pp. 368-378. 88. Peter Rudolf, T he F uture of the U nited States as a E uropean Power: T he C ase of N A T O E nlargement, E u ropea n Secu r ity, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer, 1996, pp. 179-180; see also the quotations of Ruhe on this point in C hristoph Bertram's article, in Berlin, D ie Zeit, in German, January 7, 1994, F B I S-W E U-94-006, January 10, 1994, pp. 17-19. 89. Moorhouse, pp. 368-378. 90. F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfurter A l lgemeine Sonntagszeitung, in German, January 15, 1995, F B I S-W E U-95-012, January 19, 1995, p. 9; T imothy G ar ton Ash, I n E u rope's N a me: Germ a ny a nd the D ivided Continent, N ew Yor k: Random House, 1993, passim. 91. Germany's Lostpoliti k, T he E conomist, December 7, 1996, p. 46; F B I S-S O V , A pril 16, 1997. 92. C raig W hitney, K ick ing T roubles Down the Road, New York T imes, June 19, 1997, p. A12; Paul Goble, Squaring the C ircle of E uropean Security, R F E / R L , January 22, 1997; and for earlier signs of this reluctance to act, see L ionel B arber, B russels K eeps Shut the G ates to the E ast, F in a nci a l T imes, November 16, 1995, p. 17; M adrid, E l P a is, in Spanish, December 10, 1995, F B I S-W E U-95-238, D ecember 12, 1995, p. 9; B arry D. Wood, T he State of the U nion: E nlargement, E u rope, November, 1996, pp. E SR 8-9. 93. T he F ounding Act; E rlanger, p. A12. 94. Ibid . 95. E ve n befor e t h e F ou n d i ng A ct w as sign ed, Pol a n d w as demanding that it be present at all Russia-N A T O tal ks, hardly a sign of confidence in the result, and this demand has not abated since then. See W arsaw, P A P , in Polish, M ay 23, 1997; F B I S-E E U-97-143, M ay 23, 1997, as for C hristopher and Perry see W arren C hristopher and W illiam J. Perry, N A T O's T rue M ission, New York T imes, October 21, 1997, P a ris, Le F iga ro , October 8, 1997, in F rench, F B I S-W E U -97-281, October 8, 1997. 96. K issinger. 97. F or a discussion of collective security, see George W. Downs, ed., Col lective Secur ity Beyond the Cold Wa r, A nn A rbor, M I: U niversity of M ichigan Press, 1994, which offers the latest systematic discussion of this concept; and Stephen B lan k, H elsi nk i i n Asi a?, C arlisle B ar racks,

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P A: Strategic Studies I nstitute, U .S. A rmy W ar College, 1993, pp. 16-19, and the sources cited therein. 98. See the conditions for a lasting detente in E urope laid out in 1972 by Josef Korbel, only most of which, by no means all, have been fulfilled. Josef Korbel, Detente in E u rope: Rea l or I m agin a ry?, Princeton, N J: Princeton U niversity Press, 1972, p. 6. 99. V ilnius, L ithu a ni a n Weekly, in E nglish, July 31-A ugust 6, 1992, F B I S-U S R-92-112, September 2, 1992, pp. 91-92. 100. H amburg, Welt a m Son ntag, in German, M arch 27, 1994, F B I S-W E U-94-060, M arch 29, 1994, pp. 15-16. 101. F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfu rter A l lgemeine, in German, July 2, 1993, F B I S-W E U-93-137, July 20, 1993, pp. 30-31. 102. Ibi d . 103. Sam N unn, Robert B lack will, A rnold Horelick, Stopping the D ecl i n e i n U . S- R u ssi a n R e l a t io n s, S a n t a M o n ica , C A : R a n d Corporation, 1996, argues explicitly that Russia must approve the E uropean status quo before N A T O enlarges. 104. Berlin, D ie Welt , in German, M arch 5, 1994, F B I S-W E U-94044, M arch 7, 1994, pp. 15-16; Copenhagen, Ber l i ngske T i den de, i n D anish, F ebruary 3, 1994, F B I S-W E U-94-030, January 14, 1994, pp. 4243; F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfu rter A l lgemeine, in G er man, F ebr u a ry 12, 1994, Ibi d ., pp. 44-45. 105. Ibi d . 106. O leg Samorodni, I nterests Coincide, T he B a ltic I n depen dent, December, 9-15, 1994, p. 6. 107. F r an kfur t am M ain, F r a n kfu rter A l lgemei ne, in German, A ugust 23, 1995, F B I S-W E U-95-163, A ugust 23, 1995, pp. 86-87; Open Medi a Resea rch I nstitute, D a ily Report, A ugust 24, 1995. 108. F r an kfur t am M ain, F r a n kfu rter A l lgemei ne, in German, September 13, 1995, F B I S-W E U -95-177, September 13, 1995, p. 6. 109. F r a n k f u r t , F r a n k f u r ter A l lgemei ne Son n t agszei t u ng, i n German, A ugust 20, 1995, F B I S-W E U-95-163, A ugust 23, 1995, pp. 7-8. 110. Bonn, B u l leti n , in German, M arch 4, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-051, M arch 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.

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111. Speech by C hancellor H elmut Kohl at the 33rd Conference on Security, M unich, F ebruary 3, 1996, German I nformation Center, N ew Yor k, Vol. X I X, No. 3, 1996, p. 3. 112. F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfurter A llgemeine, in German, M ay 20, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-100, M ay 22, 1996, p. 16. 113. F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfu rter A l lgemeine, in German, July 19, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-141, July 22, 1996, pp. 8-9. 114. Berlin, D ie Welt, I nternet E dition, in German, January 18, 1997, F B I S-W E U-97-013, January 22, 1997. 115. T allinn, B N S , in E nglish, A ugust 29, 1996, F B I S-S O V-96-170, A ugust 30, 1996, pp. 52-53. 116. Ruhe, p. 33. 117. Ibi d .; L ammers' remar ks directly follow an admission that the E U is still an incomplete security organization precisely because it cannot guard its members (not to mention nonmembers), so the call for it and the neutrals to lead in the B altic is truly an abdication of responsibility. Berlin, D ie T ageszeitung, in German, July 14, 1997, F B I S-W E U-97-197, July 16, 1997. T his is also precisely the point of the German commissioned study by Ronald Asmus and Robert N urick, N A T O E xpansion and the B altic States, Santa Monica, C A: Rand Corporation, 1996, a study which seems to ignore the fundamental precepts of F innish and Swedish policies in the B altic. 118. W illiam D rozdia k, A llies M ap Steps to L in k Russia to W ider N A T O, Washington Post, January 16, 1997, pp. 1, 23. 119. Ibi d .; E rlanger, p. A12, strongly suggests that much of this agenda is becoming N A T O's official position, and T he F ounding Act text confirms it. 120. H amburg, Welt am Sonntag , in German, December 8, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-237, December 10, 1996; Berlin, D ie Welt, in German, December 14, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-243, December 18, 1996. 121. Ibid.; Jacqueline S. Porth, E xperts A re Refining E urope's Security Model for 21st Century, U nited States I nformation Agency, December 23, 1996. 122. To cite only two examples, D avid Hoffman, N A T O, Russia Agree on N ew T ies, Washington Post , M ay 15, 1997, p. 1; L awrence McQ u i l l a n, W ho H as V eto Power U nder N A T O-R ussi a Accor d? Russian President Boris Yeltsin Says a N ew N A T O-Russia Pact G ives

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Moscow V eto Power O ver K ey D ecisions by t he A lliance, a V iew President C linton Says Is W rong. Both A re Right, Reuters, M ay 14, 1997. 123. C hernomyrdin; Roland E ggleston, Germany Proposes N ew Concession to Russia on N A T O, R F E / R L D a ily Report, December 18, 1996. 124. F B I S-S O V , November 6, 1996. 125. E u ropea n D efence: H ot A i r a nd F alli ng C u r ves, R U S I Newsbr ief, Vol. X V I, No. 11, November 1996, pp. 2-4. 126. V i l n i u s, R a d i o V i l n i u s I n ter n a t i o n a l, i n L i t h u a n i a n , September 24, 1996, F B I S-S O V-96-189, September 30, 1996. 127. Paul A. Goble, N A T O After Round O ne, R F E / R L , Ju ne 19, 1997. 128. F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfu rter A l lgemeine, in German, June 4, 1997, F B I S-W E U-97-155, June 4, 1997. 129. Berlin, D ie Welt, I nter net Version, in German, A pril 12, 1997, F B I S-W E U-97-103, A pril 13, 1997. 130. H amburg, Welt a m Son ntag, in German, June 8, 1997, F B I SW E U- 97-159, June 8, 1997. 131. F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfu rter A l lgemeine, in German, June 9, 1997, F B I S-W E U-97-160, June 9, 1997. 132. F r an kfur t am M ain, F r a n kfu rter A l lgemei ne, in German, M arch 13, 1997, F B I S-W E U- 97-072, M arch 13, 1997. 133. M adrid, A B C , in Spanish, M ay 4, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-087, M ay 4, 1997. 134. D uygu B azoglu Sezer, Russia and the South: Central Asia and the Southern C aucasus, E uropea n Security, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 317-320. 135. W hitney, p. A12; Goble, Squaring the C ircle; B arber; F B I SW E U , December 12, 1995, p. 9; Wood, pp. E SR 8-9; F ran kfurt am M ain, F r a nkfu rter A l lgemeine, in German, November 26, 1996, F B I S-W E U96-229, November 27, 1996; Paris, Le Monde, in F rench, A ugust 12, 996, F B I S-W E U-96-158, A ugust 14, 1996, pp. 12-13.

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136. Reneo L u k ic and A llen L ynch, E u rope F rom the B a l k a ns to the U r a ls: T he D isintegr ation of Y ugosl avi a a nd the Soviet U nion, O xford: O xford U niversity Press, and SI PR I, 1996, p. 267. 137. B russels, R apid D atabase (I nternet Version), in E nglish, June 5, 1997, F B I S-W E U-97-109, June 5, 1997; W hitney; B arber; and for t el l i ng ex a m p les a n d a n a l ysis of t h e d isu n i t y a n d i r r esol u t ion concer ning the W E U and C F SP see the W E U repor t, O rga n isi ng Secur ity in E urope-Pol itica l Aspects, Document 1509, January 26, 1996. 138. M ich a e l S t u e r m e r , N A T O - O eff n u n g: T r a nsa t l a n t ischer K l aer u ngsbed a rf, Stift u ng W issensch aft u nd Politi k, E ben h a usen, SW P-K A A 2933, November 1995, pp. 11-12. 139. F B I S-W E U , January 22, 1997; Goble, June 19, 1997. 140. F raser C ameron, T he B ureaucratic Politics of C F SP in the E uropean U nion: T he Roles of Germany, F rance, and B ritain, F raser C ameron, Roy G insberg, Josef Janning, T he E u ropea n U n ion 's Common F oreign a nd Secur ity Policy: Centr a l Issues . . . Key Pl ayers, C arlisle B arracks, P A, Strategic Studies I nstitute, U .S. A rmy W ar College, 1996, p. 22. 141. V an Staden and De Nooy, pp. 22-23. 142. Stock holm, Svensk a D agbl a det, in Swedish, December 14, 1996, F B I S-W E U -96-243, D ecember 18, 1996; Stock holm, D agens N yheter , in Swedish, A ugust 1, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-162, A ugust 21, 1996. 143. Riga, R a d io R iga Networ k, in L atvian, A ugust 5, 1996, F B I SS O V-96-154, A ugust 8, 1996, p. 55. 144. Stock holm, D agens N yheter, in Swedish, M ay 2, 1996, F B I SW E U-96-087, M ay 3, 1996, pp. 25-27. 145. Stock holm, D agens N yheter, in Swedish, July 27, 1996, F B I SW E U-96-148, July 31, 1996, p. 20. 146. Ibi d . 147. Stock holm, D agens N yheter, in Swedish, A ugust 7, 1996, F B I SW E U-96-157, A ugust 13, 1996, p. 14; Stock holm, Svensk a D agbl a det, in Swedish, A ugust 8, 1996, F B I S-W E U- 96-147, A ugust 13, 1996, pp. 1415. 148. Ibi d .

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149. Stock holm, Svensk a D agbl a det, in Swedish, A ugust 28, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-170, September 5, 1996. 150. Ibi d . 151. Ibi d . 152. Ibi d . 153. Ibi d . 154. Ibi d . 155. Ibi d . 156. Stephen A. C ambone, T he Strategic I mplications of N A T O E n l a rgemen t, Stephen J. B l a n k , ed., F rom M a d r i d to B r ussels: Perspectives on N A T O E nl a rgement, C arlisle B ar racks, P A: Strategic Studies I nstitute, U .S. A rmy W ar College, 1997, pp. 4-8; Strobe T albott, Russia H as Nothing to F ear, New Yor k T i mes, F ebruary 18, 1997, p. A21. 157. K issinger; R.W. A pple Jr., Road to A pproval Is Rock y, A nd the G amble Is Perilous, New York T imes, M ay 15, 1997, p. 1. 158. C ambone, pp. 4-8; F B I S-W E U, June 8, 1997. 159. H ow T o D ea l W i t h A rgu men ts A g a i nst N A T O a n d I ts E n l a rgement, M imeo, U .S. Department of State, presented to the I I I A nnual Convention of the Association for the Study of N ationalities, Columbia U niversity, N ew Yor k: N Y, A pril 25, 1997, p. 3. 160. A pple, p. 1. 161. Moscow, Itogi , in Russian, M ay 27, 1997, F B I S-S O V-97-109, M a y 27, 1997; P a v e l I v a nov , M oscow a t C r uci a l D i p lom a t ic C rossroads, Asi a T i mes, A ugust 16, 1997, E-mail transmission from Johnson's Russia L ist, D johnson@cdi.org; A leksei Push kov, RussiaN A T O: A dvice B ut No Love Yet, Rossiysk aya G azeta, A ugust 13, 1997, Joh nson's R ussi a L ist , E - M a i l t r a nsm ission , D joh nson@cd i.org; Moscow, R I A Novosti, M ay 17, 1997, T ranslated for Johnson's Russia L ist, D johnson@cdi.org, M ay 17, 1997; Jim Hoagland, T he G atsby Syndrome, Washington Post Weekly E dition, July 14, 1997, p. 5. 162. Peters, pp. 3-4; O pen Medi a Resea rch I nstitute, D a i ly D igest, September 3, 1996; B ritish A merican Security Council and Centre for E u ropea n Secu rity a nd D isa r mamen t, N A T O E xpa nsion: T i me to Reconsider, A Speci a l Report, November 25, 1996, pp. 8-9.

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163. Ibi d . 164. R a dio F ree E urope / R a dio L iberty Newsline, July 8, 1997. 165. W illiam Perry, E nlarging the E uropean Security C ircle, Wash i ngton T imes, December 10, 1996, Special Policy B riefing No. 1; and, for a listing of the original PfP functions, see M aurice B lin, Rapporteur, P a rtnership for Peace: A Prelimin a ry Assessment, N A T O I nternational Secretariat, 1994 A L 222 P C/ E E (94), p. 5. 166. F i n a l Commu n ique, Issued at the M i n ister i a l Meeti ng of the North Atl a ntic Counci l, N A T O H Q, B russels, December 10, 1996 N A T O , I nter net, pp. 5-6. 167. Jamie Shea, Should N A T O Be E nlarged to the E ast?, M arco C arnovale, ed., E u ropea n Secu r ity a nd I nter n ation a l I nstitutions After the Cold Wa r, N ew Yor k: St. M artin's Press, 1995, p. 84. If N A T O had followed the German tendency to free riding, this outcome could easily h ave ensued. 168. F B I S-W E U , September 5, 1996. 169. F i n a l Commun ique, December 10, 1996, pp. 5-6. 170. Ibi d . 171. Philip H . Gordon, Does the W E U H ave a Role? Wash i ngton Q u a rter ly, Vol. X X, No. 1, W inter, 1997, pp. 125-140. 172. Stephen J. B lan k, Russia and E urope in the C aucasus, E u ropea n Secu r ity, Vol. I V, No. 4, F all, 1995, pp. 622-645. 173. B arrington, pp. 752-55. 174. Prima kov; C hernomyrdin. 175. T allinn, B N S , in E nglish, July 16, 1997; F B I S-S O V -97-197, July 16, 1997; F B I S-S O V , June 11 and June 12, 1997. 176. Ibi d .; F B I S-S O V , June 19, 1997. 177. V an Staden and De Nooy, pp. 20-21. 178. Downs; B lan k, H elsi nk i i n Asi a, pp. 16-19. 179. K arsten Voight, Senator W illiam Roth, and Representative C harlie Rose, T he E nl a rgement of the A l l i a nce: D r aft Speci a l Report of the Wor k i ng G roup on N A T O E n l a rgement, N A T O I n ter n a t ion a l Secretariat, 1994, Paragraph 16.

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180. M ichael B renner, M ultilateralism and E uropean Security, Su rviva l , Vol. X X X V, No. 3, Summer, 1993, p. 141. 181. N A T O E n l a rgement Study, B russels, September 28, 1995, N A T O I nternet. 182. F B I S-W E U , September 5, 1996; and see also the remar ks of M ia Doornaert, the D iplomatic E ditor of De Sta nd a rd , (B russels) in C ambone, ed., p. 58. 183. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe T albott, T he U .S., T he E U , and O ur Common C hallenges, Rem a rks to the U .S.- E U Conference, W ashington, D C, M ay 6, 1997, U .S. Department of State I nternet. 184. L ionel B arber, N A T O Holds T al ks with E U on Push for N ew Members, F i n a nci a l T imes, November 15, 1996, p. 24; Paris, Le Monde, in F rench, A ugust 12, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-158, A ugust 14, 1996, pp. 12-13; Stock holm, Svensk a D agbl a det , in Swedish, A ugust 23, 1996, F B I S-W E U-96-169, September 4, 1996. 185. F B I S-W E U , September 5, 1996. 186. Rom a n Szpor l u k , I n t rod uct ion: S t a tehood a n d N a t ionB uilding in Post-Soviet Space, Roman Szporlu k ed., N ation a l I dentity a n d E t h n ici ty i n R ussi a a n d t he N ew S t a tes of E u r a si a, T h e I nternational Politics of E urasia, Series E ditors, B ruce Parrott and K aren D awisha, Volume 2, A rmon k, N Y: M. E . Sharpe & Co., I nc., 1994, p. 12. 187. A rbatov, pp. 43-60; Moscow, Nezavisim aya G azeta, in Russian, M arch 14, 1995, F B I S-S O V- 95-053, M arch 20, 1995, pp. 5-7.

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U.S. A R MY WA R C O L L E G E Major General Rober t H. Scales, J r. Comman dant ***** ST R A T E G I C ST U D I ES I NST I T U T E D i rector Colonel R icha r d H. Witherspoon D i rector of Resea rch D r. E a r l H. T ilfor d, J r. A uthor D r. Step hen J. B lan k D i rector of P ublications and P roduction Ms. Ma r ian ne P. Cowli ng P ublications Assistant Ms. R ita A. R ummel ***** Composition M rs. Ma r y Jane Semple Cover A r tist M r. James E. K istler